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Iraq Displacement Continues To Outpace Returns And Will Only Get Worse

The International Organization for Migration (IOM) recently reported that the number of displaced in Iraq climbed again from 3.3 million to 3.4 million. While cities like Tikrit have been touted as success stories of people going back to their homes, continued military operations are driving out more families.

The IOM counted 3,418,332 displaced in Iraq from January 1, 2014 to March 31, 2016. That was an increase from the 3,320,844 reported in late February. Anbar, 1,486,866 people, and Ninewa, 1,125,414, accounted for 76% of all the internal refugees in the country.

The cause of the increase was military operations in Salahaddin, Anbar and Ninewa. At the start of March several clearing operations were conducted in the Samarra, Tikrit, and Baiji districts. Then in the middle of that month the successful Hit campaign started in Anbar that forced around 30,000 people to leave the area. Then at the end of March the Makhmour offensive in Ninewa was launched displacing around 2,500. People were still leaving the Ramadi area as well as the security forces were driving the Islamic State out of its surrounding towns.

Things have not been all grim as people have started to go back to their home areas. In total 553,104 civilians went back to their districts. Salahaddin had the most with 262,074, followed by 131,766 in Ninewa, and 118,404 in Diyala. In Tikrit 90% of the city’s population has gone back. 71,000 people returned to the Ramadi area since March, months ahead of what local officials believed possible because of left over explosives from the Islamic State. The problem is that the number of people being forced out because of on going fighting outpaced the number of people going back.

The IOM warned that the continued movement of people was stretching the resources of it and other humanitarian groups. It and the United Nations are afraid that this crisis will only increase as the fight for Mosul approaches. That could lead to over one million people fleeing the fighting. The international community has continuously failed to meet the donation marks asked for by the U.N. That means the consequences of Mosul could completely overwhelm the aid agencies.

SOURCES

International Organization for Migration, “Displacement in Iraq Exceeds 3.4 Million: IOM,” 4/19/16

US Increasing Troops & Operations In Iraq Once Again

The United States has once again upped its participation in the war in Iraq for the second time in two months. Secretary of Defense Ash Carter was in Baghdad and announced a troop increase and greater participation. More trainers and artillery were being sent, Apache helicopters would have a bigger role, and the Kurds were getting financial help as well.

In March 2016 the U.S. sent marines covertly to Ninewa. The new force was called a temporary deployment to keep them off the books, but they pushed the American military presence in the country to over 5,000. The marines opened up a firebase to support the Iraqi army for the eventual freeing of the province. Their deployment was quickly revealed when the Islamic State killed a marine. The base marked a major change in strategy for Washington. It was now looking to place its forces near the front so that they could take part in offensive operations instead of just doing advising and training.

By early April, the Pentagon let it be known that it wanted another small increase in troops and greater freedom of action. It said more advisers and trainers would be sent, and they would work closer to the front, and that Apache helicopters would be used. This was part of President Obama’s decision to increase pressure on the Islamic State and take on Mosul by the end of the year. In order to do that, the White House wanted more direct support for the Iraqi forces.

On April 18 during a trip to Baghdad, Defense Secretary Ash Carter made a formal announcement about the new policy. 217 new troops were to be sent, which would take on a mix of duties including advising, force protection, and servicing helicopter. Most of the advisers were to come from the Special Forces and would imbed with Iraqi brigades and battalions with the 15^th Division in the Makhmour district of Ninewa. Before U.S. troops had only operated at the division level. Secretary Ash also noted that Apaches could be used for offensive operations. In December, Prime Minister Haidar Abadi turned down an offer to use the American helicopters, but now the two countries appeared to be on the same page. High Mobility Artillery Rockets Systems (HiMARS) would also be sent to Ninewa. They have the range to hit Mosul from Makhmour allowing the U.S. to back the Iraqi advance all the way to the city. Finally, $415 million would be allocated to the Peshmerga to help the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) with its military bills, while it is facing a financial crisis with its oil economy collapsing.

The Americans would also be increasing their raids upon high value Islamic State officials. On April 17, a U.S. helicopter landed in Badush, Ninewa south of Mosul and seized an IS member out of his car. The next day, American and Kurdish Special Forces killed Salman Abu Shabib al-Jabouri, aka Abu Saif, and two of his aides in Hamam Ali, Ninewa. He was in charge of operations in Makhmour and was a member of IS’s military council. These were meant to weaken IS’s leadership in Ninewa in the area where the U.S. troops are deploying to. The Pentagon was hoping to hit the militants’ foot soldiers and their leadership weakening the group from the top and bottom.

Overall, the new U.S. deployment is not much, but the White House can only work in increments given the political situation in Iraq. Premier Abadi is in a precarious situation right now, especially as his reform program is collapsing around him. Many of his critics within the Shiite parties completely reject the Americans being in the country, and the pro-Iranian ones constantly claim the U.S. is actually backing the Islamic State. Given that situation in Baghdad, Washington can only move forward in increments otherwise it would provoke a strong reaction from Abadi’s opponents, weakening him further. Together the two countries have been able to forge closer military cooperation, and the new troops will be able to provide quicker responses to threats posed by the insurgents. Hopefully that will save Iraqi lives and hasten the defeat of the Islamic State.

SOURCES

Baldor, Lolita, “Pentagon: US may set up more small outposts in Iraq,” Associated Press, 4/6/16

BBC, “US extra troops to boost fight against IS in Iraq,” 4/18/16

Coles, Isabel, “U.S.-led raids in Iraq kill and capture Islamic State fighters,” Reuters, 4/18/16

Copp, Tara, “US to send Apache helicopters, more troops to help in Mosul fight,” Stars and Stripes, 4/18/16

Munoz, Carlo, “Obama: Iraq to retake Mosul from ISIS by end of year,” Washington Times, 4/19/16

Reuters, “U.S. to send more troops to Iraq, escalating war on Islamic State,” 4/18/16

Schmidt, Michael, “Obama to Send Military Advisers Closer to Front Lines of ISIS Fight in Iraq,” New York Times, 4/18/16

Schmidt, Michael and Schmit, Eric, “US. Plans to Step Up Military Campaig Against ISIS,” New York Times, 4/16/16

Sputnik, “US, Kurdish Special Forces Kill Senior Daesh Leader in Iraq,” 4/18/16

Origins Of Iraq’s Ethnosectarian Quota System

Iraq’s ethnosectarian quotas are a mainstay of the country’s political system. There are arguments going on about it right now as Prime Minister Haidar Abadi is unsuccessfully trying to name his own ministers without having to follow them. Most people blame the American Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) for institutionalizing the quotas when it put together the Iraqi Governing Council based upon sect and ethnicity, which was then duplicated in the interim government led by Iyad Allawi and every administration afterward. What is far less known is that the opposition to Saddam came up with quotas long before the U.S. invasion.

Blame for Iraq’s ethnosectarian quotas usually rests with the United States, and for good reason. In July 2003 the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) created the Iraqi Governing Council. The 25 member group was made up of 13 Shiites, 5 Sunnis, 5 Kurds, 1 Turkmen, and 1 Assyrian Christian. In doing so, the U.S. institutionalized the idea that the government should be broken up proportionally according to the country’s different groups. The cabinet of interim Prime Minister Iyad Allawi followed that pattern, and every government that came afterward. Because of that history most would think that was the start of the practice, but it actually began years beforehand amongst Iraqi exiles.

During the 1990s there were several conference of Iraqi parties opposed to Saddam Hussein, one of which took place in Vienna in June 1992 that was based upon quotas. Most of the major groups except for the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) attended. There were 170 delegates that were determined by a quota system to try to balance the Islamist parties with the others. The religious parties got 35.5% of the representatives, the western style liberal democrats and independents, received 35.5%, the Kurds 23.5%, and the Turkmen 5.8%. The meeting led to the creation of the Iraqi National Congress (INC), which was supposed to be an umbrella organization. The decision on the representatives, while not completely based upon ethnicity and sect nonetheless set the stage for more explicit ones later on.

Massoud Barzani called for another conference to be held in Kurdistan in October 1992 dubbed the Salahaddin meeting. Again, the organizers came up with fixed numbers for those attending, this time more explicitly mixing religion and ethnicity along with political ideology. There were to be 33% Shiite Islamists, 25% Kurds, 16% Arab nationalists, 6% Turkmen, 4% democrats, 4% liberals, 4% Iraqi tribes, 3% Communists, 3% Assyrians and Christians, and 2% Sunni Islamists. In total, 234 people showed up that included the Iraqi National List, the Iraqi Communist Party, the Iraqi Democratic Party, the Independent Iraqi Authority, the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq, Dawa, the Islamic Action Organization, the Iraqi National Turkmen Party, and others that covered 90% of the opposition parties. At the end a three man presidential council was decided upon to lead the Iraqi National Congress. Again, the presidents were given to one Shiite, one Kurd, and one Sunni, which were Mohammed Ibrahim Bahr Uloom, Massoud Barzani, and General Hassan Mustafa Naqib. The Salahaddin conference showed that the anti-Saddam groups believed they needed quotas to include the wide variety of groups committed to the cause. They were also moving towards having those based more upon ethnosectarian criteria, than politics, which was the original reason they were used at the Vienna meeting.

In February 1993 there was another meeting of the INC’s presidential council in Irbil. It was decided that a consultative committee should be formed. Originally that was made up of 10 people, but then expanded to 26 to become an executive council, which was led by Ahmed Chalabi. Of those members, 33% were given to Shiite Islamists, 25% to Kurds, 7% to Sunnis, 6% to Turkmen, 6% to Assyrians, and 3% to secular and liberal parties. Here the participants were almost all based upon ethnosectarianism.

Many of these parties would return to Iraq after the 2003 U.S. invasion and become involved in politics. Some would gain seats on the CPA’s Iraqi Governing Council, and then the governments formed after 2005. It’s not clear whether they suggested quotas to CPA head Paul Bremer or the Americans thought of it their own. What the 1990s meetings showed was that the exiles were all familiar and comfortable with them as they had been using them for over a decade.  

SOURCES

Aaron, Daniel Meyers, Marisa, “Cost of Exile: The Role of the Returning Exiles In Post-2003 Iraq,” The Institute for Middle East Studies, The Elliott School of International Affairs, The George Washington University, May 2014

Al-Ahram, “Untying the knot,” 2/19/03

International Crisis Group, “Iraq’s Shiites Under Occupation,” 9/9/03

Al-Shamrani, Ali, “The Iraqi Opposition Movement: The Post-Gulf War Era 1990-1996,” Department of War Studies, King’s College, 2001

Security In Iraq Apr 8-14, 2016

Violence remained high in Iraq during the second week of April 2016. That was due to two causes. First, the Iraqi forces continued their march through Anbar, with two lesser operations in Kirkuk and Ninewa. At the same time, the Islamic State appears to be launching a mini-spring offensive. It is nowhere near as large as its previous ones, but there are more attacks than usual.

There were 141 incidents from April 8-14, 2016 in Iraq. That was just the same as the previous week when there were 144. Baghdad was the most violent province as usual with 64 incidents, followed by 19 in Ninewa, 17 in Kirkuk, 14 in Anbar, 12 in Salahaddin, 9 in Diyala, 3 in Babil, 2 in Basra, and 1 in Dhi Qar.

Those led to 271 dead and 391 wounded. There were 1 Nujafi volunteers, 2 Peshmerga, 2 Sahwa, 22 Hashd, 79 Iraqi Security Forces (ISF), and 165 civilians who died, and 2 Sahwa, 11 Peshmerga, 20 Volunteers, 32 ISF, 95 Hashd, and 231 civilians who were injured. Ninewa was the deadliest governorate with 91 fatalities. There were also 79 in Baghdad, 50 in Anbar, 33 in Kirkuk, 9 in Diyala, 7 in Salahaddin, and 1 each in Babil and Basra.

The Iraqi forces finally took Hit in western Anbar. At the start of the week 85% of the area had been cleared. By the end of the week it was taken. Freeing the town helps secure the road heading westward from Ramadi to Ain Assad base and Haditha.

The question then arises of where the Iraqi forces will head next. There appears to be no consensus as there is no unity of command in Anbar. The Hashd and ISF are still acting on their own initiatives. The Hashd started a new sweep through Subhait, the seventh since July, and announced a new operation against Garma, which they still have not been able to take after trying for two years. The approaches to southern Fallujah were also said to be secured, but those operations have never proven successful since the city was surrounded at the start of 2014. At the same time troops were being sent to Rutba, which is in the west heading towards the Syrian border. It’s likely that all of these operations will continue simultaneously as the cooperation between the different forces has not improved.

The Islamic State responded with 9 attacks in Anbar. The largest occurred in Albu Bali, Amiriya Fallujah, Hit and Subhait with infantry attacks and car bombings. A suicide car bomb got through the defenses in Albu Bali and killed 12 soldiers and wounded 2 more.

Finally, an air strike on Fallujah was blamed for killing 10 civilians and wounding 25 more. That could have been American or Iraqi.

Baghdad remained the focal point of the Islamic State. There were 64 incidents there that killed 79 and wounded 213. The south as usual had the most insurgent violence with 24 attacks including 1 grenade, 1 sticky bomb, 1 mortar, 5 shootings, and 16 IEDs. A suicide bomber was arrested in the center, and there was 1 major robbery, 4 kidnappings, and 7 bodies dumped.

Violence in Baghdad, Apr 8-14, 2016

Center: 5 – 1 Suicide Bomber Arrested, 1 Kidnapping, 3 IEDs

East: 8 – 1 Shooting/Robbery, 2 Shootings, 2 IEDs, 3 Sticky Bombs

Outer East: 2 – 1 Sticky Bomb, 1 IED

North: 6 – 1 Kidnapping, 1 Mortar, 2 Shootings, 2 IEDs

Outer North: 8 – 1 Sticky Bomb, 1 Shooting, 6 IEDs

South: 10 – 1 Sticky Bomb, 3 Shootings, 6 IEDs

Outer South: 14 – 1 Grenade, 1 Mortar, 2 Shootings, 10 IEDs

West: 7 – 1 Shootings, 2 Sticky Bombs, 4 IEDs

Outer West: 2 – 1 Mortar, 1 IED

Unknown: 3 – 1 Newspaper raided, 2 Kidnappings

In Basra there continued to be political violence. There were attacks on a customs house, a South Oil Company officer was shot and killed in his house, and a sound bomb went off on an employee of the Deputy governor.

The previous week there was a suicide bombing in Dhi Qar. The second week of April another suicide bomber was arrested in Nasiriyah before he could carry out an attack. That showed IS is reaching out to new targets during its offensive.

Violence has picked back up in Kirkuk. There were 17 incidents during the week. IS attacked Kurdish positions five times. There was also a heavy firefight with the Hashd led forces during the Bashir operation that killed 19 police and Hashd and wounded 90. The second phase of the Bashir sweep was announced on April 9, but then it was called off due to bad weather. For a few weeks there was only one attack per week in the province, but now things have returned to normal in part in response to the Hashd offensive.

The ISF Makhmour campaign in Ninewa went so badly that it was postponed on April 5. The two Iraqi units carrying out the operation were novices, and quickly bogged down due to bad weather and heavy resistance by the IS. The militants launched a series of car bomb and suicide attacks to drive back the ISF, but they were turned back.

There was also an attack upon the Kurdish positions in Gwar, and a mortar attack on the Zilcan camp where volunteers for ex-Governor Nujafi are being trained by Turkish troops that killed 1 and wounded 20.

IS executed 35 people in Mosul. A mass grave was also discovered with the bodies of 40 ISF members in it who had been executed by the Islamic State.

There were 12 incidents in Salahaddin. The number wasn’t important, but the locations were. There were attacks outside of Tikrit, and in the Baiji district showing that IS had moved back into those areas. It’s gotten to the point that there are clashes and bombings in those areas a couple times a week.

There was only one successful car bombing during the week, which occurred in Anbar. The Iraqi forces claimed they destroyed 17 more in Anbar, 13 in Ninewa, and 3 each in Kirkuk and Salahaddin. Those figures are unreliable as the ISF and Hashd regularly exaggerate how many they are able to blow up and defeat.

Violence In Iraq 2015-16

Date	Incidents	Dead	Wounded
JAN	911	2,656	3,032 + 150
FEB	730	2,345	2,366
MAR	820	2,665	2,529
APR	751	2,753	2,621
MAY	674	2,565 + 1,499	1,952 + 646
JUN	708	2,153 + 405	2,174
JUL	688	2,716	3,198 + 4,024
AUG	684	2,440 + 760	1,777
SEP	649	1,731	1,668 + 3,003
OCT	589	1,144	1,555
NOV	530	1,174	1,455 + 124 + 1,322
DEC	553	1,155	1,252 + 5,920
Jan 1-7	150	808	421
Jan 8-14	140	436	417
Jan 15-21	135	275	227
Jan 22-28	132	392	322
Jan 29-31	41	81	334
JAN	598	2,052	1,721
Feb 1-7	146	575	313
Feb 8-14	119	146	323
Feb 15-21	130	225	239
Feb 22-29	153	371	690
FEB	549	1,281	1,566
Mar 1-7	183	321	478
Mar 8-14	168	408	415
Mar 15-21	130	349	409
Mar 22-28	135	213	420
Mar 29-31	49	172	121
MAR	665	1,463	1,843
Apr 1-7	144	239	444
Apr 8-14	141	271	391

Security By Province Apr 8-14, 2016

Province	Incidents
Anbar	14 Incidents 50 Killed: 1 Sahwa, 16 Civilians, 33 ISF 45 Wounded: 7 ISF, 38 Civilians 5 Shootings 4 IEDs 1 Suicide Bomber 1 Suicide Car Bomb 1 Mortar 7 Suicide Bombers Killed 1 Suicide Car Bomb Destroyed 16 Car Bombs Destroyed
Babil	3 Incidents 1 Killed: 1 Civilian 1 Wounded: 1 Civilian 1 Shooting 1 IED
Baghdad	64 Incidents 79 Killed: 1 Sahwa, 2 Hashd, 5 ISF, 71 Civilians 213 Wounded: 2 Sahwa, 4 Hashd, 24 ISF, 183 Civilians 12 Shootings 35 IEDs 8 Sticky Bombs 3 Mortars 1 Grenade 1 Suicide Bomber Arrested
Basra	2 Incidents 1 Killed: 1 Civilian 1 Shooting 1 IED 1 Sound Bomb
Dhi Qar	1 Incident 1 Suicide Bomber Arrested
Diyala	9 Incidents 9 Killed: 9 Civilians 11 Wounded: 2 Hashd, 9 Civilians 3 Gunfire 5 IEDs 1 Suicide Bomber Killed
Kirkuk	17 Incidents 33 Killed: 1 ISF, 1 Peshmerga, 12 Civilians, 19 Hashd 99 Wounded: 1 ISF, 9 Peshmerga, 89 Hashd 7 Shootings 3 IEDs 1 Suicide Bomber 2 Rockets 2 Mortars 6 Suicide Bombers Killed 3 Suicide Car Bombs Destroyed
Ninewa	19 Incidents 91 Killed: 1 Volunteer, 1 Peshmerga, 40 ISF, 49 Civilians 22 Wounded: 2 Peshmerga, 20 Volunteers 5 Shootings 17 IEDs 2 Mortars 13 Suicide Bombers Killed 8 Suicide Car Bombs Destroyed 3 Car Bombs Destroyed
Salahaddin	12 Incidents 7 Killed: 1 Hashd, 6 Civilians 8 Shooting 1 IED 13 Suicide Bombers Killed 2 Suicide Car Bombs Destroyed 1 Car Bomb Destroyed

Car Bombs In Iraq Apr, 2016

Date	Car Bombs	Dead	Wounded
Apr 1	Hit, Anbar
Apr 2	Hit, Anbar – 3 destroyed
Apr 3
Apr 4	Baghdadi x2, Anbar Meshada & Taji, Baghdad Basra, Basra Baghdadi, Rashad, Shihabi, Subhait, Anbar – 21 destroyed Abu Ghraib, Baghdad – 2 destroyed Nasir, Ninewa – 6 destroyed Siniya, Salahaddin – 2 destroyed	16	35
Apr 5	New Baghdad, Baghdad Baghdadi & Subhait, Anbar – 9 destroyed Tal Ahmed, Kirkuk – 1 destroyed Makhmou, Nasir, Ninewa – 13 destroyed	3	14
Apr 6	Kubaisa, Anbar – 3 destroyed Nasir, Ninewa – 7 destroyed
Apr 7	160 Kilo, Garma, Hit, Anbar – 7 destroyed Tal Ahmed, Kirkuk – 3 Destroyed Hardan, Ninewa – 2 destroyed Shirqat-Baiji Road, Salahaddin – 2 destroyed
Totals	7 – 81 Destroyed	19	49
Apr 8	Hit, Anbar – 10 destroyed Makhmour, Ninewa – 7 destroyed
Apr 9	Albu Bali, Anbar Hit & Subhait, Anbar – 6 destroyed	12	2
Apr 10	Bashir, Kirkuk – 3 destroyed Nasir, Ninewa – 1 destroyed Baiji, Salahaddin – 2 destroyed
Apr 11
Apr 12	Hit, Anbar – 1 destroyed Nasir, Ninewa – 2 destroyed
Apr 13	Makhmour & Nasir, Ninewa – 3 destroyed
Apr 14	Makhoul, Salahaddin – 1 destroyed
Totals	1 – 36 Destroyed	12	2

SOURCES

AFP, "Iraq says town of Heet retaken from IS after weeks of fighting," 4/14/16

Adel, Loaa, "Source: Unidentified men detonate local-made IED near customs office in Basra," Iraqi News, 4/10/16

Alsumaria, "Killed the procurement official at the South oil Company by unidentified gunmen in Basra," 4/12/16

Buratha News, "Anbar Operaions announces the destruction of a car bomb and Daash boats in Hit," 4/12/16

eKurd, "iraqi Kurdistan News in brief - April 15, 2016," 4/15/16

Al Forat, "The arrival of fresh troops from the popular crowd to Rutba in preparation to free it," 4/11/16

- "Car bomb in Makhoul Mountains," 4/14/16

- "Commander in Nienveh operations: Euphrates death of 7 Daash suicide bombers in Makhmour," 4/8/16

- "Destroyed 10 car bombs in Hit," 4/8/16

Fox News Lation, "58 Jihadists die in attacks, skirmishes in Iraq," 4/9/16

Al Maalomah, "Destroyed a car bomb in Ninewa," 4/13/16

- "Nineveh Command destroyed two car bombs," 4/13/16

Al Mada, "Hit Council announces liberation of 85% of Hit and confirms 30 Daash gunmen killed," 4/8/16

- "Killing and injuring 134 members of the Popular Crowd and Daash during the liberation battles of Bashir south of Kirkuk," 4/10/16

- "Security officer and seven cohorts killed in Garma by Daash east of Fallujah," 4/9/16

- "Suicide bomber arrested in Dhi Qar who was planning an attack in central Nasiriyah," 4/14/16

Mamoun, Abdelhak, "ISIS security official of Karma District killed in eastern Fallujah," Iraqi News, 4/10/16

- "Security forces to liberate and cleanse al-Karma District in 72 hours," Iraqi News, 4/11/16

New Sabah, "Security file," 4/11/16

NINA, "-7 Suicide Bombers Killed South of Mosul," 4/13/16

- "Anti-terrorism forces contine freeing all regions of Heet," 4/9/16

- "Daash Bomb Zilcan Camp, North Of Mosul," 4/12/16

-"Found a mass grave containing the remains of 40 of the local security forces south of Mosul," 4/9/16

- "Iraqi Army Repels IS Attack Near Makhmour," 4/10/16

- "Leader of Rapid Intervention Brigade completed first encirclement of Fallujah Enemy incurred losses in lives and equipment," 4/14/16

- "The start of the second phase of liberation of Bashir village southern city of Kirkuk," 4/9/16

NRT, "Iraqi Army Repels IS Attack Near Makhmour," 4/10/16

Rudaw, "Iraqi army delay al-Nasr offensive," 4/5/16

Shafaq News, "Security commander repulsed two Daash suicide attacks north Baiji," 4/10/16

Xinhua, "23 IS militants killed in clashes, airstrikes in Iraq," 4/10/16