End Of Big Alliances In Iraq’s 2014 Election?

 

Iraq’s last three elections for parliament were characterized by large alliances running for office. In 2005 for example all the religious Shiite parties and some smaller entities ran together as the United Iraqi Alliance and walked away with the most seats in the two votes held that year. Now Iraqi politics appear to be going through a progression as some major players have announced that they will run alone in the 2014 balloting. This might be a positive change for the country as lists are attempting to form their own individual identity rather than running in large coalitions where many different parties with different agendas held loose and often unwieldy alliances.

Two major lists from the 2010 vote, and perhaps a third have broken up. In the last parliamentary election there were four large coalitions that collected the vast majority of votes. Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki had his State of Law led by his Dawa and Deputy Premier Hussein Shahristani’s Independents. The Sadrists and Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI) formed the National Alliance. The Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) and the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) were part of the Kurdish Alliance. Finally Iyad Allawi, Tariq Hashemi, Rafi Issawi, Osama and Atheel Nujafi, Saleh al-Mutlaq and others created the Iraqi National Movement (INM). The National Alliance and the National Movement are now no more, there have been reports that the Independents might leave State of Law, while the Kurdish parties are debating whether to run together or separately. Back in October 2013, Iyad Allawi’s Iraqi National List said that it would run alone in 2014. That was just stating the obvious as the INM had already come apart earlier in the year. Now Parliament Speaker Osama Nujafi’s Mutahidun, Deputy Premier Saleh al-Mutlaq’s Iraqi National Dialogue Front, and Jamal Karbuli’s Solution Movement will all run separately. In November, a spokesman for the Supreme Council and a parliamentarian from the Sadr bloc separately announced that they would be independent parties in 2014 marking the end of their National Alliance. Both claimed that the new electoral law did not favor large lists, and that’s what led to their decision. After the 2013 provincial vote the Sadrists claimed they had a strategic alliance with ISCI that would continue into next year’s election. That came after the two worked together to depose State of Law from several provinces such as Basra and Baghdad. Those two will likely cooperate after the election, but beforehand they will be separate. Maliki’s list may split as well. There was a report that Shahristani’s Independents is considering running separately. That party wants more seats, but State of Law lost standing in the 2013 election, which is making the Independents reconsider its alliance. At the same time, the Badr Organization is going to maintain its ties with Maliki. Badr joined State of Law for this year’s balloting. Finally, there are the Kurdish parties, which are trying to go in the other direction. In 2010 the PUK and KDP maintained their traditional alliance, but the three opposition parties, the Change List, the Kurdistan Islamic Union, and the Kurdistan Islamic Group went it alone. Now the KDP and PUK are trying to get them to all compete together. The Islamic Group has expressed tentative support for the idea saying that all the Kurdish parties need to run together in provinces with disputed areas like Tamim otherwise the Kurdish vote would be split. The Change List and Islamic Union however have accused the PUK and KDP of cheating in the 2013 election, and therefore are standoffish on any grand Kurdish list. That might mean the Kurdish Alliance is the only surviving major list left in 2014, but it will not be expanding. If this trend continues it will be an important change for Iraqi politics. Having these large lists was only meant to pool votes to gain power rather than bringing together like-minded parties. Dawa, the Supreme Council, and the Sadrists all had opposing views yet they joined together in 2005 under the United Alliance. Likewise the PUK and KDP still have different opinions about the future of Kurdistan and the country in general yet they are trying to keep up a united front for 2014. At the minimum parties running alone will provide the public with more choices next year.

Iraq’s government is still developing. At first, many divergent parties banded together usually on ethnosectarian grounds to get as many votes as possible. Now the lists appear to be going in the other direction. Many parties are still personal vehicles for their leaders rather than real political organizations, but developing their own individual messages and programs is an important change. More importantly there is no longer one large Shiite list, one large Sunni list, one large Kurdish list. Now there’s State of Law, the Sadrists, the Supreme Council, Fadhila, Mutahidun, the Iraqi National Dialogue Front, the Iraqi National List, the Change List, etc. to all pick from. That doesn’t mean communal based politics is dead, but it is a step away from it, which can only be a positive for the country’s future.  

SOURCES

Ahmed, Hevidar, “Kurdish Parties Divided Over Fighting Iraqi Elections as Single Bloc,” Rudaw, 11/12/13

AIN, “Sadr confirms: “No for granting Maliki 3^rd term,”” 11/12/13

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Asharq Al-Awsat, “Iraq: Sadr and Hakim form new “strategic” alliance,” 7/11/13

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Habib, Mustafa, “the next leader of iraq? former extremist and Islamic cleric the most likely candidates,” Niqash, 11/7/13

Jawad, Haider Ali, “Muqtada al-Sadr criticized Maliki’s nomination for a third term, saying “I seek refuge with Allah,”” Buratha News, 10/27/13

National Iraqi News Agency, “Ahrar bloc will enter individually in all provinces in the upcoming parliamentary elections,” 11/16/13

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- “Citizen bloc intends to enter the upcoming parliamentary elections in an individual list,” 11/16/13

- “Sadr explains that his refusal to renew the mandate of a third term for al-maliki does not include members of his party,” 11/16/13

Radio Nawa, “Iraqi List decides to contest the next parliamentary elections alone,” 10/19/13

Al Rafidayn, “Sadrists and coalition with state of law ‘impossible’ if insist on Maliki third term,” 9/3/13

- “Source: Allawi fails to revive his ‘Sunni’ alliances .. The agreement with the ‘Shiite Islamists’ weak,” 9/2/13

Shafaq News, “Ameri’s bloc resolves its electoral decision by allying with State of law,” 11/16/13

Neo-Baathist-Nationalist Coalition Announced

October 31, 2009 was the deadline to register coalitions for the 2010 parliamentary elections. On that day a new list called the Iraqi National Movement was announced made up of parliamentarian Saleh al-Mutlaq of the National Dialogue Council, former Prime Minister Iyad Allawi of the Iraqi National List, and Vice President Tariq al-Hashemi. He was the former leader of the Iraqi Islamic Party, but left to form his own Renewal List. Hashemi had been in negotiations with Allawi and Mutlaq since August, and there were talks with Interior Minister Jawad Bolani and his Constitution Party. He chose to join Sheikh Ahmad Abu Risha of Anbar to form the Unity Alliance instead. Allawi was also courted by the major Shiite coalition, the Iraqi National Alliance. Hashemi may be responsible for the Awakening Councils of Diyala joining the Iraqi National Movement as well. The Islamic Party successfully co-opted the Sons of Iraq/Awakening movement in Diyala in 2007-2008, which helped their Iraqi Accordance Front List to come in first place in the 2009 elections there.

The Iraqi National Movement includes both Shiites, Allawi, and Sunnis, Mutlaq and Hashemi, but its main appeal is to Baathists and nationalists. Since the U.S. invasion Mutlaq and Allawi have consistently pushed for the inclusion and rehabilitation of former army officers from Saddam’s time along with Baathists. Hashemi on the other hand has roots with the Muslim Brotherhood, an Islamist group that originated in Egypt, which gave birth to the Iraqi Islamic Party. All three also call for a strong central government, and to limit outside influences, especially from Iran.

Overall, the Iraqi National Movement is a medium sized coalition. In the 2009 provincial elections, Mutlaq and Allawi won 45 seats, accounting for 10.2% of the total. Allawi’s List gained seats in both the largely Sunni west and north, and a spattering across Shiite southern Iraq as well, and became part of the ruling coalitions in Babil, Qadisiyah, and Salahaddin. Mutlaq only gained representation in Sunnis areas, and came in second in Anbar where his party got the head of the council. In comparison, Maliki’s State of Law list won 140 seats, 31.8%, the Supreme Council got 55 seats, 12.5%, the Sadrists 41 seats, 9.3%, and former Prime Minister Ibrahima al-Jaafari 23 seats, 5.2%. Together those last three have formed the new Iraqi National Alliance, and got 119 seats total, 27.0%. The real importance of the Iraqi National Movement will be seen after the election, as no coalition is likely to even come out with a plurality. That will mean a huge amount of back door dealing and negotiations to name a new government, which will likely take months as it did the last two times Iraq went through that process.

Allawi and Mutlaq’s Showing In The 2009 Provincial Elections

Total Provincial Seats: 440

Allawi’s Iraqi National List – Provinces (# of seats)
Anbar (2)
Babil (3)
Baghdad (5)
Basra (2)
Diyala (3)
Qadisiyah (3)
Salahaddin (5)
Wasit (3)
TOTAL: 26, 5.9%

Mutlaq’s Iraqi National Project – Provinces (# of seats)
Anbar (6)
Baghdad (4)
Diyala (6)
Salahaddin (3)
TOTAL: 19, 4.3%

SOURCES

Agence France Presse, “Iraqi VP joins forces with ex-PM to form new bloc,” 10/28/09

Alsumaria, “New Iraq political coalition in the offing,” 8/24/09

Aswat al-Iraq, “Iraq’s Unity Alliance formally announced,” 10/21/09
- “VP announces new list for upcoming parliamentary elections,” 9/12/09

Iraq The Model, “Accord Front Collapses, Sunni Tribes Seek Shiite Allies,” 8/15/09

Al Jazeera, “Iraqi parties form new coalition,” 10/31/09

Roads To Iraq, “The National Movement,” 10/31/09

Visser, Reidar, “Allawi-Mutlak: Consolidation at the Centre of Iraqi Politics,” Ira and Gulf Analysis, 10/27/09

Maliki Attempts To Forge New Ruling Coalition

Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s State of Law list was the biggest winner after the January 2009 provincial elections. Since the results have been announced Maliki has been maneuvering to create a new ruling coalition that would participate in the 2009 parliamentary elections and be his new source of support.

When Maliki became Prime Minister in 2006 he was backed by a coalition of Shiites, Sunnis, and Kurds that followed the “national unity” model propagated by the Americans. His main supporters were the Shiite United Iraqi Alliance made up of the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council (SIIC), Dawa – Iraq, the Sadrist Trend, the Fadhila Party, Maliki’s own Dawa Party, the Sunni Iraqi Accordance Front, the Kurdish Patriotic Union of Kurdistan and Kurdistan Democratic Party, and smaller independent parties. Maliki was actually a compromise candidate as the Sadrists and SIIC could not initially agree on who was to replace Prime Minister Ibrahim al-Jaafari.

The ruling alliance quickly fractured because of these differences. By the end of 2006 the Kurds, Accordance Front, Dawa and the SIIC were all conspiring to push Sadr out of the government. The U.S. was also applying pressure to exclude him. Sadr had already sealed his own fate when he withdrew his six ministers from the cabinet at the end of November 2006, thereby denying him any real say in the government. The U.S. and Shiites parties were hoping that including Sadr in the government would turn him towards politics, and away from being a militia leader, but Sadr’s position always came from his ability to control the streets and violence, so one could not come without the other. Eventually both the Sadrists and Fadhila left the United Shiite Alliance and Maliki’s ruling coalition. A new alliance was then made consisting of the Dawa, the Supreme Council, and the two Kurdish parties. The Accordance Front was later brought on board as well.

While the ruling parties were generally united in getting rid of Sadr they had some fundamental differences on the future of the country as well. The Kurds and Supreme Council both supported federalism. The Kurds wanted more autonomy for Kurdistan, while the SIIC were pushing for a nine province Shiite region in the south. Maliki on the other hand wanted a stronger central government based in Baghdad. As the Prime Minister began exerting more of his power with the improved security situation in 2008, these differences began coming to the fore. By the fall both parties were criticizing and making moves against Maliki, and he was replying in turn.

Since the January 2009 provincial elections, the Prime Minister has been attempting to forge a new alliance to run in the parliamentary elections and back him afterwards. Although the coalition has not been finalized the broad outlines of it are apparent. The new grouping looks to be made up of Maliki’s State of Law List with the Dawa Party at its core, the Sadrists, the Sunni Iraqi National Dialogue Front who ran as the Iraqi National Project in the provincial balloting, and perhaps Iyad Allawi’s Iraqi National List. This group has already made a deal to rule Wasit province. Saleh al-Mutlaq, the head of the Dialogue Front has also said he is open to joining with the State of Law list in Diyala, Salahaddin, Baghdad, and Babil. According to the Al-Qatan paper, Maliki is also courting the Fadhila party, Ibrahim al-Jaafari’s Reform List, and Ahmad Chalabi. Originally, Allawi looked to be joining with the SIIC, but he has apparently changed his mind as the State of Law offers the chance to rule. While Saleh and the Sadrists are both apprehensive of working with Maliki since they have had major differences with him in the past, what unites them is opposition to the Supreme Council and the Kurds, and of course the chance to hold power.

The SIIC and Kurds, along with the Iraqi Accordance Front have attempted to keep their old alliance together. In Diyala for example, the Accordance Front, the Supreme Council, and the Kurdish Alliance have agreed to work together to run the provincial council.

Whether Maliki’s attempt to re-arrange Iraq’s political map succeeds or not is yet to be seen. The ruling provincial councils have not even been announced yet, and there is still plenty of negotiating to be done. What is for sure is that the old coalitions are mostly dead. The United Iraqi Alliance, which was the largest victor in the 2005 parliamentary elections, has now broken apart. The Sunni Accordance Front has also split. The Kurdish alliance is the only one that remains, and they are now diametrically opposed to Maliki and his attempt to centralize power. This is all part of the new status quo that is still emerging after the end of the sectarian war of 2006-2007.

SOURCES

Agence France Presse, “Sadr renews idea of local alliances with Iraq PM,” 2/20/09

Alsumaria, “Iraq parties form alliances after elections,” 2/13/09

Asharq al-Awsat, “Al Maliki Wants An Alternative To The Current Shiite Alliance That Will Support The Central Government And Reject The Sectarian Quota System,” 2/16/09

Associated Press, “Shiites, Kurds form alliance; 4 Iraqi kids found in rubble of bombed area,” 8/16/07

Aswat al-Iraq, “KA, IAF agree to share leading posts in Diala,” 2/24/09
- “PM Accuses Kurdish Leadership of ‘violating’ the Constitution,” 11/20/08

Felter, Joseph and Fishman, Brian, “Iranian Strategy in Iraq, Politics and ‘Other Means,’” Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, 10/13/08

International Crisis Group, “Iraq After The Surge II: The Need for a New Political Strategy,” 4/30/08

Parker, Ned, “Sadr’s bloc quits Iraq’s ruling coalition,” Times of London, 9/16/07

Roads To Iraq Blog, “American delegation met with former Iraqi army officers,” 2/20/09
- “The upcoming confrontation, Maliki and the Kurdish Coalition,” 11/14/08
- “Reconciliation without reconciliation,” 3/10/09

Rossmiller, Alex, “The Bush administration’s four-year history of erratic meddling in search of an Iraqi ‘savior.’” American Prospect, 4/11/07

Al-Sa’dawi, Ahmad, “post-election analysis: real change or more of the same?” Niqash, 2/19/09

Shadid, Anthony, “New Alliance In Iraq Cross Sectarian Lines,” Washington Post, 3/20/09

Visser, Reidar, “Maliki, Hakim, and Iran’s Role in the Basra Fighting,” Historiae.org, 4/9/08
- “Two Very Different Takes on Centralism,” Historiae.org, 9/20/08

Al-Wazzan, Saleem, “al-maliki angles for broad alliance in basra,” Niqash, 3/20/09

Wong, Edward, “Iraqis weigh alliance to marginalize Sadr and bolster Maliki,” International Harold Tribune, 12/11/06

Early Election Predictions

The results of the January 31, 2009 provincial elections will not be known for weeks, but there are already a slew of reports predicting the winners. The biggest victor is Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki whose State of Law list could come away with more than half of the fourteen provinces that held elections. Former Prime Minister Iyad Allawi, while not winning any governorates could have a strong showing as well. The Sadrists and Supreme Iraqi Islamic Council look to be the losers, but are still on the scene. New parties like the Awakening in Anbar and the Hadbaa party in Ninewa have also appeared. In the larger picture, the vote is a correction for some of the problems created by the 2005 one, it shows that the idea of a southern autonomous region is probably dead, that Maliki’s drive for a strong central government is on its way to becoming a reality, and that sectarian and ethnic divides still exist in Iraq. The biggest question is whether any of these new politicians will do any better at actual governing than the ones that they are replacing.

Who Could Be The Winners?

Six parties have apparently taken the lion’s share of votes in the January election. According to the government Al-Sabah paper those are Maliki’s State of Law list, the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council’s list, the Iraqi National List of former Prime Minister Allawi, the Sadrists’ Independent Trend of the Noble Ones, the National Project, and the Iraqi Accordance Front of Vice President Tariq al-Hashemi. The State of Law coalition is made up of Maliki’s Islamic Dawa Party, the offshoot Dawa Party Iraqi Organization, the Independent Blog, the Solidarity Bloc, the Islamic Union of Iraqi Turkmen, Kurdish Feli Fraternity Movement, and the Shaabani Uprising Bloc 1991. They call for law and order, getting rid of militias and corruption, and a strong central government. It is a Shiite list, but includes Arabs, Kurds, and Turkomen. The Martyr of the Pulpit is made up of four branches of the Supreme Council, the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council, the Shaheed al-Mihrab Bloc, the Badr Organization, and the Independent Bloc. They advocate an autonomous Shiite region in the south, job creation, oppose the return of Baathists, and want compensation for crimes during Saddam’s rule. The Iraqi Accordance Front also put together a coalition consisting of the Iraqi Islamic Party, the Reform Bloc of Diyala Province, the Iraqi Legation for Independent Organization of Civil Society, the Arabic Iraqi Congregation, and the General Conference of Iraqi People. They advocate the unity of Iraq, Arab and Islamic identity, an end to the U.S. occupation, the freeing of all prisoners held by the Americans, amending the constitution, maintaining Diyala’s borders, and reforming the government and justice system. The National Project is an opposing Sunni coalition led by Salih al-Mutlaq and former speaker of parliament Mahmoud Mashadani. They are both from the Iraqi Natioanl Dialogue Council who recently split from the Accordance Front. They along with the Iraqi National List and Sadrists have all worked together in parliament as the loosely organized opposition. Iraqi nationalism, a call for a strong central government, and opposition to the ruling parties are what unite them.

Of those six, Maliki’s State of Law could walk away with the majority of Iraq’s provinces. Two papers Al-Sabah and Al-Sharq al-Awsat say that Maliki’s State of Law has come in first in six southern provinces. All are not known yet, but reports point to Basra, Dhi Qar, Muthanna, Wasit, Maysan, and one other. A government source said the list could come away with all nine southern provinces, the five already mentioned plus Karbala, Najaf, Babil, and Qadisiyah. That seems like wishful thinking. In Basra, which was the beginning of Maliki’s turnaround from a weak ineffectual leader to a strong one, his coalition has 50% of the vote. In second is the Supreme Council with 20%. The State of Law may also come away with Baghdad, having won the Shiite east, including Sadr City. That could leave the Prime Minister’s list in control of seven provinces, and be a major blow to the Supreme Council and the Sadrists that are now in power.

Some new parties such as the al-Hadbaa National List in Ninewa may also be victorious. The List is made up of the al-Hadbaa National United Assembly, the Patriotic and National Forces Assembly, the Iraqi and Kurdsitani Party for Freedom and Equality, and the Al-Wasat Iraqi Assembly. The party is led by Atheel al-Nujaifi, and has run on an explicitly anti-Kurdish and pro-security ticket. They oppose Kurdish rule and designs on the province. Currently Kurds control 31 of the 41 council seats, and wish to annex northern sections of the province. Al-Hadbaa has accused the Kurdish controlled security forces and their militia the peshmerga of harassing them. They also claim that if they are elected they will help bring an end to the insurgency in Ninewa, which is largely fueled by the ethnic divide between Arabs and Kurds. This conflict could be the reason why 60% of the province turned out to vote, one of the highest in the country. A U.S. official said that the party could have up to 66% of the vote. If true that would mean they could rule the province without the need of a larger coalition or joint rule with the Kurds. The U.S. general in command of Mosul said he hoped the election would lead to reconciliation, and an end to the violence in one of the country’s most volatile areas. However al-Hadbaa’s anti-Kurdish campaign could lead to more divisions instead.

In other Sunni areas, the Anbar Awakening and Accordance Front list are battling it out. According to Al-Sabah, the tribal Awakening is winning in Anbar. A parliamentarian from the Accordance Front claimed his list is taking in Anbar however, along with Diyala and Salahaddin. He also said they are coming in third in Babil and Basra, a surprise if true since they are Shiite majority provinces.

Another newcomer is Yousef Majid al-Haddoubi, who could walk away with Karbala. Al-Haddoubi is a secular Shiite independent who heads the Brigade List. He was the governor of the province under Saddam, and then became the mayor of Karbala City after the U.S. invasion.

Larger coalitions to rule provinces are also emerging. In Najaf, the Sadrists, the Iraqi National List, the Reform Movement, and the Iraqi National Congress announced that they would form an alliance to try to take the province.

What Does It All Mean?

Many of the parties that came to power in 2005 were not representative of their populations. This could account for most of them being swept from office. The Supreme Council won Babil, Baghdad, Dhi Qar, Karbala, Muthanna, Najaf and Qadisiyah in the previous vote because they were the largest Shiite party, the best organized, had the most money, were founded by an established clerical family the Hakims, had the backing of Iran, said Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani supported them, and the Sadrists largely stayed away from the polls. The SIIC also won in Diyala, the Iraqi Islamic Party in Anbar, and the Kurds in Ninewa and Salahaddin because of the Sunni boycott. The Islamic Party for example, only got 2,692 votes out of 3,775 in Anbar as a result because it ran largely uncontested. Those disparities are now over, although Anbar may still be up for grabs.

There have also been several articles stating that the 2009 vote is a rejection of the religious parties, but this is only partly true. The two main parts of Maliki’s State of Law list are Shiite religious groups, the Islamic Dawa and the Dawa Party Iraq Organization. The Supreme Council might have lost control of the south, but are still present, the same thing with the Sadrists. The Iraqi Islamic Party is also Islamist. Many stressed nationalism and backed independents, but that doesn’t invalidate their pasts. What the lists found is that they had to address issues more to get elected rather than just their religion, and that is an important shift in Iraqi politics. At the same time, Sunnis continued to mostly vote for Sunni parties, Shiites for Shiites, Kurds for Kurds. Sectarianism still exists in Iraq, it’s just more political than violent today.

For the south, the January election probably marks the end of any autonomous region there. The Supreme Council promoted a nine province Shiite region after the U.S. invasion, but largely dropped it. Right before the vote, a member of the Hakim family said they would revive the idea after January 31. That won’t happen now because the SIIC may not control a single province after everything is said and done. The defeat of the Basra autonomous plan and polls show little support for the idea anyway.

Instead, Iraq could be moving towards a stronger central government based in Baghdad. Maliki consistently called for this as he was campaigning across the country. His military actions against the Sadrists, insurgents, and Kurds were all part of his strategy. Now he could have control of both Baghdad, and friendly governors in the south to further his plan.

Finally, the most important question is whether any of the State of Law candidates or any of the other new lists coming to power will be any better at governing than the current ones. Many voted for the State of Law list because of the Prime Minister, not the actual politicians running. The current provincial councils are known for being incompetent, sectarian, corrupt, and suffer from a slow paper based bureaucracy and a centralized state where Baghdad and the individual ministers have all the power. The new councils will also have to deal with half the money as their predecessors due to the dramatic drop in the price of oil. That will make their job even more difficult. They will have to do a much better job to keep the loyalty of their followers, and not alienate more Iraqis from the political system that has not served them well on the local and provincial level.

SOURCES

Agence France Presse, “Iraqi PM Calls for Strong Central Government,” 1/22/09

Alsumaria, “Iraq elections leaks say Al Maliki ahead,” 2/2/09

Aswat al-Iraq, “IAF realizes progress in Salah el-Din, Diala, Anbar, - MP,” 2/2/09
- “No decrease in salaries because of oil prices – planning minister” 12/19/08
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Cocks, Tim, “Vote sows seeds of greater calm in Iraq’s north,” Reuters, 2/2/09

Farrell, Stephen, “Election: What The Papers Say,” Baghdad Bureau Blog, New York Times, 2/2/09

Hendawi, Hamza and Abdul-Zahra, Qassim, “Momentum builds for a self-ruled southern Iraq,” Associated Press, 1/16/09

Ibrahim, Waleed, “’Surprise’ poll victories strengthen Iraq’s Maliki,” Reuters, 2/1/09

International Crisis Group, “Iraq’s Provincial Elections: The Stakes,” 1/27/09

Knights, Michael and McCarthy, Eamon, “Provincial Politics in Iraq: Fragmentation or New Awakening?” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, April 2008

Londono, Ernesto, “In Iraq’s north, a defining vote,” Washington Post, 2/2/09

Niqash, “accord and reform bloc,” 1/28/09
- “the hadbaa national list,” 1/28/09
- “the shaheed al-mihrab list,” 1/28/09
- “state of law coalition,” 1/28/09

Who Speaks For The Sunnis?

Yesterday, January 14, the major Sunni bloc the Iraqi Accordance Front (IAF) boycotted parliament. They claimed that it was illegal to hold sessions without a speaker. The real reason was because they have been unable to fill the position as their coalition has collapsed and opposition parties have challenged their right to the spot.

The Accordance Front began disintegrating last month. As reported earlier, on December 24 the Iraqi National Dialogue Council and the Independents Bloc left the Accordance Front, charging that the Iraqi Islamic Party (IIP) was attempting to monopolize power within the coalition. On January 12, four parliamentarians from the Independent Democratic Gathering also departed for the same reason. The Front that once had 44 seats in parliament, and the majority of Sunni lawmakers, was reduced to just 25. The Islamic Party held 22 of those seats, with the remaining 3 coming from Adnan Dulaimi’s General Council for the People of Iraq Party. There are a total of 69 Sunnis in the 275-member parliament.

With their weakened position, the IAF has not been able to build consensus over a replacement for the speaker of parliament. The former speaker, Mahmoud al-Mashhadani was forced to resign on December 23 after his comments about shoe throwing journalist Muntadar al-Zaidi. Since then the Iraqi National Dialogue Council as well as the secular Iraqi National List (INL) of former Interim Prime Minister Ilyad Alawi have presented candidates, to compete with the Islamic Party’s two. The National List actually put up three parliamentarians, a woman, a Shiite, and a Sunni. Both they and the Dialogue Council, which are now both part of the loosely connected opposition, are challenging the sectarian and big party quotas that have dominated the body since its creation after the U.S. invasion. Under this system, the prime minister was to be a Shiite from the United Iraqi Alliance, the president was a Kurd from the Kurdish Alliance, and the speaker was a Sunni from the Accordance Front. The Dialogue Council claims that since Mashhadani came from their party, they are entitled to the position, while the National List is saying it doesn’t even have to be a Sunni. The INL also took up the position of the defecting Sunni parties by criticizing the Islamic Party for holding the speakership, one vice president, one deputy premier, and a number of ministers. The Iraqi paper Azzaman also reported that Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki might have also objected to the IIP’s domination of most of the Sunni offices in government. Shocked by this turn of events, the United Iraqi Alliance and Kurds have tried to stand by the Accordance Front by saying they deserve the speaker position.

From the beginning the Islamic Party was always the strongest of the Sunni parties. It was formed in 1960 modeled after the Muslim Brotherhood. It was quickly outlawed by the government and became largely an underground opposition group. After the U.S. invasion the party’s secretary general Mohsen Abdel Hamid was named to the Iraqi Governing Council. In 2005 they were the only major party to defy the Sunni boycott and were elected to several provincial councils. It later helped form the Iraqi Accordance Front and went on to win the largest single number of seats in parliament of any Sunni party. Heading into the January 2009 provincial elections they were initially predicted to lose control of Anbar province, but have since been able to break apart the tribal Awakening probably meaning they will have joint rule there. They have also built up ties with Sons of Iraq groups in Baghdad, are part of the main Sunni coalition in Diyala, and are running in Ninewa.

The battle over the speaker of parliament and the break-up of the Accordance Front is largely about who will speak for the Sunnis. Right now, no one can say. The Islamic Party is still the best organized, and appears to be well positioned in the provincial elections. They may come out the winners with the Accordance Front existing only in name. This also happened with the Shiite United Iraqi Alliance, as the Fadhila Party and Sadrists left in 2007, and the Dawa Party and Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council are running against each other. These two coalitions were created at a time of extreme sectarianism and fighting. That is now changing. That may still leave the Islamic Party as a winner after elections as Iraqis tend to vote by sect, but they also benefit from their size, breadth, and money, as the old coalitions past by the wayside.

For more on the break up of the Iraqi Accordance Front see:

Accordance Front Breaks Apart

SOURCES:

Abdullah, Muahmmed, “Diyala Sees Early Campaigning,” Niqash, 12/8/08

Alsumaria, “Accordance Front boycotts Parliament session,” 1/14/09
- “Iraq Parliament speaker post under debate,” 1/8/08

Aswat al-Iraq, “2 IIP candidates for parliament speaker post – MP,” 1/2/09
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- “IAF represents only IIP – MP,” 1/8/09
- “INDC puts forward candidates for parliament’s speakership,” 12/24/08
- “INL nominates 3 MPs for parliament’s speakership,” 1/13/09
- “NDF puts forward candidate for speaker,” 1/13/09
- “Lawmaker announces nomination for parliamentary speakership,” 1/6/09
- “Parliament’s speaker position for IAF – VP,” 12/31/08
- “Parliament’s speaker should be IAF nominee – Kurdish MP,” 1/6/09
- “UIA, KA agree to IAF’s candidate for speaker,” 1/11/09

BBC, “Iraqi Governing Council members,” 7/14/03

Dagher, Sam, “Dispute Weakens Iraqi Sunni Coalition,” New York Times, 1/11/09

Dalli, Hussein, “Iraq Awakening Councils form party,” Al Jazeera, 4/14/08

IraqSlogger.com, “Iraq Papers Tue: 124,000 Bodyguards in Iraq!” 12/29/08

Niqash, “irqai Islamic party (iip),” 11/7/05

Parker, Ned, “Iraq looks ahead to provincial, national elections,” Los Angeles Times, 11/5/08

Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, “Iraq To Replace Parliament Speaker Deemed Offensive,” 1/9/09

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UPI, “Sunnis marginalized in Iraqi politics,” 1/8/09

Yoshino, Kim and Hameed, Ali, “More Iraq parliament members pull out of Sunni bloc,” Los Angeles Times, 1/12/09

Iraqi Accordance Front Breaks Apart

On Wednesday December 24, the Iraqi National Dialogue Council (INDC) withdrew from the Iraqi Accordance Front (IAF), the major Sunni coalition in parliament. The IAF was made up of three main parties, the Iraqi Islamic Party, the General Council for the People of Iraq, and the Iraqi National Dialogue Council. A group of independent Sunni members of parliament known as the Independents Bloc also left. The IAF originally held 44 seats in parliament. It now has 28 left. This comes just a month before the January 2009 provincial elections. The defection points towards the increasing divisions within Sunni politics that began in 2007.

The split within the IAF was due to the arguments between the Dialogue Council and the Islamic Party. The INDC said they were leaving the Front because the Islamic Party was trying to monopolize power. Back in April 2008 the INDC made a similar accusation and threatened to leave the bloc. At that time, the Accordance Front was negotiating with Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki to return to the cabinet, which they had been boycotting since August 2007. The INDC said that the Islamic Party was trying to take all six ministry positions the Front had left absent. The Dialogue Council was dividing itself then with some legislators leaving the party in May to form the Independents’ Bloc. When the Accordance Front finally did return to the government in July, the Islamic Party received four ministers, and the National Dialogue Council two. That apparently didn’t overcome the problems between the two parties, as the same differences re-emerged and led to the break up of the coalition in December. The Dialogue Council now appears to be allying itself with the opposition parties that consist of the Sadrists, the Fadhila Party, the Iraqi National List, the National Reform Movement, and several other independent parties not aligned with the major coalitions.

The split also comes as the speaker of parliament and INDC member Mahmoud al-Mashhadani resigned his position. The Dialogue Council claims that they and their new allies the opposition parties have the right to name Mashhadani’s replacement. The Accordance Front says that they will name the new speaker, pointing to more conflict between these former allies.

The break-up of the Accordance Front comes as Sunni politics in general have become more fractured and diverse. The Anbar Awakening and the creation of the Sons of Iraq across central and northern Iraq challenged the IAF’s claim that they stood for their community. In the 2005 provincial elections, all the major Sunni parties boycotted except for the Islamic Party, which took control of Anbar. The Accordance Front ran together in the parliamentary election later that year and received 44 seats. The new Sunni organizations claimed that the IAF gained their power illegitimately, and many are planning on challenging them in the 2009 provincial elections.

Maliki has also played the Sunni politicians against the tribes in a divide and conquer policy to keep the Sunnis weak. It apparently worked as the Accordance Front got none of their demands met when they returned to the cabinet after months of boycotting, and still don’t have any real say in decision-making. They also wanted to rejoin the government before the 2009 elections because they were afraid that the new Sunni groups like the Awakening would take their places in the cabinet if they didn’t, a fear stoked by Maliki’s maneuverings.

No one can say for sure who speaks for the Sunnis today. The Islamic Party won control of Anbar by default because the rest of the community was largely boycotting the vote. The 2005 parliamentary election was noted for its sectarian and ethnic divisions. Now there are more independents and nationalists planning on running in the upcoming voting such as the Sunni tribes and the Sons of Iraq. The Accordance Front division follows the de facto split of the Shiite United Iraqi Alliance as parties that were once allied together in coalitions, are now seeing each other as rivals. The split between the National Dialogue Council and the Islamic Party can be seen within this context. Disagreements and resentments against the larger parties are coming to the fore now that sectarianism is lessoning across the country. The 2009 elections may provide clarity about these parties and their popularity, Sunni or otherwise, but they could also increase the divisions as the new and the old wrangle for power.

SOURCES

Ahmed, Farook, “The Iraqi Accord Front’s Return to Government,” Institute for the Study of War, 5/16/08

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