On March 6 at a conference in Baghdad of tribal sheikhs Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki called for reconciliation with former Baathist military personnel. He said that as long as these former regime members were focused on the future and not the past they would have a place in society. This followed a months worth of activities where the government was attempting to get Saddam era Army officers to return from exile and be integrated back into Iraq.
At a meeting in the capital for Tribal Support Council members Prime Minister Maliki called for reconciliation with Baathists soldiers. He said that they made mistakes in the past, but now was the time to forgive and forget, and close that chapter in Iraq’s history. A Sunni parliamentarian from Iyad Allawi’s Iraqi National List said that the Prime Minister’s statements were needed, but more importantly, they needed to be backed up by action. That’s what the government was attempting to do the previous month.
In February 2009 Baghdad made several overtures to former soldiers from Saddam’s army that were living in foreign countries. This began with dialogue with former officers in both Jordan and Baghdad. The government was offering those below colonel jobs in the new Army, while those of a higher rank would receive pensions. According to Asharq al-Awsat this offer was open to any soldiers except members of Saddam’s Fedayeen. The Defense Ministry said they were preparing Iraq’s embassies and attaché offices across the region to accept whatever soldiers wanted to return, and set up a special committee to help integrate them. In the Baghdad meeting American and British officials were also involved, and according to the Saudi Al-Qatan paper, a delegation of Americans met with former officers in Amman, Jordan as well. The Iraqi armed forces have already taken in over 96,000 soldiers from Saddam’s army, so there was a precedent for this policy.
The motivations behind the move seemed to cause a bit of controversy in Iraq. In mid-January 2009 then Vice President elect Joe Biden visited Iraq. While there he told the Maliki government that they needed to do more on political reconciliation. A few weeks later Maliki, while meeting with French President Nicholas Sarkozy, responded by saying that the U.S. could no longer pressure Iraq, and that reconciliation was almost complete. Al-Hayat later reported that the outreach to soldiers was in fact done under pressure from the Americans.
While there were initial meetings with some officers, things seemed to quickly turn sour. In the beginning of February a former general met with Iraqi, American and British officials in Baghdad about soldiers returning. The former head of the Army also called on soldiers to go back to Iraq from abroad, and an ex-Republican Guard general said that the government was hoping 23,000 officers would come back. By mid-February however former officers were saying that they would not take up Maliki’s offer, and urged others to follow suit. They said they would only reconcile with the government if they got rid of the DeBaathification process, and paid them back pay for their years in exile. Discussions seemed to end at that point.
Iraq’s Army has already taken in thousands of former soldiers, but there are still some recalcitrant ones living in foreign countries. The latest outreach to those appeared to have been the result of Vice President Biden’s urging, showing that the U.S. still has pull within Iraq even though it is reducing troop levels. The future of the initiative is unknown however. What looked to be a promising start quickly turned into rejection by the old officers. Still, the military has been one of the few Iraqi institutions to take in members of the old regime in large numbers, although ironically it is prohibited under the Accountability and Justice Law (12) that replaced the DeBaathification order.
SOURCES
Agence France Presse, "Iraq parliament fails to elect new speaker," 2/8/09
Associated Press, “Biden Visits Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan,” 1/12/09
Aswat al-Iraq, “Ministerial plan to receive former army officers,” 2/15/09
Azzaman, “Former army generals snub government’s offer to return,” 2/19/09
International Center for Transitional Justice, “Briefing Paper: Iraq’s New ‘Accountability and Justice’ Law,” 1/22/08
Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, “Iraqi Government Invites Former Army Officers Back,” 2/18/09
- "Officers Who Served Under Saddam To Rejoin Iraqi Army," 2/7/09
Reid, Robert, “Iraqi PM reaches out to Saddam supporters,” Associated Press, 3/6/09
Roads To Iraq Blog, “American delegation met with former Iraqi army officers,” 2/20/09
- “Another failing reconciliation attempt,” 2/14/09
Santora, Marc and Cowell, Alan, “With Swipe at U.S., Iraq Builds ties to French,” New York Times, 2/11/09
Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, “Quarterly Report and Semiannual Report to the United States Congress,” 1/30/09
Saturday, March 7, 2009
Friday, March 6, 2009
Ups And Downs Of Iraq’s Oil Industry And Its Implications For The Budget
A government official recently announced Iraq’s oil figures for February 2009. Exports were slightly down from the previous month. That accounted for a drop in revenue despite prices staying the same. The country’s production has always fluctuated for a number of reasons, both man made and natural. A bigger issue is what the price of Iraqi crude means for the budget.
In early March 2009 an Iraqi oil official announced that February’s exports and revenue were below February numbers. In January 2009 Iraq sold around 1.9 million barrels of oil a day for an average price of $37 a barrel. That brought in approximately $2.15 billion. By February exports had declined to about 1.8 million barrels a day. The price stayed the same, but revenues were down to $1.7 billion. Aging infrastructure and bad weather were blamed for the change between the two months.
Overall, Iraq’s production has been increasing over the last year. January’s numbers were an improvement over December 2008 when Iraq exported 1.82 million barrels a day. Total production was up in 2008 at 850.239 million barrels compared to 742.079 million in 2007. Exports were also up 13.3% from 2007 to 2008. However total production dropped for the last three months of 2008. The country has never reached pre-war levels either. Today the country averages between 2.3-2.4 million barrels a day in overall production, but before 2003 it produced 2.58 million.
The continual fluctuations in oil production and the low prices have big implications for Iraq’s immediate future. This year 85% of Iraq’s revenues are expected to come from petroleum. The 2009 budget, which was just passed by parliament, is based upon a $50 a barrel price for oil and 2 million barrels a day of exports. With prices low and production not going up any time soon, that means running a deficit, which could be up to $30 billion out of a $58.6 billion budget. The Finance Minister says that it will use its savings to cover the difference, but it only has around $35 billion. That would mean depleting almost its entire account for one budget, with no guarantees that in 2010 there would not be similar problems unless the world economy recovers. For this reason, the Finance Ministry is also considering floating $5 billion in government bonds to help fund projects. On the other hand, the Oil Ministry has been desperately trying to sign contracts with foreign countries to increase production. Some service deals have been signed, but the major international oil companies have not come to an agreement with Baghdad yet, and are arguing over the terms of the contracts.
Iraq has no flexibility in its oil production. The government wants to bring in foreign companies to boost output and add needed know how and investment, but the negotiations have been inconclusive so far. That’s not soon enough however for Iraq’s 2009 budget which is based upon a higher price and export numbers than Iraq is now capable of. If Baghdad goes ahead with its budget it will be running a huge deficit that will affect all sectors of the country from the economy, which is largely state-run, to employment as the government is the largest employer. It might also influence the parliamentary elections scheduled for the end of the year as many of the winning parties in the January 2009 provincial elections promised better services. That may not be possible under the current budget and oil output.
SOURCES
Abdul-Zahra, Qassim, “Iraq passes sharply reduced budget for 2009,” Associated Press, 3/5/09
Associated Press, “Iraq’s oil exports down in February,” 3/3/09
- “Iraq’s oil exports inch up in January,” 2/1/09
Aswat al-Iraq, “GDP higher by 10.9 % in 2008,” 2/11/09
Al-Hashemi, Mostafa, “$25 billion surplus staves off financial crisis – Iraqi minister,” Azzaman, 2/2/09
Mackey, Peg, “Iraq to rely on own technicians to reverse output decline,” Reuters, 2/24/09
Madhani, Aamer, “Iraq’s economy sputters as oil prices drop,” USA Today, 1/28/09
Reuters, “Iraq’s Legal and Security Risks Still Frighten Firms,” 2/13/09
- “UPDATE 1-Iraq to issue 1st post-Saddam bonds for $5 bln,” 1/28/09
Robertson, Campbell and Glanz, James, “Falling Revenues Threaten Rebuilding and Stability in Iraq,” New York Times, 2/26/09
Ryan, Missy, “Falling Oil Price Could Hamper Iraqi Military,” Reuters, 2/9/09
- “Iraq must focus on reconstruction upkeep, U.S. says,” Reuters, 2/4/09
Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, “Quarterly Report and Semiannual Report to the United States Congress,” 1/30/09
Al-Tameemi, Alaa, “Parliament divided on 2009 budget,” Azzaman, 3/4/09
In early March 2009 an Iraqi oil official announced that February’s exports and revenue were below February numbers. In January 2009 Iraq sold around 1.9 million barrels of oil a day for an average price of $37 a barrel. That brought in approximately $2.15 billion. By February exports had declined to about 1.8 million barrels a day. The price stayed the same, but revenues were down to $1.7 billion. Aging infrastructure and bad weather were blamed for the change between the two months.
Overall, Iraq’s production has been increasing over the last year. January’s numbers were an improvement over December 2008 when Iraq exported 1.82 million barrels a day. Total production was up in 2008 at 850.239 million barrels compared to 742.079 million in 2007. Exports were also up 13.3% from 2007 to 2008. However total production dropped for the last three months of 2008. The country has never reached pre-war levels either. Today the country averages between 2.3-2.4 million barrels a day in overall production, but before 2003 it produced 2.58 million.
The continual fluctuations in oil production and the low prices have big implications for Iraq’s immediate future. This year 85% of Iraq’s revenues are expected to come from petroleum. The 2009 budget, which was just passed by parliament, is based upon a $50 a barrel price for oil and 2 million barrels a day of exports. With prices low and production not going up any time soon, that means running a deficit, which could be up to $30 billion out of a $58.6 billion budget. The Finance Minister says that it will use its savings to cover the difference, but it only has around $35 billion. That would mean depleting almost its entire account for one budget, with no guarantees that in 2010 there would not be similar problems unless the world economy recovers. For this reason, the Finance Ministry is also considering floating $5 billion in government bonds to help fund projects. On the other hand, the Oil Ministry has been desperately trying to sign contracts with foreign countries to increase production. Some service deals have been signed, but the major international oil companies have not come to an agreement with Baghdad yet, and are arguing over the terms of the contracts.
Iraq has no flexibility in its oil production. The government wants to bring in foreign companies to boost output and add needed know how and investment, but the negotiations have been inconclusive so far. That’s not soon enough however for Iraq’s 2009 budget which is based upon a higher price and export numbers than Iraq is now capable of. If Baghdad goes ahead with its budget it will be running a huge deficit that will affect all sectors of the country from the economy, which is largely state-run, to employment as the government is the largest employer. It might also influence the parliamentary elections scheduled for the end of the year as many of the winning parties in the January 2009 provincial elections promised better services. That may not be possible under the current budget and oil output.
SOURCES
Abdul-Zahra, Qassim, “Iraq passes sharply reduced budget for 2009,” Associated Press, 3/5/09
Associated Press, “Iraq’s oil exports down in February,” 3/3/09
- “Iraq’s oil exports inch up in January,” 2/1/09
Aswat al-Iraq, “GDP higher by 10.9 % in 2008,” 2/11/09
Al-Hashemi, Mostafa, “$25 billion surplus staves off financial crisis – Iraqi minister,” Azzaman, 2/2/09
Mackey, Peg, “Iraq to rely on own technicians to reverse output decline,” Reuters, 2/24/09
Madhani, Aamer, “Iraq’s economy sputters as oil prices drop,” USA Today, 1/28/09
Reuters, “Iraq’s Legal and Security Risks Still Frighten Firms,” 2/13/09
- “UPDATE 1-Iraq to issue 1st post-Saddam bonds for $5 bln,” 1/28/09
Robertson, Campbell and Glanz, James, “Falling Revenues Threaten Rebuilding and Stability in Iraq,” New York Times, 2/26/09
Ryan, Missy, “Falling Oil Price Could Hamper Iraqi Military,” Reuters, 2/9/09
- “Iraq must focus on reconstruction upkeep, U.S. says,” Reuters, 2/4/09
Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, “Quarterly Report and Semiannual Report to the United States Congress,” 1/30/09
Al-Tameemi, Alaa, “Parliament divided on 2009 budget,” Azzaman, 3/4/09
Thursday, March 5, 2009
Monthly Media Coverage of Iraq From February 2 To March 1, 2009
Iraq re-emerged in the U.S. media in February 2009, sort of. During the four weeks of the month Iraq was in the top ten stories according to the Pew Research Center’s Project for Excellence in Journalism twice. That happened in the first week, February 2 to 8 and the last February 23 to March 1. Also of note is the fact that Iraq broke into the top five stories in the country for the firs time since October 2008.
Iraq was in and out of the news in February 2009. In the opening week Iraq was the number four story in the country, but only received 2% of overall coverage. That was when the results of the provincial elections were finally announced. For the next two weeks however, February 9 to 15 and 16 to 22, the war disappeared from the headlines. From February 23 to March 1 Iraq re-emerged as the number 3 and number 10 stories. At number 3 was President Obama’s announcement that he would pull most American troops out of the country by the end of 2011, which garnered 6% of American news coverage. At number 10 were events in Iraq, which included the charges against Iraqi parliamentarian Mohammad al-Daini for involvement in a number of insurgent attacks including a bombing of the legislature in 2007, and the re-opening of the Iraqi Museum. That received 2% of all stories in the U.S. media.
The last time Iraq broke the top five stories in America was the week of October 6 to 12, 2008. At that time Iraq was at number 4 even though it was only 1% of all stories. That was the week that Christians were attacked in Mosul, and the U.S. and Iraq were negotiating a Status of Forces Agreement.
Overall, average American coverage of Iraq was up for February compared to the previous month, but about average for the last six months of 2008. In February the war averaged 2.5% of all U.S. media coverage. That was double the amount of reporting in January when Iraq only received 1.25%. February matched the last six months of 2008 when it was between 2-3% of all stories. That is still below the average of 2007 when the war was 25% of the news and was consistently in the top five. If not for the President’s speech on his new Iraq policy, the topic might have dropped off the radar for the rest of the month. The coverage shows that only big events such as elections and announcements from Washington will get the American media’s attention, because it is spending most of its time on the current economic crisis and the new Obama administration.
SOURCES
Baker, Peter, “With Pledges to Troops and Iraqis, Obama Details Pullout,” New York Times, 2/27/09
Meyers, Steven Lee, “Iraq Museum Reopens Six Years After Looting,” New York Times, 2/23/09
Mohammed, Riyadh, “Election Results: Who’s Up, Who’s Down,” Baghdad Bureau Blog, New York Times, 2/6/09
Pew Research center’s Project for Excellence in Journalism, “PEJ News Coverage Index: Feb. 2-8, 2009, The News Narrative Turns Bearish On Obama,” 2/9/09
- “PEJ News Coverage Index: Feb. 9-15, 2009, Stimulus Success Shifts The Storyline,” 2/17/09
- “PEJ News Coverage Index: February 16-22, 2009, Fresh Challenges, New Debates Drive A Grim Economy Story,” 2/23/09
- “PEJ News Coverage Index: February 23-March 1, 2009, The New Obama Narrative: “Change” Was An Understatement,” 3/4/09
Santora, “Iraqi Lawmaker Is Charged With Masterminding an Attack on Parliament,” New York Times, 2/22/09
Iraq was in and out of the news in February 2009. In the opening week Iraq was the number four story in the country, but only received 2% of overall coverage. That was when the results of the provincial elections were finally announced. For the next two weeks however, February 9 to 15 and 16 to 22, the war disappeared from the headlines. From February 23 to March 1 Iraq re-emerged as the number 3 and number 10 stories. At number 3 was President Obama’s announcement that he would pull most American troops out of the country by the end of 2011, which garnered 6% of American news coverage. At number 10 were events in Iraq, which included the charges against Iraqi parliamentarian Mohammad al-Daini for involvement in a number of insurgent attacks including a bombing of the legislature in 2007, and the re-opening of the Iraqi Museum. That received 2% of all stories in the U.S. media.
The last time Iraq broke the top five stories in America was the week of October 6 to 12, 2008. At that time Iraq was at number 4 even though it was only 1% of all stories. That was the week that Christians were attacked in Mosul, and the U.S. and Iraq were negotiating a Status of Forces Agreement.
Overall, average American coverage of Iraq was up for February compared to the previous month, but about average for the last six months of 2008. In February the war averaged 2.5% of all U.S. media coverage. That was double the amount of reporting in January when Iraq only received 1.25%. February matched the last six months of 2008 when it was between 2-3% of all stories. That is still below the average of 2007 when the war was 25% of the news and was consistently in the top five. If not for the President’s speech on his new Iraq policy, the topic might have dropped off the radar for the rest of the month. The coverage shows that only big events such as elections and announcements from Washington will get the American media’s attention, because it is spending most of its time on the current economic crisis and the new Obama administration.
SOURCES
Baker, Peter, “With Pledges to Troops and Iraqis, Obama Details Pullout,” New York Times, 2/27/09
Meyers, Steven Lee, “Iraq Museum Reopens Six Years After Looting,” New York Times, 2/23/09
Mohammed, Riyadh, “Election Results: Who’s Up, Who’s Down,” Baghdad Bureau Blog, New York Times, 2/6/09
Pew Research center’s Project for Excellence in Journalism, “PEJ News Coverage Index: Feb. 2-8, 2009, The News Narrative Turns Bearish On Obama,” 2/9/09
- “PEJ News Coverage Index: Feb. 9-15, 2009, Stimulus Success Shifts The Storyline,” 2/17/09
- “PEJ News Coverage Index: February 16-22, 2009, Fresh Challenges, New Debates Drive A Grim Economy Story,” 2/23/09
- “PEJ News Coverage Index: February 23-March 1, 2009, The New Obama Narrative: “Change” Was An Understatement,” 3/4/09
Santora, “Iraqi Lawmaker Is Charged With Masterminding an Attack on Parliament,” New York Times, 2/22/09
Wednesday, March 4, 2009
Another Tough Year Ahead For Iraq’s Farmers
Iraq was once one of the major agriculture producers of the Middle East. Now the farming sector has fallen into disrepair, and Iraq is a major food importer. Both Baghdad and the U.S. military however are hoping that it will make a come back to provide a source of growth to make up for the plummeting price of oil, and jobs for an economy that is still facing high unemployment. The problem is that the farm sector faces such large structural problems that it will probably take a decade for it to recover.
In 2008 Iraq faced one of the worst drought in years. Rainfall in 2007 was down 40% according to the Iraqi government, and affected the northern provinces of Irbil, Dohuk, Tamim, Diyala, and Ninewa the worst. Barley and wheat that are dependent upon rain were hit the hardest. Production for both dropped 51%, and in November 2008, the government announced that it would have to import 50 thousand tons of wheat to make up for the shortfall. The Ministry of Agriculture started several assistance programs, but U.S. government observers didn’t think that many were effective.
2009 looks to be no better. The Iraqi paper Al Sabah reported that the Water Resource Ministry announced in January that snow and rain were down 1/3 from normal levels. In February the Agriculture Minister said that farm production is down 30%. This year the United Nations has also designated Iraq one of 32 countries that needs external food aid. Iraq already imports 50% of its food needs.
The lack of water was just the latest hit to a sector of Iraq’s economy that has fallen on hard times since the 1980s. 26% of Iraqis are involved in farming, and it accounts for 8% of the country’s production making it one of the largest after oil. It has largely been neglected since the Saddam times however, and then faced international sanctions, the chaos and sectarian war that followed the U.S. invasion, and government incompetence. For example, many farm workers have left the rural areas for the cities. The fighting also disrupted trade within the country. Corrupt government officials is another issue. The chief Iraqi inspector in Wasit told The National that corruption was everywhere in the province. Many officials take cuts of aid that is supposed to go to farmers, and families often offer bribes to get assistance from the government. The government is also not able to supply fertilizer and water from the irrigation system. Electrical shortages have limited power for pumps. There are few tariffs, which means Iraq has been flooded with cheap food imports from Syrian, Iran, and Turkey since the U.S. invasion. The lack of adequate drainage is also leading to high salinity in the south. 5% of the country’s arable land is disappearing a year as a result. Finally, there is little use of modern farming techniques, and a lack of credit. Many farmers can’t qualify for loans anyway, and need bribes if they want one. All of these make Iraqis less competitive than their foreign competitors.
Baghdad is now trying to promote the farm sector in a drive to diversify the economy. Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki announced a $200 million plan for agriculture. The government is going to subsidize seed sales and support for livestock and dates. Baghdad also has a plan to reclaim six million acres of land with high salinity. At the same time the government has cut subsidies for fuel and fertilizer.
Many U.S. officials in Iraq are skeptical of these plans. The head of the U.S. Provincial Reconstruction Team in Maysan and another member in the province told Reuters that the business was so dysfunctional and broken, and the government so incompetent and corrupt that it would be a Herculean task to revive farming. A U.S. Department of Agriculture report said the sector was “a disaster.” A U.S. farm expert thought it would take ten years to recover.
None of this is good news for Iraq’s struggling economy. The country is almost completely dependent upon oil to earn money. Now that prices have dropped for crude, the government is facing some tough decisions. Baghdad is talking about diversifying, and it’s important that the Agriculture Ministry is getting more money, but it’s unclear whether this is mere lip service or a real commitment.
SOURCES
Alsumaria, “Iraq waning farm sector urges recovery,” 3/3/09
Ashton, Adam, “Iraqi farmers are back in business, and Iraqis love local produce,” McClatchy Newspapers, 12/20/08
Aswat al-Iraq, “Agro-production down due to scarce rain – minister,” 2/23/09
Department of Defense, “Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq,” December 2008
Iraq Directory, “Iraq is Submitting a Tender to Buy 50 Thousand Tons of Wheat,” 11/25/08
Latif, Nizar, “Iraq in midst of ‘agricultural disaster,’” The National, 12/11/08
Ryan, Missy, “Iraq’s ailing farm sector more crucial than ever,” Reuters, 2/28/09
Al Sabah, “Iraq faces massive water shortage, Water Resources said,” 1/21/09
Sands, Phil and Latif, Nizar, “Corruption at the root of Iraq’s failing agriculture,” The National, 2/24/09
Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, “Quarterly Report and Semiannual Report to the United States Congress,” 1/30/09
In 2008 Iraq faced one of the worst drought in years. Rainfall in 2007 was down 40% according to the Iraqi government, and affected the northern provinces of Irbil, Dohuk, Tamim, Diyala, and Ninewa the worst. Barley and wheat that are dependent upon rain were hit the hardest. Production for both dropped 51%, and in November 2008, the government announced that it would have to import 50 thousand tons of wheat to make up for the shortfall. The Ministry of Agriculture started several assistance programs, but U.S. government observers didn’t think that many were effective.
2009 looks to be no better. The Iraqi paper Al Sabah reported that the Water Resource Ministry announced in January that snow and rain were down 1/3 from normal levels. In February the Agriculture Minister said that farm production is down 30%. This year the United Nations has also designated Iraq one of 32 countries that needs external food aid. Iraq already imports 50% of its food needs.
The lack of water was just the latest hit to a sector of Iraq’s economy that has fallen on hard times since the 1980s. 26% of Iraqis are involved in farming, and it accounts for 8% of the country’s production making it one of the largest after oil. It has largely been neglected since the Saddam times however, and then faced international sanctions, the chaos and sectarian war that followed the U.S. invasion, and government incompetence. For example, many farm workers have left the rural areas for the cities. The fighting also disrupted trade within the country. Corrupt government officials is another issue. The chief Iraqi inspector in Wasit told The National that corruption was everywhere in the province. Many officials take cuts of aid that is supposed to go to farmers, and families often offer bribes to get assistance from the government. The government is also not able to supply fertilizer and water from the irrigation system. Electrical shortages have limited power for pumps. There are few tariffs, which means Iraq has been flooded with cheap food imports from Syrian, Iran, and Turkey since the U.S. invasion. The lack of adequate drainage is also leading to high salinity in the south. 5% of the country’s arable land is disappearing a year as a result. Finally, there is little use of modern farming techniques, and a lack of credit. Many farmers can’t qualify for loans anyway, and need bribes if they want one. All of these make Iraqis less competitive than their foreign competitors.
Baghdad is now trying to promote the farm sector in a drive to diversify the economy. Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki announced a $200 million plan for agriculture. The government is going to subsidize seed sales and support for livestock and dates. Baghdad also has a plan to reclaim six million acres of land with high salinity. At the same time the government has cut subsidies for fuel and fertilizer.
Many U.S. officials in Iraq are skeptical of these plans. The head of the U.S. Provincial Reconstruction Team in Maysan and another member in the province told Reuters that the business was so dysfunctional and broken, and the government so incompetent and corrupt that it would be a Herculean task to revive farming. A U.S. Department of Agriculture report said the sector was “a disaster.” A U.S. farm expert thought it would take ten years to recover.
None of this is good news for Iraq’s struggling economy. The country is almost completely dependent upon oil to earn money. Now that prices have dropped for crude, the government is facing some tough decisions. Baghdad is talking about diversifying, and it’s important that the Agriculture Ministry is getting more money, but it’s unclear whether this is mere lip service or a real commitment.
SOURCES
Alsumaria, “Iraq waning farm sector urges recovery,” 3/3/09
Ashton, Adam, “Iraqi farmers are back in business, and Iraqis love local produce,” McClatchy Newspapers, 12/20/08
Aswat al-Iraq, “Agro-production down due to scarce rain – minister,” 2/23/09
Department of Defense, “Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq,” December 2008
Iraq Directory, “Iraq is Submitting a Tender to Buy 50 Thousand Tons of Wheat,” 11/25/08
Latif, Nizar, “Iraq in midst of ‘agricultural disaster,’” The National, 12/11/08
Ryan, Missy, “Iraq’s ailing farm sector more crucial than ever,” Reuters, 2/28/09
Al Sabah, “Iraq faces massive water shortage, Water Resources said,” 1/21/09
Sands, Phil and Latif, Nizar, “Corruption at the root of Iraq’s failing agriculture,” The National, 2/24/09
Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, “Quarterly Report and Semiannual Report to the United States Congress,” 1/30/09
Tuesday, March 3, 2009
Latest United Nations Numbers On Baghdad Province
Baghdad province is a paradox. It is one of the richest in the country, yet has pockets of deep poverty. Security is improving throughout the country and the capital, but it still has the most violence. Electricity production has increased yet half of Baghdad suffers from sever power outages. The United Nations’ Inter-Agency Information and Analysis Unit recently released a paper detailing the situation in the capital province.
Population
Baghdad has the largest, most urbanized population in Iraq. There are 7,145,470 people there, which is 24% of the total population. 87% live in urban areas, 13% in rural ones. The province is divided into nine major districts: Abu Ghraib, Adhamiyah, Kadhimiyah, Karkh, Madain, Mahmudiya, Resafa, Sadr City aka Thawra, and Tarmia.
Population
Baghdad: 7,145,470
Abu Ghraib: 326,626
Adhamiyah: 842,310
Kadhimiyah: 832,310
Karkh: 1,624,057
Madain: 332,883
Mahmudiya 496,053
Resafa: 1,312,052
Sadr City: 1,316,583
Tarmia: 62,147
Security
The security situation in Baghdad has improved with the rest of the country, but it is still the most dangerous area in the country. From June to December 2008 there was a steady decline in security incidents with one large increase from August to October that subsequently leveled off. At the beginning of June there were around 400 security incidents a month in the province. That declined to around 300 in August, but then increased to almost 550 by October. Since then they have decreased to around 250 by the end of 2008. The U.S. military has much more in depth reporting than the U.N. and found that attacks went from 2,221 a month in April 2008 to 713 in December.
Displaced
Baghdad faced the most displacement in the country during the sectarian war. After the Samarra Shiite shrine bombing in February 2006 1.6 million Iraqis became internal refugees. Over 60% of those came from the capital. Today there are 90,731 displaced families in the province, the largest amount in the country. Some Iraqis have begun to return, although it’s still a small percentage of the total. The International Organization for Migration recorded 31,521 families coming back to Baghdad so far as of February 2009. They face a variety of problems including finding jobs, permanent housing, and services.
Employment
Iraq’s unemployment rate matches that of the country’s. Iraq has 18% unemployment. 12% of males in the capital are unemployed, compared to 20% for women. 83% of the male population was involved in the labor force compared to 81% in the country. Unemployment for them was concentrated in Resafa and Sadr City that had double-digit joblessness. As a recent U.N. report found very few women are involved in Iraq’s economy. Only 11% of Baghdad province’s women were either employed or looking for work, compared to 18% in the country. There are wide differences between the districts however. In Mahmudiya and Tarmia 76% and 67% of women respectively were involved in the labor force. In Sadr City it was only 8%. Jobs for women are directly related to education. 43% of women over 10 years old in the province lack a primary education. The U.N. employment study found that women needed a college education to find steady work.
Employment in Baghdad
Male Unemployment (15-64 years old)
Iraq 12%
Tarmia 1%
Abu Ghraib 3%
Adhamiyah 3%
Mahmudiya 3%
Karkh 6%
Kadhimiyah 8%
Madain 8%
Baghdad 12%
Sadr City 15%
Resafa 16%
Males In Labor Force (15-64 years old)
Iraq 81%
Baghdad 83%
Karkh 75%
Mahmudiya 81%
Resafa 82%
Sadr City 83%
Adhamiyah 85%
Madain 85%
Kadhimiyah 83%
Abu Ghraib 87%
Tarmia 96%
Female Unemployment (15-64 years old)
Iraq 13%
Mahmudiya 0%
Tarmia 1%
Abu Ghraib 2%
Madain 5%
Karkh 7%
Sadr City 12%
Adhamiyah 13%
Kadhimiyah 17%
Baghdad 20%
Resafa 23%
Females In Labor Force (15-64 years old)
Iraq 18%
Sadr City 8%
Baghdad 11%
Resafa 16%
Kadhimiyah 17%
Karkh 19%
Madain 27%
Adhamiyah 28%
Abu Ghraib 49%
Tarmia 67%
Mahmudiya 76%
Poverty
Baghdad is one of the richest provinces in the country, but still has pockets of poverty. In Adhamiyah the U.N. found no families in the lowest income quintile. In Abu Ghraib (1%), Karkh (1%), Kadhimiyah (2%), and Resafa (4%) there was also little poverty. That compared to Sadr City (16%), Madain (20%), and Mahmudiya (20%) where poverty was the highest.
% of households in the lowest income quintile
Iraq 22%
Adhamiyah 0%
Abu Ghraib 1%
Karkh 1%
Kadhimiyah 2%
Resafa 4%
Tarmia 12%
Sadr City 16%
Madain 20%
Mahmudiya 20%
Electricity
The Electricity Minister recently announced that Iraq had surpassed pre-war levels of power production. The problem remains that output does not meet demand. The capital is a perfect example. In Karkh, Sadr City, Resafa, and Adhamiyah more than half the population has power cuts for more than 11 hours a day. Abu Ghraib on the other hand has the best electricity supply in the province with only 2% suffering from long power outages.
% of households with more than 11 hours of power cuts or no connection to electricity network
Iraq 52%
Abu Ghraib 2%
Tarmia 29%
Mahmudiya 33%
Madain 40%
Karkh 60%
Sadr City 67%
Kadhimiyah 67%
Resafa 70%
Adhamiyah 76%
Water
Baghdad’s water supply is quite good. 10% of the province compared to 26% in the country is connected to the water network. Only Mahmudiya has a real problem with almost 50% having no access.
% of households not connected to water network
Iraq 26%
Abu Ghraib 0%
Adhamiyah 0%
Kadhimiyah 0%
Karkh 0%
Sadr City 0%
Tarmia 0%
Resafa 5%
Madain 7%
Baghdad 10%
Mahmudiya 47%
Food
Most Iraqis depend upon the country’s food rations, which are the largest in the world. That hasn’t prevented problems with malnutrition however. 22% of Iraqis, and 21% of Baghdad have children five years and younger that suffer from chronic malnutrition. The districts worst affected are Sadr City, Kadhimiyah, and Adhamiyah, while Abu Ghraib, Mahmudiya, and Tarmia have the fewest incidents.
% of children 0-5 years old with chronic malnutrition
Iraq 22%
Baghdad 21%
Abu Ghraib 4%
Mahmudiya 6%
Tarmia 6%
Resafa 14%
Madain 16%
Karkh 18%
Sadr City 20%
Kadhimiyah 32%
Adhamiyah 42%
Health
Baghdad overall does better than the rest of the country in terms of chronic diseases. 8% of the province reported being affected by them compared to 9% in Iraq. Tarmia did the best with only 4% reporting chronic cases, but that compared to Karkh, Kadhimiyah, Abu Ghraib, Sadr City, Adhamiyah, and Resafa that were all in double digits.
% of individuals with chronic disease
Iraq 9%
Baghdad 8%
Tarmia 4%
Mahmudiya 8%
Madain 9%
Kadhimiyah 10%
Karkh 10%
Abu Ghraib 11%
Sadr City 12%
Adhamiyah 14%
Resafa 15%
SOURCES
Inter-Agency Information and Analysis Unit, “Baghdad Governorate Profile,” United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, February 2009
- “Iraq Labour Force Analysis 2003-2008,” United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, January 2009
International Organization for Migration, “Three Years Of Post-Samarra Displacement In Iraq,” 2/22/09
Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, “Iraq’s Electricity Production Surpasses Prewar Level,” 2/19/09
Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, "Quarterly Report and Semiannual Report to the United States Congress," 1/30/09
Population
Baghdad has the largest, most urbanized population in Iraq. There are 7,145,470 people there, which is 24% of the total population. 87% live in urban areas, 13% in rural ones. The province is divided into nine major districts: Abu Ghraib, Adhamiyah, Kadhimiyah, Karkh, Madain, Mahmudiya, Resafa, Sadr City aka Thawra, and Tarmia.
Population
Baghdad: 7,145,470
Abu Ghraib: 326,626
Adhamiyah: 842,310
Kadhimiyah: 832,310
Karkh: 1,624,057
Madain: 332,883
Mahmudiya 496,053
Resafa: 1,312,052
Sadr City: 1,316,583
Tarmia: 62,147
Security
The security situation in Baghdad has improved with the rest of the country, but it is still the most dangerous area in the country. From June to December 2008 there was a steady decline in security incidents with one large increase from August to October that subsequently leveled off. At the beginning of June there were around 400 security incidents a month in the province. That declined to around 300 in August, but then increased to almost 550 by October. Since then they have decreased to around 250 by the end of 2008. The U.S. military has much more in depth reporting than the U.N. and found that attacks went from 2,221 a month in April 2008 to 713 in December.
Displaced
Baghdad faced the most displacement in the country during the sectarian war. After the Samarra Shiite shrine bombing in February 2006 1.6 million Iraqis became internal refugees. Over 60% of those came from the capital. Today there are 90,731 displaced families in the province, the largest amount in the country. Some Iraqis have begun to return, although it’s still a small percentage of the total. The International Organization for Migration recorded 31,521 families coming back to Baghdad so far as of February 2009. They face a variety of problems including finding jobs, permanent housing, and services.
Employment
Iraq’s unemployment rate matches that of the country’s. Iraq has 18% unemployment. 12% of males in the capital are unemployed, compared to 20% for women. 83% of the male population was involved in the labor force compared to 81% in the country. Unemployment for them was concentrated in Resafa and Sadr City that had double-digit joblessness. As a recent U.N. report found very few women are involved in Iraq’s economy. Only 11% of Baghdad province’s women were either employed or looking for work, compared to 18% in the country. There are wide differences between the districts however. In Mahmudiya and Tarmia 76% and 67% of women respectively were involved in the labor force. In Sadr City it was only 8%. Jobs for women are directly related to education. 43% of women over 10 years old in the province lack a primary education. The U.N. employment study found that women needed a college education to find steady work.
Employment in Baghdad
Male Unemployment (15-64 years old)
Iraq 12%
Tarmia 1%
Abu Ghraib 3%
Adhamiyah 3%
Mahmudiya 3%
Karkh 6%
Kadhimiyah 8%
Madain 8%
Baghdad 12%
Sadr City 15%
Resafa 16%
Males In Labor Force (15-64 years old)
Iraq 81%
Baghdad 83%
Karkh 75%
Mahmudiya 81%
Resafa 82%
Sadr City 83%
Adhamiyah 85%
Madain 85%
Kadhimiyah 83%
Abu Ghraib 87%
Tarmia 96%
Female Unemployment (15-64 years old)
Iraq 13%
Mahmudiya 0%
Tarmia 1%
Abu Ghraib 2%
Madain 5%
Karkh 7%
Sadr City 12%
Adhamiyah 13%
Kadhimiyah 17%
Baghdad 20%
Resafa 23%
Females In Labor Force (15-64 years old)
Iraq 18%
Sadr City 8%
Baghdad 11%
Resafa 16%
Kadhimiyah 17%
Karkh 19%
Madain 27%
Adhamiyah 28%
Abu Ghraib 49%
Tarmia 67%
Mahmudiya 76%
Poverty
Baghdad is one of the richest provinces in the country, but still has pockets of poverty. In Adhamiyah the U.N. found no families in the lowest income quintile. In Abu Ghraib (1%), Karkh (1%), Kadhimiyah (2%), and Resafa (4%) there was also little poverty. That compared to Sadr City (16%), Madain (20%), and Mahmudiya (20%) where poverty was the highest.
% of households in the lowest income quintile
Iraq 22%
Adhamiyah 0%
Abu Ghraib 1%
Karkh 1%
Kadhimiyah 2%
Resafa 4%
Tarmia 12%
Sadr City 16%
Madain 20%
Mahmudiya 20%
Electricity
The Electricity Minister recently announced that Iraq had surpassed pre-war levels of power production. The problem remains that output does not meet demand. The capital is a perfect example. In Karkh, Sadr City, Resafa, and Adhamiyah more than half the population has power cuts for more than 11 hours a day. Abu Ghraib on the other hand has the best electricity supply in the province with only 2% suffering from long power outages.
% of households with more than 11 hours of power cuts or no connection to electricity network
Iraq 52%
Abu Ghraib 2%
Tarmia 29%
Mahmudiya 33%
Madain 40%
Karkh 60%
Sadr City 67%
Kadhimiyah 67%
Resafa 70%
Adhamiyah 76%
Water
Baghdad’s water supply is quite good. 10% of the province compared to 26% in the country is connected to the water network. Only Mahmudiya has a real problem with almost 50% having no access.
% of households not connected to water network
Iraq 26%
Abu Ghraib 0%
Adhamiyah 0%
Kadhimiyah 0%
Karkh 0%
Sadr City 0%
Tarmia 0%
Resafa 5%
Madain 7%
Baghdad 10%
Mahmudiya 47%
Food
Most Iraqis depend upon the country’s food rations, which are the largest in the world. That hasn’t prevented problems with malnutrition however. 22% of Iraqis, and 21% of Baghdad have children five years and younger that suffer from chronic malnutrition. The districts worst affected are Sadr City, Kadhimiyah, and Adhamiyah, while Abu Ghraib, Mahmudiya, and Tarmia have the fewest incidents.
% of children 0-5 years old with chronic malnutrition
Iraq 22%
Baghdad 21%
Abu Ghraib 4%
Mahmudiya 6%
Tarmia 6%
Resafa 14%
Madain 16%
Karkh 18%
Sadr City 20%
Kadhimiyah 32%
Adhamiyah 42%
Health
Baghdad overall does better than the rest of the country in terms of chronic diseases. 8% of the province reported being affected by them compared to 9% in Iraq. Tarmia did the best with only 4% reporting chronic cases, but that compared to Karkh, Kadhimiyah, Abu Ghraib, Sadr City, Adhamiyah, and Resafa that were all in double digits.
% of individuals with chronic disease
Iraq 9%
Baghdad 8%
Tarmia 4%
Mahmudiya 8%
Madain 9%
Kadhimiyah 10%
Karkh 10%
Abu Ghraib 11%
Sadr City 12%
Adhamiyah 14%
Resafa 15%
SOURCES
Inter-Agency Information and Analysis Unit, “Baghdad Governorate Profile,” United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, February 2009
- “Iraq Labour Force Analysis 2003-2008,” United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, January 2009
International Organization for Migration, “Three Years Of Post-Samarra Displacement In Iraq,” 2/22/09
Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, “Iraq’s Electricity Production Surpasses Prewar Level,” 2/19/09
Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, "Quarterly Report and Semiannual Report to the United States Congress," 1/30/09
Monday, March 2, 2009
Operation New Hope In Mosul
On February 20, 2009 the Iraqi government announced the beginning of its third security offensive in Ninewa province. Like the previous ones Operation New Hope is aimed at securing the troubled city of Mosul. Operation Lion’s Roar/Mother of Two Springs launched in May 2008, and Mother of Two Springs II in October 2008 had little affect on the number of casualties in the city in the long run. In January 2009 attacks were down before the provincial elections however. Afterwards casualties went back up, but still at a lower level then in 2008. Operation New Hope appears to be a more targeted campaign, and involves U.S. troops. It may be the last major joint Iraq-U.S. military operation before the June deadline for U.S. troops to be out Iraq’s cities, but like the previous ones does not address the major causes of violence in the city.
Operation New Hope has two stated goals. First it is a targeted campaign aimed at arresting suspects on a wanted list. On the opening day 74 people were arrested. Second it hopes to increase the government’s presence in certain areas outside of Mosul. Iraqi forces are in the lead, but the U.S. apparently has a large role. That’s shown by the fact that nine American soldiers were killed in the city in February 2009 before and during the offensive. Mosul is one of the few areas where U.S. forces have incorporated the Iraqis troops into their command center.
The offensive has been expected for quite some time. Back in November 2008 there were reports that Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki was considering a new operation there. The Prime Minister first talked of clearing Mosul back in December 2007. The moves against the Mahdi Army in early 2008 however delayed it until May. It was originally called Operation Lion’s Roar, but was then renamed Mother of Two Springs, a nickname for Mosul. Thirty-two thousand soldiers and police were committed to the operation, but by September Maliki admitted that it had not worked and blamed the citizens for not cooperating. As reported here before, Mother of Two Springs had little affect on the number of casualties beforehand and afterwards. When Christians were attacked in the city in October the government again committed more police to secure Mosul.
It wasn’t until the end of 2008 that attacks finally dropped, reaching a low in January 2009 as the country prepared for the provincial elections. According to press reports by January Mosul averaged just 1.8 deaths per day and 2.74 wounded compared to 3.61 deaths and 6.06 wounded per day in October 2008. One major difference between 2008 and 2009 has been the lack of mass casualty bombings. The city however was the deadliest in the country for politicians, and by February attacks and casualties started climbing back up.
Selected Casualty Numbers For Mosul Based Upon Press Reports
April 2008 – One Month Before Operation Lion’s Roar/Mother Of Two Springs
63 attacks/incidents – 2.1 attacks & incidents/day
71 killed – 2.37 killed/day
209 wounded – 7.0 wounded/day
42 kidnapped
June 2008
49 attacks/incidents –1.97 attacks & incidents/day
100 killed – 3.33 killed/day
279 wounded – 9.3 wounded/day
4 kidnapped
October 2008 – Month of Operation Mother Of Two Springs II
92 attacks/incidents – 2.96 attacks & incidents/day
112 deaths – 3.61 deaths/day
188 wounded – 6.06 wounded/day
November 2008
65 attacks/incidents – 2.16 attacks & incidents/day
53 deaths – 1.76 deaths/day
249 wounded – 8.3 wounded/day
December 2008
65 attacks/incidents – 2.09 attacks & incidents/day
68 deaths – 2.19 deaths/day
181 wounded – 5.83 wounded/day
January 2009 – Provincial Elections
52 attacks/incidents – 1.67 attacks & incidents/day
56 deaths – 1.80 killed/day
85 wounded – 2.74 wounded/day
February 2009
81 attacks/incidents – 2.89 attacks & incidents/day
58 deaths – 2.0 deaths/day
111 wounded – 3.96 wounded/day
The major cause of the violence in the city is the divide between Arabs and Kurds. In the January 2005 elections Sunnis boycotted, resulting in the Kurds taking over the provincial council. The Kurds also have aspirations to annex five areas around Mosul in northern Ninewa. Both have caused great anger amongst the province’s Arabs. To make matters worst, during the Surge many Al Qaeda operatives and other groups were forced north and settled in Mosul, which has been called the last urban stronghold for the insurgency. All together this has caused an explosive mix. Many of these armed groups have tried to portray themselves as the protectors of the Arabs against the Kurds, and continue to reject participating in the political system. As noted here before, Prime Minister Maliki attempted to exploit this division for his own political purposes by courting the Arabs in the city to oppose the Kurds. Maliki removed Kurdish units and officers, replacing them with Arab ones, and offered Arabs a role in reconstruction. Rather than offering reconciliation, the Prime Minister pushed for further ethnic differences.
The provincial elections may not help this process. The Al-Hadbaa party won an outright majority in the vote running on an explicitly anti-Kurdish campaign. The party’s leader Atheel al-Nujafi who will probably become the new governor has said that all the sitting Kurdish officials need to be replaced on the provincial council, and that he will not work with any Kurds that put Kurdish concerns before those of Ninewa. The current deputy governor who is a Kurd has accused Al-Hadbaa of wanting to rid Mosul of Kurds.
Al-Hadbaa’s Nujafi believes that Operation New Hope will do little to solve the province’s problems. He may be right. Until the divide between Arabs and Kurds is resolved there will be violence in Mosul. Prime Minister Maliki enflamed the situation by taking an anti-Kurdish turn in late 2008, and the Al-Hadbaa party has a similar position. Many were hoping that the provincial elections would help turn many of these conflicts into a political one, but in Ninewa’s case that may not be true. The real test will be whether violence goes back to 2008 levels now that the voting is over or remains at their current lower rate.
For more on Mosul see:
Mosul – Dangerous Place For Politicians
Mosul Remains One Of The Most Violent Cities In Iraq
Mosul: The New Battleground Between Maliki And The Kurds
New Security Offensive In Mosul?
Christians In Mosul Update
Bad Times For Iraq’s Christians
Back To Mosul
Mosul Update
The Security Situation In Mosul
SOURCES
A Pakistan News, “1 Policeman Killed, 10 injured in Separate Attacks In Iraq,” 12/1/08
- “Twin Blasts in Northern Iraq 2 Killed,” 12/31/08
Agence France Presse, “Iraq arrests dozens of ‘terrorists’ in Mosul,” 2/21/09
Ali, Fadhil, “Iraqi Government Launches Operation to Expel al-Qaeda from Mosul,” Terrorism Focus, Jamestown Foundation, 5/20/08
Areef, Slaem, “Mosul a ghost city as troops press ahead with offensive,” Azzaman, 5/15/08
Arraf, Jane, “As Iraq calms, Mosul remains a battle front,” Christian Science Monitor, 12/17/08
Associated Press, “Blast in Iraq kill 33, injure Iraqi general and four GIs,” 12/1/08
- “Bombs tear through Baghdad, Mosul,” 12/1/08
- “Two Iraqi policemen killed by U.S. troops,” 2/1/09
Associated Press and Agence France Presse, “Bombings in Baghdad kill 14,” The National, 11/4/08
Aswat al-Iraq, “2 army personnel wounded in IED blast in Mosul,” 2/26/09
- “2 civilians killed by U.S. warplane fire west of Mosul,” 11/1/08
- “2 civilians killed in Mosul,” 12/29/08
- “2 gunmen killed in Ninewa,” 11/13/08
- “2 IEDs wound 3 soldiers in Mosul,” 12/27/08
- “2 Iraqi soldiers killed in Mosul attack,” 11/1/08
- “2 killed, 25 wounded in 2nd suicide bombing in Mosul,” 11/27/08
- “2 mortars leave 4 soldiers wounded in Mosul,” 2/13/09
- “2 soldiers wounded by gunmen fire in Mosul,” 2/13/09
- “2 wanted men arrested, IEDs rip through Mosul,” 2/18/09
- “2 women injured in attack on PUK in Mosul,” 2/24/09
- “2 wounded by IED in Mosul,” 2/4/09
- “2 wounded in blast in Mosul,” 12/25/08
- “3 civilians injured by bomb blast in Mosul,” 1/26/09
- “3 cops killed in Mosul gunfire,” 1/11/09
- “3 gunmen killed in Mosul,” 1/23/09
- “3 missiles hit Mosul hospital, wound civilian,” 2/25/09
- “3 policemen killed by gunmen in Mosul,” 2/11/09
- “3 soldiers, policeman wounded in Mosul,” 12/4/08
- “3 women wounded by U.S. fire in Mosul,” 2/3/09
- “3 wounded in hand-grenade attack in Mosul,” 2/15/09
- “3 wounded in IED in Mosul,” 2/16/09
- “4 civilians injured in suicide explosion in Mosul,” 11/27/08
- “4 civilians wounded in Mosul blast,” 1/19/09
- “4 civilians wounded in Mosul blasts,” 11/10/08
- “4 killed, 6 wounded in Iraq violence in 24 hours,” 11/1/08
- “4 police personnel wounded in car bomb blast,” 1/11/09
- “4 sound bombs explode inside Mosul university,” 1/14/09
- “5 houses set on fire in Ninewa,” 2/16/09
- “5 IEDs rock Mosul; no casualties reported,” 12/11/08
- “6 suspects nabbed, IED defused in Mosul,” 2/18/09
- “6 women injured in Mosul blasts,” 12/1/08
- “12 killed, injured in Mosul attack,” 2/2/09
- “23 killed, injured in acts of violence until Friday afternoon,” 1/9/09
- “Army forces detonate bomb in Mosul without damage,” 2/6/09
- “Bike bomb explodes in Mosul, no casualties,” 1/7/09
- “Blast in Mosul kills policemen, wounds 6,” 11/17/08
- “Blast near KDP headquarters in Mosul,” 2/23/09
- “Bomb explodes near police motorcade in Mosul,” 1/6/09
- “Bomb explodes without casualties in Kirkuk,” 2/11/09
- “Bomb explodes without casualties in Mosul,” 2/10/09
- “Bomb wounds child, mother, army seizes TNT in Ninewa,” 11/14/08
- “Cab driver found dead in Mosul,” 1/7/09
- “Car bomb defused in eastern Mosul,” 2/19/09
- “Car bomb defused in eastern Mosul,” 2/23/09
- “Car bomb defused in Mosul,” 12/26/08
- “Car bomb kills cop, injures 5 in southern Mosul,” 2/19/09
- “Car bomb wounds 4 cops in Mosul,” 12/30/08
- “Child wounded in IED blast in Mosul,” 11/2/08
- “Civilian body found in Mosul,” 2/10/09
- “Civilian killed, 16 wounded in Mosul bombing,” 12/28/08
- “Civilian killed by U.S. fire in Mosul,” 12/15/08
- “Civilian wounded by gunmen fire in Mosul,” 2/6/09
- “Civilian wounded by U.S. fire in Mosul,” 2/4/09
- “Civilian wounded in attack in Mosul,” 2/25/09
- “Civilian wounded in car bomb attack in Mosul,” 12/7/08
- “Cop injured, two bombs explode in Mosul,” 1/12/09
- “Cop killed by bomb blast in Mosul,” 1/28/09
- “Cop killed in bomb blast in Mosul,” 2/18/09
- “Cop, soldier killed in Mosul attacks,” 12/13/08
- “Cop wounded in gun attack in Mosul,” 12/2/08
- “Explosion in front of KDP building in Ninewa,” 12/18/08
- “Female body found east of Mosul,” 2/13/09
- “Gang of kidnappers arrested, body found in Mosul,” 2/27/09
- “Gunmen kill cop in central Mosul,” 2/23/09
- “Gunmen kill former cop in Mosul,” 12/30/08
- “Gunmen kill officer in Ninewa,” 2/24/09
- “Gunmen set AsiaCell’s power generators on fire in Mosul,” 1/2/09
- “Gunmen set 2 AsiaCell’s towers ablaze in Mosul,” 1/6/09
- “Gunmen shoot down policeman in Mosul,” 11/24/08
- “Gunmen wound Mosul medicine college dean,” 12/14/08
- “Hand grenade wounds 3 cops in Mosul,” 2/24/09
- “IED blast targets police patrol in Mosul,” 2/8/09
- “IED injures U.S. soldier in Mosul,” 12/16/08
- “IED rocks IIP building in Ninewa,” 12/11/08
- “IED targets U.S. patrol in Mosul; no casualties,” 12/16/08
- “IED targets U.S. patrol, no casualties,” 1/12/09
- “IED wounds 2 in southern Mosul,” 1/18/09
- “IED wounds 4 in Mosul,” 2/3/09
- “IED wounds 5 in Mosul,” 1/26/09
- “IED wounds civilian in Mosul,” 2/28/09
- “IED wounds soldier in Mosul,” 2/14/09
- “IED wounds soldier in Mosul,” 2/21/09
- “IIP leader gunned down in Mosul,” 2/11/09
- “Iraq army Mosul HQ mortared,” 12/3/08
- “Iraqi soldier injured by bomb blast in Mosul,” 11/29/08
- “Journalist killed by policeman in Mosul,” 2/5/09
- “Local elections candidate gunned down,” 12/31/08
- “Military policeman shot in Mosul,” 12/24/08
- “More than 142 gunmen arrested during Mosul’s operations,” 5/13/08
- “Mosul blast leaves civilian killed, 2 wounded,” 1/24/09
- “Mosul car bomb kills 4, wounds 1,” 1/27/09
- “Neighborhood mayor gunned down in eastern Mosul,” 12/13/08
- “Ninewa blast wounds servicemen,” 1/21/09
- “Officer killed, 2 soldiers wounded in car bomb blast in Mosul,” 12/21/08
- “Oil protection element killed in Mosul,” 1/6/09
- “Operation Good Hope…fresh hope for Mosul residents?” 2/27/09
- “Policeman killed, 2 wounded in Mosul,” 2/5/09
- “Policeman killed, civilian wounded in Mosul blasts,” 11/6/08
- “Policeman killed, civilian wounded in separate incidents in Mosul,” 11/9/08
- “Policeman wounded in attack in Mosul,” 11/10/08
- “Policeman wounded in explosion in Mosul,” 2/2/09
- “Security forces detonate car bomb in Mosul,” 1/29/09
- “Senior police officer survives assassination attempt in Ninewa,” 2/11/09
- “Shabaki MP survives assassination attempt in Mosul,” 1/7/09
- “Soldier wounded by random fire in Mosul,” 11/24/08
- “Soldier wounded in IED blast in Mosul,” 2/19/09
- “Stocky IED injures 3 civilians in Mosul,” 1/28/09
- “Suicide attack kills soldier, wounds 3 in Mosul,” 2/11/09
- “Suicide bomber injures 2 cops in Mosul,” 11/19/08
- “Suicide car bomber wounds 3 in Mosul,” 2/9/09
- “Truck bomb kills 3 cops, injures civilian in Mosul,” 1/1/09
- “U.S. forces kill 3 brothers in Mosul,” 1/22/09
- “Unknown gunmen kill woman, wound 2 in Mosul,” 1/16/09
- “Woman shot down in western Mosul,” 12/13/08
Dagher, Sam, “Fractures in Iraq City as Kurds and Baghdad Vie,” New York Times, 10/28/08
Druzin, Heath, “Iraqis taking the lead? Yes and no,” Stars and Stripes, 2/22/09
Al-Dulaimy, Mohammed, “Found-up of Daily Violence in Iraq-Friday 2 January 2009,” 1/2/09
- “Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq-Monday 12 January 2008,” 1/12/09
- “Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq-Thursday 15 January 2008,” 1/15/09
- “Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq-Tuesday 6 January 2008,” 1/6/09
DPA, “Three policeman killed, four injured in attacks in Iraq,” 11/5/08
- “Two killed, four wounded in clashes with al-Qaeda suspects,” 11/25/08
Flintoff, Corey, “Shift In Power Heightens Tensions In Iraqi City,” All Things Considered, NPR, 2/27/09
Hammoudi, Laith, “Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq – Monday 1 December 2008,” 12/1/08
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- “Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq – Thursday 4 December 2009,” 12/4/08
- “Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq – Thursday 29 January 2009,” 1/29/09
- “Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq – Tuesday 4 November 2008,” 11/4/08
- “Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq – Tuesday 16 December 2008,” 12/16/08
- “Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq – Tuesday 24 February 2009,” 2/24/09
- “Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq – Wednesday, Feb. 11, 2009,” 2/11/09
Hammoudi, Laith and Al-Dulaimy, Mohammed, “Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq – Monday 5 January 2009,” 1/5/09
Hammoudi, Laith and Kadhim, Hussein, “Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq – Wednesday 21 January 2009,” 1/29/09
Issa, Sahar, “Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq – Friday 16 January 2009,” 1/16/09
- “Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq – Friday 21 November 2008,” 11/21/08
- “Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq – Tuesday 13 January 2009,” 1/13/09
Al Jazeera, “Blast rocks Iraqi capital,” 11/12/08
- “Twin blasts target Baghdad police,” 12/17/08
Kadhim, Hussein, “Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq-Monday 3 November 2008,” 11/3/08
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- “Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq - Thursday 12 February 2009,” 2/12/09
- “Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq – Thursday 20 November 2008,” 11/20/08
- “Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq-Thursday 25 December 2008,” 12/25/08
- “Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq – Tuesday 3 February 2009,” 2/3/09
- “Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq-Tuesday 10 February 2009, 2/10/09
- “Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq – Tuesday 30 December 2008,” 12/30/08
- “Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq-Tuesday 10 February 2009,” 2/10/09
- “Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq-Wednesday 10 December 2008,” 12/10/08
- “Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq-Wednesday 12 November 2008,” 11/12/08
- “Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq-Wednesday 17 December 2008,” 12/17/08
- “Roundup of Daily Violence in Iraq – Monday 16 February 2009,” 2/16/09
- “Roundup of Daily Violence in Iraq – Monday 23 February 2009,” 2/23/09
- “Roundup of Daily Violence in Iraq – Thursday 26 February 2009,” 2/26/09
- “Roundup of Daily Violence in Iraq – Wednesday 7 January 2009,” 1/7/09
- “Roundup of Daily Violence in Iraq – Wednesday 25 February 2009,” 2/25/09
Kahl, Colin, Nagl, John, Brimley, Shawn, “Canceling Iraq’s Blank Check,” Foreign Policy, August 2008
Kamal, Adel, “new ninawa governor: no possibility of Kurdish alliance,” Niqash, 2/24/09
KUNA, “Iraqi PM admits failure of Umm Al-Rubai in military operation,” 9/18/08
Mohammed, Mujahid, “Iraq pours in police to protect Christians,” Agence France Presse, 10/12/08
Monsters & Critics, “Six people killed in Iraq clashes,” 2/7/09
Multi-National Forces-Iraq, “Attack at IP station in Mosul kills two, injures four Update to:20090224-05,” 2/24/09
- “Solider killed by indirect fire (Mosul),” 12/25/08
Robertson, Campbell, “Iraq Hands Death Penalty to 28 Cultists for Attacks,” New York Times, 2/27/09
Reuters, “Factbox – Security developments in Iraq, 09 Nov 2008,” 11/9/08
- “FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Dec 1,” 12/1/08
- “FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Dec 2,” 12/2/08
- “FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Dec 4,” 12/4/08
- “FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Dec 5,” 12/5/08
- “FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Dec 6,” 12/6/08
- “FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Dec 15,” 12/15/08
- “FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Dec 16,” 12/16/08
- “FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Dec 18,” 12/18/08
- “FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Dec 21,” 12/21/08
- “FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Dec 30,” 12/30/08
- “FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Feb 4,” 2/4/09
- “FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Feb 7,” 2/7/09
- “FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Feb 9,” 2/9/09
- “FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Feb 10,” 2/10/09
- “FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Feb 11,” 2/11/09
- “FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Feb 12,” 2/12/09
- “FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Feb 14,” 2/14/09
- “FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Feb 15,” 2/15/09
- “FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Feb 19,” 2/19/09
- “FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Jan 1,” 1/1/09
- “FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Jan 2,” 1/2/09
- “FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Jan 3,” 1/3/09
- “FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Jan 5,” 1/5/09
- “FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Jan 9,” 1/9/09
- “FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Jan 11,” 1/11/09
- “FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Jan 13,” 1/13/09
- “FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Jan 14,” 1/14/09
- “FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Jan 15,” 1/15/09
- “FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Jan 16,” 1/16/09
- “FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Jan 18,” 1/18/09
- “FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Jan 20,” 1/20/09
- “FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Jan 25,” 1/25/09
- “FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Jan 26,” 1/26/09
- “FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Nov 2,” 11/2/08
- “FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Nov 3,” 11/3/08
- “FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Nov 4,” 11/4/08
- “FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Nov 6,” 11/6/08
- “FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Nov 8,” 11/8/08
- “FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Nov 12,” 11/12/08
- “FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Nov 15,” 11/15/08
- “FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Nov 17,” 11/17/08
- “FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Nov 23,” 11/23/08
- “Suicide bomber kills deputy head of Iraq Sunni party,” 1/18/09
- “US, Iraq Launch New Bid To Eradicate Al-Qaeda,” 2/22/09
Samuels, Lennox, “Al Qaeda Nostra,” Newsweek, 5/21/08
Stairrett, Amanda Kim, “Battalion commander among 4 soldiers killed in Iraq,” Killeen Daily Herald, 2/14/09
Xinhua, “One killed, 15 wounded in car bombing in N Iraq,” 11/13/08
- “Suicide car bomb kills 16 in N Iraq,” 12/1/08
- “Suicide car bomber wounds 10 in northern Iraq,” 1/6/09
- “Suicide car bombing kills Iraqi soldier in N Iraq,” 2/11/09
Yacoub, Sameer, “US, Iraqi forces launch anti-al-Qaida offensive,” Associated Press, 2/22/09
Operation New Hope has two stated goals. First it is a targeted campaign aimed at arresting suspects on a wanted list. On the opening day 74 people were arrested. Second it hopes to increase the government’s presence in certain areas outside of Mosul. Iraqi forces are in the lead, but the U.S. apparently has a large role. That’s shown by the fact that nine American soldiers were killed in the city in February 2009 before and during the offensive. Mosul is one of the few areas where U.S. forces have incorporated the Iraqis troops into their command center.
The offensive has been expected for quite some time. Back in November 2008 there were reports that Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki was considering a new operation there. The Prime Minister first talked of clearing Mosul back in December 2007. The moves against the Mahdi Army in early 2008 however delayed it until May. It was originally called Operation Lion’s Roar, but was then renamed Mother of Two Springs, a nickname for Mosul. Thirty-two thousand soldiers and police were committed to the operation, but by September Maliki admitted that it had not worked and blamed the citizens for not cooperating. As reported here before, Mother of Two Springs had little affect on the number of casualties beforehand and afterwards. When Christians were attacked in the city in October the government again committed more police to secure Mosul.
It wasn’t until the end of 2008 that attacks finally dropped, reaching a low in January 2009 as the country prepared for the provincial elections. According to press reports by January Mosul averaged just 1.8 deaths per day and 2.74 wounded compared to 3.61 deaths and 6.06 wounded per day in October 2008. One major difference between 2008 and 2009 has been the lack of mass casualty bombings. The city however was the deadliest in the country for politicians, and by February attacks and casualties started climbing back up.
Selected Casualty Numbers For Mosul Based Upon Press Reports
April 2008 – One Month Before Operation Lion’s Roar/Mother Of Two Springs
63 attacks/incidents – 2.1 attacks & incidents/day
71 killed – 2.37 killed/day
209 wounded – 7.0 wounded/day
42 kidnapped
June 2008
49 attacks/incidents –1.97 attacks & incidents/day
100 killed – 3.33 killed/day
279 wounded – 9.3 wounded/day
4 kidnapped
October 2008 – Month of Operation Mother Of Two Springs II
92 attacks/incidents – 2.96 attacks & incidents/day
112 deaths – 3.61 deaths/day
188 wounded – 6.06 wounded/day
November 2008
65 attacks/incidents – 2.16 attacks & incidents/day
53 deaths – 1.76 deaths/day
249 wounded – 8.3 wounded/day
December 2008
65 attacks/incidents – 2.09 attacks & incidents/day
68 deaths – 2.19 deaths/day
181 wounded – 5.83 wounded/day
January 2009 – Provincial Elections
52 attacks/incidents – 1.67 attacks & incidents/day
56 deaths – 1.80 killed/day
85 wounded – 2.74 wounded/day
February 2009
81 attacks/incidents – 2.89 attacks & incidents/day
58 deaths – 2.0 deaths/day
111 wounded – 3.96 wounded/day
The major cause of the violence in the city is the divide between Arabs and Kurds. In the January 2005 elections Sunnis boycotted, resulting in the Kurds taking over the provincial council. The Kurds also have aspirations to annex five areas around Mosul in northern Ninewa. Both have caused great anger amongst the province’s Arabs. To make matters worst, during the Surge many Al Qaeda operatives and other groups were forced north and settled in Mosul, which has been called the last urban stronghold for the insurgency. All together this has caused an explosive mix. Many of these armed groups have tried to portray themselves as the protectors of the Arabs against the Kurds, and continue to reject participating in the political system. As noted here before, Prime Minister Maliki attempted to exploit this division for his own political purposes by courting the Arabs in the city to oppose the Kurds. Maliki removed Kurdish units and officers, replacing them with Arab ones, and offered Arabs a role in reconstruction. Rather than offering reconciliation, the Prime Minister pushed for further ethnic differences.
The provincial elections may not help this process. The Al-Hadbaa party won an outright majority in the vote running on an explicitly anti-Kurdish campaign. The party’s leader Atheel al-Nujafi who will probably become the new governor has said that all the sitting Kurdish officials need to be replaced on the provincial council, and that he will not work with any Kurds that put Kurdish concerns before those of Ninewa. The current deputy governor who is a Kurd has accused Al-Hadbaa of wanting to rid Mosul of Kurds.
Al-Hadbaa’s Nujafi believes that Operation New Hope will do little to solve the province’s problems. He may be right. Until the divide between Arabs and Kurds is resolved there will be violence in Mosul. Prime Minister Maliki enflamed the situation by taking an anti-Kurdish turn in late 2008, and the Al-Hadbaa party has a similar position. Many were hoping that the provincial elections would help turn many of these conflicts into a political one, but in Ninewa’s case that may not be true. The real test will be whether violence goes back to 2008 levels now that the voting is over or remains at their current lower rate.
For more on Mosul see:
Mosul – Dangerous Place For Politicians
Mosul Remains One Of The Most Violent Cities In Iraq
Mosul: The New Battleground Between Maliki And The Kurds
New Security Offensive In Mosul?
Christians In Mosul Update
Bad Times For Iraq’s Christians
Back To Mosul
Mosul Update
The Security Situation In Mosul
SOURCES
A Pakistan News, “1 Policeman Killed, 10 injured in Separate Attacks In Iraq,” 12/1/08
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Agence France Presse, “Iraq arrests dozens of ‘terrorists’ in Mosul,” 2/21/09
Ali, Fadhil, “Iraqi Government Launches Operation to Expel al-Qaeda from Mosul,” Terrorism Focus, Jamestown Foundation, 5/20/08
Areef, Slaem, “Mosul a ghost city as troops press ahead with offensive,” Azzaman, 5/15/08
Arraf, Jane, “As Iraq calms, Mosul remains a battle front,” Christian Science Monitor, 12/17/08
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Aswat al-Iraq, “2 army personnel wounded in IED blast in Mosul,” 2/26/09
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- “2 gunmen killed in Ninewa,” 11/13/08
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- “2 killed, 25 wounded in 2nd suicide bombing in Mosul,” 11/27/08
- “2 mortars leave 4 soldiers wounded in Mosul,” 2/13/09
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- “2 wounded by IED in Mosul,” 2/4/09
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- “3 missiles hit Mosul hospital, wound civilian,” 2/25/09
- “3 policemen killed by gunmen in Mosul,” 2/11/09
- “3 soldiers, policeman wounded in Mosul,” 12/4/08
- “3 women wounded by U.S. fire in Mosul,” 2/3/09
- “3 wounded in hand-grenade attack in Mosul,” 2/15/09
- “3 wounded in IED in Mosul,” 2/16/09
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- “4 civilians wounded in Mosul blast,” 1/19/09
- “4 civilians wounded in Mosul blasts,” 11/10/08
- “4 killed, 6 wounded in Iraq violence in 24 hours,” 11/1/08
- “4 police personnel wounded in car bomb blast,” 1/11/09
- “4 sound bombs explode inside Mosul university,” 1/14/09
- “5 houses set on fire in Ninewa,” 2/16/09
- “5 IEDs rock Mosul; no casualties reported,” 12/11/08
- “6 suspects nabbed, IED defused in Mosul,” 2/18/09
- “6 women injured in Mosul blasts,” 12/1/08
- “12 killed, injured in Mosul attack,” 2/2/09
- “23 killed, injured in acts of violence until Friday afternoon,” 1/9/09
- “Army forces detonate bomb in Mosul without damage,” 2/6/09
- “Bike bomb explodes in Mosul, no casualties,” 1/7/09
- “Blast in Mosul kills policemen, wounds 6,” 11/17/08
- “Blast near KDP headquarters in Mosul,” 2/23/09
- “Bomb explodes near police motorcade in Mosul,” 1/6/09
- “Bomb explodes without casualties in Kirkuk,” 2/11/09
- “Bomb explodes without casualties in Mosul,” 2/10/09
- “Bomb wounds child, mother, army seizes TNT in Ninewa,” 11/14/08
- “Cab driver found dead in Mosul,” 1/7/09
- “Car bomb defused in eastern Mosul,” 2/19/09
- “Car bomb defused in eastern Mosul,” 2/23/09
- “Car bomb defused in Mosul,” 12/26/08
- “Car bomb kills cop, injures 5 in southern Mosul,” 2/19/09
- “Car bomb wounds 4 cops in Mosul,” 12/30/08
- “Child wounded in IED blast in Mosul,” 11/2/08
- “Civilian body found in Mosul,” 2/10/09
- “Civilian killed, 16 wounded in Mosul bombing,” 12/28/08
- “Civilian killed by U.S. fire in Mosul,” 12/15/08
- “Civilian wounded by gunmen fire in Mosul,” 2/6/09
- “Civilian wounded by U.S. fire in Mosul,” 2/4/09
- “Civilian wounded in attack in Mosul,” 2/25/09
- “Civilian wounded in car bomb attack in Mosul,” 12/7/08
- “Cop injured, two bombs explode in Mosul,” 1/12/09
- “Cop killed by bomb blast in Mosul,” 1/28/09
- “Cop killed in bomb blast in Mosul,” 2/18/09
- “Cop, soldier killed in Mosul attacks,” 12/13/08
- “Cop wounded in gun attack in Mosul,” 12/2/08
- “Explosion in front of KDP building in Ninewa,” 12/18/08
- “Female body found east of Mosul,” 2/13/09
- “Gang of kidnappers arrested, body found in Mosul,” 2/27/09
- “Gunmen kill cop in central Mosul,” 2/23/09
- “Gunmen kill former cop in Mosul,” 12/30/08
- “Gunmen kill officer in Ninewa,” 2/24/09
- “Gunmen set AsiaCell’s power generators on fire in Mosul,” 1/2/09
- “Gunmen set 2 AsiaCell’s towers ablaze in Mosul,” 1/6/09
- “Gunmen shoot down policeman in Mosul,” 11/24/08
- “Gunmen wound Mosul medicine college dean,” 12/14/08
- “Hand grenade wounds 3 cops in Mosul,” 2/24/09
- “IED blast targets police patrol in Mosul,” 2/8/09
- “IED injures U.S. soldier in Mosul,” 12/16/08
- “IED rocks IIP building in Ninewa,” 12/11/08
- “IED targets U.S. patrol in Mosul; no casualties,” 12/16/08
- “IED targets U.S. patrol, no casualties,” 1/12/09
- “IED wounds 2 in southern Mosul,” 1/18/09
- “IED wounds 4 in Mosul,” 2/3/09
- “IED wounds 5 in Mosul,” 1/26/09
- “IED wounds civilian in Mosul,” 2/28/09
- “IED wounds soldier in Mosul,” 2/14/09
- “IED wounds soldier in Mosul,” 2/21/09
- “IIP leader gunned down in Mosul,” 2/11/09
- “Iraq army Mosul HQ mortared,” 12/3/08
- “Iraqi soldier injured by bomb blast in Mosul,” 11/29/08
- “Journalist killed by policeman in Mosul,” 2/5/09
- “Local elections candidate gunned down,” 12/31/08
- “Military policeman shot in Mosul,” 12/24/08
- “More than 142 gunmen arrested during Mosul’s operations,” 5/13/08
- “Mosul blast leaves civilian killed, 2 wounded,” 1/24/09
- “Mosul car bomb kills 4, wounds 1,” 1/27/09
- “Neighborhood mayor gunned down in eastern Mosul,” 12/13/08
- “Ninewa blast wounds servicemen,” 1/21/09
- “Officer killed, 2 soldiers wounded in car bomb blast in Mosul,” 12/21/08
- “Oil protection element killed in Mosul,” 1/6/09
- “Operation Good Hope…fresh hope for Mosul residents?” 2/27/09
- “Policeman killed, 2 wounded in Mosul,” 2/5/09
- “Policeman killed, civilian wounded in Mosul blasts,” 11/6/08
- “Policeman killed, civilian wounded in separate incidents in Mosul,” 11/9/08
- “Policeman wounded in attack in Mosul,” 11/10/08
- “Policeman wounded in explosion in Mosul,” 2/2/09
- “Security forces detonate car bomb in Mosul,” 1/29/09
- “Senior police officer survives assassination attempt in Ninewa,” 2/11/09
- “Shabaki MP survives assassination attempt in Mosul,” 1/7/09
- “Soldier wounded by random fire in Mosul,” 11/24/08
- “Soldier wounded in IED blast in Mosul,” 2/19/09
- “Stocky IED injures 3 civilians in Mosul,” 1/28/09
- “Suicide attack kills soldier, wounds 3 in Mosul,” 2/11/09
- “Suicide bomber injures 2 cops in Mosul,” 11/19/08
- “Suicide car bomber wounds 3 in Mosul,” 2/9/09
- “Truck bomb kills 3 cops, injures civilian in Mosul,” 1/1/09
- “U.S. forces kill 3 brothers in Mosul,” 1/22/09
- “Unknown gunmen kill woman, wound 2 in Mosul,” 1/16/09
- “Woman shot down in western Mosul,” 12/13/08
Dagher, Sam, “Fractures in Iraq City as Kurds and Baghdad Vie,” New York Times, 10/28/08
Druzin, Heath, “Iraqis taking the lead? Yes and no,” Stars and Stripes, 2/22/09
Al-Dulaimy, Mohammed, “Found-up of Daily Violence in Iraq-Friday 2 January 2009,” 1/2/09
- “Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq-Monday 12 January 2008,” 1/12/09
- “Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq-Thursday 15 January 2008,” 1/15/09
- “Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq-Tuesday 6 January 2008,” 1/6/09
DPA, “Three policeman killed, four injured in attacks in Iraq,” 11/5/08
- “Two killed, four wounded in clashes with al-Qaeda suspects,” 11/25/08
Flintoff, Corey, “Shift In Power Heightens Tensions In Iraqi City,” All Things Considered, NPR, 2/27/09
Hammoudi, Laith, “Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq – Monday 1 December 2008,” 12/1/08
- “Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq – Saturday 29 November 2008,” 11/29/08
- “Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq – Thursday 4 December 2009,” 12/4/08
- “Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq – Thursday 29 January 2009,” 1/29/09
- “Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq – Tuesday 4 November 2008,” 11/4/08
- “Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq – Tuesday 16 December 2008,” 12/16/08
- “Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq – Tuesday 24 February 2009,” 2/24/09
- “Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq – Wednesday, Feb. 11, 2009,” 2/11/09
Hammoudi, Laith and Al-Dulaimy, Mohammed, “Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq – Monday 5 January 2009,” 1/5/09
Hammoudi, Laith and Kadhim, Hussein, “Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq – Wednesday 21 January 2009,” 1/29/09
Issa, Sahar, “Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq – Friday 16 January 2009,” 1/16/09
- “Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq – Friday 21 November 2008,” 11/21/08
- “Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq – Tuesday 13 January 2009,” 1/13/09
Al Jazeera, “Blast rocks Iraqi capital,” 11/12/08
- “Twin blasts target Baghdad police,” 12/17/08
Kadhim, Hussein, “Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq-Monday 3 November 2008,” 11/3/08
- “Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq-Monday 24 November 2008,” 11/24/08
- “Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq – Sunday 21 December 2008,” 12/21/08
- “Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq - Thursday 12 February 2009,” 2/12/09
- “Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq – Thursday 20 November 2008,” 11/20/08
- “Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq-Thursday 25 December 2008,” 12/25/08
- “Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq – Tuesday 3 February 2009,” 2/3/09
- “Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq-Tuesday 10 February 2009, 2/10/09
- “Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq – Tuesday 30 December 2008,” 12/30/08
- “Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq-Tuesday 10 February 2009,” 2/10/09
- “Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq-Wednesday 10 December 2008,” 12/10/08
- “Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq-Wednesday 12 November 2008,” 11/12/08
- “Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq-Wednesday 17 December 2008,” 12/17/08
- “Roundup of Daily Violence in Iraq – Monday 16 February 2009,” 2/16/09
- “Roundup of Daily Violence in Iraq – Monday 23 February 2009,” 2/23/09
- “Roundup of Daily Violence in Iraq – Thursday 26 February 2009,” 2/26/09
- “Roundup of Daily Violence in Iraq – Wednesday 7 January 2009,” 1/7/09
- “Roundup of Daily Violence in Iraq – Wednesday 25 February 2009,” 2/25/09
Kahl, Colin, Nagl, John, Brimley, Shawn, “Canceling Iraq’s Blank Check,” Foreign Policy, August 2008
Kamal, Adel, “new ninawa governor: no possibility of Kurdish alliance,” Niqash, 2/24/09
KUNA, “Iraqi PM admits failure of Umm Al-Rubai in military operation,” 9/18/08
Mohammed, Mujahid, “Iraq pours in police to protect Christians,” Agence France Presse, 10/12/08
Monsters & Critics, “Six people killed in Iraq clashes,” 2/7/09
Multi-National Forces-Iraq, “Attack at IP station in Mosul kills two, injures four Update to:20090224-05,” 2/24/09
- “Solider killed by indirect fire (Mosul),” 12/25/08
Robertson, Campbell, “Iraq Hands Death Penalty to 28 Cultists for Attacks,” New York Times, 2/27/09
Reuters, “Factbox – Security developments in Iraq, 09 Nov 2008,” 11/9/08
- “FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Dec 1,” 12/1/08
- “FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Dec 2,” 12/2/08
- “FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Dec 4,” 12/4/08
- “FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Dec 5,” 12/5/08
- “FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Dec 6,” 12/6/08
- “FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Dec 15,” 12/15/08
- “FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Dec 16,” 12/16/08
- “FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Dec 18,” 12/18/08
- “FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Dec 21,” 12/21/08
- “FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Dec 30,” 12/30/08
- “FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Feb 4,” 2/4/09
- “FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Feb 7,” 2/7/09
- “FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Feb 9,” 2/9/09
- “FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Feb 10,” 2/10/09
- “FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Feb 11,” 2/11/09
- “FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Feb 12,” 2/12/09
- “FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Feb 14,” 2/14/09
- “FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Feb 15,” 2/15/09
- “FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Feb 19,” 2/19/09
- “FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Jan 1,” 1/1/09
- “FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Jan 2,” 1/2/09
- “FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Jan 3,” 1/3/09
- “FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Jan 5,” 1/5/09
- “FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Jan 9,” 1/9/09
- “FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Jan 11,” 1/11/09
- “FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Jan 13,” 1/13/09
- “FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Jan 14,” 1/14/09
- “FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Jan 15,” 1/15/09
- “FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Jan 16,” 1/16/09
- “FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Jan 18,” 1/18/09
- “FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Jan 20,” 1/20/09
- “FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Jan 25,” 1/25/09
- “FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Jan 26,” 1/26/09
- “FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Nov 2,” 11/2/08
- “FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Nov 3,” 11/3/08
- “FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Nov 4,” 11/4/08
- “FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Nov 6,” 11/6/08
- “FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Nov 8,” 11/8/08
- “FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Nov 12,” 11/12/08
- “FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Nov 15,” 11/15/08
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Samuels, Lennox, “Al Qaeda Nostra,” Newsweek, 5/21/08
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Xinhua, “One killed, 15 wounded in car bombing in N Iraq,” 11/13/08
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Yacoub, Sameer, “US, Iraqi forces launch anti-al-Qaida offensive,” Associated Press, 2/22/09
Sunday, March 1, 2009
Maliki’s Private Security Forces?
On February 17 members of the Baghdad Brigade arrested the secretary of parliamentarian Mohammad al-Daini. Nine days before members of the same unit detained Daini’s chief bodyguard. That began the latest drama in Iraq’s parliament as Daini was accused of involvement in a series of terrorist and criminal acts. The events also highlighted one of two security units that have come to be increasingly scrutinized by Iraqi lawmakers.
The Baghdad Brigade and the Counterterrorism Unit have been accused of being Prime Minister’s private security forces. The Baghdad Brigade has been in charge of the Green Zone since it was handed over by the U.S. on New Year’s day 2009. It is led by General Emaad Yahseen Al Zuhary, and is officially part of the Army. Its’ operations against Daini’s staff shows that it apparently has police powers in other parts of the capital. The Counterterrorism force is an elite unit of over 4,000 that focuses upon militias, the insurgency, kidnappings, and gangs. The unit was brought together in April 2007 under the Counterterrorism Bureau created by the Prime Minister. The Unit is actually independent from both the Defense and Interior ministries. Nouri al-Maliki has just put forward a bill in parliament that would institutionalize their independence by creating their own budget. Both the Baghdad Brigade and the Counterterrorism Unit also answer directly to the Prime Minister. This is what has led some Iraqi politicians to question these two forces, and Maliki’s intentions. Some of their uses have also added to the controversy.
The Counterterrorism Unit was the first one to gain notoriety when it raided the Diyala provincial council headquarters in August 2008. The unit arrested the provincial security chief and the president of Diyala University, but along the way killed the governor’s secretary and one of his bodyguards, beat the deputy governor, and got into a firefight with local police killing four officers. Baghdad claimed the two arrested officials were on a wanted list, but then later claimed that it was a rogue operation. Few believed that explanation since the unit is under the direct control of Maliki. Some thought it was the Prime Minister asserting his control over the provincial council. Several of the Sunni members of the council from the Iraqi Islamic Party, including the arrested provincial security chief, were trying to reach out and co-opt the province’s Sons of Iraq (SOI) in preparation for the provincial elections. At the same time Maliki was intent on breaking the SOI by creating a rival Diyala tribal support council to lure away their members, while arresting others. The bungled raid was part of this struggle between Baghdad and the province.
In December 20008 the Counterterrorism Unit also arrested several Interior Ministry officials. The supposed reasons for their detentions ranged everywhere from plotting a coup, to being former Baathists, to planning arson in the Interior Ministry building, to making fake IDs to gain access to the ministry. The fact that the Interior Minister Jawad al-Bolani had a different story for the arrests than Maliki would point to another use of the special force to send a political message. Al-Bolani is the leader of the Constitutional Party that ran in the provincial elections. He was said to have used the security forces and his position to expand the party. The arrests could have been a sign by the Prime Minister that Bolani needed to watch his steps before the January 2009 vote.
Maliki has increasingly used the security forces against his political rivals, and to impose his will and the authority of the central government over parts of the country. This began when he sent the security forces after the Mahdi Army in Basra in March 2008. Since then he has also employed them against the Sunni insurgents, the Sons of Iraq, the Kurds, the Sunnis of Diyala, and the Interior Ministry. If the charges against al-Daini prove to be true, it shows that the Baghdad Brigade and the Counterterrorism Unit are not just used at Maliki’s whim. At the same time, Iraq has few to any real checks and balances on the power of the prime minister, and the rule of law is weak. That has caused growing concern amongst parliamentarians over Maliki’s moves to create these two forces that are independent from the rest of the security forces and ministries, and only answer to him.
SOURCES
Aswat al-Iraq, “PM forms ministerial committee to investigate Diala incidents,” 8/19/08
- “PM’s special force arrested my chief guard, secretary – MP,” 2/18/09
August, Oliver, “Iraqi officials arrested in anti-Saddam party swoop,” Times of London, 12/18/08
Elliott, DJ, “Iraqi Security Forces Order of Battle update: February 2009,” Long War Journal.org, 2/5/09
Kadhim, Hussein, “Iraqi government plays down arrests of 23 police officers,” McClatchy Newspapers, 12/18/08
Michaels, Jim, “Chain of command concerns raised in Iraq,” USA Today, 2/23/09
Parker, Ned and Hameed, Saif, “Iraq releases detained security officers,” Los Angeles Times, 12/20/08
Parker, Sam, “Guest Post: Behind the Curtain in Diyala,” Abu Muqawama Blog, 8/20/08
Peyamner News Agency, “Articles – Baghdad residents welcome green zone handover,” 1/2/09
Raghavan, Sudarsan and Mizher, Qais, “Arrests in Iraq Seen as Politically Motivated,” Washington Post, 12/19/08
Robertson, Campbell and Al-Salhy, Suadad, “Charges Dismissed in Iraq Against Ministry Detainees,” New York Times, 12/23/08
Robertson, Campbell and Williams, Timothy, “Status of Detained Iraqis Is Murky Amid Talk of a Political Showdown,” New York Times, 12/21/08
Rubin, Alissa, “Ahead of Election, Iraq’s Leader Pushes for Gains,” New York Times, 1/26/09
Russo, Claire, “Countdown To Diyala’s Provincial Election: Maliki & The IIP,” Institute for the Study of War, 1/30/09
- “The Maliki Government Confronts Diyala,” Institute for the Study of War,” 9/23/08
Salaheddin, Sinan, “Police: Iraqi troops raid Diyala governor’s office,” Associated Press, 8/19/08
Spangler, Nicholas, “Diyala raid was rogue operation, Iraqi government says,” McClatchy Newspapers, 8/22/08
Susman, Tina and Salman, Raheem, “Manhunt targets Iraq lawmaker whose plane was turned back,” Los Angeles Times, 2/26/09
Tran, Mark, “Iraqi officials arrested over coup plot against prime minister,” Guardian, 12/18/08
The Baghdad Brigade and the Counterterrorism Unit have been accused of being Prime Minister’s private security forces. The Baghdad Brigade has been in charge of the Green Zone since it was handed over by the U.S. on New Year’s day 2009. It is led by General Emaad Yahseen Al Zuhary, and is officially part of the Army. Its’ operations against Daini’s staff shows that it apparently has police powers in other parts of the capital. The Counterterrorism force is an elite unit of over 4,000 that focuses upon militias, the insurgency, kidnappings, and gangs. The unit was brought together in April 2007 under the Counterterrorism Bureau created by the Prime Minister. The Unit is actually independent from both the Defense and Interior ministries. Nouri al-Maliki has just put forward a bill in parliament that would institutionalize their independence by creating their own budget. Both the Baghdad Brigade and the Counterterrorism Unit also answer directly to the Prime Minister. This is what has led some Iraqi politicians to question these two forces, and Maliki’s intentions. Some of their uses have also added to the controversy.
The Counterterrorism Unit was the first one to gain notoriety when it raided the Diyala provincial council headquarters in August 2008. The unit arrested the provincial security chief and the president of Diyala University, but along the way killed the governor’s secretary and one of his bodyguards, beat the deputy governor, and got into a firefight with local police killing four officers. Baghdad claimed the two arrested officials were on a wanted list, but then later claimed that it was a rogue operation. Few believed that explanation since the unit is under the direct control of Maliki. Some thought it was the Prime Minister asserting his control over the provincial council. Several of the Sunni members of the council from the Iraqi Islamic Party, including the arrested provincial security chief, were trying to reach out and co-opt the province’s Sons of Iraq (SOI) in preparation for the provincial elections. At the same time Maliki was intent on breaking the SOI by creating a rival Diyala tribal support council to lure away their members, while arresting others. The bungled raid was part of this struggle between Baghdad and the province.
In December 20008 the Counterterrorism Unit also arrested several Interior Ministry officials. The supposed reasons for their detentions ranged everywhere from plotting a coup, to being former Baathists, to planning arson in the Interior Ministry building, to making fake IDs to gain access to the ministry. The fact that the Interior Minister Jawad al-Bolani had a different story for the arrests than Maliki would point to another use of the special force to send a political message. Al-Bolani is the leader of the Constitutional Party that ran in the provincial elections. He was said to have used the security forces and his position to expand the party. The arrests could have been a sign by the Prime Minister that Bolani needed to watch his steps before the January 2009 vote.
Maliki has increasingly used the security forces against his political rivals, and to impose his will and the authority of the central government over parts of the country. This began when he sent the security forces after the Mahdi Army in Basra in March 2008. Since then he has also employed them against the Sunni insurgents, the Sons of Iraq, the Kurds, the Sunnis of Diyala, and the Interior Ministry. If the charges against al-Daini prove to be true, it shows that the Baghdad Brigade and the Counterterrorism Unit are not just used at Maliki’s whim. At the same time, Iraq has few to any real checks and balances on the power of the prime minister, and the rule of law is weak. That has caused growing concern amongst parliamentarians over Maliki’s moves to create these two forces that are independent from the rest of the security forces and ministries, and only answer to him.
SOURCES
Aswat al-Iraq, “PM forms ministerial committee to investigate Diala incidents,” 8/19/08
- “PM’s special force arrested my chief guard, secretary – MP,” 2/18/09
August, Oliver, “Iraqi officials arrested in anti-Saddam party swoop,” Times of London, 12/18/08
Elliott, DJ, “Iraqi Security Forces Order of Battle update: February 2009,” Long War Journal.org, 2/5/09
Kadhim, Hussein, “Iraqi government plays down arrests of 23 police officers,” McClatchy Newspapers, 12/18/08
Michaels, Jim, “Chain of command concerns raised in Iraq,” USA Today, 2/23/09
Parker, Ned and Hameed, Saif, “Iraq releases detained security officers,” Los Angeles Times, 12/20/08
Parker, Sam, “Guest Post: Behind the Curtain in Diyala,” Abu Muqawama Blog, 8/20/08
Peyamner News Agency, “Articles – Baghdad residents welcome green zone handover,” 1/2/09
Raghavan, Sudarsan and Mizher, Qais, “Arrests in Iraq Seen as Politically Motivated,” Washington Post, 12/19/08
Robertson, Campbell and Al-Salhy, Suadad, “Charges Dismissed in Iraq Against Ministry Detainees,” New York Times, 12/23/08
Robertson, Campbell and Williams, Timothy, “Status of Detained Iraqis Is Murky Amid Talk of a Political Showdown,” New York Times, 12/21/08
Rubin, Alissa, “Ahead of Election, Iraq’s Leader Pushes for Gains,” New York Times, 1/26/09
Russo, Claire, “Countdown To Diyala’s Provincial Election: Maliki & The IIP,” Institute for the Study of War, 1/30/09
- “The Maliki Government Confronts Diyala,” Institute for the Study of War,” 9/23/08
Salaheddin, Sinan, “Police: Iraqi troops raid Diyala governor’s office,” Associated Press, 8/19/08
Spangler, Nicholas, “Diyala raid was rogue operation, Iraqi government says,” McClatchy Newspapers, 8/22/08
Susman, Tina and Salman, Raheem, “Manhunt targets Iraq lawmaker whose plane was turned back,” Los Angeles Times, 2/26/09
Tran, Mark, “Iraqi officials arrested over coup plot against prime minister,” Guardian, 12/18/08
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