The recent spate of bombings and violence in Iraq has led the authorities to blame prisoners released by the Americans as one major cause. Under the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) the U.S. is to either release all detainees or turn them over to the government. In December 2008 American forces held over 15,000 Iraqis. Even before the SOFA was signed the U.S. had been stepping up its process of releasing them, letting 16,000 out in the first ten months of 2008. In 2007 the commander of U.S. detention facilities set up an extensive program to rehabilitate the Iraqis held by giving them religious, educational, and vocational classes. Now about 50 Iraqis are being released a day. By the summer of 2009 the American military plans to close down their main prisons, and release all but 2,500-5,000 that are considered the worst prisoners by the end of the year.
When the U.S. began releasing prisoners in 2007 it raised concerns of American commanders, and it now has become an issue with Iraq’s politicians. In February 2008, U.S. officers told the Christian Science Monitor that they were worried that the ex-detainees might jeopardize security. In October, the police chief in Ramadi said that he was keeping a close eye on former prisoners, and paying some of them to be spies. As more were released, an Iraqi police colonel in a town in Anbar said he was being overwhelmed by ex-prisoners, and had arrested 70 of them. The deputy police commander in Fallujah said they were looking for 10% of the detainees, while an intelligence officer at the Interior Ministry was worried about Shiite militants regrouping as Special Groups in Basra and Baghdad. He claimed 60% of the prisoners were returning to militancy. These were all local officials expressing their concerns.
When a spate of mass casualty bombings occurred in Baghdad however, the issue became a national one. Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki gave an interview with the BBC at the end of April 2009 where he blamed the attacks on the Americans’ release program. It was then announced in May that the government was beginning a program to re-capture many of the people let go by the Americans. Later in the month the Prime Minister said that he wanted to amend the Amnesty Law passed in February 2008, claiming that it released too many prisoners. While Baghdad has announced that 132,838 people had been amnestied as of May 18, 2009 only around 6,300 were actual prisoners that were released. The rest were people on bail, parole or had warrants on them.
Freeing prisoners held by the U.S. was a major concern of the Iraqis during the negotiations over the SOFA. 85% were said to be Sunnis, and the main Sunni party the Iraqi Accordance Front and its leader Vice President Tariq Hashemi had been pushing for their release for years. The handover of prisoners by the Americans was also a sign of Iraq’s sovereignty. That symbolic gesture may now be coming to an end. It’s likely that some of these former prisoners are returning to their insurgent and militia pasts now that they are free. At the same time, Baghdad is searching for scapegoats to divert attention away from the increase in attacks and deaths. Together they give a powerful incentive for the government to begin rounding people up, at least for the time being, to show that the security forces are doing something to counter the rash of violence.
SOURCES
Agence France Presse, “Iraqi detainees refusing to go home: US general,” 3/23/08
Alsumaria, “US Army releases about 3000 Iraqi detainees,” 3/18/08
Associated Press, “US military says number of detainees falling,” 3/3/09
Aswat al-Iraq, “132,838 inmates released so far under Amnesty Law,” 5/18/09
- “Some inmates released by U.S. are wanted by Iraqi authorities – official,” 4/24/09
Boot, Max, “We Are Winning. We Haven’t Won,” Weekly Standard, 1/28/08
Cordesman, Anthony, “Iraq’s Insurgency and Civil Violence,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, 8/22/07
DPA, “US to transfer Iraqi prisoners to local authorities,” 12/11/08
Eisenstadt, Michael, “Populism, Authoritarianism, and National Security in al-Maliki’s Iraq,” Washington Institute for Near East Studies, 5/12/09
Haynes, Deborah, “US risks fanning violence as it opens gates of Iraqi detention camps,” Times of London, 4/20/09
IRIN, “IRAQ: Lawyers accuse government of concealing information about detainees’ UN Office For The Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 9/19/07
Kingsbury, Alex, “In Iraq, U.S. Marines Rely on Allies Like a Hatchet-Wielding Colonel to Keep the Peace,” U.S. News & World Report, 10/30/08
Lubold, Gordon, “A new U.S. push to release more detainees in Iraq,” Christian Science Monitor, 2/22/08
- “Do U.S. prisons in Iraq breed insurgency?” Christian Science Monitor, 12/20/07
Muir, John, “’No Delay’ in US withdrawal from Iraq,” BBC News, 4/27/09
Peter, Tom, “Iraqi courts to decide fate of America’s detainees,” Christian Science Monitor, 1/29/09
Pincus, Walter, “U.S. Working to Reshape Iraqi Detainees,” Washington Post, 9/19/07
Pincus, Walter and Greenwell, Megan, “U.S. Releases 260 Iraqi Detainees,” Washington Post, 9/23/07
Reilly, Corinne, “As clock ticks, U.S. letting thousands of Iraqi prisoners go,” McClatchy Newspapers, 10/27/08
Reuters, “Iraq PM slams law pardoning mainly Sunni prisoners,” 5/23/09
San Francisco Chronicle, “U.S. military divided on troop withdrawal,” 8/25/07
Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, “Quarterly Report to the United States Congress,” 4/30/09
Stone, Andrea, “Some worried about detainee transfer to Iraq,” USA Today, 1/26/09
United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, “Humanitarian Update Iraq February 2009,” 2/28/09
Zair, Kareem, “Iraq to re-detain released prisoners,” Azzaman, 5/16/09
Monday, May 25, 2009
Sunday, May 24, 2009
Baghdad Responds To Renewed Violence Pt. I: Al Qaeda’s Prince Arrested Or An Imposter?
On April 23, 2009 the Iraqi government claimed they had arrested Abu Omar al-Baghdadi, the prince of the Islamic State of Iraq, a front group created by Al Qaeda in Iraq to give it a more local character. The authorities said they captured him in the Resafa district of Baghdad. Baghdadi has been the public voice of the Islamic State, releasing several speeches. The Iraqis have not allowed the Americans to talk to the detainee, and there are serious doubts that this is really Baghdadi. Instead, it appears that the government made up this story to make it seem like they were doing something to counter the rash of bombings that hit the capital in April 2009.
The Iraqi government has been bragging about the capture of Baghdadi since the end of April. Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki confirmed his arrest on April 27, and said that the security forces had been tracking him for two months. Later, the Iraqi Defense Minister told parliament that his identity had been confirmed. On May 18 the government released a taped confession by Baghdadi. In the recording he claimed to be 40 years old, and a former employee at the Commission for Military Industrialization under Saddam. He said his real name was Ahmad Abid Ahmad Khames al-Majmai from Diyala. He stated that he joined Al Qaeda in Iraq in 2005, and became the leader of the Islamic State in 2006. He went on to say that his organization received funding from Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Syria, and that his group and the Baathists worked together with the help of the Iraqi Islamic Party. Finally, he stated that an associate of Al Qaeda in Iraq founder Abu Musab al-Zarqawi gave him orders to carry on with the sectarian war. Conveniently the government seemed to not only capture the head of the most notorious terrorist and insurgent group in the country, but one that admitted to everything from foreign funding, to connections to Saddam and the Baathists, to the civil war.
Following up on that, Maliki’s supporters touted the arrest to the press. Maliki’s media advisor Yasin Majid said that Baghdadi’s arrest was more important than the capture of Saddam, and that it proved that the Iraqi security forces could handle the country after the U.S. withdrawal. A Dawa parliamentarian went on to claim that the detention could realign Iraq’s politics as it linked the Baathists, Al Qaeda in Iraq, and the Iraqi Islamic Party, the largest Sunni party in the country.
Quickly problems began developing with the government’s story however. First, before the taped confession was released, Minister of National Security Shirwan al-Waili gave a completely different story of Baghdadi’s alleged background. The Minister claimed that his real name was Maad Ibrahim Muhammad, who was a former colonel in the Republican Guard until 1990. He was tried and sentenced to death for membership in an Islamist group by Saddam’s government, but was then released and kicked out of the army. He then went on a foreign trip to Syria, Algeria, and Morocco, before returning to Iraq in 2004. There he joined Zarqawi’s Al Qaeda in Iraq. He was then caught by the Americans in 2007 and held at Camp Bucca, the main U.S. prison camp, for one and a half years. He was later released under the February 2008 Amnesty Law. He was picked again, this time by the Iraqis, but bribed an officer to obtain his release. Not only was this dramatically different from the taped confession, but according to Nibras Kazimi of Talisman Gate and the Hudson Institute, conflicts with Baghdadi’s released speeches. He put out most of his speeches during 2007, which would mean he recorded many of them while in a U.S. prison. Kazimi found a Maad Ibrahim Muhammad on a list of prisoners released under the amnesty law, but he was in Diyala, not Baghdad as Waili’s story claimed.
To counter the government’s claim, the insurgents released two speeches by Baghdadi refuting his arrest. In the first one, he claimed the government was playing games claiming that he was captured and releasing a picture of someone the Islamic State did not know. A member of the SITE Intelligence Group and Kazimi both said that the voice, style and tone of the tape were like the others made by Baghdadi. The Iraqi authorities have dismissed the recording. After that, another tape was aired on Al Jazeera ridiculing the government again saying their confession was a fake, and that they had aired two different stories of who he allegedly was.
In Anbar, the provincial police chief and Awakening leaders also claim they are tracking the “real” Baghdadi. Sheikh Ali Hatem Sulaiman, one of the Awakening heads in Anbar, and the Anbar police chief told the Los Angeles Times that they didn’t believe the man held by the authorities was the real insurgent leader. Instead, they said they were tracking Baghdadi across their province.
The Americans have had no say on the matter because the Iraqi government has not allowed them to see the captured man. In July 2007 however, the U.S. military said that Baghdadi was a fake name made up by the Islamic State. The group hired an actor to play his part. Afterwards, it’s believed the insurgents placed a real person in that position to take up the role of Baghdadi.
The Iraqis also have a history of making up stories about capturing top Al Qaeda in Iraq leaders. In 2007 they claimed to have eliminated Baghdadi, but it turned out to be an insurgent leader that had been killed by the U.S. instead. The Iraqis confiscated his body before it was buried, and tried to make a story out of it.
The character Baghdadi originally appeared three years ago. In January 2006 it was announced that Zarqawi had stepped aside for an Iraqi named Abdullah Rashid al-Baghdadi. It was said that he was a relative of the Prophet Mohammed to give him religious standing, and his name was to give the foreign led insurgent group an Iraqi character. Baghdadi was given the leadership position of the Mujahadeen Shura Council, an umbrella insurgent organization of militants. Zarqawi was later killed and replaced by an Egyptian Abu Ayyub al-Masri. He went on to form the Islamic State of Iraq in October 2006 with Baghdadi still the nominal leader.
The major cause of the story of Baghdadi’s capture is probably the return of mass casualty attacks to Iraq recently. April 2009 witnessed a series of bombings that killed almost 200 people. The papers were full of stories of Iraqis worried that violence was increasing, and that the sectarian war might be renewed since most of the victims were Shiites. That put intense pressure on Prime Minister Maliki to do something, especially because he ran in the January 2009 provincial elections partially on his security crackdowns. That is the likely reason why the government hatched this story of capturing the leader of the Islamic State of Iraq. Not happy with just that, Maliki is now trying to make it a political matter by criticizing the Islamic Party by saying they are connected to the terrorists. The man the authorities hold could very well be an insurgent leader, but there are simply too many wholes and questions in the story to believe what Baghdad is saying about him. Not only that but the Prime Minister is now playing a dangerous political game with the capture, which could have serious repercussions for him down the road.
SOURCES
Alsumaria, “Al Maliki confirms arrest of Al Qaeda Chief,” 4/27/09
Aswat al-Iraq, “Top gunmen confessed to Syrian, Egyptian, Saudi funding – BOC,” 5/18/09
Babylon & Beyond Blog, “IRAQ: Abu Omar Baghdadi speaks?” Los Angeles Times, 5/13/09
Chulov, Martin, “Wave of bombings kills up to 70 as al-Qaida chief is caught,” Guardian, 4/23/09
Kazimi, Nibras, “’Al-Baghdad’ on TV,” Talisman Gate Blog, 5/18/09
- “Al-Baghdadi’s Sixteenth Speech,” Talisman Gate Blog, 5/12/09
- “Al-Waili on al-Baghdadi (Updated),” Talisman Gate Blog, 5/10/09
- “More Twists in the ‘al-Baghdadi’ Sage,” Talisman Gate Blog, 5/22/09
Kimmage, Daniel, and Ridolfo, Kathleen, “Iraqi Insurgent Media: The War of Images And Ideas,” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, June 2007
Roggio, Bill, “The Awakening, al Qaeda clash in Iraq,” Long War Journal.org, 12/17/07
- “Islamic State of Iraq leader reported captured,” Long War Journal, 4/23/09
- “US Military denies al Qaeda leader al Masri is in custody,” Long War Journal.org, 5/9/08
Sly, Liz, “Even in custody, Abu Omar al Baghdadi proves elusive,” Los Angeles Times, 5/15/09
- “In Baghdad, dread grows with death toll,” Los Angeles Times, 5/2/09
- “Rifts deepen within Iraq’s insurgency,” Chicago Tribune, 1/24/06
The Iraqi government has been bragging about the capture of Baghdadi since the end of April. Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki confirmed his arrest on April 27, and said that the security forces had been tracking him for two months. Later, the Iraqi Defense Minister told parliament that his identity had been confirmed. On May 18 the government released a taped confession by Baghdadi. In the recording he claimed to be 40 years old, and a former employee at the Commission for Military Industrialization under Saddam. He said his real name was Ahmad Abid Ahmad Khames al-Majmai from Diyala. He stated that he joined Al Qaeda in Iraq in 2005, and became the leader of the Islamic State in 2006. He went on to say that his organization received funding from Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Syria, and that his group and the Baathists worked together with the help of the Iraqi Islamic Party. Finally, he stated that an associate of Al Qaeda in Iraq founder Abu Musab al-Zarqawi gave him orders to carry on with the sectarian war. Conveniently the government seemed to not only capture the head of the most notorious terrorist and insurgent group in the country, but one that admitted to everything from foreign funding, to connections to Saddam and the Baathists, to the civil war.
Following up on that, Maliki’s supporters touted the arrest to the press. Maliki’s media advisor Yasin Majid said that Baghdadi’s arrest was more important than the capture of Saddam, and that it proved that the Iraqi security forces could handle the country after the U.S. withdrawal. A Dawa parliamentarian went on to claim that the detention could realign Iraq’s politics as it linked the Baathists, Al Qaeda in Iraq, and the Iraqi Islamic Party, the largest Sunni party in the country.
Quickly problems began developing with the government’s story however. First, before the taped confession was released, Minister of National Security Shirwan al-Waili gave a completely different story of Baghdadi’s alleged background. The Minister claimed that his real name was Maad Ibrahim Muhammad, who was a former colonel in the Republican Guard until 1990. He was tried and sentenced to death for membership in an Islamist group by Saddam’s government, but was then released and kicked out of the army. He then went on a foreign trip to Syria, Algeria, and Morocco, before returning to Iraq in 2004. There he joined Zarqawi’s Al Qaeda in Iraq. He was then caught by the Americans in 2007 and held at Camp Bucca, the main U.S. prison camp, for one and a half years. He was later released under the February 2008 Amnesty Law. He was picked again, this time by the Iraqis, but bribed an officer to obtain his release. Not only was this dramatically different from the taped confession, but according to Nibras Kazimi of Talisman Gate and the Hudson Institute, conflicts with Baghdadi’s released speeches. He put out most of his speeches during 2007, which would mean he recorded many of them while in a U.S. prison. Kazimi found a Maad Ibrahim Muhammad on a list of prisoners released under the amnesty law, but he was in Diyala, not Baghdad as Waili’s story claimed.
To counter the government’s claim, the insurgents released two speeches by Baghdadi refuting his arrest. In the first one, he claimed the government was playing games claiming that he was captured and releasing a picture of someone the Islamic State did not know. A member of the SITE Intelligence Group and Kazimi both said that the voice, style and tone of the tape were like the others made by Baghdadi. The Iraqi authorities have dismissed the recording. After that, another tape was aired on Al Jazeera ridiculing the government again saying their confession was a fake, and that they had aired two different stories of who he allegedly was.
In Anbar, the provincial police chief and Awakening leaders also claim they are tracking the “real” Baghdadi. Sheikh Ali Hatem Sulaiman, one of the Awakening heads in Anbar, and the Anbar police chief told the Los Angeles Times that they didn’t believe the man held by the authorities was the real insurgent leader. Instead, they said they were tracking Baghdadi across their province.
The Americans have had no say on the matter because the Iraqi government has not allowed them to see the captured man. In July 2007 however, the U.S. military said that Baghdadi was a fake name made up by the Islamic State. The group hired an actor to play his part. Afterwards, it’s believed the insurgents placed a real person in that position to take up the role of Baghdadi.
The Iraqis also have a history of making up stories about capturing top Al Qaeda in Iraq leaders. In 2007 they claimed to have eliminated Baghdadi, but it turned out to be an insurgent leader that had been killed by the U.S. instead. The Iraqis confiscated his body before it was buried, and tried to make a story out of it.
The character Baghdadi originally appeared three years ago. In January 2006 it was announced that Zarqawi had stepped aside for an Iraqi named Abdullah Rashid al-Baghdadi. It was said that he was a relative of the Prophet Mohammed to give him religious standing, and his name was to give the foreign led insurgent group an Iraqi character. Baghdadi was given the leadership position of the Mujahadeen Shura Council, an umbrella insurgent organization of militants. Zarqawi was later killed and replaced by an Egyptian Abu Ayyub al-Masri. He went on to form the Islamic State of Iraq in October 2006 with Baghdadi still the nominal leader.
The major cause of the story of Baghdadi’s capture is probably the return of mass casualty attacks to Iraq recently. April 2009 witnessed a series of bombings that killed almost 200 people. The papers were full of stories of Iraqis worried that violence was increasing, and that the sectarian war might be renewed since most of the victims were Shiites. That put intense pressure on Prime Minister Maliki to do something, especially because he ran in the January 2009 provincial elections partially on his security crackdowns. That is the likely reason why the government hatched this story of capturing the leader of the Islamic State of Iraq. Not happy with just that, Maliki is now trying to make it a political matter by criticizing the Islamic Party by saying they are connected to the terrorists. The man the authorities hold could very well be an insurgent leader, but there are simply too many wholes and questions in the story to believe what Baghdad is saying about him. Not only that but the Prime Minister is now playing a dangerous political game with the capture, which could have serious repercussions for him down the road.
SOURCES
Alsumaria, “Al Maliki confirms arrest of Al Qaeda Chief,” 4/27/09
Aswat al-Iraq, “Top gunmen confessed to Syrian, Egyptian, Saudi funding – BOC,” 5/18/09
Babylon & Beyond Blog, “IRAQ: Abu Omar Baghdadi speaks?” Los Angeles Times, 5/13/09
Chulov, Martin, “Wave of bombings kills up to 70 as al-Qaida chief is caught,” Guardian, 4/23/09
Kazimi, Nibras, “’Al-Baghdad’ on TV,” Talisman Gate Blog, 5/18/09
- “Al-Baghdadi’s Sixteenth Speech,” Talisman Gate Blog, 5/12/09
- “Al-Waili on al-Baghdadi (Updated),” Talisman Gate Blog, 5/10/09
- “More Twists in the ‘al-Baghdadi’ Sage,” Talisman Gate Blog, 5/22/09
Kimmage, Daniel, and Ridolfo, Kathleen, “Iraqi Insurgent Media: The War of Images And Ideas,” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, June 2007
Roggio, Bill, “The Awakening, al Qaeda clash in Iraq,” Long War Journal.org, 12/17/07
- “Islamic State of Iraq leader reported captured,” Long War Journal, 4/23/09
- “US Military denies al Qaeda leader al Masri is in custody,” Long War Journal.org, 5/9/08
Sly, Liz, “Even in custody, Abu Omar al Baghdadi proves elusive,” Los Angeles Times, 5/15/09
- “In Baghdad, dread grows with death toll,” Los Angeles Times, 5/2/09
- “Rifts deepen within Iraq’s insurgency,” Chicago Tribune, 1/24/06
Friday, May 22, 2009
Sadrist Sighting In Turkey
On May 2, 2009 Moqtada al-Sadr made a rare public appearance in Turkey. The last time he’d been seen was a TV interview on Al Jazeera on March 29, 2008. His previous personal appearance was a speech given in Kufa, Iraq on May 15, 2007. Since February 2007 Sadr has been in the holy city of Qom, Iran studying to be an ayatollah. He also left Iraq to escape the Surge, which he believed rightfully would eventually target him and his movement. The goal of his emergence was to meet with his leaders and forge a new political strategy for the future.
Initially, few understood why Sadr would show up in Turkey of all places, but it was later revealed that it was a political meeting of top Sadrist officials. Sadr met with 70 members of his movement according to Iraq Slogger, including five Sadrist parliamentarians. The main issue discussed was the future of the Sadrist Trend, and how it will participate in the parliamentary elections, which are now scheduled for January 30, 2010. Sadr’s top spokesman said that the movement would follow a similar strategy as it did in the January 2009 provincial elections when it didn’t form its own party, but rather supported independents. As a sign of this new direction, Sadr announced that he had given up armed struggle against the Americans, and would now concentrate on politics and culture. To gain legitimacy and show his new stance Sadr met with Turkish President Abdullah Gul and Prime Minister Recept Tayyip Erdogan. Sadrist officials also said that their leader would soon be returning to Iraq when his religious training was finished.
In the 2009 elections the Sadrists had mixed results. They lost control of Maysan where they held the governorship, and reportedly did badly in Sadr City. Their overall percentage of votes also went down from 12.7% in the 2005 provincial elections to 8.1% in 2009. They did however gain representation in eleven provinces compared to just three in 2005. The Sadrist backed Independent Trend of the Noble Ones formed ruling coalitions with Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s State of Law in two of them, Babil and Dhi Qar.
At the same time the government continues to target selected Sadr officials. On May 10 for example, Iraqi security forces raided the house of a Sadrist imam in Kadhemiya, Baghdad, but he wasn’t home, and the police claimed to have arrested a Sadrist leader in Dhi Qar who was accused of terrorism.
As reported before, the Sadr movement has also faced numerous divisions. The latest was when 200 moderates formed their own breakaway social and political group in March 2009. The previous month it was reported that Asaib Ahl al-Haq, the League of the Righteous, a Special Group supported by Iran, was planning on forming its own political party for the parliamentary elections. Qais Khazali formed the League. Khazali was one of Sadr’s father’s top followers who kept the movement together after Saddam Hussein assassinated the elder Sadr. The League claims to be the legitimate Sadr movement, and still believes in armed struggle. The last two times Sadr is known to have come back to Iraq in May 2007 and April 2008 it was to try to deal with these various breakaway groups. Prime Minister Maliki and other Shiite leaders have also been trying to peel away Sadrs followers.
Sadr has been trying to move away from being seen as a militia leader and more as a politician since he originally ordered a ceasefire in August 2007. He now rejects using violence, but his movement has split into so many different groups, and lost standing with everyday Shiites because of the new status quo created after the end of the sectarian war, that he doesn’t have the influence and control that he once did. His main goal now is probably to unify his followers, build on his showing in the provincial elections, and prove to be a larger player in parliament. He may end up losing seats however as he had mixed results in January 2009.
For more on Sadr see:
Massive Security Raids In Basra
Anbar Sheikhs Reach Out To Shiites
New Challenges To Sadr's Leadership
Iran's Policy Towards Iraq
How Did The Sadrists Do In The Provincial Elections?
A Divided Sadr Trend
Sadrists Announce Parties They Support For Provincial Elections
Sadr's Predicament
Combating Terrorism Center's Report On Iran's Role In Iraq
Combating Terrorism Center Report On Iranian Training of Shiite Militants
SOFA Passes
Shiite Rivalries Increasing As Provincial Elections Near
How Failure To Deal With Iraq's Militias Caused The Breakdown Of The Country
Another Sadrist Assassinated
Sadrist Cleric Assassinated In Basra
Sadr Struggles To Remain Relevant
Sadr's Leadership Or Lack Thereof
Hezbollah's Role In Iraq
Desperation Move By The Sadrists? Update II
Desperation Move By The Sadrists? Update I
Vali Nasr: Iranian Policy In Iraq At A Crossroads
Operation Promise of Peace In Maysan Province
Overview Of Iran's Influence In Iraq
Desperation Move By The Sadrists?
Sadr's Leadership Or Lack Thereof
SOURCES
Agence France Presse, “Iraq radical cleric meets fellow Shiites,” 5/2/09
- “Iraq sets election date,” 5/18/09
Alsumaria, “Iraq elections leaks say Al Maliki ahead,” 2/2/09
Associated Press, “Shiite militia may be disintegrating,” 3/21/07
Aswat al-Iraq, “Iraqi security forces raid cleric’s house in Kadhemiya,” 5/10/09
- “Thi-Qar police say arrested Sadrist leader,” 5/10/09
Bozkurt, Abdullah, “Deciphering Muqtada al-Sadr’s visit to Turkey: forging new relations,” Today’s Zaman, 5/13/09
Chon, Gina, “Iraq Hopes Grow on Split in Sadr Body, Amnesties,” Wall Street Journal, 3/30/09
Cobanoglu, Cagri, “Al-Sadr asks Ankara to play bigger role in Middle East,” Today’s Zaman, 5/4/09
Cochrane, Marisa, “The Fragmentation of the Sadrist Movement,” Institute for the Study of War, January 2009
Eisenstadt, Michael, “Populism, Authoritarianism, and National Security in al-Maliki’s Iraq,” Washington Institute for Near East Studies, 5/12/09
Fayad, Ma’ad, “Iran Ordered Muqtada al-Sadr to Return to Al-Najaf – Iraqi Sources,” Asharq Alawsat, 4/14/08
Felter, Joseph and Fishman, Brian, “Iranian Strategy in Iraq, Politics and ‘Other Means,’” Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, 10/13/08
Ibrahim, Waleed, “’Surprise’ poll victories strengthen Iraq’s Maliki,” Retuers, 2/1/09
Mohsen, Amer, “Iraq Papers Thu: The Convention,” IraqSlogger.com, 5/6/09
Reuters, “Iraq’s Sadr back in Iran – U.S. military sources,” 7/8/07
Ricks, Thomas and Raghavan, Suadrasan, “Sadr Back in Iraq, U.S. Generals Say,” Washington Post, 5/25/07
Initially, few understood why Sadr would show up in Turkey of all places, but it was later revealed that it was a political meeting of top Sadrist officials. Sadr met with 70 members of his movement according to Iraq Slogger, including five Sadrist parliamentarians. The main issue discussed was the future of the Sadrist Trend, and how it will participate in the parliamentary elections, which are now scheduled for January 30, 2010. Sadr’s top spokesman said that the movement would follow a similar strategy as it did in the January 2009 provincial elections when it didn’t form its own party, but rather supported independents. As a sign of this new direction, Sadr announced that he had given up armed struggle against the Americans, and would now concentrate on politics and culture. To gain legitimacy and show his new stance Sadr met with Turkish President Abdullah Gul and Prime Minister Recept Tayyip Erdogan. Sadrist officials also said that their leader would soon be returning to Iraq when his religious training was finished.
In the 2009 elections the Sadrists had mixed results. They lost control of Maysan where they held the governorship, and reportedly did badly in Sadr City. Their overall percentage of votes also went down from 12.7% in the 2005 provincial elections to 8.1% in 2009. They did however gain representation in eleven provinces compared to just three in 2005. The Sadrist backed Independent Trend of the Noble Ones formed ruling coalitions with Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s State of Law in two of them, Babil and Dhi Qar.
At the same time the government continues to target selected Sadr officials. On May 10 for example, Iraqi security forces raided the house of a Sadrist imam in Kadhemiya, Baghdad, but he wasn’t home, and the police claimed to have arrested a Sadrist leader in Dhi Qar who was accused of terrorism.
As reported before, the Sadr movement has also faced numerous divisions. The latest was when 200 moderates formed their own breakaway social and political group in March 2009. The previous month it was reported that Asaib Ahl al-Haq, the League of the Righteous, a Special Group supported by Iran, was planning on forming its own political party for the parliamentary elections. Qais Khazali formed the League. Khazali was one of Sadr’s father’s top followers who kept the movement together after Saddam Hussein assassinated the elder Sadr. The League claims to be the legitimate Sadr movement, and still believes in armed struggle. The last two times Sadr is known to have come back to Iraq in May 2007 and April 2008 it was to try to deal with these various breakaway groups. Prime Minister Maliki and other Shiite leaders have also been trying to peel away Sadrs followers.
Sadr has been trying to move away from being seen as a militia leader and more as a politician since he originally ordered a ceasefire in August 2007. He now rejects using violence, but his movement has split into so many different groups, and lost standing with everyday Shiites because of the new status quo created after the end of the sectarian war, that he doesn’t have the influence and control that he once did. His main goal now is probably to unify his followers, build on his showing in the provincial elections, and prove to be a larger player in parliament. He may end up losing seats however as he had mixed results in January 2009.
For more on Sadr see:
Massive Security Raids In Basra
Anbar Sheikhs Reach Out To Shiites
New Challenges To Sadr's Leadership
Iran's Policy Towards Iraq
How Did The Sadrists Do In The Provincial Elections?
A Divided Sadr Trend
Sadrists Announce Parties They Support For Provincial Elections
Sadr's Predicament
Combating Terrorism Center's Report On Iran's Role In Iraq
Combating Terrorism Center Report On Iranian Training of Shiite Militants
SOFA Passes
Shiite Rivalries Increasing As Provincial Elections Near
How Failure To Deal With Iraq's Militias Caused The Breakdown Of The Country
Another Sadrist Assassinated
Sadrist Cleric Assassinated In Basra
Sadr Struggles To Remain Relevant
Sadr's Leadership Or Lack Thereof
Hezbollah's Role In Iraq
Desperation Move By The Sadrists? Update II
Desperation Move By The Sadrists? Update I
Vali Nasr: Iranian Policy In Iraq At A Crossroads
Operation Promise of Peace In Maysan Province
Overview Of Iran's Influence In Iraq
Desperation Move By The Sadrists?
Sadr's Leadership Or Lack Thereof
SOURCES
Agence France Presse, “Iraq radical cleric meets fellow Shiites,” 5/2/09
- “Iraq sets election date,” 5/18/09
Alsumaria, “Iraq elections leaks say Al Maliki ahead,” 2/2/09
Associated Press, “Shiite militia may be disintegrating,” 3/21/07
Aswat al-Iraq, “Iraqi security forces raid cleric’s house in Kadhemiya,” 5/10/09
- “Thi-Qar police say arrested Sadrist leader,” 5/10/09
Bozkurt, Abdullah, “Deciphering Muqtada al-Sadr’s visit to Turkey: forging new relations,” Today’s Zaman, 5/13/09
Chon, Gina, “Iraq Hopes Grow on Split in Sadr Body, Amnesties,” Wall Street Journal, 3/30/09
Cobanoglu, Cagri, “Al-Sadr asks Ankara to play bigger role in Middle East,” Today’s Zaman, 5/4/09
Cochrane, Marisa, “The Fragmentation of the Sadrist Movement,” Institute for the Study of War, January 2009
Eisenstadt, Michael, “Populism, Authoritarianism, and National Security in al-Maliki’s Iraq,” Washington Institute for Near East Studies, 5/12/09
Fayad, Ma’ad, “Iran Ordered Muqtada al-Sadr to Return to Al-Najaf – Iraqi Sources,” Asharq Alawsat, 4/14/08
Felter, Joseph and Fishman, Brian, “Iranian Strategy in Iraq, Politics and ‘Other Means,’” Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, 10/13/08
Ibrahim, Waleed, “’Surprise’ poll victories strengthen Iraq’s Maliki,” Retuers, 2/1/09
Mohsen, Amer, “Iraq Papers Thu: The Convention,” IraqSlogger.com, 5/6/09
Reuters, “Iraq’s Sadr back in Iran – U.S. military sources,” 7/8/07
Ricks, Thomas and Raghavan, Suadrasan, “Sadr Back in Iraq, U.S. Generals Say,” Washington Post, 5/25/07
Thursday, May 21, 2009
Going Into Debt To Cover Budget Deficit
On April 3, 2009 the Presidential Council passed the $58.9 billion 2009 Iraqi budget. It was based upon 2 million barrels a day in oil exports at a price of $50 a barrel. In that month the country was only able to sell 1.82 million barrels a day at $47 a barrel. As a result, the country is expected to run anywhere from a $25 billion to $30 billion deficit. Parliament originally believed that this would be covered by the country’s large foreign reserves that had built up since 2005 due to rising oil prices and an inability of Baghdad to spend most of its money. The Finance Minister Baqir Jabr said this stands at $75 billion, $44 billion in the Central Bank of Iraq and $30 billion held by the Finance Ministry itself. On April 27 Minister Jabr however said that the government couldn’t use that fund. That was followed by the Central Bank announcing in May that it had turned down the government’s request to cover the deficit. That leaves Baghdad with only two means to make up the difference. One, it can hope that the Oil Ministry is able to boost oil production to bring in more money. That’s unlikely to happen anytime soon. The other option is for the government to get a loan from the International Monetary Fund (IMF). That’s the route Baghdad is currently following.
It seems that parliament was completely unaware of the rules governing the budget when it was passed or were misinformed about them. There were several reports that lawmakers expected the budget deficit to be covered by the country’s reserves. It was only after that it was passed that the Finance Minister let them know that they could not use this money. The legislature either never talked to the Ministry or the Central Bank when it was debating the budget or were misled. In the end, parliament ended up passing a budget, almost half of which it can’t pay for. To make matters worse, it will go further in debt, borrowing money from the IMF to cover the difference, despite the fact that it has a massive reserve. Hopefully that can be used to pay the loan back, otherwise the situation will get worse in the next fiscal year unless petroleum prices skyrocket up again.
For more on Iraq's budget see:
Falling Oil Revenues, and Uneven Production
Baghdad Failing To Invest In Its Future
Presidential Council Vetoes 2009 Budget
Ups and Downs Of Iraq's Oil Industry And Its Implications For The Budget
Iraq's Budget Stalled
How Are The Current Provincial Councils Doing?
Iraq Revises Budget Once Again
Iraq Cuts Budget
Are Budget Cuts Ahead For Iraq?
Iraq's New Budget Woes
Iraq Cuts Its 2009 Budget, But Still Can't Spend It
NY Times Finds Iraq Spends Even Less Of Its Budget
GAO August 2008 Report On Iraq's Budget And Spending
SOURCES
Abdul-Zahra, Qassim, “Iraq passes sharply reduced budget for 2009,” Associated Press, 3/5/09
Agence France Presse, “Iraq presidency approves slashed budget,” 4/3/09
Aswat al-Iraq, “MP expects 50% deficit in 2009 budget,” 4/27/09
Azzaman, “Iraq’s hard cash reserves estimated at more than $70 billion, minister says,” 3/18/09
Cockburn, Patrick, “Collapse in Iraqi oil price shatters hope of recovery,” Independent, 3/20/09
Cordesman, Anthony, “The Changing Situation in Iraq: A Progress Report,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, 4/4/09
Hafidh, Hassan, “UPDATE: Iraq April Oil Exports 1.82M B/d, Up 0.33% On Month,” Dow Jones, 5/3/09
Al-Hashemi, Mostafa, “Iraq not to tap hard cash reserves despite fall in oil prices,” Azzaman, 4/27/09
Iraq Directory, “Central Bank of Iraq (CBI) declined government’s request to borrow from Reserved funds,” 5/5/09
Levinson, Charles, “Toll Rises as Iraq Slows Surge,” Wall Street Journal, 5/9/09
Sly, Liz, “Economic downturn finally hits Iraq,” Los Angeles Times, 5/11/09
It seems that parliament was completely unaware of the rules governing the budget when it was passed or were misinformed about them. There were several reports that lawmakers expected the budget deficit to be covered by the country’s reserves. It was only after that it was passed that the Finance Minister let them know that they could not use this money. The legislature either never talked to the Ministry or the Central Bank when it was debating the budget or were misled. In the end, parliament ended up passing a budget, almost half of which it can’t pay for. To make matters worse, it will go further in debt, borrowing money from the IMF to cover the difference, despite the fact that it has a massive reserve. Hopefully that can be used to pay the loan back, otherwise the situation will get worse in the next fiscal year unless petroleum prices skyrocket up again.
For more on Iraq's budget see:
Falling Oil Revenues, and Uneven Production
Baghdad Failing To Invest In Its Future
Presidential Council Vetoes 2009 Budget
Ups and Downs Of Iraq's Oil Industry And Its Implications For The Budget
Iraq's Budget Stalled
How Are The Current Provincial Councils Doing?
Iraq Revises Budget Once Again
Iraq Cuts Budget
Are Budget Cuts Ahead For Iraq?
Iraq's New Budget Woes
Iraq Cuts Its 2009 Budget, But Still Can't Spend It
NY Times Finds Iraq Spends Even Less Of Its Budget
GAO August 2008 Report On Iraq's Budget And Spending
SOURCES
Abdul-Zahra, Qassim, “Iraq passes sharply reduced budget for 2009,” Associated Press, 3/5/09
Agence France Presse, “Iraq presidency approves slashed budget,” 4/3/09
Aswat al-Iraq, “MP expects 50% deficit in 2009 budget,” 4/27/09
Azzaman, “Iraq’s hard cash reserves estimated at more than $70 billion, minister says,” 3/18/09
Cockburn, Patrick, “Collapse in Iraqi oil price shatters hope of recovery,” Independent, 3/20/09
Cordesman, Anthony, “The Changing Situation in Iraq: A Progress Report,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, 4/4/09
Hafidh, Hassan, “UPDATE: Iraq April Oil Exports 1.82M B/d, Up 0.33% On Month,” Dow Jones, 5/3/09
Al-Hashemi, Mostafa, “Iraq not to tap hard cash reserves despite fall in oil prices,” Azzaman, 4/27/09
Iraq Directory, “Central Bank of Iraq (CBI) declined government’s request to borrow from Reserved funds,” 5/5/09
Levinson, Charles, “Toll Rises as Iraq Slows Surge,” Wall Street Journal, 5/9/09
Sly, Liz, “Economic downturn finally hits Iraq,” Los Angeles Times, 5/11/09
Wednesday, May 20, 2009
What If Iraq Goes Bad? Position Paper by Stephen Biddle, Council On Foreign Relations
Stephen Biddle is a senior fellow for defense policy at the Council on Foreign Relations. He has been one of the leading writers on Iraq, and was a consultant to General David Petraeus while he was commander in Iraq. This month, May 2009, he released a new report, “Reversal In Iraq.” In it he goes through four scenarios that might reverse course in Iraq, and then finishes off by saying that the U.S. needs to extend its deployment to make sure the gains made are maintained, and Iraq moves towards stability.
Biddle begins his paper by warning that the advances made in Iraq are fragile. This is something that the U.S. military command in the country has repeatedly said. Biddle believes that Iraq is in the beginning of a negotiated settlement to a civil war. In the 23 cases of similar conflicts that Biddle studied from 1940 to 1992, 10 failed within five years of a cease-fire. That is one reason why Biddle calls for caution. The added difficulty in Iraq is that the peace deals made there were all haphazard. Biddle counts over 200 separate negotiations that involved the U.S. and insurgents, tribes, and militias. In none of them was the Iraqi government involved. Now the country is dealing with the aftermath as most sides still distrust each other, and are trying to feel their way forward. This is by nature an unstable situation, made the more so by the bitterness left over by the sectarian war that raged from 2006-2007. Biddle believes that one little flare up could have unintended consequences and renew the fighting. Fortunately, conditions still favor cease-fires in Iraq.
The first situation that threatens this new status quo is the possible emergence of a strong man. That comes in the form of Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki. He has been amassing power in his office, and over the central government and security forces. He has also been taking on his opponents. One are the largely Sunni Sons of Iraq (SOI) units put together by the U.S. that are at the heart of many of the cease-fires in the country. Because each neighborhood has its own SOI leader Maliki has been able to pick off selected ones individually. By starting off with the ones that actually had bad backgrounds or committed crimes he has been able to avoid criticism from the United States. That was the case with the beginning of the government’s latest crackdown that began in March 2009 with the arrest of Adel Mashadani, the head of the SOI in the Fadhil area of Baghdad. U.S. forces backed up the Iraqis in the raid and ensuing firefight. The Americans later said that the arrest was legitimate, and repeated the Iraqi charges against him. The U.S. has said little about the subsequent arrests. Biddle is unsure whether Maliki really wants to be an autocrat or whether he is simply an opportunist trying to grab power when a situation presents itself. The problem Biddle sees is that the Prime Minister may overstep himself and lead to renewed fighting. Then again, with the multitude of unorganized Sunni units, Maliki may be able to manage the situation while eliminating the SOI piece by piece.
The most dangerous threat to long-term stability in Iraq is the Kurdish-Arab divide. In disputed areas like Kirkuk there is oil, a history of abuse under the former regime, competing claims for property rights, and a complete unwillingness to budge on any issue. Mosul is a similar situation. This conflict has allowed Al Qaeda in Iraq and other insurgent groups to find sanctuary in the north, while they have largely been forced out of the rest of the country by portraying themselves as the protectors of the Arabs against the Kurds. As reported several times before, Prime Minister Maliki is involved in this dispute as well, trying to align himself with the Sunni Arabs of the north to pressure the Kurds.
Another issue that might lead to renewed conflict in Iraq is a possible spillover from an Israeli attack on Iran. If Israel were to bomb Tehran’s nuclear facilities, that could lead to Shiite militia attacks on U.S. forces in Iraq since the Americans will be blamed for Israel’s actions. This seems the most unlikely of Biddle’s scenarios.
Fourth, a precipitous U.S. withdrawal might undermine all of the advances made in Iraq. Biddle believes that in many civil wars foreign peacekeepers are crucial to maintaining cease-fires. Many U.S. forces are no longer directly involved in combat operations and are now acting just like peacekeepers trying to mediate conflicts, help with reconstruction, providing basic services, etc. Biddle argues that if the U.S. were to leave too soon before real stability is achieved, the new status quo might deteriorate. That could bring in Iraq’s neighbors and bring down the entire region. A problem with this is that Iraq has already gone through a sectarian civil war where foreign countries were supporting different sides, and the conflict did not spread outside of Iraq.
Biddle concludes by calling for a longer stay for U.S. forces in Iraq. Looking at the American experience in Bosnia and Kosovo, he says that 50,000-70,000 American troops should remain in Iraq past the 2011 deadline set by the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA). He even suggests that the U.S. might renegotiate the deal to allow for this. In the meantime he says that the U.S. should use all of its remaining influence to moderate the actions of Prime Minister Maliki. The U.S. still has sway with financial institutions, international organizations, and offers military assistance to the Iraqis. The problem is U.S. sway in Iraq is diminishing as the Obama administration is committed to withdrawal and Maliki is feeling more independent by the day.
Stephen Biddle has often made this argument. He and many other analysts from American think tanks are worried about what will happen after the U.S. leaves, so therefore they err on the side of caution. This is a view shared by the American commander in Iraq General Ray Odierno and General David Petraeus, the head of the Central Command that has responsibility for the Middle East as well. They originally argued for a 23-month timeline for pulling out U.S. troops. Not being discussed publicly now, but Biddle and his compatriots may get their way. The Iraqi Defense Minister Abdul Qadis Jasim said in 2008 that his forces will not be fully independent and capable of defending Iraq’s borders until 2020. The country is still in the process of buying heavy military equipment. The Air Force for example has no jet fighters, the army no artillery. In April 2009, the head of the Iraqi Air Force said they want to buy 96 F-16 fighters from the U.S. Baghdad has no money for such purchases right now however because of its budget problems. That could push back the 2020 date even further. Since either side can amend the SOFA, it’s very likely that Baghdad will ask a sizeable contingent of Americans to stay in the country past December 2011 until it’s ready to protect its own territory from both internal and external threats. The problem with Biddle’s paper is that there is no telling whether a longer stay will have any affect upon Iraq’s internal politics. Can Maliki be moderated? Can the Arab-Kurdish dispute be resolved? The U.S. hasn’t stopped Maliki’s crackdown on the SOI, and is deferring to the United Nations to resolve disputed territories in the north, and this is with over 100,000 troops in the country. Biddle and others may be misled into thinking that the U.S. has more influence within Iraq that it actually does.
For other reports by Iraq experts see:
Norwegian Institute's Policy Paper On The Way Forward In Iraq
Kenneth Pollack: Too Soon To Wave Victory Flag
Reidar Visser On Obama's Options In Iraq
Withdrawal Instead of Patience As Center of U.S. Strategy In Iraq
Iraq Needs Real Governance Center for Strategic and International Studies Report Says
Cordesman Interview: U.S. Needs To Stay For The Long Haul In Iraq
Council on Foreign Relations-Brookings' Experts Call for Patience In Iraq
Anthony Cordesman, CSIS Report on Iraqi Forces
Council on Foreign Relations and Brookings Institution Experts Voice Their Opinions After Recent Trip To Iraq
Is Iraq Going To End Up Like Eastern Europe?
SOURCES
Alsumaria, “Iraq to purchase F-16 fighters this year,” 4/1/09
Biddle, Stephen, “Reversal in Iraq,” Center for Preventative Action Council on Foreign Relations, May 2009
C-Span Video, “Stephen Biddle, Military Consultant To Gen. David Petraeus,” 9/10/07
Carter, Chelsea, “Falling oil prices stymie Iraq’s security spending,” Associated Press, 3/1/09
Gray, Andrew, "U.S. commanders favor slower Iraq pullout," Reuters, 2/7/09
Londono, Ernesto, “Plunging Oil Prices Force Iraq to Cut Security Jobs,” Washington Post, 5/18/09
Missing Links Blog, “Iraqi forces to be ready by the year 2020, according to plan,” 8/11/08
Nordland, Rod, “Rebellious Sunni Council Disarmed After Clashes, Officials in Baghdad Say,” New York Times, 3/31/09
Reid, Robert, “ANALYSIS: Weekend uprising shows Iraqi tensions,” Associated Press, 3/31/09
Rubin, Alissa and Nordland, Rod, “Troops Arrest an Awakening Council Leader in Iraq, Setting Off Fighting,” New York Times, 3/29/09
Biddle begins his paper by warning that the advances made in Iraq are fragile. This is something that the U.S. military command in the country has repeatedly said. Biddle believes that Iraq is in the beginning of a negotiated settlement to a civil war. In the 23 cases of similar conflicts that Biddle studied from 1940 to 1992, 10 failed within five years of a cease-fire. That is one reason why Biddle calls for caution. The added difficulty in Iraq is that the peace deals made there were all haphazard. Biddle counts over 200 separate negotiations that involved the U.S. and insurgents, tribes, and militias. In none of them was the Iraqi government involved. Now the country is dealing with the aftermath as most sides still distrust each other, and are trying to feel their way forward. This is by nature an unstable situation, made the more so by the bitterness left over by the sectarian war that raged from 2006-2007. Biddle believes that one little flare up could have unintended consequences and renew the fighting. Fortunately, conditions still favor cease-fires in Iraq.
The first situation that threatens this new status quo is the possible emergence of a strong man. That comes in the form of Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki. He has been amassing power in his office, and over the central government and security forces. He has also been taking on his opponents. One are the largely Sunni Sons of Iraq (SOI) units put together by the U.S. that are at the heart of many of the cease-fires in the country. Because each neighborhood has its own SOI leader Maliki has been able to pick off selected ones individually. By starting off with the ones that actually had bad backgrounds or committed crimes he has been able to avoid criticism from the United States. That was the case with the beginning of the government’s latest crackdown that began in March 2009 with the arrest of Adel Mashadani, the head of the SOI in the Fadhil area of Baghdad. U.S. forces backed up the Iraqis in the raid and ensuing firefight. The Americans later said that the arrest was legitimate, and repeated the Iraqi charges against him. The U.S. has said little about the subsequent arrests. Biddle is unsure whether Maliki really wants to be an autocrat or whether he is simply an opportunist trying to grab power when a situation presents itself. The problem Biddle sees is that the Prime Minister may overstep himself and lead to renewed fighting. Then again, with the multitude of unorganized Sunni units, Maliki may be able to manage the situation while eliminating the SOI piece by piece.
The most dangerous threat to long-term stability in Iraq is the Kurdish-Arab divide. In disputed areas like Kirkuk there is oil, a history of abuse under the former regime, competing claims for property rights, and a complete unwillingness to budge on any issue. Mosul is a similar situation. This conflict has allowed Al Qaeda in Iraq and other insurgent groups to find sanctuary in the north, while they have largely been forced out of the rest of the country by portraying themselves as the protectors of the Arabs against the Kurds. As reported several times before, Prime Minister Maliki is involved in this dispute as well, trying to align himself with the Sunni Arabs of the north to pressure the Kurds.
Another issue that might lead to renewed conflict in Iraq is a possible spillover from an Israeli attack on Iran. If Israel were to bomb Tehran’s nuclear facilities, that could lead to Shiite militia attacks on U.S. forces in Iraq since the Americans will be blamed for Israel’s actions. This seems the most unlikely of Biddle’s scenarios.
Fourth, a precipitous U.S. withdrawal might undermine all of the advances made in Iraq. Biddle believes that in many civil wars foreign peacekeepers are crucial to maintaining cease-fires. Many U.S. forces are no longer directly involved in combat operations and are now acting just like peacekeepers trying to mediate conflicts, help with reconstruction, providing basic services, etc. Biddle argues that if the U.S. were to leave too soon before real stability is achieved, the new status quo might deteriorate. That could bring in Iraq’s neighbors and bring down the entire region. A problem with this is that Iraq has already gone through a sectarian civil war where foreign countries were supporting different sides, and the conflict did not spread outside of Iraq.
Biddle concludes by calling for a longer stay for U.S. forces in Iraq. Looking at the American experience in Bosnia and Kosovo, he says that 50,000-70,000 American troops should remain in Iraq past the 2011 deadline set by the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA). He even suggests that the U.S. might renegotiate the deal to allow for this. In the meantime he says that the U.S. should use all of its remaining influence to moderate the actions of Prime Minister Maliki. The U.S. still has sway with financial institutions, international organizations, and offers military assistance to the Iraqis. The problem is U.S. sway in Iraq is diminishing as the Obama administration is committed to withdrawal and Maliki is feeling more independent by the day.
Stephen Biddle has often made this argument. He and many other analysts from American think tanks are worried about what will happen after the U.S. leaves, so therefore they err on the side of caution. This is a view shared by the American commander in Iraq General Ray Odierno and General David Petraeus, the head of the Central Command that has responsibility for the Middle East as well. They originally argued for a 23-month timeline for pulling out U.S. troops. Not being discussed publicly now, but Biddle and his compatriots may get their way. The Iraqi Defense Minister Abdul Qadis Jasim said in 2008 that his forces will not be fully independent and capable of defending Iraq’s borders until 2020. The country is still in the process of buying heavy military equipment. The Air Force for example has no jet fighters, the army no artillery. In April 2009, the head of the Iraqi Air Force said they want to buy 96 F-16 fighters from the U.S. Baghdad has no money for such purchases right now however because of its budget problems. That could push back the 2020 date even further. Since either side can amend the SOFA, it’s very likely that Baghdad will ask a sizeable contingent of Americans to stay in the country past December 2011 until it’s ready to protect its own territory from both internal and external threats. The problem with Biddle’s paper is that there is no telling whether a longer stay will have any affect upon Iraq’s internal politics. Can Maliki be moderated? Can the Arab-Kurdish dispute be resolved? The U.S. hasn’t stopped Maliki’s crackdown on the SOI, and is deferring to the United Nations to resolve disputed territories in the north, and this is with over 100,000 troops in the country. Biddle and others may be misled into thinking that the U.S. has more influence within Iraq that it actually does.
For other reports by Iraq experts see:
Norwegian Institute's Policy Paper On The Way Forward In Iraq
Kenneth Pollack: Too Soon To Wave Victory Flag
Reidar Visser On Obama's Options In Iraq
Withdrawal Instead of Patience As Center of U.S. Strategy In Iraq
Iraq Needs Real Governance Center for Strategic and International Studies Report Says
Cordesman Interview: U.S. Needs To Stay For The Long Haul In Iraq
Council on Foreign Relations-Brookings' Experts Call for Patience In Iraq
Anthony Cordesman, CSIS Report on Iraqi Forces
Council on Foreign Relations and Brookings Institution Experts Voice Their Opinions After Recent Trip To Iraq
Is Iraq Going To End Up Like Eastern Europe?
SOURCES
Alsumaria, “Iraq to purchase F-16 fighters this year,” 4/1/09
Biddle, Stephen, “Reversal in Iraq,” Center for Preventative Action Council on Foreign Relations, May 2009
C-Span Video, “Stephen Biddle, Military Consultant To Gen. David Petraeus,” 9/10/07
Carter, Chelsea, “Falling oil prices stymie Iraq’s security spending,” Associated Press, 3/1/09
Gray, Andrew, "U.S. commanders favor slower Iraq pullout," Reuters, 2/7/09
Londono, Ernesto, “Plunging Oil Prices Force Iraq to Cut Security Jobs,” Washington Post, 5/18/09
Missing Links Blog, “Iraqi forces to be ready by the year 2020, according to plan,” 8/11/08
Nordland, Rod, “Rebellious Sunni Council Disarmed After Clashes, Officials in Baghdad Say,” New York Times, 3/31/09
Reid, Robert, “ANALYSIS: Weekend uprising shows Iraqi tensions,” Associated Press, 3/31/09
Rubin, Alissa and Nordland, Rod, “Troops Arrest an Awakening Council Leader in Iraq, Setting Off Fighting,” New York Times, 3/29/09
Tuesday, May 19, 2009
New Political Crackdown In Diyala
On May 18, 2009 Interior Ministry forces arrested the head of the Iraqi Accordance Front (IAF) in Diyala Abdul Jabbar al-Khazraji and a Sons of Iraq leader Sheikh Riyad al-Mujami in Baquba, the provincial capitol. They were sent to Baghdad where they are charged with attacks on civilians. The raid was part of Operation Promise of Good II, the latest security crackdown in the province. In April 2009, Iraqi forces had tried to detain four members of the IAF on the day they were to be sworn in as new members of the Diyala provincial council. The U.S. prevented the arrests, and Vice President Tariq al-Hashemi, the leader of the Accordance Front, was also involved. Accordance Front and SOI members said that the government was out to destroy them, and an SOI leader said that dozens had fled and hundreds had quit their posts as a result. As reported before, even the Shiite parties of the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council, that is part of the ruling coalition in Diyala and Dawa, which is the opposition, have complained about Operation Promise of Good II. All of this has a striking resemblance to the first Promise of Good launched in 2008.
Operation Promise of Good II was begun on May 1, involving 21,000 police as well as elements of the 5th Iraqi Army Division, and two other brigades. The original Promise of Good was announced in June 2008, and eventually included 2 Army divisions, and 15,000-20,000 police. Both times Baghdad said it was going after insurgents, but the offensives quickly turned into political crackdowns on the Sunni parties and SOI of Diyala. In 2008 the security forces had a 5,000-name want list that mostly consisted of SOI members. By the end of August five SOI leaders and hundreds of fighters were arrested, and more had fled. The SOI went to the U.S. for help, but received little assistance. The political nature of the operation was emphasized when three SOI were arrested the day before the deadline to register for the January 2009 provincial elections. They were released the next day, but their detention made them ineligible to run as candidates. The security forces also arrested members of the Iraqi Islamic Party, the leaders of the Accordance Front, who were allied with the SOI. In August 2008 Maliki ordered a raid on the provincial council offices to detain the Diyala security chief and Iraqi Islamic Party member Hussein al-Zubaydi because of his conflict with the Maliki appointed provincial police chief. That constituted the stick of Maliki’s strategy for Diyala. By January 2009 when the government took control of the SOI, Baghdad promised them jobs as a carrot.
Despite Maliki’s effort to break the power of the Sunnis in Diyala, after the provincial elections, the Accordance Front came out on top, and was able to form a coalition with their parliamentary allies the Kurdish Alliance and the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council’s Diyala Coalition to gain the governorship. This did not go over well with Maliki as his State of Law followers protested, and threatened to go to court over the results.
It seems now that Maliki’s strategy failed to win him election victory he is going back to the stick to deal with Diyala’s Sunnis. The Prime Minister was unable to break the ties between the SOI and the Accordance Front, which led to their winning in the voting. The IAF was then able to outmaneuver the State of Law, and form a ruling coalition to take over the Diyala council. Maliki has therefore turned to arresting the Accordance Front leader, and going back to rounding up SOI members. If Operation Promise Of Good II is like the last one, there will be no mass arrests. Rather warrants will be issued and selected leaders and some rank and file will be rounded up to force the majority to either give into Maliki’s will or flee and quit, thus relieving the government from having to pay them and finding them permanent employment later on.
For more on the situation in Diyala see:
Local Criticism of New Security Operation In Diyala
Old And New Alliances Argue Over Control of Diyala Provincial Council
New And Old Provincial Councils In Diyala Embroiled In Controversy
The Islamic Party's Victory In Diyala
Here Comes The Carrot For Diyala's Sons Of Iraq
SOURCES
Abdullah, Muhammed, “sectarian polarization in diyala,” Niqash, 4/20/09
Ashton, Adam, “Iraqi government to take control of Sunni militia in Diyala,” McClatchy Newspapers, 12/27/08
Aswat al-Iraq, “4 blocs to contest the results of Diala council votes,” 4/12/09
- “Bashaer al-Kheir II will not eliminate gunmen – official,” 5/6/09
- “Dialans have zero trust in Iraqi security forces – MP,” 5/4/09
- “IAF head’s detention is meant for political liquidation – IIP,” 5/19/09
- “Thousands of protesters call to dissolve IHEC-Diala,” 3/1/09
- “Thousands stage demonstrations in Diala,” 4/8/09
Goetze, Katharina and Salman, Daud and Naji, Zaineb, “Could Awakening Fighters Rejoin Insurgency?” Institute for War & Peace Reporting, 10/31/08
Parker, Ned, “Iraq’s Sunnis turn toward the ballot,” Los Angeles Times, 1/31/09
Russo, Claire, “Diyala’s Provincial Election: Maliki & The IIP,” Institute for the Study of War, 1/30/09
Santora, Marc, “Iraq Arrests 2 Sunni Leaders, Raising Fears of Violence,” New York Times, 5/19/09
Operation Promise of Good II was begun on May 1, involving 21,000 police as well as elements of the 5th Iraqi Army Division, and two other brigades. The original Promise of Good was announced in June 2008, and eventually included 2 Army divisions, and 15,000-20,000 police. Both times Baghdad said it was going after insurgents, but the offensives quickly turned into political crackdowns on the Sunni parties and SOI of Diyala. In 2008 the security forces had a 5,000-name want list that mostly consisted of SOI members. By the end of August five SOI leaders and hundreds of fighters were arrested, and more had fled. The SOI went to the U.S. for help, but received little assistance. The political nature of the operation was emphasized when three SOI were arrested the day before the deadline to register for the January 2009 provincial elections. They were released the next day, but their detention made them ineligible to run as candidates. The security forces also arrested members of the Iraqi Islamic Party, the leaders of the Accordance Front, who were allied with the SOI. In August 2008 Maliki ordered a raid on the provincial council offices to detain the Diyala security chief and Iraqi Islamic Party member Hussein al-Zubaydi because of his conflict with the Maliki appointed provincial police chief. That constituted the stick of Maliki’s strategy for Diyala. By January 2009 when the government took control of the SOI, Baghdad promised them jobs as a carrot.
Despite Maliki’s effort to break the power of the Sunnis in Diyala, after the provincial elections, the Accordance Front came out on top, and was able to form a coalition with their parliamentary allies the Kurdish Alliance and the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council’s Diyala Coalition to gain the governorship. This did not go over well with Maliki as his State of Law followers protested, and threatened to go to court over the results.
It seems now that Maliki’s strategy failed to win him election victory he is going back to the stick to deal with Diyala’s Sunnis. The Prime Minister was unable to break the ties between the SOI and the Accordance Front, which led to their winning in the voting. The IAF was then able to outmaneuver the State of Law, and form a ruling coalition to take over the Diyala council. Maliki has therefore turned to arresting the Accordance Front leader, and going back to rounding up SOI members. If Operation Promise Of Good II is like the last one, there will be no mass arrests. Rather warrants will be issued and selected leaders and some rank and file will be rounded up to force the majority to either give into Maliki’s will or flee and quit, thus relieving the government from having to pay them and finding them permanent employment later on.
For more on the situation in Diyala see:
Local Criticism of New Security Operation In Diyala
Old And New Alliances Argue Over Control of Diyala Provincial Council
New And Old Provincial Councils In Diyala Embroiled In Controversy
The Islamic Party's Victory In Diyala
Here Comes The Carrot For Diyala's Sons Of Iraq
SOURCES
Abdullah, Muhammed, “sectarian polarization in diyala,” Niqash, 4/20/09
Ashton, Adam, “Iraqi government to take control of Sunni militia in Diyala,” McClatchy Newspapers, 12/27/08
Aswat al-Iraq, “4 blocs to contest the results of Diala council votes,” 4/12/09
- “Bashaer al-Kheir II will not eliminate gunmen – official,” 5/6/09
- “Dialans have zero trust in Iraqi security forces – MP,” 5/4/09
- “IAF head’s detention is meant for political liquidation – IIP,” 5/19/09
- “Thousands of protesters call to dissolve IHEC-Diala,” 3/1/09
- “Thousands stage demonstrations in Diala,” 4/8/09
Goetze, Katharina and Salman, Daud and Naji, Zaineb, “Could Awakening Fighters Rejoin Insurgency?” Institute for War & Peace Reporting, 10/31/08
Parker, Ned, “Iraq’s Sunnis turn toward the ballot,” Los Angeles Times, 1/31/09
Russo, Claire, “Diyala’s Provincial Election: Maliki & The IIP,” Institute for the Study of War, 1/30/09
Santora, Marc, “Iraq Arrests 2 Sunni Leaders, Raising Fears of Violence,” New York Times, 5/19/09
Monday, May 18, 2009
Breakthrough On Oil Deal Between Baghdad and Kurdistan? Not Quite
On May 8 the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) announced that it had been given permission to export oil. Baghdad and Kurdistan almost agreed to the same deal in the winter of 2008 only to see it fall apart. This latest report was hailed as a breakthrough between the two sides that have bitterly argued over who has control over the country’s resources, but a closer inspection of the terms shows that selling Kurdish oil is still a long way off.
In early May the Iraqi central government seemingly authorized the KRG to export oil. This would begin on June 1 and come from the Tawke and Taq Taq fields. Those are the only two currently producing in Kurdistan, and are being developed by the Norwegian DNO and the Swiss-Canadian and Turkish joint venture Addax Petroleum-Genel Enerji. At first, the Oil Ministry denied the story, but later confirmed it. The Tawke field will be able to connect to the Kirkuk-Turkey pipeline, while Taq Taq would truck its oil to that line until an extension was built. In total, both were expected to add 70,000 barrels a day immediately. The KRG claims that they have the potential of 250,000 barrels down the road. All of the profits from these fields would be deposited in the Development Fund for Iraq, which is controlled by Baghdad. This comes just at a time when Iraq’s revenues have plummeted, and it is expecting a budget deficit that could grow to $25 billion unless it boosts oil production.
There’s one major hitch however. The Oil Ministry has said that the Kurds can export their oil, but that it will not pay the companies. That means the Kurdish government will have to. The KRG has signed production sharing agreements with the oil businesses, which generally pay between 18-20% of production. The Kurds receive all of their money from the central government, and have no independent means of garnering revenue, so they will be hard pressed to compensate DNO, Addax and Genel Enerji. The KRG is acting like this is a done deal, but those three oil companies issued a press release saying that they are not moving forward until the finances are straightened out.
Something very similar occurred in November 2008. Then the Oil Minister was trying to work out a deal over those same Taq Taq and Tawke fields to export. The negotiations began in June 2008, and seemed to be on the verge of coming to fruition that winter when things fell apart. Baghdad demanded that the Kurds void all their oil contracts that they signed after they passed their own oil law in August 2007, while the KRG wanted a share of the profits. The negotiations collapsed in December as a result.
In the on-going dispute between Baghdad and the KRG, it appears that the Kurds have been outplayed for the time being. The central government would love to add Kurdish oil production to their coffers, especially if they don’t have to pay anything. However this may be a short lived victory as the Oil Ministry is under intense pressure to either boost production immediately or give up its authority over petroleum because of the dire financial situation of the government. At a May oil and gas summit in Houston, Texas for example, oil executives, analysts, advisers, and the former Oil Minister all said that international companies would not invest in Iraq until a national oil law was passed, and the government offers better terms on its contracts. Iraq’s Oil Minister Hussein al-Shahristani was also given a petition signed by 140 members of Iraq’s parliament collected by the Oil and Gas Committee calling for him to appear and answer questions on why his policies have failed. Vice President Adel Abdul-Mahdi of the Supreme Council also publicly criticized Minister Shahristani for failing to increase output this month. Oil analysts also believe that while the Kurds might be frustrated in their effort to expand their oil industry in the short term, it is adding even more pressure on the central government to allow them to export. In April 2009 Iraq exported 1.82 million barrels a day. The Oil Minister’s goal is 2 million barrels. The KRG’s claim that they can add 250,000 barrels a day would achieve that amount.
The Kurds hope of exporting oil seems closer now than ever before. As long as oil prices remain low, there will be intense pressure on Baghdad to boost production. The Oil Ministry has proven incapable of doing that. As reported before, oil output has gone up and down since the invasion, and has never achieved the benchmarks set by the government. All sides, the Kurds, parliament, international oil companies, etc, have criticized Oil Minister Shahristani. He has the backing of Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki however. With a massive budget deficit expected, all of this is coming to a head. Of course, this being Iraq, it’s just as likely that the issue will be deadlocked for months and months as find a resolution.
For more on Iraq’s oil industry click on the “oil” label below.
SOURCES
Abbas, Mohammed, “Iraq Central Gov’t, Kurdistan Agree Oil Exports (UPDATE 2),” Reuters, 11/28/08
AFX News Limited, “Kurdish Authorities Stand by Foreign Oil Contracts,” 12/2/08
Ali, Mohanad, “Five committees set up to solve differences over oil with Kurds,” Azzaman, 11/30/08
Alsumaria, “Kurdistan leader upholds Iraq Constitution,” 3/13/09
Amara, Mostafa, “Kurds cannot collect oil royalties, says minister,” Azzaman, 12/22/08
Arabian Business, “Iraq in breakthrough to link Kurd oilfields to export,” 11/25/08
Bayoumy, Yara and Rasheed, Ahmed, “Iraq officials attack Oil Ministry, urge new policy,” Reuters, 5/16/09
Bergin, Tom, “UPDATE 1-Iraq Kurd leader eyes 1 mln bpd oil in 3 yrs,” Reuters, 3/12/09
Ciszuk, Samuel, “KRG-Baghdad still at odds over IOC pay,” Iraq Oil Report, 3/25/09
- “No clarity on Iraq-KRG oil export flap,” Iraq Oil Report, 5/13/09
- “Taq-Taq aim is 180K bpd despite no export rights,” Iraq Oil Report, 3/25/09
Hafidh, Hassan, “2nd UPDATE:Iraq Vice Pres: Not Doing Enough To Up Oil Output,” Zawya Dow Jones, 5/16/09
- “UPDATE: Iraq April Oil Exports 1.82M B/d, Up 0.33% On Month,” Dow Jones, 5/3/09
Hafidh, Hassan and Swartz, Spencer, “Iraq Ends Ban, Allows Kurds to Export Oil,” Wall Street Journal, 5/11/09
Hamad, Qassim Khidhir, “oil dispute threatens Iraqi economy,” Niqash, 4/16/09
Helman, Christopher and Bogan, Jesse, “The Failure Game Of Iraqi Oil,” Forbes, 5/13/09
Hilterman, Joost, “Kurdish crude bails out Baghdad,” The Argument Blog, Foreign Policy.com, 5/13/09
Ibrahim, Waleed, “UPDATE 4-Kurds say will launch oil exports, Iraq denies,” Reuters, 5/8/09
International Crisis Group, “Oil For Soil: Toward A Grand Bargain On Iraq And The Kurds,” 10/28/08
Lando, Ben, “Iraq oil showdown,” Iraq Oil Report, 5/14/09
Reuters, “Iraq earns $60 billion from 2008 crude exports,” 1/5/09
- “Iraq Kurds to start Tawke crude exports June 1,” 5/8/09
Salaheddin, Sinan, “Iraqi Kurds to Begin Solo Exports of Crude Oil,” Associated Press, 11/28/08
Shattab, Ali, “Kurds illegally sell oil produced in their region, minister says,” Azzaman, 1/3/09
Sly, Liz, “Economic downturn finally hits Iraq,” Los Angeles Times, 5/11/09
UPI, “Baghdad, Erbil agree to some oil exports,” 11/24/08
- “Heritage confident of Iraqi exports,” 5/7/09
Zair, Kareem, “Iraqi Kurds say their region holds up to 45 billion barrels of oil,” Azzaman, 4/21/09
- “Kurds will not export oil unless they rescind deals with foreign firms, oil minister says,” Azzaman, 12/6/08
In early May the Iraqi central government seemingly authorized the KRG to export oil. This would begin on June 1 and come from the Tawke and Taq Taq fields. Those are the only two currently producing in Kurdistan, and are being developed by the Norwegian DNO and the Swiss-Canadian and Turkish joint venture Addax Petroleum-Genel Enerji. At first, the Oil Ministry denied the story, but later confirmed it. The Tawke field will be able to connect to the Kirkuk-Turkey pipeline, while Taq Taq would truck its oil to that line until an extension was built. In total, both were expected to add 70,000 barrels a day immediately. The KRG claims that they have the potential of 250,000 barrels down the road. All of the profits from these fields would be deposited in the Development Fund for Iraq, which is controlled by Baghdad. This comes just at a time when Iraq’s revenues have plummeted, and it is expecting a budget deficit that could grow to $25 billion unless it boosts oil production.
There’s one major hitch however. The Oil Ministry has said that the Kurds can export their oil, but that it will not pay the companies. That means the Kurdish government will have to. The KRG has signed production sharing agreements with the oil businesses, which generally pay between 18-20% of production. The Kurds receive all of their money from the central government, and have no independent means of garnering revenue, so they will be hard pressed to compensate DNO, Addax and Genel Enerji. The KRG is acting like this is a done deal, but those three oil companies issued a press release saying that they are not moving forward until the finances are straightened out.
Something very similar occurred in November 2008. Then the Oil Minister was trying to work out a deal over those same Taq Taq and Tawke fields to export. The negotiations began in June 2008, and seemed to be on the verge of coming to fruition that winter when things fell apart. Baghdad demanded that the Kurds void all their oil contracts that they signed after they passed their own oil law in August 2007, while the KRG wanted a share of the profits. The negotiations collapsed in December as a result.
In the on-going dispute between Baghdad and the KRG, it appears that the Kurds have been outplayed for the time being. The central government would love to add Kurdish oil production to their coffers, especially if they don’t have to pay anything. However this may be a short lived victory as the Oil Ministry is under intense pressure to either boost production immediately or give up its authority over petroleum because of the dire financial situation of the government. At a May oil and gas summit in Houston, Texas for example, oil executives, analysts, advisers, and the former Oil Minister all said that international companies would not invest in Iraq until a national oil law was passed, and the government offers better terms on its contracts. Iraq’s Oil Minister Hussein al-Shahristani was also given a petition signed by 140 members of Iraq’s parliament collected by the Oil and Gas Committee calling for him to appear and answer questions on why his policies have failed. Vice President Adel Abdul-Mahdi of the Supreme Council also publicly criticized Minister Shahristani for failing to increase output this month. Oil analysts also believe that while the Kurds might be frustrated in their effort to expand their oil industry in the short term, it is adding even more pressure on the central government to allow them to export. In April 2009 Iraq exported 1.82 million barrels a day. The Oil Minister’s goal is 2 million barrels. The KRG’s claim that they can add 250,000 barrels a day would achieve that amount.
The Kurds hope of exporting oil seems closer now than ever before. As long as oil prices remain low, there will be intense pressure on Baghdad to boost production. The Oil Ministry has proven incapable of doing that. As reported before, oil output has gone up and down since the invasion, and has never achieved the benchmarks set by the government. All sides, the Kurds, parliament, international oil companies, etc, have criticized Oil Minister Shahristani. He has the backing of Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki however. With a massive budget deficit expected, all of this is coming to a head. Of course, this being Iraq, it’s just as likely that the issue will be deadlocked for months and months as find a resolution.
For more on Iraq’s oil industry click on the “oil” label below.
SOURCES
Abbas, Mohammed, “Iraq Central Gov’t, Kurdistan Agree Oil Exports (UPDATE 2),” Reuters, 11/28/08
AFX News Limited, “Kurdish Authorities Stand by Foreign Oil Contracts,” 12/2/08
Ali, Mohanad, “Five committees set up to solve differences over oil with Kurds,” Azzaman, 11/30/08
Alsumaria, “Kurdistan leader upholds Iraq Constitution,” 3/13/09
Amara, Mostafa, “Kurds cannot collect oil royalties, says minister,” Azzaman, 12/22/08
Arabian Business, “Iraq in breakthrough to link Kurd oilfields to export,” 11/25/08
Bayoumy, Yara and Rasheed, Ahmed, “Iraq officials attack Oil Ministry, urge new policy,” Reuters, 5/16/09
Bergin, Tom, “UPDATE 1-Iraq Kurd leader eyes 1 mln bpd oil in 3 yrs,” Reuters, 3/12/09
Ciszuk, Samuel, “KRG-Baghdad still at odds over IOC pay,” Iraq Oil Report, 3/25/09
- “No clarity on Iraq-KRG oil export flap,” Iraq Oil Report, 5/13/09
- “Taq-Taq aim is 180K bpd despite no export rights,” Iraq Oil Report, 3/25/09
Hafidh, Hassan, “2nd UPDATE:Iraq Vice Pres: Not Doing Enough To Up Oil Output,” Zawya Dow Jones, 5/16/09
- “UPDATE: Iraq April Oil Exports 1.82M B/d, Up 0.33% On Month,” Dow Jones, 5/3/09
Hafidh, Hassan and Swartz, Spencer, “Iraq Ends Ban, Allows Kurds to Export Oil,” Wall Street Journal, 5/11/09
Hamad, Qassim Khidhir, “oil dispute threatens Iraqi economy,” Niqash, 4/16/09
Helman, Christopher and Bogan, Jesse, “The Failure Game Of Iraqi Oil,” Forbes, 5/13/09
Hilterman, Joost, “Kurdish crude bails out Baghdad,” The Argument Blog, Foreign Policy.com, 5/13/09
Ibrahim, Waleed, “UPDATE 4-Kurds say will launch oil exports, Iraq denies,” Reuters, 5/8/09
International Crisis Group, “Oil For Soil: Toward A Grand Bargain On Iraq And The Kurds,” 10/28/08
Lando, Ben, “Iraq oil showdown,” Iraq Oil Report, 5/14/09
Reuters, “Iraq earns $60 billion from 2008 crude exports,” 1/5/09
- “Iraq Kurds to start Tawke crude exports June 1,” 5/8/09
Salaheddin, Sinan, “Iraqi Kurds to Begin Solo Exports of Crude Oil,” Associated Press, 11/28/08
Shattab, Ali, “Kurds illegally sell oil produced in their region, minister says,” Azzaman, 1/3/09
Sly, Liz, “Economic downturn finally hits Iraq,” Los Angeles Times, 5/11/09
UPI, “Baghdad, Erbil agree to some oil exports,” 11/24/08
- “Heritage confident of Iraqi exports,” 5/7/09
Zair, Kareem, “Iraqi Kurds say their region holds up to 45 billion barrels of oil,” Azzaman, 4/21/09
- “Kurds will not export oil unless they rescind deals with foreign firms, oil minister says,” Azzaman, 12/6/08
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