The Moribund Kirkuk Committee

The 2009 Provincial Election Law postponed voting in Tamim province because of the disputed city of Kirkuk. Article 23 created a committee made up of seven parliamentarians, two Kurds, two Turkman, 2 Arabs, and one Christian, who were supposed to come up with a power sharing deal for the province before voting would happen there. They were to complete their work by March 31, 2009, but because of their inability to make any decisions they got a two-month extension. May 31 has come and gone and the committee is no closer to finishing their work, so they have been given another week. This is likely to happen again and again as the Article 23 committee appears more for show than actual work.

According to a United States Institute of Peace delegation that went to Iraq in May 2009, the Article 23 Committee was created as a public relations move by parliament. When it was devising the provincial election law the legislators felt they had to show that they were doing something about Kirkuk, so they created the committee. Since it started its work in February 2009 it has hardly met, has little money, and no one thinks that it will lead to anything. The effect is that elections in Tamim are to be delayed indefinitely.

Tamim is a key province in the divide between Arabs and Kurds. The Kurds have been trying to legally annex Kirkuk since the U.S. invasion. They were able to insert Article 140 into the Iraqi constitution in 2005, which said that there should be a census and referendum on the future of all disputed areas by December 31, 2007. That was extended until June 30, 2008, but both deadlines came and passed with no action. Since then the United Nations has taken over the role of finding a resolution to the area. In April 2009 they presented their suggestions. Kurdish officials have called Kirkuk their Jerusalem, and said that they will not rest until it has been annexed by Kurdistan. Kirkuk is also home to one of Iraq’s three largest oil fields, and perhaps two-thirds of its natural gas reserves. Until new voting is held the Kurds want a majority of the seats on the provincial council to reflect their population. The Arabs and Turkmen on the other hand, want the council divided evenly between them and the Kurds, plus a seat for Christians. This situation is likely to remain deadlocked as well. That would seem to suit the Kurds that have de facto control of the provincial council, but in the long-term Arab politicians seem to think that the central government will win. They believe in time, as the Iraqi security forces grow in strength, they will eventually be able to rest control of all of the disputed territories from the Kurds. A U.S. military officer told the United States Institute of Peace officials that as soon as the Iraqi Army had its full compliment of M1 Abrams tanks, the Kirkuk dispute would be over.

The fear of course is that this could lead to violence. The U.S. commander in Iraq General Ray Odierno says that Arab-Kurdish tensions are one of his top priorities. American think tanks have also expressed concern. So far things have remained political, even as Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki began pushing the Kurds over the disputed territories in 2008. Baghdad taking on the Kurds in Kirkuk however, would be a totally different dynamic. This would seem a prime example of a case needing U.S. mediation before it departs, but the Americans have been deferring to the U.N.. The U.N. in turn, can do little without U.S. support. That means not only are provincial elections not going to happen in Tamim, but a resolution to Kirkuk’s final status is going nowhere as well.

SOURCES

Abbas, Mohammed, “Iraq Kurds say must have say on Kirkuk oil fields,” Reuters, 6/1/09

Agence France Presse, “Iraq delays Kirkuk election report by a week: MP,” 5/31/09

Biddle, Stephen, “Reversal in Iraq,” Center for Preventative Action Council on Foreign Relations, May 2009

Daly, John, “Analysis: Kirkuk elections and Iraqi oil,” UPI, 6/2/09

Haynes, Deborah, “Transcript of The Times interview with General Ray Odierno,” Times of London, 4/9/09

International Crisis Group, “Oil For Soil: Toward A Grand Bargain On Iraq And The Kurds,” 10/28/08

Jakes, Lara, “Key UN report to suggest power-sharing plan in Iraq’s divided Kirkuk,” Associated Press, 3/29/09

Al-Khalidi, Diaa, “kirkuk awaits election law,” Niqash, 3/11/09

Londono, Ernesto, “Kurds, Arabs Maneuver Ahead of U.N. Report on N. Iraq,” Washington Post, 4/17/09

Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, “Iraqi Parliament’s Mission To Kirkuk Ends In Failure,” 5/27/09

Reilly, Corinne, “U.N. experts urge power sharing in Kirkuk,” McClatchy Newspapers, 4/22/09

Serwer, Daniel and Parker, Sam, “Maliki’s Iraq between Two Elections,” United States Institute of Peace, May 2009

Visser, Reidar, “The Kirkuk Issue Exposes Weaknesses in Iraq’s Ruling Coalition,” Historiae.org, 8/7/08

Troubles Continue In Ninewa Over Results Of Provincial Elections

Disputes between the Ninewa Fraternal List led by the two main Kurdish parties, the Kurdistan Democratic Party and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan, and the new ruling party in Ninewa al-Hadbaa continue. On June 1, 2009 IraqSlogger reported that there was a shoot out between the peshmerga in the Sinjar district and tribesman. Many of the tribes in the province supported al-Hadbaa. Five civilians were killed in the fighting before Iraqi security forces arrived and secured the area. On May 28 300 people gathered in the Telafar district demanding that they become independent from the province. The protestors said they had been neglected by the provincial council, and complained about the new al-Hadbaa governor Atheel al-Nujafi. There was a similar protest on May 17 in the Shikhan district. That district, plus Sinjar and Hatra have suspended their cooperation with the al-Hadbaa controlled provincial council. The Kurdistan Regional Government has also ordered the peshmerga to stop any provincial official from entering these areas. As reported before, this led the peshmerga to stop Governor Nujafi from going to a sporting event in a Kurdish controlled town. The provincial police chief was also denied entry to another Kurdish area in May as well.

The problems started in April 2009 when al-Hadbaa, who had won 19 of Ninewa’s 37 council seats, took all of the positions in the local government. In response, the Ninewa Fraternal List walked out and announced that they were boycotting the new provincial government. Governor Nujafi has said that he will allow the Fraternal List positions if they recognize the borders of Ninewa and withdraw the peshmerga. According to IraqSlogger, a leading Kurdish politician responded by stating that the issue of the peshmerga was between Baghdad and Kurdistan, and that the governor should not be involved. Now deadlocked, both al-Hadbaa and the Fraternal List have been going to Baghdad to try to get the central government to force the other side to give in.

Time is probably on the side of al-Hadbaa. The Americans have told the Fraternal List that since al-Hadbaa won a majority in the provincial elections they have the right to form the government they want. Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki is also looking for new Sunni partners to run with in the 2010 parliamentary elections, and might align with al-Hadbaa. The threat is that without mediation violence could ensue between the two competing parties. Ninewa is already one of the most deadliest provinces in Iraq, and this divide plays into the hands of the insurgents as well who portray themselves as the protectors of Arabs against the Kurds. The U.S. held up the 2009 provincial elections and the participation of Sunnis as an important turning point in Iraqi politics. The situation in Ninewa shows that at least in that part of Iraq, it might have just made things worse.

For more on the political divisions in Ninewa click on the "al-Hadbaa" label below.

SOURCES

Associated Press, “Iraqi provincial election results,” 2/19/09

Aswat al-Iraq, “Shaykhan protest calls for boycotting Ninewa’s local govt.,” 5/17/09
- “Talafar’s residents demand its separation from Ninewa,” 5/28/09

Bakri, Nada, “Dispute Over Land Simmering in Iraq,” Washington Post, 5/18/09

Dagher, Sam, “Tensions Stoked Between Iraqi Kurds and Sunnis,” New York Times, 5/18/09

Hamad, Qassim Khidhir, “arab domination rejected by kurds in makhmour,” Niqash, 5/22/09

IraqSlogger.com, “Ninewa Gov Presses Case with B’dad Officials,” 5/13/09

Reilly, Corinne and Abbas, Ali, “Kurdish-Arab tensions continue to grow in northern Iraq,” McClatchy Newspapers, 4/14/09

Smith, Daniel, “Othman to Najafi “Don’t Interfere,”” IraqSlogger.com, 5/30/09
- “Sinjar-Clashes Leave Five Wounded,” IraqSlogger.com, 6/1/09

Iraq Reporting Hits Another New Low In May, 2009

May 2009 saw Iraq take another fall from America’s headlines. The war did not make it into the top ten news stories for any of the four weeks of that month according to the Pew Research Center’s Project for Excellence in Journalism. Not only did Iraq not make the top ten, for two of those four weeks it did not make the top ten in any of the five major media sources in America, newspapers, the internet, network TV, cable TV, or radio.

For the two weeks of May 4 to 10 and May 11 to 17 Iraq was not only absent from the top ten stories in the country, but did not make the top ten in any of the five press outlets. For May 18 to 24 Iraq again did not make the top ten stories, but did reach number 5 in newspapers with 4% of its coverage. That week saw the conviction of Steven Green, a former soldier, for the rape and murder of a 14-year old Iraqi girl, and her parents. From May 25 to 31 the war did a little better. While it did not make the top 10, it was the number 7 and number 8 story in newspapers, and number 10 on network TV. On May 25 three Americans were killed in a bombing in Fallujah, the next day a U.S. soldier died, and another on May 28. In total, 24 U.S. soldiers died in May, the highest number since September 2008.

May’s news coverage was a further drop from April. That month Iraq did make the top ten for one week, but was out for the other four. Not only that, but for the first time since the invasion, the war also did not crack the top ten of any media outlet for one of that months’ five weeks. March 2009 was the first month Iraq did not make the overall top ten stories. America’s press has been decreasing its stories on Iraq since the beginning of 2007. As Washington began turning to other issues like the 2008 presidential campaign, the recession, and Afghanistan-Pakistan, so did the media. Unless American elites begin talking about the war again, Iraq can expect to fade more and more in the news despite the fact that there are still over 100,000 troops in the country.

SOURCES

BBC, “US deaths in Iraq rise sharply in May,” 6/1/09

Dao, James, “Ex-Soldier Gets Life Sentence for Iraq Murders,” New York Times, 5/21/09

Pew Research Center’s Project for Excellence in Journalism, “The Debate Over Gitmo And Waterboarding Drives The News, PEJ News Coverage Index: May 18-24, 2009,” 5/25/09
- “Economy Up And Flu Down In A Stressful Week, PEJ News Coverage Index: May 4-10, 2009,” 5/11/09
- “Politics Punctuate The Terrorism Debate, PEJ News Coverage Index: May 11-17, 2009,” 5/18/09
- “Sotomayor Spin Wars Dominate The Narrative, PEJ News Coverage Index: May 25-31, 2009,” 6/1/09

Robertson, Campbell, “U.S. Soldier and 11 Iraqis Die in Attacks,” New York Times, 5/29/09

Santora, Marc, “State Department Official Is Among 3 Killed in Iraq,” New York Times, 5/26/09

Williams, Timothy, “Bomb Kills G.I. in Baghdad as Attacks Keep Rising,” New York Times, 5/27/09

USIP Report On Iraqi Politics and The 2010 Parliamentary Elections

In May 2009 two members of the United States Institute of Peace (USIP), Daniel Serwer and Sam Parker, traveled to Baghdad where they met with around 20 top Iraqi politicians and government officials. They wrote a report about their trip called “Maliki’s Iraq between Two Elections.” The major topic of discussion was the 2009 provincial elections, and its repercussions for the 2010 parliamentary vote. The Iraqi elites agreed that Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki had stolen the stage of Iraqi politics. All of the major national parties now operate in relation to him. At the same time, the USIP group worked with the newly elected provincial council in Diyala, who were more concerned about getting their government working than what was going in the capital. The report believes that this could be the beginning of a major change in Iraq with the emergence of issue-based parties rather than sectarian ones. That’s likely to be a long-term process as the major parties with the money, organization, and power are likely to dominate the parliamentary vote, and are still caught up on what to do with Maliki.

The first issue dealt with was the impact of the January 2009 provincial elections. Most of the Iraqis felt that the vote had gone off well, and were now reflecting upon the lessons learned. One was that parties with a strong organization and that could get out the vote did well. Coalition building was also of importance since so many parties participated it was the only way to gain power. Many also talked about “wasted votes,” those that went to parties and candidates that didn’t garner enough ballots to gain seats on the councils. That amounted to about 30% of the overall vote. That compared to Maliki’s State of Law List, which only got 19% of the national returns. 50% of the electorate also did not participate. The major parties were interested in trying to win over some of these populations.

All of the politicians were also focused upon the Prime Minister. Everyone seemed to base their positions upon Maliki. Some want to oppose him, some want to ally with him, and others want to see what will happen after the 2010 vote. No one thought Maliki would face a no confidence vote in parliament before the parliamentary elections. That could make him a martyr, and also deny his critics the chance to blame him for the country’s problems. There are also no clear replacements for him.

This is quite a change from when Maliki first came into office. His Dawa party returned to Iraq in 2003 from exile, weak, divided, lacking support, money and a militia. He was picked for his position because of his weakness compared to the two major Shiite parties the Supreme Iraqi Islamic Party (SIIC) and the Sadrists that dominated the United Iraqi Alliance. His initial inaction in the face of the increasing violence and chaos reinforced his image as an ineffectual leader. This all changed with the Surge. The Americans went after all of Maliki’s opponents from Al Qaeda in Iraq to the Sunni insurgency to the Shiite militias. That made the Iraqi state and the Prime Minister stronger. In 2008 he launched his own security crackdowns on the Sadrists in Basra, Sadr City, and Maysan. This created a new view of the Prime Minister and government as strong and decisive. Maliki was quick to claim all of the success, and make himself synonymous with the state.

In the process Maliki has stepped away from his former friends, and attempted to forge new ones to gain all the glory of the improved situation in the country. Maliki’s main coalition is made up of the Iraqi Islamic Party, the Supreme Council, and the two Kurdish parties, the Kurdistan Democratic Party and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan. Originally Moqtada al-Sadr was also part of that group, but was pushed out with the help of the Americans. In 2008 Maliki moved away from this alliance to establish his independence. That was signaled in the January 2009 provincial elections when he formed his own State of Law List. Afterwards, Maliki has reached out to all groups in preparation for the 2010 vote. The Prime Minister for example, has held discussions with Saleh al-Mutlaq’s Hiwar Party, Ninewa’s al-Hadbaa List, Sheikh Abu Risha’s Anbar Awakening, and attempted to reach out to Baathists in an attempt to find new Sunni partners. Maliki also talked to the Sadrists, and recently flew to Iran to meet with the head of the Supreme Council Abdul Aziz al-Hakim who is in Tehran for cancer treatment. In doing so, he hopes to be the main player in any new ruling coalition that might emerge. He also has everyone guessing as to whom he will run with in the elections, himself, rejoin the United Iraqi Alliance, or some new gathering.

The Iraqi Islamic Party (IIP) has emerged as the strongest critic of the Prime Minister. Like the Dawa, they entered the new Iraqi political scene after the invasion with no real base, but were able to put together the main Sunni alliance the Iraqi Accordance Front, which has since disintegrated. During the Surge, they were able to take advantage of the new Sons of Iraq groups, and successfully co-opt many of them, thus gaining a grass roots organization. The IIP’s victory in Diyala in 2009 was an example of this. The party went on to win the most seats of any Sunni group in the provincial elections. To oppose Maliki they are trying to build up the power of the parliament. The election of Ayad al-Samarraie as speaker of the legislature on April 19, 2009 was the first step in their plan. He wants to make the parliament a check on Maliki’s authority. That was recently seen when the parliament forced the resignation of the Trade Minister, who was from the Dawa Party, over corruption. There are plans to question other members of Maliki’s cabinet about misdeeds as well. Parliament also blocked funding for the Tribal Support Councils, which was a patronage system put together by the Prime Minister in various provinces, and a reconciliation initiative that was aimed at co-opting Baathists. The Islamic Party is also pushing for constitutional reform to limit the Prime Minister’s office.

The Supreme Council has become another major opponent of Maliki, but seems to be turning inwards in the aftermath of their defeat in the provincial elections. In 2005 the SIIC walked away with eight governorships out of eighteen. In 2009 they won none. Since then they have been trying to deal with this loss. In the 2010 vote they want to portray themselves as being independent from Iran, and no longer advocating for a Shiite southern region. Despite their criticisms, they also want to try to convince Maliki to rejoin the United Iraqi Alliance, and run together in the election. Another major distraction is the fact that its leader, al-Hakim, is dying of cancer. When he passes, many think that the SIIC will split in two with old guard Badr Brigade militia leaders like Finance Minister Bayan Jabr running one faction, and newer officials like Vice President Adel Abd al-Mahdi the other.

The Kurds are also in conflict with Maliki. Beginning in 2008 the Prime Minister began moving the Iraqi Army into disputed territories of the north, which have largely been under Kurdish control since 2003. There have been several confrontations with the peshmerga as a result. The main Kurdish parties and the Americans are afraid that the dispute between Kurdistan and Baghdad will lead to violence. The United Nations is trying to mediate, but without strong U.S. support their work is likely to go nowhere. Surprisingly most of the Arab politicians in Baghdad were not that concerned about this issue. They believe that time is on the side of the central government, and as it gets stronger the Kurds will have to give way. Until then this division is likely to fester for the next couple years.

After those three major groups there are a series of smaller Shiite, Sunni, and secular parties that are also related to Maliki. What the paper called the Shiite center is made up of Interior Minister Jawad al-Bolani’s Constitutional Party, government spokesman Ali al-Dabbagh Competents Party, and ex-Prime Minister Ibrahim al-Jaafari’s National Reform Trend. The Sadrists are still a force in Shiite politics as well. The main secular leader is ex-Prime Minister Iyad Allawi and his Iraqi National List. Finally there are Sunnis like parliamentarian Saleh al-Mutlaq’s Hiwar Party, the al-Hadbaa List of Ninewa, former Islamic Party member Dhafir al-Ani, and Deputy Prime Minister Rafi al-Issawi. All of these parties ran in the 2009 election as nationalists, arguing for a strong central government. That was similar to Maliki’s State of Law platform, so they had mixed results. The Shiite centrists, Sadrists, and Allawi got some provincial seats, but didn’t do as well as they had hoped. The smaller Sunni parties actually did surprisingly well. Maliki also courted all of these groups as potential new allies.

Finally the USIP traveled to Diyala to help the new provincial council there forge a position paper on what their goals would be while in office. There the USIP found that the politicians were much more interested in getting the local government working, especially because the previous one was considered a failure, rather than national politics. The Diyala council members didn’t pay much attention to their party bosses in Baghdad, and were more issue based. The Americans saw this as an important development in Iraqi politics, as the Diyala council was likely to meet the needs of average Iraqis compared to the power struggles going on in the capital.

“Maliki’s Iraq between Two Elections” points out the dynamics of Iraq’s national and local politics. In Baghdad, the major parties are involved in a prolonged struggle for power as Maliki has successfully placed himself as the public face of the government. His former allies have been left out in the cold, and are either challenging him, like the Islamic Party and Kurds, or trying to re-organize like the SIIC. At the same time, this has opened up opportunities for newer and smaller parties by allying with one side or the other. It also appears that this struggle is more important than actually improving the country for many politicians. At the provincial level however, the USIP found different parties, sects, and ethnicities working together on the newly elected council, trying to address their constituents’ needs. The USIP paper believes that the 2010 election could be a turning point if Maliki decides to run on issues like he did in 2009. There is also the possibility that he will go back to sectarian politics and rejoin the United Iraqi Alliance. The USIP hopes for the former outcome, but if it doesn’t happen they believe there will probably be more opportunities in the future to change the political culture of Iraq. It seems likely that this will stay at the local level, and take quite some time to bubble up to the top. The major parties including Maliki are caught up in a serious struggle for the right to rule, which will have to play out before issues become the prime focus of the government, if ever. Until then finding new friends and shifting alliances will continue to dominate the capital.

SOURCES

Bakri, Nada, “In Iraq, Assertive Parliament Emerges Under New Speaker,” Washington Post, 5/27/09

Domergue, Jeremy, “Selection of Speaker Reveals Shifting Coalitions in Iraqi Parliamentary Politics,” Institute for the Study of War, 4/28/09

Press TV, “Iraq’s Maliki at Hakim’s bedside in Tehran,” 5/31/09

Serwer, Daniel and Parker, Sam, “Maliki’s Iraq between Two Elections,” United States Institute of Peace, May 2009

Visser, Reidar, “Maliki Suffers Setbacks as Samarrai is Confirmed as New Speaker and More Governors Are Elected South of Baghdad,” Historiae.org, 4/19/09

Wong, Edward, “Iraqis weigh alliance to marginalize Sadr and bolster Maliki,” International Harold Tribune, 12/11/06

May 2009 International Organization for Migration Report On Iraq's Displaced

At the end of May 2009 the International Organization for Migration (IOM) released its latest report on Iraq's displaced. They specifically are worried about the fate of the two million plus Iraqis that have not returned home yet. They note that while thousands of displaced have gone back to their original provinces, the vast majority have not. Both groups continue to face problems such as finding work and housing, and gaining access to services and assistance. The IOM is concerned that many of these Iraqis will become permanent refugees.

Since 2007 the IOM has noted that Iraqis displaced after the February 2006 Samarra bombing, which triggered the sectarian war, have begun to return. The IOM has counted 49,464 of these families, or 296,598 people, that have come back. Only 7%, of those, 3,443 families, were refugees. That is a small fraction of the estimated 1.6 million that lost their homes after the 2006 attack. They have gone back to 765 different locations in Iraq. 90% of the post-Samarra displaced came from Baghdad, Diyala and Ninewa, so it should be no surprise that those three provinces, plus Anbar have seen the most returns. Qadisiyah, Muthanna, and Dhi Qar had the least with 44, 64, and 108 families respectively. 61% of displaced families surveyed said they wanted to go home.

Post-Feb. 2006 Displaced And Refugee Family Returns (Not Including Kurdistan)

Province	Returning Families	% That Are Refugee Families
Iraq	49,464	7%
Baghdad	31,497	4%
Diyala	8,779	1%
Anbar	4,536	27%
Ninewa	1,602	1%
Maysan	626	49%
Tamim	620	37%
Basra	500	0%
Karbala	298	21%
Babil	258	9%
Najaf	215	55%
Salahaddin	191	35%
Dhi Qar	108	31%
Muthanna	64	88%
Qadisiyah	44	23%

A major factor in returning is the proximity of the displaced to their original homes. 68% of the families that came back resided within their home province. That compared to 21% that were in another province, and 11% that came back from another country. That varied however across each province. In Muthanna and Najaf for example, 100% of the returnees were refugees, while none of those that came back to Basra and Ninewa were in foreign nation beforehand.

Origins Of Returnees By Province

Location	Refugees	Displaced Within Same Province	Displaced In Another Province
TOTAL	11%	68%	21%
Anbar	36%	52%	12%
Babil	15%	52%	33%
Baghdad	6%	71%	23%
Basra	0%	0%	100%
Diyala	6%	61%	33%
Karbala	92%	0%	8%
Maysan	0%	0%	100%
Muthanna	100%	0%	0%
Najaf	100%	0%	0%
Ninewa	0%	100%	0%
Salahaddin	88%	13%	0%
Tamim	58%	11%	31%
Wasit	50%	0%	50%

Conditions in Iraq appeared to be another major reason why families come back. 36.7% of returnees interviewed by the IOM said that better security was the top cause for returning. That was followed by 35.7% that believed a combination of improved security and difficult conditions where they lived was the major factor. Only 15.5% felt that they left because of the hardships they were going through.

Reasons For Return

Reasons for Return	%
Improved security in home area	36.7%
Improved security in home area and difficult conditions	35.7%
Very difficult conditions	15.5%
Other	5.8%
Government returnee payments	4.2%
Improved security in home area, difficult conditions, returnee payments	1.8%
Very difficult conditions and returnee payments	0.3%

The majority of families feel safe after their returns, but there are still some troubling incidents. 59.6% of those polled by the IOM said they felt safe all of the time after going back, while 39.4% said they only felt safe some of the time. There are various anecdotal stories of attacks and threats against displaced. In the Dora neighborhood of Baghdad an IED targeted displaced. Eighteen families in Abu Ghraib came back, but couldn't stay in their homes and became displaced again. Two families from Diyala went back, but were attacked by a militia, which led to the death of two family members. They left the province again as a result. According to IraqSlogger, in Adhamiya, Baghdad, the Sons of Iraq put "X"s on the houses of Shiites that had been displaced telling them not to come back in April 2009. The state of their property is another issue for returnees. 49.1% said that their houses were in good condition, but 38.7% found some damage to them.

The government has also been actively encouraging Iraqis to come back. Baghdad offered $851 for families that did. The authorities have recently announced that they were no longer registering people anymore, which was a prerequisite to receive the money. Not many returnees signed up for this program in the first place, and the government paid even fewer. The IOM found that only 44% of those surveyed had applied for the money, and of those, only 36% said they got it.

For those still displaced, finding work, services, and aid are major problems. 50.4% of male-headed households were out of work, and 97.3% of female-led ones were. Overall, 35% of those surveyed said they could work, but couldn't find a job. Salahaddin, 75%, Muthanna 70%, and Babil, 64%, had the highest responses in that category. In total, 56% of the displaced are unemployed. 64.2% of those surveyed claimed they had six hours or less of electricity. 83.8% did say they had access to the national water system, but that doesn't mean that it is potable. Almost all of the displaced, 98%, said they had their food ration card, but their access varied. 32% said they regularly got their rations, 60% said it was irregular, and 8% said they never got them. Ninewa was the worst with 99% saying they got their rations infrequently. Getting health care also varied greatly from province to province. 90% or more in Anbar, Maysan, Muthanna, Najaf, Ninewa and Salahaddin said they had adequate access, while 57% of returnees in Baghdad, 65% in Basra, and 78% in Tamim claimed they had none. When asked what their greatest needs were, displaced families said food, 63%, fuel, 51%, and health care, 40% were the top priorities. 88% also said they had received no aid outside of the government.

Unemployment

Total: 44% employed, 56% unemployed

Male-headed household: 49.6% employed, 50.4% unemployed

Female-headed household: 2.7% employed, 97.3% unemployed

Overall the IOM is worried about what will happen to the millions of Iraqis that have lost their homes because of the war. Only a small fraction has returned, and those that haven't face a plethora of problems, most importantly finding work and food. Those that have come back also face a similar set of problems. Neither the government, nor non-government organizations such as the IOM have the resources to deal with such a large population. The fear is that many of them will simply have to fend for themselves, perhaps creating a permanent class of displaced both within and without of Iraq for the foreseeable future.

SOURCES

International Organization for Migration, "IOM Emergency Needs Assessments; Post February 2006 Displacement In Iraq, Monthly Report," 4/1/09

- "IOM Monitoring And Needs Assessments of Iraqi Return, May 2009," May 2009

Smith, Daniel and al-Timimi, Yousif, "Residents: Some Sahwa Still Keeping Shi'a Out," IraqSlogger.com, 4/21/09

U.S. Reconstruction In Iraq Coming To An End

U.S. reconstruction in Iraq is coming to an end. The effort to rebuild the country following the 2003 invasion was the largest in American history, with the U.S. budgeting $51 billion for the project. That amount has almost all been spent, and no new large outlays are expected in the future, especially with the U.S. planning on withdrawing. The Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR) believes that most of this money failed to achieve its goals. While the Iraqi security forces were successfully reconstituted, the larger goal of boosting services and the economy of Iraq failed.

Since March 2003 the U.S. has promised $51.0 billion for reconstruction in Iraq. $24.43 billion was for security, and $26.57 for the economy, government, and services. $42.16 billion of the total amount has been obligated for projects, while $37.89 billion was actually spent. Of the remaining $3.01 billion in unspent funds, $2.82 billion is for the Iraqi armed forces and police. The new Obama administration has asked for an additional $700 million, $449 million of which is supposed to go to reconstruction. The White House did not ask for any new money for the Iraqi security forces. Instead, the President wants to extend $1 billion in bridge funds left over from 2008 for that purpose.

The American program was originally aimed at rebuilding Iraq’s infrastructure and building a democracy, but as violence rose in the country, more and more money was appropriated for security. By April 2009 the Iraqi security forces took almost half of the funding at $24.43 billion compared to $11.82 billion for infrastructure like electricity, oil, gas, water, sanitation, transportation, and communications. The SIGIR reported that the rise in attacks in Iraq derailed much of the reconstruction program, delaying projects and adding additional costs.

The U.S. program has not been without success. The one area that the SIGIR believes has seen the best effort is the rebuilding of the Iraqi security forces. They now stand at over 700,000 strong. The Americans have also added 1.2 million cubic meters of sewage treatment capacity, brought up water production to 2.4 million cubic meters of potable water per day, and for three straight quarters electricity production has gone up. Power output is now higher than pre-invasion levels. The problem is since the overthrow of Saddam, demand for services has skyrocketed amongst Iraqis, and the U.S.-funded increases have not kept up. Only around 25% of Iraqis polled say they were satisfied with the sewage system for example.

Today, U.S.-reconstruction is coming to an end, leaving Iraq increasingly in charge. There are no current oil projects on-line for example. There is still $224.39 million going to be spent on electricity however. Now the Iraqi government is the largest source of funding for rebuilding. Its capital budget used for investment has recently gone down from $13.1 billion in 2008 to $12.7 billion this year. Iraq has also never been able to spend all of its money, like the Electricity Ministry that only spent 12% of its budget last year.

Now that Iraqis are taking control, transferring projects is becoming an issue. An April 26, 2009 SIGIR audit found that the U.S. had been turning over projects to Iraqis with no unified plan or process. Many are given to the Iraqi government whether they can handle them or not. Most transfers are also done at the local level, and the information is not passed up to Baghdad or Washington. Of $13.5 billion in projects studied by SIGIR, 72% were handed over to local authorities, and only 13% to the central government. That means neither government has a real idea on what has been done so far. Some of these projects were not even wanted by the Iraqis, and were left unused or were not maintained. The Iraqis in general also don’t have the experience or training in much of the equipment installed by the Americans. For instance, examinations of Iraqi health care facilities found that gear wasn’t always installed and Iraqis didn’t always know how to operate them. The SIGIR is worried that this will mean much of the U.S. investment will be wasted. The U.S. is trying to address this by spending $313.7 million on training and spare parts. That still doesn’t address the larger issue of how the Iraqis will take control of the thousands of projects built by the Americans.

In its review of the U.S. reconstruction effort, the SIGIR believes that much of the U.S. reconstruction project has failed. Iraqis are largely unhappy with the state of the economy, services, and government. Production of many services such as electricity is higher than under Saddam, but it’s only meeting a fraction of demand. The main problem was the lack of security, which was not planned for. That derailed and delayed much of the work. Violence also shifted the focus of the Americans to the point that the security forces received just as much money as building up the economy and government combined. The U.S. also tended to impose their views of what Iraq should have, rather than asking Iraqis what they wanted. Many of the large infrastructure projects therefore were not used properly, left to break down, or were never wanted. Some of the $51 billion budgeted for Iraq has gone to good work, especially the money appropriated by U.S. commanders to local Iraqis. The larger projects however are more of a mixed bag.

Total Outlays By U.S.

Security - $24.43 billion
$21.18 billion obligated
$18.58 billion expended
$3.24 billion unspent
$6.84 billion for equipment and transportation
$5.79 billion for infrastructure
$5.67 billion for training and operations
$2.42 billion for sustainment
$1.72 billion for rule of law
$1.0 billion for other

Infrastructure - $11.82 billion
$11.41 billion obligated
$10.86 billion expended
$553 million unspent

Infrastructure – Electricity - $5.09 billion
$4.98 billion obligated
$4.75 billion spent

Infrastructure – Water and Sanitation - $2.25 billion
$2.17 billion obligated
$2.01 billion spent

Infrastructure – Oil and Gas - $2.05 billion
$1.93 billion obligated
$1.88 billion spent

Infrastructure – Other - $1.31 billion

Infrastructure – Transportation and Communication - $1.12 billion
$1.09 billion obligated
$965 million spent

Governance - $7.02 billion
$5.64 billion spent
$2.38 billion obligated for capacity development
$1.92 billion obligated for democracy and civil society
$1.88 billion obligated for public services
$0.81 billion obligated for humanitarian relief

Economy - $1.47 billion
$1.25 billion spent

SOURCES

Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, “Asset-Transfer Process for Iraq Reconstruction Projects Lacks Unity and Accountability,” 4/26/09
- “Hard Lessons,” 1/22/09
- “Quarterly Report to the United States Congress,” 4/30/09

Iraqi Casualties Down For May 2009

April 2009 was marked by a series of mass casualty bombings that took the lives of some 290 Iraqis. The jump in deaths that month had many inside and out of Iraq worried that large-scale violence might be returning. The latest numbers however, show a drop in deaths for May.

The Iraqi Interior Ministry released its latest figures for casualties in Iraq. They reported 165 killed in May, 134 of which were civilians, and the remaining 31 from the Iraqi security forces. In April they recorded 355 deaths, preceded by 252 in March, 258 in February, and 191 in January. January had the lowest toll since the U.S. invasion in 2003, but May’s numbers have now surpassed that according to the Iraqi government.

Other organizations also noted the drop. Iraq Body Count found 483 killed in April, compared to a preliminary number of 344 in May, while icasualties reported 188 dead in May and 347 in April. The Associated Press keeps its own count as well and said that 225 died in May, while 371 were killed in April.

The U.S. command in Iraq noted that attacks were down 50% in mid-May compared to all of April 2009. A U.S. military spokesman said that there had only been 13 major attacks in Iraq from the beginning of May to the 23rd of that month compared to 28 for all of April. General Odierno, the U.S. commander in Iraq believed that attacks were related to two important anniversaries. April 6-7 marked the formation of the Baath Party, while April 9 was the fall of Saddam from power.

Iraq Deaths

Iraqi Ministries
November 08 340
December 08 316
January 09 191
February 09 258
March 09 252
April 09 355
May 09 165

Iraq Body Count
November 08 472
December 08 521
January 09 275
February 09 343
March 09 415
April 09 483
May 09 344

Icasualties.org
November 08 317
December 08 320
January 09 187
February 09 202
March 09 278
April 09 347
May 09 182

Associated Press
January 09 242
February 09 288
March 09 335
April 09 371
May 09 225

As reported before, overall attacks and deaths in Iraq are down compared to 2008, but have begun to creep back up in recent months. From April 1 to September 30, 2008 there were an average of just over 1,700 attacks per month. That went down to 1,169 from October 1 to December 31, 2008, and then to an average of 323 for January 1 to March 20, 2009. Casualties also dropped from July to December 2008, before hitting a low point in January 2009. That corresponded with campaigning for the 2009 provincial elections when Sunnis came out in large numbers compared to 2005 when they boycotted the ballot box. It appears that insurgents backed off for a period of time to allow people to vote. A similar series of events happened in the December 2005 elections when many insurgent groups backed the vote, held off on operations, and even provided security at polling centers. The trend since January 2009 has been for the number of Iraqis killed to go back up until May. Whether that month will turn out to be a temporary dip like January or the beginning of a new trend is yet to be seen.

For more on violence in Iraq see:

New Attack And Death Statistics For Iraq

How Many Have Died In Iraq And By What Means

Is Violence Increasing In Iraq?

Review of 2008 Attack Statistics In Iraq

2008 Iraq Death Totals

Iraqi Death Counts

SOURCES

Chon, Gina, “U.S. Says Attacks in Iraq Are Down 50% So Far in May,” Wall Street Journal, 5/25/09

Cordesman, Anthony, “Iraq: USCENTCOM and Iraqi Government Estimates of the Trends in the Patterns in Violence and Casualties,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, 5/1/09

Haynes, Deborah, “Transcript of The Times interview with General Ray Odierno,” Times of London, 4/9/09

Reid, Robert, “Iraq civilian deaths fall after April spike,” Associated Press, 6/1/09

Sly, Liz, “Iraqi casualties fall to record low in May,” Los Angeles Times, 6/1/09

Steinberg, Guido, “The Iraqi Insurgency,” German Institute for International and Security Affairs, December 2006