February 2008 UNICEF Report on Iraq

UNICEF recently released a report on Iraq. It not only focused upon the country’s children, but health, education, poverty, and the displaced. The organization said that with the reduction in violence there was greater access to Iraq’s communities. That was revealing more examples of poverty and deprivation than anyone knew about previously.

The biggest issue UNICEF reported on was a developing measles threat. It said that nine provinces had reported measles affecting 6,000 people since early 2008. The Iraqi Ministry of Health is worried that it could spread. Najaf, Sulamaniya, Irbil, Maysan, and Dohuk were endangered by this disease, while a more recent report from the United Nations’ IRIN news agency said that Salahaddin, Tamim, Anbar, Diyala, Baghdad, Babil and Dhi Qar were hit the hardest. Most victims were small children under the age of six. Government officials said that the main cause of the spread of measles was the lack of security, which kept health workers out of many areas.

The United Nations agency also went to a few schools in the northern provinces of Diyala, Irbil, and Dohuk. All of them were lacking basic services, especially access to clean water. In Dohuk the schools lacked bathrooms, while children in two villages in Irbil were suffering from water born diseases.

The displaced was another issue the report dealt with. In Tamim, 900 children were found begging on the streets of Kirkuk. 100 of them were orphans. Around half were internal refugees. All of them were trying to support their impoverished families. Internal refugees that were returning to the province lacked shelter, and access to water and sanitation. In Basra 250 squatters in an old navy had no sanitation, health care, or clean water. On the positive side 1,325 displaced families returned to the city of Mosul in Ninewa.

In 2008 Iraq suffered a sever drought. The worst hit areas were in the north. UNICEF traveled to Irbil and Ninewa and saw the drought’s lingering effects. In two areas of Irbil there was high poverty exacerbated by the lack of water that destroyed their farms, which were also their main source of food.

Examples of impoverishment were also found in Anbar. The outskirts of the province had deep poverty. Two areas by Ramadi that suffered because of the violence are now improving because the government has started programs for children. They still lack adequate health, sanitation and other basic services however.

The last part of the report detailed the various projects UNICEF was working on in Iraq. So far, the organization has committed $8 million for humanitarian projects in 59 communities. Those have mainly focused upon water, schools, and health campaigns. The major problem is that United Nations can hardly meet its obligations. UNICEF is short 89% of the money it needs for its various programs.

UNICEF is hoping that the provincial elections will lead to more responsible local governments that will address the needs of the country’s children. They are afraid about the spread of measles. The lack of services is also a large problem across the country. Iraq’s infrastructure has not been kept up because of the violence. Even as that has declined, there is still large-scale neglect. Finally poverty is another major issue. It has led to children begging, and kept them from going to school. More and more of these cases are being discovered as attacks have declined. The lack of money for both the United Nations and the Iraqi government after the fall in oil prices will probably mean these issues will not be solved any time soon however.

SOURCES

IRIN, “IRAQ: Measles emerges in violence-hit regions,” 2/24/09

UNICEF, “UNICEF Humanitarian Action Update Iraq,” 2/17/09

Obama’s Withdrawal and American Public Opinion

Today Friday February 27 President Obama outlined his plans to withdraw U.S. forces from Iraq. In a speech at a Marine base he said that roughly two-thirds of U.S. troops would be out of Iraq by August 2010. The Pentagon presented the president with three withdrawal plans. These were a 16-month plan, what Pres. Obama promised in his election campaign, a 19-month one, and a 23 month one. As reported before, the U.S. commander in Iraq General Odierno had been advocating for keeping as many American troops in the country as possible, and withdrawing them very slowly. The president apparently picked a middle course between his election promise and Odierno’s wishes by going with the 19-month plan. Even after that’s complete, up to 50,000 U.S. troops could remain in Iraq for training, supply, intelligence, and the external defense of Iraq. CBS News and the New York Times recently released a public opinion poll on Iraq that found the American public agreeing with the President’s timeline.

On February 23, 2009 CBS News and the New York Times released the latest American public opinion poll on Iraq. The survey asked 1,112 people questions by phone from February 18 to 22. It included 315 Republicans, 397 Democrats, and 400 independents.

When asked what country should be the focus of the United States Iraq was still number one by just one percentage point. 36% said Iraq was the most important, followed by Afghanistan 35%, Iran 10%, North Korea 7%, and something else or a combination 4%.

When queried on how they thought things were going in Iraq almost two-thirds said things were well. 11% said very well, 52% said somewhat well, 20% said somewhat badly, 9% replied very badly, and 8% didn’t know or did not respond. Overall 63% felt things were good in Iraq compared to 29% who said the situation was bad. That was the highest amount of positive responses since a December 2003 poll. At that time 65% said things were well in Iraq, and 33% said they were bad. By June 2007 the mood had flipped with only 22% saying things were good in Iraq, compared to 77% who felt it was bad. In a December 2008 survey, the mood change could be seen with 56% saying things were well, and 39% saying it was bad. Now would appear to be the most opportune time to pull out U.S. forces as over 60% of those polled feel that things are good in Iraq. If more thought Iraq was going badly the administration would probably be attacked for withdrawing under duress.

Public feelings on such a move was another question in the poll. Based upon President Obama’s original plan to pull out troops within 16 months, the poll asked how important that was. 46% said it was very important, 32% said somewhat, 10% said not too important, 8% said not important at all, and 4% either didn’t know or had no answer.

Early on in his campaign President Obama committed to withdrawing troops from Iraq. The Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) signed between Iraq and the United States says that all U.S. troops have to be out of Iraq by the end of 2011. The majority of U.S. forces will now be about before that deadline. The public opinion poll shows that the American public largely supports this move. The remaining force of several thousand will be there to ensure stability. There’s a good chance that many of these will even stay beyond 2011 if General Odierno has his way. They can remain if the Iraqi government agrees to it. Before than however, the U.S. needs to show that it is committed to pulling out troops because in July of this year Iraq will have a referendum on the SOFA. If it is not passed American soldiers and marines would have to be out by the end of 2009.

CBS News/New York Times Poll February 23, 2009

Which country should be the focus of the U.S. government?
Iraq 36%
Afghanistan 35%
Iran 10%
North Korea 7%
Something else or combination 4%
Don’t know/no answer 8%

How are things going for the U.S. in Iraq?
Very well 11%
Somewhat well 52%
Somewhat badly 20%
Very badly 9%
Don’t know/no answer 8%

Comparing February 2009 Poll to December 2008, June 2007, and December 2003 Polls
Feb. 2009: 63% well, 29% bad
Dec. 08: 56% well, 39% bad
June 07: 22% well, 77% bad
Dec. 03: 65% well, 33% bad

How important is it for the U.S. to withdraw troops in 16 months?
Very important 46%
Somewhat important 32%
Not too important 10%
Not important at all 8%
Don’t know/no answer 4%

SOURCES

Barnes, Julian, “Compromise on Iraq withdrawal timeline appears near,” Los Angeles Times, 2/25/09

BBC, “Obama outlines Iraq pullout plan,” 2/27/09

CBS News/New York Times, “Iraq, Afghanistan, And Iran February 18-22, 2009,” 2/23/09

DeYoung, Karen and Kornblut, Anne, “Obama Sets Timetable for Iraq,” Washington Post, 2/28/09

Rubin, Alissa and Robertson, Campbell, “Iraq Backs Deal That Sets End of U.S. Role,” New York Times, 11/27/08

Iran Tried To Trade Security In Basra For Nuclear Program

At the end of February 2009 the BBC is going to air a program “Iran and the West: Nuclear confrontation.” In the show they interview Sir John Sawers, the British ambassador to the U.N. He claims that Iran sent messages to England that they would help improve security and political stability in Basra in return for allowing Tehran to work on its nuclear program. At the time the Iranians were deeply involved in supporting a variety of Shiite militias in the city that were attacking British troops.

Beginning in late 2003 Iran began negotiating with Britain, France, and Germany over its nuclear program. The talks did not go well with Iran refusing to back off. At one point, the Iranians did offer a deal. According to Ambassador Sawers, the Iranians left several messages for the three European countries that involved Basra. Tehran said they would stop attacks on British troops in the city as well as halt undermining the Iraqi political system in return for Britain, France, and Germany accepting Iran’s nuclear program. The Iranians were intent on continuing work on their project. Sawers said the British did not accept the offer.

The Iranians started exerting influence over Basra immediately after the U.S. invasion. In March 2003 Iran’s leaders President Mohammad Khatami and Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamanei decided that they would deploy the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council’s Badr Brigade to several Iraqi cities after the U.S. attack including Basra. At the time the militia was a formal part of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards’ Qods Force, and received up to $20 million a year in funding from them. The Qods Force also used front groups like the Iranian Red Crescent to infiltrate Basra.

Eventually Tehran began supporting a wide variety of Shiite militias in Basra to carry out attacks on the British. In 2005 they were supplying Iraqi militias with the Explosively Formed Projectile (EFPs) roadside bombs that were used against the English forces. Iran also offered $300 a month to anyone that would carry out attacks on the British. In October 2005 the British said that they captured a Mahdi Army commander who admitted to using EFPs, and blamed Iran and Lebanon’s Hezbollah for supplying them. Basra also became a major transit point for the Qods Force to ship weapons to militias they supported throughout southern Iraq. By mid-2007 the U.S. and British claimed that these supplies had increased with larger caliber rockets being provided to militias. Earlier in March 2007 breakaway militia commander Qais Khazali, his brother Laith, and Hezbollah commander Ali Mussa Daqduq were arrested in Basra. Qais Khazali had once been one of the leaders of the Sadrist movement, helping keep it alive during the Saddam era. In 2004 however he broke away to form his own group, and was eventually named the leader of what became known as the Special Groups by Iran. Daqduq was sent to Iraq to coordinate Hezbollah’s work with the Qods Force.

While the British were focused upon Iran’s military policy in Basra, Tehran also began increasing economic ties. In July 2005 the two countries signed an export deal to ship 150,000 barrels of Iraqi oil per day to Iran for refining. Basra also imported electricity from Iran. Iranian products flooded the Basra market. England’s Guardian reported that Iran was using friendly militias to intimidate local merchants to buy Iranian goods. A free trade zone between Basra and Iran also facilitated this trade. Iran became so influential that many stores in Barsa had signs in Persian, and Iranian money was accepted.

Iran was willing to give up their support for the Badr Brigade, the Mahdi Army, Special Groups, and the Thar Allah militias in return for England’s acquiescence in Tehran’s pursuit of its nuclear program. When Britain turned them down was not mentioned in the press reports, but Iran’s strong military influence was finally curtailed when Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki launched his offensive in Basra in March 2008. During the fighting General Petraeus claimed that Iranians were helping the Sadrists with tactical operations. Tehran’s goal has always been political influence within Iraq however, so they helped negotiate the cease-fire to end the conflict. In the aftermath several Mahdi Army commanders were captured that detailed the training Iran offered to militiamen. New Iranian weapons with 2008 production dates were also found in the city, and a Hezbollah operative was captured there. Iran was dealt a setback in Basra, but its economic power remains, and it showed its political importance when it helped end the fighting.

Ambassador Sawers’ revelation shows the role Iraq plays in Iran’s foreign policy. Before Saddam Hussein was Iran’s greatest rival and threat. After the U.S. invasion, Iraq became a great opportunity for Tehran. They could increase their political, economic and cultural influence in Iraq, while using it as a tool in its dealing with the West. Supporting Shiite militias was not only a way to exert power in Iraq, but also a means to hold down American troops as Iran feared that the Bush administration might attack them. The offer to England also showed that Iran’s military policy was always subject to its political needs. Whether Iran will continue to play such a role in the future is a big question as Iraqi nationalism is now re-emerging.

SOURCES

Abdul-Ahad, Ghaith, “’Welcolme to Tehran’ – how Iran took control of Basra,” Guardian, 5/19/07

Allam, Hannah, Landay, Jonathan, and Strobel, Warren, “Is an Iranian general the most powerful man in Iraq?” McClatchy Newspapers, 4/28/08

Alsumaria, “Militias and neighbors loot Iraqi South Oil,” 2/9/08

Baxter, Sarah and Colvin, Marie, “Iran joined militias in battle for Basra,” Sunday Times of London, 4/6/08

BBC, “Iran ‘behind attacks on British,’” 10/5/05

Beehner, Lionel, “IRAN: Nuclear Negotiations,” Council on Foreign Relations, 5/16/05

Beehner, Lionel, Bruno, Greg, “Iran’s Involvement in Iraq,” Council on Foreign Relations, 3/3/08

Borger, Julian, “Iran offered to end attacks on British troops in Iraq, claims diplomat,” Guardian, 2/20/09

Cochrane, Marisa, “The Fragmentation of the Sadrist Movement,” Institute for the Study of War, January 2009

Dreazen, Yochi, “U.S. Weighs Messages From Iran,” Wall Street Journal, 4/29/08

Felter, Joseph and Fishman, Brian, “Iranian Strategy in Iraq, Politics and ‘Other Means,’” Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, 10/13/08

Glanz, James and Rubin, Alissa, “U.S. and Iran Find Common Ground in Iraq’s Shiite Conflict,” New York Times, 4/21/08

Hendawi, Hamza and Abdul-Zahra, Qassim, “Hezbollah said to train Shiite militiamen in Iraq,” Associated Press, 7/1/08

Kagan, Kimberly, “Iran’s Proxy War against the United States and the Iraqi Government,” Institute for the Study of War, 8/20/07

Katzman, Kenneth, “Iran’s Activities and Influence in Iraq,” Congressional Research Service, 12/26/07

Mazzetti, Mark, Myers, Steven Lee and Shanker, Thom, “Questions Linger on Scope of Iran’s Threat in Iraq,” New York Times, 4/26/08

Norton-Taylor, Richard, “British troops to stay in Basra ‘for the long term,’” Guardian, 5/2/08

Oliver, Christian, “Iran and Iraq look to heal old wounds with oil deal,” Reuters, 7/19/05

Overhaus, Marco, “European diplomacy and Iran’s nuclear programme,” EuroActiv.com, 7/27/07

Partlow, Joshua, “Iraq and Iran: the ties that bind,” Seattle Times, 1/27/07

PBS Newhour, “Iran’s Role in Iraq, Nuclear Ambitions Cloud U.S. Policy,” 4/16/08

Pearson, Bryan, “Clear Iranian role in Baghdad violence: military,” Agence France Presse, 4/27/08

Phillips, James, “Deter Iranian and Syrian Meddling In Postwar Iraq,” Heritage Foundation, 4/4/03

Rayment, Sean, “Iran ‘paid Iraq insurgents to kill UK soldiers,” Telegraph, 5/25/08

Rubin, Alissa and Gordon, Michael, “Iraq Team to Discuss Militias With Iran,” New York Times, 5/1/08

Susman, Tina, “Iraq jumps into U.S.-Iran tussle,” Los Angeles Times, 4/29/08

Tanter, Raymond, “Iran’s Threat to Coalition Forces in Iraq,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 1/15/04

White, Jeffrey, “Fighting Iran in Iraq,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2/14/07

Wong, Edward, “Iran Is Playing a Growing Role in Iraq Economy,” New York Times, 3/17/07

Wright, Robin, “Iranian Flow Of Weapons Increasing, Officials Say,” Washington Post, 6/3/07

Iraq's Displaced – 3 Years After The Samarra Bombing

There are around 2.8 million internally displaced Iraqis. This crisis has gone through three major phases. First Saddam was responsible for one million Iraqis losing their homes largely due to his campaigns against the Kurds in the north and the Shiites in the south. From 2003-2005 200,000 more were displaced due to the U.S. invasion and the following operations against the insurgency and Shiite militias. Then on February 22, 2006 the Shiite shrine at Samarra was bombed, which set off the sectarian war that lasted until 2007. As a result, 1.6 million Iraqis became internal refugees. The International Organization for Migration (IOM) is the premier refugee organization in Iraq. It has polled and assisted 80% of those that were displaced after the Samarra shrine was blown up. Recently the IOM released a report on the state of these internal refugees on the three-year anniversary of the attack. It found that the process of return has begun, but the vast majority have still not gone back to their homes. Fortunately there has been little new displacement recently. Those that have still not returned are facing increasing problems finding jobs, shelter, and sustenance. The government has not been able to adequately deal with this situation, and the amount of foreign aid has not been adequate either. The IOM warns that Iraq's internal refugees are facing an increasingly uncertain future as a result.

History Of Displacement

2006 saw the largest number of Iraqis lose their homes, but that process has slowed since then. After the February 2006 bombing 5.5% of Iraqis became displaced. On average 14,152 families left their homes a month in 2006. From January to June 2007 that slowed to 8,033 families per month, dropping to 2,269 per month from July to September 2007, and finally 866 a month for the last quarter of the year. By 2008 378 families were losing their homes a month. That went down to almost zero by June 2008. In October the Christian community in Mosul was attacked, with twelve killed. That led to 2,465 families to flee. That process has begun to be reversed.

Displacement By Period

Period	Average number of displaced families per month	Percent of total displaced beginning in 2006
2006	14,152	70.3%
January – June 2007	8,033	23.0%
July – September 2007	2,269	3.3%
October – December 2007	866	1.2%
2008	378	2.2%

Displacement in Iraq also followed certain patterns shaped by the fighting. 57% of the internal refugees are Shiite, 31% are Sunni, 5% are Christians, 4% are Sunni Kurds, and 3% are other. During the sectarian war Shiites left Baghdad and Diyala and fled south. Sunnis on the other hand, exited Baghdad and the south for the north and west. For example, the majority of Iraqis that fled Basra were Sunnis, while most of the displaced there are Shiites from Baghdad. In Anbar almost 100% of the displaced are Sunnis, while 60% that left were Shiites. Almost all of the displaced in Karbala, Maysan, Muthanna, Najaf, Dhi Qar, and Wasit are Shiites from Baghdad and Diyala. Christians and Kurds went north to Ninewa, Tamim, Diyala and Kurdistan. In comparison, the majority of Iraq's refugees that have left the country are Sunnis.

Returns

The issue of return is the newest one facing Iraq's displaced. Based upon its work, the IOM believes that the majority of Iraq's internal refugees want to go back to their homes if security improvements hold. They found that around 130,000 families, 61%, want to go back to their original residences, 45,000 families, 22%, would like to settle where they are, while 35,000, 17%, want to leave and relocate in another country. Already the IOM has identified 49,432 families, around 296,592 people, have returned. 69% of those were displaced within their home province, 20% came back from a different one, and 11% returned from a foreign country. Of that last group most were in Syria and went back to Anbar and Baghdad. The first returns were recorded in April 2007 in the Madain, Abu Ghraib and Taji districts of Baghdad. Since then the numbers coming back have increased, with 31,521 families going back to the capital. Interviews with almost 3,000 of them found that 36% came back because of better security in their communities, and 36% said it was a combination of that plus hardships.

Returning Families By Province

Baghdad	31,521
Diyala	8,818
Anbar	4,542
Ninewa	1,536
Tamim	627
Maysan	626
Basra	493
Other	1,269

That still leaves 273,243 families as internal refugees. Baghdad province has the most, 90,732 families, followed by Diyala, 22,784 families, Ninewa, 19,100, and Dohuk, 18,706. The majority came from just eight of Iraq's eighteen provinces. Baghdad provided the most, 64.3%, as it was the center of the sectarian war. Of those, opinions on return are different depending upon where they currently reside. Baghdad, Diyala, Najaf, Tamim, and Anbar have the highest numbers of those that want to go back to their homes. Most of those come from Baghdad and Diyala. In comparison, Basra, Wasit, Dhi Qar, and Qadisiyah have the most families that want to resettle there.

Location Of Displaced By Province

Location	Number of Families	% of Total
Iraq	273,243	100%
Baghdad	90,732	33%
Diyala	22,784	8%
Ninewa	19,100	7%
Dohuk	18,706	7%
Sulaymaniya	14,585	5%
Babil	12,677	5%
Wasit	12,306	5%
Karbala	10,921	4%
Irbil	10,304	4%
Anbar	9,179	3%
Tamim	7,911	3%
Salahaddin	7,790	3%
Dhi Qar	7,066	3%
Maysan	6,792	2%
Basra	5,989	2%
Qadisiyah	3,858	1%
Muthanna	2,457	1%

Origins Of Displaced

Province	Percentage
Baghdad	64.3%
Diyala	19.0%
Ninewa	6.0%
Salahaddin	3.2%
Anbar	2.6%
Tamim	1.8%
Basra	1.7%
Babil	0.9%
Other	0.5%

Another factor related to going back is the state of their property. Only 16% of the post-Samarra displaced had access to their homes. 43% have no accessibility, mostly because their residence has been occupied or destroyed. 38% don't know the status of their property.

The government has not been able to handle those that have returned. Families that go back are supposed to register with the authorities, making them eligible for 1 million dinars ($870). As of January 2009, only 12,969 families have signed up with the government. Most of those, approximately 9,100, are in Baghdad, followed by Diyala, 3,096, and Anbar, 522. That's only 26% of the returnees. Even though that's a small number, the IOM believes that the government is being overwhelmed dealing with them.

Needs

99% of Iraq's displaced have housing, but the quality varies greatly, and some are worried of losing it. 82% of Iraqi internal refugees surveyed by the IOM said housing was a concern. 59% of the internal refugees rent a house, but those costs are going up and many families are having a hard time earning money. 18% are living with family or friends. 22% are squatting or living in makeshift housing. Many of those feared for their future after Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki issued Order 101 in 2008 that told the security forces to evict squatters. That was suspended for the January 2009 provincial elections, and there's no word if it will be re-enacted. The last 1% is living in camps. That usually only happens out of desperation.

IOM's polling shows that food, shelter, and work are also top needs. Those are followed by water, legal aid, and health care. Most Iraqis depend upon the government's food rations. 81% of the displaced surveyed said that they need greater access to food. 19% have no access to the food ration system, while 44% only receive them sometimes. Kurdistan, Basra, and Kirkuk have the spottiest access. In Dohuk for example, 90% do not receive their rations. Maysan, Karbala, Muthanna, Salahaddin, Dhi Qar, and Baghdad have the best distribution. Health care was a secondary concern with 16% saying it was a need. That's probably because 86% said they had access to some kind of aid, however that doesn't account for its quality. The health system has been greatly degraded since the U.S. invasion. Many doctors and nurses have left the country, and there is a shortage of equipment and medications.

Conclusion

In the end, the IOM believes that Iraq's displaced are facing a precarious situation. Three years after the Samarra bombing and the majority of the 1.6 million that lost their homes are still displaced. Some Iraqis have begun going back to their homes, but it is still a small percentage of the total, and the government has only been able to help a fraction of them. Those that are still refugees face problems finding work, housing, and food. The IOM has tried to help, but the amount of international aid has not met the needs. These problems will only grow as more time passes.

SOURCES

Aswat al-Iraq, “150 displaced Christian families return to Mosul,” 2/10/09

International Organization for Migration, “Anbar, Baghdad & Diyala, Governorate Profiles,” December 2008
- “Three Years Of Post-Samarra Displacement In Iraq,” 2/22/09

Oweis, Khaled Yacoub, “Iraqi refugees in Syria reluctant to return,” Reuters, 2/12/09

United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, “Iraq Humanitarian Update,” October 2008

UN Assistance Mission for Iraq, “Human Rights Report 1 January – 30 June 2008,” December 2008

Election Monitoring Report From The Ninewa Plains

Ninewa is one of the most diverse and volatile provinces in Iraq. It is the home to Arabs, Kurds, Christians, Yazidis, and Shabaks. The Arabs and Kurds are both vying for power there, and the small minority groups have been caught in the middle. In the 2005 election the Kurds were accused of disenfranchising Christians and others. For this reason the United Nations sent monitors from their Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organization working with the Assyria Council of Europe to Ninewa to observe the January 2009 provincial elections. They recently released a report on their work that found the voting and procedures went routinely, but that many displaced Iraqis were not allowed to participate.

In the January 2005 provincial elections the Kurds were accused of violating the rights of minorities in Ninewa. The Kurds issued threats, refused to open voting centers, didn’t deliver ballot boxes, and took part in fraud to ensure their control of the province. The Kurdish militia the peshmerga for example stopped voting boxes being delivered to Christian areas in the Ninewa plains. Thousands of minorities were believed to have been denied the right to vote as a result. It was for this reason that the United Nations decided to send in teams to that area for the 2009 election.

Election monitors were made up of members of the U.N.’s Unrepresented Nations and People Organization and the Assyria Council of Europe. They worked in the Tellkaif and Hamadaniya districts of Ninewa. These were the same areas where minorities were disenfranchised in 2005.

The U.N. found that campaigning before the vote was free and open. In 2005 the Sunni Arabs boycotted, which allowed the Kurds to take control of the provincial election. This time the Arabs were enthusiastic about the balloting because they wanted power. The Kurds on the other hand expected a defeat, but wanted to minimize their loses. All sides used posters, TV commercials, and rallies to garner support. The openness of the electioneering showed the improvement in security compared to 2005.

The Iraqi Election Commission also launched a robust voter education program. They had materials in both Kurdish and Arabic, which were handed out widely. They also regularly ran TV shows on how to vote. Finally, the Commission also held public meetings to educate people.

The U.N. monitors received three complaints of possible violations. The first came from a parliamentarian from the Yazidi Movement for Reform and Progress who told a reporter in Baghdad that Yazidis were being intimidated by the Kurdish peshmerga after they complained to the Election Commission about violations by the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP). Yazidis claimed that KDP officials were using military vehicles to campaign with, and employed soldiers at their rallies. A Shabak lawmaker from the Shabak Democratic Assembly told the U.N. that an unnamed political party was pressuring Shabaks to vote for them. The parliamentarian said he had filed a complaint with the Election Commission. Finally, on election day a voter claimed that he and others were given a ride to the voting center in return for their votes. None of these stories could be confirmed during the time the U.N. team was working in Ninewa.

During the election the largest problem the monitors witnessed were displaced Iraqis not being able to vote. One voting center was told to open two stations for the displaced immediately before the balloting. Those two eventually ran out of ballots. More importantly, over 100 displaced were not allowed to vote because they did not have their documents in order. As reported before, similar incidents were reported across the country.

Otherwise the monitors said the elections went well. Security was tight around the voting centers. Most of the voting materials were used appropriately with only minor problems. They did receive complaints about political parties attempting to manipulate voters, but none of those stories could be checked. The greatest issue was the disenfranchisement of internal refugees. It seems as if the Election Commission did not do a good enough job informing the displaced about how and where they were to register. They could either vote in their home provinces, or in their current residencies, but either way they had to sign up with the Commission. This did not get through and an unknown amount of refugees were not allowed to participate in the provincial election as a result.

SOURCES

United States Commission on International Religious Freedom, “Iraq Report – 2008,” December 2008

Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organization-Assyria Council of Europe, “Election Observation Mission, Nineveh Plain, Iraq, January 28-February 2, 2009” 2/13/09

Pres. Talabani Heads Off Political Revolt Within The PUK

On February 18, Iraq’s President Jalal Talabani met with officials from his Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) who were threatening to leave the party. According to the Iraqi paper Azzaman, Talabani held a conference with Kosrat Rassoul, the Vice President of the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) and Secretary General of the PUK, the head of the Kurdish Alliance Barham Salih, and four members of the PUK headquarters Omar Sayid Ali, Othman Hajji Mahmoud, Jalal Johar, and Mustafa Sayid Qadr. All of them were threatening to resign from the PUK unless their demands were met. They wanted Talabani to create more democratic processes within the PUK and Kurdistan, commit to fighting corruption, and talk with dissident Nishurwan Mustafa. Before the meeting, protests were held in Sulaymaniya and Irbil in support of both sides.

The dissident wanted Talabani to hold discussions with former PUK leader Nishurwan Mustafa to try to convince him to become involved in the party again. Mustafa helped form the PUK back in 1975 with Jalal Talabani. Mustafa was the Deputy Secretary General of the party until December 2006. That’s when Talabani pushed him out. Since then he has increasingly criticized the KRG for all kinds of wrongs ranging from autocratic rule, corruption, a lack of services, failing to improve the economy and standard of living, and trying to control business in the region. He might also be forming his own party to run in the upcoming Kurdish elections. Mustafa has been able to voice these critiques through his media company, Wusha, that has its own newspapers, TV station, and website. The PUK leadership has not taken these statements kindly. In December 2008 for example, they expelled several members in England who were followers of Mustafa. The officials called for Talabani to resign due to corruption.

The PUK officials also wanted graft, bribes, and the lack of democratic practices tackled. It’s been said that both the PUK and the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), headed by Kurdish President Massoud Barzani, take bribes for contracts in the region. Nepotism is another issue. The KRG inherited two cement factories built by Baghdad when they gained their de facto autonomy after the Gulf War. One was taken over by the PUK, the other by Talabani’s wife. There are also reports that construction contracts are given out to relatives of high officials. 50% of the jobs in Kurdistan come from the regional government. Many of those are handed out as a form of patronage to party officials, or to members of the Talabani and Barzani families. The PUK has also tried to clamp down on dissent. In April 2008 Talabani banned any party member from publicly criticizing the KRG. Journalists have been harassed for reporting on corruption in the government. Intellectuals and human rights groups have charged the Kurdish security forces of arresting their members when they speak out against the authorities.

Coming right before parliamentary elections in Kurdistan, scheduled for May 2009, President Talabani could not ignore this threat to party unity. After his meeting with the dissidents in Baghdad he agreed to all of their demands. He said that there would be more transparency in KRG spending, some officials would be replaced, and he would initiative talks with Mustafa and ask him to come back to the party. One of Rassoul or Salih’s deputies would also take over the PUK’s intelligence agency. The PUK and KDP have had carte blanch rule in Kurdistan since the 1990s. Since then criticism of their leadership has slowly grown. It took the threat of dividing the PUK to finally make one of the two Kurdish leaders to address it. It will be interesting to see how many of these reforms are followed through with.

SOURCES

Agence France Presse, “Five Iraqi Kurdish Party Officials Resign,” 2/13/09

Alsumaria, “Talabani to share power within his party,” 2/18/09

Azzaman, “Al Adeeb Warns Of Kurdish Ambitions That Lead To Iraq’s Break Up,” 2/18/09
- “Talabani Tries To Prevent His Party From Splitting And Rejects The Resignation Of Rasul,” 2/17/09

Clark, Kate, “Corruption in Iraqi Kurdistan,” BBC News, 1/11/08

Fifield, Anna, “Kurdistan: the other Iraq,” Financial Times, 11/11/08
- “Kurdistan’s press pays for tackling corruption,” Financial Times, 10/3/08

Hama-Tahir, Wrya, “Iraqi Kurds frustrated with own leaders, security forces,” Middle East Online, 2/18/08
- “Kurdish Party Hits Out at Former Leader,” Institute of War & Peace Reporting, 12/5/08

Kurdish Media, “Kurdish lawmaker defends corruption in Kurdistan administration,” 5/26/08

Mahmood, Azeez and Mahmood, Rebaz, “Talabani Supporters Rally Over Media Controversy,” Institute For War & Peace Reporting, 4/4/08

Majid, Kamal, “An Assessment of the conditions in the Kurdish part of Iraq,” Brussels Tribunal.org, 7/23/08

Osman, Twana and Zagros, Roman, “Ex-Kurdish Leader Takes On Old Allies,” Institute for War & Peace Reporting, 11/12/08

Reuters, “Iraq’s Kurds to elect parliament on May 19,” 2/2/09

Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, “Quarterly Report and Semiannual Report to the United States Congress,” 1/30/09

Voter Disenfranchisement In Provincial Elections

Iraq’s Election Commission recently announced that there was voter fraud in all fourteen of the country’s provinces that participated in the provincial elections. 30 voting boxes were thrown out as a result. That however was a very small fraction of the total used. There were 37,000 voting centers alone for example that used countless numbers of ballot boxes. A much larger and more serious problem was the apparent disenfranchisement of an unknown amount of Iraqis that could not find their names on the registration rolls.

In Wasit province Hayat Yusif was an independent woman candidate running for office for the first time. She spent her own money campaigning. On election-day January 31, 2008 when she went to cast her ballot she couldn’t find her name on the voting list. When she went to the Election Commission about it they said that up to 700 others had already complained about the same issue. From news reports this situation apparently played out across the entire country. In each situation the Election Commission said that it was the voters’ fault for not registering.

There was much confusion about exactly how this process worked however. The New York Times’ Baghdad Bureau Blog said that every Iraqi that had a food ration card was automatically registered to vote. The Washington Institute for Near East Policy said everyone over 18 was allowed to vote. Iraqis still had to sign up however. The biggest problem was with the displaced that had very low registration numbers.

The government ran public information campaigns about the new system, but many were still left out. Hayat Yusif was one of these. She didn’t register because she believed that everyone who had a food ration card was automatically signed up. The same thing happened to thousands of others, especially the internal refugees. The exact number is not known, but the Election Commission claimed it was only 1% of voters. The Los Angeles Times reported that some Iraqis went from voting station to station looking for their names. A journalist that worked as an election monitor in Kut, Wasit said that 90 people were turned away from the voting station he watched because they were not on the voting rolls. In Basra, the Election Commission admitted that many displaced were not able to vote because they didn’t register. In Diyala the Kurdish Alliance claimed that 16,000 Kurdish families in the Khanaqin district couldn’t vote. 700 displaced families in the provincial capital Baquba protested over the same matter, as well as in Haswa, a town west of Baghdad. In Ninewa the Kurds said thousands couldn’t vote there as well.

A voting monitor from Europe who went to eight voting centers in northern Iraq said the registration system was flawed because so many voters were left off the lists. For the displaced, some might have been registered in their original provinces instead of where they currently resided. For others like Hayat Yusif they might not have understood the new system and never signed up. Whatever the case it’s apparent that the situation was widespread enough to keep several thousand of Iraqis from participating in the provincial ballot. This was a sad note for an otherwise successful election. The major question now is if these people that were not allowed to vote will continue to participate in the other elections planned for this year or whether their disenfranchisement will make them cynical and drop out.

SOURCES

Abdul-Zahra, Qssim, “Iraqi election commission acknowledges fraud,” Associated Press, 2/15/09

Abdullah, Muhammed, “displaced denied vote in diyala,” Niqash, 2/3/09

Bruno, Greg, “Iraq’s Political Landscape,” Council on Foreign Relations, 1/29/09

Carpenter, J. Scott and Knights, Michael, “Provincial Elections Kick Off Iraq’s Year of Choices,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 1/26/09

Fadel, Leila, “Calm Iraqi election marred as thousands were denied vote,” McClatchy Newspapers, 1/31/09
- “Low turnout in Iraq’s election reflects a disillusioned nation,” McClatchy Newspapers, 2/2/09
- “Some fraud found but no revote,” Baghdad Observer Blog, McClatchy Newspapers, 2/15/09

Morin, Monte, “Iraq vote turnout fails to meet expectations,” Los Angeles Times, 2/2/09

Naji, Zaineb, “Voter Apathy Among Iraq Displaced,” Institute for War & Peace Reporting, 9/24/08

Rubin, Alissa, “Election Turnout: Analysis,” Baghdad Bureau Blog, New York Times, 2/1/09

Sands, Phi, “’Great confusion’ at Iraqi polling stations,” The National, 2/3/09

Sands, Phil and Latif, Nizar, "Registration rule denied many Iraqis their vote," The National, 2/8/09

Al-Wazzan, Saleem, "al-maliki emerges triumphant in basra," Niqash, 2/4/09

Williams, Timothy, “The Ballot: Inside Iraq’s Voting Booth,” Baghdad Bureau Blog, New York times, 1/13/09

Possible Ruling Coalitions In The Provinces

Now that Iraq’s Election Commission has announced the final results and seat allocations the winning parties have two weeks to form coalitions to rule. They need 51% of the seats to appoint the governor, deputy governor, head of council, and the provincial police chief. Only in Basra and Ninewa did the victors, Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s State of Law and the Al-Hadbaa List respectively, gain enough seats to have outright majorities. Three possible set of partners have already been reported. First, Moqtada al-Sadr has told his followers to consult with Maliki’s State of Law. The Awakening of Iraq and Independents has formed an alliance with Saleh al-Mutlaq’s Iraq National Project. Finally, the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council’s Al-Mihrab Martyr List is talking with Ilyad Allawi’s Iraqi National List.

If these deals work out Maliki’s list could have majorities in Baghdad, Dhi Qar, Maysan, and Wasit. The Awakening would also rule Anbar. In Karbala, Muthanna, Najaf, and Qadisiyah the State of Law and the Sadrists would have to bring in one more party to rule. Babil, Diyala, and especially Salahaddin are much more fragmented, especially the last one, and will take several parties to come together to run those.

Overall, the elections have revealed three things about the current state of Iraqi politics. First, the Dawa has surpassed the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council (SIIC) as the predominate Shiite party. Second, the Kurds’ loss of control of Ninewa and Salahaddin shows their declining position within the country. They once had a winning combination with the SIIC, but after both lost in the provincials their hopes of greater federalism is probably dead. The Kurds will be coming under increasing pressure to give up their hopes of annexing territories outside of Kurdistan as a result. Finally, the vote showed that Sunni politics is as fragmented as ever. The Iraqi Islamic Party ran in 2005 despite the Sunni boycott, gaining a head start on their competitors. This time they will have to form coalitions with newer parties to rule in Diyala and Salahaddin, and lost control of Anbar.

Provinces Currently With Majorities

Basra: Maliki’s State of Law 20 of 30 seats
Ninewa: Al-Hadbaa 19 of 37 seats

Possible Ruling Coalitions

Anbar: Sheikh Abu Risha’s Awakening of Iraq and Independents – 8 seats plus parliamentarian Saleh al-Mutlaq’s Iraq National Project – 6 seats. Total of 14 of 29 seats
Baghdad: Maliki’s State of Law – 28 seats plus Sadr’s Independent Trend of the Noble Ones – 5 seats. Total of 33 of 57 seats
Dhi Qar: Maliki’s State of Law – 13 seats plus Sadr’s Independent Trend of the Noble Ones – 7 seats. Total of 20 of 31 seats
Maysan: Maliki’s State of Law – 8 seats plus Sadr’s Independent Trend of the Noble Ones – 7 seats. Total of 15 of 27 seats
Wasit: Maliki’s State of Law – 13 seats plus Sadr’s Independent Trend of the Noble Ones – 3 seats. Total of 20 of 28 seats

Provinces Up In The Air

Babil: State of Law – 8 seats plus Sadr’s Independent Trend of the Noble Ones – 3 seats. Needs five more seats for majority of 16 of 30 seats
Diyala: Iraqi Accordance Front – 9 seats. Needs six more seats for majority of 15 of 29 seats
Karbala: Youssef al-Habboubi – 1 seat plus Maliki’s State of Law – 9 seats plus Sadr’s Independent Trend of the Noble Ones – 4 seats. Needs one more seat for majority of 14 of 27 seats
Muthanna: Maliki’s State of Law – 5 seats plus Sadr’s Independent Trend of the Noble Ones – 2 seats. Needs seven more seats for majority of 14 of 26 seats
Najaf: Maliki’s State of Law – 7 seats plus Sadr’s Independent Trend of the Noble Ones – 6 seats. Needs two more seats for majority of 15 of 28 seats
Qadisiyah: Maliki’s State of Law – 11 seats plus Sadr’s Independent Trend of the Noble Ones – 2 seats. Needs two more seats for majority of 15 of 28 seats
Salahaddin: Iraqi Accordance Front – 5 seats. Needs ten seats for majority of 15 of 28 seats

SOURCES

Agence France Presse, “Sadr renews idea of local alliances with Iraq PM,” 2/20/09

Alsumaria, “Iraq parties form alliances after elections,” 2/13/09

Associated Press, “Iraqi provincial election results,” 2/19/09

Fadel, Leila, “Volatile Anbar province a test of Iraq’s future,” McClatchy Newspapers, 2/17/09

Rubin, Alissa, “Prime Minister’s Party Wins in Iraqi Vote but Will Need to Form Coalitions,” New York Times, 2/6/09

Visser, Reidar, “The Provincial Elections: The Seat Allocation Is Official and the Coalition-Forming Process Begins,” Historiae.org, 2/19/09

The On-Going Kurdish-Arab Dispute

Part of Iraq’s new political dynamic is the increasing feud between the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) and Baghdad. The dispute began when the constitutional article on the city of Kirkuk was never followed through with at the end of 2007. The future of the city has been put on hold indefinitely. In 2008 Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki also began confronting the Kurds by moving troops into the Khanaqin district in Diyala, and forming Tribal Support Councils across northern Iraq. Now every month Kurdish officials attack the central government, and they respond in kind. The latest event happened when the Associated Press (AP) interviewed the Kurdish Prime Minister and deputy speaker of the Kurdish parliament who claimed Maliki was dangerous, and that the argument over Kirkuk could lead to war.

The AP article was another example of the growing frustration the Kurds are feeling. The Kurdish officials began by complaining about the United States doing nothing about Kirkuk. Kurdish Prime Minister Nechirvan Barzani said that unless the Americans stepped in there could be war with Baghdad over the issue. The deputy speaker of the Kurdish parliament added that Maliki was dangerous and becoming more autocratic. The speaker said that Maliki was acting like Saddam, something other Kurds have claimed before. Both were afraid this dispute with the central government could escalate after Maliki’s victories in the provincial elections.

As could be expected, these statements led to some heated responses. A member of the Shiite United Iraqi Alliance said the Kurds were being counterproductive. A member of Maliki’s Dawa Party tried to turn the tables by accusing the Kurds of trying to annex northern regions of the country. A State Department spokesman made the most cogent remark by stating that Iraqis needed to solve their problems using their own institutions rather than always turning to the U.S. A few days later, the Kurdish deputy speaker denied that he said anything about Maliki, and claimed that he had never even spoken to the Associated Press.

Every few weeks the Kurds have made similar statements. In the beginning of February 2009, Prime Minister Nechirvan Barzani warned Baghdad about moving the 12th Iraqi Army Division towards Kirkuk. At the end of January, Kurdish President Massoud Barzani gave a speech in Dohuk where he said that the government was using the security forces to create a dictatorship. In the second week of that month, President Barzani also gave an interview with the Los Angeles Times where he claimed that Maliki was becoming drunk with power, which was making him authoritarian and autocratic. Barzani warned that if things did not change the Kurds could declare independence. At the very beginning of the year, President Barzani released an open letter that said Iraqi Arabs were showing their prejudice against Kurds and stirring up trouble. He implied that this could lead to the same kind of persecution the Kurds faced under Saddam.

The warnings about Kirkuk and Maliki’s growing power have been the major themes of the Kurds’ attacks on Baghdad. The 2005 constitution included Article 140 that said there should be a census and referendum on the future of Kirkuk by the end of 2007. As reported before, this deadline was at first extended, and then in effect dropped. The United Nations is supposed to be dealing with the issue, but has made no headway. A special election committee hasn’t even started its work to set up a process to hold a vote there for the provincial council. This has caused immense frustration amongst KRG officials. The International Crisis Group argued that the Kurds have held up major legislation in the parliament as a result.

The Prime Minister also began directly confronting the Kurds in the disputed territories when he moved troops into the Khanaqin district of Diyala in the summer of 2008, and then formed Tribal Support Councils in Ninewa and Kirkuk’s Tamim province. This stoked fears in Kurdistan that Maliki was not only going to refuse to allow any resolution of Kirkuk, but block the Kurds’ desire to add a series of other areas in northern Iraq. The Kurds feel that any area that has a large Kurdish population or that they lay historical claim to should be annexed, while Maliki wants to contain them to their current borders of Dohuk, Irbil, and Sulaymaniya.

Neither side has shown any willingness to compromise or negotiate. At the end of 2008 five committees were created of the five ruling parties, the Kurdistan Democratic Party, the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan, The Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council (SIIC), the Dawa Party, and the Iraqi Islamic Party, to work out differences within the government. By December 2008 only two committees had done anything however, and those were on finances and natural resources. The more important ones on foreign policy, disputed territories, and the armed forces had gone nowhere. The lack of checks and balances in the Iraqi government has also meant the Kurds could do nothing about Article 140 being put on permanent hold, or Maliki organizing tribes. The only thing they could do is try to organize a no confidence vote in parliament and bring down Maliki’s government. This has been a hotly debated issue in recent months, but nothing has happened.

At the heart of the matter is that the Kurds and Maliki have diametrically opposed views of how to run the country. As the recent provincial election showed, those parties like Maliki’s that advocated Iraqi nationalism, and a strong central government did the best. The Kurds on the other hand want decentralization, and more autonomy. Iraqi nationalism has also been increasingly fashioned as being anti-Kurdish, opposed to giving Kurds more freedom or to allow them to annex any territories. The Kurds were once in a strong position to fight off their opponents when they were allied with the Supreme Council that also wanted an autonomous Shiite region in the south. With no strong prime minister, the Kurds and SIIC could cut deals in parliament and create facts on the ground through their control of provincial councils and the local security forces to back their positions. Now that time is over as Maliki is asserting his control over all the security forces, and has used them and ad hoc organizations like the Tribal Support Councils to impose his will on the country.

With Prime Minister Maliki on the rise, the Kurds can only look forward to more frustration in achieving their goals of expanding and gaining more autonomy. So far the dispute has been kept in the political arena with the two sides trading verbal jabs at each other. During the summer of 2008 the two sides almost came to blows however, with only American intervention preventing it from escalating. The recent election has only made things worse from the Kurds’ perspective as they lost control of both Ninewa and Salahaddin, two things they could’ve used as trading chips in any negotiations. At the same time Maliki’s party did very well improving his position, while an anti-Kurdish party Al-Hadbaa won in Ninewa. Violence is also a threat in Iraq, but a more likely result will be the Kurds pushing for independence as Kurdish President Barzani has already warned of. If they can’t get what they want within the Iraqi system, the urge to secede will probably increase. This conflict will be one of the major issues of 2009.

SOURCES

Abbot, Sebastian, "Iraq's stability threatened by Arab-Kurdish rift," Associated Press, 2/8/09

Agence France Presse, “Maliki, Kurd Leader Trade Barbs Ahead of Polls,” 1/26/09

Ali, Ahmed and Knights, Michael, “Kirkuk: A Test for the International Community,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 1/14/09

Alisha, “Iraqi Kurds Leader Blames Arabs for Growing Rift,” UAE Daily News, 1/2/09

Alsumaria, “Barzani warning of war spurs major reactions,” 2/17/09

Associated Press, “Iraqi Kurds want U.S. help to avoid war with Arabs,” 2/15/09

Aswat al-Iraq, “Kurdish Lawmaker Denies Reports on Describing Maliki As ‘new Saddam,’” 2/18/09

Hiltermann, Joost, “Iraq’s elections: winners, losers, and what’s next,” Global Democracy, 2/10/09

International Crisis Group, “Oil For Soil: Toward A Grand Bargain On Iraq And The Kurds,” 10/28/08

Kurdish Globe, “Negotiations Ongoing Between Erbil and Baghdad,” 12/4/08

Parker, Ned, “Kurdish leader sees authoritarian drift in Iraq,” Los Angeles Times, 1/11/09

Rubin, Alissa, “Ahead of Election, Iraq’s Leader Pushes for Gains,” New York Times, 1/26/09

Official Iraqi Election Results (REVISED)

Iraq’s Election Commission finally released its official results for the January 2009 Provincial Elections. The report broke down how many seats each list received. As noted before, Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s State of Law List came away the victor in nine of the fourteen provinces that voted. Those were Babil, Baghdad, Basra, Dhi Qar, Najaf, Qadisiyah, and Wasit. In Maysan and Muthanna they were tied for first. The List also finished third in Karbala, and tied for fifth in Diyala and Salahaddin.

The other big winners were the Iraqi Islamic Party and its larger Iraqi Accordance Front coalition that came in first in Diyala, tied for first in Salahaddin, and came in second in Baghdad, tied for second in Anbar, third in Ninewa, and fifth in largely Shiite Basra. The Iraqi National List of former Interim Prime Minister Ilyad Allawi also had one victory tying for first in Salahaddin, and also coming in tied for third in Babil, Baghdad, Qadisiyah, Wasit, and fourth in Diyala, and tied for fifth in Anbar. That was much better than the preliminary results.

There were three new victors as well. The coalition Al-Hadbaa List won in Ninewa running on a largely anti-Kurdish ticket. Youssef Majid al-Habboubi, an independent Shiite and former Baathist won in Karbala. Sheikh Ahmed Abu Risha, one of the leaders of the tribal Anbar Awakening won the most seats in Anbar.

The Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council (SIIC) also did better than originally predicted. They tied for most seats in Maysan and Muthanna with the State of Law List, and also got second place in Babil, Basra, Najaf, Qadisiyah, and Wasit, third in Dhi Qar, tied for fourth in Karbala, tied for fifth in Diyala and Qadisiyah. They did finish a disappointing sixth in Baghdad after having controlled that province since the 2005 elections.

Independent Sunni parliamentarian Saleh al-Mutlaq’s Iraq National Project also did well for a small party. They came in tied for second in Anbar and Diyala, and tied for third in Salahaddin.

The Kurds were expecting to lose control of Ninewa and Salahaddin because of the larger Sunni turnout. They did, but their lists got the second most seats in Ninewa and Diyala. They got no representation in Salahaddin.

The Sadrists, former Prime Minister Ibrahim al-Jaafari’s National Reform Party, and the Fadhila Party fared the worst of the major parties. Initially Sadr’s followers were said to have finished second in Maysan, Dhi Qar, Baghdad, and Babil, third in Najaf and Wasit, fourth in Basra and Karbala, fifth in Qadisiyah and Muthanna, and eighth in Diyala. When all was said and done they came out second in Dhi Qar, third in Maysan and Najaf, tied for third in Babil, Baghdad, and Wasit, tied for fourth in Karbala and Muthanna, tied for fifth in Basra, and no seats in Diyala. Al-Jaafari’s list tied for third place in Babil, Muthanna, and Qadisiyah, fourth in Dhi Qar and Maysan, tied for fifth in Baghdad and Najaf, and a distant seventh in Baghdad and Diyala. The biggest loser had to be the Fadhila Party however. Not only did they lose control of Basra finishing seventh, but they only did slightly better with two fifth place results in Dhi Qar and Qadisiyah.

Parties or alliances need to hold 51% of the seats to name the top positions such as governor, deputy governor, head of council, provincial police chief, etc. After the seat allotment was announced, Maliki’s State of Law list and the al-Hadbaa List came out with majorities in Basra and Ninewa. In the other twelve provinces ruling coalitions need to be formed. The talk is that Maliki’s State of Law list will form an alliance with Sadr’s followers, while the Supreme Council is reaching out to Allawi’s Iraqi National List. In Anbar, the tribes have formed a coalition with al-Mutlaq’s Iraq National Project to shut out the Iraqi Islamic Party from power. This after Sheikh Abu Risha joined with them in a coalition at the end of 2008. Salahaddin, which was formerly ruled by the Kurds had the greatest fragmentation. Ten parties finished with enough votes to receive seats at the council. In Karbala independent Shiite Youssef Majid al-Habboubi won the most votes, but because he did not run as part of a party or list he only received one of 27 seats. That left the independent Hope of Rafidain list and Maliki’s State of Law with the most representation with nine seats each. Habboubi could become governor, but the real powers would be with the parties behind him.

Below is a breakdown of the major parties that won seats, how they fared, and then how many seats were allotted by province.

Major Parties & Candidates
Awakening of Iraq and Independents – Sheikh Ahmed Abu Risha. One of the leaders of the tribal Awakening movement in Anbar
Coalition of Diyala – Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council’s Diyala list
Fadhila Party – Ayatollah Mohammed al-Yaccoubi. Claims the mantle of Moqtada al-Sadr’s father’s movement
Al-Hadbaa Party – Coalition of four parties in Ninewa that ran an anti-Kurdish campaign
Independent Trend of the Noble Ones – Moqtada al-Sadr. Sadr supported a group of independents that called ran on a nationalist, strong central government, and non-sectarian list
Iraqi Islamic Party/Iraqi Accordance Front – Vice President Tariq al-Hashemi. Main Islamic Sunni party that split apart just before the election. Called for a withdrawal of the U.S., and revising laws that are considered anti-Sunni like the DeBaathification policy
Iraqi National List – Former Prime Minister Ilyad Allawi. Appealed to nationalists and former Baathists
Iraq National Project – Parliamentarian Saleh al-Mutlaq. Independent Sunni politician that ran on a secular and nationalist campaign
Kurdish Alliance – Made up of two major Kurdish parties, Patriotic Union of Kurdistan of Iraqi President Jalal Talabani and the Kurdistan Democratic Party of Kurdish President Massoud Barzani, plus several other smaller parties
Al-Mihrab Martyr List - Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council (SIIC). Islamic party formed in Iran. Ran on religion and federalism
National Movement for Development and Reform – Jamal al-Karbouli. Made up of former Baathists and insurgents
National Reform Party – Former Prime Minister Ibrahim al-Jaafari. Broke away from the Dawa party
Ninewa Brotherhood List – Kurdish Alliance list for Ninewa
State of Law – Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s Islamic Dawa Party. Islamic party that ran on a nationalist and strong central government platform
Tribes Of Iraq – Sheikh Hamid al-Hayes. Led by one of the Anbar Awakening leaders
Youssef Majid al-Habboubi – Independent Shiite and former Baathist

Finishes By Party
State of Law – Maliki: 1st Babil, Baghdad, Basra, Dhi Qar, Najaf, Qadisiyah, Wasit, tied 1st Maysan, Muthanna, 3rd Karbala, tied 5th Diyala, Salahaddin
Iraqi Islamic Party/Iraqi Accordance Front/ Alliance of Intellectuals and Tribes – 1st Diyala, tied 1st Salahaddin, 2nd Baghdad, tied 2nd Anbar, 3rd Ninewa, tied 5th Basra
Iraqi National List – Allawi: Tied 1st Salahaddin, Tied 3rd Babil, Baghdad, Qadisiyah, Wasit, 4th Diyala, tied 5th Anbar
Al-Hadbaa Party: 1st Ninewa
Youssef Majid al-Habboubi: 1st Karbala
Awakening of Iraq and Independents – Sheikh Abu Risha: 1st Anbar
Al-Mihrab Martyr List/Diyala Coalition – SIIC: Tied 1st Maysan, Muthanna, 2nd Babil, Basra, Najaf, Qadisiyah, Wasit, 3rd Dhi Qar, tied 4th Karbala, tied 5th Diyala, Qadisiyah, 6th Baghdad
Ninewa Brotherhood List/Kurdish Alliance: 2nd Ninewa, tied 2nd Diyala
Independent Trend of the Noble Ones – Sadr: 2nd Dhi Qar, 3rd Maysan, Najaf, tied 3rd Babil, Baghdad, Wasit, tied 4th Karbala, Muthanna, tied 5th Basra
Iraq National Project – al-Mutlaq: Tied 2nd Anbar, Diyala, tied 3rd Salahaddin
National Reform Party – Jaafari: Tied 3rd Babil, Muthanna, Qadisiyah, 4th Dhi Qar, Maysan, tied 5th Baghdad, Najaf, 7th Baghdad, Diyala
Fadhila Party: 5th Dhi Qar, tied 5th Qadisiyah, 7th Basra

Results By Province:

Anbar (29 seats)
1. Awakening of Iraq and Independents – Sheikh Abu Risha: 8
2. Iraq National Project – al-Mutlaq: 6
2. Alliance of Intellectuals and Tribes – Iraqi Islamic Party: 6
4. National Movement for Development and Reform - al-Karbouli: 3
5. Iraqi National List - Allawi: 2
5. Iraqi Tribes List – Sheikh al-Hayes: 2
5. Iraqi National Unity: 2

Babil (30 seats)
1. State of Law - Maliki: 8
2. Al-Mihrab Martyr List - SIIC: 5
3. Independent Trend of the Noble Ones – Sadr: 3
3. National Reform Party – Jaafari: 3
3. Civil Society List: 3
3. Iraqi National List - Allawi: 3
3. Independent Justice Association: 3
8. Independent Ansar List: 2

Baghdad (57 seats)
1. State of Law – Maliki: 28
2. Iraqi Accordance Front: 7
3. Independent Trend of the Noble Ones – Sadr: 5
3. Iraqi National List – Allawi: 5
5. Iraq National Project – al-Mutlaq: 4
6. Al-Mihrab Martyr List – SIIC: 3
7. National Reform Party – Jaafari: 3
8. Christian: 1 – through quota
8. Mandean: 1 – through quota

Basra (35 seats)
1. State of Law - Maliki: 20
2. Al-Mihrab Martyr List – SIIC: 5
3. Gathering of Justice and Unity: 2
3. Independent Trend of the Noble Ones - Sadr: 2
5. Iraqi National List - Allawi: 2
5. Iraqi Islamic Party: 2
7. Fadhila Party: 1
8. Christians: 1 – through quota

Dhi Qar (31 seats)
1. State of Law - Maliki: 13
2. Independent Trend of the Noble Ones - Sadr: 7
3. Al-Mihrab Martyr List – SIIC: 5
4. National Reform Trend – Jaafari: 4
5. Fadhila Party: 2

Diyala (29 Seats)
1. Iraqi Accordance Front: 9
2. Iraq National Project – al-Mutlaq: 6
2. Kurdish Alliance: 6
4. Iraqi National List - Allawi: 3
5. State of Law - Maliki: 2
5. Diyala Coalition – SIIC: 2
7. National Reform Party – Jaafari: 1

Karbala (27 seats)
1. Youssef Majid al-Habboubi: 1
2. Hope of Rafidain: 9
2. State of Law - Maliki: 9
4. Al-Mihrab Martyr List - SIIC: 4
4. Independent Trend of the Noble Ones - Sadr: 4

Maysan (27 seats)
1. State of Law - Maliki: 8
1. Al-Mihrab Martyr List – SIIC: 8
3. Independent Trend of the Noble Ones – Sadr: 7
4. National Reform Party – Jaafari: 4

Muthanna (26 seats)
1. State of Law – Maliki: 5
1. Al-Mihrab Martyr List – SIIC: 5
3. The People’s List: 3
3. National Reform Party – Jaafari: 3
4. Independent Trend of the Noble Ones – Sadr: 2
4. Gathering of Muthanna: 2
4. Independent National List: 2
4. Gathering of Iraqi Professionals: 2
4. Gathering of Middle Euphrates: 2

Najaf (28 seats)
1. State of Law – Maliki: 7
1. Al-Mihrab Martyr List – SIIC: 7
3. Independent Trend of the Noble Ones – Sadr: 6
4. Loyalty to Najaf: 4
5. National Reform Party – Jaafari: 2
5. Union of Independent Najaf: 2

Ninewa (37 seats)
1. Al-Hadbaa Party: 19
2. Ninewa Brotherhood List – Kurdish Alliance: 12
3. Iraqi Islamic Party: 3
4. Shabak: 1 – through quota
4. Christian: 1 – through quota
4. Yazidi: 1 – through quota

Qadisiyah (28 seats)
1. State of Law – Maliki: 11
2. Al-Mihrab Martyr List – SIIC: 5
3. Iraqi National List – Allawi: 3
3. National Reform Party – Jaafari: 3
5. Independent Trend of the Noble Ones – Sadr: 2
5. Islamic Loyalty Party: 2
5. Fadhila Party: 2

Salahaddin (28 seats)
1. Iraqi Accordance Front: 5
1. Iraqi National List – Allawi: 5
3. Iraq National Project – al-Mutlaq: 3
3. National Project of Iraq: 3
5. Group of Intellectuals and Scientists: 2
5. Iraqi Turkoman Front: 2
5. Front of Liberation and Building: 2
5. Salahaddin Patriotic List: 2
5. Brotherhood and Peaceful Coexistence: 2
5. State of Law – Maliki: 2

Wasit (28 seats)
1. State of Law – Maliki: 13
2. Al-Mihrab Martyr List – SIIC: 6
3. Independent Trend of the Noble Ones – Sadr: 3
3. Iraqi National List – Allawi: 3
3. Iraqi Constitutional Party: 3

SOURCES

Associated Press, “Iraqi provincial election results,” 2/19/09

Farrell, Stephen, “Election: Preliminary Results,” Baghdad Bureau Blog, New York Times, 2/5/09

Hamid, Nirmeen, “anbar’s Islamic party and tribes vie for power,” Niqash, 12/12/08

Madhani, Aamer, "In Anbar, new partnership are taking root," USA Today, 2/8/09

Rubin, Alissa, “Prime Minister’s Party Wins in Iraqi Vote but Will Need to Form Coalitions,” New York Times, 2/6/09

Al-Sa’dawi, Ahmad, “post-election analysis: real change or more of the same?” Niqash, 2/19/09

United Nations Report On Unemployment In Iraq

The United Nations’ Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs recently released a report on unemployment in Iraq. It surveyed 25,875 families in 115 districts across all eighteen of the country’s provinces. The study found that unemployment was 18%, but that might rise because so much of the economy is dependent upon the government.

The U.N.’s findings on employment were much closer to the official numbers, than many unofficial estimates. The U.N.’s survey found that unemployed was 18%, and underemployment was 10%. The organization stated that those statistics had largely stayed the same since 2004. That was close to the last estimates released by the government. In late January 2009 the Central Agency for Statistics and Information Technology said the unemployment rate was 15% based upon a poll of 18,144 families across the country. In comparison, at the end of the 2008 the Minister of Planning Ali Baban told the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction that he believed unemployed was 35-40%.

The U.N. found that young men and women were hit the hardest by unemployment. Men between the ages of 15-29 had a 28% unemployment rate. They made up 57% of all the unemployed in the country. That was almost double the government’s statistics of 26% unemployment amongst young people. Women faced an even tougher situation as only 17% were involved in the labor market. Of those, 23% were unemployed and looking for a job. The vast majority that were employed, 80%, were college educated. Only 30% of women with a secondary education were in the labor force, and that dropped to 10% for women that only finished primary school. Iraqi women were much worse off compared to their compatriots in neighboring countries. In Kuwait for example 52% of women worked, 42% in Iran, and 29% in Jordan.

One major cause of these labor patterns was the government. 43% of all jobs in Iraq and 60% of full time work was provided by the public sector. The number of people working for the government doubled from 2005 to 2008. As reported earlier, (5) a breakdown of jobs across Iraq’s provinces found that the government was the largest employer in fourteen of eighteen provinces, and tied for first in one more. In Kurdistan, the local authorities provided 50% of jobs. Wasit had the smallest percentage, but even then was 23%, second only to farming. The government also preferred older men between 45-65, and have hired more of them in recent years. This has distorted the labor market as civil jobs have drawn away the best and brightest from the private sector, while shutting out women and young men.

Public jobs were the most coveted in Iraq because of their security, benefits, and high pay. On average, a family with one government worker has a per capita income 14% higher than a household with one private sector employee. In rural areas that disparity is even higher at 22%. 55% of homes have no one working for the government. That means they are more likely to fall into poverty, especially if they have a female-headed household since women are far more likely to be out of work.

Private employment has declined from 2003 to 2008. In that first year 21% worked part time in the private sector, and 28% were full time. By 2008 25% worked part time for a private business, while 22% had full time employment there. As would be expected more workers moved into the public sector during that period, from 20% with a full time job with the government in 2003 increasing to 31% in 2008. The U.N. found that much of the full time work in the private sector since 2007 has been due to contracts given by the government. The agency warned that unless business grew the 450,000 new workers entering the labor market in 2009 would probably not find a consistent job.

There are many structural impediments to this happening. Private businesses can’t compete with government owned ones that are subsidized. High inflation in recent years has also kept interest rates high, which limits loans. Less than 2% of small businesses surveyed said that they had taken a loan from a bank or government for example. The oil industry also dominates Iraq’s economy, which has led to little diversification. Petroleum is also not labor-intensive meaning there are few jobs in the country’s largest business. Iraq’s laws also do not promote industry. The lack of security has kept international firms from investing and creating new sources of employment as well.

The U.N. warned that Iraq’s economy was heading for a crisis because of the drop in the price of oil. Oil profits account for the overwhelming majority of the country’s revenues. Now that world prices have collapsed, the government will not be able to employ as many workers. In 2009 salaries and benefits account for almost one-third of government expenditures. That will mean Baghdad will have to divert more of its spending to paying employees rather than investing in the future. That in turn means fewer jobs in the long run. That could threaten the future development of the country as their will be more unemployment, especially for the young, that could lead to more social unrest.

The paper ends with some recommendations for Baghdad to follow to try to alleviate this problem over the long term. First the laws have to be changed so that they promote private business. The budget also has to be adjusted so that it can give more contracts to the private sector. The economy also needs to break its dependence upon oil and diversify to create more jobs. More work also has to be created in the private sector for women and young men. The United Nations, World Bank, and Baghdad already have one program running to support business in the country. The U.S. has an Iraq First program to funnel reconstruction contracts to Iraqi owned companies. Much more is needed to solve this problem however. A government information campaign would probably also be necessary to begin changing society’s opinion about women in the work force as well. In the short-term, there is little help for Iraq’s employment situation as oil prices are dropping, and the budget is heading for a deficit. The government’s response has been to push for more oil production and exports, rather than to diversify, showing that the dominant paradigm amongst officials is to stick with what’s proven, rather than trying to forge a new way forward.

SOURCES

Aswat al-Iraq, “Iraqi Unemployment Rate Dropped by 15% in 2008,” 1/26/09

Inter-Agency Information and Analysis Unit, “Iraq Labour Force Analysis 2003-2008,” United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, January 2009

Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, “Quarterly Report and Semiannual Report to the United States Congress,” 1/30/09

Susman, Tina, “IRAQ: Unemployment bad and getting worse,” Babylon & Beyond Blog, Los Angeles Times, 2/15/09

How Did The Sadrists Do In The Provincial Elections?

Many commentators and reports before and after the January 2009 provincial elections predicted that Moqtada al-Sadr would do badly in the vote. The results were a mixed bag for his followers. The movement did not say whom it supported until just before the balloting. It lost Maysan the only province that it controlled, and Sadr City as well to Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s State of Law List. The Sadr Trend also did badly in Basra the site of a government crackdown in early 2008. At the same time the Sadrists finished second in four provinces, gained more representation than they had before, and could be forming ruling coalitions with Maliki’s List.

Because of the government’s operations against the Mahdi Army, and the movement’s late announcement of what lists it backed the Sadrists appeared to be at a disadvantage before the provincial vote. Beginning in March 2008 Prime Minister Maliki launched military operations against the Sadrists in Basra, Sadr City, Maysan, and the rest of the south. There was obviously a political element behind these moves, as the Prime Minister has not shied away from using the security forces as a political instrument. In April the political council for national security said that the Sadrists would be banned from the provincial elections if they did not disarm. That led Sadr to announce in June that his followers would not run their own candidates in the vote, but would rather support independents. Who exactly they were was not announced until early January 2009, when Sadr’s office said that they were behind two lists, the Blameless and Reconstruction List and the Independent Trend of the Noble Ones. That left little time for the Sadrists to organize. However, Sadr still controls dozens of local mosques across the country that spread his message, and has been attempting to reform his movement by disbanding the Mahdi Army and creating a new social and religious group the Mumahidoon, Those Who Pave The Way. This gave him a way to get out the vote at the grassroots level. At the same time, he had to compete with the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council and Maliki who both saw Sadr’s followers as being up for grabs, and made a concerted effort to recruit them.

The Sadrists saw the elections as an important way to regain political influence that they had been losing since 2007, but seemed to realize the limits of their power as well. In the January 2005 elections, Sadr told his followers to refrain from voting, that was only partially heeded. Sadrists won 12.7% of the vote in three provinces, included control of Maysan, and seats in Baghdad and Qadisiyah. In the parliamentary vote, the movement received thirty seats. In 2006 the Sadr movement helped make Maliki prime minister, and received several ministries in return. However after that high point, the Sadrists became more and more political outsiders. In 2007 Sadr pulled his followers from the cabinet to protest Maliki not setting a date for a U.S. withdrawal effectively eliminating any influence Sadr might have over major government decisions. The Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council also convinced the Prime Minister to isolate the Sadrists in parliament, and form a new ruling council with them, the Kurds, and the Sunni Iraqi Accordance Front that excluded Sadr’s followers. During the later half of the Surge, the Mahdi Army also became a major target of the U.S. Maliki’s offensives in 2008 shattered much of the militia as well. During this whole time the movement was also fracturing as more and more leaders began ignoring Sadr’s commands for their own grab at power. The 2009 election therefore was a major way for Sadr to not only get back into politics, but to show that his movement was still relevant. The Sadrists were therefore one of the one of the main voices calling for balloting as soon as possible, over the objections of the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council and Kurds who wanted to hold onto their positions in the provinces. As the vote finally approached, Sadr’s spokesmen said that they did not expect to win any province except Maysan, but were rather looking to gain enough seats to make sure no party dominated any province. The spokesmen also said that they hoped to gain around one-third of the votes across the south so that they would be part of any ruling coalition that was formed.

In the early election results the Sadrists lost in their strongholds, yet won seats across more provinces than they did in 2005. The Independent Trend of the Noble Ones came in second in four provinces Maysan, Dhi Qar, Baghdad, and Babil, third in Najaf and Wasit, fourth in Karbala and Basra, and fifth in Qadisiyah and Muthanna, and eighth in Diyala. They received 8.1% of the votes across those eleven provinces, far below the 33% Sadrist leaders were hoping for. Their greatest defeats were in Maysan where they lost control of the province to Maliki’s State of Law List, Baghdad where apparently Sadr City voted for Maliki as well, Najaf where Sadr’s main office is located, and Basra, the site of the Prime Minister’s first crackdown. In the capital, although they came in second, they only garnered 9% of the vote, a 29% difference from Maliki’s State of Law List who with 38%. In Basra the Sadrists finished fifth with 5%, and came in third in Najaf with 12.2%. In Maysan the vote was much closer with Maliki’s State of Law winning with 17.7%, but the Sadrists coming in second with 15.2%, only a 2.5% difference. On the positive side in 2005 Sadrist only gained seats in three provinces, but this time will have representation in eleven. They are also apparently forming a ruling coalition with the State of Law List in Baghdad and across the south. Despite Maliki’s offensives against the Mahdi Army, both sides have a mutual animosity towards the Supreme Council. Sadr’s strategy apparently worked on this front. While they did not win any provinces, and lost power in some, they did get votes in new ones, and have the opportunity to join with the winning State of Law List to govern.

Where Moqtada al-Sadr is heading is yet to be seen. Following one setback after another since 2006, his movement finally has something positive to talk about. The election results, while mixed, did give his list enough seats to be players in the ruling coalition if the reports prove to be true. It shows once again that Sadr is a survivor, and that when he appears to be done, his movement is still capable of a comeback. What is not known is if an alliance with the State of Law List will give the Sadrists any real positions of power in the provincial councils, and whether they will be able to delivery on any promises. The seats will give them access to patronage to rebuild their base, and build on before the parliamentary elections scheduled for the end of the year. On the other hand the provinces will have a 50% budget cut, which will limit this capability. In the provincials Shiite voting was down across the country, with many disillusioned with the current ruling elites. That could continue unless the Sadrists, and all the other Shiite parties, prove that they are better than the politicians they are replacing.

Sadrist Finishes In 2005 Provincial Elections

Received 12.7% of vote in three provinces

Maysan: 1st place 31.9%
Qadisiyah: 6th place 4.2%
Baghdad: 6th place 2.0%

Sadrist Early Returns In 2009 Provincial Elections

Received 8.1% of vote across 11 provinces

Maysan: 2nd place 15.2%
Dhi Qar: 2nd place 14.1%
Baghdad: 2nd place 9%
Babil: 2nd place 6.2%
Najaf: 3rd place 12.2%
Wasit: 3rd place 6%
Karbala: 4th place 6.8%
Basra: 4th place 5%
Qadisiyah: 5th place 6.7%
Muthanna: 5th place 5.1%
Diyala: 8th place 3.1%

SOURCES

Abdullah, Muahmmed, “Diyala Sees Early Campaigning,” Niqash, 12/8/08

Agence France Presse, “Iraqi Shiite Factions Intimidation Claims,” 2/5/09

Ali, Sarmad, “Arab Perspective: News for Feb. 4,” Baghdad Life Blog, Wall Street Journal, 2/4/09

Alsumaria, “Iraq elections leaks say Al Maliki ahead,” 2/2/09
- “Iraq parties form alliances after elections,” 2/13/09
- “Iraq Provincial Law causes deep rift,” 3/8/08

Associated Press, “Al-Sadr’s Followers Eye Comeback in Jan. 31 Vote,” 1/20/09

Aswat al-Iraq, “Sadr calls for ‘renewing’ UIA, welcomes alliances,” 2/13/09
- “Sadrist MP fears election rigging,” 1/31/09

Bennett, Brian, “The Perils of Iraqi Lawmaking,” Time, 3/1/08

Bruno, Greg, “Iraq’s Political Landscape,” Council on Foreign Relations, 1/29/09

Cochrane, Marisa, “The Fragmentation of the Sadrist Movement,” Institute for the Study of War, January 2009

Cordesman, Anthony, “The Shi’ite Gamble: Rolling the Dice for Iraq’s Future,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, 4/21/08

Dagher, Sam, “Gunmen Kill Iraqi Cleric Campaigning for Council,” New York Times, 1/17/09

Economist, “The enigma of Muqtada al-Sadr,” 2/14/08

Fadel, Leila, “Assassinations replacing car bombs in Iraq,” McClatchy Newspapers, 10/9/08

Farrell, Stephen, “Election: Preliminary Results,” Baghdad Bureau Blog, New York Times, 2/5/09

Gordon, Michael, “The Last Battle,” New York Times, 8/3/08

Hoge, James, “A Discussion of Iraqi Futures,” Council on Foreign Relations, 9/8/08

International Crisis Group, “Iraq’s Provincial Elections: The Stakes,” 1/27/09

Kahl, Colin, “Bridge On The River Euphrates,” National Interest, 9/2/08

Knights, Michael, “Significance of the Provincial Elections,” Arab Reform Bulletin, December, 2008

Knights, Michael and McCarthy, Eamon, “Provincial Politics in Iraq: Fragmentation or New Awakening?” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, April 2008

Kukis, Mark, “As Iraqi Elections Loom, al-Sadr’s Political Clout Fades,” Time, 1/26/09

Majeed, Alaa, “Iraq Press Roundup,” UPI, 1/8/09

Paley, Amit and Sarhan, Saad, “Powerful Iraqi Cleric Recalibrates Strategy,” Washington Post, 6/15/08

Raghavan, Sudarsan, “For Prominent Iraqi Cleric, a Test of Influence,” Washington Post, 1/31/09

Reuters, “Iraq’s Al-Sadr Ready For Alliances With Al-Maliki,” 2/14/09

Roads To Iraq Blog, “Maliki – Sadr alliance,” 2/11/09

Roggio, Bill, “Sadrist Fared Poorly in Iraq Elections,” The Blog, Weekly Standard, 2/5/09

Rubin, Alissa and Dagher, Sam, “Sadr, Insurgency Icon, Is Silent, but Backers Work Behind Scenes,” New York Times, 1/31/09

Shadid, Anthony, “Despite Discontent and Fragmentation, Islamic Parties Dominate,” Washington Post, 1/19/09

Visser, Reidar, “The Kirkuk Issue Exposes Weaknesses in Iraq’s Ruling Coalition,” Historiae.org, 8/7/08
- “The Sadrist Parliamentary Bloc Confirms Its Support of Two Electoral Lists,” Historiae.org, 1/11/09

Mosul – Dangerous Place For Politicians

Mosul remains one of the most violent cities in Iraq. While attacks are down in Ninewa overall from 924 in the months between July and September to 511 from October to December 2008, the province is still the second most dangerous in the country after Baghdad. This has been especially true for political party officials and candidates in the provincial elections. Six have been killed and three attacked in Mosul before and after the vote, more than anywhere else in Iraq.

The first attacks began in December 2008 and have continued up to this month, February 2009. On December 1 two members of the Sunni Iraqi Islamic Party (IIP) were gunned down in western Mosul. The first, Marwan Nazar was a high school teacher who was killed going to work. Abduljabbar Mohammed, another IIP member was killed later that day while driving in the same part of town. On New Year’s Mowaffaq al-Hamdani, a candidate for the Iraq For Us List was shot in a café downtown. Afterwards, the United Nations’ Special Envoy to Iraq condemned all three murders. On January 7, 2009 a Shabak parliamentarian who belonged to the United Iraqi Alliance escaped an assassination attempt. At the end of the month Hazem Salim Ahmed, a Shiite of the Iraqi Unity List, a Tribal Support Council in Ninewa that ran as part of Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s State of Law List, was killed in western Mosul. On February 2 the house of an al-Hadbaa List candidate was blown up south of Mosul. Fortunately, the building was empty and no one was hurt. Ahmed Fathi al-Jabouri of the IIP was not so lucky when he was gunned down after prayers in his mosque in western Mosul on February 11. The next day Abdilkareem al-Sharabi, the deputy head of the Sunni National Dialogue Front was shot in western Mosul. The latest incident occurred February 15 when Talab Muhsin Abbo, a principle at a preparatory school and al-Hadbaa List candidate was wounded when a sticky bomb attached to the bottom of his car exploded in southern Mosul. While the victims of these attacks came from different parties and sects there are some similarities. Of the nine attacks at least six targeted Sunnis. Five also occurred in the western Sunni half of Mosul.

The major cause of the violence in Ninewa is the divide between the Sunni majority and the Kurds who control the province. They were able to come to power due to the Sunni boycott of the provincial elections in 2005. The hope is that the recent vote and the ascendancy of the Arab parties will help quell this simmering conflict. In the last two months of 2008 there was a considerable drop in violence in the province overall. On the other hand more politicians were attacked in Mosul than anywhere else in the country. No one took responsibility for any of the incidents, but the likely candidates are the insurgency since almost all took place in the western half of the city. That points to some rejectionists who still do not want to participate in the political process. The fact that the al-Hadbaa List won the most votes on an explicitly anti-Kurdish ticket also does not bode well for resolution to Ninewa’s problems. The big question is if the newly victorious Arab parties can convince enough of their brethren to make the dispute with the Kurds political or if it will continue to have a large violent component.

SOURCES

Al-Ansary, Khalid, “Election friction flares in Iraq’s violent north,” Reuters, 1/2/09

Aswat al-Iraq, “Candidate assassinated in Mosul,” 1/29/09
- “Election candidate wounded by IED,” 2/15/09
- “Gunmen Blow Up Candidate’s House in Ninewa,” 2/2/09
- “IIP leader gunned down in Mosul,” 2/11/09
- “Local elections candidate gunned down,” 12/31/08
- “NDF member assassinated in Mosul,” 2/12/09
- “Shabaki MP survives assassination attempt in Mosul,” 1/7/09
- “Two IIP members assassinated in Mosul,” 12/1/08

Sabah, Zaid and Mizher, Qais, “Three Sunni Candidates Slain Days Before Elections,” Washington Post, 1/30/09

Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, “Quarterly Report and Semiannual Report to the United States Congress,” 1/30/09

U.S. Reports On Iraq’s Economy & Services

In January 2009 both the Defense Department and the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR) released their quarterly reports to Congress on Iraq. Both included overviews of Iraq’s economy and services. While the Pentagon tends to stress the positives, the SIGIR has some of the most up to date statistics, and gives a much more in depth look at the major sectors of Iraq’s economy. Both found aggregate improvements in the country, but still massive problems that need to be addressed.

Growth

The Iraqi Ministry of Planning recently reported that Iraq’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) grew 10.9% in 2008. That was above the 9% growth predicted by the International Monetary Fund (IMF). While the improved security conditions has allowed more space for Iraqi businesses, the one major reason why Iraq’s economy grew so much last year was because of the massive increase in the price of oil. With the dramatic drop in the petroleum market, Iraq’s economy can be expected to shrink in 2009. There are also large structural problems. Iraq’s oil sector has been largely stagnant since the U.S. invasion. The violence has kept foreign investors away and hindered local businesses, which has left the state the driving force in the economy. The country needs massive investment to upgrade its infrastructure and provide jobs. Officially the unemployment rate is 15%, but the Minister of Planning Ali Baban and other sources believe it is much higher. The SIGIR thinks that unemployment and underemployment could be as high as 60%. Corruption also affects every part of the government and economy, and takes a large toll.

Oil & Gas

Oil is the main driver of Iraq’s economy. All the oil companies are state-run, and are expected to account for 85% of the country’s revenue in 2009. The drop in oil prices therefore will cause a major crisis for Iraq at least in the short term. Besides that the country has no flexibility in its oil exports to make up for fluctuations in international prices. Oil production in 2008 averaged 2.42 million barrels a day, an almost 15% increase from 2.11 million barrels a day in 2007. However that was below the 2.5 million mark from before the U.S. invasion. Overall, production has been stagnant since 2003, with minor changes up and down. The same thing applies to exports. In the last three months of 2008 Iraq exported 1.79 million barrels a day, a 3% increase from the previous quarter, but a 6% decrease from the same period in 2007.

The U.S. has spent $1.86 billion on the oil and gas industry, but it still needs several billion dollars more in investment. An audit by the SIGIR of work done by Kellog Brown & Root to work on Iraq’s southern oil fields and port found that Iraqis may not be taking care of many of these projects finished by the United States. At the end of 2008 the Oil Ministry also began two rounds of bidding for international companies to invest in nineteen oil and gas fields across the country. By the middle of this year the Ministry hopes to have these contracts completed. They are hoping that these corporations will boost exports to two million barrels a day in 2009, and overall production to 6 million by 2015. Iraq has also signed up a Japanese company to work on improving the port in Basra where the vast majority of the country’s exports flow through. Baghdad is moving ahead with these deals despite the fact that the Hydrocarbon law that will define the role of companies and the government in the oil and gas fields has been deadlocked in parliament for almost two years now.

Despite Iraq’s oil wealth it cannot meet its public’s demand for refined petroleum products. At the end of 2008 it did not meet its benchmarks for production of a range of goods like gas and diesel. By that time it was short 51% of gas needs, 36% of diesel, 24% of liquefied petroleum, and 15% of kerosene demand. The production of these products has gone up, but it is being outstripped by the Iraqis’ desires for more.

Corruption and transparency is also a problem with the industry. In December 2008 the IMF said that Iraq was not doing enough to fight corruption in the oil sector. The IMF and United Nations also both criticized Baghdad for not setting up rules for better accountability with its revenues. The huge amount of money generated by petroleum is obviously a huge attraction to officials hoping to steal, but Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki has never shown any enthusiasm for stopping it. Instead he sees it as a public relations problem to be solved by simply not talking about it.

Farming

The Pentagon’s report said that farming has the biggest opportunity for growth this year. Agriculture accounts for 6% of GDP, and employs around 25% of the workforce, the second largest private employer in Iraq. Most of it is subsistence however, rather than for profit. The Defense Department listed all the structural impediments to this sector actually improving any time soon. Farming lacks government support, tariffs to keep out foreign competition, modern technology and techniques, electricity and fuel shortages that hinder the use of pumps for irrigation, a system that is broken down throughout the country, credit and investment, markets, and security. For those reasons Iraq imports 50% of its food needs.

In 2008 Iraq was also hit by a drought. It was mostly concentrated in the north affecting the provinces of Irbil, Dohuk, Tamim, Diyala, and Ninewa the worst. As a result wheat and barley production are down 51%, two of Iraq’s three major crops. The Water Resource Ministry reported in January 2009 that rain and snow was again down one third from normal, which could mean another water shortage this year. Kurdistan is working with the U.N. to help relieve the issue, while the Ministry of Agriculture began several assistance programs as well. The U.S. doesn’t think the government’s moves have been very effective however.

State Owned Businesses

As reported before, under Saddam the economy was state-run. After the U.S. invasion, the Coalition Provisional Authority unsuccessfully tried to privatize it, which led to the closing of hundreds of government owned businesses that employed up to 15% of the workforce. In 2006 the Defense Department began a program to revitalize these public industries to create more jobs. Over $100 million has been put into this project. That funding is now coming to an end, and Baghdad will now be responsible for their revitalization. At the end of 2008 the SIGIR did an audit of this effort, but found no reliable data to determine whether it was effective or not. It also found that cash was being given out without invoices, which would encourage corruption.

Debt

One area where Iraq has made a lot of progress has been with its foreign debt. Iraq owes money to two groups, the Paris Club and non-Paris Club countries. Most of this was from the Saddam era. Since 2004 Baghdad has been able to get $74 billion of its debt forgiven. That leaves $50-$75 billion still owed. The Paris Club, which is made up of western industrialized countries holds $7.6 billion in Iraq debt, down from $50 billion. Iraq reached an agreement with them on this remaining amount at the end of 2008. Most of Iraq’s remaining obligations belong to Saudi Arabia, China, and Kuwait. Negotiations with them are on going.

Banking

Banking is another industry the government is hoping will grow in 2009. The Iraqi Central Bank has been able to keep inflation in check. In 2006 it was at 32%, but by September 2008 it was cut to 12.9%. Control over inflation has allowed the Iraqi dinar to appreciate in value. From November 2006 to October 2008 Iraq’s currency increased 20% in value, and stood at 1,172 dinars for one American dollar in December 2008. The low inflation and appreciation has given Iraqis more buying power. The Central Bank is now cutting interest rates to encourage loans.

State owned banks account for 90% of all banking assets in the country. There are seven such enterprises that control 66% of the branches. The two main ones are the Rafidain and Rasheed Banks that have 150 branches each. The Agricultural Cooperative Bank, the Real Estate Bank, the Industrial Bank, the Iraq Bank, and the Trade Bank of Iraq follow those. In total the government has 397 bank branches. The largest private banks are the Al-Qarka Bank for Investment and Funding with 68 branches, the Investment Bank of Iraq with 22, and the Basra International Bank for Investment with nineteen. There are 194 private bank branches overall. Private banks have expanded with the improvement in security with more moving out to the provinces.

Like everything else, Iraq’s banks still have many problems. A December 2008 audit of the Rasheed and Rafidain banks found no business plan, no rules or regulations for workers, no reporting rules, no technology, little risk management, and hardly any services offered. For example, there are no personal accounts, safety deposit boxes, or dealings with foreign banks. More importantly, in late December 2008 two state-run banks ran out of cash, leaving Diyala province with no money to pay for government salaries, pensions, or reconstruction projects. The head of the Rafidain bank told Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty in January 2009 that if banking were a sign of economic progress, Iraq would be far behind. The entire system needs to be reformed as a result.

This year the government is attempting to solve some of these problems by encouraging foreign banks to do business in Iraq. At the end of January 2009 the Finance Ministry held a conference asking international banks to invest and open branches in Iraq. The Finance Ministry promised them that he could clear any bureaucratic obstacles that they might face. The two-day event was attended by officials from American, English, Turkish, Iranian, Lebanese, Jordanian, and Bahrain owned banks. The Iraq Central Bank had already issued licenses to three foreign banks. JP Morgan Chase and Citibank said they were interested as well.

Stock Exchange

The Iraqi Stock Exchange was opened for business in August 2007. Since then it has sputtered forward. The number of shares traded in 2008 was down from 2007, although there are now more foreign stocks available. In 2007 there were 94 companies listed on the exchange. In 2008 that only increased by two. The number of sessions went up from 119 in 2007 to 139 in 2008, as well as the shares traded, however their value went down from $357 million to $251 million.

Services

American surveys of Iraqis have found mass disappointment with the delivery of services. The Pentagon declared that in 2009 meeting basic needs would be the top issue surpassing security for the first time since the invasion. It should be no surprise than that this was a major issue in the January 2009 provincial elections. While the U.S. has found some improvement in the government’s abilities, supply of essential services still does not meet demand.

Iraqis are generally unhappy with their supply of food, water, electricity, sewage, and health. A survey from the end of 2008 found that only 16% were satisfied with the amount of electricity they received, down from 32% in 2007. 26% said they were happy with their health services, down from 36% in 2007. 31% were satisfied with their drinking water, the same amount as 2007.

Electricity

Electricity production has increased, but it is only meeting 66% of demand. By the end of last year Iraq was producing 4,997 megawatts per day, a record high. That was a 2% increase from the previous quarter. The capacity of Iraq’s generators has increased by around 1,500 megawatts on average. Like the oil industry, the power system needs massive investment to repair and upgrade facilities. Security and fuel shortages also hinder production. Climate changes, like the drought have also cut hydroelectric output.

The U.S. has spent $4.78 billion on Iraq’s electrical system and added 2,683 megawatts. Iraqis have matched this investment. In 2007 they spent $1.4 billion, in 2008 $2.3 billion, and in 2009 the proposed budget sets aside $1.1 billion. The Ministry of Electricity signed a $3 billion deal recently with General Electric to provide generators. The Ministry wants to double production eventually, and match demand. In the meantime, many Iraqis have been forced to rely upon private generators that produce between 2,000-3,000 megawatts. Thankfully, the number of attacks on the system are also down with no major ones since April 2008. Previous ones however have kept four of eleven damaged power lines out of use.

Health

Baghdad is making small steps to provide more health services, but lacks the personnel to be effective. Iraq has 27.5 million people, but only 15,500 doctors. A study said they need about 100,000. Many physicians have left the country due to the violence. The Health Ministry has a large budget, $192 million in 2008, but like the rest of the administration, has not been able to spend most of it. By the end of September 2008 they had only expended $28.5 million, 14.8%. The Ministry did launch a public relations campaign to educate Iraqis about health issues last year, has plans to build six new hospitals and 1,000 health clinics by the end of the decade, and conducted a successful five day polio campaign that vaccinated 97% of Iraq’s five million children. Until Iraq is able to meet its staffing deficit however, it will be hard to do more.

Water

Iraq’s water system is in disrepair. The facilities are operating below capacity because of a lack of maintenance, and problems with operating them. For example, when the U.S. turned over the Nassiriya Water Treatment Plant in September 2007, which cost $278 million to build, it had a capacity to treat 10,000 cubic meters of water per hour. When the SIGIR later looked at it they found that Baghdad wasn’t providing enough power, leaks were not fixed, and the personnel were not trained for their jobs. By the beginning of 2008 when American inspectors went back they found that it was operating at less then a quarter of its capabilities. The U.S. had to sign two contracts worth $1.1 million to save the project, since it felt that Baghdad would not.

As reported before, Iraq suffered a cholera outbreak in 2008 that affected more than half of its eighteen provinces. Besides the incompetence of some provincial officials that used expired chlorine to clean water, the broken down sewage and water system were largely to blame. International organizations have said that Iraq will face annual cholera incidents as a result.

Food Rations

Iraq has the largest food ration system in the world. It took up 8% of the 2008 budget. It is looked at as a basic indicator of how well the government can provide services. For 2009 there are plans to cut wealthy families from the program because of the budget crisis caused by the drop in oil prices. Less money is also going to be appropriated for it overall.

Transportation and Communication

Iraq’s Ministries of Transportation and Communication have not been able to spend most of their 2008 budgets. Transportation only spent $55 million by the end of September 2008 of its $322 million, 17%, while Communications expended $28 million of its $315 million budget, 8.8%. Iraq’s roads are in need of repair, but the lack of spending by the government means that will not be taken care of. The Ministry of Transportation does have a plan to revitalize the country’s railway system. It is opening a plant at Abu Ghraib to manufacture railroad ties at a cheaper price than imports.

Conclusion

Overall, Iraq’s economy is too dependent upon oil, and its management by the government is inefficient and corrupt. Petroleum is the only thing that makes Iraq’s economy grow, since its other industries are small and underdeveloped. The legacy of Saddam’s system still resonates, as Iraq’s bureaucracy does not function without orders from the top officials. There is little to no individual initiative. Many ministers have to sign for everything even down to hiring people. The government is also paper based, which makes things move at a snail’s pace. Many of the country’s best and brightest have left the country and are not coming back. That has led to a massive talent deficit. The lack of transparency and accounting has allowed large-scale corruption to occur largely unencumbered by any real government effort to stop it. The lack of tariffs has meant that many private businesses have suffered from cheap foreign imports. Fuel and electricity shortages, and the lack of security have increased costs. Iraqis have also shown a general lack of willingness to maintain their infrastructure, which leads to breakdowns and plants operating at less then capacity. The one positive is that security has improved, which could allow foreign companies in oil, gas, electricity, and banking to finally invest in Iraq. The lack of competent bureaucrats could negatively affect that as well as they could give foreigners too much control over Iraq’s resources, deter companies from coming because of bad contracts, or provide new avenues for graft and bribes. Still foreign know how, technology, and money is desperately needed. It will be a long and hard struggle to overcome Iraq’s many problems, and create a diversified economy that can meet the needs of its public. There is no guarantee that it will ever happen.


SOURCES

Abouzeid, Rania, “Mismanaging Iraq: No Cash to Carry,” Time, 12/29/08

Associated Press, “Iraqi official appeals to foreign banks to invest,” 1/28/09

Aswat al-Iraq, “GDP higher by 10.9 % in 2008,” 2/11/09
- “Iraqi Unemployment Rate Dropped by 15% in 2008,” 1/27/09

Chon, Gina, “Western Bank Giants Prepare to Revamp Iraq’s Financial System,” Baghdad Life Blog, Wall Street Journal, 1/28/09

Department of Defense, “Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq,” December 2008

O’Hanlon, Michael and Campbell, Jason, “Iraq Index,” Brookings Institution, 11/20/08

Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, “Official: Iraqi Banking System Needs Overhaul,” 1/13/09

Al Sabah, “Iraq faces massive water shortage, Water Resources said,” 1/21/09

Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, “Quarterly Report to the United States Congress,” 10/30/09
- “Quarterly Report and Semiannual Report to the United States Congress,” 1/30/09

El-Tablawy, Tarek, “Official: 80 percent of Iraq pipelines damaged,” Associated Press, 2/11/09

Review of 2008 Attack Statistics In Iraq

The last two quarterly reports to Congress by the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR) contained statistics on the total number of attacks from April to December 2008. For the beginning of that year, the reports contained a different metric using average daily attacks instead. As reported before, last year saw a steady decline in the number of deaths in Iraq. The casualties, depending upon the source dropped to 2003 or 2004 levels. According to the January 2009 SIGIR report, Iraqi civilian deaths are down 80% from June 2007 to December 2008. Iraqi security forces' casualties dropped 84%, and Coalition deaths are down 88% for that same time period. Attacks also declined 86% to around the same amount as 2003. From April 1 to September 30, 2008 the average number of attacks per month stayed almost the same at just over 1,700. From October 1 to December 31 however attacks dropped to approximately 1,100. The fact that was an almost 90% drop from the middle of 2007 shows just how massive the conflict in Iraq was. Attacks are now largely based upon the struggle for power rather than sect, and are nowhere near what they were in recent years. The country remains an extremely dangerous place, but has a new post-sectarian war status quo.

Southern Iraq and Kurdistan were the most peaceful parts of Iraq, while the Sunni and mixed sect-ethnic provinces accounted for the vast majority of violence. Most of the conflict in the south was between the feuding Shiite parties the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council and the Sadrists. Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki became involved when he sent forces to crackdown on the Mahdi Army in early 2008. That has largely ended leading to few acts of violence there now. In Kurdistan the tight control over the entry of non-Kurds has largely deterred attacks. Muthanna, Karbala, and Najaf all had single digit attacks from April to December 2008. The three Kurdistan provinces of Dohuk, Irbil, and Sulaymaniya only had 12 for that time period, followed by 33 in Qadisiyah, 45 in Dhi Qar, 51 in Wasit, and 94 in Maysan. That last province was the only one that had an increase in attacks from April to December because of the government's move against the Sadrists there. Basra had 145, but that was because of the end of the security operation against the Mahdi Army there as well that started in March 2008. From April to July there were 108 attacks there, but that quickly dropped to 26 from July to September, and eleven from October to the end of the year. Babil was the one southern province that had a large number of attacks consistently for the reporting period with 197 total. The remaining six provinces was the scene of most of the attacks in the country. Anbar had 646 where insurgents still carry out attacks against the Awakening tribes. Tamim with 677 contains the disputed city of Kirkuk, which has split Arabs, Kurds, Turkmen, and Christians there. Diyala had 1,321 attacks from April to December. It is ruled by Shiites, but has a Sunni majority. The Sons of Iraq there have also been a target of insurgents, and the Kurds desire to annex northern strips of the province. Salahaddin with 1,573 attacks is a largely Sunni governorate, but the provincial council is run by Kurds. Ninewa with 3,801 attacks is ethnically divided between Sunnis, Shiites, Kurds, Christians, and other smaller minority groups, and also has Kurdish leadership. Finally, the capital Baghdad has always had the most attacks with 3,801 as it is the seat of power.

Total Number of Attacks In Iraq From April 1-December 31, 2008

Province	Total Attacks 4/1/08-7/1/08	Total Attacks 7/1/08-9/30/08	Total Attacks 10/1/08-12/31/08
Muthanna	2	1	1
Karbala	1	4	0
Najaf	4	1	2
Kurdistan (Dohuk, Irbil, Sulaymaniya)	3	6	3
Qadisiyah	17	7	9
Dhi-Qar	17	21	7
Wasit	34	8	9
Maysan	12	43	39
Basra	108	26	11
Babil	81	54	62
Anbar	275	209	162
Tamim	248	245	184
Diyala	537	533	251
Salahaddin	717	482	374
Ninewa	1,041	924	511
Baghdad	2,221	867	713
TOTALS:	5,318	3,431	2,338
Avg. Per Month	1,772.6	1,715.5	1,169.0

SOURCES

Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, "Quarterly Report to the United States Congress," 10/30/08

- "Quarterly Report and Semiannual Report to the United States Congress," 1/30/09

Iraq’s Anti-Corruption Agencies

Iraq’s anti-corruption agencies continue to struggle with their job. The Minister of Planning Ali Baban told the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR) that he thought corruption was worse now than under Saddam. He said that corruption was rampant throughout the government, and that Baghdad had failed to stop it. The investigative group Transparency International supports Baban’s claims. They look into corruption in governments across the world. In 2003 they ranked Iraq 113 out of 133 governments on its annual corruption index with one being the best and 133 the worst. By 2008 Iraq was tied as the second most corrupt government in the world out of 180 nations. According to SIGIR’s evaluation, of Iraq’s three anti-corruption agencies only one was doing its job.

Iraq has three offices that are tasked with stopping corruption. Those are the inspector generals, the Board of Supreme Audit, and the Commission on Public Integrity. The Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) created the inspector generals in 2004. They were fashioned after the investigative bodies that work in the United States government. There is one inspector general for each Iraqi ministry and agency. The Board of Supreme Audit is run by Dr. Abdul Basit, and looks into the government’s finances. It is similar to the American Government Accountability Office. The third agency is the Commission on Public Integrity led by Judge Raheem al-Ogaili. It was created by the CPA as well, and is an independent group that is tasked with investigating corruption throughout the government.

Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki declared 2008 the year of fighting corruption, but SIGIR found little evidence of that. SIGIR said that the Board of Audit was the only reliable anti-corruption agency, and provided the best information. The inspector generals are caught in the middle of a controversy. Since 2008 six have been fired, but only a few of those have been replaced, leaving those agencies and ministries with no real oversight. The government claims they were not doing their job, but critics claim Prime Minister Maliki removed them for political reasons. Judge Ogaili of the Public Integrity Commission was definitely a political appointee. He took over from Judge Radhi Hamza al-Radhi who actively pursued corruption cases, but was constantly foiled by ministers, Maliki, and sometimes by the United States. In 2007 Judge Radhi fled Iraq due to threats. His successor was Judge Ogaili. He has been in office for over a year but has never been confirmed by parliament. The judge has said that corruption gives Iraq a bad image. His response has been to keep all the work of the Commission secret. He said his agency would only discuss cases after people have been found guilty. That rarely happens in Iraq. In 2008 only 300 officials were charged with corruption, and out of those 87 were found guilty. All were low-level officers. No high-level officials have ever had to go to court. That’s largely because of Article 136, a hold over from the Saddam period that allows ministers to stop any case from going to trial. This has consistently been used to stop corruption investigations. The Amnesty Law passed in 2008 that was supposed to foster reconciliation between Shiites and Sunnis has also been used to stop hundreds of corruption cases. The Commission on Public Integrity said it had to drop half of its investigations as a result of the law. By the end of 2008 the Prime Minister pardoned 1,023 government workers. Those included a group of Interior Ministry officers that were collecting salaries of 50,000 fake policemen, and Defense Ministry officials that skimmed money off of arms sales to Iraq. Maliki’s position is that corruption is all the result of Saddam Hussein, and would like to have the issue quietly disappear.

The International Monetary Fund (IMF) has also criticized Iraq’s fight with graft and fraud. The IMF has an agreement with Iraq to reduce its debt that includes better accounting of its oil profits. In 2008 the IMF said that Baghdad had not moved forward on this, and did not have a plan on how to create greater transparency. In December the organization said that Iraq had not done enough to fight corruption in the petroleum sector as a result.

The U.S. has often said it is committed to fighting corruption in Iraq, and has several programs to do so, but that appears to be more rhetoric than reality. The U.S. embassy in Baghdad has an anti-corruption coordinator, but there have been ten of those since the office was created. On average they have only served six months in Iraq, with the latest one just arriving in the country. That provides no continuity in effort. In May 2008, two State Department officials who worked in Iraq on this task said that the U.S. was never committed to the fight. The Americans have also stopped some investigations because of political concerns. A U.S. official told Reuters in December 2008 that if the U.S. or Baghdad really went after corruption, it could bring down the government because of the high officials that would be implicated.

Corruption has taken a great toll on Iraq. The former head of the Public Integrity Commission said that $13 billion had been lost in the reconstruction effort. The agency found oil workers in Basra stealing up to 500,000 barrels of oil a day in early 2008. No one of standing has been held accountable for these crimes. Instead, Prime Minister Maliki has attempted to silence the investigations fearing the bad image it creates for his country. That hinders development in a country that has mass unemployment and poverty despite its oil wealth, and undermines the public’s belief in the government. This was seen in the recent January 2009 provincial elections where corruption was a major issue. With no leadership from either the United States or Baghdad, this problem will continue to fester.

SOURCES

Adhoob, Salam, “An Inside View of the ‘Second Insurgency’: How Corruption and Waste Are Undermining the U.S. Mission in Iraq,” Senate Democratic Policy Committee Hearing, 9/22/08

Aswat al-Iraq, “Iraq among countries with highest levels of corruption – report,” 9/23/08

Brinkley, Joel, “Iraq quietly tackles rampant corruption,” San Francisco Chronicle, 1/24/09

Flahert, Anne, “Ex-officials: Bush admin. ignored Iraq corruption,” Associated Press, 5/13/08

Glanz, James and Mohammed, Riyadh, “Premier of Iraq Is Quietly Firing Fraud Monitors,” New York Times, 11/18/08

Human Rights Watch, “The Quality of Justice, Failings of Iraq’s Central Criminal Court,” December 2008

O’Hanlon, Michael and Campbell, Jason, “Iraq Index,” Brookings Institution, 11/20/08

Ryan, Missy, “U.S. Says Iraq Fails to Tackle Corrupt High Officials,” Reuters, 12/19/08

Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, “Quarterly Report to the United States Congress,” 10/30/08
- “Quarterly Report and Semiannual Report to the United States Congress,” 1/30/09

U.S. Embassy, “Review of Anticorruption Efforts in Iraq Working Draft,” 2007

Government Still Dominates Iraq’s Economy

In the recent quarterly report to Congress by the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR), there is an interview with Planning Minister Ali Baban. He noted that because Iraq lacks a strong business sector, and foreign investment has stayed away due to the violence, Baghdad plays the central role in the growth and development of the economy. This is despite the lofty goals of the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) that wanted to privatize Iraq and usher in free market reforms after the U.S. invasion. Saddam ran the country on a centralized, socialist model, so the effects of the CPA’s program was to shut down state run businesses and leave thousands of Iraqis out of work. Since then the government is still the largest employer in the country.

Lack of jobs remains a massive problem in Iraq today. Minister Baban said that unemployment stood at 35-40%. The SIGIR estimates that with underemployment that figure could rise to 60%. A 2008 United Nations’ survey of Iraqis from the end of 2007 found that the government still dominated the job market as a result because it is the only source of a steady paycheck. Unfortunately, many of these positions were obtained through bribes, party affiliation, and patronage. There are often reports of Iraqis having to pay to join the police for example. The Tribal Support Councils formed by Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki are a huge patronage system as each council is given the power to hire people for the organization as well as into the local security forces.

Below is a breakdown of jobs in fifteen of Iraq’s provinces plus Kurdistan based upon the U.N. survey. In all but three provinces, Babil, Ninewa, and Wasit, the government was the largest employer. In Najaf public sector jobs were a tie with self-employment in a non-farm industry. In Muthanna, Anbar, Dhi Qar, Basra, and Kurdistan the government provided 40% or more of the jobs with Kurdistan at the top with 50%. Self-employed but not on a farm was the second largest job source in eleven provinces and Kurdistan, followed by farming in three governorates. In Muthanna unskilled workers was the second source of work.

Two Largest Employers By Province

Kurdistan: 50% work for governmet, 20% self-employed non-farm
Basra: 46% work for government, 24% self-employed non-farm
Dhi Qar: 43% work for government, 29% self-employed non-farm
Anbar: 40% work for government, 22% self-employed non-farm
Muthanna: 40% work for government, 23% non-skilled labor
Salahaddin: 38% work for government, 32% self-employed farming
Baghdad: 38% work for government, 28% self-employed non-farm
Qadisiyah: 37% work for government, 15% self-employed non-farm
Karbala: 36% work for government, 34% self-employed non-farm
Tamim: 36% work for government, 30% self-employed non-farm
Maysan: 34% work for government, 25% self-employed non-farm
Diyala: 33% work for government, 20% self-employed non-farm
Najaf: 29% work for government, 29% self-employed non-farm
Babil: 33% self-employed farming, 26% work for government
Ninewa: 28% self-employed non-farm, 24% work for government
Wasit: 26% self-employed farming, 23% work for government

SOURCES

Cave, Damien, “Nonstop Theft and Bribery Stagger Iraq,” New York Times, 12/2/07

Fairweather, Jack, “Iraqi state enterprises warily reopen,” Financial Times, 6/16/08

Middle East Online, “Iraqi professionals forced to take small jobs,” Middle East Online, 2/21/08

Rubin, Alissa, “Maliki Pushes for Election Gains, Despite Fears,” New York Times, 1/26/09

Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, “Quarterly Report to the United States Congress,” 10/30/08
- “Quarterly Report and Semiannual Report to the United States Congress,” 1/30/09

Iraq’s Budget Stalled

Iraq’s 2009 proposed budget is still in limbo. It was recently revised a third time with a $2 billion increase after two successive cuts. It may also be based upon unrealistic predictions about the oil industry that provides the lion’s share of Baghdad’ revenue. The budget also cannot be passed because there is no speaker of parliament since Mahmoud Mashhadani resigned on December 23, 2008. This is a familiar process for Iraq where major legislation is often delayed because of political bickering.

The original 2009 budget was set at $79.8 billion, but now is at $62.8 billion, a $17 billion reduction. The budget has been changed three times. After the second time it was cut to $59.5 billion. $2 billion was recently added to cover government salaries and benefits however. Even with the reductions Iraq is still predicted to have a 31% budget deficit according to a member of parliament’s Finance Committee. The Ministry of Finance says that they have a $25 billion surplus that will cover the difference. The Ministry also announced at the end of January 2009 that it would issue government bonds for the first time. Finance Minister Bayan Jabar hopes that this will raise up to $5 billion. He gave no date on when this will happen.

80% of the 2009 budget is for operational costs, while the other 20% is for capital improvements. So far $12.2 billion has been set aside for the capital budget, $1 billion less than the previous year. The operational costs are also up from 2008 largely due to a salary increase. When the country was awash in oil profits Baghdad decided to raise pay, but not it is coming back to bite them. Wages are the biggest cost to the government. Of the $36.2 billion Baghdad has spent from January to October 2008, 38.1% was on salaries.

The reduction in the capital budget will have wide ranging effects throughout the government. The security forces are just now beginning to plan for this contingency. The National Police for example, want to add twelve new brigades to cover all of Iraq’s provinces, but now will only be able to add one more this year. The Defense Ministry has plans to buy new armored personnel carries that might go on hold as well. The food ration system is going to eliminate wealthy families from its rolls. A hiring freeze is also supposed to go into affect. The budgets for the provinces are due for a 50% decrease in spending. Other services are expected to be cut, but few Iraqi politicians are willing to sign off on them because parliamentary elections are expected at the end of the year.

An even bigger problem than the costs and cuts in the 2009 budget is the fact that it is based upon assumptions of the oil industry that may not come true. The revised budget estimates that world oil prices will be at $50 a barrel, and the country will export two million barrels a day, a long time goal of the Oil Ministry. In 2008 Iraq only produced 2.42 million barrels a day on average. For the last three months of 2008 it was down to 2.37 million barrels a day, almost the same amount as the last quarter of 2007. Exports averaged 1.79 million barrels a day at the end of 2008, a 3% increase from the previous quarter, but a 6% decrease from 2007. In January 2009 Iraq increased its exports to 1.89 million barrels a day, but the average price per barrel was only $37, a lower price than the world average of around $40. As the numbers show, oil production and exports have been largely stagnant since the U.S. invasion. They are also below the 2.58 million barrels a day mark set before the invasion. If the price and production goals are not met, Iraq will end up with a larger deficit than already expected.

A lot of things have changed since 2008. Last year Iraq was riding high off of record oil prices, and increased spending and salaries in response. Because of a paper-based bureaucracy, untrained staff and incompetence, Baghdad has never been able to spend all of its budget. This turned out to be a good thing for once as that left over money is now available to make up for the planned deficit. At the same time the budget cuts come at a time when U.S. reconstruction aid is coming to an end, and the country still needs billions to rebuild. As Planning Minister Ali Baban told the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, Iraq has little foreign investment and a small business community, which means government spending is the only real source of jobs and growth. When the budget will actually be passed is not known either, as it is taking a back seat to the disputes and competition over naming a new speaker of parliament.

SOURCES

Associated Press, “Iraq’s oil exports inch up in January,” 2/1/09

Aswat al-Iraq, "2009 budget faces 31% deficit - legislator," 2/8/09
- “No decrease in salaries because of oil prices – planning minister” 12/19/08

Al-Hashemi, Mostafa, “$25 billion surplus staves off financial crisis – Iraqi minister,” Azzaman, 2/2/09

Reuters, “UPDATE 1-Iraq to issue 1st post-Saddam bonds for $5 bln,” 1/28/09

Ryan, Missy, "Falling Oil Price Could Hamper Iraqi Military," Reuters, 2/9/09
- “Iraq must focus on reconstruction upkeep, U.S. says,” Reuters, 2/4/09

Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, “Quarterly Report and Semiannual Report to the United States Congress,” 1/30/09

Monthly Media Coverage of Iraq From December 29, 2008 to February 1, 2009

The American media’s coverage of the Iraq War in January 2009 may foreshadow the declining importance of the subject in the United States for the new year. As reported before, the American media allocated between 2-3% of its reporting to Iraq in 2008. This was a sharp decline from the beginning of 2007 when the war was a top five story and accounted for 25% of the news. By the end of the year it was down to 4%. In January 2009 Iraq accounted for only 1.25% of stories in the U.S.

According to the Pew Research Center’s Project for Excellent in Journalism that monitories all forms of American media, from December 29, 2008 to February 1, 2009 Iraq made the top ten stories in the country three out of four weeks. From December 29 to January 4 Iraq was the number seven story in America with 2% of all coverage. The handover of the Green Zone to Iraqis as part of the Status of Forces Agreement was in the news at that time. The next week Iraq did not make the top ten. From January 19 to 25 Iraq just made the top stories at number ten and only 1% of the stories. The new Obama administration was discussing its war policy then. For the week of January 26 to February 1 Iraq was number six with 2% of coverage. That was the week of the January 31 provincial elections. That was the biggest news of the month in Iraq, yet didn’t make the top five stories in America, and only raised press coverage to the average of the previous year.

Iraq has been consistently pushed farther and farther out of the news since 2007. When American politicians stopped discussing Iraq policy in 2007 there was a decided drop in media coverage. In 2008 the economic crisis and the campaign for president pushed most other news stories off the front pages and television screens. In 2009 the new Obama administration, the continued problems with the economy, and the new emphasis on Afghanistan will be the major stories, leaving Iraq more and more an afterthought in the minds of the American public.

SOURCES

Baker, Peter and Shanker, Thom, “Obama Meets With Officials on Iraq, Signaling New Commitment to Ending War,” New York Times, 1/21/09

Pew Research Center’s Project for Excellence In Journalism, “PEJ News Coverage Index: December 29, 2008-January 4, 2009; Symbols And Substance Of Obama’s First Week Drive The Narrative,” 1/5/09
- “PEJ News Coverage Index: January 5-11, 2009; Symbols And Substance Of Obama’s First Week Drive The Narrative,” 1/12/09
- “PEJ News Coverage Index: January 19-25, 2009; Symbols And Substance Of Obama’s First Week Drive The Narrative,” 1/26/09
- “PEJ News Coverage Index: January 26 – February 1, 2009; The Economic Crisis Returns With A Vengeance,” 2/2/09

Robertson, Campbell and Farrell, Stephen, “Green Zone, Heart of U.S. Occupation, Reverts To Iraqi Control,” New York Times, 12/31/08

The Islamic Party’s Victory In Diyala

There was a time when many observers believed that the Iraqi Islamic Party (IIP) would be one of the big losers in the January 2009 provincial election. The IIP had broken the Sunni boycott in 2005 and run anyway causing resentment amongst many. The formation of the Anbar Awakening, and then the Sons of Iraq across many of the Sunni areas directly challenged their rule as they had a popular base the IIP lacked. Instead the IIP and its Accordance Front coalition finished first in two provinces in the January balloting, and third in three others, plus a surprising fifth in Basra. One of those victories came in northern Diyala. The turn of events there showed how the IIP was able to turn the Sons of Iraq program to their electoral advantage.

Diyala province is in northern Iraq, and remains one of the most violent in Iraq. The population is roughly 55% Sunni Arabs, 30% Shiite Arabs, and 15% Kurds. In 2005 the Sunnis boycotted the election there allowing an alliance of the Dawa Party and the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council to take power with twenty of the 41 council seats. The Islamic Party did run there, coming in second with fourteen seats. That led to sectarian fighting and the growth of Al Qaeda in Iraq in Diyala. In April 2006 Abu Musab al-Zarqawi announced Diyala as the center of his Islamic Caliphate. That brought in Shiite militias from Baghdad to fight for their brethren, who began receiving arms and weapons from Iran. The Kurdish peshmerga had also moved into the Khanaqin district shortly after the U.S. invasion.

Things looked bleak in Diyala until 2007. That was the year members of the 1920s Revolution Brigades, and several other insurgent groups, along with the Karki and Shimouri tribes began turning on their former allies Al Qaeda in Iraq. These became the first Sons of Iraq (SOI) units in the province. What was at first seen as a threat by the Islamic Party to their claim to stand for the Sunni population, turned into an opportunity. In February 2007 Hussein al-Zubaydi the head of security in the Diyala provincial council and a member of the Islamic Party volunteered to work with the Americans to help organize the SOI. Zubaydi’s position allowed him to determine the make-up of the SOI. Later, when the U.S. began distributing aid through the SOI, the Islamic Party took advantage of that as well claiming responsibility. Through their maneuverings they were able to co-opt the SOI program, and build up a popular base that they never had before. This put them in a good position heading into the provincial elections that were originally scheduled for 2008.

It was just then that Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki became concerned about the growth of Sunni power there. In mid-2007 Baghdad created the Diyala Support Council that was supposed to ensure security in the province. It was not connected to the provincial council or security forces however, and worked explicitly to build up support for the Prime Minister. They were given control of recruiting locals into the security forces, which was a major form of patronage at Maliki’s disposal. The purpose of the council was to win over members of the SOI and weaken the Islamic Party’s new base. The U.S. quickly became concerned about the council's activities and complained to Baghdad about it saying that it might destabilize Diyala even more. In late October 2007 for example, the U.S. general in command of northern Iraq complained that Baghdad refused to take in 6,000 Sunnis into the Diyala provincial police. The general said that the Interior Ministry had turned down his request. Of course, the Diyala Support Council was able to deliver names directly to the Ministry and get them hired.

In 2008 Maliki upped the ante in Diyala. In January 2008 Baghdad formed the first Tribal Support Council in the province. Like the Diyala Support Council, the new Tribal Councils were meant to take fighters away from the SOI, create support for Maliki, divide the Sunnis, and weaken the Islamic Party. In July the Prime Minister launched the Omens of Prosperity security offensive there. The operation was aimed as much at the insurgents as the Islamic Party and their Sons of Iraq allies. By the end of August five top SOI leaders had been arrested along with hundreds of their followers, while others had fled the province. In the provincial capital Baquba for example, all of the SOI checkpoints were shut down by August, along with all but one of their offices. Members of the Islamic Party were also rounded and harassed. To underline the political nature of Omens of Prosperity the government arrested three SOI members as they were going to register as candidates for the provincial election. Their arrest made them ineligible to run. The SOI went to the U.S. for help, but they weren’t able to stop Maliki. This was a classic use of the carrot and the stick. At first, Maliki offered SOI jobs through the Diyala and Tribal Support Council programs in return for their support. He then went after those that had not joined him using the Iraqi Army and police.

The Islamic Party headed into the 2009 elections at a seeming disadvantage. There were over forty-five parties and lists running in Diyala, but the four major ones were expected to take most of the votes. Those were the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council’s Diyala Coalition, Maliki’s Rule of Law List, the Kurdistan Alliance, and the Accordance and Reform Front. The last was led by Ezze Addeen Ibrahim Yaseen Muhammed, and was made up of the Iraqi Islamic Party, the Iraqi Commission for Civil Society, the General Conference of Iraqi People, and the Iraqi Arab Assembly. It also included many members of the SOI. Concerned about their political future the SIIC controlled provincial council called for a delay in the election there for six months in December. That didn’t happen and the Islamic Party’s list began campaigning. That was tough in a province where there are still insurgent pockets. The List’s candidates rarely crossed sectarian lines, and one was kidnapped and killed. The Reform Front was also competing with Tribal Support Councils that were expected to deliver the tribes to Maliki’s list, along with Saleh al-Mutlak, a Sunni independent who was appealing mostly to Baathists.

When January 31, 2009 came along, the Islamic Party came out victorious. Despite the insurgency, and Maliki’s moves 57% of the province’s voters turned out, one of the highest in the country. They gave the Islamic Party’s list 21.1% of the vote, good enough for first place. The Kurdish Alliance came in second with 17.2%, Saleh al-Mutlak’s Iraqi National Project got 15%, while former Interim Prime Minister Ilyad Allawi’s Iraqi National List was fourth at 9.5%. Maliki’s State of Law list came in fifth with 6%. That means the Islamic Party’s List will have to cut deals with at least two others to gain a majority to rule the province.

The Islamic Party’s moves allowed it to take advantage of Iraq’s two provincial elections. In 2005 they ran basically uncontested in Diyala because of the Sunni boycott and came in second place. In 2009 they were able to come in first. Their size, organization, access to money and the media, and the election law, which favored large parties all worked to the IIP’s advantage. More importantly they were able to co-opt the former insurgents that became the Sons of Iraq as they were first being organized in 2007, while surviving Maliki’s crackdown in 2008. The IIP can now claim that they speak for many of Iraq’s Sunnis having done well in two ballots. They have to exert their power in Diyala carefully however, as they will have coalition partners and be ever vigilant of Maliki’s willingness to use the security forces for his political gain.

Early Election Results In Diyala
Iraqi Accordance Front: 21.1%
Kurdish Alliance: 17.2%
Iraqi National Project: 15%
Iraqi National List: 9.5%
State of Law: 6%
Coalition of Diyala: 5.3%
National Reform Party: 4.3%
Independent Free Movement List: 3.1%
National Movement: 2.6%
Fadhila: 2.3%
TURNOUT: 57%

SOURCES

Abdullah, Muhammed, “calls to postpone diyala election,” Niqash, 12/10/08
- “Diyala Sees Early Campaigning,” Niqash, 12/8/08

Alsumaria, “Iraq Awakening Councils in Diyala end strike,” 3/4/08

Dagher, Sam, “Risky US alliances in Iraq,” Christian Science Monitor, 7/17/07

DPA, “Head of Iraqi provincial council calls for elections postponement,” 12/9/08

DVIDS News, “Paramount Sheiks Sign Peace Agreement,” 5/2/07

Farrell, Stephen, “Election: Preliminary Results,” Baghdad Bureau Blog, New York Times, 2/5/09

Garcia-Navarro, Lourdes, “Iraq Paramilitary Group Targeted, Despite Success,” Morning Edition, NPR, 9/4/08
- “Sunni Group Says It’s Being Harassed,” Morning Edition, 9/29/08

Goetze, Katharina and Salman, Daud and Naji, Zaineb, “Could Awakening Fighters Rejoin Insurgency?” Institute for War & Peace Reporting, 10/31/08

Gordon, Michael, “Iraq Hampers U.S. Bid to Widen Sunni Police Role,” New York Times, 10/28/07

Hendawi, Hamza, “Iraq moves against some US-backed Sunni fighters,” Associated Press, 8/18/08

Iraqi News, “Three Support Councils established in Diala,” 1/24/08

Kagan, Kimberly, “The Anbar Awakening: Displacing al Qaeda from Its Stronghold in Western Iraq,” Institute For The Study of War and WeeklyStandard.com, 8/21/06-3/30/07

Kimmons, Sean, “Hashing out their differences,” Stars and Stripes, 8/29/08

Knights, Michael and McCarthy, Eamon, “Provincial Politics in Iraq: Fragmentation or New Awakening?” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, April 2008

Levinson, Charles, “Awakening Councils in hiding as arrests on rise,” USA Today, 9/22/08

Multi-National Corps – Iraq, “Diyala leaders meet to establish tribal support councils (Diyala),” 3/21/08

Niqash, “accord and reform bloc,” 1/28/09

Oppel, Richard, “Iraq Takes Aim at Leaders of U.S.-Tied Sunni Groups,” New York Times, 8/22/08

Parker, Ned, “Baqubah a minefield of Iraqi sectarian tensions,” Los Angeles Times, 12/7/08
Parker, Ned, “Iraq seeks breakup of U.S.-funded Sunni fighters,” Los Angeles Times, 8/23/08

Roggio, Bill, “1920s Revolution Brigades turns on al Qaeda in Diyala,” Long War Journal.org, 6/12/07
- “Operation Omens of Prosperity begins in Diyala,” Long War Journal.org, 7/29/08

Russo, Claire, “Countdown To Diyala’s Provincial Election: Maliki & The IIP,” Institute for the Study of War, 1/30/09
- “The Maliki Government Confronts Diyala,” Institute for the Study of War,” 9/23/08

Shadid, Anthony, “Iraq’s Diyala Province Puts Power of Ballot to the Test,” Washington Post, 2/1/09

Al-Tuawijri, Ali, “Iraq’s anti-Qaeda fighters fear for their future,” Agence France Presse, 9/6/08

Tyson, Ann Scott, “Iraq Is Criticized for Slow Hire of Police,” Washington Post, 10/27/07
- “Sunni Fighters Find Strategic Benefits in Tentative Alliance With U.S.,” Washington Post, 8/9/07
- “Tribal Members Join in Effort To Assist U.S., Iraqi Forces,” Washington Post, 9/30/07

Zavis, Alexandra, “Residents wary as Iraq police blanket Baqubah,” Los Angeles Times, 7/31/08

Unfinished Business – Tamim Province

The Kurdistan Regional Government recently announced that they would be holding regional parliamentary elections in May 2009. The elections in fourteen of Iraq’s eighteen provinces have just concluded. That leaves Tamim as the only governorate that has not held or plans to hold balloting. The provincial election law, passed in September 2008 postponed voting there until a committee could come up with recommendations on how to conduct them there. Those findings are due at the end of March, but recent comments from a Kurdish politician questions whether they will have their work done on time, leaving the future of the province up in the air.

On February 2, a parliamentarian from the Kurdistan Islamic Union, an independent Kurdish bloc, claimed that the Tamim committee was not doing its job. He said that they will not have their work done by March 31, the deadline set by parliament in the provincial election law, which will threaten elections in that province. The Islamic Union member went on to say that the rest of the country had voted, and that any delay by the committee would be unfair for the citizens of Tamim.

Tamim is in northern Iraq and contains the disputed city of Kirkuk. In the January 2005 provincial elections, the List of Kurdistan Brotherhood led by the Kurdistan Democratic Party, took over half of the votes in the province, gaining control of 26 of the 41 seats on the provincial council. The rest of the votes went to the Iraqi Turkman Front with eight seats, the Iraqi Republican Group, five seats, and the Islamic Turkman Coalition and National Iraq Union that gained one seat each. The election allowed the Kurds to take over the administration of Tamim, the security forces, and appoint the governor, something greatly resented by the Arabs, Turkmen, and some Christians. The Arabs went on to boycott the council until December 2007. The Kurds have long wanted to annex Kirkuk and northern sections of Tamim, and the provincial election was their first step in that direction. They also attempted to force Arabs out of Kirkuk, and pressure Christians to support their moves.

Later in 2005 when the Constitution was drafted, the Kurds were able to insert Article 140. It called for normalization, a census in Tamim, and a vote by December 31, 2007 on whether Kirkuk wanted to be annexed. That followed the Kurds strategy of trying to peacefully, politically, and legally incorporate Kirkuk into Kurdistan, while creating facts on the ground through their control of the province to support their cause.

Article 140 has never been implemented however. By early 2007 the United Nations realized that the constitutional process would only lead to more conflicts, so they began looking for alternatives. On August 10, 2007 the U.N. Security Council passed Resolution 1770 that said the U.N. representative in Iraq was to work on settling Kirkuk, and all other disputed territories in the country. The first thing special envoy Stephan De Mistura did was get the Iraqi government to agree to delay Article 140. That was put off until June 30, 2008. When that passed no new date was set. This was supported by the United States that came to feel that a U.N. negotiated settlement was the best way to resolve Kirkuk. The Kurds however felt betrayed. They were also worried that any negotiations would cost them territory, perhaps even Kirkuk itself.

In the meantime, the Kurds were forced into a power sharing agreement that only angered them more. In December 2007 the Kurds gave up five of their seats on the provincial council so that the Turkmen could have eleven, the Arabs eight, and the Christians one. This ended the Arab boycott of the body that had been going on for over two years. The Kurds were also supposed to create a joint decision making process, release Arab prisoners, and have the Kurdish intelligence service withdraw from the province. The Kurds believed these moves violated the constitution, so they never followed through with the deal other than to give up some of their council seats.

To express their dissatisfaction, the Kurds began stonewalling important legislation and blocking U.S. policies. For example, they refused to allow the formation of Sons of Iraq in Tamim by the Americans for a very long time. They also began holding up a number of important laws such as the original version of the provincial election law.

The main sticking point in the passage of the provincial law was how to deal with Tamim. The first version of the legislation had an amendment inserted by a Turkmen parliamentarian that would postpone elections in Tamim, replace the Kurdish peshmerga with regular security forces, while the provincial council would be divided in thirds between the Kurds, Arabs, and Turkmen, along with one seat for Christians. The council would then determine how elections were to be held there. Arabs and Turkmen supported this proposal because they knew they would lose in any vote. It was also taken up by the opposition in parliament made up of the Sadrists, the Fadhila Party, the National Dialogue Council, the Iraqi National List, along with parts of the Iraqi Accordance Front, who were opposed to the expansion of Kurdistan. The Christians on the other hand, were against the power-sharing deal because it would only give them one seat. The Kurds at first walked out in protest over the article, and then the President of Iraq Jalal Talabani, a Kurd, vetoed it. Finally the parliament agreed to a version of the law that also held off on balloting, but created the committee discussed before. The Kurds came up with this plan because it maintained their control over the province.

If the Tamim commission does not have its work done by the end of March, the issue will then pass to Baghdad. The Prime Minister, along with the President of Iraq Jalal Talabani, and the speaker of parliament are supposed to work with the United Nations to come up with an election process for Tamim if that happens. That could be very complicated, as Maliki has actively opposed the Kurds’ aspirations to annex any disputed territory. That will probably mean the future of Kirkuk will again be put off. That would suit the Kurds as they already have de facto control. Maliki on the other hand, after his victories in the provincial elections, may be tempted to send in Iraqi security forces as he did in Khanaqin in Diyala to assert central government authority, and push out the Kurds. The Prime Minister has been doing something similar in Mosul since the summer of 2008. The U.S. can’t be expected to step in as President Obama is committed to withdrawing U.S. forces, and even during the end of the Bush term abdicated responsibility to the United Nations. Tamim shows that there are still many difficult issues remaining in the country, with the Arab-Kurd disputed right at the top. The feuding parties have not been willing to negotiate or compromise. Instead they have put off any tough decisions as in the provincial election law, and preferred maneuvering on the ground to assert their authority.

SOURCES

Ali, Ahmed and Knights, Michael, “Kirkuk: A Test for the International Community,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 1/14/09

Aswat al-Iraq, “Investigation committee in Kirkuk ‘late’ – MP,” 2/2/09

BBC News, “Guide to Iraqi political parties,” 1/20/06

Goode, Erica, “Iraq Passes Provincial Elections Law,” New York Times, 9/25/08

International Crisis Group, “Oil For Soil: Toward A Grand Bargain On Iraq And The Kurds,” 10/28/08

Iraq The Model Blog, “Talabani Rejects the Provincial Election Law,” 7/24/08

Al-Khalidi, Diaa, “divisions split kirkuk Christians,” Niqash, 11/11/08

Knights, Michael and McCarthy, Eamon, “Provincial Politics in Iraq: Fragmentation or New Awakening?” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, April 2008

Raghavan, Sudarsan and Londono, Ernesto, “Iraqis Take Flawed Step On Electoral Legislation,” Washington Post, 7/23/08

Reuters, “Iraq’s Kurds to elect parliament on May 19,” 2/2/09

Rubin, Alissa, “Kurds Object to Iraqi Provincial Election Law,” New York Times, 7/23/08

Tavernise, Sabrina, and Muhammed, Riyadh, “Iraqi Measure on Provincial Voting Is Vetoed,” New York Times, 7/24/08

Visser, Reidar, “After Compromise on Kirkuk, Finally an Elections Law for Iraq’s Governorates,” Historiae.org, 9/24/08
- “The Kirkuk Issue Exposes Weaknesses in Iraq’s Ruling Coalition,” Historiae.org, 8/7/08

How Are The Current Provincial Councils Doing?

The early results for the provincial elections have been released. It will probably take several weeks for the winners to work out deals with some of the other Lists to form new coalitions to rule. While that is going on it might be a good time to review how the soon to be outgoing provincial councils did in 2008. These are numbers based upon the latest quarterly report to Congress by the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR). The paper includes some of the latest statistics on Iraq’s eighteen provinces.

Budget

Budget execution has been an on-going problem for the Iraqi provinces. Ninewa which is currently ruled by the Kurds did the worst in that regards spending only 7% of its budget largely due to the security situation. They were followed by the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council (SIIC) in Baghdad with 12%, and the Dawa-SIIC controlled Diyala with 18%. The Supreme Council did a much better job in Najaf with 95%. The Sadrist were second in Maysan with 79%, and the Islamic Party third in Anbar with 69%. Those aggregate numbers however may not mean that the councils actually accomplished much. First Iraq’s government at all levels has always spent a large amount of its operational budget that pays for wages, bills and benefits, but always lagged on its capital budget that includes investing in infrastructure and reconstruction. Second, even if a province spent most of the latter, it may not have been spent well. The Sadrists of Maysan for example, might have expended 79% of their budget, but as reported before they only finished 41 of 241 development projects in 2008.

Who Currently Rules Province And % of 2008 Budget Spent:
Kurdistan (Dohuk, Irbil, Sulaymaniya): Kurds - N/A
Ninewa: Kurds - 7%
Baghdad: SIIC - 12%
Diyala: SIIC - 18%
Qadisiyah: SIIC - 25%
Karbala: SIIC - 33%
Muthanna: SIIC - 36%
Basra: Fadhila - 37%
Dhi Qar: SIIC - 38%
Salahaddin: Kurds - 49%
Wasit: 50%
Tamim: 54%
Babil: SIIC - 58%
Anbar: Iraqi Islamic Party - 69%
Maysan: Sadrists - 79%
Najaf: SIIC - 95%

Electricity

One of the major issues in the January 2009 election was the provision of services, which are still sorely lacking in many parts of the country. Demand for electricity still outweighs supply. Wasit had the worst performance meeting only 48.1% of demand. Maysan 50.4%, Babil 51.0%, and Najaf 51.5% were almost as bad. The three provinces of Kurdistan, Dohuk, Irbil, and Sulaymaniya did the best job at 83.9%, followed by Diyala 83.0%, and Tamim 82.6%.

Average Electricity Supply & Demand Per Day (Megawatts/Hour) - % Demand Met
Wasit: 2,724/5,655 – 48.1%
Maysan: 2,566/5,090 – 50.4%
Babil: 4,039/7,915 – 51.0%
Najaf: 3,594/6,973 – 51.5%
Karbala: 2,883/5,092 – 56.6%
Qadisiyah: 3,077/4,711 – 65.3%
Baghdad: 31,714/48,420 – 65.4%
Ninewa: 10,587/15,972 – 66.2%
Muthanna: 2,532/3,770 – 67.1%
Basra: 12,032/17,148 – 70.1%
Dhi Qar: 5,404/7,536 – 71.7%
Anbar: 4,589/6,206 – 73.9%
Salahaddin: 5,459/7,186 – 75.9%
Tamim: 5,094/6,162 – 82.6%
Diyala: 3,623/4,362 – 83.0%
Kurdistan (Dohuk, Irbil, Sulaymaniya): 14,627/17,426 – 83.9%

Water

Access to potable water is greatly improving in many provinces, with a few still in bad shape. Kurdistan had the worst water supply at 40%, followed by Diyala 54%, and Muthanna 65%. Tamim, Basra, Babil, Dhi Qar, and Maysan all did the best job providing their residents with water 90% of more of the time. Again, these aggregate numbers hide wide disparities within provinces.

Access To Potable Water:
Kurdistan (Dohuk, Irbil, Sulaymaniya): 40%
Diyala: 54%
Muthanna: 65%
Karbala: 71%
Ninewa: 71%
Salahaddin: 71%
Qadisiyah: 76%
Najaf: 83%
Anbar: 84%
Baghdad: 89%
Wasit: 89%
Maysan: 91%
Dhi Qar: 94%
Babil: 97%
Basra: 98%
Tamim: 98%

Poverty

Along with a lack of services, poverty is another major issue that Iraqis face. The SIGIR used numbers based upon a United Nations World Food Program report from November 2008 discussed here before. The UN broke Iraq’s population up into five income groups, and found large swaths of the country lived in the bottom two. The poorest provinces were Qadisiyah and Karbala, while the best off were Baghdad and Basra. The latter two are both the economic and political hubs of the country, which could account for their relative lack of poverty compared to the rest of the country.

% Of Families In The Poorest Of Five Income Groups
Baghdad: 5%
Basra: 11%
Najaf: 13%
Salahaddin: 14%
Maysan: 16%
Diyala: 18%
Kurdistan (Dohuk, Irbil, Sulaymaniya): 19%
Wasit: 20%
Anbar: 24%
Dhi Qar: 27%
Babil: 28%
Muthanna: 28%
Ninewa: 31%
Tamim: 31%
Karbala: 36%
Qadisiyah: 37%

SOURCES

Aswat al-Iraq, “41 out of 241 projects implemented in Missan,” 12/30/08

Knights, Michael and McCarthy, Eamon, “Provincial Politics in Iraq: Fragmentation or New Awakening?” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, April 2008

Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, “Quarterly Report and Semiannual report to the United States Congress,” 1/30/09

The State Of Law List

The early returns from the provincial elections are in. Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s State of Law list came in first in eight of the fourteen provinces that voted including Baghdad, second in Wasit, third in Karbala, fifth in Diyala, and tenth in Salahaddin. They did not win a majority in any province however. That will mean his List will have to form coalitions with other parties to form ruling alliances. Still it was an impressive sweep of the south. Whatever deals the List cuts to rule, Maliki will be in much a stronger position to advance his agenda afterwards.

The State of Law list is made up of the Islamic Dawa Party, Dawa Party – Iraq Organization, the Independent Bloc, the Solidarity Bloc, the Islamic Union of Iraqi Turkmen, the Kurdistan Feli Fraternity Movement, and the Shaabani Uprising Bloc 1991. The Islamic Dawa was the first Shiite Islamist party formed in Iraq in the 1950s. They were small and weak after the U.S. invasion, but were able to maneuver themselves into the middleman between the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council (SIIC) and the Sadrists in parliament. When those two groups could not decide upon a prime minister they selected a member of the Dawa, first Ibrahim al-Jaafari and then Nouri al-Maliki, as a compromise candidate. Since Maliki took office, he has transformed himself from a weak and ineffective politician to a leader to be reckoned with largely through his use of the security forces. He has also moved away from Dawa’s religious roots. The Dawa Party – Islamic Organization is a breakaway from the main Dawa bloc that was formed in Basra. It holds the Ministry of Education. The Independent Bloc is led by Oil Minister Hussain al-Shahristani, and is known for being close to Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani. The Solidarity Bloc used to be part of the United Iraqi Alliance, but left in 2007. It is made up of independent Shiites, and led by former Minister of National Security Qasem Dawood from the interim Iraqi government. The Islamic Union of Iraqi Turkomen is led by Abbas al-Bayati, a Shiite Turkomen. His party too was once a member of the United Iraqi Alliance, and holds two seats in parliament. The Kurdish Feli Fraternity Movement is a Shiite Kurdish party formed in exile in Iran during the Saddam years. It had ministries in both the Maliki and Jaafari governments. Two Shiites that fought against Saddam in 1991 after the Gulf War formed the Shaabani Uprising Bloc 1991, hence its name. They hold one seat in parliament. Together the State of Law ran candidates in Baghdad, Babil, Karbala, Najaf, Qadisiyah, Muthanna, Wasit, Maysan, Basra, Diyala, Salahaddin, Ninewa, and Dhi Qar. They are united by a call for law and order, a strong central government, the end of militias, and opposition to the Kurds and the Supreme Council. It was formed around October 2008.

The List’s victories will allow Maliki to advance three of his goals. First he will have a strong base in the provinces to build upon before the parliamentary elections that are due towards the end of the year. Second his List will control several councils and governors that will support a strong central government with him at its head. Finally, the defeat of the Fadhila Party and the Supreme Council could mean the end of any calls for autonomous regions in the south. Maliki is probably also counting on Sunni parties to defeat the Kurds in Ninewa and Salahaddin, which will limit their plans of annexing northern regions. His main rivals will thus be weakened. He will still have to negotiate with other parties and stave off any no-confidence votes in the legislature, but he will probably be at the peak of his power.

Early Returns For State Of Law List’s Finishes In January 2009 Provincial Election

1st place:
Baghdad 38%
Basra 37%
Dhi Qar 23.1%
Qadisiyah 23.1%
Maysan 17.7%
Najaf 16.2%
Babil 12.5%
Muthanna 10.9%

2nd place:
Wasit 15.3%

3rd place:
Karbala 6.8%

5th place:
Diyala 6%

10th place:
Salahaddin 3.5%

SOURCES

Alsumaria, “Iraq elections leaks say Al Maliki ahead,” 2/2/09

Aswat al-Iraq, “Maliki Leads 7 Parties Alliance in Provincial Elections – MP,” 11/13/08
- “Maliki’s List Advancing in Basra’s Initial Vote Count,” 2/2/09

International Crisis Group, “Iraq’s Provincial Elections: The Stakes,” 1/27/09

Niqash, “state of law coalition,” 1/28/09

Paley, Amit, “In Iraq’s Provincial Elections, Main Issue Is Maliki Himself,” Washington Post, 1/17/09

Al-Sabah, “Maliki, Four Slates Lead in Nine Provinces, Results Say,” 2/4/09

Said, Yahia Khairi, “Political Dynamics in Iraq within the Context of the ‘Surge,’” Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 4/2/08

Early Returns For Provincial Elections

The early results for the January 2009 provincial elections are in. The Iraqi Election Commission claims they have counted 90% of the votes in the fourteen provinces that took part. There are two sets of differing numbers available, one from the New York Times, the other from Alsumaria TV. The numbers from the Times are used below because they seem more comprehensive.

Overall, Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s State of Law list was the biggest winner. They came in first in eight provinces, Baghdad, Basra, Dhi Qar, Qadisiyah, Maysan, and Najaf, second in Wasit, third in Karbala, fifth in Diyala, and tenth in Salahaddin. The List did not win a majority in any of those governorates however. They did the best in Baghdad with 38% and Basra 37%. That will mean they will have to form coalitions with other parties to rule.

That could be the Sadrists, who lost control of Maysan, but came in second there and in Dhi Qar, Baghdad, and Babil, and third in Najaf and Wasit. Although Maliki launched military campaigns against them in early 2008, they both have a common animosity towards the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council (SIIC) that once ruled most of the south.

The rest of the Shiite lists had mixed results. The SIIC won no provinces, but finished second in Najaf, Qadisiyah, Basra, Wasit, Muthanna, and Babil, and third in Maysan and Dhi Qar. Former Prime Minister Ibrahim al-Jaafari created the Reform Party after he left the Dawa. His best results were third in Qadisiyah, and then several fourth places in the south. Finally, the Fadhila Party lost Basra finishing sixth there. That symbolized their finish across the rest of the country.

There was also the Sunni Iraqi Accordance Front and its major party the Iraqi Islamic Party and the Kurdish Alliance. The Accordance Front came in 1st in Diyala and Salahaddin, third in Anbar, Baghdad and Ninewa, and a surprising fifth in Basra, a largely Shiite province. The Kurdish Alliance lost control of Ninewa but finished a respectable second there, and the same in Diyala. They did much worse in Salahaddin.

A few new parties and independents also emerged. The Iraq National Project, led by independent Sunni parliamentarian Salih al-Mutalk came in first in Anbar, third in Diyala and Salahaddin, fourth in Baghdad, and fifth in Ninewa. Alusi did better than former Interim Prime Minister Ilyad Allawi’s secular Iraqi National List. They did finish second in Salahaddin appealing to the largely Sunni population by criticizing American policies like the deBaathification law and disbanding the armed forces. Otherwise they had a lot of fourth place finishes in provinces like Diyala and Baghdad. Amongst the tribal Awakening groups in Anbar, Sheikh Ahmed Abu Risha’s Awakening and National Independent List finished second, while his former ally now rival Sheikh Amid al-Hayes’ Tribes of Iraq finished a distant seventh. The mayor of Karbala City Yousef Majid al-Haddoubi carried Karbala itself, but with only 13.3% of the vote, while the Iraqi nationalist newcomers al-Hadbaa Party discussed before won in Ninewa, but with 38.4% instead of the 66% predicted by an American official earlier. That will mean they will have to join with their rivals the Kurdish Alliance to run the province. That might force al-Hadbaa to tone down their anti-Kurdish rhetoric or conversely freeze the entire process.

The next several weeks will really show what this election was about. The State of Law and every other List that took first place will have to find other parties to rule because none walked away with a majority of the votes. That could lead to joint governance where no single party will be able to impose their will, intense infighting that will incapacitate the process, or a mixture of both where parties will carve up the provincial offices much like the provinces and the central government are currently run.

The major parties and candidates:

Awakening and National Independents List – Led by Sheikh Ahmed Abu Risha, one of the Anbar Awakening leaders. Aligned with Iraqi Accordance Front
Coalition Of Diyala – Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council’s Diyala List
Constitutional Party – Led by Interior Minister Jawa al-Bulani
Fadhila Party – Formed by Ayatollah Mohammed al-Yacoubi who claimed the legacy of Mohammed Sadeq al-Sadr’s movement, Moqtada al-Sadr’s father, after the U.S. invasion
Yousef Maid al-Habboubi – Independent Shiite mayor of Karbala
Al-Hadbaa Party – Coalition of four parties in Ninewa
Independent Free Movement List – One of two independent lists supported by the Sadrists
Iraq National Project – Led by independent Sunni Parliamentarian Salih Mutalk
Iraqi Accordance Front – Major Sunni list led by Vice President Tariq al-Hashemi’s Iraqi Islamic Party
Iraqi Communist Party – Led by Hamid Majid Mousa
Kurdish Allliance – Made up of two major Kurdish parties, the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan of Iraqi President Jalal Talabani and the Kurdistan Democratic Party of Kurdish President Massoud Barzani, and other smaller parties
Al-Mihrab Martyr List – Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council List
National Movement for Development and Reform – Led by Jamal al-Karbouli. Made up of former Baathists and insurgents
National Reform Party – Headed by former Prime Minister Ibrahim al-Jaafari who broke away from the Dawa Party
State Of Law List – Headed by Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s Islamic Dawa Party
Tribes Of Iraq – Led by Sheikh Hamid al-Hayes, one of the Anbar Awakening leaders

ANBAR
Iraqi National Project: 17.6%
Awakening and National Independents List: 17.1%
Accordance Front: 15.9%
National Movement for Reform and Development: 7.8%
Iraqi National List: 6.6%
Iraqi Unity: 4.6%
Tribes of Iraq: 4.5%
Group of Scholars And Intellectuals: 3.3%
Justice Movement: 3.2%
National Bloc: 2.3%
Constitutional Party: 2%
TURNOUT: 40%

BABIL
State of Law: 12.5%
Al-Mihrab Martyr List: 8.2%
Independent Free Movement List: 6.2%
National Reform Party: 4.4%
Iraqi Commission for NGOs: 4.1%
Independent Justice: 3.7%
Independent Ansar: 3.4%
Iraqi National List: 3.4%
National Unity: 3.3%
TURNOUT: 56%

BAGHDAD
State Of Law: 38%
Independent Free Movement List: 9%
Iraqi Accordance Front: 9%
Iraqi National Project: 8.6%
Al-Mihrab Martyr List: 5.4%
National Reform Party: 4.3%
Iraq Nation List: 1.6%
Fadhila: 1.3%
Iraqi Communist Party: 1.2%
TURNOUT: 40%

BASRA
State of Law: 37%
Al-Mihrab Martyr List: 11.6%
Gathering of Justice and Unity: 5.5%
Independent Free Movement List: 5%
Iraqi Accordance Front: 3.8%
Fadhila: 3.2%
Iraqi National List: 3.2%
National Reform Party: 2.5%
TURNOUT: 48%

DHI QAR
State of Law: 23.1%
Independent Free Movement List: 14.1%
Al-Mihrab Martyr List: 11.1%
National Reform Party: 7.6%
Fadhila: 6.1%
Constitutional Party: 3.2%
Iraqi National List: 2.8%
TURNOUT: 50%

DIYALA
Iraqi Accordance Front: 21.1%
Kurdish Alliance: 17.2%
Iraqi National Project: 15%
Iraqi National List: 9.5%
State of Law: 6%
Coalition of Diyala: 5.3%
National Reform Party: 4.3%
Independent Free Movement List: 3.1%
National Movement: 2.6%
Fadhila: 2.3%
TURNOUT: 57%

KARBALA
Yousef Majid al-Haddoubi: 13.3%
Hope of Rafidain: 8.8%
State of Law: 8.5%
Independent Free Movement List: 6.8%
Al-Mihrab Martyr List: 6.4%
Justice and Reform: 3.6%
National Reform Project: 2.5%
Fadhila: 2.5%
TURNOUT: 60%

MAYSAN
State of Law: 17.7%
Independent Free Movement List: 15.2%
Al-Mihrab Martyr List: 14.6%
National Reform Project: 8.7%
Fadhila: 3.2%
TURNOUT: 46%

MUTHANNA
State of Law: 10.9%
Al-Mihrab Martyr List: 9.3%
Jumhouriyoun: 7.1%
National Reform Project: 6.3%
Independent Free Movement List: 5.1%
National List: 5%
Gathering of Muthanna: 4.9%
Academics: 4.4%
Middle Euphrates: 3.9%
Fadhila: 3.7%
Iraqi National List: 3.5%
TURNOUT: 61%

NAJAF
State of Law: 16.2%
Al-Mihrab Martyr List: 14.8%
Independent Free Movement List: 12.2%
Loyalty to Najaf: 8.3%
National Reform Project: 7%
Union of Independent Najaf: 3.7%
Tribes and Sons of Najaf: 2.6%
TURNOUT: 55%

NINEWA
Al-Hadbaa: 38.4%
Kurdish Alliance: 25.5%
Iraqi Islamic Party: 6.7%
Turkomen Front: 2.8%
Iraqi National Project: 2.6%
Al-Mihrab Martyr List: 1.9%
TURNOUT: 60%

QADISIYAH
State of Law: 23.1%
Al-Mihrab Martyr List: 11.7%
National Reform Project: 8.2%
Iraqi National List: 8%
Independent Free Movement List: 6.7%
Islamic Loyalty: 4.3%
Fadhila: 4.1%
Development of Diwaniya: 3.4%
Iraqi National Congress: 3%
TURNOUT: 58%

SALAHADDIN
Iraqi Accordance Front: 14.5%
Iraqi National List: 13.9%
Iraqi National Project: 8.7%
Jumuaa: 8.5%
Scholars and Intellectuals: 6.6%
Turkomen Front: 4.8%
Salahaddin List: 4.6%
Taaqi List: 4.5%
Tahrir wa-Binaa: 4.5%
State of Law: 3.5%
Constitution Party: 3.2%
Al-Mihrab Martyr List: 2.9%
TURNOUT: 65%

WASIT
State of Law: 15.3%
Al-Mihrab Martyr List: 10%
Independent Free Movement List: 6%
Iraqi National List: 4.6%
Constituion Party: 3.9%
National Reform Party: 3.2%
Independence: 3%
TURNOUT: 54%

Note: The original version of this article said that the Iraqi National Project that came in first in Anbar was headed by Parliamentarian Mithal al-Alusi. According to Juan Cole at Informed Comment the List is actually led by Saleh al-Mutlaq. The piece has been changed to reflect that.

SOURCES

Abdullah, Muahmmed, “Diyala Sees Early Campaigning,” Niqash, 12/8/08

Agence France Presse, “Iraqi Shiite Factions Face Intimidation Claims,” 2/5/09

Alsumaria, “Iraq provincial elections preliminary results,” 2/5/09

Aswat al-Iraq, “Dawlat al-Qanoon coalition dominates 9 of 14 provinces,” 2/5/09
- “MP accuses Kurds of ‘illegitimate’ campaigning,” 1/24/09
- “URGENT / IHEC announces 90% of election results,” 2/5/09
- “URGENT / PM’s list garners 38% of votes in Baghdad,” 2/5/09

Cole, Juan, "Religious Parties Sweep Shiite South; Sunni Arabs fragmented, mainly Secular," Informed Comment, 2/6/09

Dagher, Sam, “Tribal Rivalries Persist as Iraqis Seek Local Posts,” New York Times, 1/20/09

Daniel, Trenton, “Pro-Iran party loses big in Iraq local elections, returns show,” McClatchy Newspapers, 2/5/09

Farrell, Stephen, “Election: Preliminary Results,” Baghdad Bureau Blog, New York Times, 2/5/09

Hamid, Nirmeen, “anbar’s Islamic party and tribes vie for power,” Niqash, 12/12/08

Al-Jazeera, “Strong poll showing by Iraqi PM,” 2/5/09

Lynch, Marc, “Iraqi Sunnis after the Awakening,” Abu Aardvark Blog, 6/20/08

O’Rourke, Brian, “Prime Minister’s Bloc Wins In Baghdad, Southern Iraq,” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 2/5/09

Rubin, Alissa, “Iraqi Prime Minister’s Party Dominates Vote,” New York Times, 2/6/09

Rubin, Alissa and Myers, Steven Lee, “As Iraqis Tally Votes, Former Leader Re-emerges,” New York Times, 2/4/09

UPI, “Maliki’s party tops provincial election,” 2/5/09

Visser, Reidar, “The Candidate Lists Are Out: Basra More Fragmented, Sadrists Pursuing Several Strategies?,” Historiae.org, 12/22/08

Ninewa’s al-Hadbaa Party

One of the few new parties to come out victorious in the January 2009 provincial elections could be the al-Hadbaa party of Ninewa province. A U.S. official told Reuters that he thought the Hadbaa list would get around 66% of the vote there. The province is one of the most divided and violent in the country due to the simmering dispute between the majority Arabs who are ruled by the Kurds. There are also a large number of minorities such as Christians, Yazidis, Shabaks, and Turkomen who reside there that are caught in the middle. The province had one of the highest voter turnouts in the country at 60%, which could be the result of the power struggle between all these various groups. If al-Hadbaa does come out the winner, it may increase the tensions in Ninewa as it ran on an Arab-nationalist, anti-Kurdish ticket.

While there were twenty-five other entities running in Ninewa, the election was really between Al-Hadbaa and the Kurdish Ninewa Brotherly List. The al-Hadbaa National List was formed in 2007. It is made up of four parties, Al-Hadbaa National United Assembly, the Patriotic and National Forces Assembly, the Iraqi and Kurdistani Party for Freedom and Equality, and Al-Qasat Iraqi Assembly. Atheel Najafi who comes from a rich and famous Mosul pedigree heads the List. He and other well-known families and tribes form the backbone of the Al-Hadbaa National United Assembly, which was put together in 2007. The Patriotic Union and National Forces Assembly was founded by Isam Aead Sheat al-Jubouri. The Assembly is itself a coalition of the Democratic Reform and Justice Party, the Justice and Reform Iraqi Movement, the Arab Socialist Movement, the Nasserite Avant-Garde Socialist Party, and the Iraqi Arab Party. The Iraqi and Kurdistani Party for Freedom and Equality was also founded in 2007 by Arshad Ahmed al-Zebari. They oppose Kurdish independence. Al-Qasat Iraqi Assembly was started in Mosul in 2005 by engineer Fares Abdul Azeez al-Sanjari. They want an end to the U.S. occupation, freeing of prisoners, and decentralized rule.

Together the List called for Iraqi unity as an Arab and Islamic country, an end to the U.S. presence and militias, women’s rights, the development of the province, and claim they will help end the insurgency. They were most noted however for their attacks on the Kurds, who currently control the provincial council because of the Sunni boycott in January 2005. They opposed the Kurds’ aspirations to annex northern sections of the province, accused them of cheating in the voting, manipulating the security forces, blamed them for raids on their offices, and said they would remove Kurds from leadership positions. Atheel Najafi went as far as to claim that the Kurds tried to assassinate him.

The Kurdish List is made up of the two main Kurdish parties, the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) of Iraqi President Jalal Talabani, and the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) of Kurdistan President Massoud Barzani, along with many other smaller entities Those include the Kurdistan Islamic Union, the Assyrian National Congress, the Iraqi Communist Party, the Kurdistan Communist Party, and the Kurdistan Socialist Party. The Kurds want a federal system that will ensure their autonomy, and the annexation of areas they lay historical claim to. One Kurdish member of the Ninewa council for example, said that the election would prove that the people in the disputed territories in the northern region of the province want to join Kurdistan, and a Kurdish Army officer claimed that Mosul would eventually be part of an independent Kurdistan as well. The Kurds also accused the al-Hadbaa list of being Baathists, and having ties to Al Qaeda in Iraq.

The Kurds held no illusion about their chances heading into 2009. In 2005 because of the Sunni boycott, only 14% of the province voted. This time they were expecting a heavy Arab turnout, which apparently happened. They were therefore cold about holding the elections in the first place, and tried to delay the passage of the provincial election law in parliament in 2008. In December, the Kurds on the Ninewa council attempted to delay the vote there unsuccessfully to hold off the inevitable.

As the campaign started, electioneering was difficult because of the lack of security. Much of the work was done secretly as a result. One researcher at Mosul University thought the 2005 election was actually more open with more parties participating, but with fewer voters because of the Sunni boycott. Al-Hadbaa was expected to take the southern Arab portions of Ninewa, and most of Mosul, while the Brotherly List had support in the north and west, and northern Mosul. The rural areas were considered up for grabs

American officials have often said that they hope the elections could help solve the problems in Ninewa. Right after the voting was completed for example, the U.S. general in command of Mosul said this could be a turning point. That may be wishful thinking, as the campaigning between the Kurds and Hadbaa was anything but cordial. If the U.S. official was correct and al-Hadbaa gets two-thirds of the seats they will be able to rule the province on their own, which could lead to a direct confrontation with the outgoing Kurds. Al-Hadbaa’s campaign promises of removing Kurds from positions of authority and asserting Arab identity will be rejected by the Kurdish List. Unfortunately, that is the way Iraqi nationalism is increasingly being formulated. Al-Hadbaa’s demands on the Kurds closely mirror statements and moves made by Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki since 2008 as he has tried to establish himself as a national leader of the country. What is needed is reconciliation and power sharing in Ninewa, but none of the sides, nor Baghdad is proposing that. That means the divide between Arabs and Kurds will continue, but the big question now is whether it will still be as violent or become more political.

SOURCES

Al-Ansary, Khalid, “Election friction flares in Iraq’s violent north,” Reuters, 1/2/09

Aswat al-Iraq, “MP accuses Kurds of ‘illegitimate’ campaigning,” 1/24/09
- “Ninewa council votes for postponing local elections,” 12/18/08

Cocks, Tim, “Vote sows seeds of greater calm in Iraq’s north,” Reuters, 2/2/09

Farrell, Stephen, “Election Turnout: Early Figures,” Baghdad Bureau Blog, New York Times, 2/1/09

Garcia-Navarro, Lourdes, “Iraq’s Election Campaign Especially Bitter In Mosul,” Morning Edition, NPR, 1/30/09

International Crisis Group, “Iraq’s Provincial Elections: The Stakes,” 1/27/09

Kamal, Adel, “violence threatens mosul elections,” Niqash, 12/11/08

Kukis, Mark, “Is Mosul on the Mend?” Time, 3/9/08

Londono, Ernesto, “In Iraq’s north, Vote Tallies To Define Loyalties,” Washington Post, 2/2/09

Niqash, “the hadbaa national list,” 1/28/09
- “Kurdistan alliance,” 1/28/09

Parker, Ned, “Iraq looks ahead to provincial, national elections,” Los Angeles Times, 11/5/08

Parker, Ned and Redha, Usama, “Arabs, Kurds take their fight to polls,” Los Angeles Times, 1/25/09

Visser, Reidar, “Pushing the Limits of Decentralization: Kurdish Parties ‘Decide’ to Postpone Local Elections in Mosul,” Historiae.org, 12/18/08

International Crisis Group Report On Iraq’s Provincial Elections

Four days before Iraq’s January 31 provincial elections, the International Crisis Group released a report on the power struggles, perceptions, and institutions that would shape the vote. The provincial councils can set local agendas, spend money, direct reconstruction, and collect taxes. Their budgets however are set by Baghdad, which complicates their work, as they don’t have full control over the purse. The current councils are not always representative of their populations because of a Sunni and Sadrist boycott. That has caused ethnic divisions between Arabs and Kurds in Salahaddin, Diyala, and Ninewa. Since their election in 2005, many of the councils have also done a poor job governing, because they are largely untrained, incompetent, sectarian, and corrupt. Many Iraqis are disillusioned by their rule. The new candidates will have to maneuver through the institutional and political barriers to getting elected, and then prove that they can do a better job than their predecessors.

Battleground Provinces

Ninewa is one of the most troubled provinces in Iraq that has suffered as a result of the 2005 provincial elections. It is divided between the Sunni Arab majority and the Kurdish minority that resides in eastern Mosul, western Sinjar, and northern and eastern strips along the Kurdistan border. There are also many smaller minorities such as Turkomen, Yazidis, Christians, and Shabaks, who are caught in the crossfire between the Arabs and Kurds. This ethnic conflict has caused Ninewa to be one of the most violent in the country with a still active Al Qaeda in Iraq and other insurgents. In 2005 55.7% of the voting population participated in provincial elections, but only 14% in Ninewa. This was largely due to the Sunni boycott. As a result, the Kurdistan Nationalist Democratic List comprising the Kurdistan Democratic Party and several smaller parties took 31 of the 41 provincial seats. As a result, the Kurds gained control of the local government as well as the security forces that has been greatly resented by the Arabs to this day. Their dispute with the Arabs has led them to block the formation of Sons of Iraq (SOI) units because they see them as a threat to their power. They were eventually created, but only in three Arab majority areas. The Kurds also have aspirations to annex northern sections of the province. Several military campaigns have been carried out in Ninewa, which might have made the situation worse. In 2008 Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki also became involved when he launched his own offensive in Mosul, and then began concentrating on the Kurds. As reported before, he placed his brother-in-law in charge of the Army division in control of Mosul, and began rotating Kurdish officers and units out, to be replaced by Arab ones. He also tried to win the Arabs over by offering them reconstruction projects. Future peace in the province depends not only upon Sunnis gaining representation, but reconciliation between them, the Kurds, and the province’s minorities.

Diyala is another mixed province with many Shiite Arabs. It also has Kurds and Turkomen in the north. Like Ninewa, the Kurds want to annex northern portions of the province. Many of the tribes there are mixed Sunni-Shiite. In 2005 only about 33% of the province voted. As a result, the council was divided between the SIIC-Dawa coalition that received 20 seats, the Iraqi Islamic Party that got 14, and the Kurds’ seven. The SIIC gained the governorship and control of the security forces, the Islamic Party got the deputy governor, and the Kurds the head of the council. Many Sunnis resented the Islamic Party’s participation since they violated the boycott. These divisions contributed to violence, a dysfunctional council, little reconstruction, and up to 27,000 families fleeing their homes. Eight of the 41 council members were assassinated, leading to many others living in other parts of the country for protection. In 2007 the first Sons of Iraq (SOI) unit was formed, which helped quell violence in some areas, but not all, and they also clashed with the provincial police who were mostly Shiite and Kurds. In 2008 Maliki launched a security operation in Diyala as well. At first the security forces went after the insurgents, but later trained their sights on the SOI, members of the provincial council, and then the Kurds in the disputed Khanaqin district. Like in Ninewa, Maliki made the situation worse in Diyala by increasing tensions.

Anbar was once the heart of the Sunni insurgency. In 2005 only around 3,800 out of approximately 574,000 voters participated. The Iraqi Islamic Party (IIP) ran almost unopposed winning 34 of the province’s 41 council seats. The IIP acted almost unilaterally afterwards, cutting deals to maintain power that were illegal. First, in August 2006 they replaced thirteen council members with people that were not elected. This was due to the fact that four council members were killed, seven never took office out of fear, one became an aide to the governor, and one was elected to parliament. Then at the end of 2006, they added eight additional seats to the council in an attempt to appease and co-opt the Anbar Awakening, who was seen as a threat to the IIP’s rule. That didn’t work, and the Awakening began pushing for elections as soon as possible hoping to sweep the IIP out.

Baghdad was the center of the violence in Iraq and only 48% voted in 2005. The SIIC won 28 of 51 seats, and gained control of the governorship and the head of the council. Dawa won 11 seats, the Fadhila party six, and a group of pro-Sadrist independents three. The Sunnis were virtually absent from power due to their boycott, and gave no legitimacy to the council. After the sectarian war and the massive displacement that ensued, the council now almost represents the demographics of the capital.

The last province the Crisis Group discussed was Basra. In 2005 the Supreme Council-Dawa coalition won 20 seats, the Fadhila Party twelve, the secular Iraqi National List of former Interim Prime Minister Ilyad Allawi five, the Islamic Dawa – Iraq Organization three, and the Future Iraq Gathering of the former oil minister Ibrahim Bahr al-Ulum two. After the election, Fadhila formed a coalition with those last three groups to take the governor position. The Fadhila Party controls the province’s administration, the SIIC the security forces, and the Sadrists once ran the streets and port. The rivalry between these groups led to open warfare between their competing militias. That wasn’t quelled until Maliki’s offensive there in March 2008.

The Major Political Parties

The parties participating in the 2009 elections are divided between the current ruling ones made up of the SIIC, the Kurdish Alliance, the Iraqi Islamic Party, and the Dawa Party, and the opposition consisting of the Sadrists, the Fadhila Party, the Iraqi National List, the Iraqi Communist Party, and the Awakening/SOI forces. The parties now in power have the advantage of controlling the facts on the ground, offering patronage, friendly mosques, and links with the tribes.

The Supreme Councils is one of the largest parties in Iraq. It was formed in Iran in the 1980s. In 2005 they largely ran under the banner of Grand Ayatollah Sistani. Since then they have raised the ire of almost every party in the country that hopes to unseat them. The SIIC controls most of the local governments in the south, along with Baghdad, which they will use to win votes. In many provinces they run the security forces, and also have a large number of friendly clerics and mosques. In 2009 they are running the Martyr of the Mihrab and Independent Forces List, which includes the Shahid al-Mihrab Gathering, the Badr Organization, Vice President Adel Abd al-Mahdi’s Independent Gathering, the Hezbollah Movement, and the Sayyed al-Shuhada Movement. They want to maintain control, and establish a Shiite nine province autonomous region in the south.

The Kurdish Alliance is made up of Massoud Barzani’s Kurdistan Democratic Party, Jalal Talabani’s Patriotic Union of Kurdistan, and several smaller parties. They have proven to be the most disciplined and organized of all of Iraq’s coalitions. They are unified by Kurdish nationalism, and the call for a federal system that will allow them greater autonomy. They also wish to annex several northern areas that they claim are historically Kurdish. They have worked through the constitution and government to accomplish these goals. Kurdish politicians interviewed by the Crisis Group expected defeat in 2009, but wanted to lose as few seats as possible.

The Iraqi Islamic Party (IIP) was helped by the country’s turn to religion after the U.S. invasion, and the sectarian-ethnic quota system created by the Americans. They were also an established party, having been one of the first Sunni Islamist groups in the country. In 2005 they ran largely unopposed and gained seats in several provinces. They later formed the Iraqi Accordance Front with two other Sunni parties. They have had a difficult relationship with the other ruling parties, and boycotted the cabinet for several months. They have basically been included to provide the image of national unity, while given no real power or responsibility other than the ministries they control. The other ruling parties have also been upset that they have not been able to stop the insurgency. When the Awakening and Sons of Iraq forces emerged, they were put on the defensive by their own community that questioned their running in 2005 provincial elections. In December 2008 the Accordance Front also broke up when the National Dialogue Council left. They could lose seats as a result, but still have urban support, and are counting on the tribal forces splitting apart and dividing the Sunni vote to the IIP’s advantage.

The Dawa Party was the smallest and weakest of the major parties after the election, but may come out the biggest winner in 2009. Dawa was the first Shiite Islamic party founded in Iraq back in the 1950s. It gained control of the premiership due to the rivalry between the SIIC and Sadrists who blocked each other’s grab for power. They ended up selecting first Ibrahim al-Jaafari and then Nouri al-Maliki as compromise candidates for Prime Minister so their rival couldn’t have the post. Maliki replaced Jaafari, and was at first seen as weak and ineffectual, but has since then proven to be an adept politician able to negotiate a path between the United States, Iran, and the other ruling parties. Since his moves against the Mahdi Army, insurgents, and Kurds, he has fashioned himself into a nationalist leader. He has also argued for a strong central government, and opposed the SIIC’s and Kurds’ regional aspirations. As Prime Minister he has put Dawa members in key positions throughout the government, and centralized control of the security forces in his office. For the 2009 elections Maliki put together the State of Law list made up of his Dawa Party, Islamic Dawa – Iraq Organization, Oil Minister Hussain al-Shahristani’s Independents List, the Solidarity List, al-Intifadha al-Shaabaniya Pact, the Fayli Kurds’ Brotherhood Movement, and the Turkomen Islamic Union. As noted before, they may come away with more than half of the fourteen provinces that held elections this month.

There are also several opposition parties that are hoping to gain in the provincial elections. They are made up of the Sadrists, the Anbar Awakening and Sons of Iraq, the National Reform Party, the Fadhila Party, the Iraqi National List, and the Iraqi Communist Party. They all favor Iraqi nationalism, reject federalism, and oppose the SIIC. They were largely responsible for having elections this year over the protests of the ruling parties. Two major problems with all of them are that they are not running as a unified list, and are largely driven by their individual leaders’ personalities.

The Sadrists have been on the defensive since 2007. They were blamed for much of the violence as the sectarian war died down, were targeted by the U.S. and Maliki, went through Sadr’s cease-fire, then disbanded their militia, and now are trying to form a new social group. They still control many mosques, which are crucial to turn out and motivate voters. Sadrist politicians interviewed by the Crisis Group said they didn’t expect to win power in any province, but rather were wanted to stop the major parties from having a monopoly over them. Due to threats by Maliki to ban any party from running that had a militia, the Sadrists are instead backing two independent groups, the Integrity and Construction List and the Liberals Independent Trend.

The Awakening and SOIs are some of the newest groups on Iraq’s political scene. They forged an alliance with the U.S. aimed at kicking out Al Qaeda in Iraq, and gaining power. They oppose both the Shiite led government, and the Iraqi Accordance Front. The Awakening is based in Anbar, while SOIs have formed political parties in Baghdad and Diyala. They have not created a unified list however, and have increasingly been splintering along tribal lines. The Anbar Awakening for example, split in late 2008 with Abu Risha, the brother of the slain founder of the Awakening, and at least one other sheikh forming an alliance with the ruling Islamic Party. Maliki has also attempted to weaken the SOI in Baghdad and Diyala by arresting and harassing them.

Former Prime Minister Ibrahim al-Jaafari was once one of the leaders of the Dawa Part, but became increasingly dissatisfied after he was replaced by Maliki. He eventually left to form his own National Reform Party that includes his wing of the Dawa. He has also looked to form links with the Sadrists, and appears to have had lots of money to spend electioneering.

The Fadhila Party is based out of Basra, and was created by Muhammad al-Yaqoubi. He claimed the mantle of Ayatollah Muhammaed Sadeq al-Sadr’s movement, the father of Moqtada al-Sadr, after the invasion. They support an autonomous Basra region, which was defeated just before the January 31 provincial elections. They have not governed Basra well, and have been accused of corruption and oil smuggling. They will probably lose control there, but are hoping to gain seats in the rest of the south.

Last there is former Interim Prime Minister Ilyad Allawi’s secular Iraqi National List. They received massive support from the Americans in the 2005 election but did extremely poorly. They have formed an alliance with the Iraqi Communist Party and the Sunni Iraqi Front for National Dialogue.

Forces Shaping the 2009 Election

Besides the political parties, the 2009 elections will also be shaped by several structural issues within Iraqi society. Those include the performance of the current ruling councils, public perceptions, institutions, political manipulation, mosques, and the tribes.

Performance and perceptions might prove to be the most important factors in the 2009 election. In 2005 violence, boycotts, sectarian divisions, and a mix of confusion and excitement were major factors in the voting. As a result, many Iraqis stuck with parties from their own sect. Exile groups that had moved back to the country after the U.S. invasion had an advantage over others because they were established parties. The Shiite ones had clerics and mosques, and claimed Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani supported them. This gained them votes, but perhaps not legitimacy. They had to earn that, but have largely failed due to their bad governance. Many provinces suffered during the sectarian war, but even in the south that didn’t have as much violence the provincial politicians were not able to provide law and order, fight corruption, overcome inexperience, provide development, or spend their budgets. The councils have mostly blamed the lack of security and Baghdad for their problems, but many Iraqis blame them personally. The Crisis Group predicted this might depress the vote, which might be one major reason why only 51% of Iraqis decided to come out to the polls this time.

The ruling parties also tried to exploit their control of local governments to win votes. Government jobs are a massive source of employment in the country and are given out as a form of patronage. They may have also used their positions and control of the security forces to intimidate voters. Maliki for one actively used the government to promote his State of Law List.

Because of the plethora of new political groupings, the established ones have also resorted to political manipulation by forming their own independent parties to fool and divide voters. Many of these new independents are simply branches of the major political parties. In Anbar for example, the Islamic Party is running on its own, but also has the National Future Gathering and the Independent National Tribal Gathering. The SIIC created the Independent Gathering, which is supposed to be a less religious branch of the movement.

Mosques and clerics will also play a role in the vote. The leading Shiite ayatollahs have said they do not support any party this time around. Grand Ayatollah Sistani has implied that he is deeply upset with the current provincial governments, but that didn’t stop the SIIC from using his image and name repeatedly in their campaign events. The SIIC and Sadrists also control many local mosques and preachers that called for their followers to vote.

Iraq’s tribes also re-emerged in 2006 due to the Anbar Awakening at first, but then as tools of Maliki’s Dawa Party. In 2008 Maliki began creating Tribal Support Councils across Iraq. They were first started in his drive against the Sadrists with many southern tribes joined because they felt that the Mahdi Army was taking away their followers. Since then they have been created as a vote getter for Maliki. Each is controlled by a member of the Dawa Party, and gets $25,000 a month from Maliki’s office. Each member is allowed to hire several people, which creates a strong patronage system for both the tribal sheikhs and Maliki. The sheikhs were expected to turn out their tribesman on January 31 for the State of Law List. This was bitterly opposed by both the SIIC and Kurds who rightly saw them as challenges to their rule. Several tribes have also formed their own parties seeking a piece of the political and reconstruction pie.

Possible Results

The Crisis Group paper focused exclusively on the battleground provinces they identified at the beginning. For some reason they did not include Salahaddin, which is also divided between Arabs and Kurds. In Ninewa the newly formed al-Hadbaa party, which is the largest Arab coalition was expected to win. They oppose both the Kurds and the Islamic Party. The Kurds tried to postpone the election there to stave off their inevitable defeat, but were unsuccessful. A Kurdish official said they expected to lose control of Ninewa, and get between nine to 12 seats compared to their current 31. In Diyala the ruling Shiite and Kurdish parties also tried to delay the vote in anticipation of a strong Sunni turnout. The Kurdish head of the provincial council predicted that the Kurds would only have four seats compared to their current seven, and thought the Sunnis would walk away with twenty of the twenty-nine seats. Just who that would be was unknown as Maliki has created Tribal Support Councils in Diyala, and there are also various SOI groups competing with the Islamic Party. The fracturing of the Anbar Awakening will probably lead to joint rule between them and the Islamic Party. That could work if the two sides can negotiate a power sharing agreement. Baghdad was seen as up in the air since there were so many parties, Maliki’s State of Law, the SIIC, the Sadrists, the SOI, Allawi’s Iraqi National List to name just a few, competing there. Basra was a battle between Fadhila, the SIIC, the Sadrists, and Dawa.

Conclusion

The Crisis Group concluded by saying the greatest barriers to an effective vote in January 2009 that could bring about change was voter apathy, corrupt and incompetent councils, and political manipulation. Many parties ran on nationalism and the provision of services. The problem is more and more Iraqis are growing cynical about the political process due to the actions of the ruling parties that have failed to improve their daily lives. The Crisis Group thought that even if there were a successful January vote that would not mean that the underlying problems in the country would be solved. They could bring about new politicians that are more nationalist and support central control, but the ultimate test of the elections will be if the new politicians can gain popularity and legitimacy by doing a good job governing.

SOURCES

Fadel, Leila, “Low turnout in Iraq’s election reflects a disillusioned nation,” McClatchy Newspapers, 2/2/09

International Crisis Group, “Iraq’s Provincial Elections: The Stakes,” 1/27/09

Parker, Sam, “Guest Post: Behind the Curtain in Diyala,” Abu Muqawama Blog, 8/20/08

Rubin, Alissa, “Ahead of Election, Iraq’s Leader Pushes for Gains,” New York Times, 1/26/09

Early Election Predictions

The results of the January 31, 2009 provincial elections will not be known for weeks, but there are already a slew of reports predicting the winners. The biggest victor is Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki whose State of Law list could come away with more than half of the fourteen provinces that held elections. Former Prime Minister Ilyad Allawi, while not winning any governorates could have a strong showing as well. The Sadrists and Supreme Iraqi Islamic Council look to be the losers, but are still on the scene. New parties like the Awakening in Anbar and the Hadbaa party in Ninewa have also appeared. In the larger picture, the vote is a correction for some of the problems created by the 2005 one, it shows that the idea of a southern autonomous region is probably dead, that Maliki’s drive for a strong central government is on its way to becoming a reality, and that sectarian and ethnic divides still exist in Iraq. The biggest question is whether any of these new politicians will do any better at actual governing than the ones that they are replacing.

Who Could Be The Winners?

Six parties have apparently taken the lion’s share of votes in the January election. According to the government Al-Sabah paper those are Maliki’s State of Law list, the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council’s list, the Iraqi National List of former Prime Minister Allawi, the Sadrists’ Independent Trend of the Noble Ones, the National Project, and the Iraqi Accordance Front of Vice President Tariq al-Hashemi. The State of Law coalition is made up of Maliki’s Islamic Dawa Party, the offshoot Dawa Party Iraqi Organization, the Independent Blog, the Solidarity Bloc, the Islamic Union of Iraqi Turkmen, Kurdish Feli Fraternity Movement, and the Shaabani Uprising Bloc 1991. They call for law and order, getting rid of militias and corruption, and a strong central government. It is a Shiite list, but includes Arabs, Kurds, and Turkomen. The Martyr of the Pulpit is made up of four branches of the Supreme Council, the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council, the Shaheed al-Mihrab Bloc, the Badr Organization, and the Independent Bloc. They advocate an autonomous Shiite region in the south, job creation, oppose the return of Baathists, and want compensation for crimes during Saddam’s rule. The Iraqi Accordance Front also put together a coalition consisting of the Iraqi Islamic Party, the Reform Bloc of Diyala Province, the Iraqi Legation for Independent Organization of Civil Society, the Arabic Iraqi Congregation, and the General Conference of Iraqi People. They advocate the unity of Iraq, Arab and Islamic identity, an end to the U.S. occupation, the freeing of all prisoners held by the Americans, amending the constitution, maintaining Diyala’s borders, and reforming the government and justice system. The National Project is an opposing Sunni coalition led by Salih al-Mutlaq and former speaker of parliament Mahmoud Mashadani. They are both from the Iraqi Natioanl Dialogue Council who recently split from the Accordance Front. They along with the Iraqi National List and Sadrists have all worked together in parliament as the loosely organized opposition. Iraqi nationalism, a call for a strong central government, and opposition to the ruling parties are what unite them.

Of those six, Maliki’s State of Law could walk away with the majority of Iraq’s provinces. Two papers Al-Sabah and Al-Sharq al-Awsat say that Maliki’s State of Law has come in first in six southern provinces. All are not known yet, but reports point to Basra, Dhi Qar, Muthanna, Wasit, Maysan, and one other. A government source said the list could come away with all nine southern provinces, the five already mentioned plus Karbala, Najaf, Babil, and Qadisiyah. That seems like wishful thinking. In Basra, which was the beginning of Maliki’s turnaround from a weak ineffectual leader to a strong one, his coalition has 50% of the vote. In second is the Supreme Council with 20%. The State of Law may also come away with Baghdad, having won the Shiite east, including Sadr City. That could leave the Prime Minister’s list in control of seven provinces, and be a major blow to the Supreme Council and the Sadrists that are now in power.

Some new parties such as the al-Hadbaa National List in Ninewa may also be victorious. The List is made up of the al-Hadbaa National United Assembly, the Patriotic and National Forces Assembly, the Iraqi and Kurdsitani Party for Freedom and Equality, and the Al-Wasat Iraqi Assembly. The party is led by Atheel al-Nujaifi, and has run on an explicitly anti-Kurdish and pro-security ticket. They oppose Kurdish rule and designs on the province. Currently Kurds control 31 of the 41 council seats, and wish to annex northern sections of the province. Al-Hadbaa has accused the Kurdish controlled security forces and their militia the peshmerga of harassing them. They also claim that if they are elected they will help bring an end to the insurgency in Ninewa, which is largely fueled by the ethnic divide between Arabs and Kurds. This conflict could be the reason why 60% of the province turned out to vote, one of the highest in the country. A U.S. official said that the party could have up to 66% of the vote. If true that would mean they could rule the province without the need of a larger coalition or joint rule with the Kurds. The U.S. general in command of Mosul said he hoped the election would lead to reconciliation, and an end to the violence in one of the country’s most volatile areas. However al-Hadbaa’s anti-Kurdish campaign could lead to more divisions instead.

In other Sunni areas, the Anbar Awakening and Accordance Front list are battling it out. According to Al-Sabah, the tribal Awakening is winning in Anbar. A parliamentarian from the Accordance Front claimed his list is taking in Anbar however, along with Diyala and Salahaddin. He also said they are coming in third in Babil and Basra, a surprise if true since they are Shiite majority provinces.

Another newcomer is Yousef Majid al-Haddoubi, who could walk away with Karbala. Al-Haddoubi is a secular Shiite independent who heads the Brigade List. He was the governor of the province under Saddam, and then became the mayor of Karbala City after the U.S. invasion.

Larger coalitions to rule provinces are also emerging. In Najaf, the Sadrists, the Iraqi National List, the Reform Movement, and the Iraqi National Congress announced that they would form an alliance to try to take the province.

What Does It All Mean?

Many of the parties that came to power in 2005 were not representative of their populations. This could account for most of them being swept from office. The Supreme Council won Babil, Baghdad, Dhi Qar, Karbala, Muthanna, Najaf and Qadisiyah in the previous vote because they were the largest Shiite party, the best organized, had the most money, were founded by an established clerical family the Hakims, had the backing of Iran, said Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani supported them, and the Sadrists largely stayed away from the polls. The SIIC also won in Diyala, the Iraqi Islamic Party in Anbar, and the Kurds in Ninewa and Salahaddin because of the Sunni boycott. The Islamic Party for example, only got 2,692 votes out of 3,775 in Anbar as a result because it ran largely uncontested. Those disparities are now over, although Anbar may still be up for grabs.

There have also been several articles stating that the 2009 vote is a rejection of the religious parties, but this is only partly true. The two main parts of Maliki’s State of Law list are Shiite religious groups, the Islamic Dawa and the Dawa Party Iraq Organization. The Supreme Council might have lost control of the south, but are still present, the same thing with the Sadrists. The Iraqi Islamic Party is also Islamist. Many stressed nationalism and backed independents, but that doesn’t invalidate their pasts. What the lists found is that they had to address issues more to get elected rather than just their religion, and that is an important shift in Iraqi politics. At the same time, Sunnis continued to mostly vote for Sunni parties, Shiites for Shiites, Kurds for Kurds. Sectarianism still exists in Iraq, it’s just more political than violent today.

For the south, the January election probably marks the end of any autonomous region there. The Supreme Council promoted a nine province Shiite region after the U.S. invasion, but largely dropped it. Right before the vote, a member of the Hakim family said they would revive the idea after January 31. That won’t happen now because the SIIC may not control a single province after everything is said and done. The defeat of the Basra autonomous plan and polls show little support for the idea anyway.

Instead, Iraq could be moving towards a stronger central government based in Baghdad. Maliki consistently called for this as he was campaigning across the country. His military actions against the Sadrists, insurgents, and Kurds were all part of his strategy. Now he could have control of both Baghdad, and friendly governors in the south to further his plan.

Finally, the most important question is whether any of the State of Law candidates or any of the other new lists coming to power will be any better at governing than the current ones. Many voted for the State of Law list because of the Prime Minister, not the actual politicians running. The current provincial councils are known for being incompetent, sectarian, corrupt, and suffer from a slow paper based bureaucracy and a centralized state where Baghdad and the individual ministers have all the power. The new councils will also have to deal with half the money as their predecessors due to the dramatic drop in the price of oil. That will make their job even more difficult. They will have to do a much better job to keep the loyalty of their followers, and not alienate more Iraqis from the political system that has not served them well on the local and provincial level.

SOURCES

Agence France Presse, “Iraqi PM Calls for Strong Central Government,” 1/22/09

Alsumaria, “Iraq elections leaks say Al Maliki ahead,” 2/2/09

Aswat al-Iraq, “IAF realizes progress in Salah el-Din, Diala, Anbar, - MP,” 2/2/09
- “No decrease in salaries because of oil prices – planning minister” 12/19/08
- “Sadrists in one bloc with INL, reform movement,” 2/2/09

Cocks, Tim, “Vote sows seeds of greater calm in Iraq’s north,” Reuters, 2/2/09

Farrell, Stephen, “Election: What The Papers Say,” Baghdad Bureau Blog, New York Times, 2/2/09

Hendawi, Hamza and Abdul-Zahra, Qassim, “Momentum builds for a self-ruled southern Iraq,” Associated Press, 1/16/09

Ibrahim, Waleed, “’Surprise’ poll victories strengthen Iraq’s Maliki,” Reuters, 2/1/09

International Crisis Group, “Iraq’s Provincial Elections: The Stakes,” 1/27/09

Knights, Michael and McCarthy, Eamon, “Provincial Politics in Iraq: Fragmentation or New Awakening?” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, April 2008

Londono, Ernesto, “In Iraq’s north, a defining vote,” Washington Post, 2/2/09

Niqash, “accord and reform bloc,” 1/28/09
- “the hadbaa national list,” 1/28/09
- “the shaheed al-mihrab list,” 1/28/09
- “state of law coalition,” 1/28/09

Comparing The January 2009 to January 2005 Provincial Elections (REVISED)

The results of the January 2009 elections will not be known for weeks, but the early returns show a lower turnout than the last time Iraqis voted on provincial councils in January 2005. At that time, 58% of Iraqis, over 8 million out of approximately 14 million people cast ballots. That included out-of-country voting in fourteen nations where 280,303 Iraqis registered. It also included a massive Sunni boycott, where only around 2% showed up. The first counts for the 2009 vote have 51% turnout with around 7.5 million out of 14.9 million registered voters participating. If those numbers hold it could be a disappointing finish. In Anbar for example where the Awakening tribes were having a heated campaign against the Iraqi Islamic Party for control only 40% voted. There were many early reports of widespread apathy amongst Iraqis who felt that politics had not improved their daily lives, that could be proving true. There are also growing reports of voters either being left off of roles or being confused about where their election centers were.

Here are the early returns for the January 31 vote compared to the January 2005 election.

January 31, 2009 Provincial Election Early Voter Turnout By Province

Anbar: 40%
Babil: 56%
Baghdad: Still pending, expected 39-40%
Basra: 48%
Dhi Qar: 50%
Diyala: 57%
Karbala: 60%
Maysan: 46%
Muthanna: 61%
Najaf: 55%
Ninewa: 60%
Qadisiyah: 58%
Salahaddin: 65%
Wasit: 54%

January 2005 Provincial Election Voter Turnout By Province

Anbar 2%
Babil 71%
Baghdad 48%
Dhi Qar 67%
Diyala 34%
Dohuk 89%
Karbala 73%
Maysan 59%
Muthanna 61%
Najaf 73%
Ninewa 17%
Qadisiyah 69%
Salahaddin 29%
Sulaymaniya 80%
Wasit 66%

Who Currently Rules Iraq’s Provinces

ANBAR

Governor: Mamoun Sami Rashid al-Awani

Party	Votes	Seats
Iraqi Islamic Party (Hashemi)	2,692	29
Independent Iraqi Group	755	8
Reconciliation and Liberation Bloc	328	4
TOTAL VALID BALLOTS	3,775	41
INVALID BALLOTS	28

BABIL

Governor: Salim al-Mesalmaoui

Party	Votes	Seats
Faithful Iraqis Association (Supreme Council)	192,643	25
Al-Rasul Association	43,226	6
Imam Ali Society	41,607	6
Security & Reconstruction	17,295	2
Babil Independent Association	15,779	2
TOTAL VALID BALLOTS	494,054	41
INVALID AND BLANK BALLOTS	21,786

BAGHDAD

Governor: Hussein al-Tahan, Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council

Party	Votes	Seats
Baghdad Nation (Supreme Council)	694,800	28
Baghdad Peace (Dawa)	264,130	11
Islamic al-Fadhila Party	156,229	6
National Democratic Alliance	46,265	2
Iraqi Communist Party	36,713	2
National Independent Cadres and Elites (Sadrists)	35,441	1
Iraqi Independent al-Bayan Gathering	34,366	1
TOTAL VALID BALLOTS	1,750,772	51
INVALID BALLOTS	21,600

BASRA

Governor: Muhmmad al-Waili, Islamic al-Fadhila Party

Al-Waili became governor because the Supreme Council ran two candidates and split their vote.

In April 2007 the Supreme Council had a no confidence vote against al-Waili that was ratified by Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki in July, but al-Waili is still in office.

Al-Waili was temporarily placed under house arrest during the government offensive in Basra in March 2008.

Party	Votes	Seats
Islamic Basra (Supreme Council)	235,704	20
Islamic al-Fadhila Party	150,823	12
Iraqi National List (Allawi)	49,005	4
Islamic Dawa Party	37,997	3
Iraqi Independent List	21,236	2
TOTAL VALID BALLOTS	713,271	41
INVALID BALLOTS	7,733

DHI QAR

Governor: Aziz Kadum Alwan al-Ogheli, Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council

Party	Votes	Seats
Islamic Al-Fadhila Party	103,114	11
Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council	100,237	11
Islamic Dawa – Iraq Organization	89,263	10
Iraqi National List (Allawi)	20,767	2
Islamic Movement of the 15th of Shaaban	19,709	2
Iraqi Communist Party	18,769	2
Iraqi Independent Gathering	15,531	2
Independent Coalition for the Care of Democracy	13,880	1
TOTAL VALID BALLOTS	522,271	41
INVALID BALLOTS	4,707

DIYALA

Governor: Raad Hameed al-Mula al-Tamimi, Badr Brigade, Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council

Party	Votes	Seats
Coalition of Islamic & National Forces in Diyala (Dawa & Supreme Council)	84,390	20
Iraqi Islamic Party (Hashemi)	55,960	14
Kurdish Arabic Turkmen Democratic Coalition – Diyala Governorate	30,268	7
TOTAL VALID BALLOTS	210,574	41
INVALID BALLOTS	3,283

DOHUK

Governor: Tamar Ramadan, Kurdistan Democratic Party

Party	Votes	Seats
Kurdistan Democratic Party	302,133	33
Kurdistan Islamic Union	35,675	4
Patriotic Union of Kurdistan	35,483	4
TOTAL VALLID BALLOTS	383,265	41
INVALID BALLOTS	5,273

IRBIL

Governor: Ali Nikzad, Kurdistan Democratic Party

Party	Votes	Seats
Democratic Voice of Kurdistan List (Kurdistan Democratic Party)	347,772	23
Patriotic Union of Kurdistan	244,343	16
Kurdistan Islamic Union	22,523	1
Islamic Group of Kurdistan	18,781	1
TOTAL VALID BALLOTS	647,994	41
INVALID BALLOTS	16,622

KARBALA

Governor: Uqeil al-Khazaali, Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council

Party	Votes	Seats
Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council	101,932	21
Islamic al-Fadhila Party	22,085	5
Shiite Political Council	10,655	2
Democratic Progressive Gathering	9,698	2
Independent Council of Tribal Sheikhs & Notables of Karbala Governorate	9,647	2
Iraqi Democratic Current	9,161	2
Independent Unified List for the Governorate of Holy Karbala	8,719	2
Dr. Abbas al-Hasnawi	8,621	1
Democratic Meeting for Holy Karbala	7,605	2
Independent Intellectuals Gathering	7,233	2
TOTAL VALID BALLOTS	297,201	41
INVALID BALLOTS	3,168

MAYSAN

Governor: Adil Mahwadar Radi, Sadrist

Party	Votes	Seats
Al-Hussayni Thought Forum (Sadrists)	78,859	15
Islamic Unified Front (Supreme Council)	28,211	6
Islamic Dawa – Iraq Organization	25,388	5
Islamic al-Fadhila Party	20,379	4
Al-Rida Center for Culture & Guidance	13,410	3
Gathering of the Independent Sons of Maysan	9,674	2
Iraqi Republican Group	7,560	2
Islamic Dawa Party	7,006	1
Maysan Democratic Coalition	6,833	1
Shiite Political Council	6,558	1
Independent National Islamic Congregation	6,201	1
TOTAL VALID BALLOTS	246,957	41
INVALID BALLOTS	1,559

MUTHANNA

Governor: Muhammad ali-Hassan Abbas al-Hassani, Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council

Al-Hassani was assassinated in August 2007

Ahmad Marzouq Salal of the Dawa Party who was head of the provincial council took his place.

Party	Votes	Seats
Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council	23,918	8
Islamic al-Fadhila Party	18,206	6
Al-Furat al-Awsat Assembly	17,924	6
Islamic Independent Society	14,550	5
Islamic Dawa Party	13,354	4
Gathering for al-Muthanna	12,687	4
Allegiance Coalition	10,221	3
Iraqi National List (Allawi)	7,530	3
Iraqi Communist Party	5,602	2
TOTAL VALID BALLOTS	173,155	41
INVALID BALLOTS	2,004

NAJAF

Governor: Asad Abu Gilel al-Taie, Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council

Party	Votes	Seats
Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council	133,676	19
Loyalty to Al-Najaf	64,837	9
Banner of the Independents	26,585	4
Iraqi National List (Allawi)	23,663	3
Islamic al-Fadhila Party	15,999	2
Allegiance Coalition	13,464	2
Iraq Future Gathering	11,513	2
TOTAL VALID BALLOTS	359,268	41
INVALID BALLOTS	3,079

NINEWA

Governor: Usama Yousif Kashmula, Independent

Kashmula was assassinated in July 2004

Duraid Kashmoula, his brother, took his place

Party	Votes	Seats
Democratic Patriotic Alliance of Kurdistan (Kurdistan Democratic Party & Patriotic Union of Kurdistan)	109,295	31
Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council	17,255	5
Iraqi Islamic Party (Hashemi)	7,065	2
Council of the United Clans of Mosul	6,624	2
National Rafidain List	4,650	1
TOTAL VALID BALLOTS	165,934	41
INVALID BALLOTS	864

QADISIYAH

Governor: Khalil Jalil Hamza, Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council

Hamza was assassinated in August 2007

Hamid al-Khodairi of the Supreme Council replaced him

Party	Votes	Seats
Martyr of the Sanctuary Sayyid Muhammad Baqir al-Hakim (Supreme Council)	102,005	20
Shiite Political Council	26,898	5
Islamic Dawa Party	15,446	3
Iraqi National List (Allawi)	15,396	3
Islamic al-Fadhila Party	14,606	3
Independent Brotherhood (Sadrists)	14,485	3
Islamic Dawa Party – Iraq Organization	10,854	2
Loyalty to Iraq Coalition (Sadrists)	8,052	2
TOTAL VALID BALLOTS	337,220	41
INVALID BALLOTS	3,898

SALAHADDIN

Governor: Hamed Hamood Shekti al-Qaisi

Party	Votes	Seats
List of the Unified Democratic Coalition in Salahaddin Governorate (Kurdish Democratic Party & Patriot Union of Kurdistan)	22,160	8
Liberation & Reconciliation Gathering	17,017	6
Iraqi Turkmen Front	14,917	5
Coalition of the Iraqi National Unity	13,321	5
Unified List	12,815	4
Iraqi National List (Allawi)	10,215	3
Islamic Dawa Party	8,691	3
National Iraqi Gathering	8,641	3
National al-Resalyoon List (Sadrists)	6,133	2
Gathering of Independent in Salahadin	4,739	2
TOTAL VALID BALLOTS	137,476	41
INVALID BALLOTS	1,834

SULAYMANIYA

Governor: Dana Ahmed Majid, Patriotic Union of Kurdistan

Party	Votes	Seats
Patriotic Union of Kurdistan	485,718	28
Kurdistan Islamic Union	75,008	5
Islamic Group of Kurdistan	53,088	5
Kurdistan Democratic Party of Iraq	91,578	3
Communist Party of Kurdistan	8,192
TOTAL VALID BALLOTS	731,323	41
INVALID BALLOTS	13,183

TAMIM

Governor: Abdulrahman Mustapha Fatah

Party	Votes	Seats
List of Kurdistan Brotherhood (Kurdistan Democratic Party)	237,303	26
Iraqi Turkoman Front	73,791	8
Iraqi Republican Group	43,635	5
Islamic Turkoman Coalition	12,678	1
National Iraq Union	12,329	1
TOTAL VALID BALLOTS	400,892	41
INVALID BALLOTS	5,059

WASIT

Governor: Latif Hamid Turfa, Sadrist

Party	Votes	Seats
Iraqi Elites Gathering	185,813	31
Shiite Political Council (Supreme Council & Dawa)	22,346	4
Gathering of the Independents in Wasit	16,518	3
Iraqi Communist Party	12,780	2
Democratic Iraq Gathering	9,010	1
TOTAL VALID BALLOTS	324,678	41
INVALID BALLOTS	2,704

NOTES
Allawi = Former Interim Prime Minister Ilyad Allawi of the Iraqi National List, aka Iraqi National Accord

Hashemi = Vice President Tariq Hashemi of the Iraqi Islamic Party that is part of the Iraqi Accordance Front

SOURCES

BBC, “Q&A: Iraqi election,” 2/13/05

Biddle, Stephen, Nasr, Vali, Nash, William, “Political and Security Developments in Iraq and the Region,” Council on Foreign Relations, 6/12/08

Chon, Gina and Naji, Zaineb, “Iraq Drive for Voters Lags,” Wall Street Journal, 9/18/08

Cordesman, Anthony, “The Shi’ite Gamble: Rolling The Dice For Iraq’s Future,” Center for Strategic And International Studies, 4/21/08

Dagher, Sam, “Basra strike against Shiite militias also about oil,” Christian Science Monitor, 4/9/08

Dreyfuss, Robert, “Iraq’s Election: What to Watch For,” The Nation, 1/28/09

Farrell, Stephen, “Election Turnout: Early Figures,” Baghdad Bureau Blog, New York Times, 2/1/09

International Mission for Iraqi Elections, “Final Report: Assessment of the January 30, 2005, Election Process,” August 2005

IRIN, “IRAQ: Year in Review 2005 – Iraqis go to the polls,” 1/9/06

Knights, Michael and McCarthy, Eamon, “Provincial Politics in Iraq: Fragmentation or New Awakening?” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, April 2008

Naji, Zaineb and Salman, Daud, “Iraq: Pol