How Iraq’s Religious Parties Attempted To Seize Power In The Post-Invasion Vacuum

In April 2003, the government of Saddam Hussein fell. With it went the bureaucracy and the security forces. Into this vacuum stepped local Shiite clerics and exile political parties, all attempting to take advantage of the chaos to seize power. The Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council (SIIC) in coordination with Iran moved in thousands of its militiamen. Moqtada al-Sadr’s followers tried to take over in major cities, and killed one of his main rivals. The SIIC and Sadrists were not only able to take control of some areas of the country during this period, but set the stage for them to become the new leaders of Iraq.

Badr Brigade fighters in Iran (SIIC)

The Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council (SIIC) was one of the largest and most well organized parties to step into the void created by the overthrow of Saddam. As early as November 2001, the SIIC’s militia, the Badr Brigade met with friendly tribes, to begin planning for post-Saddam Iraq. Badr told the sheikhs to take over government offices after the impending U.S. invasion. This was coordinated with the Iranians, which the SIIC had close ties to. The Supreme Council’s founders Ayatollah Mohammed Baqir al-Hakim and Sayid Abdul Aziz al-Hakim, who came from one of Iraq’s leading religious families, fled to Iran during the Iran-Iraq War where they created the party. They pledged allegiance to Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, and the Iranian Revolutionary Guard created the Badr Brigade to help in its war with Baghdad. The Supreme Council would later forge ties with the Americans, participating in various opposition meetings before the March 2003 invasion. The U.S. ended up picking the SIIC as being the main Shiite party it would work with, despite its ties to Iran. This was partly due to its connections with other leading opposition parties like the Kurds and the Iraqi National Congress, all of which the SIIC had worked with for years. In the new Iraq, the Hakims were hoping to play upon their name, opposition to Saddam, support from Tehran, and organization to take advantage of the U.S. invasion. This gave it an early lead to become one of the new powers in the country.

Immediately after the March 2003 invasion, the SIIC sent in thousands of its Badr Brigade fighters into Iraq. They positioned some in Kurdistan before the attack, while others moved in from Iran. The United States was aware of these moves, and warned Badr that it would be attacked if it were encountered during the invasion. In April 2003, the U.S. deployed peshmerga and Special Forces into Diyala province to try to block Badr from entering from Iran there. Neither of these actions deterred the Supreme Council however. The Badr Brigade was able to seize key cities in Diyala, and ended up fighting Baathists, Sunni tribes, and the Iranian-opposition party Mujahedeen e-Khalq in the province. This forced the United States to try to disarm the Badr, which only partially worked. The SIIC also moved to seize power in southern Iraqi cities like Basra, Najaf, and Karbala. In Kut, the capital of Wasit for example, SIIC cleric Sayid Abbas Fadhil claimed control of the city, and took over the city hall before U.S. forces arrived. The Badr Brigade also began assassinating Baathists. While being nominally aligned with the United States, the Supreme Council proved to have its own agenda. The SIIC had been waiting for twenty years for the fall of Saddam, and were not going to pass up the opportunity to assert itself across Iraq. They moved into Shiite areas of northern and southern Iraq, went after their opponents like former regime members, and set themselves up as the new government in parts of the country.

Ayatollah Haeri appointed Sadr his representative in Iraq, and called on Shiites to seize power after the fall of Saddam (New York Times)

Moqtada al-Sadr was also active during this period. First, Ayatollah Kadhem al-Hussein al-Haeri, a leading cleric based in Qom, Iran, appointed Sadr his representative in Iraq on April 7, 2003. The next day, al-Haeri issued a Fatwa calling on Shiites to seize power, and to oppose the United States. At the same time, Sadrists began asserting their control over Sadr City in Baghdad and southern Iraq, setting up offices, banning alcohol, and making women wear veils. On April 10, Sadr’s followers assassinated one of Moqtada’s main rivals, Sayid Abdul Majid al-Khoei in the Imam Ali shrine in Najaf, and surrounded the house of Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, the most senior cleric in Iraq, threatening him as well. Like the Supreme Council, the Sadrists tried to take over local administration in several of the country’s cities. Sadr’s followers also began working at the grass roots level with their offices that distributed social services to build up its support. Sadr went on to directly challenge his rivals by assassinating Sayid Khoei and threatening Ayatollah Sistani. Those events set the trend for the Sadrists as they would become the main movement of the Shiite poor, as well as one of the more violent militias.

Both the Hakims and Sadr were able to translate their early moves after the U.S. invasion into political power in post-Saddam Iraq. In 2003, Sayid Abdul Aziz Hakim became a member of the Iraqi Governing Council put together by the Coalition Provisional Authority. The Sadrists led two revolts in 2004, and became the major Shiite opposition group to the Americans. In 2005, the two parties decided to work together in the United Iraqi Alliance, which ended up winning the most seats in parliament in the two elections held that year. They then took over local administrations, provincial councils, governorships, and police forces in southern Iraq as a result. They then turned on Sunnis in response to the constant sectarian attacks by groups like Al Qaeda in Iraq, as well as fighting each other for dominance of southern Iraq. The United States was caught flatfooted to deal with any of this. They did not expect the government to totally collapse in the wake of the invasion, and did nothing during the chaotic weeks that followed when the war was officially over. That space allowed groups like the Supreme Council and Sadrists to rise to prominence. The SIIC turned out to be the party, the United States decided to work with, because it was willing to cooperate with them, while the Sadrists were considered a threat, because they constantly called for the Americans to leave the country, and were willing to use force to achieve that. Today, both parties remain members of the government, which is in part, the result of their aggressive moves to seize power in the wake of the U.S. invasion.

SOURCES

Abedin, Mahan, “The Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI),” Middle East Intelligence Bulletin, October 2003

Ashour, Mohammed, “sistani’s rule,” Niqash, 5/27/10

Byman, Daniel, “An Autopsy of the Iraq Debacle: Policy Failure or Bridge Too Far?” Security Studies, October 2008

Chivers, C.J., “A Nation At War: Northern Front; Attention Now Shifts to the Role of the Kurds,” New York Times, 4/10/03

Cochrane, Marisa, “The Fragmentation of the Sadrist Movement,” Institute for the Study of War, January 2009

Collier, Robert, “Iraq’s Shiites show strength on once-banned pilgrimage,” San Francisco Chronicle, 4/23/03

Elkhamri, Mounir, “Iran’s Contribution to the Civil War in Iraq,” Jamestown Foundation, January 2007

Felter, Joseph and Fishman, Brian, “Iranian Strategy in Iraq, Politics and ‘Other Means,’” Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, 10/13/08

International Crisis Group, “Shiite Politics In Iraq: The Role Of The Supreme Council,” 11/15/07

Landay, Jonathan and Strobel, Warren, “No real planning for postwar Iraq,” Knight Ridder Newspapers, 9/11/03

Lochhead, Carolyn, “Shiite clerics challenge U.S. goal in Iraq,” San Francisco Chronicle, 4/24/03

PBS Frontline, “Interview Jon Lee Anderson,” Beyond Baghdad, 2/12/04

Phillips, James, “Deter Iranian and Syrian Meddling In Postwar Iraq,” Heritage Foundation, 4/4/03

Raghavan, Sudarsan, “Shiite Clerics’ Rivalry Deepens In Fragile Iraq,” Washington Post, 12/21/06

Smith, Craig, “Iraqi in Iran urges Shiites to take power,” San Francisco Chronicle, 4/26/03

Strauss, Valerie, “Pentagon: Ex-Iraqi Leader Aziz Is in Custody,” Washington Post, 4/24/03

Ware, Michael, “Inside Iran’s Secret War For Iraq,” Time, 8/22/05

Wilkinson, Tracy, “U.S. overseer tours Baghdad,” San Francisco Chronicle, 4/22/03

Support For Maliki Allows Sadr To Escape Prosecution For 2003 Murder Of Cleric Abdul Majid Al-Khoei

On October 24, 2011, Iraq’s Supreme Judicial Council announced that the murder case against Muqtada al-Sadr for the death of Sayid Abdul Majid al-Khoei in 2003 had been dropped. The court said that there was no incriminating evidence against Sadr, while a spokesman for the Council claimed that there was never even an investigation. He went on to say that there was an arrest warrant for Sadr, but that the British issued it. All of this was an amazing story, since an Iraqi judge did in fact hand out a warrant for Sadr and several of his lieutenants in 2003, and an attempt to enforce them by the Americans led to the first Sadr uprising in April 2004.

Sayyid Khoei (AFP)

Sayid Abdul Majid al-Khoei was a leading Iraqi cleric who went into exile after the Persian Gulf War. In 1991, after the conflict ended, Shiites in southern Iraq rose up against Saddam Hussein. Khoei was actively involved in the rebellion, transporting weapons and fighters between Najaf and Karbala, taking part in attacks, and even met with Coalition forces to ask if they would help. They declined, even though Washington had encouraged Iraqis to overthrow their government. The revolt only lasted a few days, and was eventually put down by the use of widespread repression by Baghdad. Al-Khoei’s father, Grand Ayatollah Sayid Abu al-Wasim al-Khoei was the head of Iraq’s Shiite religious establishment at the time, and was put under house arrest for helping the rebels. Afterward, several hundred thousand people became internal and external exiles, trying to flee the government forces. Sayid Khoei ended up escaping to London in 1992, where he lived in exile for the next eleven years. Khoei came from a prominent family, and he and his father’s involvement in the 1991 uprising made him one of the main Iraqi exile figures before the 2003 invasion.

In London, Khoei tried to remain involved with his community and Iraqi politics. He headed the Khoei Foundation, a Shiite charity, and fostered good relations with the United States State Department and the British Foreign Office. In December 2002, he attended a conference of Iraqi opposition parties in London to prepare for the coming U.S. invasion. The meeting went nowhere as the different factions were deeply divided. He also went to Washington D.C. to meet with CIA and Pentagon officials to discuss the impending war. Afterward, he began recruiting people who could go to Iraq after the fall of the regime to help stabilize the south. Due to his time in the West, and his moderate views, Khoei became a favorite of the two powers leading the drive to war with Iraq, England and the United States. They were hoping to draw upon his standing, and family name to help stabilize Iraq after the fall of the regime.

When the invasion of Iraq finally began in March 2003, Khoei went back to Iraq, and immediately ran into his family’s main protagonists, the Sadrists. On March 28, Khoei was flown from England to a U.S. military base in Bahrain. Then on April 3, he was taken to Nasiriyah, and eventually Najaf, his former home. He convinced the American forces to withdraw from the historical section of the city, and began lobbying Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, who had succeeded Khoei’s father as the chief Shiite cleric in the country, to issue a fatwa to allow U.S. forces in the rest of Najaf. One of his aides suggested that he meet with Muqtada al-Sadr who was taking advantage of the fall of the regime to gain greater authority with Shiites. The Khoeis and Sadrs had become rivals in the 1990s. In 1998 for example, Moqtada’s father Mohammed Sadiq al-Sadr condemned Khoei for fleeing Iraq, and said that he should not be part of the religious establishment. For that reason, Khoei turned down the suggestion. Sadr was aware of Khoei’s arrival, and had him followed. Upon his return, Khoei was hoping to re-establish himself with the country’s religious community, and his family’s followers. At the same time, he re-started his rivalry with Sadr. The Sadrists were preaching Iraqi nationalism and opposition to the Coalition's presence in the country. Khoei's arrival with the aid of the U.S. marked him as a collaborator in the eyes of Moqtada, which would eventually cost Khoei his life.

The Imam Ali Shrine in Najaf where Khoei was murdered by Sadr's followers (Wikipedia)

On April 10, 2003 Khoei went to the Imam Ali shrine in Najaf to meet with its custodian, and hold a press conference there. This was a controversial move because the custodian was seen as being a collaborator with Saddam. Khoei, the custodian, and a small entourage arrived at the shrine in the early morning. A crowd of Sadr supporters gathered outside, and began chanting pro-Sadr slogans. Khoei tried to clam the crowd. Journalist Patrick Cockburn claims that someone lunged at Khoei with a knife, while his son, Haider al-Khoei wrote that the Sadrists began throwing rocks. In response, Khoei fired a shot in the air, which dispersed the crowd temporarily. The problem was, they came back with guns and started shooting at Khoei’s people. The shooting lasted 90 minutes, and Khoei and his party eventually gave up. Riyad Nouri, Sadr’s brother-in-law then ordered that Khoei be taken to Sadr’s residence in the city. As they walked out of the shrine, Mahdi Army militiamen stabbed Khoei and the custodian, killing the latter. Bleeding, Khoei was dumped on the street in front of Muqtada’s house, but Sadr ordered Khoei to be taken away. He and some of his followers tried to hide out in a surrounding shop, but he was eventually found, and shot. A few of Khoei’s entourage were able to escape and went to an American military base in the city, pleading for help. They refused to do so, and ordered the party to leave the country. Khoei’s people then went to Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, but he was just as unhelpful. Muqtada immediately claimed he had nothing to do with the murder, and said that he actually sent his followers to try to protect Khoei. The Sadr and Khoei families had competed with each other over standing and position within the Shiite religious community for several decades. With the country in flux after the fall of Saddam, Sadr seemed to feel that he could take this rivalry to the next level by having his opponent assassinated in the street, foreshadowing how his Mahdi Army would operate during the coming civil war.

Khoei’s brutal death could not be ignored, and the U.S. and Iraqi authorities were forced to act. In June 2003, Khoei’s murder was investigated, and in August 2003, Judge Raed Juhi issued an arrest warrant for Sadr, and two dozen of his followers. That included Mustafa al-Yacoubi and RiyadNouri, two senior leaders, who had helped keep the Sadr movement alive after Sadr’s father was killed by Saddam in 1999. The Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) was scared to carry out the order however. The CPA did not know how to deal with Sadr. Even though they did not consider him a powerful leader yet, they were afraid that if he was arrested, Sadr would become a nationalist leader, and turn Shiites against the Coalition. If they killed him, he could become a martyr. Those questions, led the U.S. to sit on the warrant.

The American indecision on the matter lasted for several months, but when they finally did act, it led to the first Sadrist uprising. In September 2003, for example, there were plans to move on Sadr, but then they were canceled. Finally, on March 28, 2004, the CPA shut down Sadr’s newspaper al-Hawza for inciting violence. Then on April 3, General Ricardo Sanchez, the commander of Coalition forces in Iraq told CPA head Paul Bremer that he was going after Mustafa Yacoubi for the Khoei murder. When the U.S. arrested Yacoubi, Sadr’s followers quickly rallied to his aid, and began fighting the Americans. This led to the first uprising by Sadr’s militia, the Mahdi Army. Fighting took place in the cities of Najaf, Baghdad, Nasiriyah, Amarah, Kufa, (1) and Kut. Many of the Iraqi and Coalition forces folded in the face of this onslaught. Iraqi police in Baghdad’s Sadr City abandoned their posts, the Mahdi Army took over police stations in Kufa, Ukrainian and Italian troops were forced to withdraw from Kut and Nasiriyah, the Spanish and Salvadorans in Najaf, and the Bulgarians in Karbala were almost overrun. By May, Shiite leaders had brokered a cease-fire, and the fighting eventually ended. Sadr used the uprising to gain more power. He attempted to rally popular support against the Americans, which has become a mainstay of his message and appeal. With little religious training, Sadr also attempted to use his standing with the street to force his way up the Shiite hierarchy, and challenge the established clerics.

Sadr has used his political connections to escape arrest for the Khoei murder

Many of the Sadrists with warrants against them were eventually detained, but then they were released, and the case against all of them was compromised for political expediency. Riyad Nouri was arrested on May 23, 2004, but had the charges against him dropped on August 14, 2005. Yacoubi was set free that same day. When the December 2005 elections came around, Ibrahim al-Jaafari of the Dawa party promised to release the remaining Sadrist lieutenants, and have the murder case dropped against them and Muqtada, if his movement would support Jaafari’s bid to be prime minister. After Jaafari was confirmed in office, the Sadrists were released, and the testimony against Muqtada was changed so that he was no longer implicated in Khoei’s death. Sadr himself ended up leaving Iraq in 2007 for Qom, Iran, to escape the United States’ Surge, and to attend religious training. When he decided to publicly return to Iraq in January 2011, he was afraid that the government would revive the warrant against him. He didn’t have to worry however, because once again in a political deal, Sadr’s murder charge was dropped in return for supporting Nouri al-Maliki’s second term as premier. Despite all the missteps that Sadr has made, and all the crackdowns by the United States and Iraqi governments, he has proven to be a survivor. Each time a new Iraqi government has been formed, he has played a pivotal role. That in turn, has repeatedly allowed him to escape prosecution, and have his followers released from prison.

The recent announcement by the Iraqi Supreme Judicial Council that there is no longer a case against Muqtada al-Sadr is just the latest example of the political favors he has been able to draw upon. Today, Sadr sits as one of the main supporters of Prime Minister Maliki. As a result, his politicians have gained important positions in the new government, the Sadrists regained control of Maysan province, and many of his militiamen were released from jail. Sadr has also been able to come and go from Iraq as he pleases, with assurances that the arrest warrant against him will not be enforced. Despite the trappings of democracy, such as elections, a parliament, etc., the country does not have the rule of law. Maliki and other premiers have been able to bend the courts to their will. Even the murder of a prominent cleric like Sayid Abdul Majid al-Khoei can be suddenly overlooked, and the case made to disappear. As long as Maliki needs Sadr’s backing he can be assured that the assassination of Khoei will not be an issue.

FOOTNOTES

1. San Francisco Chronicle, “30 killed in Iraq clashes after arrest of cleric’s aide,” 4/5/04

SOURCES

Ahmed, Hamid, “Gunmen Kill Sadrist Official in Iraq,” Associated Press, 4/11/08

Anderson, Jon Lee, “The Uprising,” New Yorker, 5/3/04

Cochrane, Marisa, “The Fragmentation of the Sadrist Movement,” Institute for the Study of War, January 2009

Cockburn, Patrick, Muqtada, Muqtada Al-Sadr, The Shia Revival, and the Struggle for Iraq, New York, London, Toronto, Sydney: Scribner, 2008

Collier, Robert, “Iraq’s Shiites show strength on once-banned pilgrimage,” San Francisco Chronicle, 4/23/03

-“U.S. risks turning Shiite cleric into contender,” San Francisco Chronicle, 4/12/04

Hauslohner, Abigail, “Iraq Assassination Reignites Tensions,” Time, 4/11/08

Hendawi, Hamza and Abdul-Zahra, Qassim, “Al-Sadr shift: away from politics and favoring fight,” Associated Press, 4/24/08

Haider al-Khoei, “The Untold Story: Khoei Murder,” 7/10/07

Knights, Michael, “Iran in Iraq: the Role of al-Sadr,” Real Clear World,” 2/9/11

McGeary, Johanna, “New Thugs On The Block,” Time, 4/19/04

Packer, George, The Assassins’ Gate, America In Iraq, New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2005

Parker, Ned, “Dozens of Iraqis pardoned at Sadr movement’s behest,” Los Angeles Times, 7/27/11

Risen, James, State of War; The Secret History of the CIA and the Bush Administration, New York, London, Toronto, Sydney: Free Press, 2006

San Francisco Chronicle, “30 killed in Iraq clashes after arrest of cleric’s aide,” 4/5/04

Sarhan, Saad and Davis, Aaron, “Cleric Moqtada al-Sadr returns to Iraq after self-imposed exile,” Washington Post, 1/6/11

Shadid, Anthony, “Sadr’s Disciples Rise Again To Play Pivotal Role in Iraq,” Washington Post, 8/30/05

Shadid, Anthony and Leland, John, “Anti-U.S. Cleric Returns to Iraq, and to Power,” New York Times, 1/5/11

Al-Sharq Al-Awsat, “Al-Sadr fled to Iran due to assassination fears,” 1/26/11

Al-Tayyeb, Mouhammed, “Sadr no longer suspected of killing Abdul Majid al-Khoei,” AK News, 10/24/11

VIDEO: Sayyid Abdul Majid Al-Khoei From Najaf

Interview with Ayatollah Abdul Majid al-Khoei on Al-Arabiya accompanied by images of his return to Najaf in 2003 before his death.

VIDEO: Sayyid Abdul Majid Al-Khoei

The 1991 Shiite Uprising In Southern Iraq

In 1991, immediately after the Gulf War ended, an uprising started in southern Iraq. It began in Basra, and quickly spread to the major cities of the south. It only lasted for a few days before Saddam Hussein was able to regain control. In its wake, thousands were killed and more were left as refugees. The revolt was the biggest threat to Saddam’s power since he took office, and would leave deep scars in the south.

On March 1, 1991, Iraqi soldiers returning from the just ended Gulf War rose up in Basra. The city had been bombed during the war, sanctions had led to inflation and shortages in the country, and the government looked very vulnerable after its defeat. In February, a message from President George Bush calling for the people of Iraq to rise up and overthrow Saddam was broadcast on Voice of America radio. Even before that, the CIA had set up a radio station in Saudi Arabia, calling on the people to get rid of Saddam. That was the setting for the 1991 revolt. 

Iraqi troops began straggling back to the city in early February, disheveled and demoralized. Some commandeered tanks and armored vehicles, and attacked government offices. Locals joined in, and a wave of looting broke out. They then set about killing Baath Party members and secret police officers. The uprising soon spread to Najaf and Kufa on March 3, Karbala on March 5, and then Diwaniya, Hillah, Amarah, Nasiriyah, and Kut, along with smaller cities such as Samawa, Zubayr, Kumait, and Qalat Saleh. 

(Global Security)

 This was the first major revolt by Iraq’s Shiites since Saddam Hussein had taken power in 1979. Before, the government had carried out a divide and conquer strategy with them, supporting different clerics for example, to keep the community split. During the Iran-Iraq War, Baghdad had stressed Arab nationalism, and Iraq’s differences with Iran to keep the public loyal. It also suppressed the Dawa Party, the main Shiite opposition group, which had been driven underground, and was mostly living in exile. Over 60% of the population was Shiite, and the thought of them rising up threatened the entire regime. It brought up fears of Iranian interference as well.

The Shiites rose up in different manners in each city. Unlike the rest of the south, the revolt in Najaf seemed organized. It started with a march by civilians and deserting soldiers down some of the main streets. The demonstration grew in size, and fighting with government forces eventually broke out. Soon afterward the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council’s (SIIC) Badr Brigade militia infiltrated into Iraq from Iran, and crossed the country to Najaf. They came with banners and pictures of its leader Ayatollah Mohammed Baqir al-Hakim and Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, which the SIIC had pledged allegiance to. The party called for an Iranian style, Shiite religious government. U.S. intelligence believed that 3,000-5,000 Badr militiamen eventually entered Iraq during the revolt. The Supreme Council chose to do so because Najaf was one of the centers of Shiite Islam, containing some of its holiest shrines. If the party was able to seize Najaf, it could use the city’s spiritual symbolism to help with its standing with the rest of the people to claim leadership of the uprising.

The SIIC was led by the Hakim family, and had its roots in the Dawa Party that was formed in the 1950s. Ayatollah Mohammed Baqir al-Hakim later broke with Dawa, and he and Ayatollah Mohsen al-Hakim ended up fleeing to Iran during the Iran-Iraq War. There, Tehran was organizing Shiites, and in return for its support the Hakims formed the Supreme Council. The Iranian Revolutionary Guards created the Badr Brigade in 1983 as the Supreme Council’s armed wing. It fought on the Iranian side in the war, and took part in interrogations of captured Iraqi soldiers during the war. There were stories that it used torture during this process. It also tried to recruit prisoners of war into the organization, some of them being forced. All of these tactics made the SIIC very unpopular back in Iraq.

In Karbala, Nasiriyah, Diwaniya, and Hillah, the revolt played out much differently. In Karbala, young rebels and deserting soldiers stormed government offices. In the process, they captured Baathists, government officials, soldiers, and police, many of which were executed. The security forces immediately launched a counteroffensive, while Badr militiamen also joined the uprising, as Karbala was also a holy Shiite city. In Nasiriyah, the rebellion started in the marshes with soldiers returning from the Gulf War and local tribes. They took over the Baath party and security forces headquarters, and then moved on an army unit, taking over the area. In Diwaniya, young men took up weapons and were able to commandeer some tanks from a military base just outside of the city. They took the provincial capital building, along with Baath and security forces offices. There too, some tribes joined in what became heavy fighting. Finally, in Hillah, young men took over the local offices and an infantry training center. They could not overwhelm a military intelligence building, or a military base just outside of the city, which continued to fight against the uprising. Diwaniya, even sent a force to try to capture the entire city on March 15, but failed. In all the cities, it was the youth that took up arms, whether they were civilians or military men. Also, while some tribes joined in, the majority did not, and the rebellion did not spread to the rural areas.

The uprising got a huge boost when Grand Ayatollah Sayid Abu al-Qasim al-Khoei, Iraq’s Shiite religious leader, gave it his support. At first, Ayatollah Khoei did not seem to support the rebellion. Rebels however urged him to take the lead, which resulted in him issuing two fatwas. The first called on the people to protect Islam and guard its holy sites. The second said that a Supreme Committee should be created to rule. The backing of the Ayatollah gave the young rebels a huge boost in legitimacy, and made it seem like the religious establishment was behind them. Despite these two statements however, the revolt stayed limited in appeal.

During this time, Saddam did not sit idly by. The government was organizing its forces, specifically the Republican Guard whose main task was to protect the regime. In Basra, the fight was already on as 6,000 Guards were holed up in the city. They went on the offensive on March 4. The tactics used there were repeated throughout the south. The Guard, for example, used human shields, making women and children walk in front of them, and tying people to their armored vehicles. They fired indiscriminately into residential areas with first artillery, and then tanks. Units then went district-by-district arresting any young men they found. Some were killed in mass executions held at public squares, while others were carted off to Baghdad. Local clergy were rounded up and arrested or killed as well. By March 17, Basra had been retaken, and by March 19, Karbala too. In Najaf, rebels had used the Tomb of Imam Ali, one of the holiest sites to Shiites, as their headquarters. The tomb was shelled by Iraqi forces, and heavily damaged, while almost all of those captured inside were killed. The government then arrested the cities leading clergy, including Ayatollah Khoei, who was taken to Baghdad. There, on March 21, he was forced to appear on state television next to Saddam, calling for an end to the fighting, while pledging allegiance to the dictator. Afterward, Khoei was returned to Najaf, and placed under house arrest. In the process, the Badr Brigade fled back into Iran. By March 29, it was all over. The rebels had been able to seize most of the major cities in the south, and put a huge scare into the regime, which was also facing Kurdish peshmerga in the north. In the end however, Saddam was able to hold onto power with his superior military force.

The Shiite uprising failed for several reasons. Phebe Marr in The Modern History of Iraq, believed the revolt scared many people such as the upper and middle classes, and most tribes because of its looting and executions. It seemed like the uprising was only leading to anarchy, which led many to not join in. The military did not rise up either, although individual soldiers did. Together, that meant the rebellion did not have the support and resources to fight off the government. Outside help never came, despite hopes that it would. Rebels believed that the Coalition would assist them, especially after President Bush called for the people to overthrow Saddam, but they never did. The U.S. wanted the army or Baath Party to stage a coup, not for the country to have a popular revolt. (1) The uprising, actually scared Washington and its Arab Allies (2) who were afraid of the country breaking up, and an Iranian backed government coming into power. (3) At the same time, the Americans’ desire for a military takeover and the decision to end the war after 100 hours backfired, leaving the Iraqi forces with far more firepower than at first thought. Saddam for example, still had one-quarter of his tanks, half of his armored personnel carriers, and the U.S. also allowed the Iraqis to use helicopters, all of which were deployed against the rebels. Not only that, but the U.S. allowed Iraqi units to pass through their lines to retreat back to Iraq, and protected arms depots from Shiites. Iran, despite sending in the Badr Brigade, actually never fully committed to the rebellion. All together that meant the spontaneous rebellion never had a chance. It didn’t mobilize the popular support necessary, didn’t have the weapons to fend off the government, and never got any real foreign help that it thought it would receive. It was able to take advantage of the confluence of events following the Gulf War, but as soon as Saddam was able to concentrate his forces it was over for the Shiites.

A mass grave found in southern Iraq after the fall of Saddam (libcom.org)

 For almost a month, the rebels were able to hold most of the major urban centers of the South. By the end of March, the government had regained control. Tens of thousands of people fled to the southern marshes for refuge. Another 100,000 went to Iran, and more left for Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. By 1992, there were still an estimated 250,000 displaced hiding out in the marshes. There was also sporadic fighting into April, as fighters would move back and forth from Iran to Iraq, (4) and executions were being held in Basra up to May. In the aftermath, the government set about destroying Shiite shrines in Karbala and Najaf, cemeteries, and homes of suspected rebels. Eventually, Saddam would drain the marshes as well, turning most of it into a desert to assert central authority. For a few days, with rebellions in both the South and in Kurdistan, it seemed like the government could fall, but that dream quickly died. The revolts made Saddam restructure his government and security forces in an attempt to suppress any uprising that might happen in the future. In the south, cities, families, and the religious establishment were devastated. It would take years for them to recover, hampered not only by Saddam, but the international sanctions that were imposed for his invasion of Kuwait.

FOOTNOTES

1. Broder, Jonathan, “U.S. policy on Iraqi chaos: Cold, hard – and wistful,” San Francisco Examiner, 3/31/91

2. Ibrahim, Youssef, “Iran Organizing Hussein’s Foes, Arab and Foreign Diplomats Say,” New York Times, 3/20/91

3. Gerstenzang, James and Ross, Michael, “Saddam’s Ouster Could Destabilize Mideast Politics,” San Francisco Chronicle, 3/6/91

4. Newsday, “Saddam’s Shiite foes still fighting,” Sacramento Bee, 4/28/91

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Abedin, Mahan, “The Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI),” Middle East Intelligence Bulletin, October 2003

Anderson, Jack, “Iranians aiding Iraqi resistance,” Oakland Tribune, 4/22/91

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BBC, “Flashback: the 1991 Iraqi revolt,” 8/21/07

Broder, Jonathan, “U.S. policy on Iraqi chaos: Cold, hard – and wistful,” San Francisco Examiner, 3/31/91

Clarke, Richard, Against All Enemies, Inside America’s War on Terror, New York, London, Toronto, Sydney: Free Press, 2004

Felter, Joseph and Fishman, Brian, “Iranian Strategy in Iraq, Politics and ‘Other Means,’” Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, 10/13/08

Gerstenzang, James and Ross, Michael, “Saddam’s Ouster Could Destabilize Mideast Politics,” San Francisco Chronicle, 3/6/91

Human Rights Watch, “Endless Torment, The 1991 Uprising in Iraq And Its Aftermath,” June 1992

Ibrahim, Youssef, “Iran Organizing Hussein’s Foes, Arab and Foreign Diplomats Say,” New York Times, 3/20/91

International Crisis Group, “Shiite Politics In Iraq: The Role Of The Supreme Council,” 11/15/07

Johns, Dave, “The Crimes of Saddam Hussein, Supression of the 1991 Uprising,” Frontline World, 1/24/06

Lakes, Gary, “Behind the Battle for Power in Iraq – Who’s Who,” San Francisco Chronicle, 3/7/91

Marr, Phebe, The Modern History of Iraq, Colorado, Oxford: Westview Press, 2004

Nasr, Vali, “When the Shiites Rise,” Foreign Affairs, July/August 2006

Newsday, “Saddam’s Shiite foes still fighting,” Sacramento Bee, 4/28/91

Polk, William, Understanding Iraq, New York, London, Toronto, Sydney: Harper Perennial, 2006

Reuters, “Signs of Revolt Against Saddam In Southern Iraq,” San Francisco Chronicle, 3/2/91

Tripp, Charles, A History Of Iraq, United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press, 2008

Watson, Russell with McDaniel, Ann, Barry, John and Warner, Margaret Garrard and Moreau, Ron, “Unfinished Business?” Newsweek, 4/8/91

Wawro, Geoffrey, “Desert Storm Turns Twenty: What Really Happened in 1991, and Why it Matters, Part II of II,” Huffington Post, 1/22/11