UN Weapons Inspections In Iraq (1991-2009)

This timeline covers the two rounds of U.N. weapons inspections in Iraq, the first following the 1991 Gulf War and the second before the 2003 invasion.

 

Musings On Iraq UN Inspectors Were Right Iraq Was Not A Threat

Musings On Iraq Iraq’s Rejection of UN Inspectors Led To Mistrust Over WMD and 2003 Invasion

Musings On Iraq Charles Duelfer’s Account Of The End Of The 1990s U.N. Inspections

Musings On Iraq Chilcot Inquiry Section 3.6 Development of UK Strategy and Options, November 2002 to January 2003

Musings On Iraq review The Saddam Tapes

Musings On Iraq review of Iraq In The Eye of the Storm

Musings On Iraq review The Report of the Iraq Inquiry, Executive Summary

Musings On Iraq review Out Of The Ashes, The Resurrection of Saddam Hussein

Musings On Iraq review Neighbors, Not Friends, Iraq And Iran After The Gulf Wars

 

1991

Apr 3 UN Resolution 687 said Iraq had to destroy its WMD and long range missiles Iraq had

to make a declaration on its WMD and nuclear programs by 4/17/91 UN Secretary General would create a weapons inspection commission by 5/17/19

 

May 14 UN nuclear inspectors arrived in Iraq

 

May 15 International Atomic Energy Agency started first weapons inspection in Iraq

 

Jun 9 1st UN weapons inspection of Iraq’s WMD began

 

Jun 23 2nd International Atomic Energy Agency inspection team arrived in Iraq

 

Jun 25 Iraqis fired on UN weapons inspectors at suspected nuke site

(Musings On Iraq Chilcot Report Sec 1.1 UK Iraq Strategy 1990 To 2000)

 

Jun 28 UN inspectors denied access to Fallujah nuclear site while trucks took equipment

            out                                                                                                       

(Musings On Iraq Chilcot Report Sec 1.1 UK Iraq Strategy 1990 To 2000)

 

Jun 30 Saddam created special committee headed by Tariq Aziz to conceal weapons

            programs from UN inspectors

(Musings On Iraq Chilcot Report Sec 1.1 UK Iraq Strategy 1990 To 2000)

(Musings On Iraq review Out Of The Ashes, The Resurrection of Saddam Hussein)

Jun 30 1st WMD inspection team arrived in Iraq

 

Jul 7 UN inspectors found several kilograms of enriched uranium and large stocks of natural

            uranium from Iraq’s nuclear weapons program

Jul 7 Iraq Foreign Min Hussein told UN that it would make a declaration of its nuclear program Hussein

said Iraq had not violated Non-Proliferation Treaty or IAEA safeguards

Musings On Iraq review Out Of The Ashes, The Resurrection of Saddam Hussein

Jul 7 Iraq’s concealment committee met Decided to reveal details about nuke program after inspectors

found site Decided to secretly destroy WMD programs and materials to hide them from inspectors Would prove long term problem because Iraq could never fully prove what it destroyed and what it was hiding to inspectors

(Musings On Iraq Chilcot Report Sec 1.1 UK Iraq Strategy 1990 To 2000)

(Musings On Iraq review The Saddam Tapes)

(Musings On Iraq review of Iraq In The Eye of the Storm)

 

Jul 8 Iraq admitted to UN inspectors it had 3 secret programs to enrich uranium to

            build a nuclear bomb Before Iraq denied it had any nuclear weapons program

(Musings On Iraq Chilcot Report Sec 1.1 UK Iraq Strategy 1990 To 2000)

(Musings On Iraq review The Saddam Tapes)

(Musings On Iraq review Out Of The Ashes, The Resurrection of Saddam Hussein)

 

Jul 18 UN inspectors formally condemned Iraq for violating agreement over inspections

Jul 18 UN inspectors found hidden Iraqi missile program and destroyed equipment

(Musings On Iraq review Out Of The Ashes, The Resurrection of Saddam Hussein)

 

Jul 27 4th International Atomic Energy Agency inspection team entered Iraq Concluded Iraq had

            a nuclear bomb program

 

Jul 30 Iraq admitted to have four times as many chemical munitions as it claimed before

            to UN weapons inspectors

(Musings On Iraq Chilcot Report Sec 1.1 UK Iraq Strategy 1990 To 2000)

(Musings On Iraq review The Saddam Tapes)

(Musings On Iraq review Out Of The Ashes, The Resurrection of Saddam Hussein)

 

Aug 6 Iraq told UN weapons inspectors that it worked on anthrax and botulin toxin as

            part of its biological weapons program

 

Aug 8 3rd WMD inspection team arrived in Iraq Baghdad admitted it worked on supergun

            program

 

Aug 11 US flew U2 spy plane over Iraq claiming it was for UN inspectors

 

Aug 15 UN Resolution 707 said Iraq was in flagrant violation of weapons inspectors 

            Allowed inspectors to use planes and helicopters for flights inside Iraq

Aug 15 Baghdad objected to Res 707 saying US had flown U2 spy plane over Iraq

            claiming it was for inspectors

 

Sep 6 4th WMD inspection team arrived in Iraq Baghdad refused to allow them to use their

            own helicopters Offered to have Iraqi army fly them around

 

Sep 22 UN inspectors went to Nuclear Design Center in Baghdad Found docs that detailed secret

nuclear weapons program and secret facility in Baghdad

 

Sep 24 UN Inspectors found over 53,000 documents on Iraq’s nuclear program at Atheer

facility but were held for 4 days by Iraqis until they could leave During standoff at Atheer facility US IAEA member Galluci sent important info about seized documents to State Dept

 

Oct 11 Iraq rejected UN Resolution 715 which extended UN weapons inspections and

            allowed cameras to be installed at former weapons sites

(Musings On Iraq Chilcot Report Sec 1.1 UK Iraq Strategy 1990 To 2000)

 

Oct 21 Iraq told UN weapons inspectors it had program to build a nuclear bomb

(Musings On Iraq Chilcot Report Sec 1.1 UK Iraq Strategy 1990 To 2000)

 

1992

Jan 14 Iraq admitted to UN inspectors that it was trying to enrich uranium to build a

            nuclear bomb

(Musings On Iraq Chilcot Report Sec 1.1 UK Iraq Strategy 1990 To 2000)

 

Jan 20 Report UN inspectors found equipment to build 2,000 centrifuges German and Austria

companies sold parts for program Iraqi scientists said Saddam wanted nuclear bomb to compete with Israel


 

Jul 5 Iraq refused to allow UN inspectors into Agriculture Ministry causing a crisis

(Musings On Iraq Chilcot Report Sec 1.1 UK Iraq Strategy 1990 To 2000)

 

Jul 18 Tariq Aziz proposed that experts from non-aligned countries on Security Council inspect

Agriculture Ministry Rejected by UN inspectors Bush threatened military action if inspectors not let in

(Musings On Iraq UN Inspectors Were Right Iraq Was Not A Threat)

(Musings On Iraq Iraq’s Rejection of UN Inspectors Led To Mistrust Over WMD and 2003 Invasion)

 

Jul 21 UN inspectors withdrew from outside Agriculture Ministry Had been outside for 2 weeks

 

Jul 26 Iraq agreed to UN inspection of Agriculture Min after two week standoff as long as

            wouldn’t include any Americans

 

Jul 28 UN inspectors went through Agriculture Min but found nothing as Iraqis had removed all

            WMD docs

 

Nov 1 Report UN inspectors found US companies contributed to Iraq’s nuke program CIA knew about

deals and did nothing 200 of 770 US licensed exports to Iraq went to weapons programs 1985-90 US sold $1.5 bil in dual use goods to Iraq that probably went to weapons

 

1993

Jan 8 Iraq warned that it was in material breach of weapons inspections and would

            suffer consequences

 

Jan 10 Iraq refused to allow UN weapon inspectors to fly from Bahrain into the southern

            no fly zone

(Musings On Iraq Chilcot Report Sec 1.1 UK Iraq Strategy 1990 To 2000)

(Musings On Iraq review Out Of The Ashes, The Resurrection of Saddam Hussein)

(Musings On Iraq review The Saddam Tapes)

 

Jan 13 US UK and France carried out air and missile strikes on Iraq for not cooperating

            with UN inspectors

(Musings On Iraq review Out Of The Ashes, The Resurrection of Saddam Hussein)

 

Jan 17 US fired 45 Tomahawk missiles at Baghdad for not allowing U.N. inspectors into

            country

(Musings On Iraq review Out Of The Ashes, The Resurrection of Saddam Hussein)

 

Jan 18 US UK and France carried 3rd day of air strikes on Iraq for not cooperating with

            UN inspectors 21 killed

(Musings On Iraq review Out Of The Ashes, The Resurrection of Saddam Hussein)

 

Jan 21 Iraq declared ceasefire with Coalition over not allowing UN weapons inspectors into

            country Demanded US review no fly zones

(Musings On Iraq review The Saddam Tapes)

(Musings On Iraq review Out Of The Ashes, The Resurrection of Saddam Hussein)

 

Mar 11 Iraq objected to UN inspections claiming they were trying to deindustrialize country by

blocking use of dual use equipment

 

Oct 15 Chief UN inspector Ekeus told Security Council progress had been made on missile

chemical and nuclear programs Iraq was hoping its recent concessions would end sanctions

 

Nov 26 Iraq accepted UN Resolution 715 to extend UN weapons inspections Initially rejected

resolution Also agreed to long term monitoring of WMD sites

 

1994

Oct 6 Iraq put troops on Kuwait border and threatened to stop working with UN

            weapons inspectors Was meant to pressure UN to end sanctions

 

1995

Mar 25 Iraq told UN inspectors it had produced 550lbs of VX but denied weaponizing it to try to

end US complaints and end sanctions Backfired as Security Council decided to continue them

 

Apr 10 UN inspectors report Said monitoring system was running Destroyed all known nuclear

facilities

(Musings On Iraq UN Inspectors Were Right Iraq Was Not A Threat)

(Musings On Iraq Iraq’s Rejection Of UN Inspectors Led To Mistrust Over WMD And 2003 Invasion)

 

May 2 Saddam held meeting to discuss whether Iraq should continue to cooperate with

            UN weapons inspectors

(Musings On Iraq Chilcot Report Sec 1.1 UK Iraq Strategy 1990 To 2000)

(Musings On Iraq review Out Of The Ashes, The Resurrection of Saddam Hussein)

(Musings On Iraq review The Saddam Tapes)

 

Jul 1 Iraq told UN inspectors it had a biological weapons program and made anthrax and

botulinum 1989-90 Denied it weaponized agents Seemed like Iraq had come clean about all of its WMD and nuclear weapons programs to inspectors

(Musings On Iraq Chilcot Report Sec 1.1 UK Iraq Strategy 1990 To 2000)

(Musings On Iraq review Out Of The Ashes, The Resurrection of Saddam Hussein)

(Musings On Iraq review The Saddam Tapes)

 

Aug 8 Iraq claimed Hussein Kamal responsible for hiding weapons programs from UN

inspectors after he defected to Jordan Iraq admitted that it weaponized biological weapons to UN inspectors Hussein Kamal’s defection undermined Iraq’s program to hide its WMD and nuclear programs from UN inspectors

(Musings On Iraq Chilcot Report Sec 1.1 UK Iraq Strategy 1990 To 2000)

(Musings On Iraq review Out Of The Ashes, The Resurrection of Saddam Hussein)

 

Aug 17 Iraq told inspectors after 1991 Kuwait invasion Iraq had placed biological weapons

into 166 bombs and 25 missile warheads Didn’t provide any docs which led to complaints by inspectors

 

Aug 20 Iraq admitted to UN inspectors that its crash program to build a nuclear bomb

failed Said WMD docs had been discovered at Hussein Kamal’s farm Blamed him for hiding materials form inspectors

(Musings On Iraq Chilcot Report Sec 1.1 UK Iraq Strategy 1990 To 2000)

 

Aug 22 UN interviewed Hussein Kamal Saddam’s son-in-law that defected to Jordan

Kamal said Iraq hid its WMD and nuclear program from inspectors but all the programs had ended after Gulf War US and UN didn’t believe Kamal’s claim that the programs were over Kamal did convince them that Iraq would always hide them

(Musings On Iraq Review The United States And Iraq Since 1990, A Brief History With Documents)

(Musings On Iraq review Out Of The Ashes, The Resurrection of Saddam Hussein)

 

Sep 4 UN chief inspector Ekeus said Iraq had admitted to biological artillery shells bombs and warheads

Had larger quantities of anthrax (8,500 liters) and botulinum (19,000 liters) than previously declared Iraq also had crash program in Aug 90 to build nuclear bomb within a year but didn’t have triggers

(Musings On Iraq UN Inspectors Were Right Iraq Was Not A Threat)

(Musings On Iraq Iraq’s Rejection of UN Inspectors Led To Mistrust Over WMD and 2003 Invasion)

(Musings On Iraq Chilcot Report Sec 1.1 UK Iraq Strategy 1990 To 2000)

(Musings On Iraq review Out Of The Ashes, The Resurrection of Saddam Hussein)

(Musings On Iraq review The Saddam Tapes)

 

Oct 11 UN inspector report Iraq developed more WMD than thought before and worked on missile

program Required more investigations

(Musings On Iraq UN Inspectors Were Right Iraq Was Not A Threat)

(Musings On Iraq Iraq’s Rejection of UN Inspectors Led To Mistrust Over WMD and 2003 Invasion)

 

1996

Feb 4 UK intel team arrived in Wash DC to get CIA equipment to tap into Iraqi

            communications to help UN inspectors

(Musings On Iraq review of Iraq In The Eye of the Storm)

(Musings On Iraq review Neighbors, Not Friends, Iraq And Iran After The Gulf Wars)

 

Feb 27 Iraq provided new declaration on missile program with more info to UN

            inspectors

 

Mar 17 UN inspectors said work was moving forward and Iraq was not hiding WMD

            as some suggested

 

Apr 6 At conference in New York UN inspectors deducted that Iraq had biological weapons facility at

Hakam, Baghdad

 

Jun 12 UN Resolution 1060 found Iraq not allowing UN weapons inspectors full access

            to sites

(Musings On Iraq Charles Duelfer’s Account Of The End Of The 1990s U.N. Inspections)

(Musings On Iraq review of Iraq In The Eye of the Storm)

(Musings On Iraq review The Saddam Tapes)

(Musings On Iraq review Out Of The Ashes, The Resurrection of Saddam Hussein)

 

Jun 19 UN and Iraq began talks on allowing UN inspectors access to sensitive sites Dep PM Aziz

told UN inspectors they got most of their intel from US and UK that were trying to remove Saddam Aziz told inspectors they made sensitive visits to provoke a crisis at behest of US and UK

Jun 19 CIA was hoping to cause a crisis between Iraq and UN inspectors to justify

military action against Saddam that would start coup CA working with ex-Gen Shawani and his sons in Republican Guard

(Musings On Iraq review of Iraq In The Eye of the Storm)

(Musings On Iraq review The United States And Iraq Since 1990: A Brief History with Documents)

(Musings On Iraq review Out Of The Ashes, The Resurrection of Saddam Hussein)

(Musings On Iraq review Neighbors, Not Friends, Iraq And Iran After The Gulf Wars)

Jun 19 Iraqi intelligence had captured an Iraqi operative involved in coup and rounded

            up everyone in plot

(Musings On Iraq UN Inspectors and CIA Spying On Iraq In The 90s)

 

Jun 22 UN and Iraq agreed on terms for allowing UN inspectors into Republican Guard

            Special Republican Guard Special Security Organization Mukhabarat sites

 

Jul 1 Richard Butler became head UN weapons inspector replacing Rolf Ekeus Butler

            was more confrontational with Iraqis

(Musings On Iraq review of Iraq In The Eye of the Storm)

 

Sep 7 Iraq submitted declaration on nuclear program Inspectors thought Iraq was hiding

            information

(Musings On Iraq Chilcot Report Sec 1.1 UK Iraq Strategy 1990 To 2000)

 

Oct 3 Iraq admitted to UN inspectors that it hid part of its missile program and then

            secretly destroyed them in March 1992

(Musings On Iraq Chilcot Report Sec 1.1 UK Iraq Strategy 1990 To 2000)

 

Oct 11 Inspector report to UN Secretary General said Iraq had not fully disclosed its WMD and missile

programs

(Musings On Iraq Chilcot Report Sec 1.1 UK Iraq Strategy 1990 To 2000)

(Musings On Iraq review of Iraq In The Eye of the Storm)

(Musings On Iraq review The Saddam Tapes)

(Musings On Iraq review Out Of The Ashes, The Resurrection of Saddam Hussein)

 

1997

Mar 23 Memo told Iraqi officials to hide material, documents, equipment from U.N.

            weapons inspectors

(Musings On Iraq Chilcot Report Sec 1.1 UK Iraq Strategy 1990 To 2000)

(Musings On Iraq Charles Duelfer’s Account Of The End Of The 1990s U.N. Inspections)

(Musings On Iraq review The Saddam Tapes)

(Musings On Iraq review Out Of The Ashes, The Resurrection of Saddam Hussein)

 

Mar 26 Secretary of State Albright said Iraq not cooperating with inspections and US would not

            remove sanctions

 

Mar 28 Secretary of State Albright said Iraq had lied and blocked UN inspections Said

            inspections and sanctions had contained Iraq

(Musings On Iraq review The United States And Iraq Since 1990: A Brief History with Documents)

(Musings On Iraq review Out Of The Ashes, The Resurrection of Saddam Hussein)

(Musings On Iraq review Neighbors, Not Friends, Iraq And Iran After The Gulf Wars)

 

Jun 12 UN inspectors said Iraq had blocked them from 3 sites in last two days

(Musings On Iraq Chilcot Report Sec 1.1 UK Iraq Strategy 1990 To 2000)

(Musings On Iraq Charles Duelfer’s Account Of The End Of The 1990s U.N. Inspections)

(Musings On Iraq review of Iraq In The Eye of the Storm)

(Musings On Iraq review The Saddam Tapes)

(Musings On Iraq review Out Of The Ashes, The Resurrection of Saddam Hussein)

 

Jun 13 UN complained about Iraq’s obstruction of weapons inspections

(Musings On Iraq Chilcot Report Sec 1.1 UK Iraq Strategy 1990 To 2000)

(Musings On Iraq Charles Duelfer’s Account Of The End Of The 1990s U.N. Inspections)

(Musings On Iraq review Out Of The Ashes, The Resurrection of Saddam Hussein)

(Musings On Iraq review The Saddam Tapes)

 

Jun 21 UN Resolution 1115 said Iraq had to fully cooperate with weapons

            inspectors and allow them into disputed sites

 

Jul 17 Saddam said if UN didn’t end sanctions inspections would end

 

Sep 9 New inspector head Butler arrived in Baghdad Was more confrontational and worked closely

            with US

 

Sep 13 Iraqi soldier attacked a weapons inspector on board a helicopter for trying to take

            pictures of vehicles moving inside a suspected WMD site

(Musings On Iraq Charles Duelfer’s Account Of The End Of The 1990s U.N. Inspections)

 

Sep 17 UN inspectors watched Iraqis moving files and burning documents while waiting

            for access to a WMD site

(Musings On Iraq Chilcot Report Sec 1.1 UK Iraq Strategy 1990 To 2000)

(Musings On Iraq Charles Duelfer’s Account Of The End Of The 1990s U.N. Inspections)

(Musings On Iraq review Out Of The Ashes, The Resurrection of Saddam Hussein)

(Musings On Iraq review The Saddam Tapes)

 

Sep 25 UN inspectors found Iraqi Food and Drug Examination Lab in Baghdad worked

            on gangrene since 1980s

Sep 25 UN inspectors attempted to inspect Special Security Office but denied

(Musings On Iraq Charles Duelfer’s Account Of The End Of The 1990s U.N. Inspections)

 

Sep 27 Inspectors were denied access to Special Republican Guard barracks

 

Sep 29 Inspectors denied access to presidential complex in Salahaddin

 

Oct 1 Iraq blocked UN inspectors at three sites over last week

(Musings On Iraq Charles Duelfer’s Account Of The End Of The 1990s U.N. Inspections)

(Musings On Iraq review Out Of The Ashes, The Resurrection of Saddam Hussein)

(Musings On Iraq review The Saddam Tapes)

 

Oct 6 UN inspectors report Some progress on chemical and missile programs but nothing

            with biological weapons Iraqis had also banned inspections at presidential sites

(Musings On Iraq Charles Duelfer’s Account Of The End Of The 1990s U.N. Inspections)

(Musings On Iraq review Out Of The Ashes, The Resurrection of Saddam Hussein)

Oct 6 IAEA provided last report on inspections Said if any information was left on Iraq’s

            nuclear program was a political decision

(Musings On Iraq Chilcot Report Sec 1.1 UK Iraq Strategy 1990 To 2000)

 

Oct 8 IAEA report Iraq started centrifuge program in 1987 but was way behind schedule

            Iraq might have had a bomb by 1996 if not for Gulf War

 

Oct 23 UN Resolution 1134 said that Iraq had to fully comply with weapons inspectors and condemned

non-cooperation Were splits within UN security council over continued weapons inspections

(Musings On Iraq Charles Duelfer’s Account Of The End Of The 1990s U.N. Inspections)

 

Oct 28 Iraq National Assembly said inspections should be stopped until deadline given to end

sanctions Saddam said Iraq would cooperate with inspections if they respected Iraqi sovereignty

 

Oct 29 Tariq Aziz said no Americans would be allowed as inspectors accusing them of

            being spies and trying to overthrow Saddam

Oct 29 IAEA suspended all its work in Iraq

(Musings On Iraq Charles Duelfer’s Account Of The End Of The 1990s U.N. Inspections)

 

Oct 30 Tariq Aziz claimed surveillance planes used by inspectors were working for US

            intelligence Threatened to shoot them down CIA was using planes to spy on Iraq

(Musings On Iraq UN Inspectors and CIA Spying On Iraq In The 90s)

(Musings On Iraq review Neighbors, Not Friends, Iraq And Iran After The Gulf Wars)

(Musings On Iraq review The Saddam Tapes)

Oct 30 Iraq asked 10 American inspectors to leave country

 

Nov 3 Iraq blocked UN inspection at al-Samoud missile range because included Americans

Nov 3 Iraq asked inspectors to suspend two days of U2 overflights claiming they were supplying intel for

planned US air strikes

(Musings On Iraq Charles Duelfer’s Account Of The End Of The 1990s U.N. Inspections)

(Musings On Iraq review Out Of The Ashes, The Resurrection of Saddam Hussein)

(Musings On Iraq review The Saddam Tapes)

Nov 3 UN sent delegation to Baghdad to try to end standoff with inspections

 

Nov 5 Iraq blocked US weapons inspectors into facilities in last two days

(Musings On Iraq Charles Duelfer’s Account Of The End Of The 1990s U.N. Inspections)

(Musings On Iraq review Out Of The Ashes, The Resurrection of Saddam Hussein)

(Musings On Iraq review The Saddam Tapes)

 

Nov 7 Iraq announced new deal with UN over inspections

 

Nov 10 Iraq said it would not allow any US planes to be used for weapons inspections

(Musings On Iraq Charles Duelfer’s Account Of The End Of The 1990s U.N. Inspections)

(Musings On Iraq review Out Of The Ashes, The Resurrection of Saddam Hussein)

(Musings On Iraq review The Saddam Tapes)

 

Nov 12 Iraq expelled 6 US weapons inspectors claiming they were spies Almost entire

            inspection staff withdrawn as a result

(Musings On Iraq review Neighbors, Not Friends, Iraq And Iran After The Gulf Wars)

Nov 12 UN Resolution 1137 demanded Iraq allow full and unhindered weapons

            inspections Imposed travel restrictions on Iraqi officials

(Musings On Iraq Charles Duelfer’s Account Of The End Of The 1990s U.N. Inspections)

(Musings On Iraq review The Road to Iraq, The Making of a Neoconservative War)

(Musings On Iraq Review The United States And Iraq Since 1990, A Brief History With Documents)

(Musings On Iraq review Out Of The Ashes, The Resurrection of Saddam Hussein)

(Musings On Iraq review The Saddam Tapes)

 

Nov 13 Iraq expelled US members of UN weapons inspectors accusing them of being

            spies

(Musings On Iraq review The Saddam Tapes)

(Musings On Iraq review Out Of The Ashes, The Resurrection of Saddam Hussein)

(Musings On Iraq review Neighbors, Not Friends, Iraq And Iran After The Gulf Wars)

 

Nov 14 Clinton said by expelling UN inspectors Iraq would have sanctions until the “end of time”

 

Nov 18 Russian President Boris Yeltsin met with Iraqis trying to convince them to

            cooperate with weapons inspectors

(Musings On Iraq Charles Duelfer’s Account Of The End Of The 1990s U.N. Inspections)

 

Nov 20 Russia brokered deal to allow US members of UN inspectors back into Iraq In return inspections

would be completed quickly and UN would begin talks over ending sanctions

(Musings On Iraq Charles Duelfer’s Account Of The End Of The 1990s U.N. Inspections)

 

Nov 21 UN weapons inspectors returned to Iraq US and UK had plan to cause confrontation with

Iraq to justify military strike

(Musings On Iraq Charles Duelfer’s Account Of The End Of The 1990s U.N. Inspections)

(Musings On Iraq review Neighbors, Not Friends, Iraq And Iran After The Gulf Wars)

 

Nov 22 UN inspectors talked out of visit to Special Republican Guard base by US that did

            not want another confrontation that would allow Saddam to blame inspectors

 

Nov 28 Iraq said inspectors could not go to presidential and sovereign sites

 

Dec 17 Iraq banned UN weapons inspectors from presidential and sovereign sites

(Musings On Iraq Charles Duelfer’s Account Of The End Of The 1990s U.N. Inspections)

(Musings On Iraq review Out Of The Ashes, The Resurrection of Saddam Hussein)

(Musings On Iraq review The Saddam Tapes)

 

1998

Jan 12 1st day new UN inspections went to General Security HQ and Abu Ghraib prison

looking for docs on WMD tests on prisoners from 1994-95

 

Jan 13 Iraqis objected to UN inspectors having too many Americans and British and

            refused cooperation until team changed US was using inspectors to spy on Iraq

(Musings On Iraq UN Inspectors Were Right Iraq Was Not A Threat)

(Musings On Iraq Iraq’s Rejection of UN Inspectors Led To Mistrust Over WMD and 2003 Invasion)

(Musings On Iraq UN Inspectors and CIA Spying On Iraq In The 90s)

(Musings On Iraq review The Saddam Tapes)

(Musings On Iraq review of Iraq In The Eye of the Storm)

(Musings On Iraq review Out Of The Ashes, The Resurrection of Saddam Hussein)

(Musings On Iraq review Neighbors, Not Friends, Iraq And Iran After The Gulf Wars)

 

Jan 15 After Iraq refused to cooperate again UN inspection team left Iraq

(Musings On Iraq review The Saddam Tapes)

(Musings On Iraq review Out Of The Ashes, The Resurrection of Saddam Hussein)

 

Jan 25 Report US was preparing strike against Iraq called Operation Desert Thunder for

non cooperation with UN inspectors US was hoping to cause a confrontation with inspectors to attack Iraq

(Musings On Iraq UN Inspectors and CIA Spying On Iraq In The 90s)

(Musings On Iraq review Iraq In The Eye of the Storm)

(Musings On Iraq review Out Of The Ashes, The Resurrection of Saddam Hussein)

(Musings On Iraq review Neighbors, Not Friends, Iraq And Iran After The Gulf Wars)

 

Jan 27 Head UN inspector Butler quoted in NY Times saying Iraq had enough biological

weapons and missiles to “blow away” Tel Aviv UN chief Annan demanded Butler apologize for NY Times interview which he did

 

Jan 28 UK discussed using force against Iraq to ensure continued UN weapons inspections

(Musings On Iraq Review The Report of the Iraq Inquiry, Executive Summary)

 

Feb 4 UK intel report said UN inspectors had destroyed majority of Iraq’s WMD programs

 

Feb 13 UN chief Annan said he had a personal initiative to end inspector crisis with

            Iraq Began consulting with Security Council members to win approval

 

Feb 19 Blair said UN weapons inspections had to continue or action would be taken against

            Iraq

(Musings On Iraq Review The Report of the Iraq Inquiry, Executive Summary)

(Musings On Iraq Chilcot Report Sec 1.1 UK Iraq Strategy 1990 To 2000)

 

Feb 20 UN Sec Gen Annan met with Saddam to try to restart UN weapons inspections

(Musings On Iraq Charles Duelfer’s Account Of The End Of The 1990s U.N. Inspections)

 

Feb 23 UN negotiated Iraq working with UN inspectors again including unrestricted

            visits, but didn’t work

(Musings On Iraq Charles Duelfer’s Account Of The End Of The 1990s U.N. Inspections)

 

Mar 1 UN inspectors revealed progress of their work with CNN violating agreement with

            Iraq on inspection regime

 

Mar 2 UN Resolution 1154 allowed weapons inspectors at Iraq’s presidential palaces US

            was hoping to cause a confrontation to strike Iraq

(Musings On Iraq UN Inspectors and CIA Spying On Iraq In The 90s)

 

Mar 5 UN weapons inspectors returned to Iraq and carried out successful searches

Mar 5 UN inspector Ritter installed device that allowed NSA to monitor Iraq’s military and

            security communications to uncover WMD concealment program

 

Mar 6 UN inspectors went to Special Republican Guard and Special Security Directorate

            sites US was hoping to cause confrontation over inspectors to strike Iraq

(Musings On Iraq UN Inspectors and CIA Spying On Iraq In The 90s)

(Musings On Iraq review of Iraq In The Eye of the Storm)

(Musings On Iraq review Out Of The Ashes, The Resurrection of Saddam Hussein)

 

Mar 7 UN inspectors went to Special Republican Guard and Special Security Directorate

NSA intercepted Saddam’s secretary Mahmoud telling Special Security Directorate to delay inspection at one site so documents could be removed Destroyed at another Info given to inspectors US was hoping to cause confrontation to strike Iraq

(Musings On Iraq UN Inspectors and CIA Spying On Iraq In The 90s)

(Musings On Iraq review of Iraq In The Eye of the Storm)

(Musings On Iraq review Out Of The Ashes, The Resurrection of Saddam Hussein)

(Musings On Iraq review Neighbors, Not Friends, Iraq And Iran After The Gulf Wars)

 

Mar 8 UN inspectors went to old and new Defense Ministry buildings and found nothing Iraqis

told UN inspectors they knew Clinton admin wanted to provoke a confrontation to strike Iraq

(Musings On Iraq UN Inspectors and CIA Spying On Iraq In The 90s)

(Musings On Iraq review Iraq In The Eye of the Storm)

(Musings On Iraq review Out Of The Ashes, The Resurrection of Saddam Hussein)

(Musings On Iraq review Neighbors, Not Friends, Iraq And Iran After The Gulf Wars)

 

Mar 26 UN inspectors went to presidential palace and found nothing

 

Mar 28 UN Resolution 1154 okayed agreement between UN Secretary General and Iraq to

            allow inspectors into presidential palaces and other sites

(Musings On Iraq Charles Duelfer’s Account Of The End Of The 1990s U.N. Inspections)

 

Apr 13 IAEA report to UN Iraq provided full and complete record of its nuclear program

            and shown no new activity

(Musings On Iraq Chilcot Report Sec 1.1 UK Iraq Strategy 1990 To 2000)

 

Apr 22 Tariq Aziz letter to UN Said inspectors ignored last 7 yrs of progress Said intrusive

            inspections work of US to create justification for US military strike

(Musings On Iraq review The Saddam Tapes)

(Musings On Iraq review Neighbors, Not Friends, Iraq And Iran After The Gulf Wars)

 

Apr 28 Inspectors report to UN said no progress in last 4 months due to confrontation with Iraq

 

Jun 3 Inspector report to UN Iraq not accounted for missiles warheads VX amounts of

ingredients and final products made from them Russia France China refused to approve the report

(Musings On Iraq Chilcot Report Sec 1.1 UK Iraq Strategy 1990 To 2000)

 

Jun 13 UN inspectors met with Iraqi delegation led by Tariq Aziz

 

Jun 14 2nd day of meetings between UN inspectors and Iraq Agreed on inspection regime

UN inspectors demanded that Iraq come clean on its concealment program which angered Aziz He thought UN inspectors working with US to move goal posts every time there was progress to drag out process

 

Jun 18 Inspectors report to UN Said Iraq not come clean on VX program 1st denied it

worked with it Then said produced experimental amount that was destroyed Iraq later admitted it produced 1.7 tons of VX but didn’t weaponize it

(Musings On Iraq Chilcot Report Sec 1.1 UK Iraq Strategy 1990 To 2000)

(Musings On Iraq review Out Of The Ashes, The Resurrection of Saddam Hussein)

(Musings On Iraq review The Saddam Tapes)

 

Jul 4 IAEA report to UN Iraq did not have nuclear weapons Iraqi scientists had not given

            complete access IAEA would focus upon long term monitoring

 

Jul 18 UN inspectors went to Iraq Air Force HQ Found document showing Iraqis used

mustard gas tabun sarin gas gangrene during Iran-Iraq War in larger quantities than Iraq had previously disclosed Iraqis refused to let inspectors keep the document

(Musings On Iraq Chilcot Report Sec 1.1 UK Iraq Strategy 1990 To 2000)

(Musings On Iraq review Out Of The Ashes, The Resurrection of Saddam Hussein)

(Musings On Iraq review The Saddam Tapes)

 

Aug 3 Tariq Aziz met UN inspectors Complained they were focusing upon minor issues

not important to disarmament Said dragging out process at behest of US Demanded that Iraq be certified WMD free and inspections end Aziz said Iraq had nothing else to declare about its weapons programs Chief UN inspector Butler said Iraq had not provided evidence to prove claim it had declared all of its weapons programs

(Musings On Iraq review The Saddam Tapes)

(Musings On Iraq review Out Of The Ashes, The Resurrection of Saddam Hussein)

 

Aug 4 Saddam ended cooperation with UN inspectors Kept monitoring system in tact

Demanded inspectors reflect rotating membership of Security Council and offices be moved to Geneva or Vienna and out of NY to not be influenced by US

(Musings On Iraq Chilcot Report Sec 1.1 UK Iraq Strategy 1990 To 2000)

(Musings On Iraq Charles Duelfer’s Account Of The End Of The 1990s U.N. Inspections)

(Musings On Iraq review Out Of The Ashes, The Resurrection of Saddam Hussein)

(Musings On Iraq review The Saddam Tapes)

 

Aug 14 Washington Post report UN chief Butler had followed US instructions to hold back on

            inspections because Clinton admin didn’t want confrontations with Saddam

 

Aug 26 UN inspector Ritter quit after his anti-concealment unit was disbanded at request of

Clinton administration Ritter claimed from Nov 97-August 98 Clinton administration had tried to block inspectors work 7 times and came from top of White House staff Ritter’s claims about Clinton administration convinced many on UN Security Council US manipulating inspectors for its own aims

(Musings On Iraq review of Iraq In The Eye of the Storm)

(Musings On Iraq review Neighbors, Not Friends, Iraq And Iran After The Gulf Wars)

 

Oct 6 Inspectors report to UN Iraq had blocked disarmament and was now attempting to block monitoring

work

(Musings On Iraq review Out Of The Ashes, The Resurrection of Saddam Hussein)

(Musings On Iraq Chilcot Report Sec 1.1 UK Iraq Strategy 1990 To 2000)

 

Oct 31 Iraq suspended all cooperation with UN weapons inspectors Demanded full review of its

disarmament and timetable for ending sanctions Led Clinton to order military build up in Gulf

(Musings On Iraq Chilcot Report Sec 1.1 UK Iraq Strategy 1990 To 2000)

(Musings On Iraq Charles Duelfer’s Account Of The End Of The 1990s U.N. Inspections)

(Musings On Iraq review Out Of The Ashes, The Resurrection of Saddam Hussein)

(Musings On Iraq review The Saddam Tapes)

(Musings On Iraq review Neighbors, Not Friends, Iraq And Iran After The Gulf Wars)

 

Nov 5 UN Resolution 1205 condemned Iraq suspending work with weapons inspectors

(Musings On Iraq Charles Duelfer’s Account Of The End Of The 1990s U.N. Inspections)

 

Nov 10 All UN weapons inspectors left Iraq after Baghdad refused to cooperate anymore

(Musings On Iraq Charles Duelfer’s Account Of The End Of The 1990s U.N. Inspections)

 

Nov 11 UN Secretary Gen Annan appealed to Saddam to work with weapons inspectors again

 

Nov 12 Iraq Ambassador to UN told military strike impending if did not agree to work

            with weapons inspectors again

 

Nov 13 Tariq Aziz told CNN UN inspectors spying for US and Israel

(Musings On Iraq review Neighbors, Not Friends, Iraq And Iran After The Gulf Wars)

Nov 13 UN chief Annan sent letter to Saddam saying he had to cooperate with inspectors

to avoid a US-UK military strike Annan told Saddam that if cooperated with inspectors Security Council would discuss Iraq’s disarmament to move towards ending sanctions

Nov 13 Countries told Iraq that if it didn’t back down on inspectors it would be hit by

            US within 24 hours

Nov 13 Iraq sent letter to UN blaming US for blocking review of Iraq’s disarmament Said

            because of UN chief Annan it would cooperate with inspectors again

Nov 13 Tariq Aziz went on CNN to say that Iraq would let inspectors return US B-52

            bombers were only about an hour away from bombing Iraq Clinton recalled them

 

Nov 14 Clinton outlined 5 conditions Iraq had to meet with UN Included unconditional

access by inspectors and turning over all documents If Iraq didn’t agree US would

(Musings On Iraq review The United States And Iraq Since 1990: A Brief History with Documents)

(Musings On Iraq review Neighbors, Not Friends, Iraq And Iran After The Gulf Wars)

 

Nov 15 UN accepted Iraq’s letter asking inspectors back

Nov 15 Natl Sec Adv Berger met with head UN inspector Butler on inspection schedule to

            plan confrontation to give US excuse to bomb Iraq

(Musings On Iraq review of Iraq In The Eye of the Storm)

(Musings On Iraq review Out Of The Ashes, The Resurrection of Saddam Hussein)

(Musings On Iraq review Neighbors, Not Friends, Iraq And Iran After The Gulf Wars)

 

Nov 18 UN inspections began again in Iraq with goal of causing a confrontation to justify US bombing

(Musings On Iraq review of Iraq In The Eye of the Storm)

(Musings On Iraq review Out Of The Ashes, The Resurrection of Saddam Hussein)

 

Nov 19 Iraqis refused to hand over documents to UN inspectors

(Musings On Iraq Chilcot Report Sec 1.1 UK Iraq Strategy 1990 To 2000)

(Musings On Iraq review Out Of The Ashes, The Resurrection of Saddam Hussein)

(Musings On Iraq review The Saddam Tapes)

 

Nov 20 UN inspectors asked Iraq for 12 documents Included June 1993 report by committee on WMD

Investigation into Hussein Kamal’s concealment of WMD Review of Iraqi air forces use of chemical weapons in Iran-Iraq War Iraq said committee didn’t exist Never reviewed Kamal’s activities Would only give edited version of air force paper

(Musings On Iraq Chilcot Report Sec 1.1 UK Iraq Strategy 1990 To 2000)

 

Nov 21 Adviser to UN chief said could never 100% prove WMD disarmament and at some

            point inspections became political and impossible to prove negative

 

Dec 4 Iraq started blocking inspections again

Dec 4 Under pressure from Russia France China UN inspectors began weekly reports

            They wanted inspections done by end of year

 

Dec 9 Over 5 days Iraqis banned three inspections at biological and chemical sites and

            Baath Party HQ

(Musings On Iraq Chilcot Report Sec 1.1 UK Iraq Strategy 1990 To 2000)

(Musings On Iraq review Out Of The Ashes, The Resurrection of Saddam Hussein)

(Musings On Iraq review The Saddam Tapes)

 

Dec 11 Chief UN inspector Butler met with Natl Sec Adv Berger and decided US would

            strike Iraq Clinton wanted to send message Saddam vulnerable

(Musings On Iraq review Out Of The Ashes, The Resurrection of Saddam Hussein)

(Musings On Iraq review Neighbors, Not Friends, Iraq And Iran After The Gulf Wars)

 

Dec 12 UN inspections were called off due to Iraq non-cooperation

 

Dec 13 Head UN inspector Butler went over draft of his report to UN with White House so

            that it could be revised Clinton wanted report harsher on Iraq

 

Dec 14 UN chief Annan said once Security Council decided Iraq had met its disarmament

obligations sanctions would end

Dec 14 WashPost report US went over multiple drafts with head UN inspector Butler

            before he submitted report to Security Council

 

Dec 15 US told chief UN inspector Butler to remove his team from Iraq before imminent

            US strike

Dec 15 UN inspector chief report to Security Council said Iraq not cooperating again Was

            released to press before UN members got their copies

(Musings On Iraq review Out Of The Ashes, The Resurrection of Saddam Hussein)

Dec 15 Clinton told PM Netanyahu that inspection report would be bad and US would bomb Iraq

            as a result

(Musings On Iraq review Neighbors, Not Friends, Iraq And Iran After The Gulf Wars)

 

Dec 16 UN inspectors left Iraq again over non-cooperation

(Musings On Iraq Charles Duelfer’s Account Of The End Of The 1990s U.N. Inspections)

(Musings On Iraq review Out Of The Ashes, The Resurrection of Saddam Hussein)

Dec 16 US and UK started Operation Desert Fox after Iraq broke off cooperation with UN weapons

inspectors Considered failure at time Hit empty buildings Actually ended Iraqs plans to revive WMD programs 

(Musings On Iraq How Operation Desert Fox Finished Off Iraq’s WMD Programs)

Dec 16 Assessment by International Atomic Energy Agency Iraq had not produced a nuclear bomb before

Gulf War Iraq only produced a few grams of weapons grade nuclear material before Gulf War Iraq didn’t have capability to produce nuclear material because of inspections

 

Dec 23 Russia and China called for Chief UN inspector Butler to be removed for working with US

 

1999

Jan 5 UN weapons inspector report said Iraq had not accounted for 550 mustard gas artillery

rounds Unaccounted for WMD stocks would become major argument by Bush admin that Iraq was hiding its WMD

 

Feb 23 State Dept denied that US was using UN inspectors to spy on Iraq but it was

 

Mar 2 Wash Post reported that US intelligence was using UN inspectors to spy on Iraq something

            it denied in Feb

 

Nov 26 Baath paper said Iraq couldn’t accept sanctions and spies at same time but sanctions

easier to accept then spies and crises they created to prolong sanctions “Spies” was referring to UN inspectors 

 

2000

Feb 11 Iraq announced UN weapons inspectors would not be allowed back into country

 

Aug 24 Iraq rejected new UN inspectors and Resolution 1284

 

Aug 30 US and Soviets agreed not to send UN inspectors back to Iraq

 

Oct 20 British Foreign Office said wanted to offer end of sanctions to return inspectors to Iraq but didn’t

think US would agree

 

2001

Feb 5 NSC meeting discussed returning UN inspectors to Iraq and how to deal with

            Iraqi opposition

 

Nov 26 Bush called Saddam a terrorist who would be held accountable and said Iraq needed to allow UN

weapons inspectors back in

 

Nov 27 Saddam rejected Bush’s call for UN weapons inspectors to return to Iraq

 

Dec 17 UN Resolution 1284 created UNMOVIC as new Iraq WMD inspection regime

 

2002

Feb 26 MI6 Chief Dearlove said US would demand weapons inspectors under conditions

            Saddam wouldn’t accept to justify military action

 

Mar 5 UK Foreign Secretary Straw wrote article saying if Saddam refused weapons

            inspectors there would be consequences

(Musings On Iraq Review The Report of the Iraq Inquiry, Executive Summary)

 

Apr 5 Blair and Bush met and talked about using inspections to pressure Saddam

(Musings On Iraq Review The Report of the Iraq Inquiry, Executive Summary)

 

Apr 15 Rumsfeld claimed that UN inspectors in 90s were ineffective 

 

Apr 25 IAEA report that during inspections in 1990s Iraq’s nuclear program was

            dismantled and no ability to produce nuke material

 

May 17 PM Blair’s foreign policy adv Manning told Natl Sec Adv Rice that they had to get weapons

inspections back into Iraq to garner public support for any war

 

Jul 5 Talks between Iraq and UN in Vienna brokedown over new weapons inspections

 

Jul 30 Fmr head UN inspector Ekeus said US manipulated 90s inspections to spy on Iraqi

security services and find location of Saddam Said US wanted to create crises to justify attacks on Iraq

(Musings On Iraq UN Inspectors and CIA Spying On Iraq In The 90s)

 

Jul 31 Iraq Foreign Minister Sabri said Baghdad rejected return of UN inspectors Said they

            would just collect intel for U.S. strikes

 

Aug 1 Iraq invited Chief UN Inspector Blix to Baghdad for talks about new inspection

            regime

 

Aug 4 Under Secretary of Defense for Arms Control Bolton told BBC US didn’t care

            whether new UN inspections happened because goal was regime change in Iraq

 

Aug 25 James Baker OpEd in New York Times said U.S. needed UN resolution that Iraq

submit to inspections anytime Said U.S. needed to be explicitly that if Iraq avoided the inspections U.S. would invade and change the govt

 

Aug 26 Cheney speech at Veterans of Foreign War Called Said Iraq good at deceiving weapons

            inspectors

 

Aug 30 Blair decided UK strategy would be to get UN to issue resolution that would

            give ultimatum to Iraq on inspectors or else

(Musings On Iraq Review The Report of the Iraq Inquiry, Executive Summary)

 

Sep 2 NSC met to discuss how to approach UN on Iraq Powell wanted new inspections

            Cheney said that would be useless Bush decided to ask for new inspections

 

Sep 7 NSC meeting debated whether US should go to UN and ask for return of weapons

inspectors Powell for Cheney against

Sep 7 Blair and Bush met and decided on new UN resolution demanding new inspections

in Iraq Blair told Bush they should seek 2 UN resolutions 1 for inspectors 2nd for if Iraq didn’t comply Blair said that UK would take part in any military action against Iraq

(Musings On Iraq Review The Report of the Iraq Inquiry, Executive Summary)

Sep 7 Bush and Blair press conference Both said IAEA found Iraq had nuclear program

and was 6 months away from getting a bomb Were referring to 1996 IAEA report during UN inspections not new one

 

Sep 16 Iraq told UN it would allow new weapons inspections with no conditions

 

Sep 19 Saddam sent letter to UN saying it had no WMD or nuclear weapons

Sep 19 Rumsfeld told Senate that UN weapons inspections were weak and weren’t going

            to find anything

 

Sep 25 US and UK worked on draft UN resolution demanding inspectors return to Iraq

(Musings On Iraq Review The Report of the Iraq Inquiry, Executive Summary)

 

Sep 28 US gave draft UN resolution to France Russia China on new weapons inspectors Gave 7 days for

Iraq to provide weapons declaration to UN 23 days to open all WMD sites Set up military bases for inspectors to work out of that would have no fly and no drive zones around them If Iraq failed to meet these demands UN member states were authorized to use all means to restore peace Were meant to make demands that Iraq would never comply with and justify war

 

Sep 30 Iraq and UN negotiated new weapons inspections in Vienna but blocked 8

            presidential sites US rejected deal

 

Oct 1 Head UN inspector Blix met with Iraqi delegation Iraq agreed to UN Res 1284 and

            new unconditional inspections Iraq gave CDs on its nuclear facilities to IAEA

 

Oct 11 Putin said he supported new inspections in Iraq but doubted Saddam had WMD

 

Oct 16 Iraq renewed offer for new UN inspections after US rejected deal

 

Nov 1 UN head inspectors Blix and El Baradei visited Bush and Cheney at White House

            Bush said inspections had full US backing

 

Nov 6 Secretary of State Powell got ok from National Security Adviser Rice to make deal

with France over language of new UN resolution to allow weapons inspections in Iraq

 

Nov 7 UK Embassy in US said hawks in Washington thought UN Res 1441 authorizing new weapons

inspections was a defeat

(Musings On Iraq Review The Report of the Iraq Inquiry, Executive Summary)

 

Nov 8 UN Resolution 1441 said Iraq was in violation of previous resolutions and authorized new

weapons inspections anywhere in Iraq

(Musings On Iraq Hangs Blix Replies To Tony Blair)

Nov 8 UN Res 1441 was immediately interpreted in different ways France said it meant a 2nd resolution

was necessary to go to war UK said it was last chance for Iraq or it would suffer the consequences

 

Nov 13 Iraq accepted UN Resolution 1441 to allow UN weapons inspectors

(Musings On Iraq Chilcot Inquiry Section 3.6 Development of UK Strategy and Options, November 2002 to January 2003)

Nov 13 Def Sec Rumsfeld memo to Bush Said inspections were important because Saddam would make a

mistake and the military would be ready to react as soon as Bush gave the order

 

Nov 14 UK intel report said Iraq accepted new weapons inspectors to avoid US led attack and would

continue to hide its most important WMD programs

(Musings On Iraq Chilcot Inquiry Section 3.6 Development of UK Strategy and Options, November 2002 to January 2003)

 

Nov 18 New UN inspectors arrived in Baghdad

 

Nov 25 Head weapons inspector Blix told Security Council inspections would begin in Iraq on 11/27/02

 

Nov 27 UN weapons inspections carried out first inspections under new regime

 

Nov 28 UN inspectors went to Dawrah Foot and Mouth Disease Facility Said facility couldn’t be used in

weapons programs Reporters said it was mostly destroyed

 

Dec 2 Bush Cheney Deputy Secretary of Defense Wolfowtiz gave speeches across US saying that Iraq

would not cooperate with weapons inspectors

(Musings On Iraq Chilcot Inquiry Section 3.6 Development of UK Strategy and Options, November 2002 to January 2003)

Dec 2 White House spokesman said if Saddam said he had no WMD proved he was lying

If he said he had WMD he violated UN resolutions

 

Dec 3 Iraq officials cooperated with UN inspectors at surprise search of one of Saddam’s Baghdad

palaces

 

Dec 6 White House accused Iraq of hiding WMDs from UN inspectors

(Musings On Iraq Chilcot Inquiry Section 3.6 Development of UK Strategy and Options, November 2002 to January 2003)

 

Dec 7 Iraq gave its WMD and nuclear weapons declaration to UN as part of new inspections claiming it

had no WMD

(Musings On Iraq Chilcot Inquiry Section 3.6 Development of UK Strategy and Options, November 2002 to January 2003)

Dec 7 Iraqi general claimed weapons declaration proved Iraq had no WMD

Dec 7 US and UK condemned Iraq’s weapons declaration as being incomplete and for denying it had

WMD

(Musings On Iraq Chilcot Inquiry Section 3.6 Development of UK Strategy and Options, November 2002 to January 2003)

Dec 7 Cheney told NSC Iraq’s weapons declaration was a material breach and Bush should move towards

war Said Powell and UN wanted to use inspections to avoid war Rumsfeld and Rice didn’t think Iraq’s weapons declaration was a material breach

 

Dec 9 UN inspectors found Fallujah II chlorine plant out of service US listed it as WMD site

(Musings On Iraq Chilcot Inquiry Section 3.6 Development of UK Strategy and Options, November 2002 to January 2003)

 

Dec 10 IAEA went to Al Qaim facility US claimed was an active Iraqi nuclear plant Found it

destroyed Went to Al Furat and found no nuclear equipment there

(Musings On Iraq review Hoodwinked, The Documents That Reveal How Bush Sold Us a War)

(Musings On Iraq Chilcot Inquiry Section 3.6 Development of UK Strategy and Options, November 2002 to January 2003)

 

Dec 11 IAEA went to Tarmiya facility where Iraq had worked on enriched uranium before Gulf War Found

it destroyed

(Musings On Iraq review Hoodwinked, The Documents That Reveal How Bush Sold Us a War)

(Musings On Iraq Chilcot Inquiry Section 3.6 Development of UK Strategy and Options, November 2002 to January 2003)

 

Dec 17 Secretary of State Powell hinted that US would reject Iraq’s weapons declaration to UN inspectors

(Musings On Iraq Chilcot Inquiry Section 3.6 Development of UK Strategy and Options, November 2002 to January 2003)

 

Dec 18 NSC meeting on UN inspections Bush said Iraq not cooperating Bush told Powell that if Iraq was

in material breach that would mean war

(Musings On Iraq review Wanting War: Why the Bush Administration Invaded Iraq)

(Musings On Iraq Chilcot Inquiry Section 3.6 Development of UK Strategy and Options, November 2002 to January 2003)

Dec 18 State Dept posted listing of omissions in Iraq’s UN weapons declaration

Dec 18 UK Foreign Secretary Straw said Iraq in material breach of UN resolutions with

            its weapons declaration that denied it had WMD

Dec 18 IAEA head El Baradei in Reuters said no evidence that Iraq has worked on any

            nuclear facilities since 1998

 

Dec 19 Head UN inspector Blix and IAEA chief El Baradei told Security Council about initial weapons

inspections Blix said Iraq had not provided much new info Said 1 main problem was declared amounts of WMD produced vs what Iraq could’ve produced and 2 secret destruction of stocks Iraq’s claims and potential WMD production didn't match and had no proof of its secret destruction of stocks

(Musings On Iraq Chilcot Inquiry Section 3.6 Development of UK Strategy and Options, November 2002 to January 2003)

Dec 19 Sec of State Powell and US Amb to UN Negroponte said Iraq in “material breach” of disarmament

obligations with its weapons declaration to UN

Dec 19 France said it was up to inspectors not US to determine whether Iraq was hiding WMD

Dec 19 Russia criticized US for not providing evidence to Security Council and inspectors of Iraqi

violations during inspections

 

Dec 20 IAEA inspectors said Tuwaitha facility involved in civilian nuclear research not involved in

weapons program

(Musings On Iraq Chilcot Inquiry Section 3.6 Development of UK Strategy and Options, November 2002 to January 2003)

 

Dec 30 For Sec Straw and Sec of State Powell thought UN inspections would not provide

smoking gun against Iraq so alternatives needed

Dec 30 UN inspectors said they had gone to all major suspected WMD sites and found nothing

 

Dec 31 UN inspector told press they were finding no evidence of Iraq’s WMD and Western intel

providing nothing substantive

(Musings On Iraq Chilcot Inquiry Section 3.6 Development of UK Strategy and Options, November 2002 to January 2003)

 

2003

Jan 2 UN inspector told Irish Times no active WMD or nuclear programs found in

            Iraq

(Musings On Iraq Chilcot Inquiry Section 3.6 Development of UK Strategy and Options, November 2002 to January 2003)

 

Jan 4 UK For Pol Adv Manning told Blair US almost given up on inspections because

            wanted immediate action against Iraq

(Musings On Iraq Review The Report of the Iraq Inquiry, Executive Summary)

(Musings On Iraq Chilcot Inquiry Section 3.6 Development of UK Strategy and Options, November 2002 to January 2003)

 

Jan 6 Saddam accused UN inspectors of being spies

Jan 6 IAEA asked State Dept for info about Iraq-Niger uranium deal

(Musings On Iraq How US Intelligence Failed The Iraq-Niger Uranium Story)

Jan 6 IAEA head El Baradei no evidence of any suspicious Iraq nuclear activities

(Musings On Iraq Chilcot Inquiry Section 3.6 Development of UK Strategy and Options, November 2002 to January 2003)

 

Jan 7 IAEA went to Al Qaim facility 3rd time US claimed was an active Iraqi nuclear

            plant Found it destroyed

(Musings On Iraq review Hoodwinked, The Documents That Reveal How Bush Sold Us a War)

(Musings On Iraq Chilcot Inquiry Section 3.6 Development of UK Strategy and Options, November 2002 to January 2003)

 

Jan 9 Head UN weapons inspector Blix said no smoking gun found in Iraq but

didn’t mean there were no WMD Said Iraq’s Dec weapons declaration was incomplete

(Musings On Iraq Chilcot Inquiry Section 3.6 Development of UK Strategy and Options, November 2002 to January 2003)

Jan 9 IAEA head El Baradei said aluminum tubes Iraq tried to buy were probably for

            rockets not nuclear program

Jan 9 White House responded to IAEA saying Iraq spinning it over aluminum tubes Said knew for

            a fact Iraq had WMD

 

Jan 10 US official said Iraq was deceiving the IAEA about its nuclear program

Jan 10 NY Times article IAEA challenged aluminum tubes story that they were for nuke program

and Energy and State Depts thought they might be for rockets CIA, DIA, NSA, White House said aluminum tubes Iraq tried to buy were for centrifuges State and Energy Depts disagreed UK didn’t think tubes for nuke program White House official told Times Iraq was spinning IAEA after it said aluminum tubes were not for centrifuges

(Musings On Iraq How A Contested Aluminum Tubes Story Became The Basis For War With Iraq)

 

Jan 11 CIA report Iraqi missile brigade outside Baghdad given missiles to hide from UN

            inspectors some with WMD agents Report used in Powell’s Feb 03 UN speech

 

Jan 12 IAEA said it would be hard to believe that Iraq was hiding a complete nuclear weapons

program Said provisional conclusion aluminum tubes Iraq tried to buy were for rockets not centrifuges

(Musings On Iraq How A Contested Aluminum Tubes Story Became The Basis For War With Iraq)

(Musings On Iraq Chilcot Inquiry Section 3.6 Development of UK Strategy and Options, November 2002 to January 2003)

 

Jan 13 IAEA head El Baradei said inspectors needed a few months to finish work in Iraq

 

Jan 16 UN inspectors found 12 missile warheads that could carry WMD not included

            in Iraq’s 2002 weapons declaration

 

Jan 17 UN inspectors after 4 inspections said Fallujah II chlorine plant inoperative US

            claimed it was producing WMD

 

Jan 18 UN inspectors said sites named by US as WMD facilities had been looked at

            and nothing found

 

Jan 19 Fmr UN inspector David Kay OpEd in Wash Post said UN weapons inspectors

            would never find any hard evidence against Iraq

 

Jan 20 Military Industrialization Commission ordered its director generals to come

            forward with any info on WMD

Jan 20 White House gave report to Congress on Iraq’s noncompliance with UN inspectors

            Included Iraq not mentioning trying to buy uranium

(Musings On Iraq How US Intelligence Failed The Iraq-Niger Uranium Story)

 

Jan 24 IAEA told Wash Post aluminum tubes Iraq tried to buy were wrong for nuke program

(Musings On Iraq How A Contested Aluminum Tubes Story Became The Basis For War With Iraq)

 

Jan 25 Military Industrialization Commission officials had Republican Guard commanders sign

            docs that they had no WMD in units

 

Jan 26 Blair said Iraq non-cooperation with UN inspectors was material breach of

            UN Resolution

 

Jan 27 Head UN inspector Blix told Security Council that Iraq cooperating with inspections but

had not accepted disarmament Asked what undeclared WMD items did Iraq have Asked did it illegally produce anything after 1998 Said Iraq’s Dec WMD declaration had provided no new info and not answered questions Said were questions about Iraq’s production of anthrax VX gas and WMD bombs from Iran-Iraq War

Jan 27 El Baradei told Security Council IAEA had found no evidence of an active nuclear

program in Iraq Said aluminum tubes Iraq tried to buy were probably for rockets not nuclear program

(Musings On Iraq How A Contested Aluminum Tubes Story Became The Basis For War With Iraq)

Jan 27 Powell said Iraq was hiding its WMD

Jan 27 US intelligence said Blix would back off next declaration to UN on inspections

            because didn't want to start war

Jan 27 Some in White House believed Blix lying about inspections and could not be trusted

Jan 27 Bush believed US stuck in inspection process and pushed him towards war

 

Jan 28 Bush’s State of Union said Iraq wasn’t disarming and hiding its programs from

            weapons inspections

 

Feb 1 Chief UN inspector Blix refused US claims that Iraq was sending WMD and

            scientists outside country to hide them

 

Feb 4 US gave documents on alleged Iraq-Niger uranium deal to IAEA

(Musings On Iraq How A Contested Aluminum Tubes Story Became The Basis For War With Iraq)

Feb 4 UN inspectors looked at two alleged mobile WMD labs and found nothing

Feb 4 Blair said plan was to get UN to show Iraq not cooperating on WMD and then have

Arab countries make Saddam step down

 

Feb 5 Chief UN inspector Blix told press never found any evidence of Iraq having mobile WMD

            labs

(Musings On Iraq How Iraqi Defector CURVEBALL Became Basis For US Claims That Iraq Had WMD)

 

Feb 8 Iraq turned over new documents about its WMD programs to UN inspectors

            that was called substantial

Feb 8 UN inspectors went to site CURVEBALL defector claimed was secret WMD facility

            and found nothing

(Musings On Iraq How Iraqi Defector CURVEBALL Became Basis For US Claims That Iraq Had WMD)

(Musings On Iraq Look Who The LA Times Dug Up – CURVEBALL)

(Musings On Iraq The Story Of CURVEBALL And Iraq’s Mobile Biological Weapons Labs)

 

Feb 9 France and Germany proposed tripling number of UN inspectors in Iraq US attacked plan

 

Feb 10 France Germany Russia statement called for more time for inspections Doused

hopes that France would vote for or abstain on 2nd UN resolution on Iraq authorizing use of force

 

Feb 11 CIA Dir Tenet told Senate Iraq had WMD and was hiding them from UN inspectors

Feb 11 CIA senior Africa analyst said that Iraq-Niger uranium docs looked like fakes

(Musings On Iraq How US Intelligence Failed The Iraq-Niger Uranium Story)

 

Feb 12 IAEA interviewed Iraq’s ex-amb to Vatican Zahawie who was named in Iraq-Niger

            uranium deal docs Denied story

(Musings On Iraq How US Intelligence Failed The Iraq-Niger Uranium Story)

Feb 12 UN inspectors announce Iraq’s Samoud 2 missiles violated range limits set by UN

Feb 12 CIA Dir Tenet told Senate US had briefed UN on all suspected WMD

            sites Didn’t give info on 21 of 105 sites

 

Feb 13 IAEA interviewed Iraq’s ex-amb to Vatican Zahawie second time over Iraq-Niger

            uranium deal Denied story

(Musings On Iraq How US Intelligence Failed The Iraq-Niger Uranium Story)

 

Feb 14 Chief Inspector Blix briefed Security Council on Iraq inspections Said found no evidence

of WMD Said 400 inspections at 300 sites Were all without notice and gained entry every time Said Iraqis cooperating Soil samples showed no signs of WMD Iraq still had unaccounted for materials Found 2 banned missiles Refuted Powell’s claim that Iraqis were cleaning WMD sites before inspections

Feb 14 IAEA head El Baradei said it had dismembered Iraq’s nuke program in 1998 and found no

evidence that it had been restarted yet Iraq had provided documents for why aluminum tubes it tried to buy had such specific specifications

(Musings On Iraq How A Contested Aluminum Tubes Story Became The Basis For War With Iraq)

Feb 14 Powell told Security Council Iraq not cooperating with inspections and use of force

            still an option

 

Feb 17 U2 spy planes began flying over Iraq for UN weapons inspectors

Feb 17 IAEA found that Iraq-Niger uranium docs were fakes

(Musings On Iraq How US Intelligence Failed The Iraq-Niger Uranium Story)

 

Feb 20 Chief UN Inspector Blix told Blair intelligence he’d gotten wasn’t great and

            maybe Iraq didn’t have much WMD

Feb 20 UN sources told press US intel on Iraq WMD was not turning up anything

Feb 20 Report interviews with Iraqi scientists by inspectors had not turned up any evidence

            of a nuclear program

 

Feb 27 Saddam agreed to destroy Samoud 2 missiles found to violate range limitations

            by UN inspectors US and UK said Iraq playing games

 

Feb 28 US attacked Iraq agreement to destroy Samud II missiles claiming it was just

            propaganda not real disarmament

Feb 28 Rumsfeld said Iraq never cooperated with UN inspectors

Feb 28 UN said found no evidence of active WMD programs in Iraq Inspectors went to site

CURVEBALL claimed was secret WMD facility for second time for samples Found nothing Said found small stock of mustard gas and some old WMD warheads and Iraq built 2 banned missiles Said Iraq had not provided any new information to answer questions from 1990s inspections

(Musings On Iraq How Iraqi Defector CURVEBALL Became Basis For US Claims That Iraq Had WMD)

(Musings On Iraq Look Who The LA Times Dug Up – CURVEBALL)

(Musings On Iraq The Story Of CURVEBALL And Iraq’s Mobile Biological Weapons Labs)

 

Mar 2 Senior admin official told NY Times UN weapons inspectors would not lead to

            anything

 

Mar 3 IAEA told US that docs alleging Iraq-Niger uranium deal were forgeries

(Musings On Iraq How US Intelligence Failed The Iraq-Niger Uranium Story)

 

Mar 5 Powell said that Iraq weapons declaration to UN farce because it said it had no

            WMD and claimed it was hiding them from inspectors

 

Mar 6 Bush TV address Said time running out on UN weapons inspectors Accused Iraq

            of hiding its WMD Bush said that he’d not decided on war when he had

Mar 6 National Security Adviser Rice letter to Senator US had briefed UN on all suspected WMD

            sites Didn’t give info on 21 of 105 sites

 

Mar 7 Head weapons inspector Blix said that Iraq doing more but not fully cooperating and still months

more work ahead Fund no evidence of mobile WMD labs

(Musings On Iraq How Iraqi Defector CURVEBALL Became Basis For US Claims That Iraq Had WMD)

Mar 7 IAEA chief El Baradei told UN no evidence Iraq restarted nuclear program

Concluded that aluminum tubes Iraq tried to buy were for rockets not nuke program Said documents claiming Iraq tried to buy uranium from Niger were fakes

(Musings On Iraq How A Contested Aluminum Tubes Story Became The Basis For War With Iraq)

(Musings On Iraq How US Intelligence Failed The Iraq-Niger Uranium Story)

Mar 7 Powell told UN Security Council in response to IAEA that US had new proof that

            Aluminum tubes were for centrifuges

 

Mar 12 Iraqi scientists began private interviews with UN inspectors

 

Mar 15 VP Cheney told NBC that UN weapons inspectors had missed Iraq’s nuke program in 1990s and

they weren’t going to do better this time Said Iraq could have a nuclear bomb soon Said Iraqis defying inspections again

 

Mar 16 VP Cheney told Meet The Press that UN inspectors were wrong about Iraq’s weapons

program in general citing Iraq buying aluminum tubes which US claimed were for centrifuges Qaeda

(Musings On Iraq How A Contested Aluminum Tubes Story Became The Basis For War With Iraq)

 

Mar 17 UN Sec Gen Annan announced he would order withdrawal of weapons inspectors due to

            impending war

 

Mar 18 UN weapons inspectors ended work in Iraq Did 731 inspections at 411 sites and

            found no WMD or nuclear programs

 

Mar 19 UN inspector said WMD decontamination trucks US pointed out were water or

            fire trucks

 

Mar 28 Chief weapons inspector Blix said US gave up on inspections in early 2003

 

Apr 12 Chief UN Weapons Inspector Blix said inspections could’ve contained Iraq and

US and UK never believed in process Said US and UK fabricated evidence against Iraq to justify war

 

Apr 22 Chief UN inspector Blix told BBC US tried to discredit inspections at the Security

            Council

 

Apr 17 Chief UN inspector Blix cited Iraqi scientist who said Iraq had no WMD

 

May 30 Final report of UN inspectors found no evidence of WMD programs

May 30 UN inspectors said soil samples helped back Iraq story that they destroyed

            anthrax

 

Jun 5 UN Security Council asked US to allow its weapons inspectors back into Iraq

 

Jun 6 UN head inspector Blix said just because there were questions about Iraq’s WMD

didn’t mean it had them Said US and UK never provided quality intel on Iraq’s WMD

Jun 6 US rejected having UN weapons inspectors back in Iraq to look for WMD

 

Jun 10 Head UN inspector Blix accused Pentagon of trying to undermine him during

            inspections

 

Jun 16 Head UN Inspector Blix said empty 122mm WMD artillery shells were from

            1980s after US said they could be part of stocks

 

Jun 22 Head weapons inspector Blix thought Iraq only had “debris” of WMD program since

none found since invasion Blix said pre-war reports by Iraqis that WMD were destroyed might prove true Cited Hussein Kamal in 94 who said no WMD left

 

Jun 24 UN head inspector Blix said inspectors were not impressed with Powell’s Feb 03

            speech to UN on Iraq’s WMD

 

Aug 8 IAEA Found no Iraqi nuclear weapons program after 1991

 

Sep 18 Head weapons inspector Blix said he believed Iraq destroyed its WMD in 90s

 

2004

Feb 21 Report US did not brief UN inspectors on 21 of 105 WMD sites in Iraq US claimed

            it gave info on all sites

 

Feb 27 Fmr chief UN inspector Blix told Guardian he thought US spied on him

 

2009

Nov 26 Former UK Amb to US Meyer testified to Chilcot Inquiry Said US decided on Iraq war before UN

weapons inspectors returned in Nov 02 Said US already had invasion plan with war starting Jan 03 which was pushed back to March Meyer said UN inspectors had no time to finish their work US and UK only wanted a smoking gun to justify war

(Musings On Iraq Former British Diplomat Confirms that U.N. Inspectors Were Means To War With Iraq)

 

 

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This Day In Iraqi History - Jan 17

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