Shell Natural Gas Deal In Basra Delayed Again

In 2009 Iraq successfully carried out two rounds of bidding for its petroleum fields, which will re-introduce international oil companies to the country. Development of the nation’s natural gas reserves however, remains largely unfulfilled. In February 2008 Iraq’s Oil Ministry signed a preliminary deal with Royal Dutch Shell to collect and exploit natural gas in Basra. Later Japan’s Mitsubishi was also added to the negotiations. Both companies were interested in Iraq because it has the tenth largest natural gas reserves in the world. It currently produces around 1.7 billion cubic feet per day, but most its gas is actually burned off, wasting an estimated $40 million a day.

While the Iraqi cabinet immediately approved the deal in 2008, parliament and others criticized the proposal. One concern was the fact that it was a no contest bid. Others questioned whether Shell and Mitsubishi would be given a monopoly over natural gas in southern Iraq.

With talks going nowhere the deputy Oil Minister announced in September 2009 that the Basra deal would have to be finalized after the 2010 parliamentary elections. The initial agreement between Iraq and the two corporations expires on March 22, 2010 however. Iraq will not have a government at that time as parliamentary voting is being held March 7, and a forming a new ruling coalition will likely take months. Mitsubishi and Shell therefore have asked for an extension. That would leave the new government to try to finalize the talks that have dragged on for over two years now. In the meantime, Iraq will be losing hundreds of millions of dollars in lost gas production that it could desperately use to develop the rest of the country and pay for essential services.

SOURCES

El-Gamal, Rania, “UPDATE 2-Iraq says talks with Shell prolonged, continue,” Reuters, 2/26/10

Salahedin, Sinan, “Iraq-Shell gas deal likely to be delayed until after January elections, official says,” Washington Examiner, 9/5/09

Early Iraqi Election Results Update

Iraq’s Election Commission has updated its partial results from the March 7, 2010 parliamentary elections. The count is uneven across the country. In the southern province of Wasit for example 67% of the votes have been counted, while in Salahaddin only 17% were tallied. As before Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s list is still in first place with the lead in seven provinces Babil, Baghdad, Basra, Karbala, Muthanna, Najaf, and Wasit. Former Prime Minister Iyad Allawi’s Iraqi National Movement/Iraqiya has the second most first place finishes so far in Anbar, Diyala, Ninewa, Salahaddin, and surprisingly Tamim. The Supreme Council-Sadrist led Iraqi National Alliance is in the lead in Dhi Qar, Maysan, and Qadisiyah. Finally, the Kurdish Alliance is in front in Dohuk, Irbil, and Sulaymaniya.

Partial Early Election Results

Winning Lists
State of Law: Babil, Baghdad, Basra, Karbala, Muthanna, Najaf, Wasit
Iraqi National Movement: Anbar, Diyala, Ninewa, Salahaddin, Tamim
Iraqi National Alliance: Dhi Qar, Maysan, Qadisiyah
Kurdish Alliance: Dohuk, Irbil, Sulaymaniya

Anbar
59% counted
1. Iraqi National Movement 122,195
2. Accordance Front 22,546
3. Unity of Iraq 18,321
4. State of Law 2,898
5. Iraqi National Alliance 2,019

Babil
34% counted
1. State of Law 72,410
2. Iraqi National Alliance 57,630
3. Iraqi National Movement 33,622
4. Unity of Iraq 5,427
5. Accordance Front 3,059
6. Kurdish Alliance 382

Baghdad
18% counted
1. State of Law 158,763
2. Iraqi National Alliance 108,126
3. Iraqi National Movement 104,810
4. Accordance Front 6,036
5. Unity of Iraq 4,219
6. Kurdish Alliance 3,673
7. Change List 330
8. Kurdish Islamic Union 161

Basra
63% counted
1. State of Law 219,657
2. Iraqi National Alliance 121,497
3. Iraqi National Movement 36,093
4. Accordance Front 9,111
5. Unity of Iraq 4,859

Dhi Qar
59%
1. Iraqi National Alliance 120,028
2. State of Law 114,354
3. Iraqi National Movement 20,674
4. Unity of Iraq 10,508
5. Kurdish Alliance 190

Diyala
17% counted
1. Iraqi National Movement 42,648
2. Iraqi National Alliance 10,645
3. State of Law 10,119
4. Kurdish Alliance 7,058
5. Accordance Front 3,923
6. Change List 1,409
7. Unity of Iraq 1,193
8. Kurdish Islamic Union 341

Dohuk
55.6% counted
1. Kurdish Alliance 170,960
2. Kurdish Islamic Union 31,053
3. Change List 12,570
4. Rafidain 2,619
5. Kurdish Islamic Group 1,555
6. Iraqi National Alliance 84

Irbil
30% counted
1. Kurdish Alliance 96,378
2. Change List 20,691
3. Kurdish Islamic Group 12,444
4. Kurdish Islamic Union 10,401
5. Iraqi National Alliance 71

Karbala
35% counted
1. State of Law 69,496
2. Iraqi National Alliance 31,992
3. Iraqi National Movement 14,339
4. Unity of Iraq 4,571

Maysan
23% counted
1. Iraqi National Alliance 29,454
2. State of Law 22,460
3. Iraqi National Movement 3,201
4. Unity of Iraq 1,270

Muthanna
18% counted
1. State of Law 14,981
2. Iraqi National Alliance 11,154
3. Unity of Iraq 4,209
4. Iraqi National Movement 2,886
5. Kurdish Alliance 488
6. Accordance Front 124

Najaf
34% counted
1. State of Law 55,953
2. Iraqi National Alliance 48,674
3. Iraqi National Movement 9,104
4. Unity of Iraq 2,477
5. Kurdish Alliance 154

Ninewa
15% counted
1. Iraqi National Movement 62,212
2. Kurdish Alliance 19,055
3. Accordance Front 7,108
4. Unity of Iraq 4,624
5. Iraqi National Alliance 3,508
6. State of Law 1,812
7. Change List 510
8. Kurdish Islamic Union 431
9. Kurdish Islamic Group 69

Qadisiyah
10% counted
1. Iraqi National Alliance 2,153
2. State of Law 1,519
3. Iraqi National Movement 651
4. Unity of Iraq 490
5. Kurdish Alliance 14

Salahaddin
17% counted
1. Iraqi National Movement 34,476
2. Accordance Front 10,110
3. Unity of Iraq 7,601
4. State of Law 6,988
5. Iraqi National Alliance 4,988
6. Kurdish Alliance 3,207
7. Change List 365

Sulaymaniya
63.6% counted
1. Kurdish Alliance 178,071
2. Change List 160,144
3. Kurdish Islamic Union 56,840
4. Kurdish Islamic Group 43,908
5. Iraqi National Alliance 104

Tamim
61.9% counted
1. Iraqi National Movement 123,862
2. Kurdish Alliance 120,664
3. Change List 20,152
4. Kurdish Islamic Union 14,471
5. Accordance Front
6. Kurdish Islamic Alliance 7,887
7. Iraqi National Alliance 7,887
8. State of Law 7,805

Wasit
67% counted
1. State of Law 66,794
2. Iraqi National Alliance 58,382
3. Iraqi National Movement 22,607
4. Unity of Iraq 8,512
5. Mithal al-Alusi 2,330
6. Kurdish Alliance 361

SOURCES

The Majlis, “Results: Iraq’s 2010 parliamentary election,” 3/15/10

Wall Street Journal, “The Election in Iraq,” 3/15/10

Too Early For Kurds To Claim Victory Over Kirkuk?

After Iraq’s March 7, 2010 parliamentary elections, the Kurdish Alliance made up of the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) were claiming victory in Tamim, the home to the disputed city of Kirkuk. They said that early returns showed that they had gotten 50% of the vote, which would give them 7-8 of the 12 seats up for grab in the province. The Kurdish Alliance could use that strong showing to claim that they had a mandate to move forward with the annexation of the Kirkuk, something they have wanted to do since the 2003 overthrow of Saddam. In the negotiations for a new government, which is already including the Kurds, they would demand that Article 140 of the 2005 constitution be implemented. The article called for a return of those displaced from the province by the previous regime, a census, and then a referendum on the fate of the disputed territories by the end of 2007. Obviously that never happened, but the Kurdish Alliance would put forward a renewed effort on that front after the vote.

That may have to be put on hold once again however. Early returns show that former Prime Minister Iyad Allawi’s National Movement is now in first place in the vote in Tamim. That was predicted in an exit poll done by the Ayn al Iraq monitoring group that found 37% of those polled voted for the National Movement, and 34% supporting the Kurdish Alliance in the governorate. Even if the Kurds ended up winning the vote when the final count is made, their victory would likely be disputed. The local Arabs and Turkmen claim that the Kurdish parties have moved in thousands of Kurdish families that never lived there before to change the demographics of Tamim in their favor. The 2010 election law also allows an investigation of irregularities in the polling in the province with a majority vote in parliament. If that occurred a committee would have one year to look into the ballots.

The Kurdish parties may be as frustrated about Kirkuk after the 2010 vote as they were before. When they joined the Iraqi government in 2005 they were promised that Kirkuk would be dealt with. That never happened. Now they may not even win the vote in the province, which would complicate any demand they make to move forward with Article 140 if they joined the next government. Like many major issues in Iraq, Kirkuk may be caught up in an endless deadlock as a result.

SOURCES

AK News, “Kurdish politicians optimistic about Kirkuk issue,” 3/13/10

BBC, “PM Maliki extends Iraqi poll lead,” 3/14/10

Dagher, Sam, “Iraq Election May Leave Status of Kirkuk Uncertain,” New York Times, 3/12/10

Hilterman, Joost, “Kurds no closer to taking Kirkuk after Iraqi elections,” Middle East Channel, Foreign Policy, 3/8/10

Inside Iraq, “Iraqi organization project elections results,” McClatchy Newspapers, 3/10/10

What An American Expert Gets Wrong About Iraq And Its Election

Kenneth Pollack of the Brookings Institution has long thought that the U.S. will need to maintain a large military and diplomatic presence in Iraq to help with its transition from years of dictatorship. In his latest piece, “Iraq: An Elections Preview,” he writes that the Americans will be crucial in the negotiations over a new government following Iraq’s parliamentary elections, and could need to deploy troops into Iraq’s streets again to help put down a return to violence if those talks fail. The first part of his argument is persuasive, but Pollack fails to realize the diminishing role America plays in Iraq.

Pollack’s thesis is that it will take months to form a new Iraqi government after the March elections, and that the U.S. will need to shepherd this process along so that talks don’t fall apart. Because none of the major lists will win a majority a broad based coalition will be necessary to gain the necessary seats in parliament to select a new prime minister. If the four largest blocs, Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s State of Law, the Supreme Council-Sadrist led National Alliance, Former Prime Minister Iyad Allawi’s National Movement, and the Kurdish Alliance all emerge relatively equal in the standings, it could lead to deadlock. Pollack is afraid if that process drags out the sides could turn to violence to push their positions in the street. He even mentions a new civil war as a possible outcome. That would require a robust American diplomatic effort to keep talks going and U.S. troops returning to Iraq’s cities, which they left in June 2009. Pollack is obviously worried that the Obama administration is only interested in withdrawing forces, which it is, and will abandon Iraq at this crucial moment, which will lead the country to fall apart once again.

Pollack gets many points right, but misses some major ones as well. First, it will likely take months for Iraq’s major lists to form a new government. After the January 2009 provincial elections, it took until April to announce new ruling coalitions in the fourteen governorates that took part. Putting together a national government will be much harder, and take longer. Many parties look towards the U.S. as a neutral moderator in moments like this. The Americans for example, were crucial in getting the election law passed in early 2010 when parliament missed its own deadline. It would be natural then, for Iraq’s parties to call on the U.S. embassy if they hit an impasse in their talks. At the same time, huge public pressure from Washington wasn’t able to stop the banning of candidates before the March vote. In fact, the Prime Minister and others turned on the U.S. for trying to influence the process, so there is a limit to what it can do, especially if it isn’t done behind closed doors. Where Pollack runs into problems is his warning that violence may erupt if things don’t go well. Iraq’s leaders didn’t turn to fighting when it took months to put together the provincial councils, so why would they do it now? In many southern governorates Maliki shut out the Supreme Council who had run that region since 2005, but they didn’t take that as an affront serious enough to deploy their militia. The Sunnis also want a place in government, and have joined all of the major lists so they will get some sort of representation, even if it is a minor one. There simply doesn’t seem to be motivation for a turn to violence at this moment, especially not a new civil war. That would require not only a breakdown of Iraqi politics, but the state as well, both of which are unlikely. Another problem with Pollack is that he believes U.S. forces could help. This assumes that Baghdad would ask for American assistance, but with a large Iraqi security force why would they? Iraqis rarely see U.S. troops these days except in the countryside, and they also have a very low opinion of the U.S. military. 

Overall, Pollack fails because he doesn’t believe Iraqis can deal with their own problems. Instead he thinks that the U.S. constantly needs to step in to maintain political and military stability in the country. He doesn’t realize that U.S. influence has declined, and is sometimes resented. Yes, the U.S. embassy will remain a key player when Iraq hits a road block, but at the same time, there is only so much that the U.S. can do since Iraq’s politicians are driven by their own internal power struggles and constituencies. That is especially true on the military front where it’s highly unlikely that Iraq will either return to large scale fighting at this time or ask large numbers of U.S. troops for help if it does. Iraqis are in control now, and they are going to determine their own future with some U.S. help, but not with the overwhelming influence that Pollack and others hope to maintain.

SOURCES

Department of State, “Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq,” 2/15/10

International Crisis Group “Iraq’s Uncertain Future: Elections and Beyond,” 2/25/10

Pollack, Kenneth, “Iraq: An Elections Preview,” Brookings Institution, 3/2/10

Early Iraqi Election Results And Predictions

The Iraqi Election Commission is slowly releasing some preliminary results for the March 2010 parliamentary balloting. So far the Commission has released partial results for five provinces, Babil, Irbil, Najaf, Diyala, Maysan, and Salahaddin. The Commission has counted 33% of the vote in Babil, 34% in Najaf, 28% in Irbil, and 17% in Diyala and Salahaddin each. The Commission has not reported how much of the vote in Maysan has been processed yet. Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s State of Law List was leading in two southern provinces, Babil and Najaf. Its Shiite rival the National Alliance was ahead in Maysan. In Irbil in Kurdistan, the Kurdish Alliance was in first place, while in Diyala and Salahaddin former Prime Minister Iyad Allawi’s National Movement was the front-runner.

Major Lists In The 2010 Vote
State of Law – Prime Minister Maliki’s Dawa Party
National Alliance – Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council, Sadrists, former Prime Minister Ibrahim al-Jaafari, Fadhila Party, Iraqi National Congress
National Movement – Former Prime Minister Iyad Allawi’s Iraqi National List, Iraqi National Dialogue Front
Kurdish Alliance – Kurdistan Democratic Party, Patriotic Union of Kurdistan
Unity of Iraq – Interior Minister Jawad Bolani’s Constitution Party, Sheikh Ahmad Abu Risha’s Awakening of Iraq and Independents
Accordance Front – Iraqi Islamic Party
Change – New Kurdish opposition party
Islamic Union – Kurdish Islamic party
Kurdish Islamic Union – Kurdish Islamic party

Winners/% Of Vote Counted By Election Commission
State Of Law – Babil/34%, Najaf/28%
National Movement – Diyala/17%, Salahaddin/17%
Kurdish Alliance – Irbil/28%
National Alliance - Maysan

Early-Partial Results

Babil
1. State of Law
2. National Alliance
3. National Movement
4. Unity of Iraq
5. Kurdish Alliance

Diyala
1. National Movement
2. National Alliance
3. State of Law
4. Kurdish Alliance
5. Unity of Iraq

Irbil
1. Kurdish Alliance
2. Change
3. Islamic Union
4. Kurdish Islamic Union

Maysan
1. National Alliance
2. State of Law
3. National Movement
4. Unity of Iraq

Najaf
1. State of Law
2. National Alliance
3. National Movement
4. Unity of Iraq
5. Kurdish Alliance

Salahaddin
1. National Movement
2. Accordance Front
3. Unity of Iraq
4. State of Law
5. National Alliance

An exit poll by Ayn al Iraq, an election-monitoring group has also been released. It was based upon text messages from 25,565 voters in fifteen of Iraq’s provinces. It didn’t include the three provinces in Kurdistan. Ayn only reported on the top three lists in each governorate. They found that State of Law was ahead in nine provinces, the National Movement held sway in five provinces, while the National Alliance was the winner in Dhi Qar. When compared to the partial results released by the Election Commission, Ayn’s prediction is holding true in Babil, Diyala, and Najaf, but was off in Maysan and Salahaddin. In the former, Ayn had the State of Law coming in first, followed by the National Alliance and the National Movement. The early results show the National Alliance in first, State of Law in 2nd, and the National Movement 3rd. In Salahaddin Ayn found the National Movement 1st, State of Law 2nd and the Unity of Iraq 3rd. The Election Commission has the National Movement in 1st, followed by the Iraqi Consensus, and then the Unity of Iraq.

Winners
State of Law – Babil, Baghdad, Basra, Karbala, Maysan, Muthanna, Najaf, Qadisiyah, Wasit
National Movement – Anbar, Diyala, Ninewa, Salahaddin, Tamim
National Alliance – Dhi Qar

Anbar
National Movement 75%
Unity of Iraq 7%
National Alliance 3%

Babil
State of Law 41%
National Alliance 29%
National Movement 19%

Baghdad
State of Law 35%
National Movement 21%
National Alliance 17%

Basra
State of Law 51%
National Alliance 30%
National Movement 7%

Dhi Qar
National Alliance 38%
State of Law 35%
National Movement 8%

Diyala
National Movement 49%
National Alliance 19%
State of Law 15%

Karbala
State of Law 57%
National Alliance 31%
National Movement 11%

Maysan
State of Law 46%
National Alliance 39%
National Movement 7%

Muthanna
State of Law 44%
National Alliance 31%
National Movement 11%

Najaf
State of Law 49%
National Alliance 30%
National Movement 7%

Ninewa
National Movement 51%
Unity of Iraq 31%
Accordance Front 6%

Qadisiyah
State of Law 40%
National Alliance 31%
National Movement 23%

Salahaddin
National Movement 65%
State of Law 14%
Unity of Iraq 10%

Tamim
National Movement 37%
Kurdish Alliance 34%
State of Law 5%

Wasit
State of Law 49%
National Alliance 34%
National Movement 10%

Overall, if Ayn’s results and the Election Commission’s returns hold up, they would show that Maliki’s State of Law still holds sway over southern Iraq and Baghdad as it did in the January 2009 provincial elections, and the Kurdish Alliance is still in control of Kurdistan. The Sunni vote was divided between various parties in 2009, but this year it has coalesced around Allawi’s list. Finally, the National Alliance has faced its second major defeat. As in 2009, it has lost a lot of its hold over the Shiite electorate, and is finishing second across most of southern Iraq. As reported before, this year’s balloting would solidify the new balance of power amongst Iraq’s major parties that emerged in 2009.

SOURCES

Carlstrom, Gregg, “Latest Iraq Election Results: Erbil, Diyala, Saleheddin Provinces,” The Majlis, 3/12/10

Independent High Electoral Commission, “Results”

Inside Iraq, “Iraqi organization project elections results,” McClatchy Newspapers, 3/10/10

Iraqi Parties Maneuver To Form New Ruling Coalition

As Iraq’s parties complain and contest the counting of the votes that were cast on March 7, 2010 for the country’s next parliament, those same lists are already hard at work trying to put together a new ruling coalition. On March 9 for example, former Prime Minister Ibrahim al-Jaafari of the Iraqi National Alliance was quoted as saying that he felt a “conviction” to join with Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s State of Law. The next day, Vice President Tariq Hashemi who ran as part of the Iraqi National Movement met with Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council (SIIC) leader Ammar al-Hakim, who is part of the National Alliance. For his part, Hakim courted the Kurds at a press conference on March 11 saying that they were an essential part of the country. The Kurdish Alliance, made up of the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), are demanding that PUK leader Jalal Talabani return as President of Iraq. Kurdistan President Massoud Barzani already nominated Talabani for the post, while a parliamentary member of the Alliance said that the presidency would be a key demand. Finally, a member of State of Law said that it wouldn’t give up on its current allies in the government, the Supreme Council and the Kurdish Alliance.

Anything is possible in Iraqi politics, and the results of the election are only slowing trickling out, but early signs point to the current ruling coalition of Maliki’s Dawa led State of Law, the SIIC, KDP, and PUK joining together once again as they did in 2005. There were plenty of hints and rumors before the election that the State of Law and National Alliance were going to re-unite afterward. The Kurdish Alliance wants to maintain its influence in Baghdad, and has a long-standing relationship with the Supreme Council dating back to before the U.S. invasion in 2003. SIIC leader Hakim said back in January 2010 that the two had already agreed to a post-election deal. The National Alliance on the other hand, looks to be finishing a disappointing third behind the State of Law and National Movement, so maintaining the current line-up of the government would allow them to hold onto power. Finally Maliki’s main priority has always been to return as prime minister. He would’ve joined the National Alliance back in late 2009 if they had promised him that. Although he’s had disagreements with both the National and Kurdish Alliances in the past, holding onto his position is more important, and will likely lead him to make concessions to the two to gain their support. That could also mean shutting out former Prime Minister Iyad Allawi’s National Movement. The National Alliance already targeted Allawi’s list before and after the vote by banning their candidates through the Accountability and Justice Commission, which the National Alliance controls. Members of Allawi’s list have also said that they want an Arab to be president, which would be unacceptable to the Kurds. What direction the leading lists will actually take will be revealed soon enough as the Iraqi Election Commission announce their findings in the coming days.

SOURCES

AK News, “Ammar al-Hakim: The Kurds will always be main partners in Iraq,” 3/11/10
- “Maliki seeks coalition after March polls,” 3/1/10
- “Post of President “crucial point” for Kurds in forging alliances,” 3/10/10

Alsumaria, “Hashimi meets Hakim, tackle post elections,” 3/10/10
- “Al Maliki surprises Iraqi National Coalition,” 1/7/10

Aswat al-Iraq, “Maliki’s bloc member says fresh mechanism to activate quadruple alliance needed,” 3/11/10
- “Presidency of Kurdistan nominates Talabani President of Iraq,” 3/10/10
- “PUK, KDP agree to form national bloc – al-Hakim,” 1/14/10
- “State of Law to ally with National Coalition to achieve majority-official,” 1/11/10

Dawlat Al-Qanon Network, “Al-Maliki Answers Reporters’ Questions Online,” MEMRI Blog, 12/8/09

Najm, Hayder, “coalition possible, constitution vital, says jaafari,” Niqash, 3/9/10

Al-Qabas, Al-Watan, Baghdad Times, Al-Hayat, Al-Zaman, “Iraq Votes – Part IV,” MEMRI Blog, 3/11/10

Shadid, Anthony and Arango, Tim, “In Early Tally, Tight Race Deepens Splits,” New York Times, 3/11/10

Al-Sharq Al-Awsat, “Al-Maliki Meeting With Al-Sistani Indicates Approaching Alliance with Shi’a Coalition,” MEMRI Blog, 1/5/10

U.S.-Iraqi-Peshmerga Joint Patrols Get Off To Rough Start

In mid-January 2010 joint patrols and checkpoints run by U.S., Iraqi, and Kurdish peshmerga forces were established in Diyala, Tamim, and Ninewa along the border of disputed territories within those provinces such as around the city of Kirkuk. The U.S. commander in Iraq General Ray Odierno originally made the proposal for these operations in August 2009 in an attempt to ease tensions between Baghdad and the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG). The idea generated widespread opposition amongst Arabs and Turkmen in northern Iraq, but a deal was eventually worked out between the central and regional governments. In mid-February and the beginning of March the operation faced two major setbacks.

First, on February 10, 2010 the U.S. commander in Ninewa set up a joint escort for the governor of the province that led to a confrontation with Kurdish forces. The incident began when a joint force took Governor Atheel al-Nujafi to the Kurdish controlled town of Takleef. There, locals threw rocks and tomatoes at his caravan leading to shots being fired in the air. Iraqi forces with the governor ended up arresting some peshmerga troops, who in turn detained some government soldiers. The standoff eventually ended when all of the prisoners were released, but the affair wasn’t over. Afterward, the governor accused the Kurds of kidnapping. KRG President Massoud Barzani countered by suspending joint patrols, and calling Nujafi a criminal who would be arrested if he ever entered another Kurdish area in Ninewa again. After the January 2009 provincial elections in which Nujafi’s al-Hadbaa party won a majority and took over the local government, the Kurds boycotted and set up their own administration in sixteen districts that they controlled. Takleef was in one of those areas. The U.S. tried to smooth over the situation by saying that it was all a misunderstanding, but the American commander in Ninewa still said that local officials should be able to go anywhere in the governorate. Eventually Barzani okayed the continuation of joint patrols.

The second mishap occurred on March 7, the day of general voting for Iraq’s parliament. A provincial council member in Ninewa who was going to cast his ballot just outside of Mosul was mistakenly fired upon by a joint checkpoint. The council member later died of his wounds in a hospital, while eight others in his entourage were wounded. The incident was labeled a tragic misunderstanding between the two parties.

So far these two incidents have not become a national issue, but if another problem happens the joint patrols could quickly become one. Gen. Odierno envisioned the operation as a way to relieve tensions between Arabs and Kurds, which he considers the main threat to stability in Iraq. He was able to overcome a lot of local opposition to get the program up and running. The two recent events show that they may not be able to accomplish much. That’s especially true in Ninewa where there are two rival administrations, one run by the provincial council and another by the KRG. There it seems the best that the patrols and checkpoints could do is maintain the status quo. At their worst, they could lead to another confrontation that blows up in the face of the Americans.

SOURCES

Arraf, Jane, “Before Iraq election, Arab and Kurd tensions soar in the north,” Christian Science Monitor, 3/1/10

KUNA, “Mosul explosions kill one, injure 20 others,” 3/7/10

Reuters, “FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, March 7,” 3/7/10