Lack Of Commitment To Fight Corruption In Iraqi Government

As reported earlier, corruption within the Iraqi government is endemic. Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki has never been committed to fighting it because investigations make his government look bad. The U.S. has also been lackluster in pushing for oversight as well. Recent reports show that the situation has not gotten any better.

The New York Times for example, recently reported that Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki is secretly getting rid of anti-corruption officials. The article said that up to seventeen officials might have been pushed out or replaced recently. Seven to nine of them were inspector generals in ministries such as Water Resources, Culture, Trade, Youth and Sport, and perhaps Foreign Affairs, along with the Central Bank of Iraq, the Sunni Endowment, and the Christian Endowment. The Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR) confirmed at least six removals. Maliki supporters claim there is nothing behind the Prime Minister’s actions, while others are afraid that he will replace the officials with Dawa members or worse, it is a move to slowly end oversight within the government.

Anti-corruption investigations were already hobbled before Maliki’s recent actions. The main oversight agency, the Commission on Public Integrity recently announced that it had sent 337 cases to court in 2008. At the same time, only 86 people had been actually convicted, and most of those were very low-level officials who were mostly selling fake papers to Iraqis who wanted to flee the country. The Commission also noted that the Amnesty Law, which was supposed to promote reconciliation by releasing Sunnis from Iraqi jails, has also stopped investigations of 1,721 officials. That was more than half of its cases. The commission also doesn’t operate outside of Baghdad, severely limiting what it can and cannot do. Its previous head, Judge Rati al-Rathi constantly clashed with Maliki and ministers over investigations. Maliki demanded that all cases be okayed by him, and he often wanted them stopped. Rathi fled Iraq in 2007 due to threats, and was replaced by Judge Rahim al-Ogaili who supports getting rid of inspector generals. Rathi later told the U.S. House of Representatives in October 2007 that corruption cost Iraq $18 billion from 2004-2007.

Under the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) the United States set up Iraq’s oversight apparatus. Inspector Generals were created and appointed by the Americans in each Iraqi ministry and sub-ministries, along with the Board of Supreme Audit that was to oversee the budget, and the Commission on Public Integrity that was to investigate the entire government. The U.S. however was never committed to fighting corruption in the first place, and when sovereignty was turned over to the Iraqis, the situation became worse as none of the preceding governments were interested either.

For more on corruption in Iraq see:

Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction’s Quarterly October Report

Corruption and Reporting In Kurdistan

Iraqi Corruption Remains Endemic

Iraqi Corruption

SOURCES

Glanz, James and Mohammed, Riyadh, “Premier of Iraq Is Quietly Firing Fraud Monitors,” New York Times, 11/18/08

Kadhim, Abbas, “A Plan for Post-Surge Iraq,” Strategic Insights, November 2007

Reuters, “Iraq Says 300 Officials Charged With Corruption,” 11/18/08

Schoof, Renee, “Iraqi judge: Corruption undermines Iraq’s future,” McClatchy Newspapers, 10/4/07

Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, “Quarterly Report to the United States Congress,” 10/30/08

United Nations Humanitarian Report On Iraq

At the end of October 2008, the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs released its latest report on Iraq. The study covered the cholera outbreak, security, refugees and their return, the drought, and Iraq’s budget.

In 2008 the United Nations and non-government organizations (NGOs) increased their activities within Iraq due to the improved security situation. Together they have formed a Consolidated Appeals Process to fund humanitarian assistance to Iraqis. In 2008 this fund had $164,675,584, but it asked for $271,371,554. This money went towards refugees, health, shelter, water, sanitation, schools, and food aid. Overall, the U.N. believes that the situation within Iraq is moving from a country in crisis to fragile stability where violence is down and refugees are slowly returning.

Health

The first major issue the report covered was the health situation, namely the on-going cholera outbreak. The first case appeared in Maysan province in August 2008. Since then it has spread to twelve of Iraq’s eighteen provinces, including Anbar, Babil, Baghdad, Basra, Qadisiyah, Diyala, Irbil, Karbala, Muthanna, Najaf, and Wasit. The number of cases peaked on September 22 with 79 then decreased, only to pick up again in mid-October. The disease is a regular occurrence in the country with an average of 600 annual cases. As of November 4, there were 738 confirmed cases. By November 18 the Iraqi Health Ministry reported that number had increased to 900, but said it will no longer provide statistics because of concerns with the media, other ministries, and victims. There have also been eight deaths as a result. As reported earlier, the majority of cases have occurred in Babil. The major causes have been inadequate and deteriorating infrastructure, and official incompetence.

The United Nations and the Iraqi government have tried to respond to the crisis. The World Health Organization has provided support to Baghdad as well, which has set up 950 centers to monitor the outbreak. The Ministry of Health also has a Cholera Preparedness Plan at work. By November 13, they claimed that 99% of the cases in Babil and Qadisiyah had been cured.

Cholera Cases In Iraq As Of 11/4/08
Diyala: 1 district affected, first-last case 9/9/08 – 9/9/08, 1 case
Wasit: 1 district affected, first-last case 9/30/08 – 9/30/08, 2 cases
Irbil: 2 districts affected, first-last case 10/14/08 - 10/14/08, 2 cases
Maysan: 1 district affected, first-last case 8/7/08 - 8/28/08, 3 cases, 1 death
Anbar: 2 districts affected, first-last case 9/7/08 - 10/1/08, 8 cases
Muthanna: 1 district affected, first-last case 10/14/08 - 11/1/08, 10 cases
Najaf: 3 districts affected, first-last case 9/17/08 - 10/28/08, 33 cases, 5 under investigation
Karbala: 3 districts affected, first-last case 9/5/08 - 10/27/08, 55 cases, 4 under investigation
Basra: 5 districts affected, first-last case 8/18/08 - 10/6/08, 58 cases, 1 death, 2 under investigation
Baghdad: 12 districts affected, first-last case 9/20/08 - 11/3/08, 92 cases, 1 death, 1 under investigation
Qadisiyah: 4 districts affected, first-last case 8/28/08 - 11/2/08, 207 cases, 2 deaths, 44 under investigation
Babil: 4 districts affected, first-last case 8/7/08 - 11/3/08, 267 cases, 3 deaths
Totals: 39 districts affected, first-last case 8/7/08 - 11/3/08, 738 cases, 8 deaths, 56 under investigation

Security

The U.N. reported that the number of deaths in Iraq has decreased from September to October. In October there were 294 civilian deaths and 726 wounded compared to 332 killed and 867 wounded in September. The number of deaths is higher if unidentified bodies found on the streets are included. Most of the violence is concentrated in northern and central Iraq.

Casualties – October 2008

Iraqi Civilians: 294 killed, 726 wounded
Iraqi Security Forces: 79 killed, 195 wounded
Iraqi Officials: 8 killed, 8 wounded
Unidentified Bodies: 70
Insurgents/militiamen: 75 killed, 9 wounded
Awakening/Sons of Iraq: 8 killed, 5 wounded
TOTAL: 534 killed, 943 wounded

Security Incidents – October 2008
Kurdistan: Small Arms Fire: 1, Indirect Fire: 3, IED: 2, found: 1, TOTAL: 7
North: Small Arms Fire: 117, Indirect Fire: 4, RPG: 5, Hand Grenades: 23, IED: 165, VBIED: 7, Found: 73, TOTA: 394
North Central: Small Arms Fire: 79, Indirect Fire: 22, RPG: 7, Hand Grenades: 12, IED: 124, VBIED: 4, Found: 112, TOTAL: 360
Baghdad: Small Arms Fire: 50, Indirect Fire: 21, RPG: 1, Hand Grenades: 14, IED: 150, VBIED: 7, Found: 120, TOTL: 363
West: Small Arms Fire: 28, Indirect Fire: 5, Hand Grenades: 1, IED: 32, VBIED: 3, Found: 12, TOTAL: 92
South Central: Small Arms Fire: 28, Indirect Fire: 1, IED: 22, Found: 17, TOTAL: 68
South: Small Arms Fire: 14, Indirect Fire: 7, Hand Grenades: 1, IED: 16, Found: 16, TOTAL: 54
TOTAL: Small Arms Fire: 316, Indirect Fire: 60, RPG: 13, Hand Grenades: 51, IED: 509, VBIED: 21, Found: 361, TOTAL: 1338

Refugees

The third issue that the U.N. report dealt with was that of Iraq’s refugees. The latest mass exodus occurred in Mosul when Christians were attacked. Twelve were killed and approximately 2,465 families fled as a result. The Christians received leaflets, letters, text messages, messages painted on walls, and even announcements on loud speakers all telling them to leave. Several houses were destroyed, and 19 were robbed. Because some of these incidents happened in the middle of the day there is strong suspicion that the Kurds were behind the attacks. The fact that they occurred right after Christians began protesting the exclusion of an article in the provincial election law that would have given minorities a quota on provincial councils also adds a political element to the incident. The Christians in Mosul are caught between the Muslim Arabs and the Kurds who are vying for control. The Christians are a swing vote in the city and province, with both sides trying to gain their loyalties or intimidate them. There are reports that up to 500 families have come back to Mosul because of jobs or school, although on November 12 two Christian sisters were assassinated at their home.

In terms of the larger refugee crisis, the U.N. notes that the process of returning has begun. Although the number of families coming back is small, it is increasing. The government fully supports this and has launched a refugee program based upon encouraging Iraqis to go back to their residences. On September 1, 2008 Maliki issued Order 101 that said all squatters must vacate their premises. The order also set up refugee centers in Baghdad to assist with returns. Any family that registered with the authorities would receive one million dinars to help with their move. The centers are also supposed to help with any property disputes. The International Organization for Migration reported that 16,782 families (100,692 people) have gone back to Baghdad. Another 11,986 families have returned to other parts of the country, with 8,691 going back to Anbar and Diyala provinces. 92% of those are internal refugees. Some are not able to go back to their homes because they are occupied or destroyed, leading to further displacement. In Maysan province for example, 100% of returnees were not able to return to their homes, only to their original neighborhoods, while in Karbala it was the exact opposite. There 100% of families were able to get back into their houses. In Baghdad, which has seen the greatest displacement and returns, 91% were able to go back to their homes. In Diyala that number was 96% and in Anbar 97%. Many of these families still face large obstacles such as finding jobs, food, and shelter.

Iraqi Government Figures On Internally Displaced
Note: This is the number of families and people that have registered with the government. The actual numbers are probably higher.

Dohuk: Families: 18,706, Individuals: 104,824, 7% of total
Irbil: Families: 10,304, Individuals: 52,007, 4% of total
Sulaymaniya: Families: 14,585, Individuals: 80,935, 5% of total
Total North: Families: 43,595, Individuals: 237,766
Ninewa: Families: 19,100, Individuals: 106,623, 3.7% of total
Tamim: Families: 7,911, Individuals: 43, 623, 4.8% of total
Anbar: Families: 9,179, Individuals: 55, 716, 3.6% of total
Baghdad: Families: 90,731, Individuals: 550,099, 7.5% of total
Diyala: Families: 22,784, Individuals: 136,891, 8.5% of total
Salahaddin: Families: 7,790, Individuals: 45,614, 3.7% of total
Total Center: Families: 157,495, Individuals: 938,566
Babil: Families: 12,677, Individuals: 77,197, 4.5% of total
Basra: Families: 5,989, Individuals: 35,509, 1.8% of total
Qadisiyah: Families: 3,858, Individuals: 25,186, 2.5% of total
Karbala: Families: 10,921, Individuals: 70,709, 7.7% of total
Maysan: Families: 6,792, Individuals: 46,523, 5.5% of total
Muthanna: Families: 2,457, Individuals: 18,331, 2.9% of total
Najaf: Families: 10,087, Individuals: 57,716, 5.2% of total
Dhi Qar: Families: 7,066, Individuals: 47,423, 2.8% of total
Wasit: Families: 12,306, Individuals: 75,457, 6.9% of total
Total South: Families: 72,153, Individuals: 454,051
Grand Total: Families: 273,243, Individuals: 1,630,383

Drought

Iraq is facing the greatest water crisis in at least ten years. The northern provinces of Diyala, Ninewa, Dohuk, and Irbil have been affected the most. In the north, many farms rely upon rain for their crops. Wheat and barley production is estimated to be 51% lower than 2007 numbers as a result. Electricity and fuel shortages along with deteriorating infrastructure are also hampering the government’s response. Families in four districts have been displaced from mountainous regions because of the drought as well because they cannot support themselves. The Kurds have set up a special committee to deal with the problem, and five million dinars have been allocated to help with wells, pipes, etc. Water shortages in Sulaymaniyah have also led to many diarrhea cases, but no cholera so far. Iraq has seen a recent spate of rain, which might alleviate the situation.

Budget

The last issue covered is Iraq’s budget. The 2009 budget was just approved on November 12 and totals $67 billion. This is a decrease from the original proposal of $80 billion. The major reason for the cut is the rapidly declining price of oil. The budget will likely run a deficit as it was based upon a $62 a barrel price for oil, when world prices are currently around $50 a barrel. $52 billion of the budget will go to operational costs such as bills and salaries, with only $4.1 billion going towards the capital budget, which is used for investment in infrastructure. The budget cut will have an affect on humanitarian assistance provided by the government as well.

SOURCES

Alsumaria, “99% of cholera cases healed in Babel,” 11/13/08
- “Iraq Cabinet approves 2009 budget,” 11/12/08

Associated Press, “Iraq plans to cut 2009 budget by $13 billion,” 10/31/08

Azzaman, “Iraqi Oil Exports Receding by 100,000 Barrels a Day Every Month, Former Minister Says,” 11/19/08

Reuters, “Gunmen Kill Two Christian Sisters In Iraq’s Mosul,” 11/12/08

United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, “Iraq Humanitarian Update,” October 2008

United Nations’ World Food Program Report On Iraq

In November 2008 the United Nations’ World Food Program (WFP) released a report on the state of Iraq’s food situation. It found that those with inadequate access to food had gone down from 4 million in 2005 to 930,000 in 2008. This happened despite the increase in violence in the country, especially during the sectarian war period from 2006-2007. The reason for this decrease has been the massive food ration system the Iraqi government maintains, the largest in the world. The WFP and other groups are also providing aid. Without these handouts, up to 6.4 million people, one-quarter of the population, would lack adequate food. The rations are controlled by the Trade Ministry, which imports most of the goods.

The report warns that despite these gains, Iraq still has many problems; the thousands of internally displaced being a major one. The WFP called on Baghdad to improve its monitoring and services to the most vulnerable in Iraqi society. That may be harder in the future as Maliki’s government has plans to end the rations and move towards more of a welfare type system.

The World Food Program’s paper also provided statistics on the standard of living for Iraqis. They found poverty to be rampant across much of the country, which had a direct affect upon access to food. The WFP divided up Iraqis into five groups from richest to poorest. One district in Dhi Qar, Diyala, Irbil, Karbala, Muthanna, and Najaf, two in Sulaymaniya, half of Ninewa, and most of Maysan and Qadisiyah had populations 75-94% in the poorest group. One district in Basra, Karbala, and Najaf, one and a half districts in Salahaddin, two in Irbil, Muthanna, Ninewa, and Tamim, three in Maysan, half of Diyala, two-thirds of Karbala, most of Babil, Dhi Qar and Sulaymaniya, and all of Wasit had people 50-75% in the poorest group. In comparison there were only eight districts, and parts of four others that had 25% or less in poverty. The rural areas were also disproportionately impoverished compared to urban ones.

Wealth obviously has a direct affect upon the ability to obtain food, the major emphasis of the WFP report. They found that the poorest group had problems with food within a month 56% of the time. Even the richest group had problems 22%, while the entire country averaged 39%. In terms of the provinces, Karbala had the worst food situation with 82% of the residents facing food shortages, followed by Babil 77%, Najaf 70%, Qadisiyah 52%, and Dhi Qar 47%. It is no coincidence that these also happen to be some of the poorest provinces in the country and are concentrated in the south. At the other end of the spectrum, Sulaymaniya 14%, Diyala 15%, Basra 16%, and Irbil 17% had the least problems with food. Overall, 35% of the country had problems with their rations. The most vulnerable group were the internally displaced, 67% of which said they had not registered to receive their food rations when they moved. The World Food Program is providing help to 750,000 of these types of refugees.

In terms of jobs, the government was the largest employer, accounting for 37%. That was followed by self-employed, but not in farming at 25%, self-employed farmers at 14%, non-skilled labor at 11%, skilled labor 8%, and farm workers 4%. After wages, the largest source of income was remittances from relatives abroad pointing to the huge refugee population of Iraqis.

Below are some of those numbers from the World Food Program report.

Note: Most of the following are estimates based upon charts in the World Food Program’s Report on Iraq.

Wealth Index – Iraq Overall
Note: The World Food Program divided up Iraqi society into five wealth categories: poorest, second, third, fourth, richest.
- 20% in poorest group
- 20% in second group
- 23% in richest

Wealth Index – Urban vs Rural
Poorest: Urban 9% Rural 47%
Second: Urban 18% Rural 19%
Third: Urban 20% Rural 16%
Fourth: Urban 22% Rural 11%
Richest: Urban 35% Rural 5%

Wealth Index By Province – Richest To Poorest
Baghdad 5% poorest – 34% richest
Dohuk 17% poorest – 30% richest
Tamim 8% poorest – 23% richest
Irbil 13% poorest – 23% richest
Anbar 10% poorest – 22% richest
Basra 11% poorest – 21% richest
Sulaymaniya 15% poorest – 20% richest
Salahaddin 18% poorest – 18% richest
Karbala 27% poorest – 18% richest
Diyala 26% poorest – 15% richest
Ninewa 30% poorest – 17% richest
Muthanna 37% poorest – 17% richest
Dhi Qar 35% poorest – 15% richest
Maysan 30% poorest – 10% richest
Babil 35% poorest – 10% richest
Wasit 35% poorest – 8% richest
Qadisiyah 45% poorest – 8% richest

Wealth Index By Districts

Click on map for larger view

Numbers before each district match numbers on the map

75-94% Of The Population In Poorest Wealth Group By Province - District
Dhi Qar – 10 Al-Chibayish
Diyala – 78 Kifri
Irbil – 66 Choman
Karbala – 4 Ain Al-Tamur
Maysan – 26 Al-Kahla, 34 Al-Maimouna, 86 Qalat Saleh
Muthanna – 49 Al-Salman
Najaf – 35 Al-Manathera
Ninewa – 8 Al-Baaj, 20 Hatra, 93 Sinjar, 98 Telefar
Qadisiyah – 3 Afaq, 18 Hamza, 51 Al-Shamiya
Sulaymaniya – 84 Penjwin, 90 Sharbazher

50-75% Of The Population In Poorest Wealth Group By Province - District
Anbar – 48 Al Rutba
Babil – 19 Hashimiya, 22 Hilla, 31 Al-Madain, 32 Al-Mahawil, 40 Al-Musayab
Basra – 37 Al-Midaina
Dhi Qar – 43 Nassriya, 46 Al-Rifai, 52 Al-Shatra, 97 Suq Al-Shoyokh
Diyala – 39 Al-Muqdadiya, 64 Baladrooz, 77 Khanaqin
Irbil – 94 Soran
Karbala – 23 Al-Hindiya
Maysan – 7 Amara, 36 Al-Mejar Al-Kabi, 57 Ali Al-Gharbi
Muthanna – 28 Al-Khidhir, 47 Al-Rumaitha
Najaf – 29 Kufa
Ninewa – 5 Akre, 17 Al-Hamdaniya
Salahaddin – 63 Balad, 88 50% of Samarra
Sulaymaniya – 65 Chamchamal, 70 Dokan, 73 50% of Halabja, 85 Pshdar, 87 Rania, 95 50% of Sulaymaniya
Tamim – 67 Daquq, 82 Makhmur
Wasit – 16 Al-Hai, 30 Kut, 41 Al-Namaniya, 55 Al-Suwaira, 61 Badra

25-50% Of The Population In Poorest Wealth Group By Province - District
Anbar – 2 Abu Ghraib, 24 Al Kaim, 25 Kadhimiya, 45 Ramadi, 59 Ana, 74 Heet
Baghdad – 6 50% of Adhamiya
Basra – 1 Abu Al-Khaseeb, 14 Fao, 44 Al-Qurna, 91 Shatt Al-Arab
Dohuk – 58 Amedi, 96 Sumel, 102 Zakho
Irbil – 71 50% of Irbil, 80 Koisnjaq, 83 Mergasur, 89 Shaqlawa
Karbala – 76 Karbala
Muthanna – 50 Al-Samawa
Najaf – 42 Najaf
Ninewa – 38 Mosul, 53 Al-Shikhan, 92 Shekhan, 100 Tilkaif
Qadisiyah – 12 Diwaniya
Salahaddin – 11 Al-Daur, 15 Al-Faris, 54 Al-Shirqat, 62 50% of Baiji, 88 50% of Samarra, 99 Tikrit, 101 Tooz
Sulaymaniya – 68 Darbandihkan, 73 50% of Halabja, 75 Kalar
Tamim – 21 Al-Hawiga, 79 Kirkuk

0-25% Of The Population In Poorest Wealth Group By Province - District
Anbar – 13 Fallujah, 72 Haditha
Babil – 33 Mahmudiya
Baghdad – 6 50% of Adhamiya
Basra – 9 Basra, 56 Al-Zubair
Diyala – 27 Al-Khalis, 60 Baquba
Dohuk – 69 Dohuk
Irbil – 71 50% of Irbil
Salahaddin – 62 50% of Baiji
Sulaymaniya – 95 50% of Sulaymaniya

Food Problems In Last 30 Days by Five Wealth Groups
Poorest 56%
Second 44%
Third 40%
Fourth 34%
Richest 22%
Iraq Overall 39%

Households Experiencing Food Shortages By Province – Least To Most
Sulaymaniya: 14%
Diyala: 15%
Basra: 16%
Irbil: 17%
Maysan: 25%
Dohuk: 28%
Ninewa: 30%
Baghdad: 31%
Muthanna: 31%
Salahaddin: 32%
Anbar: 33%
Wasit: 40%
Tamim: 45%
Dhi-Qar: 47%
Qadisiyah: 52%
Najaf: 70%
Babil: 77%
Karbala: 82%
Iraq: 35%

Employment By Household
37% government
25% self-employed, not in farming
14% self-employed on farms
11% non-skilled labor
8% skilled labor
4% farm workers

Employment By Province
Dohuk: 4% farming self-employed, 4% farm workers, 11% skilled workers, 12% non-skilled workers, 47% government, 21% self-employed not farming, 2% other
Ninewa: 9% farming self-employed, 5% farm workers, 11% skilled workers, 12% non-skilled workers, 24% government, 28% self-employed not farming, 1% other
Sulaymaniya: 9% farming self-employed, 2% farm workers, 8% skilled workers, 14% non-skilled work, 43% government 23% self-employed not farming, 1% other
Tamim: 8% farming self-employed, 3% farm workers, 4% skilled workers, 17% non-skilled workers, 36% government, 30% self-employed not farming, 1% other
Diyala: 16% farming self-employed, 14% farm workers, 13% skilled labor, 3% non-skilled labor, 33% government, 20% self-employed not farming, 1% other
Anbar: 5% farming self-employed, 16% farm workers, 9% skilled workers, 8% non-skilled workers, 40% government, 22% self-employed, not farming, 1% other
Baghdad: 17% farming self-employed, 1% farm workers, 8% skilled workers, 8% non-skilled labor, 38% government, 28% self-employed not farming
Babil: 33% farming self-employed, 1% farm workers, 3% skilled worker, 11% non-skilled worker, 26% government, 26% self-employed not farming,
Karbala: 9% farming self-employed, 3% farm workers, 7% skilled worker, 11% non-skilled worker, 36% government, 34% self-employed not farming, 1% other
Wasit: 26% farming self-employed, 14% farm workers, 4% skilled workers, 9% non-skilled workers, 23% government, 23% self-employed not farming, 1% other
Salahaddin: 32% farming self-employed, 3% farm workers, 4% skilled labor, 8% non-skilled worker, 38% government, 14% self-employed not farming, 2% other
Najaf: 18% farming self-employed, 9% farm workers, 6% skilled workers, 9% non-skilled workers, 29% government, 29% self- employed not farming, 1% other
Qadisiyah: 14% farming self-employed, 8% farm worker, 12% skilled worker, 12% non-skilled worker, 37% government, 15% self-employed not farming, 2% other
Muthanna: 10% farming self-employed, 1% farm workers, 13% skilled workers, 23% non-skilled workers, 40% government, 13% self-employed not farming, 1% other
Dhi-Qar: 7% farming self-employed, 8% skilled workers, 11% non-skilled workers, 43% government, 29% self-employed not farming, 2% other
Maysan: 12% farming self-employed, 13% farm workers, 5% skilled workers, 11% non-skilled workers, 43% government, 29% self-employed not farming, 2% other
Basra: 1% farming self-employed, 12% skilled labor, 17% non-skilled labor, 46% government, 24% self- employed not farming
Urban: 1% farming self- employed, 1% farm workers, 10% skilled labor, 12% non-skilled workers, 45% government, 31% self-employed not farming, 1% other
Rural: 37% farming self-employed, 11% farm workers, 5% skilled workers, 9% non-skilled workers, 23% government, 14% self-employed not farming, 1% other
Iraq: 14% farming self-employed, 4% farm workers, 8% skilled labor, 11% non-skilled workers, 37% government, 25% self-employed not farming, 1% other

SOURCES

Khanfir, Imed, “Iraq: Access to Food Improves But Hunger Remains,” World Food Programme, 11/12/08

Reuters, “UN Says 1 Million Iraqis Lack Food,” 11/12/08

World Food Programme, “Comprehensive Food Security And Vulnerability Analysis In Iraq,” November 2008

Reidar Visser On Obama’s Options In Iraq

Reidar Visser is a researcher at the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs and is the author of Basra, the Failed Gulf State: Separatism and Nationalism in Southern Iraq. He also runs the Historiae.org blog. On November 7 he wrote a piece on policy options for in-coming president Barak Obama in Iraq.

Visser starts off with a brief overview of the U.S.’s position in Iraq. First, the Surge has reduced violence. From the latest reports, attacks are down to levels not seen since 2004. That was only one goal of the Surge however. The point of suppressing the fighting and protecting the population was to allow space for Iraq’s politicians to cut deals and make compromises to create a more lasting peace in the country. Visser argues that has not happened. As discussed earlier, Iraq’s parliament has passed a series of reconciliation laws such as an Amnesty act and a new DeBaathification process, but none of them has been implemented as planned. The lack of political movement makes Visser believe the changes in Iraq are only temporary.

Within Iraq the real winner of the Surge has been Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki. In 2007 he was nearly ousted from office by parliament before being saved by Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice in December. Since then he has launched security operations in Basra, Sad City, Mosul, and Maysan and Diyala provinces to establish himself as the leader of his country. He has learned to use the themes of centralism and nationalism to build up his support with the Iraqi public. As a recent Iraqi public opinion poll found, Maliki is now the most popular politician in the country. He now feels secure enough to challenge his main supporters, the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council (SIIC) and the Kurds. The Prime Minister’s new position has direct consequences for U.S. policy because he is less susceptible to American pressure.

That brings Visser to President Elect Obama. As he ran for president Obama promised to draw down troops within 16 months of taking office. He also said he would use this withdrawal to pressure the Iraqi government into reconciling. This plan closely follows a June 2008 paper by the Center for a New American Security by Colin Kohl, Michele Florin, and Shawn Brimley entitled “Shaping the Iraqi Inheritance” that called for conditional engagement. The report argued that Prime Minister Maliki wants U.S. troops to stay a little while longer so they can strengthen the Iraqi army, which will consolidate his power. Kohl, Florin, and Brimley believe this gives the United States a meaningful way to pressure the Iraqis to compromise. This is in contrast to the Bush administration that has given unconditional support to Baghdad. Visser disagrees that the U.S. has this kind of influence. He doesn’t believe that Maliki needs nor cares whether the Americans will continue to support the Iraqi security forces. He has been demanding that U.S. troops leave by a set timetable for example, as a sign of Iraqi independence. If pressured, Maliki will probably tell the U.S. they don’t have the right to demand reconciliation because Iraq is a sovereign country.

What are the alternatives to Obama’s initial plans then? Another paper by Brian Katulis, Marc Lynch, and Peter Juul called “Iraq’s Political Transition After the Surge” argues that the United States needs to set a specific withdrawal date to force changes within Iraq. Their argument is that this will pressure Iraq’s politicians to cut deals so that they can stay in power because there will no longer be U.S. soldiers to prop them up. This will also make Iraq’s parliament and government more responsive to their public because they can’t rely upon the U.S. anymore to save them. Visser doesn’t believe this plan will be successful either. In 2007 Maliki claimed that the country had already reconciled. After the Sunni Accordance Front gave up on their boycott and rejoined the government in July 2008, he made similar comments. This doesn’t give the U.S. much of a chance to push for political compromises if the Prime Minister believes they are not necessary.

Visser finishes with two alternative plans of his own. One is to push for the next parliamentary elections to be as fair and open as possible. This would have the potential for new political parties to gain power and break the hold of the current ruling parties, and allow for more changes. This approach would have the added advantage in that Maliki could not use his nationalist argument against it. The issue with this recommendation is that the U.S. may not have the influence to get Iraq’s officials to change the election law to make it possible for smaller and newer parties to gain meaningful representation. The other policy wasn’t explained very well, but would be for the U.S. to get the Kurds to threaten to pull out of the government to pressure Baghdad. Visser doesn’t mention it, but the problem with that plan is that once the Kurds withdraw they may not agree to rejoin because they want independence and autonomy. At the minimum it will increase the growing divide between the central government and Arabs versus the Kurds.

It seems that none of these policies could realistically work to get Iraq’s government to move towards political compromise. As Baghdad and Maliki have gotten stronger, he has become less susceptible to U.S. demands. His new nationalist stance also makes it easy for him to reject any American pressure as an affront to Iraqi sovereignty. Withdrawing troops is already a demand Maliki is making, so that would not seem to be a good way to gain leverage. The U.S. probably doesn’t have the ability to get Iraq’s parliament to change the election laws to give more opportunities to newer parties. Finally, using the Kurds would only increase tensions within the country. This leaves the incoming Obama administration with even less ability to shape events in Iraq. That might mean Iraq will never have real reconciliation, leaving a large divide in the country in the foreseeable future.

SOURCES

Iraq Centre For Research & Strategic Studies, “Public Opinion Survey in Iraq; The Security & Political Situation in Iraq,” October 2008

Parker, Ned, “Iraq’s Nouri Maliki breaking free of U.S.,” Los Angeles Times, 9/16/08

Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, “Quarterly report to the United States Congress,” 10/30/08

Visser, Reidar, “The Obama Administration, Iraq, and the Question of Leverage,” Historiae.org, 11/7/08

Proposition To Form Basra Federal Region

Hizb al-Dawla leader Wail Abdul Latif has been calling for a Basra federal region since 2003

On November 13 the head of the Hizb al-Dawla party, parliamentarian Wail Abdul Latif gave a petition to the Iraqi Election Commission calling for the creation of a Basra federal region. 34,800 residents of the province signed it. That was 2% of the governorate’s voting population, which was required for such a proposal. The Election Commission said they had accepted the request. Latif and his supporters now have one month to collect 139,200 more signatures, 10% of the province’s voters. If that is accomplished, a referendum most be held on the measure within 15 days. Latif said this was not a plan to undermine the authority of the central government. Rather he said the purpose was to provide the province with basic services, something that he accused Baghdad of failing to do. Latif has been working on this campaign since August 2008 when he announced that he would start a petition.

Latif is a secular Shiite from Basra province. He became a judge in 1981, and was later thrown in jail by Saddam Hussein. After the U.S. invasion he was appointed governor of Basra, a post he held until 2004. The Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) later appointed him to the Iraqi Governing Council. He then joined Iyad Allawi’s interim government and became a member of his Iraqi National List party. He was mentioned as a possible minister in the Ibrahim Jaafari government that was elected in 2005, but the United Iraqi Alliance blocked his way. In 2003, while he was governor of Basra he first put forward the idea of a federal region.

Originally, several southern governors came up with the idea of a three province federal region in 2004. That was when the CPA wrote the Transitional Administrative Law (TAL) that was to rule Iraq until a constitution was written. The TAL said that three provinces could join together and form a federal region. This led the governors of Basra, Maysan, and Dhi Qar to propose such an idea. Prime Minister Jaafari killed the proposal however. In 2006 Latif revived the plan, but this time it was just Basra by itself.

Many local parties support Latif’s petition, but the friends and enemies at the national level are daunting. Within Basra, several independent Shiites, tribes, the ruling Fadhila party, and the head of the provincial council all back the plan. They all believe that Basra can’t prosper without being autonomous. Outside of the province, the head of the Karbala provincial council, and the Kurdish Alliance in parliament are fans of the idea. The Kurds already have their own regional government, and supporting others with similar aspirations strengthens their push for autonomy. On the opposite side are the Sunnis, namely the National Dialogue Bloc and the Iraqi Islamic Party. A member of the Dialogue Bloc said the move was simply electioneering before the January 2009 provincial vote. An Islamic Party official in Basra said the party was opposed to the idea of federalism. The Sunnis in general have been opposed to the concept, fearing that they would be cut out of the country’s oil wealth, which is concentrated in the Shiite south and the Kurdish north. The Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council has not publicly commented on Latif’s idea yet. They do not have much influence in Basra, and have been silent as of late on their nine-province federal region. A spokesman for Moqtada al-Sadr however, came out strongly against the proposal, saying that it could tear the country apart. The Sadrists have also stood for a strong central government because they are based in Baghdad, and have a nationalist ideology. Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki will also probably come out against the idea because he is pushing for a strong central government with him at its head. He will probably not take lightly an attempt to federalize Basra, which is the site of major oil fields, and has the country’s only major seaport where this liquid wealth flows out of.

SOURCES

Abouzeid, Rania, “A New Twist in Iraq’s Shi’ite Power Struggle,” Time, 11/16/08

Alsumaria, “Basra heading towards independent region,” 11/17/08
- “Lights shed on federalism in Iraq Basra,” 11/13/08

Aswat al-Iraq, “Establishing Basra region easing off political congestion – MP,” 11/14/08

Kurdish Globe, “Basra Seeks a Region of Its Own Within Iraq,” 11/13/08

Missing Links Blog, “Basra group reported starting one-governate federal region campaign,” 8/14/08

Otterman, Sharon, “IRAQ: The interim government leaders,” Council on Foreign Relations, 6/2/04

Visser, Reidar, “An Initiative to Create the Federal Region of Basra Is Launched,” Historiae.org, 11/13/08
- “The Maliki Government – What It Could Mean to Southern Iraq” historiae.org, 5/23/06
- “Suffering, Oil, and Ideals of Coexistence: Non-Sectarian Federal Trends in the Far South of Iraq,” Historiae.org, 11/17-20/07

Withdrawal Instead of Patience As Center of U.S. Strategy In Iraq

Marc Lynch is an associate professor of Political Science and International Affairs at George Washington University, and runs the Abu Aardvark blog as well. In the November/December issue of Foreign Affairs, Lynch has an article, “Politics First,” which is a response to an earlier piece in the journal by Stephen Biddle of the Council on Foreign Relations, and Michael O’Hanlon and Kenneth Pollack of the Brookings Institution. They, like many other Iraq analysts, argue for strategic patience. They believe that the U.S. should keep large numbers of U.S. troops in Iraq until the country completes its provincial and national elections. The argument is that a continued U.S. presence is the key to political change within the country. The Iraqis need U.S. troops to stay until they can work out their difference and reconcile. Biddle, O’Hanlon, and Pollack wrote that the U.S. should not consider drawing down its forces until 2010 at the earliest, and perhaps have half out by 2011. Lynch makes the counter view that the U.S. needs to set a specific withdrawal date to pressure the Iraqis to negotiate over power sharing.

Lynch begins by refuting the strategic patience argument. He says that most American analysts and military officials are right when they point out that Iraq’s improvements are tenuous, but their solutions are wrong. Their policy would mean an open-ended commitment of large numbers of troops waiting for political changes that may never happen. For example, Iraq’s parliament has passed several reconciliation laws, but they are often implemented in ways not originally planned or not at all. The Amnesty Law for example, made the main anti-corruption office in the Iraqi government, the Commission on Integrity, drop more than half of its cases. The largest group affected by the law has been fugitives, people who were wanted, but were never arrested in the first place. The Accountability and Justice Act that was to replace the old DeBaathification process, has only been applied by the Interior Ministry even though the law says it can’t, while the rest of the government has refused to follow it.

Lynch argues that the improved security since the Surge has actually made Iraq’s politics atrophy. Washington believes that the reduction in violence will allow Iraqi politicians to make crucial decisions about reconciliation that will help hold the country together. Lynch writes that Baghdad actually sees no reason to make any deals. Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki has become complacent because the insurgency has been weakened, his main opponents the Sadrists have been defeated for the meantime, the Iraqi security forces are improving, and the U.S. has given his government an open ended commitment. The upcoming provincial elections set for January 2009 could open up Iraq’s political system, but could also lead to more divisions or the consolidation of the ruling parties. Overall, the Prime Minister is now in a position of strength, therefore why should he compromise?

The major recommendation of the article is that in order to break this deadlock in Baghdad, the U.S. needs to set a withdrawal date. Lynch argues, only when the U.S. announces that it will begin drawing down its forces will Iraq’s political geography change. It will force Iraqi politicians to face their country’s problems, rather than expecting the U.S. to do it for them. That would make Baghdad more answerable to its public, and might force them to come to decisions they might not otherwise. The U.S. might also set some preconditions for its support, something the current White House has refused to do. This might actually become American policy now that the U.S. presidential election is over. At the same time, there is no guarantee that the Iraqi government will change if America withdraws or even if it stays. As Baghdad has become stronger, U.S. influence has weakened. Maliki is already dealing with some of the major issues in the country often times to consolidate his power and that of the central authorities. In the end, Iraqis will decide their future, and it will be up to them whether they want to reconcile or not, no matter what U.S. policy is.

For other analysts’ opinions on Iraq see:

Iraq Needs Real Governance Center for Strategic and International Studies Report Says

Cordesman Interview: U.S. Needs To Stay For The Long Haul In Iraq

Council on Foreign Relations-Brookings’ Experts Call for Patience In Iraq

Council on Foreign Relations and Brookings Institution Experts Voice Their Opinions After Recent Trip To Iraq

Is Iraq Going To End Up Like Eastern Europe?

June 18, 2008 Charlie Rose Interview With Vali Nasr of the Council On Foreign Relations, Stephen Biddle of the Council On Foreign Relations, and Michael Gordon of the New York Times

SOURCES

Biddle, Stephen, O’Hanlon, Michael, and Pollack, Kenneth, “How to Leave Behind a Stable Iraq,” Foreign Affairs, September/October 2008

Cordesman, Anthony, “The Evolving Security Situation in Iraq: The Continuing Need for Strategic Patience,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1/21/08

Lynch, Marc, “Politics First,” Foreign Affairs, November/December 2008

Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, “Quarterly Report to the United States Congress,” 10/30/08

Government Moves Against Squatters In Hurriyah, Baghdad

On November 13 the Iraqi Army, supported by the police, moved into the Hurriyah district of western Baghdad to evict squatters and destroy their makeshift homes. Thousands of people were protesting the act. There were up to 675 families, approximately 4,000 people, most of whom were Shiites squatting in the area. The security forces were acting under Order 101 issued by Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki on September 1, 2008. The order said that all squatters had to vacate their premises or face legal ramifications. Those that leave voluntarily are eligible for 300,000 dinars ($250) for six months to help them find a new place to live. This is the latest initiative in the government’s refugee policy that it announced this summer to get Iraqis to return to their homes.

Hurriya Background

Hurriya was a bloody battleground between Moqtada al-Sadr’s Mahdi Army and Sunnis during the sectarian war. By November 2007, the Shiite militia had control of the neighborhood, and had forced out between 3,000-10,000 Sunni families in the process. The Mahdi Army then fractured as different groups began fighting over the spoils of their victory. Those were renting out houses to Shiites that the Mahdi Army had brought in to solidify their hold over the area, running petrol stations, and other protection rackets.

By the summer of 2008 things had changed in the neighborhood. The Mahdi Army had lost much of its power due to the government’s crackdowns against them. By June the first Sunnis began trickling back to the area. In an attempt to regain their lost standing, the Mahdi Army set off a car bomb in mid-June that killed up to 50 people and wounded another 80. It was hoped that the attack would be blamed on Sunni insurgents, thus rekindling sectarianism and make the Shiites turn to the Sadrists for protection. It was also meant to intimidate the Sunnis that had begun to return. Those plans were foiled when a Mahdi Army commander was exposed as the mastermind behind the bombing.

By the fall and winter more displaced Sunnis were coming back. Up to 107 families had returned by September, and the government was providing them with assistance. Maliki also issued Order 101 that month and 70 squatting families were evicted from Hurriya as a result. The U.S. Army also began chipping in, and believed that up to 400 families had come back by November. The Americans estimated that 60% were planning on staying, while 40% just came back to collect property or to try to work out a rent plant with the Shiites in their homes. Many were weary of the security forces however, especially the police that were Shiite. There were also threats against them. A grenade was thrown into one of their houses, tires were set on fire in areas where Sunnis were coming back, and one returnee was murdered.

Conclusion

Hurriya is a small microcosm of what is happening in many areas of the capital where refugees are returning. Many are coming back to find their homes occupied by another sect. Not only that, but militants that forced them out are still there as well on some occasions. Attacks on returnees appear very small in number so far, but the fear and intimidation is much more of an issue. In Baghdad, returnees are supposed to register with the authorities so that they can be protected. Hurriya is also one of the first where the security forces are acting on Order 101. Where the evicted squatters will go is unknown. This confusing and tense situation is why many groups like the United Nations, Refugee International, and Iraqi non-government organizations have all said that the government should not be encouraging families to come back yet. Yet the process has begun, partly because of improved security, and partly because many can’t afford to stay where they now reside. Baghdad’s response will be a major determinant of how this situation will ultimately work out.

SOURCES

Agence France Presse, “Iraqi army destroys Baghdad squatter camp,” 11/13/08

Duparcq, Emmanuel, “Displaced Sunnis face uncertain Baghdad homecoming,” Agence France Presse, 9/16/08

International Crisis Group, “Iraq’s Civil War, The Sadrists And The Surge,” 2/7/08

International Organization for Migration, “IOM Emergency Needs Assessments,” 10/1/08
- “IOM Emergency Needs Assessments, Post February 2006 Displacement In Iraq,” 11/1/08

IRIN, “NGOs warn against encouraging large-scale refugee returns,” 11/3/08

Kagan, Kimberly, “Iran’s Proxy War against the United States and the Iraqi Government,” Institute for the Study of War, 8/20/07

Morgan, Wesley, “In Hurriyah, Sunni families trickle home,” Long War Journal.org, 11/7/08

Parker, Ned, “Iraqi civilian deaths plunge,” Los Angeles Times, 11/1/07

Raghavan, Sudarsan, “For Sunnis, an Uneasy Return Home,” Washington Post, 10/8/08

Roggio, Bill, “Mahdi Army cell leader behind deadly Baghdad bombing,” Long War Journal.org, 6/18/08

Susman, Tina, “Can Iraq’s soldiers fight?” Los Angeles Times, 4/3/08

Westervelt, Eric, “Iraqis Skeptical New Sense of Security Can Last,” All Things Considered – NPR, 11/1/07