Review Helfont,
Samuel, Compulsion
In Religion, Saddam Hussein, Islam, and the Roots of Insurgencies In Iraq,
New York: Oxford University Press, 2018
Samuel Helfont and Compulsion
In Religion, Saddam Hussein, Islam, and
the Roots of Insurgencies In Iraq deals with the much debated topic of the
role of religion during the period of Saddam Hussein. Some have argued that
Saddam embraced religion during the last few years of his regime, others
believed that the Iraqi state weakened under sanctions allowing for more
freedom at mosques and Islamists, others think the Baathists co-opted religion to
maintain its control. Helfont takes that latter approach, but in a much more
thorough way than previous authors based upon extensive research within the
captured Baathist documents that now resident in the United States.
Helfont's book breaks down into four broad time periods. First,
is the Baathist founder Michel Aflaq and how his ideas shaped Saddam’s stance
towards Islam. Second, the 1980s when Saddam made his first effort to control
the religious sphere in Iraq. Third, the 1990s when that policy came to
fruition and the government was confident enough that it launched a Faith
Campaign. Finally, how the 2003 U.S. invasion wiped away the institutions and
bureaucracy that the Baathists created, which led to the emergence of
religious, sectarian groups and an Islamist insurgency.
Michel Aflaq the Syrian founder of the Baath Party argued
that Islam was the religion of the Arabs and could be used as part of his Arab nationalist
cause. He wrote three essays on the topic in the 1940s and 50s that argued that
Islam was the embodiment of Arab nationalism. Aflaq thought it would further
the Baathists goals of creating a new Arab world. This is an important point
that Helfont brings up because much of the writing about the Baathists believe
that they were a secular party and had no interest in religion. To the
contrary, Aflaq, who was himself a Christian, thought it was an important part
of the Arab past and present that could be used to mobilize the masses. Saddam
read Aflaq’s writings and would make it required reading for party members.
Saddam felt it necessary to spread Aflaq’s views in Iraq because the country
was facing the threat of the Iranian Revolution in 1979 and then the Iran-Iraq
War in 1980, which both threatened to rally Iraq’s Shiite population against
their government. That would set Baghdad’s course for the next thirty odd
years.
In 1979 Saddam held a meeting with his advisers and decided that
the government would take control of the religious sphere to protect the regime
from threats not only emerging from Iran, but also from Wahabis and Salafis. In
the 1980s Baghdad set about educating the public about the Baath Party’s view
on religion, that it believed in faith, and that it was part of the drive for
Arab unity. He ordered surveys and studies of all the religious men in the
country to identify who was a potential threat and who could be brought into
the government’s plans. Saddam then began setting up an infrastructure to
monitor and use religion for the regime. That included turning the Endowments
Ministry into the Religious Affairs and Endowments Ministry and putting it
directly under the president’s office. Passing laws and rules that made all
religious leaders and scholars pass tests to practice. Making imams and clerics
clear all of their sermons with the authorities and make sure they followed
government themes such as the evil of Khomeini during the Iran-Iraq War. Religious
committees were created throughout each province that gave another means to observe
religious leaders. Iraq would expand this program internationally with the
Popular Islamic Conference that brought together clerics and religious scholars
from around the world to meet in Baghdad. Another institution was the Saddam
University for Islamic Studies created in 1988. All the students were given
extensive background checks to make sure they would be pliant to the regime’s
themes. When they graduated they would go out to mosques and communities and
spread those messages. Imams and clerics were offered funding as another way to
bring them into the fold. Finally, the security agencies were sent into the
mosques to check what they were doing, and infiltrated religious groups to spy
upon them. This was a calculated and long term program, meant to inform the
government about the state of religion in the country. Then to co-opt and control
the religious men over a series of years by making them pass tests, have their
sermons checked, create a new cadre that were educated under the government, and
monitor their activities.
There also a violent aspect to the campaign. As Helfont and
other recent scholars that have looked at the Baath documents have found,
Saddam preferred co-option as the first choice, but when that didn’t work he
was perfectly willing to stomp out those that would not comply. The Muslim
Brotherhood for example, was nearly wiped out by the security agencies, and
most of its leadership either had to work secretly or went into exile. The
Shiite community was harder to deal with initially because the clerics relied
upon tithes, making them economically independent, had long standing religious
schools, and a set hierarchy that promoted clerics. Even then, by the 1990s the
government had been able to achieve widespread compliance at least, some
supporters, and others that would not openly challenge the government. Those
that did such as the Hakim and Sadr families had their leaders executed and
others forced to leave Iraq.
By the 1990s, Saddam was confident enough that religion had
been brought under control that he used it in the Gulf War and afterward
launched a Faith Campaign. The West was shocked when Saddam made two speeches
in 1990 calling on the Muslim world to rise up against the United States and
declared a jihad. There was even more surprise when the Faith Campaign began in
1993. Many believed that either Saddam had become a committed Muslim or the
government was so weakened after the war and due to sanctions that it could not
stop the rise of Islamism which was sweeping across the Arab world at the time. Helfont dispels both of those showing that Saddam always had faith, but it was
one shaped by Aflaq and the Baath Party, and two, the government had spent the
last decade building up an entire system to control religion and get rid of any
opponents that might come from that area. The jihad speeches and Faith Campaign
did not come out of the blue then, but as the book clearly shows were the
fruition of years of work.
The last section of Compulsion
In Religion adds another new element to the history of Iraq. When the
Americans invaded in 2003 they wiped out the Baathist state and the system that
was in place to control religion. Without that groups that had been forced
underground like the Sadrists emerged. Shiite exile groups like Dawa and the
Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq returned. Foreign Islamists
like Abu Musab al-Zarqawi came as well. None of these groups could openly
operate under Saddam, but now had the freedom to do so under the Americans who
were unprepared to rule Iraq. All added a new level of sectarianism and
violence that would eventually throw the country into civil war by 2006, and
seized nearly one-third of the country in 2014. The U.S. came into Iraq with
little to no knowledge of what was going on within the country. Many believed
that the Iraqi state was weak, the war would wipe it away, and the rest of
Iraqi society would then be free. There was also the belief that the Shiite
south would welcome the Americans and even rejoice being free of the
dictatorship. Instead the Baath were still strong, and exerted control over all
different aspects of society not just religion right up to 2003. The Americans
would not only destroy its infrastructure but through a series of decisions
like deBaathification and disbanding the military would enrage many people
giving more room for militants to operate and sow dissension.
Compulsion In Religion
is one of a series of recent books to use the Baathist documents to shed new
light on the former regime. Helfont provides a totally original look at how
Saddam observed, co-opted, repressed, and then operationalized religion to
secure his rule and use it as another means to control society. He counters
much of the previous research that largely dismissed religion in Iraq under the
Baath. The book could also lead to a whole new range of research into how the
insurgency and militias emerged in post-2003 Iraq. It’s therefore essential
reading for Iraq researchers.
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