Brad Swanson was a former State Department official and
international investment banker from Virginia when he got a call in early 2004
to work for the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA). His friend, Michael
Fleischer was in charge of private sector development, and needed help because
his office was understaffed. Swanson eventually arrived in Baghdad in March and
spent the next four months working on trying to get Iraqi businesses up and
running after the invasion. During those few months in Iraq he became
disillusioned with the U.S. effort believing that the CPA was trying to do far
too much than it had time or ability. Here is an interview with Swanson about
his time working for the CPA, and what he thought went wrong.
1. Michael Fleischer
called you in February 2004 asking you to work on private sector development
with the CPA. What appealed to you that made you leave your family and go work
in Iraq?
I felt a duty as a citizen to help repair the damage of this
mistaken war, and I wanted to help my friend and former Foreign Service
colleague cope with a daunting undertaking. Also I recognized the great
significance of what was happening, and the former reporter and former diplomat
in me had to be there to witness history in the making!
2. Can you talk about
some of the Iraqis you worked with, and what were the problems you ran into
with the bureaucracy to make your plans reality?
As a specialist in financial services in developing
countries, I was very impressed by the sophistication and commercial skills of
the Iraqi businessmen (and yes, they were almost all men), whom I was tasked to
help rebuild their enterprises. They were eager to restore a normal
environment, but as the security situation degraded by the day, and they and
their families endured hijackings, extortion, bombings, assassinations and a
general meltdown of markets and public life, they lost much of their hope in
the future. Nevertheless, they persisted, with doggedness and even humor, to
make the most of a failing situation.
Even more impressive were the Iraqi employees of the U.S.
occupation authority in the Green Zone, coming from all skill levels, manual
laborers to high-level white collar workers. They were targeted for reprisals
by the insurgents and although they tried to hide their employment, a number of
them were found out and subjected to torture and death. I used to watch them
coming into the Green Zone in the morning and leaving in the afternoon. The
zone was in the middle of a dense city, and no one could cross the wire without
being observed. The money was good, and unemployment was at a high level, but
it took more than money to motivate these people in the face of such risk. Few
were demonstrative in their feelings, but it was clear that they understood the
danger of their situation and their quiet courage was inspiring.
Seeing this, I grew dispirited as I realized that we were failing
the Iraqi people through our own clumsy and obtuse bureaucracy. Congress had
appropriated ample funds for private sector redevelopment, but we had to work
through the USG formal procurement system, governed by a 1,000-page manual,
which was absurdly out of place in a wartime environment. Ironically, some
other parts of the CPA were awash in cash, coming through channels with little
oversight, but still not much to show for it, while our department was mired in
endless rounds of paper shuffling. I personally did not have the influence to resolve
the quandary. While we failed to create jobs through our own incompetence, the
ranks of the well-funded insurgency grew.
3. When and why did
you start thinking that there were flaws with the CPA’s approach to Iraq?
From my first day on the job in Baghdad I saw the
dysfunction in the CPA’s structure and approach. A Wild West atmosphere
prevailed with multiple power centers and little coordination. The antagonism
between the senior military commander, [General] Rick Sanchez, and the CPA
Administrator, Jerry Bremer, was palpable. The occupation formally aimed at
creating a power structure with Iraqis in charge to which it could hand over in
a few months, but there was a deep vacuum within Iraq that no amount of constitution
writing and political maneuvering could fill. While the would-be politicians
shadow boxed, Iraq slipped every day further into violence and anarchy. At the
same time, much of the CPA’s attention was focused on spinning the story for
the U.S. audience and making the Administration look good, and this detracted
from a clear-eyed vision of how to restore stability to a fractured country.
4. You told George
Packer for his Assassins’ Gate book
that you believed the U.S. went through two phases in Iraq from 2003-2004. 1st
was the arrogance phase, and then the hubris one. Could you explain what you
meant by that?
By arrogance, I mean the willfully ignorant plans of the
White House and the DOD [Department of Defense] to lop off the head of the Iraqi
government and replace it by a hand-picked group of exiles, led by Ahmed
Chalabi, who would slide smoothly into place and lead the country into a bright
future under U.S. tutelage. No one who had even an elementary knowledge of
Iraq’s recent history, and who understood Chalabi and his coterie, would have
been so blind to the unreality of the plan. What happened in the aftermath of
the invasion – the complete crumbling of the façade of governance that had only
been held together by Saddam’s terror – was predictable, and predicted by many
before the war, but these voices were not listened to. Of course, by that
point, it was too late – we were immured in a chaotic situation with far too
few resources to hold it together, and with a game plan that had lost all
possibility of being implemented.
By hubris, I mean the phase that followed the realization
that our “occupation lite” strategy was a failure. Instead of focusing on
security and getting people back to work, we created the CPA with a grandiose
set of goals to completely rebuild the Iraqi political and government system--
with advisors in every ministry, with rewrites of the law codes and business
regulations, with a complicated, and accelerated, transition to democracy. The
scope of CPA’s brief was outlandish, especially in view of its brief lifespan.
5. You also believed
that the CPA suffered from groupthink, how so?
In the hothouse atmosphere of the Green Zone, with deadly
risk just outside the wire and mortars sailing overhead, with staff crowding
offices and densely housed in trailers, there was an intense sense of community
and a tight focus on mission. Also, there was a clear emphasis from the
leadership not to embarrass the Administration. Accordingly, skeptical thinking
was discouraged. After a while, even those who harbored serious doubts found
their objectivity eroding. Their desire to maintain morale began to shape their
opinions. The semblance of belief became belief.
6. Instead of trying
to completely transform Iraq you thought that the U.S. should have been much
more pragmatic and focused upon security and the economy. What would that have
looked like and why would it have been more effective?
Most importantly, a clear focus on security would not have
led to the disbanding of the Iraqi army. We went into Iraq gravely undermanned
to contain the chaos that ensued. Instead of firing the Iraqi armed forces we
should have co-opted them. Certain senior officers needed removal, of course,
but the bulk of the army was apolitical, and would have been grateful for
continued employment and mentoring by the more professional U.S. forces. Instead,
many of the dismissed soldiers, disappointed and out of funds, turned to the
insurgency.
Regarding the economy, we wasted a lot of time and effort on
promoting foreign investment (a politically motivated absurdity during an
active insurgency); seeking to sell off state-owned enterprises; rewriting
commercial codes; reforming the stock exchange; and other peripheral activity.
Instead, we should have used the billions of dollars we had available to
directly subsidize the inefficient but job-filled parastatal sector; make loans
available on soft terms to any reasonable job-creating enterprise; protect
Iraqi industry by taxing or prohibiting imports; and other activity that would
help to stabilize employment and production in the short term, even if it went
against classic free market principles.
SOURCES
Packer, George, The
Assassins’ Gate, America In Iraq, New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2005
Swanson, Brad, “Broken, but not beyond repair,” San
Francisco Chronicle, 10/11/04
4 comments:
Of course, "the Brinkley Group" and various other programs ended up subsidizing Iraqi SOEs - years later.
The flood of imported goods when the borders were opened relieved pent-up demand for consumer goods, but it also destroyed domestic manufacturing. I wonder whether there was a better approach there.
As many people have commented on before the CPA should have kept up tariffs on products that Iraqi companies could produce and lower those on ones they couldn't It should have also been most concerned with keeping as many people employed as possible rather than firing the security forces, Baathists, and those that worked for state owned enterprises. Even after the CPA was disbanded the policy of trying to privatize and enforce "shock therapy" continued. As you mentioned, it wasn't until the Brinkley group came along that there was a real effort to change that. The problem as ever was that many Americans in Iraq either 1) didn't care about the businesses and economy or 2) didn't trust the Iraqis and wanted to do everything themselves
Really well put, thanks Brad and Joel for keeping this project alive. These were my thoughts exactly from Al Anbar in the same period. We needed state provided jobs for a two year period while we got the politics and security settled. I argued this to no avail with Ambassador Bremer, who was more concerned that we might be setting up a statist petro-state, to which i argued, what is wrong with a stable, statist petro state. CPA officials were all afluter over the transition in Eastern Europe and someone made the mistake of citing Hungary, where i was TDY from, as a positive example of privatizing a statist economy. This was a total misreading of the Hungarian case -- where the first post communist government didn't touch the economy for four years, waiting for the Socialists to come in witht he Bokros plan to do so. Those four years bought them political stabilty, exactly what we needed in Iraq. Also needed to grow the security sector massively, which would have taken up most of the slack in the labor market.
Hi Keith,
Thank you for sharing your experiences. I think everyone besides Bremer believes that the CPA took an ideological approach to the Iraqi economy and other issues, which could be called mistaken at best. Even after the CPA was disbanded many of these policies persisted to the detriment of Iraq.
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