Sadr wants a majority government and to exclude two of his main rivals former Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki and Asaib Ahl Al-Haq who are close to Tehran. There have been endless talks and violent attacks upon Sadr’s allies but he has not given up on his vision.
Iran’s position on negotiations has shifted over time. At first, Tehran focused upon getting Sadr and the Framework to unite to preserve Shiite power in the government. It sent the head of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Quds Force General Ismail Qani to Baghdad to talk to all of those involved. Al Mada repeatedly reported in January that he pushed the Framework to even sacrifice Maliki if it meant a deal could be made. This has always been a goal of Iran to maintain Shiite supremacy over the government since so many of their leaders are friends of Tehran. Asking the Framework to give up on Maliki however would mean it losing its largest vote getter. As a result Qani’s efforts failed.
In February Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei became personally involved in the process. He told the Coordination Framework it must remain united and demand that all of its members be included in the next government. Khamenei also sent threatening letters to the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and Sunni leaders for working with Sadr. In March the Revolutionary Guards fired missiles at Irbil claiming it was targeting Israeli bases there but it occurred just hours after the last talks between Sadr and the Framework failed. Some are taking it as the latest attack to get the KDP to abandon Sadr and join the Framework. So far Iran’s new strategy is working as well as its original one.
At the end of March parliament is supposed to vote on a new president. If the Tripartite Alliance can get its candidate elected it will be another step towards forming a majority government and a major setback for Iran. If the Framework is able to block the vote however the status quo might change and Tehran might have an opening to cut a deal.
SOURCES
Asharq Al-Awsat, “Iran’s Khamenei Bars Sadr’s Rivals in Iraq from Joining his Coalition,” 2/9/22
Al Mada, “The Coordination Framework meets with Sadr over government, even if it costs the isolation of al-Maliki,” 1/3/22
- “Coordination Framework removes al-Maliki and is ready to prosecute members of the Dawa Party in exchange for merging with al-Sadr,” 1/18/22
- “A new crisis between Al-Sadr and the Coordination Framework over the Prime Minister and the fate of the rest of the State of Law,” 1/20/22
- “A new mission for the Revolutionary Guards “breaking up the Tripartite Alliance” and the next goal is the Sunni forces,” 3/16/22
- “The removal of Maliki and Khazali encourages Al-Sdar to include the Coordination Committee in the majority coalition," 1/19/22
- “Al-Sadr informed Qaani that Al-Maliki’s chances has ended, and advised the latter to go to the opposition,” 2/10/22
Mansour, Renad and Robin-D’Cruz, Benedict, “Why Muqtada al-Sadr Failed to reform Iraq,” Foreign Policy, 3/10/22
Xinhua, "12 ballistic missiles hit Iraq's Kurdish regional capital," 3/13/22
- “Iraqi parliament to elect new president on March 26,” 3/16/22
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