Iraq’s Petroleum Revenue Is Being Distributed Without A New Oil Law

One complaint often made about Iraq, its reconciliation process, and oil industry is the fact that it has not passed a natural resource law that would provide an equitable distribution of its petroleum revenues, which account for 90% of the government’s money. What this argument ignores is the fact that Article 112 of the Iraqi Constitution states:

"First: The federal government, with the producing governorates and regional government, shall undertake the management of oil and gas extracted from present fields, provided that it distributes its revenue in a fair manner in proportion to the population distribution in all parts of the country."

This requirement that the provinces be given a budget according to their population has been followed every year since 2005 when the constitution was passed. In 2009 for example, Anbar with the sixth largest population outside of the three Kurdish governorates, got the sixth largest budget. Muthanna, with the smallest population outside of Kurdistan, received the smallest outlay.

Provinces: Population – 2009 Provincial Budgets
1. Baghdad: 6,995,000 - $551 million
2. Ninewa: 2,820,000 - $236 million
3. Basra: 2,408,000 - $201 million
4. Sulaymaniya: 2,159,800 – Kurdistan N/A
5. Irbil: 1,845,200 – Kurdistan N/A
6. Dhi Qar: 1,687,000 - $143 million
7. Babil: 1,574,000 - $134 million
8. Anbar: 1,427,000 - $112 million
9. Diyala: 1,323,000 - $104 million
10. Salahaddin: 1,158,000 - $97 million
11. Tamim: 1,129,000 - $99 million
12. Najaf: 1,113,000- $93 million
13. Wasit: 1,056,000 - $91 million
14. Qadisiyah: 1,033,000 - $86 million
15. Maysan: 944,000 - $80 million
16. Karbala: 902,000 - $78 million
17. Muthanna: 650,000 - $56 million
18. Dohuk: 616,600 – Kurdistan N/A

The 2010 budget also includes special provisions for oil producing provinces, and those with religious sites. This year the central government will pay each governorate that produces petroleum $1 per barrel. $20 will also be given for each foreign visitor traveling to a province, which is aimed at Najaf, Karbala, Baghdad, and Salahaddin that have famous Islamic shrines visited by thousands of pilgrims annually. This was included in the legislation in part to appease complaints from the south that produces the vast majority of Iraq’s oil, but who feels like it is not benefiting enough from their natural wealth.

Since 2005 Baghdad has been following the constitution and providing each province with funding based upon their population. Oil producing governorates are also getting extra money this year. Since almost all of Iraq’s revenue comes from petroleum it can be said that profits from that industry are being distributed throughout the country. How a new hydrocarbon law would affect that is unknown, but it would seem that complaints that one not being passed is holding up oil money being distributed are misplaced.

SOURCES

Bender, David, “Iraq oil and its future,” The Call, Foreign Policy, 8/24/10

Iraqi Constitution, 2005

Ricks, Thomas, “Did the Iraqi surge succeed?” Best Defense, Foreign Policy, 7/26/10

Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, “Quarterly Report to the United States Congress,” 4/30/09
- “Quarterly Report to the United States Congress,” 10/30/09
- “Quarterly Report to the United States Congress,” 4/30/10

Iraq’s Oil Exports Continue To Decline In August 2010

Iraq’s Oil Ministry released preliminary numbers on its exports for August 2010 and they showed another decline. In August, the country exported an average of 1.788 million barrels of crude a day. That compared to 1.820 barrels in July. The cause for the drop was three disruptions in the northern pipeline. On August 20 the line ruptured in Ninewa along a section that had been bombed in the past. The repairs took nine days. On August 11 Turkey’s Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) blew up the line in Turkey. Earlier in the month there was another technical problem as well.

Overall, output for foreign markets has been going down since the beginning of the year. In February 2010 Iraq hit a yearly high of 2.068 million barrels a day in exports. That then went down to an average of 1.840 million barrels in March, 1.767 million in April, before recovering a little to 1.890 million in May, and then dropping again for the next three months to 1.823 million barrels in June, 1.820 million barrels in July, and finally 1.788 million in August.

This has followed the trend in Iraq’s oil industry since the 2003 invasion with exports continually going up and down. At the beginning of 2009 for example, output climbed from an average of 1.77 million barrels a day in February to 2.04 million barrels a day in July before dipping for the next six month until it reached the 2 million mark again in February 2010. Technical problems, attacks, and bottlenecks have traditionally been the reasons for the ebb and flow in production. 

SOURCES

Alsumaria, “Blast hits oil pipeline on Iraq borders,” 8/11/10

Agence France Presse, “Iraq oil revenue dip despite record exports,” 3/23/10

Associated Press, “Iraq’s Oil Exports Dip in March by 11 Percent,” 4/20/10
- “Iraq’s Oil Exports Inch Up in May by About 7.4 Pct,” 6/22/10

Aswat al-Iraq, “Turkey-bound pipeline repair starts – source,” 8/21/10

Bloomberg, “Iraq oil exports via Turkey resume after blast,” 8/22/10

Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, “Iraq Status Report,” U.S. Department of State, 12/2/09
- “Iraq Status Report,” U.S. Department of State, 1/13/10
- “Iraq Status Report,” U.S. Department of State, 5/5/10
- “Iraq Status Report,” U.S. Department of State, 9/8/10

Hafidh, Hassan, “Iraq August Oil Exports -1.7% On Month At 1.788 Million B/D Official,” Dow Jones, 9/14/10
- “Iraq Dec Oil Exports Up 4% On Month At 1.977 Million B/D,” Dow Jones, 1/4/10
- “Iraq July Oil Exports -0.16% On Month At 1.820 Million B/D – Official,” Dow Jones 8/9/10
- “Iraq June Oil Exports -4% On Month At 1.823 Million Bbl – Ministry,” Dow Jones, 7/26/10
- “Iraq Oil Flow To Turkey On Hold Since Sunday – Shipper,” Dow Jones, 8/30/10

Reuters, “Iraq oil exports rise in Feb to 2.083 mln bpd,” 2/28/10
- “Iraq oil exports surge to 1.9mbpd,” 6/1/10

Amnesty International 2010 Report On Prisoner Abuse In Iraq

Amnesty International released a report in September 2010 documenting the rampant abuses going on within Iraq’s prisons. Iraqi penal codes bar arbitrary arrests, require that suspects see an investigative judge within 24 hours of their detention, and bans torture. None of these laws are being followed. On the other hand, the Iraqi legal system is largely based upon confessions, which encourages torture and mistreatment to gain one. Iraqi officials regularly announce cases of abuse as a result, but investigations lead nowhere, and no senior officials have ever been held accountable. Amnesty International believes this has created a culture of impunity, which will be hard to break.

Amnesty estimates that around 30,000 people are currently being held in Iraq without a trial. The majority are Sunnis suspected of supporting the insurgency. There are hundreds of Shiites as well, most of which are followers of Moqtada al-Sadr. Many of the jails and prisons they are in are overcrowded, and lack basic services. Detainees often aren’t allowed to contact their family members, and let them know where they are, nor receive visits. The facilities are split between the Justice, Interior, and Defense Ministries. The Iraqi Human Rights Ministry in its 2009 annual report said that it had not been able to inspect most of these prisons.

Detainees in these facilities are routinely denied lawyers. This happens despite Iraq’s penal code, which requires legal representation. Some lawyers don’t want to represent suspected terrorists, while others fear reprisals if they do. The most common reason why no legal representation is provided is because prisoners are held incommunicado, and no one knows where they are. In 2009 the Iraqi Human Rights Ministry reported that this was routine in Defense and Interior Ministry run prisons.

The lack of lawyers during questioning also encourages torture and abuse. Amnesty has heard of rape, beatings, suspension in the air, electric shock, breaking bones, removing toenails, asphyxiation, making people sit on sharp objects like broken bottles, and using drills. Two examples in 2009 came from parliament’s Human Rights Committee who started investigating the case of two women who claimed they were repeatedly raped after they were arrested, while other lawmakers said that security forces had raped more than 21 male prisoners in Baghdad and Qadisiyah. Torture often occurs right after arrest as authorities seek a confession. Police or intelligence officers usually carry out interrogations instead of investigative judges as stipulated by law, which also increases the chances of abuse and torture. Last year, the Human Rights Ministry documented 574 allegations of torture. Amnesty believes the real number is much higher, since the ministry’s access to prisoners is extremely limited.

The Iraqi security forces have also used arrests to extort money from families. In November 2009 the Interior Ministry’s Counter-Terrorism Unit arrested Dr. Adnan al-Mahdawi, Dean of Education at the University of Diyala in Baquba. The unit claimed a colleague’s wife charged Mahdawi with involvement in her husband’s death. After Mahdawi was picked up, a member of the Counter-Terrorism Unit called up his family and demanded money in return for his release. They said they couldn’t pay, and Mahdawi has been locked up ever since. In early 2010 he went to court, but the accusing wife never showed up, and the trial is still on going.

Secret prisons also exist within Iraq. In April 2010 one such facility was discovered at the Muthanna airport in Baghdad. It held more than 400 prisoners, many of which were Sunnis rounded up in and around Mosul in late 2009 that had been tortured. The prison was under the direct control of the prime minister’s office, that subsequently claimed that it was not secret, and judges and lawyers had both gone there. An investigation was launched, but nothing has been heard of it since then, which is also common.

The Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) is no better. It holds hundreds of suspected terrorists from the Islamist terrorist group Ansar al-Islam, as well followers of the legal political parties the Kurdistan Islamic Movement and the Kurdistan Islamic Group. The Kurds have also arrested Sunni Arabs outside of Kurdistan in provinces such as Ninewa and taken them to the KRG, and has been rounding up Kurds and holding them in secret jails since at least the 1990s. Many of these detainees are being held without trial, because officials claim they don’t fall under Iraqi or Kurdish laws. Amnesty believes it’s because the authorities don’t want them to go to court, and would rather imprison them indefinitely.

At the end of February 2008 Iraq’s parliament passed an Amnesty Law, meant to address the overflowing prison population. Each province was to create a judicial committee that was supposed to release anyone held for six months without seeing an investigative judge or who had not been sent to court after a year. In practice the law has largely been ignored. Prisoners have not been released after committees have said they should be, and the majority of those receiving amnesty are suspects wanted for questioning or out on bail, rather than actual prisoners. U.S. officials have claimed that Iraq’s outdated and bureaucratic judicial system, lack of computers, judges who don’t want to release people, and the inability of officials to safely travel in parts of the country are the reasons why the Amnesty Law has not been applied. Another possible reason is that the law was simply passed as a political act to make it look like Baghdad was moving towards reconciliation, and to relieve pressure from Washington, with no intention of really applying it.

Amnesty’s September report is just the latest on abuses going on within Iraq. Human Rights Watch, the United Nations, and the State Department have all made similar findings. As soon as an interim government was created in Iraq in mid-2004 stories (1) of abuse and torture began to emerge. As ever, the main causes have been the drive for a confession, the isolation many prisoners are held in, and the absence of lawyers and judges. Amnesty International called for a number of reforms by the Iraqis, and for the United States to exert pressure on Baghdad to solve these problems. The on-going insurgency, which leads to a constant flow of prisoners being rounded up, the country’s history of abuse that dates back to the Saddam era, and the lack of interest by three Iraqi administrations since the 2003 invasion points to little progress being made on this issue.

FOOTNOTES

1. Edmonson, George, “Iraq routinely torturing prisoners, group says,” San Francisco Chronicle, 1/26/05

SOURCES

Amnesty International, “New order, same abuses: Unlawful detentions and torture in Iraq,” September 2010

Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, And Labor, “2009 Human Rights Report: Iraq,” U.S. State Department, 3/11/10

Edmonson, George, “Iraq routinely torturing prisoners, group says,” San Francisco Chronicle, 1/26/05

Knowlton, Brian, “U.S. alleges rights abuses by Iraqis,” San Francisco Chronicle, 3/1/05

Human Rights Watch, “The Quality of Justice, Failings of Iraq’s Central Criminal Court,” December 2008

UN Assistance Mission for Iraq, “Human Rights Report 1 January – 30 June 2008,” December 2008

Rumor: Supreme Council-National Movement-Kurdish Coalition To Form New Government

The Iraqi press has begun to talk about a new possible ruling coalition that would break the current deadlock. The main parties involved would be the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council (SIIC), Iyad Allawi’s Iraqi National Movement, and the Kurdish Coalition. According to the media current Vice President Adel Abdul Mahdi of the SIIC would become premier, the presidency would go to Allawi, and the Kurdish Coalition would get the speaker of parliament. There would be one vice president, which would require new legislation to create since the current tripartite presidency is due to expire when a new government is formed. That post would be offered to Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s State of Law. There would also be three deputy prime ministers, which would be divided between State of Law, the National Movement, and the Kurds. 

Allegedly the major parties involved have also agreed to a formula to divide up the major ministries as well. The National Movement would receive nine, State of Law seven, the National Alliance and Kurdish Coalition four a piece, the Iraqi Accordance Front two, and the Communist Party, Christians, and Yazidis one each. The Defense and Interior Ministries would be given to independents. The Foreign Ministry would go to a Sunni of the National Movement in an effort to re-integrate Iraq into the Arab world. The Kurds would control the Oil Ministry, and either the National Alliance of State of Law would get the Ministry of Finance.

There are two contentious points in the proposed deal. First the Supreme Council is supposedly joining this coalition on its own, not as part of the National Alliance. This is to exclude the Sadrists, who are said to be promoting former Prime Minister Ibrahim al-Jaafari or Iraqi National Congress head Ahmad Chalabi as alternatives to Mahdi within the List. It’s also been said that Sadr is asking for the end of the State of Forces Agreement with the U.S., and either the Interior or Defense Ministries, which no one is willing to give him. Washington has also been pushing to keep the Sadrists out of any new government because it considers them Tehran’s closest allies in Iraq. The Americans are against the SIIC for the same reason as well. The other major problem is that the plan would require changes in the constitution. When a new government is put together the presidency will lose its veto power and be reduced to a ceremonial position, while there will be no more vice presidents. The new regime idea calls for giving the president’s post powers again to appease Allawi, and creating a vice president post that could be offered to Maliki.

On the other hand, there are incentives for the major lists involved to agree to this proposal. The National Alliance and Kurds will recognize the National Movement as the winner of the election, which is what they have been calling for all along, and Allawi will get a newly empowered presidency. The Supreme Council will get the top post in the country, the premiership, and be able to break away from the Sadrists who they were afraid of being eclipsed by since they won the majority of seats within the National Alliance. The Kurdish Coalition will get the speaker of parliament that is more influential than the presidency, and the Oil Ministry, which will end their conflict with Baghdad over petroleum exploration and exports. Both the National Alliance and National Movement have been opposed to Maliki’s return to the premiership, and this will plan will marginalize him by either giving him a minor position or pushing him into the opposition. Some of the smaller parties, even the Communists who did not win a seat in the new legislature, will be included as well. Together, the Supreme Council with 17 seats, the National Movement with 91, and the Kurds with 57 will have 165 total, two more than is necessary to have a majority in the 325 member parliament. If the Accordance Front, Christians, and Yazidis were also included that would give them twelve more seats. The question now is whether this story has any legs or if it is just the latest rumor running through Iraq’s political class.

SOURCES

AK News, “INA threaten to join al-Iraqiya if Maliki insists on his candidacy,” 9/18/10
- “The three presidencies distributed among the main forces, source,” 9/17/10

Alsumaria, “Sadrists intend buoying Jaafari and Chalabi,” 9/17/10

Aswat al-Iraq, “Deal reached to have Abdulmahdi as PM, Allawi as president – Iraqiya,” 9/17/10

Inside Iraq, “Iraq’s Election results,” McClatchy Newspapers, 3/26/10

MEMRI Staff, “A New Government in Iraq – Signs of a Breakthrough,” 9/17/10
- “Iraq Votes – Part XI,” 3/29/10

Roads To Iraq, “The new “hope-scenario” in details,” 9/18/10

Visser, Reidar, “The Sadrist Watershed Confirmed,” Iraq and Gulf Analysis, 3/29/10
- “The Seriously Time-Consuming Scenario,” Iraq and Gulf Analysis, 9/17/10

Iraq’s Finances Are A Wreck

The United States Government Accountability Office (GAO) released a report in September 2010 trying to determine whether Iraq had a surplus, and if it did whether that money could be spent on security. The GAO estimated that Baghdad had accumulated an $11.8 million adjusted surplus. That was no surprise, as Iraq has never spent all its money since 2005 when it got back its sovereignty from the United States. The real revelation of the GAO study was the fact that Iraq’s finances are a wreck, and the government doesn’t know where all its money is.

Each year the government has made advances on its spending, but it cannot fully account for them. From 2005 to 2009 the GAO found that Iraq had amassed a $52.1 billion surplus. At the same time, Baghdad claimed that it had $40.3 billion in advances, leaving an $11.8 billion adjusted surplus. The Board of Supreme Audit, the main financial oversight organization, found that the authorities didn’t fully report all of their advances, and that some of the money might have been misappropriated. A report by the Board on the 2005 budget for example, claimed that at the end of the fiscal year not all the advances were settled, but they were counted as spent anyway. It also reported that the government didn’t follow rules when executing the advances. The GAO, going through Iraq’s 2005-2009 records, couldn’t determine the nature of 40% of the spending, which was listed as “other temporary advances.” Iraqi officials would not provide any more details about them.

Another problem was that the government couldn’t keep track of all of its deposits. The GAO found that by December 2009 Baghdad had $15.3-$32.2 billion in the Central Bank of Iraq, the Development Fund for Iraq in New York City, and state owned banks. The range of money was due to a discrepancy between what the Central Bank reported to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and what the Ministry of Finance reported. The latter said that it there was $32.2 billion in government funds in the banks, but only $15.3 billion of it was free to be used on spending because the rest belonged to state-owned enterprises, trusts, and pensions. The Central Bank reported no such obligations to the IMF.

In addition, Baghdad said that it had shifted some of its money between the different banks in 2009, but this was not shown in the records. The Central Bank said that the government had transferred $10.3 billion from it to the state-owned Rafidain and Rasheed banks. There was no paper trail of this transaction however. In fact, the government accounts showed a $1.7 billion increase in its deposits with the Central Bank. The Department of Defense claimed that advances made that year could have accounted for the $10.3 billion, but the GAO didn’t find any correlation between the two. The previous year the Ministry of Finance showed a $1.8 billion deficit after advances, while government deposits in banks increased from $29.4 billion to $41.1 billion.

Finally, an independent audit of the state-run Rafidain Bank said that it could not account for its money. The private company Ernst and Young found that the bank could not validate its accounts or financial statements. At the end of 2008 the bank didn’t have records covering $11 billion, and $800 million in 2009. An earlier audit of the Rasheed bank found the same problems.

What the GAO revealed is that Iraq does not know how much it’s spending, how much of a surplus it has, nor where all its money is. That means the budget numbers are largely meaningless because of all the extra spending going on. Reporting on those advances is not trustworthy either. The lack of accountability is probably a major contributing factor to the massive fraud and corruption going on within the government, since no one seems to know where all the money is going. Since Iraq has an antiquated, paper-based bureaucracy that lacks the capacity to handle all of its expenditures, this could’ve been predicted. Under an agreement with the IMF the Iraqi government is supposed to be addressing some of these issues. The question is how effective will the measures be. In all likelihood Baghdad is probably years away from having a competent civil service that can keep track of all its accounts. Until then, Iraq will have to assume that it has money in the bank, it just won’t know how much, nor where all the funds are.  

SOURCES

United States Government Accountability Office, “Iraqi-U.S. Cost-Sharing Iraq Has a Cumulative Budget Surplus, Offering the Potential for Further Cost-Sharing,” September 2010

Iraqi Deaths Continue To Climb In 2010

While the Associated Press has not published its count for Iraqi deaths for August 2010, the other three organizations that follow casualties show that they continue to climb this year. Iraq Body Count had deaths going up from 418 in July to 501 in August, while icasualties and Iraq's ministries had declines from 534 to 363 and 535 to 426 respectively. When the four groups' numbers are averaged out they show a steady increase. January 2010 saw an average of 6.1 Iraqis killed per day, one of the lowest counts since the war began. That went to 10.1 in February, 8.7 in March, 10.7 in April, 10.3 in May, 9.4 in June, 14.8 in July, and 13.8 in August. 2010 could end up like 2009 when deaths increased in the first part of the year, and then slowly declined beginning in the Autumn.

Click on image for larger view

The increase in average deaths is due to an up-tick in attacks by insurgents in response to the American withdrawal. Security incidents leveled off at the end of 2009, but there has been a spike in the last several weeks as U.S. forces dipped below 50,000. These operations have been punctuated by a number of high profile, mass casualty attacks such as the September 5 assault upon an Iraqi military headquarters in Baghdad, and shootings and bombings in 13 Iraqi cities on August 28, which were meant to garner headlines and show that the militants have outlasted the Americans.

Click on image for larger view
Source: Office of the Director of National Intelligence

 Security Incidents in Iraq 2004-2010

Click on image for larger view
Source: Office of the Director of National Intelligence 

 Security Incidents in Iraq mid-2007-2010

In the past, the insurgents have not been able to sustain these operations for more than a month at a time. If they are able to maintain their pace into September and casualties continue to increase that could mark an end to the ten-month long dip in attacks that have been the lowest since the war began. At the same time, if the average number of deaths and incidents stays at this level, they will only be at the rate of the first half of 2009, which is a fraction of what they were at the height of the conflict.

Monthly Death Counts

Month	Iraq Body Count	Icasualties	Iraqi Ministries	Associated Press	Avg. # Of Deaths Per Day
Jan. 10	258	135	196	177	6.1
Feb.	296	236	352	255	10.1
Mar.	311	183	367	230	8.7
Apr.	376	259	328	321	10.7
May	370	279	337	278	10.3
June	353	176	284	294	9.4
July	418	534	535	356	14.8
August	501	363	426	N/A	13.8

SOURCES

CNN, "Hundreds of civilians killed in Iraqi violence in August," 9/1/10

Cordesman, Anthony, "Update On US Withdrawal From Iraq," Center for Strategic and International Studies, 9/2/10

Icasualties.org

Iraq Body Count

Myers, Steven Lee, "Attack Shows Lasting Threat to U.S. in Iraq," New York Times, 9/5/10

Reuters, "Iraq civilian deaths dip as U.S. combat mission ends," 9/1/10

Shadid, Anthony, "Qaeda in Iraq Says It Was Behind Latest Attacks," New York Times, 8/28/10

Refugee And Displaced Returns Have Slowed To Iraq

Since the overthrow of Saddam Hussein in 2003 hundreds of thousands of Iraqis have returned to their country. In the first three years of the conflict, many of those were people that had fled Saddam's dictatorship in the 1980s and 1990s. In 2005 a whole new set of people lost their homes due to the growing sectarian civil war. Beginning in 2008 many of those began to come home as well when security got better. That rate has slowed down considerably this year. The question is what has caused this change.

The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) estimates that 1,272,726 Iraqis have returned since 2003. The majority, 808,730, have been internally displaced with just 463,996 refugees having made the trip. 2007 had the fewest returns at 81,420 due to the raging civil war, but that quickly picked up the following two years to 221,260 in 2008 and 204,830 in 2009 due to the improved security. From January to July 2010 however, only 79,490 have come back. If that rate were to be maintained the rest of the year, only around 141,000 would return.

Total Returns 2003-July 2010

Year	Displaced	Refugees	Total
2003	0	55,429	55,429
2004	98,000	193,997	291,997
2005	98,000	56,155	154,155
2006	150,000	20,235	170,235
2007	36,000	45,420	81,420
2008	195,890	39,280	221,260
2009	167,740	37,090	204,830
2010 Jul.	63,100	16,390	79,490
TOTALS	808,730	463,996	1,272,726

Refugee and displaced returns have been concentrated in specific provinces. In the last year most internal refugees have gone back to Baghdad, Diyala, Ninewa, Babil, and Salahaddin. It's no coincidence that those have been the most violent areas of the country since 2003 due to their sectarian and political make-up. Baghdad, Diyala, and Babil for example, are all mixed Sunni-Shiite areas, while Salahaddin and Ninewa were Baathist and insurgent strongholds. Those coming back from other countries have mostly gone to Baghdad, Qadisiyah, Dhi Qar, Diyala, Maysan, Karbala, and Najaf. Qadisiyah, Dhi Qar, Maysan, Karbala, and Najaf are all majority Shiite governorates so many of the returnees there might have left Iraq under Saddam or earlier in the Iraq war when Shiite militias were fighting U.S. forces only to turn to exploiting their own people. Overall, Baghdad has seen the most displaced and refugees making the trip back because it has always been at the center of the conflict within the country and has the largest population.

What needs to be analyzed is why are fewer people returning this year. There are a couple possible answers. One is that the remaining number of Iraqis willing to come back is dwindling. All those that lost their homes were not expected to return. Many of Iraq's minorities for instance have been forced out, and they are not likely to come back because Baghdad has proven incapable of protecting them. Sunnis, who make up the majority of refugees, may feel uncomfortable with a government largely run by Shiites and Kurds, while Shiites, who are the largest group of displaced, could  have decided to stay where they are rather than return to mixed areas of the country where violence is still an issue. Still others may not have the means to leave where they currently reside. Another possibility is that aid agencies and neighboring countries have grossly overestimated the number of Iraq's displaced, and most have come back already. In Jordan, the government claims there are around 500,000 Iraqis, but a survey found only 161,000 and even fewer, 60,000, have registered with the UNHCR there. Syria says they have 1.5 million refugees, but other estimates have counted as few as 300,000. The International Organization for Migration cited political uncertainty following the March 2010 elections as another reason in an April report. Finally, there are questions about security, always a major reason for returns, with U.S. forces withdrawing and insurgents picking up mass casualty attacks. More data and polling is needed to figure out exactly why the number of refugees is declining.

SOURCES

International Crisis Group, "Failed Responsibility: Iraqi Refugees In Syria, Jordan and Lebanon," 7/10/08

International Organization for Migration, "IOM Emergency Needs Assessments Four Years of Post-Samarra Displacement In Iraq," 4/13/10

Seeley, Nicholas, "In Jordan, aid for Iraqi refugees is often redirected," Christian Science Monitor, 7/2/08

UNHCR Iraq Operation, "Monthly Statistical Update on Return – July 2010," United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, July 2010