Embezzlement Case In Karbala Reveals Why Corruption Persists In Iraq

In early 2010 the Iraqi government launched a massive program to build over 300,000 housing units to address the huge shortage in accommodations throughout the country. In 2009 for example, a United Nations study estimated that Iraq was short 1.5 million houses. Karbala was one province that launched a development project to meet this need. That ran into problems in March 2010, when it was announced that some of the engineers who were in control of the project created a fake company to embezzle money. According to the head of reconstruction in the province, the engineers stole around 3 million dinars, roughly $2,500, before they were caught. Iraq has consistently been ranked one of the most corrupt in the world. In 2009 for example, Transparency International had Iraq tied for the fourth spot on its list of worldwide corruption. Any large development program such as the one recently launched by the government to address housing is threatened by this ever-present problem. It can derail entire projects by making second-rate products, and delay their completion as corrupt officials siphon off money.

What happened after the Karbala case was made public is also telling as to why corruption persists within Iraq. The head of reconstruction in Karbala said that they first approached the Housing Ministry about the case, but they refused to do anything about it. The provincial council then took it upon itself to prosecute the individuals involved, and had the local Integrity Committee take up the investigation. The head of the governorate’s council criticized how the Committee was dealing with the issue, mainly because it went public with the case. The council chief said that the case needed to go through all the necessary channels and a court before the Integrity Committee should have said anything to the media about it. The Karbala incident shows how ministries in Baghdad as well as the leading officials in the provinces simply don’t want to deal with corruption, and want to keep it out of the public’s eye. The Housing Ministry seemed uninterested in the case, and the head of the Karbala’s council was more concerned about the bad publicity it created rather than the fact a crime had been committed. Until corruption is brought under control it will continue to undermine the country’s ability to develop, and weaken housing programs like this one in Karbala.

SOURCES

AK News, “Accusation of Anti-corruption committee does not represent local opinion, Karbala Council,” 3/18/10
- “Karbala to combat corruption after graft case reveled,” 3/14/10

Hasan, Faleh, “Capital Tackles Housing Woes,” Institute for War & Peace Reporting, 3/25/10

Is Maliki Done As Iraq’s Prime Minister?

Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s State of Law list finished a disappointing second in the March 2010 parliamentary election. Since then he has desperately been trying to put together a ruling coalition since the Iraqi Supreme Court ruled that the list with the largest number of seats before a new president is selected, rather than who won, would have the right to put together a new government. The problem for Maliki is that not only does he not have enough seats to be the largest alliance right now, but that he has also made so many enemies over the last few years in office. Maliki has turned on the Kurdish Alliance, the Sadrists, the Supreme Council, and the Iraqi Accordance Front in the last two years, all of which were part of his government originally, and used the security forces against most of them. The Prime Minister has also tried to centralize power around himself and his Dawa Party. Despite all that, Maliki is still promoting himself for a second term in office. His previous actions may come back to bite him however.

Since the March vote there have been scattered reports that Maliki’s opponents and even members of his own State of Law list are either opposed to his re-election as Prime Minister or are willing to sacrifice him to remain in power. On March 18 for example, McClatchy Newspapers reported that some in State of Law were willing to dump Maliki in return for leading positions within a new government. Three days later a member of the Supreme Council-Sadrist led Iraqi National Alliance told The National that his list and the Kurdish Alliance had an agreement to stop Maliki from returning to office. They said that if he were to be re-elected, he would continue to place Dawa officials throughout the civil service, and try to amass more power around himself. That was followed by a story in Azzaman that claimed the Sadrists, the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council, and the Kurdish Alliance had all vetoed a second term for Maliki. The paper talked to Sadrists who claimed that Maliki had even mentioned concessions to them if he didn’t remain Prime Minister. They said he wanted Dawa members to keep their current positions, which was around 57% of the government bureaucracy, not to investigate corruption charges against him and his party, as well as to not look into criminal acts such as torture and executions. On April 1, the on-line magazine Niqash published accounts of State of Law members outside of the Dawa party who were willing to give up on Maliki if it meant keeping Allawi out of power. Finally, the Sadrists have been outspoken in their opposition to Maliki, and their recent referendum was a way to publicly express that when their National Alliance running mate Ibrahim al-Jaafari won. In a recent demonstration in Najaf to commemorate the fall of Baghdad to U.S. forces, Sadrist speakers also said that those in power, meaning Maliki, had to step down. The National Alliance is the most natural ally for State of Law since they are both Shiite led lists. The Sadrists have been the main reason why this has not happened, and there appears to be reservations by the Supreme Council as well about Maliki. The Prime Minister has also actively courted the Kurds since before the election even occurred. They have stated that a State of Law-National Alliance-Kurdish Alliance government would be the easiest and most natural to form, but they too have agreed to nothing yet. Members of Maliki’s own list may be beginning to see which way the wind is blowing even though none has publicly been willing to break with him.

The problem for Maliki is that he may be done, but doesn’t realize it yet. He has simply turned on too many people that he now desperately needs. If his State of Law had finished first he probably wouldn’t be in this position as he would have the upper hand. Now he needs other parties more than they need him, since Iyad Allawi’s Iraqi National Movement won the election. There are only a few reports now that express opposition to Maliki, but as time passes there may be more and more. His ego will likely prevent him from realizing his current position, dragging out the government formation process for months until he drops out of the race.

SOURCES

Ali, Ahmed, “Iraqiyya’s Path to Power,” Middle East Channel, Foreign Policy, 4/8/10

Allam, Hannah and Hammoudi, Laith, “Even if he wins, Maliki may be out as Iraq’s prime minister,” McClatchy Newspapers, 3/18/10

Azzaman, “Mixed signals from Iran to accept the nomination of Allawi, Iraq’s prime minister,” 3/31/10

Latif, Nizar and Sands, Phil, “Iraqi election comes down to final ballots,” The National, 3/21/10

Najm, Hayder, “fall guy,” Niqash, 4/1/10

Zahra, Hassan Abdul, “Anti-US cleric denounces Iraqi PM at demo,” Agence France Presse, 4/9/10

Dramatic Drop In Deaths In Mosul

Mosul, the provincial capital of Ninewa in northern Iraq, is per capita, the most violence city in Iraq. After deaths there almost doubled in February 2010, they dropped to the lowest level since the U.S. invasion in March. There were 66 deaths in the city in February, up from 38 in January. That was just around the average of 64.5 deaths per month for the last half of 2009. In March however, there were only 27 people killed, an average of 0.87 per day.

That was especially remarkable, because attacks were just about the same as previous months, while the number of wounded was the highest since August 2009. In March there were an average of 2.16 security incidents per day, compared to 2.17 in February and 1.90 in January. 125 people were wounded last month, an average of 4.03 per day. That contrasted to 3.89 wounded per day in February, 2.87 per day in January, and 3.48 in December. The last time that March’s average was surpassed was in August when 5.51 people were wounded a day. It appears that insurgents tried to harm as many people as they usually do since the number of attacks in March were consistent with previous months. Their plans seemingly went awry however, as they ended up wounding more people than killing them.

Attack and Casualty Statistics for Mosul

Month	Attacks/Avg. Per Day	Deaths/Avg. Per Day	Wounded/Avg. Per Day
Aug. 09	77/2.48	102/3.29	171/5.51
Sep.	72/2.40	65/2.16	60/2.00
Oct.	66/2.12	60/1.93	82/2.64
Nov.	55/1.83	37/1.23	71/2.36
Dec.	60/1.93	44/1.41	108/3.48
Jan. 10	59/1.90	38/1.22	89/2.87
Feb.	61/2.17	66/2.35	109/3.89
Mar.	67/2.16	27/0.87	125/4.03

Breakdown Of Attacks/Incidents In Mosul - March 2010: 67
Drive by Shooting: 1
Kidnapping: 1
Sticky Bomb: 1
Assassination: 2
Shoot-out/Arrest: 4
Bombing: 4
Mortar Attack: 4+
Grenade Attack: 14+Armed Attack: 18
IED/Roadside Bomb: 18+

Violence in Mosul is notable because it lacks the large-scale bombings, which are common in Baghdad, but still ends up with the most casualties per capita of any major urban center in Iraq. Most of the attacks in Mosul are IEDs and roadside bombs, gunmen shooting individuals, and grenade attacks, the three most common forms of incidents in March. In comparison, there were only 3 large bombings in the city last month. Violence in Mosul is driven by the fact that it is the last urban stronghold of the insurgency. It’s likely to continue that way since militants play on the Arab-Kurd divide, which is the main dilemma facing Ninewa today.

SOURCES

Aswat al-Iraq, “1 soldier, 1 civilian wounded in blast western Mosul,” 3/10/10
- “2 civilians injured in Mosul blast,” 3/20/10
- “2 civilians killed in eastern Mosul,” 3/30/10
- “2 Iraqi soldiers wounded in Mosul blast,” 3/21/10
- “2 persons wounded by hand grenade in Mosul,” 3/31/10
- “2 policemen wounded in Mosul blast,” 3/21/10
- “2 soldiers wounded in attack on voting center in Mosul,” 3/2/10
- “2 wounded in blast targeting U.S. forces in Mosul,” 3/21/10
- “3 gunmen killed in blast west of Mosul,” 3/13/10
- “3 mortars hit Mosul,” 3/23/10
- “4 army personnel wounded in Mosul,” 3/1/10
- “5 soldiers wounded in twin blasts in Mosul,” 3/20/10
- “6 wounded in Mosul attack,” 3/3/10
- “7 injured in attack on voting center in Mosul,” 3/7/10
- “12 killed, 49 injured on special voting day,” 3/4/10
- “Army force arrests 4 gunmen in Mosul,” 3/28/10
- “Army forces free hostage, detain kidnappers,” 3/25/10
- “Blast kills civilian in Mosul,” 3/15/10
- “Bomb kills soldiers, wounds 3 in Mosul,” 3/19/10
- “Bomb wounds civilian in Mosul,” 3/30/10
- “Christian killed in Mosul,” 3/17/10
- “Civilian gunned down in Mosul,” 3/2/10
- “Civilian killed, contractor injured in Mosul,” 3/15/10
- “Civilian killed in Mosul attack,” 3/13/10
- “Civilian wounded in grenade blast in Mosul,” 3/14/10
- “Civilian wounded in IED blast in Mosul,” 3/28/10
- “Cop, gunman killed in central Mosul,” 3/9/10
- “Cop killed by sticky bomb in Mosul,” 3/3/10
- “Gunmen attack voting center in Mosul,” 3/4/10
- “Gunmen blew up tribal chief’s house in Mosul,” 3/28/10
- “Gunmen kill civilian in Mosul,” 3/22/10
- “Gunmen kill jail’s guard in Mosul,” 3/15/10
- “Gunmen shoot down aged man in Mosul,” 3/21/10
- “Gunmen shot, kill civilian in Mosul,” 3/9/10
- ‘Gunmen wound civilian in Mosul,” 3/19/10
- “Hand grenade kills civilian, injures 2 in Mosul,” 3/24/10
- “Hand grenade wounds cop in Mosul,” 3/20/10
- “Hand grenade wounds man, woman in Mosul,” 3/17/10
- “IED blast wounds policeman, child in Mosul,” 3/25/10
- “IED explodes near polling center, wounds 2 soldiers in Mosul,” 3/7/10
- “IED injures civilian, ex-officer’s house detonated in Mosul,” 3/24/10
- “IED targets house of ex-police director, wounds cop,” 3/10/10
- “IED wounds 5 in Mosul,” 3/24/10
- “Iraq soldier gunned down in Mosul,” 3/21/10
- “Iraqi forces kill al-Qaeda leader in Mosul,” 3/25/10
- “Mortar injures 3 in Mosul,” 3/3/10
- “Mortar wounds 7, including children, in Mosul,” 3/24/10
- “Mosque imam killed in Mosul,” 3/3/10
- “Mosque preacher killed in Mosul,” 3/14/10
- “Policeman wounded in grenade attack in Mosul,” 3/14/10
- “Roadside bomb wounds civilian in Mosul,” 3/15/10
- “Soldier killed in western Mosul,” 3/16/10
- “Soldier wounded in 2nd attack on voting center in Mosul,” 3/4/10
- “Soldier wounded in attack on Mosul,” 3/14/10
- “Thermal bomb injures cop, 2 children in Mosul,” 3/15/10
- “Trucker shot dead, son wounded in Mosul,” 3/18/10
- “U.S. forces kill gunman, wounds 2 in Mosul,” 3/26/10
- “Woman gunned down in Mosul,” 3/31/10
- “Woman gunned down inside her house in Mosul,” 3/18/10
- “Woman killed, 36 wounded in Mosul on election day-source,” 3/8/10
- “Woman, son wounded by hand grenade in Mosul,” 3/2/10

Iraq Tries To Invite Foreign Investment In Its State-Run Industries, Again

At the end of March 2010 the Iraqi Ministry of Industry said that it was putting up 240 state-run companies for joint ventures with foreign companies. The Iraqi factories include everything from construction, petrochemicals, cement, food, and textiles, and the investors can have up to 50% ownership. The problem is the Ministry of Industry has been trying to get corporations to invest in these government factories for the last two years with little success, because most are underperforming, badly managed, and are losing money.

The Iraqi government first launched an investment plan into state-run industries in 2008. Then the Ministry of Industry offered up around 40 companies for joint ventures. Only eleven got any interest, and few of those deals were finalized. In 2009, it said it was putting up 240 factories that were part of 67 state-run businesses for foreign companies to bid on, the same ones that are now  being discussed. The Ministry wanted to start the process by the end of the year, but the world recession killed the plan.

Iraq’s state-run businesses have been in steady decline since the 1980s. Wars and sanctions in the 1980s and 1990s deprived them of money, investment, maintenance, and innovation. Most were inefficient and money losers, but were kept open by Saddam Hussein to keep people employed. Then after the U.S. invasion, the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) thought they should be shut down. When Iraq regained its sovereignty in 2005 the new government returned to Saddam’s policy of keeping them open to maintain employment, and to deter people from joining militant groups. Thousands of excess workers were hired as a result. In 2009 for example, Reuters visited a power plant in Baghdad that was suppose to have 2,500 workers, but had 4,370 on the books, few of which did anything. In July 2009 the Minister of Industry said that the average state employee only worked for two hours or less a day as a result. That same year the New York Times went to an electrical factory in Diyala. The U.S. helped renovate the plant in 2007, and then when the Ministry of Industry took it over, it expanded the workforce by 300%, and raised salaries, increasing costs and making it uncompetitive. The U.S. ended up having to subsidize the factory to keep it operating. The government has also failed to protect these businesses from foreign competition with tariffs as cheap imports have flooded Iraq since the 2003 invasion, and the country’s investment laws are confusing and contradictory since they are a mix of Saddam era legislation, CPA rules, and acts passed since 2005. Due to all of these problems business groups have complained that 90% of Iraq’s factories have closed since 2006. 

This latest effort to draw in foreign companies to help out Iraq’s state-run industries will probably fail like the previous ones. Iraq’s factories are money losers, and any investor would probably demand a drastic cut back in workers that the government would likely object to. Plus the country’s investment laws are a big deterrent, as well as the lack of tariffs. Iraq’s economy has been troubled since the 1980s. It has become more dependent upon oil since the overthrow of Saddam, and the other sectors have shrunk. These problems are likely to continue until the government is able to straighten out its laws and protections, and finally bring in outside help to modernize and finance its businesses.

SOURCES

Abbas, Mohammed, “Iraq investors face bloated workforce dilemma,” Reuters, 8/10/09
- “Iraq starts privatization drive, but progress slow,” Reuters, 7/28/09

Aswat al-Iraq, “90% of Iraqi industries suspended for 20 years – IFI,” 2/26/09
- “Imported products subvert Iraqi economy,” 2/24/08

Collier, Robert, “Imports inundate Iraq under new U.S. policy,” San Francisco Chronicle, 7/10/03

Desai, Raj, “Iraq’s Economy Needs More Than Security,” Brookings Institution, 10/23/09

Iraq Directory, “The Head of Commerce Chambers: More than 24 thousand halted factory in the country,” 2/24/09
- “More than 90% of Iraqi industries are halted,” 1/10/09

Mohammed, Mohannad, “240 Iraqi firms up for grabs,” Azzaman, 3/29/10

Myers, Steven Lee, “Many Investors Still Avoid Risks of Iraq,” New York Times, 9/28/09

Yacoub, Sameer, “United Arab Emirates to name ambassador to Baghdad,” Associated Press, 6/5/08

The Sadrists Try To Have Their Say On Iraq’s Next Prime Minister

After Iraq’s March 7, 2010 election the Sadrist Trend finished with a surprising 39 seats in the new parliament. They surpassed their coalition partners the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council, the Fadhila Party, former Prime Minister Ibrahim al-Jaafari, and the Iraqi National Congress who received 20, 7, 1, and 1 seats respectively within the Iraqi National Alliance. That made the Sadrists ones of the largest parties, and a sought after coalition member to form a new government. As a result, shortly after the voting was concluded Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s State of Law, the Kurdish Alliance, and the National Alliance all sent delegations to Iran to consult with Moqtada al-Sadr who currently resides there. He quickly came out against Maliki repeating as prime minister. The Sadrists were instrumental in putting Maliki into his current position, but he turned on them in 2008 launching three large offensives against them in Basra, Baghdad, and Maysan provinces. To make Sadr’s opposition to Maliki publicly known, his movement announced a referendum for prime minister on April 2 and 3. 

The results of the Sadrist referendum were made public on April 7. Ibrahim al-Jaafari came in first place with 24%, Jaafar al-Sadr from State of Law, the son of Ayatollah Mohammad Baqir al-Sadr, the spiritual leader of the Dawa Party and the father-in-law of Moqtada, finished second with 23%, followed by Sadrist politburo leader Qusay al-Shuheil with 17%, Maliki with 10%, Iyad Allawi with 9%, Sadrist parliamentarian Baha al-Araji with 5%, Ahmad Chalabi of the Iraqi National Congress with 3%, Vice President Adel Abdul Mahdi of the Supreme Council received 2%, and Deputy Prime Minister Rafi Issawi of Allawi’s Iraqi National Movement was last with 2%. The Sadrists claimed that 1,428,000 people participated in their referendum. That would be around 700,000 more votes than the Trend received in the 2010 election for their candidates. 

Results of Sadrist Referendum
Ex-Prime Minister Ibrahim al-Jaafari 24%
State of Law candidate Jaafar al-Sadr 23%
Sadrist leader Qusay al-Shuheil 17%
Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki 10%
Ex-Prime Minister Iyad Allawi 9%
Sadrist parliamentarian Baha al-Araji 5%
Iraqi National Congress leader Ahmad Chalabi 3%
Vice President Adel Abdul Mahdi 2%
Deputy Prime Minister Rafi Issawi 2%
Others 5%

The Sadrist vote was much like the primaries they held in October 2009, which allowed the movement to announce its decisions within the facade of moving towards democracy. Like the referendum, the movement claimed that around 1.5 million people were involved in their first ballot, even though the day before they claimed only 250,000 had registered. Like the primary, the referendum was meant to give the movement’s decision the appearance of a popular mandate. In both situations the Sadrist leadership likely agreed upon the outcome before any votes were cast.

Ultimately, the referendum allows the Sadrists to reject both Maliki and Allawi to repeat as the country’s leader. Both have major problems with their candidacies. Maliki has turned on just about everyone that was part of his original coalition that put him into power including the Sadrists, while Allawi’s list is considered too Sunni, and too close to former Baathists for many Shiites and Kurds. Because of their egos however, neither Allawi or Maliki is willing to step aside or share power. Rather both are intent on pushing themselves for as long as possible. A compromise candidate is probably needed in this situation just as Maliki was chosen in 2005 when the Sadrists and Supreme Council couldn’t agree upon a prime minister. What the referendum does is put forward a number of other possible candidates. Ibrahim al-Jaafari and Jaafar al-Sadr were both allegedly supported for the prime minister spot by the Sadrists before the referendum, so it should have been no surprise when they finished one and two in the election. Jaafari’s party was only able to win one seat in parliament, one for himself, while Jaafar al-Sadr is a political novice who just joined the political process. Both lack a popular base, which could be provided by the Sadrist trend. Both could also help unite the two main Shiite lists, the National Alliance and State of Law, as the backbone of a new government. Forming a ruling coalition is only in its infancy with the initial meetings between the leading parties having resulted in no breakthroughs. The Sadrists want to influence this process with its referendum since most of the major parties have gone to Iran to consult with Moqtada, making him a possible kingmaker. In the end, the movement is just one part of the equation, but an important element nonetheless with their surprising showing in the 2010 election.

SOURCES

Alsumaria, “Sadr Front to hold survey on new Iraq pm,” 3/31/10

Arango, Tim, “Empowered Sadrists Organize New Ballot in Iraq,” New York Times, 3/31/10

Aswat al-Iraq, “Iraqi National Alliance seats: Sadrists 39, SIIC 20, Fadila 7, two for Jaafari, Jalabi,” 4/4/10
- “URGENT / Al-Jaffari wins Sadrists’ referendum,” 4/7/10

Al Jazeera, “Sadrists shun Iraq front-runners,” 4/7/10

Kazimi, Nibras, “About Those Sadrist Numbers,” Talisman Gate, 4/1/10
- “Sadrist Referendum Results,” Talisman Gate, 4/7/10

MEMRI Blog, “Iraq Votes – Part VI,” 3/17/10

Roads To Iraq, “Coalitions, negotiations and the making of a king,” 3/20/10
- “Three Sunni candidates for the presidency, Zebari to the Vice-President,” 1/17/10

Visser, Reidar, “Jaafari Wins the Sadrist Referendum,” Iraq And Gulf Analysis, 4/7/10

Candidates For Allawi’s List In Diyala Wanted By Baghdad

As reported before, the Accountability and Justice Commission was thinking of banning four winning candidates from Iyad Allawi’s Iraqi National Movement after the March 2010 parliamentary election. One of those was Najm Abdullah al-Harbi, a provincial council member in Diyala, who is currently under arrest in Baghdad. The other three may be Sadiq al-Hussein, the head of the city council in Baquba, the provincial capital, Ghydaa Saeed, and Mohammad Osman Qasim al-Khalidi, a former mayor, and the head of the National Movement in Diyala. Two of those three are currently in hiding from the security forces, but it is unclear whether Khalidi is really wanted or not.

The story of the Diyala four was first reported on March 28, 2010 by McClatchy Newspapers, although there seems to be a mix up about one of them. In its story, McClatchy wrote that three candidates from Allawi’s list, Harbi, Hussein, and Khalidi, had arrest warrants issued for them, while one was pending for Saeed. Harbi was arrested by local police in Diyala on February 7, but then the charges were dropped for lack of evidence. Before he could be released, however, a counterterrorism force under control of Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki took him to Baghdad on February 10. A security official said that Harbi was wanted in connection with a suicide bombing, but U.S. forces in the province said that he had stolen money from government projects. After Harbi’s arrest the other three went into hiding. On March 30 however, Khalidi told Alsumaria News that he was not wanted, and that there was a mix up with another man with a similar name.

Originally, the Accountability and Justice Commission wanted to disqualify Harbi from the March election, and throw out his votes, and perhaps his three other Diyala compatriots in the National Movement as well, for alleged ties to the Baath party. That could’ve taken away Iyad Allawi’s razor thin lead over Prime Minister Maliki’s State of Law list. That controversy was ended when the Election Commission said that it would not throw out the votes for Allawi’s list. Harbi remains in custody however, and at least two other National Movement candidates are still wanted and in hiding. Critics of the government claim that this is just the latest example of Maliki using the security forces to intimidate his rivals. He has a long history of doing that in Diyala. In previous pieces, it was noted that the Maliki used the army and police to try to break up and threaten the Sons of Iraq there, arrest members of the Iraqi Islamic Party and the Accordance Front, and undermine those forces before the 2009 provincial elections. It would seem that the recent events surrounding the National Movement candidates would fit Maliki’s pattern of trying to break up Sunnis organizing in Diyala, which was once a sectarian battlefield between Sunnis and Shiites.

SOURCES

Allam, Hannah and al Dulaimy, Mohammed, “Maliki’s forces move against winning Sunni candidates,” McClatchy Newspapers, 3/28/10

Alsumaria News, “Candidate from the Iraqi list in Diyala denies he has been arrested on charges of “terrorism,”” 3/30/10

Fadel, Leila, “In Iraq, candidates seek an edge with post election maneuvers,”Washington Post, 3/30/10

Fadel, Leila and Mukhtar, Uthman, “In Iraq, 5 die in blasts targeted at Ayad Allawi’s political bloc,” Washington Post, 3/29/10

Another DeBaathification Crisis Seems To Have Been Averted

In January 2010, two months before Iraq’s parliamentary elections, the Accountability and Justice Commission, which replaced the deBaathification Commission, announced that it was barring 511 candidates and 15 political blocs for alleged ties to the Baath Party. 72 of those candidates were from former Prime Minister Iyad Allawi’s Iraqi National Movement, and 67 were from Interior Minister Jawad Bolani’s Unity of Iraq Alliance. The banning would become the major issue in the run-up to the 2010 vote. The Commission was not yet done however.

Just a few days after the March 7 balloting, it was reported that the Commission was not only considering banning more candidates, but that it was thinking of disqualifying the votes for those politicians as well. Later, as the election results began to be made public, it was revealed that the Commission was looking at 11 candidates that won seats. The National Movement was afraid this could be used to take away its lead, as four of the candidates were from their list. Allawi’s coalition finished first with 91 seats, while Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s State of Law came in second with 89. The Accountability and Justice Commission head on the other hand, Ali al-Lami, said that it was the Election Commission’s fault for letting the candidates run in the first place, and that they were only able to do so due to pressure from the United Nations.

The impending crisis seemingly ended at the beginning of April. That’s when the Election Commission said that if the Accountability and Justice Commission banned any more candidates, their votes would go to their lists, and they would be able to name replacements. That ended the threat to Allawi’s first place finish.

The main reason why the candidate banning happened in the first place was because the main religious Shiite list, the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council-Sadrist led Iraqi National Alliance, was feeling threatened by the growing popularity of Allawi and his secular and nationalist campaign. The Iraqi National Alliance had no real issues to run on themselves except being Shiites, so they decided to shape the entire election on their terms, the threat of Baathists returning to power. The two leaders of the Accountability and Justice Commission, Lami and Ahmad Chalabi, were both candidates for the National Alliance, and they made the decision to bar the 511 candidates. Prime Minister Maliki joined the fray by supporting the banning because he was afraid that the deBaathification drive was cutting into his own Shiite base, and to take a hit at his main rival Allawi. It should’ve been no surprise then, that the Accountability Commission would continue to challenge Allawi after the voting was finished. Thankfully, the Election Commission came to the rescue, and said that it would not disqualify any votes. If they had not, the Baathist controversy might have blown up all over again, and caused popular unrest. Voters could’ve not only felt that their voice didn’t matter if the Accountability Commission had barred the politicians they supported and thrown out their ballots, but it had the potential to shake Iraq’s move towards democracy by taking victory away from the winner, Allawi, thereby changing the entire outcome of the election. Forming a new government in Iraq is already likely to take months. Getting rid of at least one roadblock, the continuation of deBaathification, will help this process move along just a little bit.

SOURCES

Abdul-Zahra, Qassim, “Iraqi panel wants to bar 4 elected on winning list,” Associated Press, 3/29/10

Fadel, Leila, “In Iraq, candidates seek an edge with post-election maneuvers,” Washington Post, 3/30/10

Inside Iraq, “Iraq bans 14 political blocs and its 400 politicians,” McClatchy Newspapers, 1/7/10

Londono, Ernesto and Fadel, Leila, “Dispute over candidate disqualifications could mar Iraqi vote’s legitimacy,” Washington Post, 3/10/10

MEMRI Staff, “Iraq: The Formation of a New Government – Part I,” MEMRI Blog, 4/1/10
- “Summary of Main Events Surrounding Formation of a New Iraqi Government,” 4/2/10

Parker, Ned, “In Iraq, newly elected lawmaker target of arrest warrant,” Los Angeles Times, 4/1/10