Iraq’s Oil Profits Bounce Back In August 2013 With Higher Exports And Rising Prices Due To Fears Over Syria

 

August 2013 saw Iraq’s oil industry bounce back. Its exports had been declining for three months before they rebounded in August, and so did the price for its crude. The latter was due to fears of an American strike upon Syria for its alleged use of chemical weapons. That set off international petroleum markets to Baghdad’s benefit. Iraq however is still stuck in a 17-month plateau that it is hoping to escape after major renovation work is completed on its southern oil infrastructure.

Iraq’s petroleum exports and profits both increased in August. For the month it averaged 2.57 million barrels a day, the second highest mark for the year. The Basra pipeline maintained its level from the previous month going from an average of 2.32 million barrels in July to 2.30 million in August. The cause of the country’s recovery was the Kirkuk line to Turkey, which finally overcame a huge number of leaks that put it out of action for most of June and July. It went from 283,800 barrels in May to 193,300 in June then 180,600 in July to 270,900 in August. That extra supply came just in time as the price for Iraqi crude went up as well to $104.45. From August to June Iraqi crude was selling for below $100 per barrel, but then finally started going up in July on renewed tensions in the Middle East. That culminated in a spike in August as commodity traders were scared by news that the United States might strike Syria for its alleged use of chemical weapons. How exactly that was supposed to affect the world petroleum market was not clear as Damascus is not a major player, but traders used it to their advantage to boost prices, and Iraq came out a winner as a result. For August, it earned $8.356 billion the highest amount since $8.578 billion in October 2012. In 2013, Iraq has averaged 2.45 million barrels just slightly above 2.41 million in 2012, while prices have dropped from $106.20 last year to $101.90 this year. That has meant profits have stagnated as well going from an average of $7.835 billion per month in 2012 to $7.594 billion in 2013. After the Oil Ministry opened up some new mooring points in Basra at the beginning of 2012 there has been no meaningful growth in the country’s exports leaving it at a plateau for the last 17-months. Baghdad is hoping to overcome that issue with some major maintenance work in the south, which started in September, followed by new mooring points and some more infrastructure additions.

Iraq Oil Exports And Profits 2011-2013

Month	Avg. Exports (Mil/ Bar/ Day)	Avg. Price Per Barrel	Revenue (Bill)
Jan. 11	2.16	$90.78	$6.082
Feb.	2.20	$98.44	$6.064
Mar.	2.15	$107.13	$7.167
Apr.	2.14	$114.26	$7.342
May	2.22	$108	$7.45
Jun.	2.27	$105.17	$7.173
Jul.	2.16	$108.79	$7.311
Aug.	2.18	$104.91	$7.124
Sep.	2.10	$104.89	$6.619
Oct.	2.08	$104.04	$6.742
Nov.	2.13	$106.59	$6.833
Dec.	2.14	$106.18	$7.061
2011 Avg.	2.16	$105.00	$6.913
Jan. 12	2.10	$109.08	$7.123
Feb.	2.01	$112.92	$6.595
Mar.	2.31	$117.99	$8.472
Apr.	2.50	$116.79	$8.795
May	2.45	$103.03	$7.831
Jun.	2.40	$90.09	$6.487
Jul.	2.51	$97.14	$7.577
Aug.	2.56	$106.22	$8.445
Sep.	2.59	$107.59	$8.371
Oct.	2.62	$105.51	$8.578
Nov.	2.62	$104.32	$8.200
Dec.	2.34	$103.72	$7.551
2012 Avg.	2.41	$106.20	$7.835
Jan. 13	2.35	$104.92	$7.672
Feb.	2.53	$107.66	$7.644
Mar.	2.41	$103.76	$7.772
Apr.	2.62	$98.70	$7.764
May	2.48	$97.23	$7.477
Jun.	2.33	$97.41	$6.799
Jul.	2.32	$101.00	$7.272
Aug.	2.57	$104.45	$8.356
2013 Avg.	2.45	$101.90	$7.594

Oil Exports Through Basra 2012-2013
January 2012 1.711 mil/bar/day

February 1.639 mil/bar/day

March 1.917 mil/bar/day

April 2.115 mil/bar/day

May 2.086 mil/bar/day

June 2.085 mil/bar/day

July 2.216 mil/bar/day

August 2.252 mil/bar/day

September 2.178 mil/bar/day

October 2.172 mil/bar/day

November 2.122 mil/bar/day

December 2.022 mil/bar/day

2012 Avg. 2.042 mil/bar/day

January 2013 2.093 mil/bar/day

February 2.196 mil/bar/day

March 2.1 mil/bar/day

April 2.31 mil/bar/day

May 2.19 mil/bar/day

June 2.13 mil/bar/day

July 2.32 mil/bar/day

August 2.30 mil/bar/day

2013 Avg. 2.204 mil/bar/day

Oil Exports Through Kirkuk 2012-2013

January 2012 393,500 bar/day

February 375,800 bar/day

March 400,000 bar/day

April 393,300 bar/day

May 364,500 bar/day

June 316,600 bar/day

July 300,000 bar/day

August 312,900 bar/day

September 420,000 bar/day

October 451,600 bar/day

November 426,600 bar/day

December 325,800 bar/day

2012 Avg. 373,300 bar/day

January 2013 264,500 bar/day

February 339,200 bar/day

March 316,100 bar/day

April 306,600 bar/day

May 283,800 bar/day

June 193,300 bar/day

July 180,600 bar/day

August 270,900 bar/day

2013 Avg. 269,375 bar/day

The ups and downs that Iraq’s hydrocarbon sector has experienced in the last few months are the norm. Leaks, bad weather, and repair work often occur causing exports to fluctuate. August was simply one of those months when those issues did not have a large affect. The early numbers for September however point to a decline due to the work in Basra. The Oil Ministry is hoping that it can overcome some of those issues when new infrastructure is added. That can’t happen quickly enough as the country still has not reached its vast potential.

SOURCES

Agence France Presse, “Iraq oil exports ‘rebound in August,’” 9/1/13

Dananer, “Start exporting oil from Gharraf field 35 thousand barrels per day,” 9/1/13

Al Rafidayn, “Iraq’s oil exports rise in August thanks to the southern fields,” 9/2/13

Rasheed, Ahmed, “Iraq undecided on full Basra oil port maintenance in Sept,” Reuters, 8/15/13

Razzouk, Nayla, “Iraq Threatens to Cut Revenue to Kurds Over Pipeline,” Bloomberg, 9/24/13

Republic of Iraq Ministry of Oil, “Iraq Crude Oil Exports – August 2013,” 10/1/13

Reuters, “Iraq southern oil exports drop in Sept,” 10/1/13

KRG Elections Change Region's Politics, But Will It Change The Government?

 

The Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) recently completed its latest parliamentary elections in September 2013. The results shook up Kurdish politics. One of the ruling parties, the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) finished 3^rd behind its partner the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP and the opposition Change List. The Islamic parties ran separately, dividing their votes. The real question now isn’t the ballot count, but rather what government will come of it. Who will participate, and who will be in opposition will show whether the region is ready for real political reform or not.

Like the rest of Iraq, Kurdistan’s voting took place in two stages. Up for grabs were 100 seats in the regional parliament, along with 11 quota seats for minorities. First was the special voting, which consisted mostly of the security forces. The Election Commission reported that there was a 93% participate rate in that round. Next, was the general vote, which had a 73% voter turn out. Akiko Yoshioka of Tokyo’s Institute of Energy Economics was an international observer in the KRG, and said the balloting process was clean. That hasn’t stopped the Change List, the Kurdistan Islamic Movement, and the PUK to claim voter fraud. Parties in Iraq often complain if they did not do as well as they thought they would. That allows them a way to explain their losses, and happens in nearly every election in the country. Nothing usually comes of it, and that’s likely the case here as well.

Talabani (left) and Barzani’s (right) parties have gone in opposite directions in the 2013 KRG provincial vote (Getty)

The partial results which have been announced mark a shake up of the power structure in the KRG, but they were not surprising. At the end of September, the Election Commission had gone through 95% of the ballots. The KDP was first, followed by the Change List, the PUK was in 3^rd, and then the Kurdistan Islamic Union, the Kurdistan Islamic Group, and the Kurdistan Islamic Movement. To round out the top 10 were the Kurdistan Democratic Socialist Party, the Communist Party, the Third Trend, and the Chaldean Syriac Assyrian Assembly, which is assured at least one seat reserved for minorities.

Early KRG Election Results, Sep. 2013 With 95% Of Ballots Counted

1. KDP 719,004

2. Change 446,095

3. PUK 323,867

4. Kurdistan Islamic Union 178,681

5. Kurdistan Islamic Group 113,260

6. Kurdistan Islamic Movement 20,795

7. Kurdistan Democratic Socialist Party 11,828

8. Communist Party 11,768

9. The Third Trend Toilers Party 8,268

10. Chaldean Syriac Assyrian Assembly 5,599

11. Kurdistan Democratic Solution Party 3,605

12. Rights of Kurdistan People 2,817

13. Party of Kurdistan Governors 2,420

14. Right of the People 2,005

15. Irbil Turkmen List 1,865

16. National Union of Kurdistan Party 1,717

17. Iraqi Turkmen Front 1,667

18. Reform and Progress 1,323

19. Sons of Mesopotamia 1,048

20. Turkmen Democratic Movement 1,002

21. Independents List 864

22. Yorab Nessan Aminaan 517

23. Beshkhan Arsha Bakwyan 342

24. Razkari Kurdistan Party 257

25. Brishan and Hazairan (withdrew) 202

26. Nubar Sipan Gahreeb 127

The KRG doesn’t really have region wide parties. Most are based upon specific provinces, cities, and tribes. The KDP ran with very little opposition in Dohuk and Irbil its stronghold. Beforehand, Kurdish Premier Nechirvan Barzani said that the party wanted to emerge as a clear winner in the election. It did so, largely due to the policies of KRG President Massoud Barzani who was able to portray himself as a nationalist leader with oil deals, development projects in the major cities, ties with Turkey, and his role in the Syrian conflict. That gave the KDP a commanding lead over the other lists, and will put it in the drivers seat when putting together a new government. The PUK found itself going in the opposite direction. Various theories have been floated for the party’s demise, but the real reason was its vacuum at the top. Its head Iraq President Jalal Talabani has been out of the country since December 2012 after he suffered a serious stroke. Like most Iraqi lists, the PUK is a vehicle for its leader. Without him the party is rudderless and divided, and there is no agreed upon successor. Several factions exist within it including Talabani’s wife, Hero Ibrahim Ahmed, who recently resigned as party head in Sulaymaniya after its defeat but remained on the politburo, KRG Vice President Kosurt Rasul, and deputy party secretary Barham Saleh. Who will be Talabani’s successor will probably not be determined until his death. Saleh himself gave an interview with Agence France Presse after the election warning that the party was splitting in Talabani’s absence. Those divisions were seen when Saleh said that the list needed to respect the will of the voters, and then armed PUK members stormed a vote counting center in Sulaymaniya City, driving off Election Commission officials, and allegedly tried to change the ballots. The PUK wanted to see where it stood, and ran alone instead of with the KDP as it had previously done. (1) Now it knows. The Change List surpassed the PUK, which was formed by a former founder of that party Nishurwan Mustafa. It came in second, which puts it in a position to enter into government if it wants. Its ascension was predicted. In September 2012 for instance, Talabani met with Mustafa in Sulaymaniya, and tried to work out an alliance between them. That was put on hold when Talabani was hospitalized. Then in July, a story floated that the PUK offered a power sharing agreement in Sulaymaniya province to Change. That would have been a tremendous concession for a ruling party to make as it has run the governorate by itself for decades. That highlighted the weakness of the PUK, and the rise of the Change List. The Kurdistan Islamic Union finished fourth, but said it was unhappy. In the last election in 2009, it ran with the other Islamic parties, and presented itself as an alternative to the KDP and PUK. In this campaign, it gave up on that image, and said that it was willing to join the government, and that cost it. The finish to the election was predictable to an extent. The KDP was running strong. The PUK was leaderless, and the Change List was the beneficiary. The final seat count has not been announced since all the ballots have not been counted, but each party has a sense of how many it will receive. Now the more important issue of putting together a new government is beginning.

The Change List finished second and now must decide whether they will participate in the new government and under what terms (Gorran)

The real story of the KRG elections will be who is included in the new ruling coalition. Before the vote, the KDP said that it would like a government with the PUK, the Islamic Union, and the minorities, while keeping Change in opposition. As Kamal Chomani of the Kurdistan Tribune pointed out, in the special election, the KDP peshmerga elected two Turkmen candidates out of the five quota seats for that group showing that there might not have been any voter fraud, but there was manipulation. That assures the KDP a larger share in whatever coalition is put together. For its part, the Change List stated that it wants real power if it decides to join. That could cause problems for the party as well as it has its own divisions between the older leadership who came from the PUK, and the younger members. Some may want to participate in the government, and then push for change, while others want real reforms immediately. The KDP is trying to position itself as the majority party in Kurdistan. It has finally surpassed the PUK, and probably does not want a new upstart party like the Change to now enter the game. At the same time, Barzani is in a dominant position, and might be willing to give a few positions to other parties knowing that his will be in the lead.

Whatever government emerges in Kurdistan there will be large expectations awaiting it. Kamal Chomani wrote that the people of the KRG want development, political reforms, and greater transparency. Part of the success of the KDP in this year’s election was that it pointed to all the wealth that it has brought to the region, while the Change List promised just that change. Now that the ballot counting process is almost completed, all of the parties will have to partake in intense negotiations to put together a government. The real linchpin of that process will be whether the KDP is willing to share power with new comers or just give them token positions, while increasing its own standing. That may be determined by whether the opposition parties can work together and present a united list of demands or whether all the winners act independently, which could open the door for a divide and conquer strategy by Barzani. The KRG is definitely going through a political transformation, but it’s still unclear in which direction it will be heading. The September vote was simply one step in this long journey.

FOOTNOTES

1. Rudaw, “Coalition Partner in Kurdistan Says it will Run Independently in Next Polls,” 4/1/13

SOURCES

Abbas, Mushreq, “Iraqi Kurdistan Election Campaigns in Full Swing,” Al-Monitor, 8/30/13

- “PUK Falls to Third Place In Iraqi Kurdistan Elections,” Al-Monitor, 9/27/13

Abdulla, Mufid, “Barham Salih warns of difficulties ahead for the PUK,” Kurdistan Tribune, 9/21/13

Ahmed, Hevidar, “Gorran Opposition Movement Facing Crisis Over National Assembly, Boycott,” Rudaw, 1/15/13

- “PUK in a Quandary After Poll Rout By Gorran,” Rudaw, 9/26/13

AIN, “IHEC: Participation rate of KR elections, 73%,” 9/22/13

- “Kurdish opposition accuses Talabani, Barzani’s parties of forging elections,” 9/24/13

Chomani, Kamal, conversation, 9/30/13

- “Iraqi Kurdistan Elections Could Be Turning Point,” Al-Monitor, 8/28/13

- “Iraqi Kurdistan Region’s Elections: towards Happiness or Disappointment,” World Bulletin, 9/18/13

Coles, Isabel, “Kurd political equation unbalanced by Iraq president’s absence,” Reuters, 3/3/13

Hassan, Hayman, “iraqi kurdish elections: campaigning fierce but change is not expected,” Niqash, 9/12/13

Insight Kurdistan, “Analysis: Pro KDP And Anti-Gorran Or Vice Versa,” 12/31/12

Iraq Times, “Saleh: loss once and evading a shameful decision of the people,” 9/24/13

Jamal, Sangar, “the biggest loser: shift in kurdish political landscape sees major player relegated,” Niqash, 9/26/13

Kurdistan Tribune, “Dana Saeed blames vote rigging & corruption for PUK poll defeat,” 9/24/13

- “PUK supporters fire their guns, but Barham Salih tells them to accept defeat,” 9/24/13

Kurdpress, “Tension enhances between PUK & Gorran supporters over election,” 9/24/13

National Iraqi News Agency, “KDP: there is a possibility of an agreement with the (Change) movement to share power in the region,” 6/6/13

Radio Nawa, “Hero Ibrahim Ahmed resigns from her position as director of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan in Sulaimaniya,” 9/30/13

Al Rayy, “UNHCR: more than 93% rate of participation in the special voting for the election of the Parliament of Kurdistan,” 9/19/13

Rudaw, “Ahead of Final Count, PUK Accepts Defeat in Kurdistan Polls,” 9/23/13

- “Coalition Partner in Kurdistan Says it will Run Independently in Next Polls,” 4/1/13

- “For First Time since Boycott, Gorran Chief Meets with Disgruntled Party Officials,” 2/14/13

- “Gorran in Government? To Be or Not To Be,” 9/24/13

- “Kurdistan’s Main Islamic Parties Decide to Run Separately in Polls,” 6/7/13

- “Mixed Reaction to Latest Results from Kurdistan Polls,” 9/29/13

Shafaq News, “The electoral distribution and number of entities’ votes of Kurdistan elections,” 9/29/13

- “Kosert: Salih and I caused the loss of PUK,” 9/25/13

- “PUK offers Change to share Sulaymaniyah,” 7/23/13

Yoshioka, Akiko, conversation 9/30/13

Zebari, Abdel Hamid, “Differences Deepen Between Iraqi Kurdish Parties,” Al-Monitor, 3/22/13

RADIO FREE EUROPE/RADIO LIBERTY VIDEO: At Least 51 Killed In Car Bombings In Iraq

VOICE OF AMERICA VIDEO: Regional Security Boosts Archeology In Northern Iraq

Explaining The Political Factors Behind The Increasing Violence In Iraq, An Interview With Maria Fantappie, Iraq Researcher At The International Crisis Group

 

Violence in Iraq has escalated to the worse levels seen since 2008. The insurgency is making a comeback, while the central government is repeating many of the mistakes made by the United States after the 2003 invasion. The cause of this crisis is a breakdown in the country’s politics. Members of the Sunni community feel increasingly alienated from the government, because their national leadership has failed, their local politicians are ignored, Baghdad has focused the security forces upon their areas, and the protest movement has not achieved any tangible results. To help explain how this situation has led to the current security crisis is Maria Fantappie, a former visiting scholar at the Carnegie Middle East Center and currently an Iraq researcher for the International Crisis Group. You can follow her on Twitter @Maria Fantappie and the International Crisis Group @CrisisGroup.

(Abdul Raheem Yasir)

1. In 2009, Sunnis went to the polls after largely boycotting the 2005 provincial vote, and helped put a slew of parties into power. In 2010, many of those same voters came out for Iyad Allawi and Iraqiya, the Iraqi National Movement (INM) which won a plurality of seats in the new parliament. How did Allawi and the other members of the INM turn out to be as national leaders, and how did their performance affect their followers’ opinion of participating in politics?

The key for political success in Iraq is to branch out power from Baghdad into the provinces. Iraqyia leaders focused all efforts on the assignment of government positions in Baghdad, neglecting local officials and constituents in the provinces. This was fatal to the future of the list. Starting from early 2011, while Iyad Allawi persisted in claiming the premiership for himself and the implementation of the Irbil agreement in Baghdad, Maliki ingrained power in the provinces: governors were replaced, police chiefs sacked and Sahwa tribal militias deprived of their salaries. Sunni constituents felt disappointed by their national leader and left under the grip of the government security agencies. Their disappointment evolved into distrust towards the political process altogether. In their eyes, Iraqyia leaders appeared not dissimilar from others of different political colors: locked within Baghdad Green Zone walls and far from people’s concerns.

2. In December 2012, Premier Maliki decided to go after then Finance Minister Rafi Issawi of the INM by issuing warrants for some of his guards. Exactly a year before, a similar situation unfolded with Vice President Tariq al-Hashemi who ended up being convicted in absentia for involvement in attacks. Previous to that, selected leaders of the local security forces known as the Sons of Iraq faced detentions as well. How did these events shape Sunni views of the security forces and Maliki’s rule?

These arrests created the premises for conflict, shaping Sunni self-perceptions and their perception of the government. Sunnis started viewing themselves as victims —targeted by the security forces, excluded from state-institutions, persecuted as terrorists or Baathists —and the government as the source of all this injustice. Al-Issawi events brought these feelings to the boil, exacerbating perceptions of the government’s anti-Sunni agenda, serving the Shiite interests within Iraq and the Iranian agenda in the Middle East. Nine-months of political crisis have turned perceptions into reality. Now more than ever, Sunnis are what they feared to be—excluded, discriminated and criminalized —and the government close to the way they had accused it to be: repressive, discriminatory and bound to Iran’s agenda.

3. How did the regional environment and Syria contribute to the escalation of Iraq’s domestic crisis into a conflict?

The regional environment polarized Iraq along sectarian lines, reducing the space for negotiation between the government and protesters. Earlier in 2013, the rise of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and the prospect of a Sunni power governing Syria nurtured Iraqi Sunnis hopes for a political comeback boosted the Iraqi Islamic Party aspirations to leadership and mobilized Iraqi Sunnis in protests. This, in turn, directly fed Maliki fears’ of the rise of Sunni radicals in the region pushing the government to assume a defensive position, close to Iran and the Shiite crescent in the region.

4. What divisions have emerged within the demonstrators, and have they been able to achieve any meaningful results?

The conflict evolved over a series of missed opportunities for dialogue from both the government’s and the demonstrators’ side. But the demonstrations’ failure to bring about political leadership gave the government one more reason to shun dialogue and persist in its immovable positions. Sunni tribes, clerics, Iraqi Islamic Party members and insurgency militants gathered into demonstrations against the government, because of a shared feeling of injustice. But protest leaders were often concerned with gaining legitimacy as prominent politicians, clerics, tribal chiefs and thus pushed forward parochial agendas rather than lobbying for the protesters’ demands. Among others, the Iraqi Islamic Party project of establishing a Sunni federal region divided the demonstrations square between proponents and opponents of federalism, and challenged the formation of any negotiation committee.

The Sunni protest movement was a symbol of the dissatisfaction with politics, but also allowed militants to gain more supporters as shown in this photo with black Al Qaeda in Iraq flags flying (AP)

5. How has the failure of national parties, arrests of leaders, and the protest movements inability to bring about changes in government played into the hands of extremists and the insurgency?

Above all, the government’s violent response provided Sunni armed groups opportunities to increase their recruitment and safe-heavens. On 23 April, the government’s violent crackdown on Hawija’s protest sit-in empowered the most radical voices among protesters and silenced those calling for dialogue. The government sowed hostility among Sunni tribes as it armed a new Sahwa faction, depriving others of their salaries, as well as among Sunni citizens, policing their neighborhoods and limiting their mobility. Baghdad lost Sunni local support and with that, the human intelligence needed to counter the re-emergence of armed activities in their areas. Insurgency cells who fought against the U.S. troops found fresh recruits among the frustrated Sunni youth and reactivated their operations in the Kirkuk and Salahaddin provinces. For the first time in years al-Qaeda in Iraq, the Islamic State of Iraq, can count again on local support.  Iraq’s al-Qaeda is now operating with impunity in western Anbar, across the Iraq and Syria border as well as in Syria under the name of Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant, gaining the support in Sunni areas, helping Iraqis and Syrians in their struggle against their respective governments, Baghdad and Damascus and the resurgence of Sunnis in the region. 

6. A major problem faced by the Sunni community since 2003 is the lack of unity. They have been split between armed struggle and participation in the government, between local and national politicians, nationalist and regional agendas, and other issues. Why do you think there have been so many divisions, and how could they start working together more effectively?

Sunnis do not necessarily need their leaders to ally on the basis of their belonging to the Sunni sect. What Sunnis need is what Iraqyia failed to provide them with: representative leaders. I see the existence of different ideological trends (e.g. Sunni secular and Islamist trends) as rather beneficial to the formation of inter-sectarian and inter-ethnic alliances that will help overcome a rather communitarian political system. Whether together or separately, both Sunni secular and Islamist trends should focus their efforts in effectively representing their base, reach out to provincial officials, help to define the demands of their constituents in the provinces and represent them in Baghdad central institutions.

7. These splits have allowed Maliki to play divide and conquer. Could you provide one or two examples of how the premier has been able to use that tactic, and why do you think he could face long-term troubles if he continues down that path?

So far, Maliki’s policy towards the Sunnis has been rather self-damaging.  Al-Issawi events unified Sunnis against the government, crashed the PM’s image as an Iraqi national leader and compelled him to seek even more U.S. and Iranian support to maintain power. The PM’s policy toward Sunni tribes is archetypal of the short-term benefits of a divide-and-conquer strategy. On February 2013, the government dismantled the Sahwa leadership and supported the formation of  new pro-governmental Sahwa corps— the New Sahwa —providing them with weaponry, salaries and privileges, leaving the former one with empty hands. Last May, al-Qaeda could expand its operations across the Iraq-Syrian frontier, mostly counting on co-operation, weaponry supplies and recruits of former Sahwa, now disenfranchised by governmental policies. In the absence of a radical change of approach, the government risks to further alienate Sunnis from the state, bolster Sunni solidarity with the Syrian armed oppositions, pushing them to cooperate with radical armed groups as a way to weaken the government legitimacy. If there is any way to insulate Iraq from the impact of the Syrian conflict and also for Maliki to secure his own power, this consists in an inclusive Iraqi state.

8. Rather than using greater force, what Iraq needs is some serious concessions and reconciliation to pull the Sunni community back to politics and away from the use of force. What kind of reforms should Baghdad consider?

In order to end violence, the government should win Sunnis back to its side. No security improvement will be reached without involving the Sunni population, security forces and tribes in fighting al-Qaeda and insurgency groups. A first step consists in dealing with outstanding issues that have generated the divide between the government and the Sunni population: deployment of security forces in Sunni populated areas, Sunni participation to the security forces, waves of arrests and exclusions upon alleged affiliation to terrorist groups and or Baathist regime. Also, Sahwa should return to be a united corps and ensured with monthly salaries. Any security plan should involve the co-operation with Sunni local officials, locally recruited police forces and Sahwa corps. Considering the number of missed opportunities to solve this conflict, it is legitimate to question whether or not the government ever made a serious effort to avoid reaching to the current level of violence.  

One of the major issues facing PM Maliki is whether he can put aside his immediate concerns and think long-term to hold onto power

9. Maliki would have to start thinking long-term to try to push for those changes. Right now he seems more focused upon looking strong in the face of the increasing violence, and preparing for next year’s parliamentary elections where he will face tough competition. Do you think he’s capable of putting aside those immediate concerns, and thinking big picture, which might assure him of a longer reign, and a more governorable country?

The lack of a legitimate Sunni leadership to ally with might turn into the prime minister’s biggest liability to a third term on power. The recent crisis delegitimized those Sunnis loyal to the prime minister and empowered a Shiite anti-Maliki bloc, the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI) in particular. Last June, the formation of local councils proved that a Shiite anti-Maliki bloc is a winning formula. ISCI and the Sadrists forged an alliance, and together with the Sunnis’ Mutahidun list garnered the majority needed to rule out Maliki’s coalition from Baghdad governorate. An isolated prime minister will hardly succeed for a third term. If, before or after the parliamentary elections, Shiite groups will stand together against the prime minister, only an alliance with a strong Sunni group could ensure Maliki a third term.

SOURCES

Carnegie Paper, “Contested Consolidation of Power in Iraq”, February 2013

International Crisis Group, “Make or Break: Iraq’s Sunnis and the State,” 8/14/13