Current Baghdad-Kurdistan Dispute A Replay Of 2008 Khanaqin Incident

Today, the Iraqi Army and the Kurdish peshmerga are facing off across the disputed areas of northern Iraq, while politicians in Baghdad and Irbil are in a heated war of words. The point of contention is the new Tigris Operations Command created by Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki. The recent events are almost an exact replay of 2008 when the central government confronted the Kurdish parties in Diyala province. Both appeared aimed at shoring up the premier’s standing with the electorate before provincial elections. Regional President Massoud Barzani also benefited as he rallied the Kurdish parties behind him. On the outside these confrontations looked like they could escalate into open warfare, but they were more political theater than anything else.

(New York Times)

Diyala province in northeastern Iraq contains several disputed territories, including the Khanaqin district along the Iranian border. Kurdish forces occupied the area during the 2003 invasion, and they were later asked by the central government to help with security there. In 2008, Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki selected that district as the place to confront the Kurds. First, he started setting up Tribal Support Councils across the province. They were supposed to help out with security, but were actually a way for the premier to create patronage networks throughout Iraq. Kurdish politicians interpreted the councils in Diyala as a way to undermine their hold on the disputed territories before the 2009 provincial elections. The Kurdish mayor of Khanaqin for example, said that the councils were a threat, and a way for Maliki to assert his power in the district. In April, the 34^th Peshmerga Brigade was told to vacate the district by the 5^th Army Division who said it would take over responsibility for security, but it was rebuffed. Again, the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) saw this as a provocative move by the prime minister. Then in July, Baghdad launched Operation Omens of Prosperity in Diyala, which was to focus upon insurgents. As part of it, the 1st Army Division moved into Khanaqin at the beginning of August. The unit demanded that the 34^th Peshmerga Brigade vacate the area within 24 hours, but it refused. The soldiers then attempted to force out several Kurdish political parties and the peshmerga from their offices. This led to a tense standoff between the two sides with army forces standing on one side flying the Iraqi flag, and the peshmerga on the other flying the Kurdish flag. The next month, Iraqi police tried to arrest a Kurdish intelligence officer in the district, which led to an argument, and shots being fired, which killed a peshmerga. At the time, this growing escalation by Maliki against the Kurds in Diyala was seen as a dire threat to the status quo in the country. The Kurdish and Shiite ruling parties had long-standing alliances dating back to the Saddam times when they were both opposed to his dictatorship. Now the prime minister seemed to be threatening those ties by pushing the KRG over a small district. Many thought this could explode into open warfare between the central and regional government, and had far ranging affects throughout northern Iraq.

The incidents in Khanaqin spilled over into other provinces in the region. In Ninewa, the prime minister was accused of replacing Kurdish units with Arab ones, and attempting to transfer Kurdish officers out of an army division there. 200 Kurdish soldiers and a battalion commander in the province ended up deserting, and left for Irbil. A Kurdish army brigade in Diyala refused to take orders from Baghdad as well. Finally, the premier removed two leading Kurdish officials from the team that was negotiating a Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) with the United States in August. Again, these were all seen as provocative moves by the Kurdish ruling parties. Many interpreted it as a mini-Arabization program by Maliki, which harkened back to the much more vicious and institutionalized Arabization campaign by Saddam when he forcibly uprooted Kurdish villagers from northern Iraq to be replaced by Arabs from other parts of the country.

This culminated in a war of words between Maliki and the KRG President Massoud Barzani. Kurdish officials began calling the prime minister the new Saddam. A Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) lawmaker in the Kurdish parliament told the press that Baathism was alive and well in Baghdad, and that it was trying to abrogate Article 140 of the Constitution that set out a process to determine the future of the disputed territories. (1) These verbal attacks went on for nearly a year after the Khanaqin incident at the beginning of August. It ended up having a lasting affect upon how Barzani’s KDP would see Maliki. From then on, it thought he could no longer be trusted. The feeling was that with the insurgency and militias receding in the country, the central government would repeat its long history of turning on the Kurds. This opinion played out all the way to the 2010 parliamentary elections when Barzani amongst other Iraqi politicians unsuccessfully tried to place limits upon Maliki’s power when putting together a new government.

The dispute in Diyala was eventually ended with help from the United States military, and direct talks between Irbil and Baghdad. President Barzani ended up travelling to Baghdad where he worked out a deal for Khanaqin to be placed under local police control instead of the Iraqi Army or peshmerga. The U.S. military commander in Iraq, General Raymond Odierno also helped create joint U.S.-Iraqi-Kurdish checkpoints throughout the disputed territories to get the two sides to work together on security. He also negotiated a ministerial committee to bring the top security officials from Baghdad and Irbil together. Those moves effectively diffused the tension, and the two sides went back to their normal business. It still raised fears that the situation could have gotten out of control, and some soldier or commander on the ground in Khanaqin could have made a bad decision that would have led to fighting between the army and peshmerga.

Kurdish tanks parked outside of Kirkuk, Dec. 2012 (Reuters)

Today, a very similar standoff is happening in the disputed areas. In July 2012, the Defense ministry announced the formation of the Tigris Operations Command. It would command both the army and police in Diyala, Tamim, and Salahaddin. By September, the Kurdish parties became increasingly critical of the new command, calling it illegal, provocative, and a threat to Article 140. In November, there was a shootout between the Iraqi army and police and a peshmerga unit in Tuz Kharmato in Salahaddin when there was an attempt to arrest a Kurdish businessman accused of smuggling oil. One person ended up dead, and ten were wounded. That led the central and regional governments to once again mobilize their forces and send them to the disputed territories. That same month, Barham Saleh of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) said that Maliki wanted to take the Kurds back to Saddam’s times. In a December 2 addition of Azzaman, President Barzani stated that the KRG would not allow Maliki to moves his forces into the disputed areas, and called him a dictator. The next day, the Peshmerga Ministry accused Maliki of arming Arab tribes in Ninewa, Diyala, and Tamim. Once again, the U.S. military was also brought in to help negotiate between the two sides. The events in 2012 are very similar to those in 2008. The prime minister made a provocative military move, which the Kurds saw as a threat to their claim to the disputed areas. Like 2008, they have sent their forces to stare down the central government’s. Like the dispute in Diyala, Kurdish officials have started making comparisons between Maliki and Saddam, and like then, the U.S. military has been asked to be an honest broker. The politics of the two are comparable too.

Both the present and past confrontations come before provincial elections in Iraq. On Maliki’s side, he is playing upon Arab nationalism, and trying to portray himself as standing up against Kurdish expansionism. This plays well with some Sunnis in northern Iraq who feel threatened by the Kurds. The Arab bloc in Tamim for example, welcomed the Tigris Operations Command, saying that it would reduce the power of the peshmerga. A parliamentarian from the Iraqi National Movement also stood up for the command. This was exactly the same stance that the prime minister took in 2008. Then, he was changing his image from the weak and compromise premier that took power in 2006, to the strong nationalist leader who took on Moqtada al-Sadr’s Mahdi Army in Basra and Baghdad, and then the Kurds. Just like today, some Sunni parties came to Maliki’s side over the Khanaqin incident like when a lawmaker from the Iraqi Accordance Front demanded that the peshmerga withdraw from Diyala. The benefits of these standoffs have not been one sided. President Barzani has gained political points as well. In each case, he strengthened his image as the protector of Kurdish interests. Today, he has rallied the Kurdish press, opposition parties, and the PUK behind him. This was especially important, because the opposition and PUK had become increasingly critical of Barzani’s unilateral policies beforehand. In fact, despite the news reports of possible armed conflict, it seems like the true motivations behind both incidents is political gain before upcoming elections.

Khanaqin and the Tigris Operations Command are eerily similar. In 2008, Prime Minister Maliki decided to militarily challenge the Kurds in the disputed territories. This immediately led to the KRG to call out the peshmerga, and a tense situation ensued where armed forces stared at each other over open ground, and insults were tossed around in the press. This raised fears that the central and regional governments were on the verge of war. Almost the exact same series of events are now occurring over the Tigris Operations Command. The emphasis upon the threat of violence however, misses the more important political side. In both cases, Prime Minister Maliki and President Barzani have been trying to expand their constituencies by saying that they are standing up to the other. The hope is that this will result in votes in the next round of provincial balloting. The military side of things is just the show. Behind the scenes, these two leaders are playing the real game as they use the fears about each other to build up more support.

FOOTNOTES

1. Aswat al-Iraq, “Provincial elections, Khanaqin conspiracy against Kurds – official,” 9/9/08

SOURCES

Abouzeid, Rania, “Arabs-Kurd Tensions Could Threaten Iraq’s Peace,” Time, 3/24/09

Ahmed, Hevidar, “Kurdish Parties Seen United Against Dijla Forces’ Push into Kirkuk,” Rudaw, 11/20/12

Alsabawi, Jasim, “Politicians in Baghdad say Kurdish Fears of Dijla Forces Unfounded,” Rudaw, 11/17/12

Alsumaria, “Peshmerga accuses Iraq MP of ‘arming’ Arab tribes,” 12/3/12

Arraf, Jane, “Kurdish-Iraqi government talks collapse amid fear of civil war,” Christian Science Monitor, 11/30/12

Aswat al-Iraq, “Military units should be under central govt. control,” 8/19/08

- “Provincial elections, Khanaqin conspiracy against Kurds – official,” 9/9/08

- “Withdrawal of Kurdish forces from Khanqeen asserts security in Diala – MP,” 8/13/08

Azzaman, “Kurdish leader lashes out at Iraqi premier, says he will not ‘surrender,’” 12/2/12

Bartu, Peter, “Wrestling with the integrity of a nation: the disputed internal boundaries in Iraq,” International Affairs, November 2010

Dagher, Sam, “Fractures in Iraq City as Kurds and Baghdad Vie,” New York Times, 10/28/08

Eisenstadt, Michael, “Populism, Authoritarianism, and National Security in al-Maliki’s Iraq,” Washington Institute for Near East Studies, 5/12/09

Garicia-Navarro, Lourdes, “Standoff In Iraqi City,” Morning Edition, NPR, 9/22/08

Gause, Gregory, “Gause: Maliki’s bid to be the strong man,” Abu Aardvark, 9/3/08

Gordon, Michael and Lehren, Andrew, “Tensions High Along Kurdish-Arab Line,” New York Times, 10/23/10

Hiltermann, Joost, “Everyone wants a piece of Kirkuk, the golden prize,” The National, 2/26/09

 

International Crisis Group, “Iraq and the Kurds: Trouble Along the Trigger Line,” 7/8/09

Krauss, Joseph, “Tribal power stokes fears in fractured Iraqi province,” Agence France Presse, 12/10/08

Kurdish Globe, “Peshmarga not withdrawing from Diala,” 8/15/08

Kurdistan Tribune, “’Maliki wants to take Kurdistan back to pre-1991’ – Barham Salih,” 11/19/12

Lawrence, Quil, “A precarious peace in Northern Iraq,” The Middle East Research and Information Project, 10/1/09

Mahmood, Nawzad, “Tension Easing after Standoff between Peshmerga and Iraqi Troops in Dibis,” Rudaw, 11/27/12

National Iraqi News Agency, “Kurdistan Parliament: the formation of Dijlah Operations Command, unconstitutional,” 11/8/12

- “Maliki warns Peshmerga from approaching to the armed forces,” 11/19/12

Parker, Sam, “Maliki the strongman?” Abu Muqawama, 9/5/08

Rubin, Alissa, “Rejection of Oil Law and Move to Create Tribal Councils Add to Tensions With Kurds,” New York Times, 10/28/08

Russo, Claire, “The Maliki Government Confronts Diyala,” Institute for the Study of War,” 9/23/08

Shafaq News, “PUK: Dijla operations recruit 3,000 Arab soldiers and urge them to move to Kirkuk,” 11/4/12

Sky, Emma, “Preventing Arab-Kurd Conflict in Iraq after the Withdrawal of U.S. Forces,” United States Institute of Peace, 3/22/11

Sowell, Kirk, “Inside Iraqi Politics No. 43,” 8/2/12

- “Inside Iraqi Politics No. 50,” 11/21/12

Stansfield, Gareth Anderson, Liam, “Kurds in Iraq: the struggle between Baghdad and Erbil,” Middle East Policy, Spring 2009

Zagros, Roman, “the iraq – kurdish military stand off: and the winner is…,” Niqash, 11/29/12

How Ambassador Khalilzad Walked Into A Turf War Between The State And Defense Departments As He Tried to Find A New Path For The United States In Iraq In 2005

In June 2005, Zalmay Khalilzad returned to Iraq as the new U.S. Ambassador replacing John Negroponte. Khalilzad originally worked on Iraq in 2003 as the special presidential envoy to the Iraqi opposition. When he came back to the country things were not going well. The opposition to the United States had turned into a full-blown insurgency, and America’s policy seemed adrift. The reconstruction effort was focused upon large infrastructure projects, which had not improved the lives of average Iraqis, while the military strategy was to get out as quickly as possible. The political rhetoric was about victory, but there was no actual ideas on how to achieve it, and was contradicted by the withdrawal plans. Khalilzad, like his predecessor ordered an immediate review of the situation, and came up with a new strategy. Unfortunately, because of in fighting back in Washington the ambassador’s ideas were not fully implemented until two years later. This pointed to the dysfunction and disconnect between the White House and those in the field in Iraq, which undermined what the U.S. was hoping to accomplish.

Ambassador Khalilzad entered Iraq during a time of transition for American policy. Both the State and Defense Departments were carrying out their own separate reviews. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld sent retired General Gary Luck to Iraq to go over the training program for the Iraqi security forces. He said the program needed to be greatly expanded. As a result, the Iraq Security Forces Fund was given $5.7 billion. New Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice dispatched Ambassador Richard Jones, who worked for the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) to Baghdad as well. He characterized Iraq as a failed state. The U.S. was not helping, because its staff had little interaction with Iraqis. After the CPA closed shop it shut down its regional offices, and withdrew its advisers from Iraq’s ministries. By 2005, most of the American civilian staff was holed up in the Green Zone with smaller contingents in four regional bases. Jones recommended that the reconstruction effort be shifted from the CPA’s emphasis upon large capital projects like power plants to capacity building within the Iraqi government. Those projects were not having an affect upon the daily lives of Iraqis either in terms of services, security or employment. Not only that, but also many facilities the U.S. was building were too large and advanced for the Iraqis to maintain. As a result, many were failing apart, because the locals did not have the skills, management, spare parts or supplies to run them. Jones also noted that the American embassy staff had to get out into the field, and work hand in hand with their Iraqi counterparts. These reviews pointed to the two separate policies that the United States was simultaneously following in Iraq. The Pentagon wanted to build up Iraqi forces, so that it could withdraw as soon as possible. The State Department on the other hand, was trying to finish the rebuilding job that the CPA had started; while at the same time was attempting to transform the American presence to a regular diplomatic one despite the on-going insurgency. The two agencies were also rivals dating back to the beginning of the Bush Administration, partially based upon the personal dislike between Rumsfeld and former Secretary of State Colin Powell. The Defense Secretary had even less respect for Rice, making him even more unwilling to cooperate with the diplomatic wing of the American government when she took over. Khalilzad walked into the middle of this bureaucratic turf war, and tried to find a middle ground that would help stabilize Iraq.

Khalilzad ordered his own review upon his return to Iraq in the summer of 2005. His major concern was defeating the insurgency. He thought that the Sunni community had been shut out of the new Iraq, because they were associated with the old regime. Instead of being excluded, he thought they needed to be involved in the political process as a way to reconcile with them, and help end the fighting. All of the political, economic, and reconstruction policies needed to be focused upon this sole priority. Khalilzad created the Civil Military Strategic Planning group to go over what was already in place in Iraq. It found that Gen. Casey’s plans to turn over security to the Iraqis and withdraw would fail. It also criticized the lack of cooperation between the American civilians and military, and the exclusion of Iraqis from much of their work. It advocated for a coordinated counterinsurgency strategy that would use all of the U.S. resources in the country, along with the Iraqi government. This became known as the oil spot approach, which was extrapolated upon by Andrew Krepinevich in a winter 2005 issue of Foreign Affairs. Krepinevich was a former Army officer who went on to become a defense analyst and Executive Director of the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments and professor at George Mason University. One of his specialties was the Vietnam War. Based upon that history, he advocated a counterinsurgency plan for Iraq that would focus upon securing and rebuilding specific strategic locations in Iraq such as Baghdad to defeat local militants, and win over the support of the population. Once one area was secured, the oil spot would spread to the next, until eventually the whole country could be covered. Unfortunately for Khalilzad, he didn’t have the authority to remake Iraq policy, especially on the military side, but he could change the reconstruction plans. As a result of his new ideas, the ambassador ordered a freeze on all rebuilding work, and another review of each project to make sure that it would support his counterinsurgency plan. Parts of these ideas would be later taken up by the Surge in 2007. The problem as ever was the lack of coordination between the various U.S. agencies, and the inter-office rivalries, which made that so difficult to accomplish. 

Khalilzad moved ahead with his ideas anyway, and created two new organizations in Iraq to try to put them in action. The first was the Provincial Reconstruction Development Councils. These were started in the spring of 2005 and were Iraq-American working groups to build capacity in the country’s provincial governments. They were set up in 15 of Iraq’s 18 provinces, excluding the three in Kurdistan. They came up with lists of projects, which were meant to empower Iraqis, improve their living standards, and help turn local support to the government. The other group was the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs). This was a concept that Khalilzad had helped implement when he was ambassador in Afghanistan from 2003-2005. These were joint American civilian-military organizations meant to help implement and support the plans created by the Councils. Immediately the PRTs ran into problems, because of the disputes between the State and Defense Departments. There were arguments over who would fund them, who would lead them, and how security would be provided. As a result, the first PRTs were put out in the field before they had the necessary budget, transportation, protection, and staff. The PRT in Ninewa for example, had no protection, housing or way to get around the province. It had to move into Forward Operating Base Marez, and rely upon the U.S. military unit there for almost everything. It took one year for lawyers from the Pentagon and State Department to work out an agreement about how the two departments would cooperate in Iraq. In the meantime, the PRTs would have to trudge ahead despite their limitations. Here was the first specific example of the difficulties Khalilzad would find trying to transform Iraq policy. He and his staff had come up with some good ideas, but implementing them would be another issue all together. Washington was divided, and the ambassador all the way in Baghdad would be a victim of their disagreements.

The differences between Sec of Def Rumsfeld (left) and Sec of State Rice (right) helped retard changing Iraq policy (AP)

Those differences over Iraq strategy within the White House immediately became apparent. Rumsfeld and General Casey were opposed to Khalilzad’s new ideas. Their top priority remained to get out of Iraq as quickly as possible. Secretary Rice on the other hand, became an advocate for her ambassador’s approach. On October 19, 2005, she testified to a Senate committee advocating for a Clear Hold Build plan, which was another name for the oil spot approach. Rumsfeld immediately contradicted and criticized her statements. He said, “Anyone who takes those three words and thinks it means the United States should clear and the United Sates should hold and the United should build doesn’t understand the situation. It is the Iraqis country. They’ve got 28 million people there. They are clearing, they are holding, they are building. They’re going to be the ones doing the reconstruction in that country.” Despite those objections, President Bush backed his Secretary of State as Clear Hold Build was included in the White House’s National Strategy for Victory in Iraq in November. That didn’t stop the bickering however, as Rice and Rumsfeld still battled over planning, and refused to cooperate in Iraq. It wouldn’t be until the Pentagon chief was pushed out at the end of 2006 that things would begin to change. Khalilzad’s new ideas would suffer as a result.

On the ground in Iraq there were small movements in a new direction. First, reconstruction funds began to be shifted away from the large capital projects once pushed by the CPA to smaller ones that would be more visible to Iraqis, and hopefully have an immediate impact upon their lives. This was to be accomplished by pushing for the employment of Iraqis, using Iraqi contractors wherever possible, and including local Iraqi officials and government in the planning and implementation. There were still major hurdles to overcome. Iraqis for example did not understand American contracting procedures, and much of the bidding was supposed to be done on line, which was difficult for many Iraqi businesses. There were still disputes in Washington over the PRTs as well, so they had to trudge ahead often lacking the right personnel and funding to carry out their tasks.

From 2003-2007 the United States followed an ad hoc and dysfunctional policy in Iraq. There was a lack of planning and innovative ideas in Washington, and a disconnect between what was said publicly by the Bush Administration, and what was actually happening on the ground. The President’s constant statements about victory in Iraq were not supported by the strategy being implemented on the ground. Rather then defeating the insurgency, the Pentagon was set on withdrawing, and the State Department was trying to pull back to the embassy in Baghdad. Ambassador Khalilzad immediately noted how things were failing in Iraq, and tried to right the ship. Unfortunately for him, his ideas were only supported by his superior Secretary Rice, who was unable to convince Secretary Rumsfeld to change course. The results were small changes on the ground like in the types of projects started, and the creation of two new organizations to work with the Iraqis more closely, but there was still not the full support, funding, nor coordination necessary from Washington to make it a success. Iraq would descend into further chaos and become a failed state for another year and a half before the Americans course would change.

SOURCES

Kakutani, Michiko, “Rumsfeld’s Defense of Known Decisions,” New York Times, 2/3/11

Krepinevich, Andrew, “How to Win in Iraq,” Foreign Affairs, September/October 2005

PBS Frontline, “INTERVIEWS Elisabeth Bumiller,” Bush’s War, 3/24/08

Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, Hard Lessons, 1/22/09

Weisman, Steven, “The Struggle For Iraq: Diplomacy; Rice, Testy Hearing, Cites Progress in Iraq,” New York Times, 10/20/05

Cracks Appear In New Oil Deal Between Baghdad and The Kurdistan Regional Government

In September 2012, the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) and Baghdad came to their third agreement over the former exporting its oil. The previous two times, the deals broke down over disputes over paying the energy companies operating in northern Iraq. The problem stems from the fact that the central government wants control over oil policy and contracts, which comes into conflict with the KRG’s wish to have their own strategy. That unresolved issue is coming to the fore again as the Kurds dramatically cut their exports at the end of November. This could eventually lead to the breakdown of the latest agreement between the two sides.

In November, the Kurdish regional government decided to reduce its oil exports. According to the state-run North Oil Company, the KRG was only pumping 70,000-80,000 barrels a day by the end of the month through the northern pipeline to Turkey. Before that, Oil Minister Abdul Karim Luaibi told the press on October 4 that the Kurds had reached 170,000 barrels a day. For the month, the region averaged 146,000. That was below its 200,000 barrel a day quota that it was supposed to reach that month. Deputy Premier Hussein Shahristani, who is in charge of Baghdad’s energy policy, said that payments to the oil companies working in northern Iraq would be stopped, because the KRG was not meeting its mark. The recent drop in exports then, was likely due to fears that Baghdad will follow through with Shahristani’s threats. At the same time, it appears that the KRG lacks the capacity currently to maintain its export levels, and meet its quota. Officials such as Shahristani, who has been at the forefront of opposition to the Kurds’ independent energy policy, have used this fact against them. Kurdistan may be stuck in a Catch 22 in this situation as a result. It could continue to pump oil at its current rate, but it would know that would be below its mark. Baghdad would constantly hang that over its head, and use it as an excuse not to make any payments.

Baghdad and Irbil are currently in the midst of their third oil deal. On April 1, the KRG halted its exports claiming that Baghdad owed $1.5 billion to oil businesses there. Then on August 7, Kurdistan restarted sending oil through the northern pipeline in hopes that it would renew talks with the central government. That eventually happened with a verbal agreement between the two on September 15. The KRG would export 140,000 barrels a day for September, then 200,000 barrels for the rest of the year. At the time, it was pumping 120,000 barrels. In return, the central government agreed to pay companies in Kurdistan $858.3 million. Each one of the previous agreements have started and ended the same way. There is great fanfare that this is a breakthrough for the two sides, but then Baghdad fails to deliver. On the one hand, the central government welcomes Kurdish exports, because they help it towards achieving its production goals and raises money. The deals also reinforce Baghdad’s position that it should be in charge of oil policy, and that the Kurds have to go through it. At the same time, the government of Nouri al-Maliki is opposed to the KRG’s independent oil contracts. It therefore regularly withholds payments to punish Kurdistan for following its own path.

This series of short-term deals is frustrating for the companies operating in the KRG. Genel Enerji and DNO for example, which operate the Taq Taq and Tawke fields threatened to stop foreign sales through the northern pipeline in early October, because they had not been paid yet. Together, the two firms were responsible for 110,000 barrels of Kurdistan’s 146,000 barrels of exports in October. The Finance Ministry eventually sent just over $500 million to the KRG later that month, which was distributed to DNO at the beginning of December. Kurdish authorities promised that the second installment was to arrive soon afterward, but then later press reports said that it wasn’t going to be until early 2013. Now there are questions about whether it would happen at all due to Deputy Premier Shahristani’s threat. In total, DNO has only been paid $104 million in June 2011 and $60 million in September 2011, and will receive $116 million this month for all of its exports since 2008. Oil companies in Kurdistan are waiting for a national hydrocarbon law to be passed, so that there are no more conflicts over their operations. That would allow them to legally export, and be able to monetize their investments. Until then, the firms have to rely upon these unreliable short-term export contracts where they only get paid for a fraction of their work.

The third export deal between Iraq’s central and regional governments is still in effect, but it is fraying at the edges. The Kurds are sending oil through the northern pipeline again, and they have received half a million dollars to pay the companies that are operating there. At the same time, it is not meeting its quota, and Baghdad has once again threatened to cut off payments. The two sides are still far apart on oil policy, and that will continue to lead to tension and breakdowns in these agreements. If the current one ends, and there are plenty of signs that it eventually will, it will be followed by another. The Kurds need these deals with Baghdad to show the energy companies that they will eventually be able to get a full return on their investments. The central government welcomes the Kurdish contributions, because it brings in more money and boosts its monthly export numbers. The problems rise from the fact that Baghdad holds the purse, and will continuously hold this over the head of the Kurds until their differences over oil are resolved. Their positions are so far apart however, that this will not come anytime soon, so for the foreseeable future official Kurdish exports will be at the mercy of these volatile agreements.

SOURCES

Associated Press, “Iraq’s Kurds pledge to raise oil exports in 2013,” 10/22/12

Ersoy, Ercan and Razzouk, Nayla, “Iraq to Pay Kurdistan Oil Producers Next Week, Hawrami Says,” Bloomberg, 9/24/12

Kami, Aseel, “UPDATE 1-Oil exports from Iraq’s Kurdish region rise to 170,000 bpd,” Reuters, 10/4/12

Al-Khayat, Faleh, “Iraq’s oil output slumps by 200,000 b/d in October,” Platts, 11/28/12

Lee, John, “Tawke Export Payment Received by DNO,” Iraq Oil Report, 12/3/21

Mackey, Peg, “KRG gets oil payment from Baghdad, exports to flow,” Reuters, 10/8/12

Osgood, Patrick, “Kurdistan slashes oil exports over payment feud,” Iraq Oil Report, 11/29/12

Rahman, Mohammed Abdul, “Erbil and Baghdad agree on reimbursing oil companies,” AK News, 9/15/12

Razzouk, Nayla, “Iraq’s Kurds Say Crude Exports Rise to 140,000 Barrels a Day,” Bloomberg, 9/20/12

Reuters, “Genel could halt Kurdish oil exports over pay delay,” 10/5/12

- “UPDATE 1-Iraqi Kurdish oil exports down ‘significantly’-sources,” 11/27/12

Sabri, Abdullah, “Kurdistan may increase its oil exports to more than 250,000 bpd,” AK News, 9/19/12

Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, “Quarterly report to the United States Congress,” 10/30/12

Iraq’s Insurgency Tries To End November 2012 With A Bang

November 2012, looked like it was going to end well in terms of security. The Shiite religious ceremony of Ashura went off relatively peacefully with only one small bombing. Then at the end of the month there were two days of bombings and shootings across twelve cities in northern, central, and southern Iraq that broke the calm. That last flurry of violence seemed to boost the government’s numbers for the month above the previous one. The far more accurate and reliable Iraq Body Count however, recorded a five-month decline in casualties.

There were three different death counts for November, which showed different trends. The Iraqi ministries reported 166 killed for the month, up from 144 in October. Iraq Body Count’s early figure was 244 casualties, down from October’s 253. The Agence France Presse (AFP) wire service has also started its own count, and recorded 160 fatalities in November, up from the previous month’s 136. The cause for the jump in the government and AFP numbers was the string of attacks that occurred at the end of the month. On November 27, Iraq Body Count had four bombings and three shootings across Baghdad, Ramadi in Anbar province, Kirkuk and Hawija in Tamim, Mosul in Ninewa, Nasiriyah in Dhi Qar, and Buhriz in Diyala that cost 38 lives. Two days later, 49 were killed in Hilla in Babil, Karbala, Mosul, Taji in Salahaddin, and Abu Ghraib and Besmaya in Baghdad. Overall, all three organizations have been going in different directions. The government’s numbers have consistently gone up and down with 325 in July, 164 in August, 365 in September, 144 in October, and then 166 in November. AFP was showing a downward trend with 278 in August, 253 in September, 136 in October, before hitting November’s 160. Iraq Body Count on the other hand had a five-month decline from 523 in June to 461 in July to 403 in August, 363 in September, 253 in October, and 244 in November. Since AFP’s numbers are so close to the government’s, and low compared to Iraq Body Count’s it appears that they are both missing many of the smaller incidents that regularly occur throughout Iraq that might only kill 1-2 people each. 

Deaths In Iraq 2011-2012

Month	Iraq Body Count	Iraqi Ministries	Avg. Monthly Deaths	Avg. Daily Deaths
Jan. 2011	388	259	323	10.4
Feb.	251	167	209	7.4
Mar.	307	247	277	8.9
Apr.	287	211	249	8.3
May	378	177	277	8.9
Jun.	386	271	328	10.9
Jul.	305	259	282	9.0
Aug.	399	239	319	10.2
Sep.	396	185	290	9.6
Oct.	357	258	307	9.9
Nov.	273	187	230	7.6
Dec.	388	155	271	8.7
2011 Mo. Avg.	342	217	279	9.1
Jan. 2012	522	151	336	10.8
Feb.	355	150	252	8.7
Mar.	375	112	243	7.8
Apr.	370	126	248	8.2
May	293	132	212	6.8
Jun.	523	131	327	10.9
Jul.	461	325	393	12.6
Aug.	403	164	283	9.1
Sep.	363	365	364	12.1
Oct.	253	144	198	6.4
Nov.	244	166	205	6.8
2012 Mo. Avg.	378	178	278	9.1

Since Iraq Body Count captures more of the violence in the country than the other two, its numbers showed that the insurgent’s summer offensive is over. For the last several years militants have picked up their operations during the summer. Al Qaeda in Iraq’s leader Abu Bakr al-Bahgdadi dubbed this year’s campaign Breaking Walls in July. The results were immediately seen. The average number of daily deaths based upon Iraq Body Count and the government’s ministries went from 6.8 in May to 10.9 in June, 12.6 in July, 9.1 in August, and 12.1 in September before dropping to 6.4 in October and 6.8 in November. Next month will likely have low figures as well until January when the Shiite’s celebrate Arbayeen. Al Qaeda in Iraq has hit that pilgrimage the last several years. Then things will repeat again with a dip until the summer arrives. This has become the annual pattern in Iraq, and is unlikely to change without a dramatic re-alignment in the country’s politics that would offer Sunni insurgents a means to participate openly in society.

SOURCES

Agence France Presse, “Iraq Unrest AFP Count”

- “Iraq violence rose in November,” 12/1/12

Iraq Body Count

Al Jazeera, “Iraqi security officers killed in clashes,” 7/26/12

AL JAZEERA VIDEO: Iraq Attacks Leave Dozens Dead