Musings On Iraq In The News

I was mentioned in this article “Saudis now fighting in Anbar?” by Tom Ricks in his Best Defense Blog at Foreign Policy. I am also quoted and cited in the upcoming ebook by Anthony Cordesman and Sam Khazai Iraq in Crisis by the Center for Strategic and International Studies. 

HISTORY CHANNEL VIDEO: Sons Of Saddam

MILITARY CHANNEL VIDEO: Edge of War - Saddam's Rise To Power

Iraq’s Anbar Council Claims Stability Returned To Ramadi

 

Fighting continues every day in Iraq’s western Anbar province. Recently however, the Anbar provincial council has claimed that the city of Ramadi has become a bastion of stability in an otherwise unstable governorate. Its talked about the end of military operations in the city, the return of displaced families and everyday life, and called on Baghdad to send funds to help the refugees and compensate those that have suffered losses. Those statements are contradicted by the fact that Ramadi has seen the most violence in the governorate over the last several weeks.

(BBC)

Beginning at the very end of February the Anbar council started talking about the return of security to Ramadi. On February 28 there was the first press report that refugees were returning to the city. The next day the head of the council Sabah Kahout al-Halbusi was quoted as saying that the local government was going to assess the losses people suffered in Ramadi so that they could be compensated. By March 9 the deputy head of council Faleh Issawi claimed that military operations were over in the city. He went on to say that meant schools and markets were starting to re-open, and that services like electricity needed to be repaired. Oddly enough he also admitted that insurgents were still in the southern portion of the city. By the middle of March however, the Anbar council stated that the entire city had been cleared of militants. Governor Ahmed Dulaimi Diab told the media that the council was working with the army to open up the entrances to Ramadi so that more people could get back to their homes. He was feeling so confident that he even talked about the city being was safe enough to hold elections there on time in April. This has now become the official line from the Anbar council: the province still has pockets of resistance, but Ramadi is not one of them. The local politicians have increased their rhetoric over the preceding weeks about just how safe the city is. They’ve gone from just talking about families returning to claiming that the entire city is secured. Perhaps because Ramadi is the provincial capital of Anbar the council wants to believe that it’s own base of operations of safe, but that is not the case.

Citizens and security forces celebrate after clearing Malab and 60^th Street on March 17, 2014. Two days later fighting would return to those two areas.

(Iraqi News)

There are ample examples of how fighting is continuing in Ramadi in contradiction to the council’s statements. On February 28 the day that the Anbar politicians began talking about improvements in the city there were reports of fighting in three sections of Ramadi including 60^th Street, a major area of the city that has been contested between insurgents and the security forces for weeks now. That same day government artillery fire left two people wounded. March 1 there was gunfire in the eastern section of the city. March 3 there were clashes with insurgents in three parts of Ramadi including 60^th Street again. March 4 three parts of Ramadi were again contested with 60^th Street involved once more. These shoot outs continued into March 5, which included a suicide bombing on a checkpoint, into March 6 where the fighting seemed to move down from 60^th Street to 20^th, and also included Malab another district that had long ben fought over. March 8 a suicide bomber hit another checkpoint killing 12 soldiers and wounding another 15, a car bomb was launched on a bridge that left 3 police dead and four wounded. March 9 clashes resumed on 20^th Street. March 10 there was a car bomb on an Awakening patrol, and more shooting in Malab. March 11 Malab was at the center of the conflict again along with two others areas. March 13 there was conflict in the eastern section of Ramadi, along with government artillery that left 5 fatalities and 9 injuries. March 14 turned out to be the worst day in weeks with fighting in seven different sections of the city including 20^th Street and Malab. Army artillery claimed another two lives and wounded four more. March 15 and 16 the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) and insurgents battled in Malab and the south. March 17 a suicide bomber struck a patrol killing one soldier and wounding five, and then an ambush of an army patrol the next day in the central section of Ramadi that caused the death of four soldiers. March 19 fighting returned to Malab and 60^th Street. The Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIS) has also been posting pictures of its operations in the city. One of the group’s leading military commanders Abu Waheeb for example, has constantly been photographed in Ramadi. With fighting, bombings, and artillery and mortar fire reported nearly everyday in Ramadi it’s hard to see how it could be secured. The fact that 60^th Street and the Malab area have been fought over since nearly the first day of the conflict belies the claims made by the Anbar council that everything is fine. Parts of the city might be safe enough to have some families come back, but it definitely isn’t secure enough to hold elections there as the Governor claimed.

ISIS photos posted on the internet of its operations in Ramadi and its commander Abu Waheeb

The Anbar government has been talking about Ramadi being stable more and more over the past few weeks, but this is a ruse. Its claims have gone from just refugee returns to saying that there are no more military operations to stating that the whole area is now under control. The Iraqi press has another view of the city where it reports nearly daily acts of violence. Parts of Ramadi might very well be under control. Most areas of the city for example, do not appear in the news. However there are enough security incidents to show that the city is still contested and there are large contingents of insurgents present, including elements of ISIS. The Anbar council may be looking for victories since it has lost control of its governorate. It has made plenty of statements before that the province has become safer and that the militants are losing out yet the fighting continues. That hasn’t stopped the local politicians from continuing to say that Anbar is making progress, because to say otherwise would be to admit to defeat.

SOURCES

AIN, "3 Terrorists of ISIS killed, wounded eastern Ramadi," 3/1/14

- “Dozens of displaced families return to Ramadi,” 2/28/14

- "Gunmen kill some IPs central Anbar," 3/15/14

 - "Policeman killed western Ramadi," 3/5/14

- "Security forces clash with ISIL elements in Ramadi," 3/14/14

Buratha News, "/3/ armed soldiers clash in eastern Ramadi," 3/13/14

- "Death and injury of seven members of the Awakening in armed attack south of Ramadi," 3/15/14

- "Martyrdom and wounding six children by fall of a mortar shell on the playground on a popular football center of Ramadi," 3/14/14

- "Renewed armed clashes in several areas in Ramadi after they were cleared," 3/4/14

Al Forat, "Sahwa leader's convoy targeted central Ramadi," 3/10/14

Iraq Times, "dead and wounded by a car bomb at a gathering of 27 army south of Ramadi," 3/8/14

Al Mada, “Council Anbar accuses the army of derailing the peace initiatives due to continued shelling of residential neighborhoods,” 3/9/14

- "Killed and wounded 14 civilians by random bombardment of the army on Ramadi," 3/13/14

- "Killing and wounding four soldiers in an armed attack south of Ramadi," 3/14/14

Al Masalah, “Anbar Governor: our arrangements to open the entrances and exits of Ramadi,” 3/16/14

Mustafa, Hamza, “Iraq: Anbar government says Ramadi now secure,” Asharq Al-Awsat,” 3/17/14

National Iraqi News Agency, "4 Soldiers Killed in an Ambush in Central Ramadi," 3/18/14

- “Anbar governor says that the security forces captures most of Ramadi neighborhoods,” 3/14/14

- "Armed Clashes Renewed in Ramadi, with the Participation of Army Aviation," 3/3/14

- "Armed clashes resumed between army and armed elements in Ramadi," 3/14/14

- "Armed clashes resumed between military forces and insurgents in Ramadi and Fallujah," 3/11/14

- "Armed clashes resumed in central and eastern areas of Ramadi," 3/6/14

- "Armed clashes resumed in Central and Eastern of Ramadi," 3/10/14

- "Armed clashes resume in Ramadi," 3/15/14

- "BREAKING NEWS . 10, members of army killed and wounded in central Ramadi," 3/8/14

- "BREAKING NEWS. Six members of security forces killed and wounded in center of Ramadi," 3/5/14

- "Car bomb kills three policemen, injures four others," 3/8/14

- "A Civilian Killed, Three Members of One Family wounded by Artillery Bombing to the City of Ramadi," 3/14/14

- "Clashes in parts of eastern and central Ramadi," 2/28/14

- "Clashes renewed in the street 60, al-Malaab and express way in Ramadi between the army and militants," 3/19/14

- "Clashes resume in Ramadi and Fallujah," 3/16/14

- “Dozens of Families Returned to the City of Ramadi,” 3/1/14

- "Four snipers killed in central Ramadi," 3/4/14

- "Four soldiers injured in clashes amid Ramadi," 3/9/14

- "Four Soldiers Killed in an Armed Attack West of Ramadi," 3/8/14

- "Killing 15 Gunmen in Clashes in Ramadi and Wounding Two People by Shelling," 2/28/14

Al Rayy ,"The death of one soldier and wounding five others in a suicide bombing that targeted a gathering of the army in central Ramadi," 3/17/14

Anbar Before And After The Awakening Pt. XII General Nouri al-Fahadawi

 

General Nouri al-Din Abdul al-Karim Muhlif al-Fahadawi was appointed the head of intelligence in Anbar in May 2007. Before that he worked with the local police in Anbar, and then the Defense Ministry in Baghdad. In 2009 the U.S. Marine Corps interviewed him about his experiences in the province. He talked about how the Americans initially mishandled the security situation in Anbar, but then how Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) lost its support as a result of its own mistreatment of the population.

In April 2003 U.S. forces entered Anbar without a fight, but in less than a year the province would become a center for the insurgency. Local tribes set up a delegation to meet the Americans so that they could enter the province peacefully. General Fahadawi said that the governorate was secure and quite at that time and escaped the looting that was taking place in areas such as Baghdad. A government was set up, and the tribes and police were keeping order. In the next eight months however things dramatically changed as the insurgency emerged. Many local clerics began calling for jihad against the Americans, and there were plenty of those willing to answer them. Fahadawi didn’t explain why things changed, but other Anbar notables such as clerics and sheikhs gave a laundry list of mistakes the U.S. made including not securing the border, which allowed foreign fighters in, not understanding the local dynamics and who to work with, dissolving the military and Baath party, and the shooting of protesters in Fallujah, amongst others. The problem was that the Americans continued to take similar actions after the insurgency emerged only making the situation worse. Fahadawi thought the mass arrests were the most egregious because they turned so many people against the U.S. forces.

Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) eventually emerged as the most organized and best armed group in Anbar, but made its own set of missteps, which cost it dearly. AQI won followers using its money and military hardware. It then started demanding that other insurgent groups follow it or be attacked. Not only that it carried out indiscriminate killings of Iraqis. Together that led to resistance against the group. Some Anbaris began providing intelligence to the Americans on AQI. Fahadawi claimed that eventually 95% of the province were against the insurgency, and were just waiting for a cause that would lead them into action. That was what eventually led to the emergence of the Awakening in 2006.

In March 2006 General Fahadawi decided to stand up to the insurgency. He went to Baghdad to get weapons for the provincial police. He also began working with local tribes in what became known as the Anbar Revolutionaries. The group was formed in November 2005 after a meeting with the Americans, provincial officials, and local security members. (1) At first, there was only about 100 fighters in the group, and it claimed that it wanted to expel Al Qaeda so that the U.S. would leave the country as well. The general said that the Revolutionaries and the police were responsible for the heavy fighting in the province against the insurgency, and that brought him public support. That led to more recruits, and allowed for the opening of more police stations. He complained that the Interior Ministry did not acknowledge his accomplishments and would not pay for all the new policemen he brought in. Like many Anbar notables General Fahadawi liked to lay claim to turning around the security situation in the governorate. In reality, the Anbar Revolutionaries were too small a force to do much. The police were also under constant attack, and had largely fallen apart until the U.S. began supporting the Awakening and their effort to institutionalize their fighters into the local security forces. That was when the Americans began giving more backing and protection to the local police, helped open more police stations, and set up a program to send them to Jordan for training.

General Fahadawi’s remembrances are poignant today, because the mistakes the U.S. made are being repeated in Anbar right now by the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF). They too have carried out mass arrests and mistreated the locals, which have turned many against the central government. While Baghdad has some tribal allies in the province there are plenty of others who are now in open revolt against it. That’s largely because Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki has played divide and conquer with the various sheikhs in Anbar. At the same time, the current manifestation of Al Qaeda in Iraq, the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIS) is still capable of repeating its own missteps. Right now it is working with other militant groups in Anbar, but in Syria it has demanded the fealty of others and attacked those that have not followed its lead. It also continues to carry out bloody attacks upon civilians in Iraq. It appears that some Iraqis are angry enough with the Maliki government to now accept ISIS’s help. Others claim that ISIS is not in Anbar’s cities or say that they are not playing a large role in the fighting. The Islamic State however remains the largest, most well organized militant group in not only Anbar but the entire country. It may take a while but there’s every indication that history will repeat itself and those that now welcome the group will eventually turn on it. The question is whether Baghdad will be able to take advantage of it as the Americans once did.

FOOTNOTES

1. Cahill, Lydia, “Anbar Revenge Brigade Makes Progress in the Fight Against al-Qaeda,” Terrorism Focus, Jamestown Foundation, 3/28/06

SOURCES

Anderson, John Ward, “Iraqi Tribes Strike Back at Insurgents,” Washington Post, 3/7/06

Cahill, Lydia, “Anbar Revenge Brigade Makes Progress in the Fight Against al-Qaeda,” Terrorism Focus, Jamestown Foundation, 3/28/06

McWilliams, Chief Warrant Officer-4 Timothy, and Wheeler, Lieutenant Colonel Kurtis, ed., Al-Anbar Awakening Volume II, Iraqi Perspectives, From Insurgency to Counterinsurgency in Iraq, 2004-2009, Virginia: Marine Corps University, 2009

MILITARY COUNCIL & NAQSHIBANDI VIDEOS: Insurgents In Diyala, Kirkuk, and Anbar

RED CROSS VIDEO: Iraq: ICRC President Meets People Displaced By Anbar Violence