Anbar’s Forgotten Sheikh

Out of the Anbar Awakening emerged three young and ambitious tribal sheikhs, each of which wanted both provincial and national power. One was Sheikh Ahmed Abu Risha, the brother of the slain founder of the Anbar Salvation Council. The second was Sheikh Hameed al-Hayes who split from the Salvation Council to join with the third figure Grand Sheikh Ali Hatem al-Sulaiman. He was the head of the Dulaim tribe, one of the largest in the country. Sulaiman founded the Al-Anbar Tribal Council. All three once worked together, but then went their own separate paths looking to make a name for themselves. All of them worked with the Americans to fight the insurgency, reached out to Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki to establish themselves as Sunni leaders, and then each formed his own political party to run in the January 2009 provincial elections. Abu Risha and Hayes were victorious, while Sulaiman failed to gain a single seat on Anbar’s provincial council. Now the Sheikh is talking about leading a nationwide tribal revolt against the Maliki government. This seems more an effort to regain face however, as Sulaiman probably feels like the forgotten Sheikh of Anbar.

In April 2009, Sheikh Sulaiman told the Los Angeles Times that he was organizing a national tribal meeting. He said he wanted to organize tribes from across the country to make demands on the government. He didn’t say what they were, but threatened an uprising against Maliki if they were not met. Sulaiman and his former partner Sheikh Hayes were famous for making such inflammatory statements in the past, but nothing ever came of them. It was simply a way to make a name for themselves. That is probably what Sulaiman is doing now.

Sheikh Sulaiman was from the Dulaim tribe, the largest in Anbar, and one of the most prominent in Iraq. His grandfather was the most powerful sheikh in Anbar, and he has strived to attain that position himself. He, along with Sheikh Hayes formed the al-Anbar Tribal Council as a breakaway group from Abu Risha’s Anbar Salvation Council. They were famous for threatening their opponents. In February 2008 for example, the two sheikhs told the Iraqi Islamic Party who controlled Anbar’s provincial council that they had 30 days to leave or they would be attacked. At the same time, he showed a willingness to work with Baghdad, forming a Tribal Support Council in Anbar that were meant to back-up Maliki.

All three sheikhs went their own ways in 2008 when the provincial elections were announced. Sulaiman formed the National Front for the Salvation of Iraq. He and the other tribal chiefs argued with the Islamic Party over the timing and security of the elections, at one time saying that the voting should be postponed, and then warning that his patience was wearing thin with delays. Personally, he ran a campaign based upon nationalism and his prominence in the fight with Al Qaeda in Iraq, along with promising better governance and services. When the final results were announced in February 2009 however, his party failed to gain a single seat in the elections. Abu Risha was the victor with eight seats, and he formed an alliance with Sheikh Hayes who’s party, the Iraqi Tribes List, walked away with two seats.

It’s probably out of frustration that Sulaiman is now threatening the government. Seeing his former friends turned rivals gain power in Anbar is a bitter pill for the head of the largest tribe in the province. His alliance with Maliki through the Support Council apparently didn’t help, so now he has turned to attacking the government as a way to regain notoriety and put his name back on the political map. This is a tactic that Sulaiman and Hayes perfected in the days when they worked together. Sulaiman’s poor showing in the provincials is probably a bad sign for his chances if he chose to run in the parliamentary vote. If he couldn’t win in the local elections, he’s unlikely to gain more votes in the balloting for national office.

SOURCES

Ali, Fadhil, “Sunni Rivalries in al-Anbar Province Threaten Iraq’s Security,” Terrorism Focus, Jamestown Foundation, 3/11/08

Associated Press, “Iraqi provincial election results,” 2/19/09

Hamid, Nirmeen, “al-suleiman: awakening movement is over,” Niqash, 10/24/08

Ibrahim, Waleed, “Iraq Sunni Arab dispute may delay Anbar handover,” Reuters, 7/16/08

Lynch, Marc, “Iraqi Sunnis after the Awakening,” Abu Aardvark Blog, 6/20/08

Parker, Ned, “Iraq’s Nouri Maliki may gain power with U.S. security agreement,” Los Angeles Times, 11/24/08

Robertson, Campbell and Oppel, Richard, “Iraqis Fail to Agree on Provincial Election Law,” New York Times, 8/7/08

Sly, Liz, “IRAQ: Mutterings of tribal revolt,” Babylon & Beyond Blog, Los Angeles Times, 4/28/09

Massive Security Raids In Basra

On January 24, 2009 Basra’s Operations Command (BOC) announced a security crackdown in the southern province in preparation for the January 2009 provincial elections. The campaign started off slowly, but has continued to this day with massive arrests. So many have been detained that there are few details on who they are other than members of criminal gangs and militias.

The security operation has no name, but involves both Army and police units. They have set up checkpoints across Basra City, and conduct several raids a week. Besides people, they have also confiscated weapons, cars and motorcycles. On April 25 for example, it was reported that 19 wanted men were arrested on terrorism and criminal charges, along with 36 unregistered cars and 17 motorcycles.

In the first phase of the operation from January 24 to the end of February 220 people were detained. That picked up in March with 567 arrests. This month the authorities have taken away 1,037 people for a grand total of 1,626. Along the way there have also been sporadic incidences of violence against Iraqi and Coalition forces, as well as top local officials. On April 5 an improvised explosive device (IED) targeted Basra’s governor Mohammed Mosbeh al-Waeli. The governor was unhurt. Five days later a bomb went off targeting an Iraqi army unit, and a Multi-National Force patrol was hit by an IED on April 20. Both attacks resulted in no casualties. On the 27 the Director General of the police in Basra also escaped an IED. While no suspects were mentioned in any of the press reports, they were most likely Special Groups or members of the Mahdi Army, who have probably been prime targets of these raids since they were the largest and most dangerous armed groups in the province.

No other area of Iraq has reported so many arrests in recent weeks as Basra. The provincial elections are over, but the operation is continuing. It’s not unusual for 50, 60, up to 100 men or more to be carted away in a day. The fact that there have been so few reprisal attacks by militias or gangs as a result shows their weakened position after Maliki launched his first crackdown there in March 2008. This is quite a turn around for a province where every political party had its own militia, and Iran was actively involved in supporting gunmen. It also shows the new status quo of the Sadrists who were once one of the most powerful groups in the area. The Mahdi Army has largely been disbanded, the movement has split several times, and the loyalists are now emphasizing politics, religion, and social services over militancy. This has allowed the government to sweep up his followers in the south, while reaching out to them in the new provincial councils in what has become a classic carrot and stick approach by Maliki.

SOURCES

Aswat al-Iraq, “2 wanted men arrested, explosives seized in Basra, 2/6/9
- “3 wanted men nabbed in Basra,” 1/26/09
- “5 arrested in Basra,” 2/22/09
- “5 wanted men, 2 Iranians arrested in Basra,” 1/24/09
- “6 wanted men arrested in Basra,” 3/3/09
- “6 wanted men detained in Basra, 2/10/09
- “6 wanted men nabbed, 2 Grad rockets seized in Basra,” 2/18/09
- “6 wanted men nabbed, ammo found in Basra,” 2/9/09
- “6 wanted men nabbed in Basra,” 2/4/09
- “7 wanted men arrested, kidnapped child freed,” 2/14/09
- “8 wanted persons, 14 suspects arrested in Basra,” 3/6/09
- “9 wanted persons arrested in Basra,” 1/25/09
- “10 wanted men nabbed in Basra,” 3/25/09
- “15 wanted men arrested in Basra,” 4/22/09
- “16 wanted men arrested in Basra,” 3/5/09
- “16 wanted men nabbed in Basra,” 3/2/09
- “16 wanted persons arrested in Basra,” 2/12/09
- “17 wanted men arrested, explosive materials seized in Basra,” 4/23/09
- “17 wanted men arrested in Basra,” 3/23/09
- “18 wanted men arrested in Basra,” 3/24/09
- “19 arrested during Basra raids,” 4/25/09
- “20 persons detained in Basra,” 4/9/09
- “21 arrested in Basra,” 4/10/09
- “21 wanted men, 15 suspects nabbed in Basra,” 3/15/09
- “21 wanted men arrested on criminal, terror charges,” 3/11/09
- “29, 2 IEDs defused in Basra,” 4/12/09
- “30 wanted men detained in Basra,” 3/19/09
- “30 wanted men detained in Basra,” 3/20/09
- “32 arrested in Basra,” 4/4/09
- “32 wanted persons arrested in Basra,” 2/15/09
- “38 arrested in Basra on ‘terrorist and criminal’ charges,” 2/20/09
- “40 arrested on ‘terrorist and criminal’ charges in Basra,” 3/14/09
- “44 suspects, wanted men nabbed in Basra,” 4/19/09
- “48 wanted men, 19 suspects arrested in Basra,” 2/24/09
- “50 wanted persons, suspects arrested in Basra,” 4/2/09
- “57 wanted men, suspects nabbed in Basra,” 3/17/09
- “60 wanted men nabbed in Basra,” 3/31/09
- “65 wanted men, suspects nabbed in Basra,” 4/7/09
- “65 wanted persons, suspects arrested, arms seized in Basra,” 4/9/09
- “73 persons arrested in Basra,” 4/14/09
- “74 suspects, wanted men arrested in Basra,” 4/6/09
- “75 suspects, wanted men arrested in Basra,” 4/1/09
- “79 suspects, wanted men nabbed in Basra,” 4/16/09
- “81 wanted men, suspects arrested in Basra,” 3/8/09
- “91 wanted persons, suspects captured in Basra,” 4/16/09
- “103 wanted men, suspects captured in Basra,” 3/16/09
- “109 suspects, wanted men nabbed in Basra,” 4/21/09
- “149 wanted, suspects arrested in Basra,” 4/15/09
- “Basra police chief escapes attempt on life,” 4/27/09
- “Bomb targets Iraqi army in Basra - advisor,” 4/10/09
- “MNF detains group on terror charges,” 4/19/09
- “Police arrest 10 wanted men in Basra,” 2/3/09
- “Police detain 4 wanted men in Basra,” 3/26/09
- “Roadside bomb hits MNF patrol in Basra,” 4/20/09
- “Sadr urges followers to abandon violence,” 3/18/09- “Security operation launched in Basra ahead of poll,” 1/24/09
- “URGENT/Basra governor escapes attempt with IED,” 4/5/09

The Saudi Role In The Iraqi Insurgency

Two countries are most often mentioned as being direct threats to Iraq’s sovereignty, Syria and Iran. Hundreds of former Baathists fled to Syria after the U.S. invasion in 2003 where they took up residence, and began funding and orchestrating the insurgency. Iran on the other hand has had extensive ties with Shiite militias such as the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council’s Badr Brigade, Moqtada al-Sadr’s Mahdi Army, and the break away Special Groups. The U.S. has repeatedly blamed both for fomenting violence in Iraq. The close ties between Saudi Arabia and the U.S. however, has prevented the Americans from saying much about that country, which has been one of the main financiers of the insurgency, and accounts for almost half of the foreign fighters that have traveled to Iraq.

In February 2009 Newsweek magazine interviewed Abu Ahmed, a former Salafist and insurgent leader. Ahmed joined an insurgent group in May 2003, and would later become a leader who worked with Al Qaeda in Iraq. In 2007 he was talked into switching sides to help the Americans to hunt down his former Islamist brethren. He mentioned that his group received direct funding from Saudi Arabia, but during the sectarian war of 2006-2007 his benefactors stopped sending money because they thought Iraq was spinning out of control, which reminded them of what happened in Afghanistan after the Soviet withdrawal.

Much of this cash comes from donations to religious charities. One tenant of Islam is that followers should give to the poor. In Saudi Arabia’s case, some of this money was directed towards the Sunni insurgents in Iraq instead. In December 2006, the Associated Press reported that some Saudis knew where the money was going, while others just gave to clerics. A main way of transferring the funds was to hide it in buses taking Iraqi pilgrims who went to their pilgrimage in Mecca back to Iraq. Iraqi trucks carrying goods were also used. The cash in turn was distributed to Iraqi politicians, clerics, and insurgents. A senior Iraqi official in 2006 said that there was one case where an Iraqi cleric received $25 million from Saudi Arabia and bought weapons with it.

The other major form of aid that Saudis provided was fighters. Up to 40% of all foreigners that came to fight in Iraq are estimated to come from Saudi Arabia. In December 2007 the U.S. released a study of captured insurgent documents that had information on 606 foreign fighters that had come to Iraq from August 2006 to August 2007. The largest number came from Saudi Arabia, accounting for 41% of the total. Likewise, a July 2007 news story said that 45% of all the foreigners held by the U.S. were Saudis. Many came to be suicide bombers. Saudis also played a leadership role in Al Qaeda in Iraq. In mid-April 2009 there was a report that a senior Al Qaeda commander was arrested in Basra who was a Saudi.

There has been very little mention of the role of the Saudis in the U.S. In April 2008 President Bush sent General David Petraeus and U.S. Ambassador to Iraq Ryan Crocker to Saudi Arabia to try to get them to support Iraq. The two U.S. emissaries were also supposed to discuss the Saudis’ role with the insurgency. Back in August 2007 the U.S. had a similar mission when Secretary of State Condoleeza Rice and Defense Secretary Robert Gates went to the kingdom to discuss the same topics. Earlier in that year the U.S. ambassador to the United Nations Zalmay Khalizad had accused the Saudis of destabilizing Iraq with their backing of the insurgency. Both times the U.S. administration was rebuffed. Saudi officials admitted that their young people were going to Iraq, and said they were doing what they could to stop them, but denied any role in fund raising for the insurgents. In 2006 the Iraq Study Group also mentioned the Saudi role, saying that the government was either passive about it or didn’t care.

The Saudis have four reasons for their policy. First, the Saudi kingdom opposed the U.S. invasion, and warned the Bush administration against it. Second, the Saudi elite rejected having a Shiite led government in Iraq. There are some ultra-religious Sunnis who do not believe that Shiites are real Muslims. Third, the Saudis felt that the combination of the American-led war and the ascendancy of Iraq’s Shiites would open the door to Iran, the Saudis main rival in the region. Many view Iraq as the main battleground between the two countries. Last, the kingdom is afraid that terrorists will flow into their country from Iraq. As a result the Saudis have been the most standoffish of the Arab countries towards Iraq. Since 2005 the U.S. has been pushing the Saudis unsuccessfully to support Baghdad. They have failed to follow through with their promise to forgive 80% of Iraq’s $15 billion debt, or provide $1 billion in reconstruction aid. They have also refused to open an embassy in Baghdad despite repeated pledges to do so.

Fighters and money continue to flow into Iraq through Syria, but in much smaller amounts as the insurgency has waned. Whether the Saudis are still playing a role or if they backed off as they did with Abu Ahmed’s group is unknown. The Saudis felt they could pursue this policy of supporting the Sunnis in Iraq because of their position as a leader in the Arab and Muslim world, along with their belief that the U.S. needed them to help with OPEC, the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, and Iran. This allowed them to reject pressure from Washington. This policy has barely changed since 2003. Even if they are not supporting militants as much, they continue to refuse to have full relations with Baghdad because of their fears of Shiites, Tehran, and terrorism. They are likely to be one of the last countries to accept the new status quo in Iraq, which will slow Baghdad’s acceptance in the region.

SOURCES

Associated Press, “Report: Iraqi Officials Track Financing for Sunni Insurgents to Saudi Citizens,” 12/8/09

Aswat al-Iraq, “Saudi AQI member captured in Basra,” 4/18/09

Dagher, Sam, “Is the Mahdi Army’s ‘cease-fire’ over?” Christian Science Monitor, 3/17/08

Dunne, Charles, “Iraq Going Forward: Threats to its Sovereignty, Prospects for its Future Role in the Middle East,” Institute for the Theory and Practice of International Relations, College of William and Mary, 4/13/09

Johnson, Scott, “Portrait of a Shadow,” Newsweek, 2/23/09

Oppel, Richard, “Foreign Fighters in Iraq Are tied to Allies of U.S.,” New York Times, 11/22/07

Parker, Ned, “The Conflict In Iraq: Saudi Role In Insurgency,” Los Angeles Times, 7/15/07

Regan, Tom, “Report: Private Saudi citizens funding Iraq insurgents,” Christian Science Monitor, 12/8/06

Roberts, Kristin, “Saudis biggest group of al Qaeda Iraq fighters: study,” Reuters, 12/19/07

Schmitt, Eric, “Bush Dispatches Envoys to Arab Capitals as Part of Iraq Plan,” New York Times, 4/11/08

Youssef, Nancy and Strobel, Warren, “U.S., Saudi Arabia have drifted apart,” McClatchy Newspapers, 8/2/07

Zavis, Alexandra, “Foreign fighters in Iraq seek recognition, U.S. says,” Los Angeles Times, 3/17/08

Ninewa Struggles Between Arabs and Kurds Continue

Disputes over the results of the January 2009 provincial elections are continuing in troubled Ninewa. The al-Hadbaa party walked away with 19 of the province’s 37 seats. They made a deal with the Islamic Party that won three seats to take all of the top positions such as governor, head of council, and their deputies. As a result, the Kurdish alliance is boycotting the government. Not only that but the Sinjar, Shikhan, and Hatra districts all said they will refuse to work with the al-Hadbaa led government. The head of Sinjar said he would only take orders from Kurdish President Massoud Barzani. Those areas also demanded that they be annexed by Kurdistan unless the Kurdish List was given positions in the new provincial administration. The Kurds have also staged street protests there as well. Al-Hadbaa’s leaders have been no less compromising asking the government to send a new division to the province to take the place of the Kurdish peshmerga, and threatening repercussions for the district leaders that refuse to work with the council.

The dispute is becoming national as well as Kurdish Prime Minister Nechirvan Barzani criticized the Arabs for monopolizing all of the council spots in mid-April. The Kurdish Alliance in parliament also warned of a rising autocracy in Ninewa, and demanded that al-Hadbaa share power. The Kurds have began using a common refrain against their opponents by calling al-Hadbaa Baathists, and tried to link their actions with Maliki’s drive for power in Baghdad. Al-Hadbaa’s leader and new governor of Ninewa Atheel al-Najafi replied that officials from the Kurdish Regional Government should not be interfering in the province’s affairs.

The Kurds took power in Ninewa in 2005 because the Sunnis boycotted the elections. In 2009 the al-Hadbaa party not only ran on an anti-Kurdish platform, but also promised better government and development. As a result 60% of the province’s voters turned out, tied for the third highest in the country. American officials told the New York Times that they expect al-Hadbaa to become more pragmatic because Ninewa is so poor and lacks resources, but that’s hard to believe. With a majority in the council and a Prime Minister eager to pressure the Kurds there’s little reason for the party to compromise.

SOURCES

Alsumaria, “Kurdistan PM criticizes Hadbaa List,” 4/23/09
- “Yazidis call to join Sinjar to Kurdistan,” 4/15/09

Associated Press, “Iraqi provincial election results,” 2/19/09

Aswat al-Iraq, “Kurdish lawmaker warns against autocracy,” 4/20/09
- “Lawmaker urges KRG to avoid escalating tension in Mosul,” 4/23/09
- “Mosulians fear political tension effect on council’s performance,” 4/27/09
- “Tribal chiefs, notables in Makhmour want Asayesh forces out,” 4/25/09

Kamal, Adel, “kurdish boycott threatens ninawa stability,” Niqash, 4/27/09

Reilly, Corinne and Abbas, Ali, “Kurdish-Arab tensions continue to grow in northern Iraq,” McClatchy Newspapers, 4/14/09

Reuters, “Tensions rise in Iraq’s Mosul amid Kurdish boycott,” 4/22/09

Robertson, Campbell and Farrell, Stephen, “Iraqi Sunnis Turn to Politics and Renew Strength,” New York Times, 4/18/09

Tyson, Ann Scott and Raghavan, Sudarsan, “Gates Cautiously Upbeat on Iraq,” Washington Post, 12/6/07

Iraq’s New Provincial Councils – Update

More information is now available about Iraq’s new provincial governments. Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s State of Law list was the big winner coming in first in nine of the fourteen provinces that held elections. Early reports were that Maliki was attempting to forge an anti-Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council (SIIC) coalition across the south. State of Law reached out to the Sadrists’ Independent Trend of the Noble Ones, the Fadhila Party, ex-Prime Minister Ibrahim al-Jaafari’s National Reform Party, parliamentarian Saleh al-Mutlaq’s Iraqi National Dialogue Front, and ex-Prime Minister Ilyad Allawi’s Iraqi National List. Maliki’s List was able to form governments in Babil, Dhi Qar, Karbala, and Qadisiyah with various combinations of these parties. In Maysan, Najaf, and Wasit however, State of Law cut deals with the Supreme Council to rule. This has not gone well in all of those places however, as Najaf has a State of Law head of council, but still no governor. Some of this was due to differences amongst local State of Law officials. In Baghdad and Basra State of Law won majorities so they didn’t need to connect with other parties. The parliamentary coalition that actually keeps Maliki in office made up of the SIIC, the Iraqi Accordance Front and the Kurds, maintained their ties in Diyala. The Accordance Front also gained control of Salahaddin. Otherwise this group was the big loser as the Kurdish Alliance lost control of Ninewa, while the SIIC lost its majority across the south. New Sunni parties like al-Hadbaa took power in Ninewa with the help of the Islamic Party, and the Awakening of Iraq and Independents came to office in Anbar. Muthanna is the only province that has no government. There the State of Law was tied with the SIIC’s Al-Mihrab Martyr List with five seats apiece. Maliki has tried to form an anti-Supreme Council alliance there, but the parties are evenly split 50-50 leading to deadlock so far.

Overall, Maliki’s State of Law might have won the most provinces, but the Prime Minister’s plans have not worked out as well as he wished. While his List will run all of the nine provinces that they won in, the alliances that they wanted have not always come to fruition, resulting in the Supreme Council hanging onto power in three southern provinces, plus Diyala. More importantly, the SIIC and Maliki’s constituency have stopped the Prime Minister from making moves like reaching out to Baathists meant to solidify bonds with Saleh al-Mutlaq’s Iraqi National Dialogue Front. This will all complicate Maliki’s attempt to form a new ruling coalition after the parliamentary elections, which are scheduled for the end of this year at the earliest.

Note: Not all the members of the ruling coalitions are known. What are listed are those that have been reported so far.

Anbar – 29 seats
Governor Qaseem Muhammad – Independent
Head of Council Jassem Mohammed Hamad – Iraqi National Project
Ruling Coalition
Awakening of Iraq and Independents – 8 seats
Iraqi National Project – 6 seats
4 other unnamed parties

Babil – 30 seats
Governor Salman Hassan al-Zarkani – Independent
1st Deputy Governor Iskander Wattout – Civil Society List
2nd Deputy Governor Sadeq al-Mhanna – National Reform Party
Ruling Coalition
State of Law – 8 seats - Visser
Civil Society List – 3 seats
Independent Trend of the Noble Ones (Sadrists) – 3 seats
Iraqi National List – 3 seats
National Reform Party – 3 seats

Baghdad – 57 seats
Governor Salah Abd al-Razzaq – State of Law
2nd Deputy Governor Kamil Saeed al-Saeedi - ?
Head of Council Kamil al-Zaydi – State of Law
Deputy Head of Council Thamir Riyad al-Addad – State of Law
Ruling Coalition
State of Law – 28 seats

Basra – 35 seats
Governor Shitagh Abbud – State of Law
Head of Council Jabbar Amin – State of Law
Ruling Coalition
State of Law – 20 seats

Dhi Qar – 31 seats
Governor Taleb Kazem Abdulkarim al-Hassan – State of Law
Deputy Governor Hassa Layoos - ?
2nd Deputy Governor Haydar Bunyan - ?
Head of Council Qusai al-Ibadi – State of Law
Deputy Head of Council Abdulhadi Mohan – State of Law
Ruling Coalition
State of Law - 13 seats
Independent Trend of the Noble Ones (Sadrists) - 7 seats

Diyala – 29 seats
Governor Abdulnasir al-Muntasirbillah – Iraqi Accordance Front
Deputy Governor – Furat Mohammed - Diyala Coalition
Head of Council Taleb Mohammed Hassan – Kurdish Alliance
Ruling Coalition
Iraqi Accordance Front – 9 seats
Kurdish Alliance – 6 seats
Diyala Coalition (SIIC) – 2 seats

Karbala – 27 seats
Governor Amaleddin Majeed Hameed Kadhem – State of Law
1st Deputy Governor Abbas al-Musawi – Hope of Rafidain
2nd Deputy Governor Youssefl al-Habboubi – Independent
Head of Council Amal al-Rafidayn – Hope of Rafidain
Ruling Coalition
State of Law – 9 seats
Hope of Rafidain – 9 seats
Youssef al-habboubi – 1 seat

Maysan – 27 seats
Governor Muhammad al-Sudani – State of Law
Head of Council ? – Al-Mihrab Martyr List
Ruling Coalition
State of Law – 8 seats
Al-Mihrab Martyr List (SIIC) – 8 seats

Muthanna – 26 seats
No government

Najaf – 28 seats
Head of Council ? – State of Law
Ruling Coalition
State of Law - 7 seats
Al Mihrab Martyr List – 7 seats

Ninewa – 37 seats
Governor Atheel al-Najafi – Al Hadbaa List
2nd Deputy Governor Hassan Mahmoud Ali – Independent
Head of Council Faisal Abdullah al-Yawir – Al Hadbaa List
Deputy Head of Council Wild-dar Zebari – Al Hadbaa List
Ruling Coalition
Al Hadbaa List – 19 seats
Iraqi Islamic Party – 3 seats

Qadisiyah – 28 seats
Governor Salim Husayn – State of Law
Ruling Coalition
State of Law – 11 seats
Iraqi National List – 3 seats

Salahaddin – 28 seats
Governor Mutashar al-Aliwi – Iraqi Accordance Front
Ruling Coalition
Iraqi Accordance Front – 5 seats

Wasit – 28 seats
Governor Lateef Hamad al-Tarfa – Independent
Head of Council Mahmoud Abdulrida Talal – Al-Mihrab Martyr List
Ruling Coalition
State of Law – 13 seats
Al-Mihrab Martyr List (SIIC) – 6 seats

SOURCES

Abdullah, Muhammed, “sectarian polarization in diyala,” Niqash, 4/20/09

Agence France Presse, “Sadr renews idea of local alliances with Iraq PM,” 2/20/09

Aswat al-Iraq, “4 blocs to contest the results of Diala council votes,” 4/12/09
- “Atheel Nejefi elected as Ninewa governor,” 4/12/09
- “Babel council elects independent engineer as governor,” 4/18/09
- “Baghdad’s second deputy governor elected,” 4/20/09
- “KA, IAF agree to share leading posts in Diala,” 2/24/09
- “Karbala governor assumes duty after republican decree issued,” 4/19/09
- “New Baghdad governor elected,” 4/12/09
- “New Diala governor elected,” 4/11/09
- “New governor picked for Anbar,” 4/11/09
- “New provincial council’s head, deputy selected in Thi-Qar,” 4/16/09
- “Presidential decrees to appoint governors of Thi-Qar, Babel,” 4/22/09
- “Wassit governor, provincial council chief elected,” 4/15/09
- “Zaydi unanimously elected to chair Baghdad provincial council,” 4/8/09

Hanna, Michael Wahid, “The reawakened specter of Iraqi civil war,” Middle East Research and Information Project, 4/17/09

Reilly, Corinne and Abbas, Ali, “Kurdish-Arab tensions continue to grow in northern Iraq,” McClatchy Newspapers, 4/14/09

Reuters, “Tensions rise in Iraq’s Mosul amid Kurdish boycott,” 4/22/09

Roads To Iraq Blog, “Reconciliation without reconciliation,” 3/10/09

Al-Sa’dawi, Ahmad, “post-election analysis: real change or more of the same?” Niqash, 2/19/09

Shadid, Anthony, “New Alliance In Iraq Cross Sectarian Lines,” Washington Post, 3/20/09

Visser, Rediar, “Iraq’s New Provincial Councils: A Mixed Picture North of Baghdad, Unexpected Complications in the Centre and the South,” Historiae.org, 4/13/09
- “Maliki Suffers Setbacks as Samarrai is Confirmed as New Speaker and More Governors Are Elected South of Baghdad,” Historiae.org, 4/19/09

Is Violence Increasing In Iraq?

A recent spate of mass casualty bombings in Iraq has many worried that violence is on the up tick, and that the security gains accomplished over the last year may be unravelling. On April 23 for example, there were two suicide bombings. One in Diyala was aimed at Iranian pilgrims killing 56 and leaving 39 wounded. The other was an attack in Baghdad on displaced families who were standing in line to receive food that claimed the lives of 22 and wounded 30. The next day two suicide bombers set off their devices near the Imam Musa al-Kadhim shrine in Baghdad’s Kadhimiya neighborhood that resulted in 60 dead and 125 wounded. Again, Iranian pilgrims were amongst the casualties. Some fear that this might be part of an effort by Al Qaeda in Iraq and Baathists to cause chaos as the U.S. withdraws its forces. On April 22 the Defense Department’s top Middle East official, Deputy Assistant Defense Secretary Colin Kahl echoed this thought telling the Associated Press that security incidents were likely to increase over the next few months as well. The U.S. is also emptying its jails as required under the Status of Forces Agreement releasing thousands of prisoners, worrying some that a few will return to the insurgency. One ex-detainee already killed himself in a suicide attack. When looking at the numbers for casualties and security incidents however, it appears that the level of violence in Iraq is simply returning to what it was in 2008 before a dip at the beginning of 2009.

Number Of Attacks

The last numbers released by the Pentagon showed a steady decline in attacks at the end of 2008. From April to September 2008 Iraq averaged 1,749.8 attacks per month. In the last two months of the year however that dropped to 1,169 per month. This decrease occurred across the country even in the six most violent provinces, Anbar, Tamim, Diyala, Salahaddin, Ninewa, and Baghdad. In Baghdad for example, the site of the most violence in the country, the number of attacks went from 924 from July 1, to September 30, to 511 from October 1 to December 31, 2008. Numbers for 2009 have not been released so far, but other statistics on violence show that this year has not reached 2008 levels yet.

Reports on attacks on Coalition and Iraqi institutions and bombings do not show much of an increase. The latest chart released by the Pentagon on enemy attacks on the Coalition, Iraqi Forces, infrastructure, and government facilities shows that from June to November 2008 there were around 200-300 such incidents a week. In the middle of November 2008 to April 2009 however, such attacks dropped to below 200. The Brookings Institution’s Iraq Index found that there were an average of 20.66 mass casualty bombings per month for the last half of 2008. In the first three and half months of 2009 there were an average of 12. The average monthly number of deaths resulting from such bombings went from 167.16 from July to December 2008 down to 116.85 from January to April 15, 2008. The number of such attacks remained fairly constant from January to March 2009 with 11, 11, 9 respectively, but half way through April there were already 11. The number of deaths also increased each time going from 89 in January to 105 in February to 143 in March.

Number of Mass Casualty Bombings
2008
July 19
August 22
Sep. 22
Oct. 14
Nov. 24
Dec. 23
TOTAL: 124
Monthly Avg. 20.66 attacks

2009
Jan. 11
Feb. 11
March 9
April 1-15 11
TOTAL: 42
Monthly Avg. 12 attacks

Deaths from mass casualty bombings
2008
July 181
Aug. 195
Sep. 164
Oct. 102
Nov. 169
Dec. 192
TOTAL: 1,003
Monthly Avg. 167.16 deaths

2009
Jan. 89
Feb. 105
March 143
April 1-15 - 72
TOTAL: 409
Monthly Avg. 116.85

The number of deaths overall in Iraq are also going up in 2009, but they are not up to the levels of 2008 either. As reported before, there are several different sources for casualties in Iraq. They range from the high of Iraq Body Count to the low of icasualties.org. Despite their differences all the reports follow the same broad trends. According to Iraq Body Count there were an average of 538.16 deaths per month from July to December 2008. August had the most casualties with 591, while November had the lowest at 472. From January to April 23, 2009, there were an average of 327.75 deaths. In January there were 275, going up to 343 in February, and then reaching 392 in March. From April 1 to 22 there were 301 deaths. Icasualties.org although much lower than Iraq Body Count had the same pattern with deaths slowly declining at the end of 2008 and then taking a large drop in 2009. From July to December 2008 there were an average of 336.83 deaths, compared to 222.33 in the first three months of 2009. Numbers provided by Iraq’s ministries show the same thing with casualties going down in 2008 only to go back up in 2009, but still not reaching the previous year’s. From July to December 2008 they claimed there were an average of 454 deaths per month, which then went down to 233 per month in 2009.

Iraq Body Count - Iraqi Death Numbers

2008
July 583
August 591
Sep. 535
Oct. 527
Nov. 472
Dec. 521
TOTAL: 3,229
Monthly Avg. 538.16

2009
Jan. 275
Feb. 343
March 392
April 1-23 301
TOTAL: 1,311
Monthly Avg. 327.75

Icasualties.org - Iraqi Death Numbers

2008
July 419
Aug 311
Sep. 366
Oct. 288
Nov. 317
Dec. 320
TOTAL: 2,021
Monthly Avg. 336.83

2009
Jan. 187
Feb. 202
March 278
TOTAL: 667
Monthly Avg. 222.33

Iraqi Ministries - Iraqi Death Numbers As Reported In The English Language Media

2008
July 851
Aug. 462
Sep. 440
Oct. 317 or 320
Nov. 340
Dec. 316
TOTAL: 2,726 or 2,729
Monthly Avg. 454.3 or 454.8

2009
Jan. 191
Feb. 258
March 252
TOTAL: 701
Monthly Avg. 233.66

Iraq remains a very violent and deadly country. The recent spate of bombings reminds people of the human toll of the war, which is far from over. Early speculation that the country might be spiraling downward however, seem to be premature. While attacks and deaths are creeping back up, they are still not at December 2008 levels, let alone the rest of the previous year. What appears to have happened is that insurgent groups decided to hold off on some of their activities as the January 2009 provincial elections occurred. This was probably because so many Sunni parties were participating for the first time in local balloting. With that completed the militants have gone back to what they were doing before, and casualties, bombings, etc., have all gone up as a result. If the number of attacks eventually goes above the levels seen in the last half of 2008 than that would be a strong indicator that the security gains are withering and that Iraq is entering into a new phase of violence. If they only go back to what they were however, it just shows that the early 2009 decline was temporary rather than the beginning of a new trend.

SOURCES

Agence France Presse, “March violence claims 252 Iraqi lives,” 4/1/09
- “Iraq Hails Lowest Monthly Death Toll in Three Years,” 1/2/09

Alsumaria, “Iraq death toll lowest since five years,” 2/2/09
- “Iraq violence kills 320 people in October,” 11/1/08

Al-Ani, Abbas, “Ten killed in truck bombing at Iraqi market,” Middle East Online, 3/5/09

Associated Press, “AP count: Iraqi civilian, security details drop to near lowest level,” 3/3/09

Aswat al-Iraq, “60 killed, 113 wounded, al-Baghdadi arrested in Iraq,” 4/23/09
“Diala suicide blast casualties up to 95,” 4/24/09
“URGENT/Kadhemiya death toll up to 60, wounded 125,” 4/24/09

Jakes, Lara, “Pentagon: Insurgent attacks likely to rise in Iraq,” Associated Press, 4/22/09

Karim, Ammar, “Iraq death toll for February ‘rises to 258,’” Agence France Presse, 3/1/09

Kenyon, Peter, “Billboards Serve As Reminders Of Death In Baghdad,” Morning Edition, NPR, 9/9/08

Myers, Steven Lee and Dagher, Sam, “At Least 60 More Are Killed in Attacks in Baghdad,” New York Times, 4/24/09

O’Hanlon, Michael Campbell, Jason, “Iraq Index,” Brookings Institution, 4/16/09

Raghavan, Sudarsan, “Deaths of Iraqis in July Lower Than in May, June,” Washington Post, 8/2/08

Reilly, Corinne and Hammoudi, Laith, “Attacks in Iraq kill dozens; fears mount of wider violence,” McClatchy Newspapers, 4/23/09

Rubin, Alissa, “Iraqi Militants Show New Boldness,” New York Times, 4/1/09

Rubin, Alissa and Santora, Marc, “Bomber Kills Dozens in Iraq as Fears of New Violence Rise,” New York Times, 3/11/09

Williams, Timothy, “80 Are Killed in 3 Suicide Bombings in Iraq,” New York Times, 4/23/09

Battle Over Control of Iraq’s Natural Resources Heats Up

In April 2009, the secretary of Iraq’s Oil and Gas Committee in parliament, Jabir Khalifa Jabir said that the government’s deal with Royal Dutch Shell to exploit natural gas in the south was illegal. That same committee criticized the Shell proposal in November 2008 as well. Both times the committee said that there was no transparency in the negotiations, no competition, and that it went against the interests of the country. This is part of the growing battle over who has control of Iraq’s natural resources.

In September 2008 the Oil Ministry contacted Shell to create a joint venture with the state run-South Oil Company to extract natural gas from the southern oil fields. The Iraqi government would control 51% of the joint company, and Shell 49%. The Oil Ministry claims that it looses $40 million a day in natural gas, which is burned off during oil production, because it doesn’t have the means to exploit it. The contract is supposed to last 25 years, and would give a virtual monopoly to Shell. The corporation is supposed to use the natural gas for both domestic needs and exports, but there are no specifics on how this is to work. It’s estimated that Shell could make up to $3-$4 billion in the next five years as a result, making it the largest oil or gas deal in the country’s history. In February 2009 the OIl Ministry also announced that Japan’s Mitsubishi would be working with Shell on gas production.

This has drawn the ire of the Oil and Gas Committee in parliament. In both November 2008 and April 2009 they have criticized the Shell deal. First there were no other companies considered. The Oil Ministry claims that this was okay because it will be a joint venture with a state-run company. The Ministry however, is not applying that standard for its oil deals where it is taking tenders from several different international corporations that are expecting to work as joint ventures as well. Second the committee objects to the fact that the wording of the agreement says that Shell will be the sole producer of natural gas in southern Iraq, giving it a monopoly. Jabir also claims that Article 97 of the Iraqi constitution requires all new natural resources contracts to be approved by parliament, and this has not happened, making it illegal. Jabir is also concerned that Shell will use most if not all of the gas it produces for export, rather than for domestic consumption.

The conflict between the Oil Ministry and the parliamentary committee is only the latest in a growing feud over control of Iraq’s oil and gas. As reported before, Oil Minister Hussein Shahristani has formulated a largely haphazard, and sometimes contradictory oil policy, which has failed to produce many results so far. Shahristani has been criticized as a result, and there are moves underway to strip him of much of his power. Other problems include the fact that the Iraqi legislature has not passed a new oil law, the petroleum companies have the upper hand with the drop in crude prices, and parliamentary elections in Iraq could make the Shell deal a campaign issue. Finally, much of the Iraqi public is extremely suspicious of foreign corporations, and are generally opposed to them exploiting the country’s resources. All of these issues together, probably mean that there will be little movement on the Shell contract or any oil one in the immediate future. The Oil Ministry and its critics will continue to argue over control, while the oil companies will be stand offish until the domestic situation in Iraq stabilizes.

SOURCES

Ciszuk, Samuel, “Iraq politics impact Shell gas deal,” Iraq Oil Report, 4/20/09

Crooks, Ed and Khalaf, Roula, “Shell in Iraqi gas deal worth up to $4bn,” Financial Times, 9/8/08

Graeber, Dan, “Iraq approves gas deal with Royal Dutch Shell,” Iraq Oil Report Blog, 9/7/08

Hafidh, Hassan and Herron, James, “UPDATE: Iraqi Govt OKs Mitsubishi To Join Shell In Gas Deal,” Wall Street Journal, 2/12/09

Iraq Oil Report, “Iraq opts for long term oil deals, ditches no-bids,” 9/9/08

Khadduri, Walid, “Oil in a Week – Iraqi Oil 2008-2009,” Al-Hayat, 1/12/09

Lando, Ben, “Shell-Iraq gas company is a monopoly, secret agreement shows,” UPI, 11/4/08

Lando, Ben and Majeed, Alaa, “Gas deal no monopoly, Shell and Iraq say,” UPI, 11/6/08

Macalister, Terry, “Iraq parliament promises to push Shell out of gas deal,” Guardian, 4/18/09

Rasheed, Ahmed, “Iraq Lawmakers Say Will Challenge Shell Gas Deal,” Reuters, 11/26/08

Salaheddin, Sinan, “Iraqi official: Mitsubishi to join Iraq gas deal,” Associated Press, 2/12/09

Yacoub, Sameer, “Iraq, Shell sign deal,” Associated Press, 9/22/08

Special Inspector General For Iraq Reconstruction’s “Hard Lessons” – Chapter 3 The Department of Defense Takes Charges

The third chapter of the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction’s (SIGIR) review of the U.S. effort to rebuild Iraq covers the confusion that ensued when the Pentagon was given control of the post-war effort in January 2003. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld claimed that the Pentagon would provide unity of effort in Iraq after the invasion, but in fact, it just made the chaotic planning even more disjointed. Instead of creating one command, there emerged three separate organizations each with its own leader. Rumsfeld also became personally involved in the war planning and staffing, which undermined the effort as well. These were trends that had emerged from the very beginning of post-war planning, and would continue for years afterwards. This was one of the major reasons why the SIGIR believes the U.S. failed to rebuild Iraq.

In October 2002 the Pentagon decided not to create a civilian organization to plan for post-invasion Iraq because it thought it would give the wrong message when the White House was claiming that it was doing everything possible to avoid war. That left most of the planning to the National Security Council (NSC) and the Central Command (CENTCOM), the military staff in charge of the Middle East. As reported before, this effort was uncoordinated with few of the working groups knowing about each other. On the NSC side, the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) had created a humanitarian and reconstruction plan, and started signing contracts with companies to carry out the work. The Pentagon was in charge of securing and running the oil sector. The Treasury Department was working on Iraq’s finances. CENTCOM had its own group working on what was called Phase IV, post-war planning. There was no overall agency in charge of this effort however.

In mid-October 2002 the NSC was briefed on what its groups had come up with so far. The planners said that there would be a civil administration of Iraq, although there were no actual plans behind it. The administration didn’t agree with the level of U.S. involvement, which caused major problems. The White House and Pentagon believed that the U.S. would be liberators, but had no concept of how this would actually work.

During this period CENTCOM’s Phase IV group was also getting sidelined for all the invasion work. On August 2002 the Joint Chiefs became worried about this, especially because there were only 2 majors doing most of the planning. In December 2002 they intensified their effort, and got more staff. They gave a briefing to the Joint Chiefs that month saying that there would be chaos after the invasion because there would be no Iraqi government. They believed that eventually either the U.N. or the U.S. would run Iraq, but had no specific ideas on how that would work. After that meeting, the Joint Chiefs realized that Phase IV didn’t have enough workers so it was made into Joint Task Force 4 (JTF 4) with 58 more officers.

The Pentagon became more involved when President Bush said that war was inevitable at a NSC meeting on December 18, 2003. This spurred Rumsfeld to finally create a civilian organization within the Defense Department for post-war planning. Following this Rumsfeld convinced the President to give the Pentagon control of post-invasion Iraq. Secretary of State Colin Powell agreed to this saying that his agency lacked the personnel and capacity to do the job. Rumsfeld argued that there would be unity of command with Defense in control. On January 20, 2003 President Bush signed National Security Presidential Directive 24 (NSPD 24) giving Rumsfeld this authority. The Pentagon went on to create the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Affairs (ORHA) as a result.

NSPD caused chaos within the administration. It effectively put an end to all the NSC’s projects. The officials that had been working there were shocked at the change. The Pentagon in turn ended up shunning a lot of these other groups that had been working on Iraq previously. More importantly, rather than creating unity of command, it led to three separate organizations with their own leaders. One was ORHA, the other was JTF-4, and the third was CENTCOM. As with the earlier planning, none of these groups worked with each other, and actually competed, causing more problems.

JTF 4 did away with half of CENTCOM’s Phase IV work, and tried to assert its authority over the planning process. Phase IV had a two part plan for Iraq. First humanitarian issues would be dealt with, and then reconstruction would begin. JTF-4 shut down the humanitarian work and just focused upon rebuilding. This happened in mid-January 2003, just two months before the invasion. The Joint Chiefs had also envisioned JTF-4 as the command for postwar Iraq. It was supposed to take over as soon as military operations were over, and coordinate with all the other government agencies. The problem was, that was supposed to be the job of the OHRA.

In early January Undersecretary of Defense Douglas Feith called up retired General Jay Garner to head the OHRA. Rumsfeld knew him from before, and thought a military man who had worked in Iraq after the Gulf War would be ideal for the job. Garner started his work 56 days before the invasion with no staff and no integration with the military. This was a major drawback as OHRA had no secure communications, and thus was cut out from Washington, CENTCOM, and the military command set up in Kuwait to run the invasion. The lack of staff was also another major drawback. National Security Advisor Condoleeza Rice told other government agencies to send officials, but it never really happened. One reason was that the other agencies resented the creation of OHRA as they were told about it after the fact. Garner ended up with an ad hoc group made up of retired soldiers, private contractors, military officers, and government officials. This was another trend that would continue for years with the U.S. reconstruction effort in Iraq. Garner also started his job from scratch as he was not told about the earlier efforts.

When Garner started getting the OHRA up and running it was believed that he would just be operationalizing the ideas that had already been created. Garner found out that there were no concrete plans, and didn’t even find out about all the groups that had been working on the effort. He discovered the State Department’s Future of Iraq Project and Undersecretary of Defense Feith’s Office of Special Plans for example by mistake just before the invasion. On his own Garner came up with three jobs for the OHRA: humanitarian aid, governance, and reconstruction. This closely mirrored the work already done by the NSC and Phase IV. The State Department was to run the humanitarian and governance efforts. This largely took over the work that the NSC had done. Likewise, the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) continued on with its NSC job of reconstruction. The USAID had already signed contracts with companies to do this task. One such business, the International Resource Group briefed the USAID in February 2003 telling it that it didn’t have anywhere near the money it needed to rebuild Iraq. An ominous foreshadowing of what was to come.

The cost of reconstruction became a major point of contention within OHRA, and with Garner’s superiors. At one briefing Rumsfeld asked Garner how much reconstruction would cost, and he said billions. Rumsfeld said he must be crazy. In fact, the U.S. went on to spend $50 billion on rebuilding Iraq. There were also heated debates amongst the OHRA staff about what reconstruction actually meant. Some believed it was just fixing war damage, while others thought about how it could lead to a new Iraqi government. This occurred during the earlier planning when the USAID was the only agency that believed rebuilding was an integral part of creating a democracy in Iraq. Rumsfeld and the White House however wanted that form of government without the U.S. doing the work.

What Iraq’s government would look like after Saddam was also a major point of contention. The State Department’s governance group had little to go on because there was so little information about how Iraq worked internally. The Pentagon leadership also thought that the U.S. would pass off Iraqi to Iraqis quickly, and therefore didn’t think that State had to really plan for the matter. Garner went ahead and looked into the issue anyway. A review warned that there would be a power vacuum after the invasion and criminality would result if authority wasn’t established immediately. Many in the U.S. believed that the Iraqi government would continue to operate after the war, and Garner planned to have a senior U.S. advisor help each of the country’s ministries to keep operating. The problem was OHRA didn’t even know how many ministries Iraq had.

Rumsfeld then began interfering as well, just adding to the difficulties. The Defense Secretary demanded that the Pentagon control all three of Garner’s reconstruction efforts rather than have State and USAID involved. This was all part of Rumsfeld’s belief that he was creating unity of command. That was far from reality.

CENTCOM was the third group that thought it was going to be in control of Iraq after the war. Its leadership didn’t like either the JTF-4 or OHRA. Rumsfeld believed that Garner would just be part of CENTCOM, but the military didn’t want him. CENTCOM commander General Franks tried to assert his control over OHRA, but Garner said he was independent because he was created by a presidential directive.

Franks was too caught up in the military planning for the invasion anyway. The original U.S. war plans for Iraq called for 500,000 troops. Rumsfeld was unhappy with this number as it didn’t fit his vision of a transformed military. Eventually Rumsfeld cut down the force to 160,000. At a briefing, President Bush asked whether this would be enough to secure the country and Franks said that it was. He asserted that in every village in Iraq there would be a mayor, a lieutenant, and captains to maintain civil order. In fact, there was no such plan. Others down the chain of command in the U.S. military were also uneasy about the reduced invasion force. Coalition ground commander General David McKiernan for one didn’t think there would be enough troops to secure the country after the invasion.

These ideas and agencies were put to the test one month before the invasion in a drill. All of the different groups that were working on post-war Iraq were present, although the State Department, CENCOM, and JTF-4 were told not to fully participate. The drill brought up major problems that would actually materialize after the invasion, but it was not able to prevent them. First the main difficulty that emerged was securing the country. The 160,000 strong invasion force was simply not large enough to do the job. The drill predicted that there would be civil chaos after the war that would undermine the establishment of a stable Iraq. The second problem was that there was no set reconstruction budget. Instead the U.S. was going to war with no idea about how much it would have to spend on rebuilding or whether it would be adequate. This too could lead to unrest amongst Iraq’s poor, who could rise up as a result. Third the lack of coordination between the various groups within the U.S. government was another hinderance.

President Bush and other top officials were later briefed on the drill and other plans. Garner warned the President that there was still lots of work to be done. Garner said that the Iraqi civil service, police and army all needed to be maintained to ensure domestic order. He suggested that the army be used for reconstruction. Bush okayed this plan. The same day, the President was briefed on a deBaathification plan. The idea was that only the top Baathists would be removed to ensure that the government would keep running. Bush agreed to that idea as well. Two days later Undersecretary Feith presented his plan for the creation of an Iraqi Interim Authority that would help with governance. Bush had previously vetoed the idea of creating a provisional Iraqi government before the invasion. The Interim Authority would now be doing just that using Iraqi exiles and the Kurds that the U.S. had been meeting with. Bush affirmed that idea too. The Authority would initially work with the U.S. military after the invasion before eventually taking over leadership of the country. There were no set plans on how this was to work, and it was decided to do it on the fly based upon facts on the ground in Iraq. None of these plans were actually adhered to.

Finally, days before the invasion was to begin Rumsfeld again interfered with planning. The Secretary told Garner that he had to get rid of two State Department officials from his staff. One was the head of the Future of Iraq Project. Garner was forced to get rid of him, but kept the other member of State. Then two days before the war began, Rumsfeld called Garner telling him that he was going to appoint all of the advisors that were to help run Iraq’s ministries. Garner at first objected, but then gave in.

Years later Garner lamented that the U.S. started too late to have an effective post-war planning effort. His OHRA was put together only two months before the invasion, and never had the staff to do all that was asked of it. Garner was also competing with General Franks at CENTCOM and JTF 4. This was a trend that started early on in planning when the NSC, Pentagon and CENTCOM’s Phase IV were all working independently. On top of all that Secretary Rumsfeld continually imposed himself on planning even though he had no experience in making war or reconstruction. His insistence on reducing the invasion force from 500,000 to 160,000 made it impossible for the U.S. to ensure security in Iraq. He also interfered with Garner’s staff picks, and most importantly did not believe in rebuilding Iraq. Even before the March 2003 invasion the U.S. was setting itself up for failure when it came to dealing with post-Saddam Iraq.

SOURCES

Special Inspector General For Iraq Reconstruction’s “Hard Lessons”

Amnesty International Report On Human Rights Abuses In Kurdistan

In April 2009 Amnesty International released a report on the human rights situation in Kurdistan called “Hope and Fear, Human rights in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq.” Kurdistan consists of Iraq’s three most northern provinces, Dohuk, Irbil, and Sulaymaniya. Under the 2005 Iraqi constitution it is an autonomous region. It has had far more stability than the rest of Iraq, which has allowed its economy and government to grow. Amnesty still found major rights violations however such as beatings, torture, warrant less arrests, detention without access to lawyers, disappearances, etc. Much of this is due to the activities of the Asayish security forces and the two intelligence agencies run by the governing parties. There are also many honor killings against women, and government intimidation and limits on the press. Amnesty believes that the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) needs to work on all aspects of ensuring freedom and rights for suspected terrorists, dissidents, women, and reporters, as well as fostering rule of law.

Kurdistan gained its de facto autonomy after the 1991 Gulf War. The two main Kurdish parties, the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) of Massoud Barzani, the KRG President, and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) led by the President of Iraq Jalal Talabani, control the region. In 1992 they held elections for the 105-member Kurdish parliament. The KDP and PUK won 50 seats each, with the other five going to Assyrian Christian parties.

The PUK and KDP agreed to joint rule and power sharing until disagreements led to fighting that lasted from 1994 to 1997. During that period Barzani of the KDP cut a deal with Saddam Hussein to send in the Iraqi Army to crush his rival Talabani and the PUK, which they did. The two sides didn’t come to a peace agreement until 1998. Since then the two parties have run their own security and intelligence agencies. Each party has its own peshmerga militia, Asayish security force, and intelligence agency. The KDP has the Parastin run by Masrour Barzani, the son of Massoud, while the PUK has the Dezgay Zanyari headed by Pavel Talabani, the son of Jalal.

After the U.S. invasion, Jalal Talabani was made President of Iraq, and the new 2005 Iraqi Constitution recognized Kurdistan as an autonomous region, giving the KRG formal authority and the ability to pass its own laws. In the December 2005 elections, the PUK and KDP’s Kurdish Alliance won 53 seats in the 275-member Iraqi parliament, and became part of the ruling coalition behind the subsequent prime ministers. In January 2006 the KDP and PUK signed the Kurdish Regional Government Unification Agreement that merged the two separate administrations. That was true for all the ministries and bodies except for Finance, the peshmerga, Asayish, and intelligence agencies. In May 2006 a new Kurdish government was formed with Massoud Barzani the President of the KRG and his nephew Nechirvan Barzani the Prime Minister. There are also five smaller parties that hold seats in parliament. Despite these successes, many Kurds interviewed by Amnesty and others have complained about corruption, nepotism, and the lack of transparency in the KRG. Many claim that Barzani and Talabani can do what they want without regards to the Kurdish parliament or laws. The Kurds have also taken control of many northern regions of Iraq that they claim are historically Kurdish such as Kirkuk, and administer them even though they are formally under the control of the central government based in Baghdad. There are also Kurdish and Islamist groups, both violent and peaceful that disagree with the KRG. These political disputes are at the heart of the abuses that Amnesty recorded.

The Asayish were formed in 1992 and started operating in 1993. The Kurdish Interior Ministry originally controlled the organization. After the fighting between the KDP and PUK in the mid-1990s each party formed their own Asayish. In 2004 they were made independent of all ministries, with their own budgets. They report directly to the heads of each party. Each town and city in Kurdistan has an Asayish office that also operates its own jail. The headquarters are in Irbil for the KDP, and Sulaymaniya for the PUK. The PUK Asayish is headed by Seif al-Din Ali Ahmed, and the KDP branch is run by Ismat Arguishi. Both agencies have been charged with human rights abuses, including torture. Neither is apparently bound by international, Iraqi or Kurdish law. The Kurdish government has not investigated these charges, and members of the Kurdish parliament say that they can’t make the Asayish accountable either.

Similar allegations have been made about the KDP and PUK intelligence agencies the Parastin and Dezgay Zanyari respectively. They have been charged with arbitrary arrests, running secret prisons, abuse, and torture. The intelligence forces have also gone after critics of the political parties as well as suspected terrorists.

The Asayish and intelligence forces hold hundreds, perhaps thousands of prisoners. An Amnesty report in August 2008 raised concerns about these detainees, and the KRG responded by releasing more than 3,000. Many were required to make weekly check ins with the Asayish on their activities. The main targets of these arrests have been the terrorist group Ansar al-Islam, and legal political parties like the Kurdistan Islamic Movement and the Islamic Group. Critics of the government and journalists have also been held. These arrests are made without warrants. There are also occurrences of disappearances, when the security or intelligence forces take away a suspect without telling anyone about their activities or the person’s whereabouts afterwards. This practice started in the 1990s when the KDP and PUK were fighting each other. The suspects are then taken to prisons, jails, and at times private houses, some of which are secret, for interrogation. Some have very bad conditions. One jail was closed down in mid-2007 after the Minister of Human Rights visited. During this period the detainees are often denied lawyers and access to their families. Iraqi law provides these legal rights to all that are arrested, but the Kurdish forces are not following them. There are reports of detainees being tortured as well, ranging from beatings to electric shock, to suspension by their wrists. Some have died during this process. Beatings are the most common since the Iraqi justice system relies upon confessions for prosecutions. Detentions can last anywhere from days to months to years. The Kurdish Human Rights Ministry considers all of these activities illegal, but has not power to stop them from happening.

Kurdistan’s court system also has problems. Not all suspects picked up by the Asayish and intelligence units are taken to regular courts. Some are secret. There are also stories of trials that only last for one hour, the use of forced confessions, the denial of lawyers even during trial, etc. Some Kurdish lawyers told Amnesty that they were afraid to protest these practices out of fear that they too would be arrested. One judge even wrote an article criticizing the Asayish and received a threatening call afterwards by a top Asayish official. Many don’t believe the Kurdish judiciary is independent. The Kurdish Human Rights Ministry is not happy with the system either and consider it a work in progress.

Women in Kurdistan have made great strides, but traditional practices such as honor killings are a major concern of Amnesty. The KRG has passed laws, setup shelters, and created non-government organizations to deal with women’s rights and issues. Parliament has taken up the issue lately as well. The government and local police all monitor violence against women now. As a result, Kurdistan has far more protections for women then the rest of Iraq. The main problem Kurdish women face today is honor killings. The government counted 102 of them from July 2007 to June 2008. 262 other women were also severely injured or committed suicide during that same time. Amnesty believes that many of these cases were attempts to cover up murders. Despite all the laws and groups, Kurdish women’s lives are extremely limited. They have arranged marriages, limited educations, and very few are active in the workforce. Many attacks against women are not reported, and some police and courts are unwilling to deal with the issue as well. Some women’s organizations have also been threatened for their work.

Due to the relative security of Kurdistan, the region’s media has also flourished. There are many news outlets, and the number has increased. Many are run by the political parties, but there are also more independents as well. Most avoid criticizing the government or security forces however out of fear. Those that do are often threatened or arrested by the Asayish or intelligence forces. They have even gone after writers in Kirkuk, even though it is not part of Kurdistan. One reporter died under suspicious circumstances in 2008 while being held. The government has also sued several newspapers claiming defamation. President Talabani for example, sued the Hawlati newspaper for publishing a translation of an American article that was critical of the KRG. The authorities claim that many of these papers are not professional. As a result, the government has tried to regulate the press in Kurdistan. In September 2008 a new press law was passed, which was aimed at giving them more freedom by banning detention for defamation, and reducing fines, but the security forces have not followed it.

Amnesty’s paper shows that the KRG has two parallel systems operating. One is the Kurdish parliament and regular government bodies that follow the law. The other is a secret one run by the PUK and the KDP, enforced by their security and intelligence agencies that operates by its own rules. Amnesty’s findings about abuses in Kurdistan follows closely a paper by Human Rights Watch from December 2008 entitled “The Quality of Justice, Failings of Iraq’s Central Criminal Court.” Human Rights Watch reported that there were abuses throughout the criminal justice system in Iraq, including Kurdistan. Because the courts rely upon confessions rather than evidence to find guilt, police routinely beat suspects to obtain one. Torture and overcrowding in jails and prison were also common. The Iraqi justice system also lacked due process as suspects were held for months and years without ever going to court, many had very limited access to lawyers, and forced confessions were often accepted by judges. Amnesty’s investigation of Kurdistan shows that it is no different from the rest of Iraq in this regard.

SOURCES

Amnesty International, “Hope and Fear, Human rights in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq,” April 2009

Human Rights Watch, “The Quality of Justice, Failings of Iraq’s Central Criminal Court, December 2008

Majid, Kamal, “An Assessment of the conditions in the Kurdish part of Iraq,” Brussels Tribunal.org, 7/23/08

Who Is And Isn’t Running Iraq’s Provinces

It’s been two and a half months since the January 2009 Provincial elections, and five of the fourteen provinces that voted have not named their governors or other top officials. This is due to political disputes between Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s State of Law List and other Shiite parties. Maliki’s State of Law won in eight of the nine southern provinces. Karbala was the one exception where an independent, Youssef Majid al-Habboubi won. He didn’t run as part of a party or List however, so the State of Law gained control there as well. Still, the State of Law only won majorities in Baghdad and Basra, so they needed coalitions in the rest of the provinces to rule. As Norwegian Iraq analyst Reidar Visser points out, Maliki could’ve either formed broad Shiite coalitions to rule or tried to rule with Dawa on top. He chose the latter. This has held up appointing governors, heads of councils, etc. because Maliki has been unable to put together enough parties to form majorities. Even in provinces where top officials have been named there has been controversy. This has happened in Ninewa where the Kurds are boycotting the new Sunni Al-Hadbaa-led council, and in Diyala where the State of Law is protesting Maliki’s current backers in parliament. Rather than ushering in a new era of Iraqi politics, the provincial elections have simply re-arranged the parties at the top, while kept up the bickering and in fighting. They will also face greater problems when they actually try to rule, as their budgets will be about 50% less than the previous year because of the country’s fiscal problems.

Below is a list of the officials that have been named so far, and those provinces that still lack a government. Also how the Lists and individuals finished, and how many seats they received.

Anbar – 29 seats
Governor Qaseem Muhammad – Independent (Backed by Awakening of Iraq and Independents – 1st 8 seats)
Head of Council Jassem Mohammed Hamad – Iraq National Project – Tied for 2nd 6 seats

Babil – 30 seats
Governor Salman Hassan al-Zarkani – Independent ?
1st Deputy Governor Iskandar Wattout – Civil Society List – Tied for 3rd 3 seats
2nd Deputy Governor Sadeq al-Mhanna – National Reform Party – Tied for 3rd 3 seats

Baghdad – 57 seats
Governor Salah Abd al-Razzaq – State of Law – 1st 28 seats
2nd Deputy Governor Kamil Saeed al-Saeedi - ?
Head of Council Kamil al-Zaydi – State of Law
Deputy Head of Council Thamir Riyad al-Addad – State of Law

Basra – 35 seats
No officials
The State of Law List has a majority with twenty seats, but has not been able to fill any positions yet.

Dhi Qar – 31 seats
Head of Council Qusai al-Ibadi – State of Law – 1st 13 seats
Deputy Head of Council Abdulhadi Mohan – State of Law

Diyala – 29 seats
Governor Abdulnasir al-Muntasirbillah – Iraqi Accordance Front – 1st 9 seats
Deputy Governor Furat Mohammed - ?
Head of Council Taleb Mohammed Hassan – Kurdish Alliance
The Iraqi National List who came in second with six seats, the Iraqi National List that came in fourth with three seats, the State of Law that came in tied for fifth with two seats, and the National Reform Party that came in last with one seat are disputing these appointments. They have held street demonstrations.

Karbala – 27 seats
Governor Amaleddin Majeed Hameed Kadhem – State of Law – Tied for 2nd 9 seats
1st Deputy Governor Abbas al-Musawi - Hope of Rafidain – Tied for 2nd 9 seats
2nd Deputy Governor Youssefl al-Habboubi – Independent – 1st 1 seat
Head of Council Amal al-Rafidayn – Hope of Rafidain

Maysan – 27 seats
No officials
On April 12 the Maysan council was supposed to meet to elect officials, but that was cancelled when the Sadrists of the Independent Trend of the Noble Ones who came in third with seven seats claimed the State of Law that finished first with eight seats was not going to give them the governorship.

Muthanna – 26 seats
No officials
The State of Law List, which tied for first with five seats, has not been able to put together a majority coalition yet.

Najaf – 28 seats
No officials
The State of Law List that came in tied for first with the Supreme Council’s Al-Mihrab Martyr List has not been able to name any officials yet.

Ninewa – 37 seats
Governor Atheel al-Najafi – Al-Hadbaa List – 1st 19 seats
2nd Deputy Governor Hassan Mahmoud Ali – Independent
Head of Council Faisal Abdullah al-Yawir – Al-Hadbaa List
Deputy Head of Council Wild-dar Zebari – Al Hadbaa List
The Kurdish Ninewa Brotherhood List that came in second with twelve seats is boycotting the provincial council.

Qadisiyah – 28 seats
No officials
State of Law came in first place with 11 seats. The Iraqi National List, which finished tied for 3rd, quit an alliance with them over who should be named deputy governor and deputy head of council. Fadhila, who tied for fifth place with two seats, was also supposed to be part of this alliance, but is arguing over positions as well.

Salahaddin – 28 seats
Governor Mutashar al-Aliwi – Iraqi Accordance Front – Tied for 1st 5 seats
The other provincial positions have not been filled because of political disputes. Salahaddin had the most parties elected to office.

Wasit – 28 seats
Governor Lateef Hamad al-Tarfa – Independent Trend of the Noble Ones – Tied for 3rd 3 seats
Head of Council Mahmoud Abdulrida Talal – Al-Mihrab Martyr List (SIIC) – 2nd 6 seats
Lateef Hamad al-Tarfa was re-elected governor of Wasit by the SIIC. The State of Law List who came in first with thirteen seats, was trying to block his nomination. They held street protests for a few days. The Dawa Party – Iraq also left the State of Law alliance in Wasit taking with it its three seats.

SOURCES

Associated Press, “Iraqi provincial election results,” 2/19/09

Aswat al-Iraq, “4 blocs to contest the results of Diala council votes,” 4/12/09
- “Atheel Nejefi elected as Ninewa governor,” 4/12/09
- “Babel council elects independent engineer as governor,” 4/18/09
- “Baghdad’s second deputy governor elected,” 4/20/09
- “Dawlat al-Qanoon in Wassit wants governor out of office,” 4/13/09
- “Demonstrators want Wassit governor out of office,” 4/11/09
- “Final deal to share sovereign posts in Diwaniya – official,” 4/13/09
- “Iraqi List quits Dawlat al-Qanoon alliance in Diwaniya,” 4/13/09
- “Karbala governor assumes duty after republican decree issued,” 4/19/09
- “New alliance of winning blocs formed in Thi-Qar,” 3/30/09
- “New Diala governor elected,” 4/11/09
- “New governor picked for Anbar,” 4/11/09
- “New provincial council’s head, deputy selected in Thi-Qar,” 4/16/09
- “No decrease in salaries because of oil prices – planning minister” 12/19/08
- “Shahid al-Mihrab names 2 members for Missan council,” 4/11/09
- “Shiite party quits alliance in Wassit,” 4/11/09
- “Squabbles impede election of Salah al-Din council chief,” 4/12/09
- “Thousands stage demonstrations in Diala,” 4/8/09
- “Wassit governor, provincial council chief elected,” 4/15/09
- “Zaydi unanimously elected to chair Baghdad provincial council,” 4/8/09

Hendawi, Hamza, “Iraqi Shiites rally for populist candidate,” Associated Press, 3/14/09

Reilly, Corinne and Abbas, Ali, “Kurdish-Arab tensions continue to grow in northern Iraq,” McClatchy Newspapers, 4/14/09

Visser, Reidar, “Iraq’s New Provincial Councils: A Mixed Picture North of Baghdad, Unexpected Complications in the Centre and the South,” Historiae.org, 4/13/09

Old And New Alliances Argue Over Control Of Diyala Provincial Council

On April 11, 2009 the new provincial council in Diyala named Abdulnasir al-Muntasirbillah governor. He received 17 out of 29 votes. Taleb Mohammed Hassan of the Kurdistan Alliance was made head of the council. Four losing lists, Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s State of Law, parliamentarian Saleh al-Mutlaq’s Iraqi National Dialogue Front, former Prime Minister Ilyad Alawi’s Iraqi National List, and former Prime Minister Ibrahim al-Jaafari’s Reform Movement boycotted their election. They are also going to court to contest the elections. These four diverse groups that include Sunnis and Shiites, Iraqi exiles and former Baathists represent the possible face of a new alliance for the upcoming parliamentary elections planned for the end of the year. In Diyala they are taking on a coalition of Iraqi Accordance Front, the Kurds, and the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council, which have been working together since 2007. This struggle represents a clash of old and new alliances for not only control of Diyala, but possibly for the country.

When the results of the January 2009 provincial elections were announced the Iraqi Accordance Front led by Vice President Tariq al-Hashemi’s Iraqi Islamic Party came out the winners. They received 9 of 29 seats on Diyala’s provincial council followed by Mutlaq’s Iraqi National Project List with six, the Kurdish Alliance with six, Allawi’s Iraqi National List with three, Maliki’s State of Law with two, the Supreme Council with two, and Jaafari’s National Reform Party with one.

Results of January 2009 Provincial Elections
Diyala – 29 seats total
1. Iraqi Accordance Front - Hashemi: 9
2. Iraqi National Project – al-Mutlaq: 6
2. Kurdish Alliance: 6
4. Iraqi National List - Allawi: 3
5. State of Law - Maliki: 2
5. Diyala Coalition – SIIC: 2
7. National Reform Party – Jaafari: 1

This was a marked change from the 2005 elections when the Sunnis boycotted. Then a coalition of the Supreme Council and the Dawa party came in first with 20 of 41 seats, followed by the Iraqi Islamic Party with 14, and the Kurds with seven.

Results of January 2005 Provincial Elections
Diyala – 41 seats total
Coalition of Islamic and National Forces in Diyala (SIIC & Dawa): 20
Iraqi Islamic Party – Hashemi: 14
Kurdish Arabic Turkmen Democratic Coalition Diyala Governorate – Kurds: 7

The Sunni majority was able to assert themselves in the 2009 balloting in Diyala, although their votes were spread out over several parties. The Kurds, who reside in the northern section of the province, were able to largely hold onto their power on the council, while the Shiites came out the losers. Despite these changes however, the old alliance of the Accordance Front, Kurds, and SIIC were able to push through their candidate for governor. These three parties make up three-quarters of the governing alliance in parliament behind Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki. The Supreme Council and Kurds have a long-standing relationship, and when the Accordance Front rejoined the government in 2008 after a boycott, they became a triumvirate.

By February 2009 the Accordance Front and Kurdish Alliance had cut a deal to divide up the top posts in Diyala. That drew the ire of the losing parties. On March 1 for example, thousands of their followers protested the election results in two cities in the province. Some 10,000 people were reportedly out in the streets. They were organized by the Diyala Support Council, a group formed by Maliki’s government to garner tribal support and divide the Sunni Sons of Iraq in the province. The protestors called for new elections and for the State of Law List and others not to participate in the new council. Shiites also claimed that the Election Commission was controlled by Kurds and Sunnis, and denied them votes.

Perhaps coincidently, but perhaps not, on the first day that the new council was supposed to be seated on April 6, police sent by Baghdad tried to raid the council building. They had six arrest warrants accusing new members of the council with links to the insurgency, displacing people, and murder. No names were mentioned or which parties they were attached to. U.S. forces stopped the police however. This led to more protests.

The dispute in Diyala is a microcosm of new political divisions occurring in Iraq after the provincial elections. As reported before, Maliki is trying to forge a new ruling coalition. The Prime Minister was originally put into office as a compromise candidate between the Sadrists and Supreme Council. He was supported by the Iraqi United Alliance that included the Dawa, the SIIC, the Sadrists, the Fadhila Party, and Shiite independents, plus the Kurds and the Iraqi Accordance Front. Now Maliki is abandoning those parties for a new mix. In Diyala his State of Law List is working with Saleh Mutlaq’s Iraqi National Dialogue Front, Ilyad Allawi’s Iraqi National List, and Ibrahim al-Jaafari’s Iraqi Reform Movement, all of which are protesting the new council. Maliki has also talked with the Sadrists in other parts of the country. The reason for this change is because Maliki has a different vision for the country and different goals from his former supporters. The SIIC and Kurds support a weak central government, federalism, and autonomy on oil deals. The Prime Minister on the other hand, wants a strong government based in Baghdad with him at its head. He is wrapping his campaign in Arab nationalism as well, which challenges the Kurds’ desire to expand southward and annex various areas of northern Iraq. Maliki is beginning this push for new partners in the provincial councils, and is hoping that some winning combination will emerge before the parliamentary elections. This new struggle is playing itself out in various provinces now such as Diyala, and others. The major problem is that as it stands now, Maliki’s new partners do not have nearly enough to form a majority in Iraq’s 275-member parliament, so there will be plenty more maneuvering before everything is said and done.

SOURCES

Associated Press, “Iraqi provincial election results,” 2/19/09

Aswat al-Iraq, “4 blocs to contest the results of Diala council votes,” 4/12/09
- “KA, IAF agree to share leading posts in Diala,” 2/24/09
- “New Diala governor elected,” 4/11/09
- “Police prevent Diala council from holding first session,” 4/6/09
- “Thousands of protesters call to dissolve IHEC-Diala,” 3/1/09
- “Thousands stage demonstrations in Diala,” 4/8/09

International Crisis Group, “Iraq After The Surge II: The Need for a New Political Strategy,” 4/30/08

Knights, Michael and McCarthy, Eamon, “Provincial Politics in Iraq: Fragmentation or New Awakening?” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, April 2008

Rossmiller, Alex, “The Bush administration’s four-year history of erratic meddling in search of an Iraqi ‘savior.’” American Prospect, 4/11/07

Russo, Claire, “Countdown To Diyala’s Provincial Election: Maliki & The The IIP,” Institute for the Study of War, 1/30/09

Sabah, Zaid and Raghavan, Sudarsan, “Hundreds of Iraqi Shiites Protest Voting Results, Allege Fraud,” Washington Post, 3/2/09

Shadid, Anthony, “New Alliance In Iraq Cross Sectarian Lines,” Washington Post, 3/20/09

Visser, Rediar, “Iraq’s New Provincial Councils: A Mixed Picture North of Baghdad, Unexpected Complications in the Centre and the South,” Historiae.org, 4/13/09

Center For Strategic And International Studies Briefing On Iraq

In early April 2009 Anthony Cordesman, one of the top military analysts on Iraq, of the Center for Strategic and International Studies, released the latest version of his briefing on the war, “The Changing Situation in Iraq: A Progress Report.” Cordesman comes from the camp of American think tank writers who believes that the U.S. needs to stay long-term in Iraq to ensure its stability. Under the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) however, Iraq’s military presence will end in 2011. This comes at a time when Iraq is facing a plethora of new issues including elections, power sharing, and a financial crisis, along with continuing violence. There is no telling whether the Iraq government will be able to maneuver through these problems, which means that the U.S. will have a lot to work on while they still have substantial forces in the country.

Iraq is a different place from what it was just a few years ago. A recent public opinion poll by ABC, NHK, and BBC from February 2009 detailed here shows that most Iraqis are feeling positive about their future. When asked how things were going in their life 65% said they were good compared to 35% who said that it was bad. This was the highest positive response since the poll was started back in 2005. Then 71% said things were going well in Iraq. After that the numbers dropped to 39% in February and August 2007, before climbing back up to 54% in March 2008. When asked how the entire country was doing at the time 58% said it was doing well in February 2009 compared to 43% in March 2008, 22% in August 2007, 35% in February 2007, and 44% in 2005. At the same time military and security issues dropped from being the most important issue at 58% in August 2007 to 33% in March 2008 to 22% by February 2009. Economic issues now predominate at 67% in February 2009. These match similar results found by polls coducted by the State and Defense Departments. As attacks and deaths have decreased since their peak during the sectarian war of 2006-2007 Iraqis are feeling better about their lives and the future of the country, while hoping that the economy, services, and government improve.

That doesn’t mean that security is not still a concern. Cordesman believes that Iraq could see violence for the next 4-5 years. He warns that Al Qaeda in Iraq, the Sunni insurgency, and the Shiiite militias are down, but not out. In March 2009 Interior Minister Jawad Bolani warned that there were still Al Qaeda sleeper cells in the country, and the recent spate of bombings shows that militants are still active in the country. What has changed is the number and intensity of the fighting. Attacks are now down to 2004 levels. Most of those are concentrated in just four provinces, Baghdad, Diyala, Ninewa and Salahaddin, whereas before they were across the entire nation. The February 2009 poll found that Iraqis are experiencing one-third less violence than they did in August 2008. IEDs and suicide attacks still persist, but crime, corruption, and the lack of rule of law are becoming more important.

The political arena is where most of Iraq’s rivalries and struggles are now taking place. Cordesman argues that the January 2009 provincial elections were the beginning of a political transition in Iraq. The balloting was important because it showed Iraqis that their votes counted as almost all of the ruling parties were replaced. It also raised expectations that the incoming councils would be more accountable, perform better, and provide services. The problem is that almost all of the provincial councils will require a coalition to rule. Some of these will not be stable and may break into factions. New politicians also don’t automatically mean better governance.

Cordesman noticed several trends in the provincial balloting that are different than other commentaries on them. First Arab nationalism rather than Iraqi nationalism was a winning theme. Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s State of Law list and new parties like al-Hadbaa in Ninewa ran on this platform championing a strong central government, but general opposition to the Kurds. As a result, they were the biggest losers. There were many reports that the election was a defeat for the religious parties and a move towards secularism, but Cordesman believes it was actually ones promising technocrats and better management that were successful. Maliki of course was the biggest winner, having rode into the voting with a 70% approval rating. Even his standing amongst Sunnis increased from 10% in February 2008 to 33% before the election. Maliki’s State of Law List won in Baghdad and across the south except for Karbala as a result. The Iraqi Islamic Party and and the Sadrists also did well despite some writing them off. The Sadrists will play an important role in coalitions in the south, while the Sunnis got greater representation after having boycotted the 2005 provincial vote.

The election also brought out the on-going struggle for control of the south and leadership of the Shiites. After the 2005 elections the Supreme Council was dominant. They suffered a crushing defeat after they claimed they would win Najaf, Babil, Qadisiyah, and Dhi Qar, and be the largest bloc in the rest of the south. They ran on a religious and federalist platform that was largely rejected for Maliki’s call for good governance and strong control.

More problematic is the increasing Arab-Kurdish divide. Only 44% of Iraqis say that relations between the two groups are good. In the provincial elections the Kurds lost control of Ninewa and Salahaddin. That will probably mean that there will be more tension there. This is already being seen in Ninewa where the Kurds are boycotting the al-Hadbaa headed council. The issue also threatens the unity of the Iraqi security forces. In the summer of 2008 for example, when Maliki sent the Iraqi Army into the Khanaqin district of Diyala a Kurdish battalion commander and 200 of his soldiers in Ninewa deserted and went to Irbil in Kurdistan in protest. A Kurdish brigade in Diyala also refused to take orders from the central government at that time. The fact that the insurgency is now largely based in the north in those exact same provinces is only making the matter worse. Kurdistan President Massoud Barzani has not helped the situation either as he has made monthly attacks on Baghdad and Maliki. The U.S. believes that this is the number one source of instability in the country, and could lead to new violence in the future.

The provincial elections were just the opening salvo of these two struggles. Cordesman thinks that they will continue up to and after the parliamentary elections. They are scheduled for December 2009, but it could take up to six months afterwards for a new government to be formed and take office. There is also the added issue of dissatisfaction with Maliki’s rise to power. Some think that he has too much strength. The Prime Minister has direct control over the special forces and counterterrorism units for example. These fears could be moderated by the necessity for coalitions to rule. Maliki will have to have a Sunni party in this alliance, and might also join with the Iraqi National List of former Prime Minister Ilyad Allawi. On the other hand, Maliki may reject compromising with his foes if he comes out victorious. None of these problems is really being address, but are rather being exploited by political parties for votes and support.

On top of all this Iraq is running into a budget crisis. This will affect all the other problems in the country. Cordesman argues that money was one of the main things that held Iraq together over the last couple years. Each year Iraq’s budget increased as oil prices rose. This money was distributed to the various ministries, each of which is controlled by a different political party, and used for patronage and to garner support. Now Iraq is expected to run a $24 billion deficit in the 2009-2010 fiscal year, and a $13 billion one in 2010-2011. Security will be affected as the Interior Ministry announced that it is having a hiring freeze, and is canceling its plan to hire 66,000 new police. This will also hold up crime prevention and the establishment of rule of law, which are increasingly becoming important to the Iraqi public. The rest of the armed forces will also not be able to buy new equipment and weapons. While the Iraqi forces are getting better at counterinsurgency operations, Cordesman believes that they are still 3-5 years away from being able to defend their own country from other nations. Some U.S. commanders are worried that the U.S. will leave Iraq before the Iraqi forces are capable. U.S. advisors will still remain with Iraqi units after the June 2009 deadline to be out of Iraq’s cities, and have until 2011 to conduct training operations. The Iraqis can also extend those dates if they want.

With better security and new elections Iraqis are also expecting better services. This too will be slowed down by the budget problems. The political divisions have slowed developing Iraq’s oil resources, and many Iraqis are opposed to foreign companies doing business in the country fearing exploitation. The government is also the largest employer in the country. The budget deficit will mean few new hires. Salaries and pensions that form the backbone of the operational budget take up 90% of spending, leaving only 10% for development and investment, known as the capital budget. The amount of money Iraq has been able to spend overall has increased each year since 2005, but capital budget expenditures remain anemic. In 2007 Iraqi spent 80% of its $29 billion operational budget, but only 28% of its $12 billion capital budget. That increased to 39% of the $24 billion capital budget in 2008. That year the core ministries that raise revenues and provide services only spent 23% of their $16 billion capital budget.

Foreign investment has also been slow due to laborious government regulations. The World Bank’s 2009 Ease of Doing Business Report for example, ranked Iraq 152 out of 181 countries in ease of investment. That was down six spots from 2008. The 2006 National Investment Law doesn’t have a means to implement it, the National Investment Commission doesn’t have a chair, and the provincial investment commissions are weak. Kurdistan is the only region of the country that has large-scale investment coming in at about $15 billion. The country overall still needs billions of dollars to reach its targets for oil, electricity, and water production. That’s not likely to come any time soon.

Cordesman finishes by saying that real success in Iraq requires political reconciliation. While he provides a checklist of the benchmarks set by the American Congress during the Surge on key legislation, he seems more concerned about the actual actions of Iraq’s political parties. There the struggle for power is intensifying with the elections. That could last for years. Not only are the Shiite parties competing with each other, but the Sunnis still lack strong leadership, and the Arab-Kurdish dispute is only growing in intensity. At the same time, with violence down, average Iraqis are thinking more positive about their current and future situation. According to the February 2009 public opinion poll 59% of Sunnis and Shiites say relations between them are good. That’s up from 48% in 2008. At the same time, only 33% of Sunnis say they feel safe in their neighborhoods compared to 67% of Shiites and 85% of Kurds. That reflects the fact that the Sunnis were the losers politically with the fall of Saddam Hussein, and were then defeated by the Shiites in the sectarian war. Economic issues are also coming to the fore at just the time that the country is running out of money with the collapse of oil prices. As stated before, Cordesman is one of many American think tankers that believes Americans need to stay for the long-term in Iraq until its problems are solved. In practice that means an open ended commitment, and Cordesman’s report is part of that argument as it outlines the myriad issues facing the country that are not going to be resolved anytime soon. Cordesman does now seems to have come to terms with the fact that American forces will be out by the end of 2011 with the Status of Forces Agreement. That means that while American military forces will eventually be out, U.S. diplomats will still be working there for years.

SOURCES

Abouzeid, Rania, “Arabs-Kurd Tensions Could Threaten Iraq’s Peace,” Time, 3/24/09

BBC, ABC, NHK, “Iraq Poll February 2009,” 3/16/09

Cordesman, Anthony, “The Changing Situation in Iraq: A Progress Report,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, 4/1/09

Derhally, Massoud, “Iraq Freezes 66,000 New Police Hires, Minister Says,” Bloomberg, 3/22/09

Gamel, Kim, “Iraqi budget woes force security hiring freeze,” Associated Press, 3/20/09

Zelikow, Philip, “The new strategic situation in Iraq,” Foreign Policy Online, 2/9/09

Arab-Kurdish Divide Over New Ninewa Provincial Council

On April 12 the new Ninewa provincial council met and elected its leadership. The head of the Al-Hadbaa List Atheel al-Najafi was elected governor, followed by Jabr Faisal Abdullah al-Yawir as the first deputy governor, al-Adrabbo as the head of the council, and Wild-dar Zebary as the deputy head of council. The second deputy governor, Judge Hassan Mahmoud Ali, an independent Turkmen, was the only official named not from Al-Hadbaa. The List gained these positions after they came away with 19 of the 37 seats in the January 2009 provincial elections. The Kurdish Ninewa Brotherhood List finished second with 12 seats, followed by the Iraqi Islamic Party with three. The religious minority groups the Shabaks, Christians, and Yazidis received one seat each under a quota. The ascendancy of the Arab al-Hadbaa List however has only increased the divisions in the province.

As reported before, the al-Hadbaa party ran on an explicitly anti-Kurdish platform. While campaigning for example, they declared that Mosul was an Arab city, and said that the Kurds need to give up all plans of annexing any areas in Ninewa. After the election, List leader Najafi demanded that the Kurds get rid of all of their standing politicians and replace them with ones that would only work for Ninewa’s needs. He also wanted all the Kurdish peshmerga militiamen to leave the province.

In response the Kurdish Fraternal List is boycotting the new provincial council. The Kurds want Al-Hadbaa to share power, and say they won’t return until two of the top three posts in Ninewa are given to them. The mayor of Sinjar district in western Ninewa has also declared that he will not cooperate with the new Hadbaa run council. The mayor later said that he would prefer Sinjar be annexed by Kurdistan rather than work with the Hadbaa List. There were also two days of protests in the district against the council as well. Governor Najafi has rejected these calls, hoping that the Kurds will eventually accept the new status quo and rejoin the council.

American officials said that the 2009 January provincial elections were an important benchmark for progress in Iraq. Some analysts declared it a tidal change in Iraqi politics. With more Sunnis voting after they boycotted in 2005, Ninewa was held up as one example of this. The dispute over the provincial council however shows that the voting could actually make things worse in places, and that political bickering and infighting will continue. That has wide ranging affects across the province, including the security situation as Ninewa remains one of the most unstable areas in the country. In Mosul for example, the provincial capital, attacks and casualties have gone right back up to where they were after a short dip during January. Much of that violence is due to the Arab-Kurdish divide, which is still the major issue in Ninewa before and after the balloting.

SOURCES

Abouzeid, Rania, “Arabs-Kurd Tensions Could Threaten Iraq’s Peace,” Time, 3/24/09

Alsumaria, “Yazidis call to join Sinjar to Kurdistan,” 4/15/09

Associated Press, “Iraqi provincial election results,” 2/19/09

Aswat al-Iraq “Atheel Nejefi elected as Ninewa governor,” 4/12/09
- “Sinjar to boycott new local government in Ninewa,” 4/13/09

Cocks, Tim, “Vote sows seeds of greater calm in Iraq’s north,” Reuters, 2/2/09

Flintoff, Corey, “Shift In Power Heightens Tensions In Iraqi City,” All Things Considered, NPR, 2/27/09

Gamel, Kim, “Sunni party likely big winner in northern Iraq,” Associated Press, 2/1/09

Garcia-Navarro, Lourdes, “Iraq’s Election Campaign Especially Bitter In Mosul,” Morning Edition, NPR, 1/30/09

Kamal, Adel, “new ninawa governor: no possibility of Kurdish alliance,” Niqash, 2/24/09

Mohsen, Amer, “Iraq Papers Thu: Corruption and Reconstruction,” IraqSlogger.com, 3/4/09

Reilly, Corinne and Abbas, Ali, “Kurdish-Arab tensions continue to grow in northern Iraq,” McClatchy Newspapers, 4/14/09

Sands, Phil, “Kurd-Arab battle for power unlikely to end,” The National, 1/30/09

Sly, Liz and Ahmed, Caesar, “Establishment of Iraq provincial councils drags,” Los Angeles Times, 4/15/09

Zelikow, Philip, “The new strategic situation in Iraq,” Foreign Policy Online, 2/9/09

Kirkuk Remains In Political Limbo

Every deadline set for Kirkuk in Tamim has come and gone with no resolution. The Kurds of the province want it either annexed by Kurdistan or given special status for a period of time to work out its future, while the resident Arabs and Turkmen think it should be under the control of the central government or have some sort of autonomy. The Christians there are caught in the middle. On March 31, 2009, a special committee was suppose to come up with a power sharing agreement amongst those major groups that would allow for provincial elections. That date has passed with nothing happening. That follows the failure to carry out a census and referendum called for by the Iraqi constitution at the end of 2007. That date was extended to June 2009, but that too expired with no action. The task of determining the future of Kirkuk is now up to the United Nations, which is in the process of coming up with a series of options. It the past is a prelude to the future, then the U.N.’s plans are likely to be frustrated as well.

The Provincial Election law postponed voting in Tamim until a special committee could come up with plans for how to conduct them there. The law said that a committee had to create a power sharing agreement between the Kurds, Arabs, Turkmen, and Christians, before balloting could occur. The committee was to consist of two Kurds, two Turkmen, two Arabs, and one Christian. They were to finish their work by March 31, 2009. In early February 2009 a parliamentarian from the Kurdistan Islamic Union criticized the group saying that it would miss its March deadline because it had done nothing, which would jeopardizing the election in Tamim. He proved to be right. The end of March has come and gone, and there has been no word on the committee’s progress.

A major sticking point is that there are no up to date numbers on the population of Tamim. The Kurds want to use a 1957 census that says they are the largest group, while the Arabs insist on a 1987 census that favors them. The problem arises from Saddam Hussein’s Arabization policy that forced thousands of Kurds out of Kirkuk. Since the U.S. invasion thousands of Kurds have moved to the province, while many Arabs have either been forced out or been encouraged to leave with the promise of cash payments by the Kurds if they do so. According to the law, the fate of Tamim is now supposed to pass to the cabinet, but they are unlikely to make much progress either.

That leaves the issue to the United Nations. At the end of March several officials talked to the Associated Press about a draft U.N. plan that includes five possible options to deal with Kirkuk. One official said three of those would be rejected outright by one or the other of the major groups in area, leaving the last two, a special status for Tamim or making it an autonomous region as the only viable ones. If the province is given special status that would mean that it would be under the joint rule of both Baghdad and the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG). The final decisions on how to carry out the day-to-day governance of Tamim would be left to the provincial council. Tamim would be under this specification for three to ten years until the government and the U.N. could find a resolution. This plan is favored by the Kurds because it would mean their continued control of Tamim, as they are the majority on the provincial council. The other plan is to make the province autonomous. It would still rely upon Baghdad for funding, but could possibly collect revenues from the North Oil Corporation as well, which exports its petroleum through a Kirkuk-Turkish pipeline. The Arabs and Turkmen support this idea.

In the meantime tensions are building in the province. In July 2008 the newly formed 12th Iraqi Army Division was moved into Tamim. The commander of the unit General Abdul Amir Zaidi served in that area under Saddam from 1996-1998. The commander of the Kurdish peshmerga militia claims that General Zaidi operated against the Kurds during that period, although he denies it. The general said that his orders from Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, are to remove all of the Kurdish peshmerga militiamen from the province. The peshmerga have been there since the U.S. invasion. This plan was postponed after an Iraqi Army unit almost got into a shoot out with Kurds in January 2009. The U.S. had to intervene to defuse the situation. As a result, the Kurds have called for 10,000 U.S. troops to stay in the province until its future is determined. Leading Kurdish officials such as the President of Kurdistan Massoud Barzani, and his son Masrour Barzani, have called for the implementation of Article 140 of the constitution that requires a census and then referendum on the status of Kirkuk.

The U.S. is fully aware of the potential danger in Tamim, but now has a set deadline to leave the country that complicates its role. A U.S. Army officer said in March 2009 that if there was a flare up around Kirkuk that threatened violence, the U.S. would send in troops to stop it. Despite the plan to drawdown forces in much of the country, the Americans have actually increased their presence around Kirkuk. At the beginning of the year, the U.S. Army battalion that was stationed there was replaced with a full brigade. In that same month then Vice President-elect Joe Biden traveled to Iraq and stopped in Kirkuk where he told the sides that they had to have reconciliation to resolve the future of the area. The Americans are supposed to be out of Iraq’s cities by the end of June 2009 however, and completely withdraw from the country by the end of 2011, so the Kurds especially are apprehensive about what lays ahead after they leave.

In March 2009 Kurdish President Barzani said that the problems between the Kurds and Baghdad will remain unresolved until the future of Kirkuk is determined. The Kurds lay claim to a large swath of northern Iraq, but Kirkuk is the prize. It has both symbolic importance as well as help rallies the population behind the ruling parties in Kurdistan. While the central government was weak, the Kurds moved to legally annex the area. They sent their forces into Tamim after the U.S. invasion, they took control of the local administration, they won in the provincial elections, and then added Article 140 to the Constitution to hold a referendum on the issue. In 2007 Prime Minister Maliki began asserting his authority as the American Surge and other factors began to decrease the violence. After dealing with the Sadrists and insurgents, he began confronting the Kurds. This began in places like the Khanaqin district of Diyala and Mosul in Ninewa, and eventually came to Tamim. The attempt by the 12th Iraqi Army Division to move the peshmerga out is part of Maliki’s plan to limit the Kurds to Kurdistan, and end their expansionist plans. President Barzani’s claim is probably correct then, Kirkuk will be a defining issue between Baghdad and Kurdistan. It will probably take some kind of bargain between those two to resolve it. Until then tensions will increase, elections will be postponed, and Tamim will remain in political limbo.

SOURCES

Abdullah, Muhammed, “arab leader expects Kurdish consensus in kirkuk,” Niqash, 3/3/09

Ali, Ahmed and Knights, Michael, “Kirkuk: A Test for the International Community,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 1/14/09

Alsumaria, “Peshmerga Forces along borders with Kirkuk,” 8/7/08

Aswat al-Iraq, “Investigation committee in Kirkuk ‘late’ – MP,” 2/2/09
- “Kirkuk behind all Kurds’ problems with Iraqi governments – Barzani,” 3/12/09
- “Political powers split over Kirkuk Asayesh,” 12/14/08

Daniel, Trenton, “Ethnic tensions in Kirkuk turn U.S. military into mediator,” McClatchy Newspapers, 3/9/09

Frayer, Lauren, “Kirkuk: Edging out its Arab migrants,” Associated Press, 12/8/07

Howard, Michael, “Arabs face evictions as Kurds take revenge,” Guardian, 4/18/03

International Crisis Group, “Oil For Soil: Toward A Grand Bargain On Iraq And The Kurds,” 10/28/08

Jakes, Lara, “Key UN report to suggest power-sharing plan in Iraq’s divided Kirkuk,” Associated Press, 3/29/09

Al-Khalidi, Diaa, “kirkuk awaits election law,” Niqash, 3/11/09

Mardini, Ramzy, “Rising Arab-Kurdish Tensions over Kirkuk Will Complicate U.S. Withdrawal from Iraq,” Terrorism Focus, Jamestown Foundation, 2/25/09

Parker, Ned, “Iraqi general’s presence in Kirkuk stirs dark memories,” Los Angeles Times, 3/26/09
- “Kurd sees ‘very bad signals’ from Baghdad,” Los Angeles Times, 3/28/09

Rafaat, Aram, “U.S.-Kurdish Relations In Post-Invasion Iraq,” Middle East Review of International Affairs, December 2007

Ziezulewicz, Geoff, “’The best solution will be an Iraqi solution,’” Stars and Stripes, 4/3/09
- “Kirkuk power-sharing agreements in limbo,” Stars and Stripes, 4/12/09

Anbar Sheikhs Reach Out To Shiites

The dispute over naming the Anbar governor reported here before has ended. Muhammad Qassem, the candidate nominated by Sheikh Ahmed Abu Risha of the Awakening of Iraq and Independents List was finally elected governor. After being criticized by other tribes, Qassem was reportedly elected by all the major blocs in the province. Now that that dispute has been resolved, the two main Awakening leaders from Anbar Sheikh Abu Risha and Sheikh Hameed al-Hayes are apparently positioning themselves for the parliamentary elections planned for the end of 2009 by reaching to Shiite parties.

On April 9, followers of Moqtada al-Sadr led a protest to mark the fall of Baghdad and to call for the U.S. to withdraw. While Sadr wanted one million to show up, only about 30,000 actually participated. One of those was Sheikh Hameed al-Hayes. Hayes told McClatchy Newspapers that Sadr had a clear vision for Iraq, and that the government should release his followers. Hayes went on to say that he agreed with Sadr that the U.S. should leave the country, and blamed them for creating sectarianism. This was a clear move by Hayes to reach out to the Sadr Trend.

At the same time Sheikh Abu Risha said that he was open to an alliance with Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s State of Law list before the parliamentary elections. Abu Risha said that he and Maliki had the same vision of a unified Iraq of both Shiites and Sunnis working together.

Both Hayes and Abu Risha appear to be angling to become the leading voice of Iraq’s Sunnis. In 2005 the Sunnis largely boycotted the provincial elections, allowing the Iraqi Islamic Party to get most of the votes from Sunnis that did participate. Later in the parliamentary elections, the Islamic Party led Accordance Front won the most votes of the Sunni parties, and went on to become part of Maliki’s ruling coalition. Since then, the Accordance Front has broken apart. The Prime Minister has been working to get Parliamentarian Saleh al-Mutlaq’s Iraqi National Dialogue Front to join him as a new Sunni partner. This fragmentation of the Sunnis, who have never really had strong leadership since the fall of Saddam, allows room for the Anbar sheikhs to maneuver. Both Hayes and Abu Risha are willing to do just about anything to gain power. Hayes has been known for threatening violence to get his way, while Abu Risha has formed alliances and then broken them to further his cause. That should make Sadr and Maliki weary of joining alliances with either one of them, but with Iraqi politics now in flux after the January 2009 provincial elections, anything seems possible.

SOURCES

Abbas, Mohammed, “Iraq Sunni anti-Qaeda leader eyes Shi’ite alliance,” Reuters, 4/12/09

Aswat al-Iraq, “New governor picked for Anbar,” 4/11/09

Fadel, Leila, “Volatile Anbar province a test of Iraq’s future,” McClatchy Newspapers, 2/17/09

Al-Hafoth, Wail, “Thousands march in Baghdad against US presence,” Times of London, 4/9/09

Hamid, Nirmeen, “anbar’s Islamic party and tribes vie for power,” Niqash, 12/12/08

Lawrence, Quil, “Political Rift In Iraq's Anbar Province,” Morning Edition, NPR, 4/8/09

Reilly, Corinne and Issa, Sahar, “Celebrating freedom: Thousands of Iraqis rally against U.S.,” McClatchy Newspapers, 4/9/09

Rubin, Alissa and Myers, Steven Lee, “As Iraqis Tally Votes, Former Leader Re-emerges,” New York Times, 2/4/09

Shadid, Anthony, “New Alliance In Iraq Cross Sectarian Lines,” Washington Post, 3/20/09

Refugees International Report On Iraq’s Refugees and Displaced

In early April 2009, Refugees International released its latest position paper on Iraq’s refugees and internally displaced entitled, “Iraq: Preventing the Point of No Return.” There are still several million Iraqis that have lost their homes. Many do not want to go back yet because they have concerns about security, and the lack of services provided by the government. Most will have to return at some point so the government, the U.S., and the U.N. need to work together to ensure that they can, and will want to come back. That means Baghdad needs to improve health care, education, and jobs. The U.S., U.N., and international community also need to step up their assistance and funding for humanitarian programs to help out this population. Overall, Refugees International does not believe that the time is right for Iraqis to return since there is little aid to accommodate them, and that Baghdad is doing a disservice by asking them to come back.

Since late 2007, Baghdad has been encouraging refugees to return. This came in two waves. First, in November 2007 the government set up special buses from Syria for Iraqis to come back, and offered each family $800 if they did. Then in the summer of 2008 Iraq began offering plane rides to refugees in Egypt. Baghdad didn’t consider the conditions in Iraq when they began asking Iraqis to come back. It even went as far as to ask Syria to close its borders to Iraqis in late 2007. Instead, Prime Minister Nour al-Maliki’s government felt that large numbers of returns would make Baghdad look better and increase international and domestic support. Refugees International believes that this policy was a political move meant to improve the image of the government, rather than actually help people.

In fact, Baghdad has shown little sympathy for Iraq’s refugees. Syria and Jordan claim that they are home to almost 2 million Iraqis, but Baghdad says there are only 400,000 there. A U.N. diplomat told Refugees International that Maliki thinks the refugees are traitors, filled with Baathists, who don’t want to help Iraq. Refugee International believes that this bias is largely due to the fact that most of the refugees are Sunnis.

The government has also been offering cash rewards to internally displaced families that return. Refugees International found fault with this program as well. First the payment was only offered to those that lost their homes between January 2006 and December 2007. That favors Shiites who were mostly displaced during the sectarian war. According to the International Organization for Migration’s April 2009 report, 56.8% of Iraq’s displaced are Shiites, compared to 30.8% who are Sunnis. Refugees International ignores the fact that more than 50% of Iraq’s displacement occurred after the February 2006 bombing of the Shiite shrine in Samarra, which set off the civil war.

Refugees International also talked with Iraqi officials who say they want the whole issue of refugees and the displaced to be over with by the end of 2009. The government officers claimed that there are no more reasons for Iraqis to be displaced. The February 2009 U.N. Humanitarian Report even said that some officials claimed that most of the displaced had gone home. Because of this, the government has stopped registering internal refugees, which is a prerequisite to receive assistance. Refugees International believes that the combination of encouraging refugees and the displaced to come back without providing adequate support for them will only lead to more problems. In fact, the government is making things worse because they are more concerned about making themselves look better than actually dealing with the causes and consequences of the country’s refugee crisis.

The fact that the majority of Iraq’s displaced have not gone back puts the lie to the officials’ claims. According to the International Organization for Migration (IOM), only around 50,000 families, approximately 250,000 individuals, have gone back. Most are internal refugees. Only 8% have been refugees from other countries. According to IOM surveys, 61% of Iraq’s displaced want to return, but don’t think they can yet. 39% said they want to stay where they are or be resettled somewhere else. Refugees International is concerned that if these families don’t return, it will solidify the ethnic cleansing that occurred from 2006-2007.

Baghdad needs to improve services, aid, and rule of law before there is a safe and stable environment for Iraq’s refugees and displaced to come back according to Refugees International. The improved security situation has not led to better services. The government needs to provide health care, education, and jobs, as well as offer more aid to those that are coming back. Right now Baghdad doesn’t have this capacity, nor any laws or regulations to deal with property disputes, which could take years to resolve. There is still the issue of sectarian biases within the administration. The government has set up assistance centers in the capital, and Maliki has ordered the security forces to deal with squatters, but the amount of money offered isn’t large enough, and the expulsion of squatters has just added more displaced. Iraq’s budget problems probably mean that these aid programs are in jeopardy. There are also stories of returnees being attacked and intimidated, and many have not been able to go back to their original homes. Refugees International warns that the potential for renewed violence still exists.

Refugees International has four recommendations on how to move forward on Iraq’s refugee crisis. First the U.N. should provide more aid to Iraq to help the displaced and its causes. The U.N. has had a limited presence in Iraq since its compound was bombed in 2003. Refugees International believes that improved security should allow the U.N. to create offices in each of Iraq’s eighteen provinces. Right now few displaced in Iraq receive any aid from the government or non-governmental organizations. Second, the U.S. should pay for 50% of the U.N.’s programs. Third, the government, with the assistance of the U.S. and U.N., needs to improve services and provide jobs. That is something that may prove impossible however as American and international reconstruction aid is coming to an end. Iraq has already received $125 billion, and services are still largely below pre-invasion levels. Fourth the U.S. should work with countries where Iraqi refugees are residing. That includes providing money, and helping those Iraqis that don’t wish to return.

This report by Refugee International is an important advocacy paper for Iraq’s refugees. They provide a good overview of some of the problems facing the country’s displaced, and why it’s still not the right time for them to return. The major issue now is that international assistance to Iraq is winding down, and Baghdad is facing a budget crisis so there is little hope that more money will be spent on Iraq’s refugees. That will probably mean that Iraq’s displaced will have to exist off of the meager help provided by non-government organizations and the U.N., and act on their own. Ironically, that may mean that Baghdad’s wish to put the refugee crisis behind them may come true as no new effort on their behalf can be expected in the immediate future.

SOURCES

International Organization for Migration, “IOM Emergency Needs Assessments; Post February 2006 Displacement In Iraq, Monthly Report,” 4/1/09

Kaplow, Larry, Nordland, Rod, and Spring, Silvia, “There’s No Place Like … Iraq?” Newsweek, 11/24/07

Refugees International, “Iraq: Preventing the Point of No Return,” 4/9/09

Special Inspector General For Iraq Reconstruction, “Quarterly Report and Semiannual Report to the United States Congress,” 1/30/09

United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, “Humanitarian Update Iraq February 2009,” 2/28/09

Falling Oil Revenues, and Uneven Production

Iraq is facing the worst of two worlds. The price for Iraqi oil has dropped dramatically, while it has not become a steady producer. The Oil Ministry recently announced that oil revenues were down over 50% in the first three months of 2009 compared to the same time period in 2008. At the same time petroleum production and exports have continued to fluctuate up and down.

At the beginning of April 2009 the Oil Ministry announced a dramatic drop in oil profits. In the first three months of 2009 it made $6.57 billion. That was a 57.6% decrease from the same period in 2008 when the country earned $15.49 billion. Iraq did make more in March than it did the previous months. In January 2009 Iraq made $2.15 billion, followed by $1.7 billion in February, and $2.5 billion in March. The average price of Iraqi crude has also inched up from $34.57 in December 2008 to $38.06 in February. That's still far from the highest price of $113.81 reached in July 2008, and not even up to the November 2008 price of $43.54.

Iraq Oil Revenues

March 09	$2.5 bil
Feb. 09	$1.7 bil
Jan. 09	$2.15
Dec. 08	$1.9 bil
Nov. 08	$2.2 bil
Oct. 08	$3.11 bil

An additional problem is that Iraq is still not a consistent oil producer or exporter. While yearly averages of production and exports have grown since 2005, the monthly numbers are still up and down. In January 2009 for example, Iraq produced an average of 2.15 million barrels per day (mbd) and exported 1.89 mbd. The next month production went up to 2.32 mbd, but exports dropped to 1.69 mpd. In March production, 2.38 mbd, and exports, 1.93 mbd, increased. In comparison, Iraq exported 1.93 mbd for the first three months of 2008, and went as high as 1.96 mpd in May and June of that year. The other months' exports were lower. Production and exports have stayed within the same range since the fall of 2007. These fluctuations have contributed to the changing revenues.

Monthly Averages of Iraqi Oil Production/Exports in Millions of Barrels Per Day

	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009
Jan.		2.44/1.537	2.1/1.367	1.73/1.05	1.66/1.3	2.24/1.93	2.15/1.89
Feb.		2.276/1.382	2.1/1.431	1.83/1.47	2.08/1.5	2.39/1.93	2.32/1.69
March		2.435/1.825	2.09/1.394	2.1/1.32	2.08/1.58	2.38/1.93	2.38/1.93
April		2.384/1.804	2.14/1.398	2.14/1.6	2.14/1.5	2.4/1.88
May	0.3/0.0	1.887/1.38	2.1/1.308	2.13/1.51	2.03/1.64	2.6/1.96
June	0.675/0.2	2.295/1.1488	2.17/1.377	2.3/1.67	2.0/1.47	2.52/1.96
July	0.925/0.322	2.2/1.406	2.17/1.55	2.22/1.68	2.07/1.71	2.54/1.85
Aug.	1.445/0.646	2.122/1.114	2.16/1.504	2.24/1.68	1.91/1.69	2.5/1.7
Sep.	1.722/0.983	2.514/1.703	2.11/1.6	2.234/1.65	2.3/1.9	2.37/1.65
Oct.	2.055/1.149	2.45/1.542	1.91/1.239	2.26/1.55	2.34/1.91	2.37/1.69
Nov.	2.1/1.524	1.95/1.32	1.98/1.168	2.1/1.44	2.38/1.88	2.4/1.88
Dec.	2.3/1.541	2.16/1.52	1.92/1.071	2.15/1.45	2.42/1.93	2.35/1.73
Yr. Avg.	1.44/0.795	2.25/1.47	2.079/1.36	2.11/1.5	2.11/1.66	2.42/1.84	2.28/1.83

As reported before, the Oil Ministry is desperately trying to boost production to keep money flowing. This includes issuing tenders for 100 new wells and installations. Oil Minister Hussain al-Shahristani is hoping those will increase output by 300,000-500,000 barrels per day by the end of the year. At the same time, the Ministry is moving ahead with its long-term contracts as well. That still would not bring Iraq up to pre-invasion levels. In 2001 Iraq was producing 2.6 million barrels a day. Production at the North Oil Company is about 600,000 barrels per day, 2/3 of the production before 2003, while the South Oil Company's output has declined by around 200,000 barrels per day over the last several months.

Iraq's budget and ministries are feeling the immediate effects of both declining oil prices and inconsistent production. The Electricity Ministry asked for $1 billion in the 2009 budget, but only got $400 million. As a result its had to cut $600 million in contracts with General Electric, France's Alstom, Germany's MAN AG, and South Korea's Hyndai. It had plans to boost power production by 2,000 megawatts this year, but that has been drawn back to only 600 megawatts. Iraq's cities were due to get $5 billion for development, but that has been cut 60%. Baghdad was going to get $600 million for that, but now will only get $340 million. It had planned two sewage projects in 2009 and two in 2010, but now is only going to go through with one this year, and two next. The Water Ministry is also canceling work to dredge canals. All government ministries are having a hiring freeze. The Interior Ministry stopped adding new police in December 2008. That's put a halt to integrating the Sons of Iraq. The Defense Ministry will also not be able to buy new weapons systems and other equipment.

From 2007-2008 Iraq was flowing in oil money. Those huge profits have now largely disappeared. The country's growing, but still inconsistent exports is now a larger issue, as every barrel is needed to keep up revenues. The Oil Ministry wants to boost exports to 2 million barrels a day this year, but has not been able to achieve that since 2005. With better security that might now be a possibility, but that still won't bring in enough to meet the government's needs with crude prices still low. That puts Baghdad in a precarious situation as it has rising expectations, especially after the January 2009 provincial elections, but will have to now cut some services.

SOURCES

Associated Press, "Iraq Reports Increase in Oil Exports in December, but Revenues Drop," 1/26/09

- "Iraq's oil revenues fall 25%," 12/23/08

Ali Fathi, Saadallah, "Major bottlenecks in Iraq's oil refinery sector," Gulf News, 4/5/09

Gamel, Kim, "Iraqi budget woes force security hiring freeze," Associated Press, 3/20/09

Kamal, Fatima, "Nine foreign firms win service contracts to develop 11 oil fields in Iraq," Azzaman, 4/7/09

Lando, Ben, "Iraq oil exports drop in February," Iraq Oil Report, 3/25/09

O'Hanlon, Michael Campbell, Jason, "Iraq Index," Brookings Institution, 4/2/09

Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, "Iraqi Water Projects Affected By Budget Cuts," 4/2/09

Reuters, "Iraq's Faltering Oil Revenues Hurt Public Services," 3/31/09

Salaheddin, Sinan, "OIl Ministry: Iraq's oil revenues drop," Associated Press, 4/5/09

Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, "Quarterly Report and Semiannual Report to the United States Congress," 1/30/09

Are Iraqi Forces Ready?

The Obama administration has committed itself to a timetable for withdrawal. Following the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) signed between the Bush White House and Baghdad, American combat troops are to be out of the country's cities by June 2009, and then be completely withdrawn by the end of 2011. The question then is whether the Iraqi forces are up to the job of taking over security. There is little reporting on specific operations by Iraqi units, but the anecdotal stories that are available show a mixed bag.

In November 2008 the U.S. signed the SOFA with the government of Iraq. Under this agreement U.S. combat troops are to withdraw from major cities and towns to their bases by June 30, 2009. U.S. soldiers responsible for training Iraqis would remain, and American troops will still carry out operations within Iraq. There is some talk about Iraqis asking U.S. forces to stay in certain unstable areas such as Baquba in Diyala province and Mosul in Ninewa, in addition to Basra beyond the June deadline. American troop levels are also expected to drop from around 140,000 in March 2009 to approximately 128,000 by September. They would stay at that level until after the Iraqi parliamentary elections, which are scheduled for December. After the balloting is over and confirmed troops levels are supposed to drop to around 35,000-50,000 by August 2010, and then be completely out by December 31, 2011.

If this arrangement is followed through with, Iraqi forces will have primary responsibility for most of Iraq by this summer. Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki has repeatedly said that his forces are up to the challenge. The size of the Iraqi security forces has almost doubled from around 320,000 in January 2007 to 637,495 by December 31, 2008.

According to the Pentagon's quarterly reports to Congress the number of National Police battalions operating went from 27 to 34 from January 2007 to October 2008. The National Police are a paramilitary force that supports the military in counterinsurgency operations. In January 2007 23 battalions were partially capable of conducting operations in coordination with Coalition forces, and four could plan and carry out operations with U.S. support. None were considered independent yet. By October 2008 that had grown to 1 battalion being formed, 15 that were partially ready to operate with U.S. forces, 16 that could operate with U.S. support, and two that could work independently. That showed that during the process of expansion the National Police had been able to keep up with its training and readiness with the percentage of units capable of operating with some support going from 14.8% in January 2007 to 47% in October 2008, and the number of independent battalions going from zero to two.

From the beginning of 2007 to late 2008 the number of Army battalions went from 112 to 175. In January 2007 five were being formed and couldn't operate yet, 17 were dependent upon U.S. forces, 78 could operate but with Coalition support, and 12 were considered independent. By October 2008 five battalions were being formed, 54 were incapable of working without U.S. forces, 99 were semi-dependent, and 17 were considered independent. By December the Pentagon reported that 165 of 185 Iraqi battalions were in the lead or independent. The Army has gone through the most growth so its capabilities have been harder to keep up with. In October 2008 15.1% of the force were partially capable and in January 2009 that had increased to 30.8%. The number of battalions capable of operating with some Coalition support went down from 69.6% to 56.5%, while those considered independent dropped from 10.7% to 9.7%. What these numbers actually mean is still up to debate as Anthony Cordesman from the Center for Strategic and International Studies has often pointed out.

Status Of Iraqi Forces

	Incapable of Operating	Partially Capable	Capable With Coalition Support	Independent	Totals
National Police Battalions
Jan 2007	0/0%	23/85.1%	4/14.8%	0/0%	27/100%
Oct 2008	1/2.9%	15/44.1%	16/47%	2/5.8%	34/100%
Iraqi Army Battalions
Jan 2007	5/4.4%	17/15.1%	78/69.6%	12/10.7%	112/100%
Oct 2008	5/2.8%	54/30.8%	99/56.5%	17/9.7%	175/100%

The Iraqi Army is considered farther along than the police. U.S. officers often say that their Iraqi counterparts are more capable of carrying out operations, however their quality still varies. An American commander told the Stars and Stripes in February 2009 that they still don't trust Iraqis with advance information on operations. The U.S. believes many Iraqi units are infiltrated with insurgents and militiamen. A U.S. commander found an Iraqi officer in southern Baghdad who was tipping off Shiite militias before raids for example. Rather than being fired or punished he was simply transferred to a Sunni area. U.S. soldiers and contractors are supposed to be partnered with all new Iraqi Army units. A U.S. officer that ran one of these Military Transition Teams meant to train Iraqis said there weren't enough Americans to advise all the Iraqi units so most of them have been okayed to operate whether they are ready or not. Another issue is the motivation of Iraqi troops. After the SOFA was passed all U.S. operations are supposed to be carried out jointly with Iraqi forces, although this does not always happen. There have been several stories that in practice, it is usually the Americans that initiate and lead patrols. The same Stars and Stripes article followed one patrol in Diyala that had the Americans doing all the work. A U.S. unit showed up and told the Iraqis that they were going on a mission. The Americans ended up arresting a suspected insurgent. The event was recorded as an Iraqi led patrol and nabbing. It's also still common for large numbers of Iraqi soldiers to be on leave at any given time.

The Iraqi police still have far more problems. Iraqi soldiers are drawn from across the country and are usually rotated. Police on the other hand, are locally recruited and serve in those same areas. That means they are more open to influence by political parties, militias, and others. There is also the issue of infiltration. On February 24, 2009 an Iraqi policeman shot and killed a U.S. soldier, an interpreter and two Iraqi policemen in Mosul. Three American soldiers and another interpreter were also wounded in the attack. In another incident in that city, a U.S. patrol was attacked with two grenades with Iraqi police looking on who did nothing. Abuse is often common in Iraqi jails as the judicial system relies upon confessions rather than evidence. A review of the Interior Ministry by the William and Mary College however said that the leadership is developing, and progress is being made fighting corruption and sectarianism. The Interior Minister claimed in March 2009 that he had fired 62,000 members of the Ministry since he took office in 2006 in an attempt to clean it up. The major problem the William and Mary researchers found was that the police and Interior were not institutions yet that followed rules and regulations, but were mainly driven by individuals. The National Police are the elite of the Interior Ministry, and have been largely cleaned up of militias, and are doing much better.

Does this mixed bag of reports make for a competent security force that is ready to protect the country? A phrase "Iraqi good enough" has often been mentioned as a response. Iraqi forces are not up to the quality or standards of American forces, but Iraq is not the United States. There will still be problems with outside influences, corruption, and abuses, but Iraq's police and army for the most part are probably competent enough to hold areas and fight insurgents or militiamen when confronted. They also have until 2011 to develop with American assistance. That may be good enough for Iraq.

SOURCES

Arraf, Jane, “US general: American forces may not leave key Iraqi cities,” Christian Science Monitor, 3/27/09

Associated Press, “Iraqis fear U.S. pullout of volatile Mosul,” 3/9/09
- “U.S. troops to remain active in Iraq after pullback,” 3/15/09

Cordesman Anthony, “The Changing Situation In Iraq,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, 4/1/09
- “How Soon Is Safe? Iraqi Force Development And ‘Conditions-Based’ US Withdrawals, Final Pre-Publication Draft,” 2/17/09

Department of Defense, “Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq,” December 2008

DeYoung, Karen and Kornblut, Anne, “Obama to Announce U.S. Troop Withdrawal in Iraq,” Washington Post, 2/27/09

Druzin, Heath, “Coalition forces fight in insurgent stronghold while residents urge U.S. troops to leave Mosul,” Stars and Stripes, 3/8/09
- “Iraqis taking the lead? Yes and no,” Stars and Stripes, 2/22/09
- “Shooting of four U.S. troops highlights trust issues between two forces,” Stars and Stripes, 2/27/09

Engle, Richard, “The sixth war in Iraq,” NBC News, 3/20/09

Human Rights Watch, “The Quality of Justice, Failings of Iraq’s Central Criminal Court,” December 2008

Kaplow, Larry, “The Last Day of the Iraq War,” Newsweek, 1/12/09

Salaheddin, Sinan, “Iraqi security leader wants ‘war of intelligence,’” Associated Press, 3/14/09

Sherman, Matt and Carstens, Roger, “Cooling the Streets: Institutional Reforms in Iraq’s Ministry of Interior,” Institute for the Theory and Practice of International Relations at The College of William and Mary, 11/14/08

Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, “Quarterly Report and Semiannual Report to the United States Congress,” 1/30/09

United States Government Accountability Office, “IRAQ Key Issues for Congressional Oversight,” March 2009

Iraq’s GDP

Iraq has the third largest oil reserves in the world. It has an estimated 115 billion barrels, placing it only behind Saudi Arabia and Iran. Petroleum accounts for 65% of Gross Domestic Product (GDP). Iraq has also been the recipient of $125 billion in reconstruction aid, along with reducing half of its debt. With all this potential wealth the country should be well off. Instead, it finds itself near the median point when comparing GDPs to other countries in the region, and almost at the bottom in per capita GDP in the Middle East.

In the 1980s Iraq was a growing middle class country, but fell into disrepair in the proceeding decades. After the 1991 Gulf War the economy collapsed under international sanctions. It became poor and underdeveloped on par with countries in Africa. 60% of the population for example was dependent upon the state-run food ration system, and there was widespread malnutrition. In 2002 the GDP was at $20.5 billion, and per capita GDP stood at $802. That was a 7.8% decrease from the previous year. The 2003 U.S. invasion was another setback, dropping GDP to $13.6 billion, and per capita GDP to $518. Since then Iraq has had steady growth, largely due to the increase in the price of oil, which accounts for 90% of revenues and 65% of the GDP. By 2008 GDP was at an estimated $84.7 billion, and per capita GDP at $3,100. That was a $29.3 billion increase from the previous year.

Iraq’s GDP/Per Capita GDP
2002 $20.5 billion/$802
2003 $13.6 billion/$518
2004 $25.7 billion/$949
2005 $34.5 billion/$1,237
2006 $48.5 billion/$1,687
2007 $55.4 billion/$1,978
2008 $84.7 billion/$3,100

Breakdown of Iraq’s GDP – est. 2008
65% Oil
13% Services
7% Transportation/Communication
6% Wholesale, Retail, Hotels
5% Farming
2% Manufacturing
1% Finance/Banking
1% Construction

In early 2009 Iraq’s Planning Ministry expected the GDP to continue to grow by 10.9%, but that’s hard to believe with the collapse of the petroleum market. The Pentagon predicts that there could still be positive growth in 2009 due to government spending, but even that is going to be constrained with the budget cuts.

Despite the expansion of the economy after the U.S. invasion, Iraq has not regained the standard of living that it had in the 1980s. When comparing GDPs in the region Iraq ranked 9th out of seventeen countries in 2008. Saudi Arabia at $468.1 billion, Iran at $319 billion, and the United Arab Emirates with $240.3 billion were at the top, while Bahrain at $18.6 billion, Jordan at $20.1 billion, and Yemen at $22.3 billion were the bottom three. When broken down by per capita the comparison was even more stark. Iraq was second to last with only Yemen below it. Qatar, Kuwait, and the United Arab Emirates were the richest in the region.

Comparison Of Iraq’s GDP With Other Countries In The Region
Saudi Arabia $468.1 billion
Iran $319 billion
United Arab Emirates $240.3 billion
Egypt $159.2 billion
Algeria $152.3 billion
Kuwait $148.4 billion
Qatar $95.8 billion
Morocco $87 billion
Iraq $84.7 billion
Libya $67.9 billion
Syria $50 billion
Oman $46.4 billion
Tunisia $38.9 billion
Lebanon $28.02 billion
Yemen $22.3 billion
Jordan $20.1 billion
Bahrain $18.6 billion

Comparison Of Iraq’s Per Capita GDP With Other Countries In The Region
Qatar $58,004
Kuwait $40,826
United Arab Emirates $29,063
Saudi Arabia $23,928
Bahrain $23,702
Oman $23,654
Libya $16,431
Iran $11,748
Lebanon $10,742
Algeria $8,344
Tunisia $7,894
Egypt $5,689
Jordan $5,051
Syria $4,763
Morocco $4,405
Iraq $3,880
Yemen $2,290

Iraq has had steady economic growth and a huge increase in its GDP since the 2003 invasion. Those aggregate numbers however don’t reveal the myriad problems that the country is facing. Almost all of that expansion was due to oil. In February 2009 a barrel of Iraqi crude sold at $38, down from its peak of $113.81 in July 2008. (NOTE: Iraqi oil sells below the world average, which went from $147 per barrel in July 2008 to around $50 currently.) The government dominates the economy, which is corrupt and inefficient. Investment is up, but it is caught in a bureaucratic maze that slows its impact. U.S. reconstruction funding is also coming to an end, and Baghdad has been unable to spend most of its capital budget that goes towards infrastructure. More importantly, the benefits of the development of Iraq have not trickled down much as there is still high unemployment, especially amongst the young, and high rates of poverty.

SOURCES

Agence France Presse, “Asia Companies The New Players In Iraq’s Oil Industry,” 4/9/09

Al-Ansary, Khalid, “Iraq investors bemoan red tape and lack of credit,” Reuters, 3/29/09

Aswat al-Iraq, “GDP higher by 10.9 % in 2008,” 2/11/09
- “Oil ministry says Iraq’s exports hit $1.9b in Feb.,” 3/28/09

Baker, Luke, “Investors ready for Iraq invasion as troops pull out,” Reuters, 12/22/08

Department of Defense, “Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq,” December 2008
- “Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq,” March 2009

Glanz, James, “In Report to Congress, Oversight Officials Say Iraqi Rebuilding Falls Short of Goals,” New York Times, 10/31/07

Inter-Agency Information and Analysis Unit, “Iraq Labour Force Analysis 2003-2008,” United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, January 2009

Lando, Ben, “Iraq oil exports drop in February,” Iraq Oil Report, 3/25/09

O’Hanlon, Michael and Campbell, Jason, “Iraq Index,” Brookings Institution, 2/26/09

Special Inspector General For Iraq Reconstruction, “Hard Lessons,” 1/22/09
- “Quarterly Report and Semiannual Report to the United States Congress,” 1/30/09
- “Quarterly Report to the United States Congress,” 10/30/08

UPI, “Iraqi Red Crescent predicts continued need,” 10/30/08

World Food Programme, “Comprehensive Food Security And Vulnerability Analysis In Iraq,” November 2008

Dispute Over Governor In Anbar

Anbar province saw some of the most heated disputes before and after the January 2009 provincial elections. The Anbar Awakening broke up into different factions, alliances shifted back and forth, and then when early voter returns said that the ruling Iraqi Islamic Party (IIP) had come out with a plurality, many leading sheikhs claimed the party had cheated and threatened violence. Authorities had to impose a curfew until the final results showed that the tribes had won. The bargaining for positions on the provincial council has continued since then with no less acrimony. The Awakening of Iraq and Independents list of Sheikh Abu Risha came out on top, and he has been trying to name a governor, but the other tribes have objected, leading to a new controversy in the province.

At the end of March 2009 Sheikh Abu Risha put forward two candidates for governor of Anbar. Both were ex-Baathist engineers. One was Arkhan Khalaf Tarmouz who was the former director of presidential sites under Saddam. The main candidate was Muhammad Qassem who was the head of the chemical section at the Military Industrialization Commission under the old regime. He fled to the United Arab Emirates when fighting broke out in Anbar after the U.S. invasion. The other tribes in the province have rejected both candidates. Many have criticized Qassem for example, for fleeing the country. Abu Risha has responded by saying that not only is Qassem a qualified candidate, but that his business contacts could increase investment in Anbar and help modernize the governorate.

The dispute over the governorship is part of a larger struggle for power between the different tribes and sheikhs in Anbar. Some have accused Risha of trying to create a dictatorship and enrich himself after his party won the most seats in the provincial election. Risha has threatened to expel all of his critics from the Awakening movement. These divisions began in late 2008 as the provincial vote neared.

The Anbar Awakening was a confederation of several different tribes led mostly by young sheikhs who rose to power with the backing of the United States. There were two major factions in the movement; one was led by Sheikh Abu Risha, the brother of the founder of the Awakening, and the other by Sheikh Mohammad al-Hayes. In November 2008 Abu Risha agreed to join with the Islamic Party (IIP). The Islamic Party had come to power in Anbar in January 2005 when only around 3,800 of 574,000 residents voted due to the Sunni boycott. The IIP ran largely unopposed in 2005 and came away with 34 of 41 council seats. When the Awakening arose in 2005-2006 they challenged the party’s claim to power, and began pushing for elections. Realizing their weakened position, the Islamic Party tried to divide the Awakening and court sheikhs to their side. They were successful in wooing Risha and others, who were then denounced by the rest of the Awakening leaders. The Islamic Party went on to allow the tribes to name 15 of their 29 candidates, and okay the others.

The Islamic Party and tribes continued on with their dispute right up to the voting day and beyond. First the two sides accused each other of trying to bribe voters. Sheikh Hayes went on to form his own list to run in the election known as the Iraq Tribes, made up of eleven different parties. The sheikh, always the most boisterous leader, threatened violence before the election if he didn’t win. After the actual voting at the end of January 2009 was completed, and early reports said that the Islamic Party had won a plurality, Hayes was incensed. He said there would be an uprising against the IIP if they remained in power, and that the tribes would go to war against them. The tribes also claimed there was voter fraud perpetrated by the Islamic Party. Hayes was one of the main accusers, but showing the opportunistic nature of many of the sheikhs Abu Risha broke his alliance, accused the Islamic Party of cheating, and said that the tribes would form their own government if the IIP won. The situation was so tense that the police imposed a curfew in Ramadi, U.S. Marines returned to the streets for patrols, and Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki sent an envoy to try to negotiate with the parties and keep the peace.

The negative campaign and ever dividing sheikhs appeared to turn off and confuse many voters. A member of the Iraqi Election Commission predicted low voter turnout as a result in late 2008. The official said that the people didn’t trust either the Islamic Party or the tribes, and all the infighting and divisions wasn't helping. There were also so many tribal groups, at least four major ones, that the public couldn’t tell one from the other. The official proved prophetic. Only 40% of voters turned out, the lowest percentage in the country.

When the final results were announced in mid-February Abu Risha’s Awakening of Iraq and Independents List came out on top. They were followed by parliamentarian Saleh al-Mutlaq’s Iraqi National Project, and the Islamic Party’s Alliance of Intellectuals. Sheikh Hayes’ Iraqi Tribes List finished tied for last.

Anbar Election Results
1. Awakening of Iraq and Independents – Sheikh Abu Risha: 8
2. Iraqi National Project – al-Mutlaq: 6
2. Alliance of Intellectuals and Tribes – Iraqi Islamic Party: 6
4. National Movement for Development and Reform - al-Karbouli: 3
5. Iraqi National List - Allawi: 2
5. Iraqi Tribes List – Sheikh al-Hayes: 2
5. Iraqi National Unity: 2

After that Abu Risha set about trying to form a ruling coalition. He reached out to Saleh al-Mutlaq, a former Baathist, and ex-Prime Minister Ilyad Allawi’s secular Iraqi National List. Sheikh Hayes also expressed interest in joining the alliance. What unified them was a desire to the shut the Islamic Party out of power. When Abu Risha announced his candidates for governor however, all the divisions rose again.

The maneuverings in Anbar highlight the political immaturity and opportunism of the tribes there. Many of the Awakening leaders are new to power, haven risen to positions of prominence with the help of the U.S. in opposition to Al Qaeda in Iraq. When they were fighting the Islamists they were united, but after the insurgency was largely defeated the sheikhs’ political ambitions came to the fore, and they began to argue. With the provincial elections, the Awakening shattered into different factions that would move back and forth in ever changing alliances. Abu Risha and Hayes were semi-rivals before, and that came to the fore with the election. Abu Risha broke with Hayes to join the Islamic Party, but when it was reported they won, he split with them and joined Hayes’ attacks. Now with Risha’s List announced as the victor he’s getting a taste of his own medicine as the other tribes have rejected his choices for governor.

SOURCES

Associated Press, “Iraqi provincial election results,” 2/19/09

Al-Badrani, Fadhel, “Iraq tribes threaten to take up arms over poll,” Reuters, 2/2/09

Dagher, Sam, “Tribal Rivalries Persist as Iraqis Seek Local Posts,” New York Times, 1/20/09

Daniel, Trenton, “Baath party makes comeback, but it isn’t Saddam’s anymore,” McClatchy Newspapers, 2/12/09

Economist Intelligence Unit, “Iraq politics: Election fever,” 1/28/09

Fadel, Leila, “Volatile Anbar province a test of Iraq’s future,” McClatchy Newspapers, 2/17/09

Farrell, Stephen, “Election: Preliminary Results,” Baghdad Bureau Blog, New York Times, 2/5/09

Hamid, Nirmeen, “anbar’s Islamic party and tribes vie for power,” Niqash, 12/12/08
- “Political Fight Threatens Anbar Peace,” Niqash, 11/20/08

Hauslohner, Abigail, “How Iraq Fills the Quota for Female Politicians,” Time, 1/12/09

Institute for War & Peace Reporting, “New Sunni Provincial leaders Face Daunting Tasks,” 2/27/09

International Crisis Group, “Iraq’s Provincial Elections: The Stakes,” 1/27/09

Lawrenee, Quil, “Political Rift In Iraq's Anbar Province,” Morning Edition, NPR, 4/8/09

Londono, Ernesto, “Iraq Probes Possible Voter Fraud,” Washington Post, 2/4/09

Madhani, Aamer, "Iraqi coalition wins control of troubled Anbar province," USA Today, 2/8/09

Morin, Monte and Ahmed, Caesar, “Sunni rivals clash over elections in Iraq’s Anbar province,” Los Angeles Times, 2/5/09

Myers, Steven Lee and Dagher, Sam, “After Iraqi Elections, Next Big Test Is Acceptance,” New York Times, 2/10/09

Parker, Ned, Ahmed Caesar and Hameed, Saif, “Absent election results, Iraq parties stake claims,” Los Angeles Times, 2/4/09

Raghavan, Sudarsan, “As Anbar Counts Votes, Sheiks Voice Defiance,” Washington Post, 2/5/09

Rasheed, Ahmed, “Iraq investigating serous vote fraud allegations,” Reuters, 2/4/09

Rubin, Alissa and Myers, Steven Lee, “As Iraqis Tally Votes, Former Leader Re-emerges,” New York Times, 2/4/09

Shadid, Anthony, “Iraq Election Highlights Ascendancy of Tribes,” Washington Post, 1/25/09

Al-Taei, Sundus, “tribal dispute over anbar’s new governor,” Niqash, 3/30/09

April 2009 International Organization for Migration Report on Iraq’s Displaced

The International Organization for Migration (IOM) is the premier non-governmental organization working with Iraq’s displaced. They cooperate with the Iraqi Ministry of Displacement and Migration to provide aid, and have the most extensive polling and up to date information on the plight of internal refugees. They recently released their April report.

Most of Iraq’s displacement happened after the bombing of the Al-Askari Mosque in Samarra, Salahaddin in February 2006. Approximately 1.6 million Iraqis lost their homes as a result. Displacement is still happening in the country, but at much lower rates. The majority of displaced are from Baghdad, 63.1% of the total, and are Shiite Arabs, 56.8%. The humanitarian situation of those displaced is getting worse. They lack jobs, housing, and basic services. 66.1% of displaced families have no family member working. In Qadisiyah province 99.0% of the internal refugees there are unemployed. The threat of eviction is another growing issue as many families are squatting.

Some Iraqis are also returning. IOM has counted 49,603 families that have come back by the end of March 2009. Many have found their houses destroyed and little aid to reintegrate into their communities. A few have been threatened and forced to flee again. The government has also stopped registering the displaced. This is important because to receive assistance they need to sign up with the authorities. There are reports that a few provinces are still registering refugees however. The future of all of Iraq’s internal refugees is unclear.

Statistics On Iraq’s Displaced

Origins
Baghdad 63.1%
Diyala 18.6%
Ninewa 6.1%
Salahddin 3.3%
Tamim 3.0%
Anbar 2.7%
Basra 1.6%
Babil 1.0%
Wasit 0.2%
Irbil 0.2%
Dhi Qar 0.1%

Ethnicity/Religion
Arab Shiite 56.8%
Arab Sunni 30.8%
Kurd Sunni 4.1%
Assyrian Christian 2.9%
Chaldean Christian 1.8%
Turkmen Shiite 1.2%
Turkmen Sunni 0l9%
Kurd Shiite 0.6%
Armenian Christian 0.1%
Arab Yazidi 0.1%
Kurd Yazidi 0.1%

Unemployment – No Family Member Working
Total 66.1%
Qadisiyah 99.0%
Tamim 98.6%
Basra 89.9%
Wasit 89.7%
Babil 83.3%
Ninewa 79.5%
Dhi Qar 79.0%
Anbar 77.7%
Salahaddin 77.2%
Maysan 71.5%
Muthanna 69.9%
Dohuk 64.6%
Karbala 62.7%
Najaf 56.8%
Baghdad 58.5%
Diyala 58.3%
Irbil 32.6%
Sulaymaniya 30.1%

Issues Facing The Displaced

Security

Security is good across most of the country with central and northern Iraq still having issues. In Babil, Basra, Dhi Qar, Dohuk, Irbil, Karbala, Maysan, Muthanna Qadisiyah, Salahaddin, Sulaymaniya, and Wasit things are stable. Violence has gone up however in Baghdad, especially with car bombs. This has led to more checkpoints and restrictions on movement. In the Karkh district of the capitol, four hundred families live in an area that has often been hit by rockets. Security in Ninewa has also regressed with Mosul being the center of violence. Gun and rocket attacks are common, as well as operations against American and Iraqi forces. This has resulted in many civilian casualties. Security is also bad in Diyala, although it varies from district to district. There has been an increase in bombings in the capitol Baquba. The situation in Anbar has improved, although there are still roadside bombings in Karma and Fallujah. That last city still has insurgents as well. The Highway to Jordan and Kuwait are regularly open however, but there are still curfews in certain cities. The ethnic divisions in Tamim have also led to attacks in Kirkuk. The Haweeja district there also has issues. Displaced in Kirkuk have been accused of stealing and other crimes, resulting in arrests.

Returns

IOM has recorded quite a few returns during this last reporting period. 45 families in Tamim, 24 in Irbil, 75 in Ninewa, 83 in Sulaymniya, and 135 people in Diyala have all gone back to their homes. Those in Ninewa were Christians who fled in October 2008 after they were attacked. Not everything has gone well however. A returning family in Diyala was threatened by militias, while two other families were attacked that led to two deaths. They returned to Tamim as a result. 17 displaced families in the Khalis district of Diyala have also decided to permanently settle there since their kids are enrolled in the local schools, and they have transferred their food rations there.

Evictions and Squatting

The lack of housing has led to dozens of displaced families to squat illegally on government or privately owned land. Increasing these Iraqis are facing the threat of eviction. Five families in Fallujah, Anbar, 70 in the Resafa district of Baghdad, 46 families in Najaf, and 321 individuals in Wasit have all been given orders to leave or are afraid they will get notices to do so soon. Some have not been able to pay their rents.

Health

Iraq’s health care system has deteriorated since the U.S. invasion. The displaced obviously face a tougher situation finding care. Health facilities in Anbar are poor overall. They lack trained staff and equipment. A hospital in Heet for example has a CT scanner and blood testing equipment, but no one knows how to use them. In Babil children have high rates of anemia, diarrhea, and malnutrition. A few cases of typhoid have also been found in Dohuk. In the village of Saida in Tamim there have been a high number of birth defects amongst displaced women. Three women in that village have committed suicide due to stress. Families in Sulaymaniya and Dhi Qar also lack access to health facilities.

Water

Iraq’s water infrastructure is also in a state of disrepair. The water system in Anbar relies upon electricity to operate, but supply is inconsistent. In Qaim, there is only 2-3 hours of water available per day. In Ramadi and Fallujah there is no potable water. In the Shakha community in Babil, displaced families are getting their water from a local river. Three neighborhoods in Babil also lack a sewage system. Displaced families in Kirkuk have been breaking into water pipes. Twelve families in Basra, 336 families in Muthanna, and 54 families in Najaf have no access at all. There are also limited water supplies in Qadisiyah and Salahaddin, along with the on-going drought.

Education

Few displaced families in Babil are attending school. The ones in Dohuk are old and overcrowded. Many Christians that fled Mosul in October 2008 have not enrolled their children because they did not bring the necessary documents with them.

Jobs

Next to housing, jobs is the most pressing issue for the displaced. Unemployment is high for them in every province except for the three in Kurdistan. Female-headed households have it even harder finding employment. Families in Mosul have been reduced to begging and selling cigarettes to support their families. Adhamiya district in Baghdad, Chibayish in Dhi Qar, Khidhir in Muthanna, Sinjar and Baaj in Ninewa, Diwaniya, Hamza, and Shamiya in Ninewa, Daquq and Kirkuk in Tamim, Namaniya, Suwaira, Badra, and Kut in Wasit all have 90% or more unemployment. The worse situations are in Afaq district in Ninewa and Hawiga in Tamim with 100% lacking jobs.

Statistics On Iraq’s Displaced By Province

Anbar

Origins
Baghdad 77.3%
Anbar 12.3%
Basra 6.4%
Ninewa 1.9%
Salahaddin 0.8%
Diyala 0.8%
Babil 0.2%
Dhi Qar 0.1%
Irbil 0.1%

Ethnicity/Religion
Arab Sunni 98.6%
Arab Shiite 0.9%

Families With No Members Working
Total: 77.7%
Fallujah 81.2%
Kaim 81.0%
Heet 78.1%
Ramadi 77.0%
Rutba 76.5%
Haditha 74.9%
Ana 70.1%

Babil

Origins
Baghdad 81.1%
Babil 6.4%
Diyala 6.1%
Salahaddin 2.3%
Anbar 2.0%
Wasit 1.0%
Tamim 0.95
Ninewa 0.1%

Ethnicity/Religion
Arab Shiite 94.5%
Arab Sunni 5.2%
Arab Yazidi 0.1%
Kurdish Shiite 0.1%

Families With No Members Working
Total 83.3%
Hashimiya 88.2%
Musayab 84.3%
Mahawil 82.9%
Hila 80.7%

Baghdad

Origins
Baghdad 83.7%
Diyala 13.2%
Anbar 1.5%
Salahaddin 0.8%
Tamim 0.3%
Ninewa 0.2%
Babil 0.1%

Ethnicity/Religion
Arab Shiite 71.3%
Arab Sunni 28.4%
Chaldean Christian 0.1%

Families With No Members Working
Total: 58.3%
Adhamiya 92.8%
Resafa 68.5%
Karkh 54.5%
Mahmoudiya 46.5%

Basra

Origins
Baghdad 52.2%
Salahaddin 25.7%
Anbar 8.2%
Diyala 6.4%
Tamim 4.0%
Babil 2.2%
Basra 0.7%
Wasit 0.3%
Ninewa 0.2%

Ethnicity/Religion
Arab Shiite 99.7%
Arab Sunni 0.1%
Arab Sabean Mandean 0.1%

Families With No Members Working
Total 89.9%
Abu Khaseeb 92.5%
Zubair 95.1%
Basra 89.0%
Shaat Al-Arab 83.4%

Dhi Qar

Origins
Baghdad 66.3%
Salahaddin 14.3%
Diyala 7.7%
Babil 3.6%
Anbar 3.6%
Tamim 2.6%
Wasit 1.3%
Ninewa 0.1%
Muthanna 0.1%

Ethnicity/Religion
Arab Shiite 99.4%
Arab Yazidi 0.2%
Arab Sunni 0.1%

Families With No Members Working
Total: 79.0%
Chibayish 95.3%
Rifai 77.0%
Nassirya 74.9%
Suq al-Shoyokh 72.3%
Shatra 71.8%

Dohuk

Origins
Baghdad 51.5%
Ninewa 47.0%
Tamim 0.6%
Basra 0.4%
Anbar 0.3%

Ethnicity/Religion
Sunni Kurds 40.6%
Christian Chaldean 28.9%
Christian Assyrian 19.0%
Christian Armenian 3.2%
Yazidi Kurd 2.1%
Sunni Arab 2.0%
Shiite Arab 1.8%
Shiite Turkmen 0.6%
Shiite Kurd 0.3%
Sunni Turkmen 0.3%
Christian Kurd 0.2%

Families No Members Working
Total 64.6%
Dohuk 67.4%
Zakho 61.7%
Sumel 61.6%
Amedia 33.0%

Diyala

Origins
Diyala 82.85
Baghdad 16.2%
Anbar 0.5%
Tamim 0.2%
Salahaddin 0.2%
Basra 0.1%
Babil 0.1%

Ethnicity/Religion
Arab Sunni 58.3%
Arab Shiite 31.2%
Kurd Shiite 6.9%
Kurd Sunni 2.5%
Turkmen Shiite 0.6%
Turkmen Sunni 0.5%

Families With No Members Working
Total 58.3%
Khalis 82.5%
Muqdadiya 68.2%
Baladrooz 57.6%
Baquba 55.3%
Khanaqin 20.9%
Kifri 10.3%

Irbil

Origins
Baghdad 49.9%
Ninewa 43.4%
Tamim 2.0%
Diyala 1.7%
Anbar 0.9%
Salahaddin 0.5%
Irbil 0.3%
Basra 0.2%
Babil 0.2%
Qadisiyah 0.1%
Muthanna 0.1%

Ethnicity/Religion
Kurd Sunni 39.7%
Arab Sunni 34.2%
Chaldean Christian 15.4%
Assyrian Christian 4.1%
Arab Shiite 1.1%
Armenian Christian 0.7%
Turkmen Sunni 0.4%
Arab Christian 0.1%
Arab Sabean Mandean 0.1%
Kurd Christian 0.1%
Kurd Shiite 0.1%

Families With No Members Working
Total 32.6%
Irbil 33.1%
Makhmur 32.6%
Soran 32.1%
Koisnjaq 31.6%
Mergasur 30.6%
Shaqlawa 24.6%
Choman 20.4%

Karbala

Origins
Baghdad 56.8%
Diyala 28.0%
Anbar 6.8%
Ninewa 2.8%
Babil 2.45
Tamim 1.65
Salahaddin 1.5%
Karbala 0.1%

Ethnicity/Religion
Arab Shiite 98.6%
Turkmen Shiite 1.0%
Arab Yazidi 0.3%

Families With No Members Working
Total 62.7%
Ain al-Tamur 75.0%
Karbala 63.1%
Hindiya 52.9%

Maysan

Origins
Baghdad 83.4%
Diyala 8.0%
Salahaddin 5.0%
Tamim 1.3%
Anbar 0.9%
Wasit 0.6%
Babil 0.3%
Ninewa 0.2%
Basra 0.2%
Maysan 0.1%

Ethnicity/Religion
Arab Shiite 99.9%
Arab Sabean Mandean 0.1%

Families With No Members Working
Total 71.5%
Ali Gharbi 75.5%
Amara 74.8%
Qalat Saleh 72.9%
Mejar al-Kabi 70.7%
Maimouna 64.5%
Kahla 64.4%

Muthanna

Origins
Baghdad 69.7%
Diyala 13.3%
Anbar 7.3%
Salahaddin 3.2%
Babil 2.5%
Wasit 1.9%
Ninewa 1.5%
Qadisiyah 0.5%
Irbil 0.1%

Ethnicity/Religion
Arab Shiite 99.1%
Arab Sunni 0.5%

Families With No Members Working
Total 69.9%
Khidhir 90.0%
Rumaitha 70.7%
Samawa 68.2%

Najaf

Origins
Baghdad 84.7%
Diyala 7.2%
Ninewa 2.7%
Anbar 2.1%
Tamim 1.3%
Salahaddin 1.3%
Babil 0.8%
Dohuk 0.1%

Ethnicity/Religion
Arab Shiite 97.7%
Turkmen Shiite 1.4%
Arab Christian 0.7%
Kurd Shiite 0.1%

Families With No Members Working
Total 56.8%
Kufa 20.5%
Najaf 74.2%

Ninewa

Origins
Baghdad 47.5%
Ninewa 42.6%
Basra 6.0%
Diyala 1.1%
Tamim 0.9%
Salahaddin 0.6%
Anbar 0.5%
Babil 0.4%
Wasit 0.2%
Dhi Qar 0.1%
Qadisiyah 0.1%

Ethnicity/Religion
Assyrian Christian 40.0%
Arab Sunni 24.7%
Chaldean Christian 12.2%
Turkmen Sunni 11.8%
Kurd Sunni 4.2%
Turkmen Shiite 2.1%
Arab Shiite 0.9%
Arab Yazidi 0.3%
Armenian Christian 0.2%
Turkmen Christian 0.2%
Kurd Yazidi 0.2%

Families With No Members Working
Total 79.5%
Sinjar 91.5%
Baaj 90.0%
Hamdaniya 87.3%
Mosul 86.1%
Telafar 85.9%
Shekhan 73.7%
Akre 73.2%
Tilkaif 68.2%
Shikhan 67.4%

Qadisiyah

Origins
Baghdad 76.9%
Diyala 11.3%
Anbar 4.3%
Salahaddin 3.0%
Tamim 2.6%
Babil 1.5%
Wasit 0.3%
Ninewa 0.1%

Ethnicity/Religion
Arab Shiite 99.7%
Arab Sunni 0.2%

Families With No Members Working
Total 99.0%
Afaq 100.0%
Diwaniya 99.3%
Hamza 99.3%
Shamiya 95.0%

Salahaddin

Origins
Baghdad 50.0%
Tamim 14.7%
Basra 12.0%
Diyala 10.6%
Salahaddin 4.9%
Anbar 2.1%
Ninewa 2.0%
Irbil 1.7%
Wasit 0.7%
Dhi Qar 0.6%
Babil 0.6%
Qadisiyah 0.1%

Ethnicity/Religion
Arab Sunni 96.7%
Arab Shiite 2.0%
Turkmen Shiite 0.7%
Kurd Sunni 0.4%
Turkmen Sunni 0.1%

Families With No Members Working
Total 77.2%
Tooz 82.9%
Shirqat 82.4%
Tikrit 81.1%
Baiji 74.2%
Daur 69.5%
Samarra 59.3%

Sulaymaniya

Origins
Baghdad 47.1%
Diyala 44.7%
Anbar 3.1%
Ninewa 1.8%
Salahaddin 1.1%
Tamim 0.6%
Basra 0.5%
Babil 0.4%
Wasit 0.2%
Dhi Qar 0.1%
Sulaymniya 0.1%
Muthanna 0.1%
Karbala 0.1%

Ethnicity/Religion
Arab Sunni 60.2%
Kurd Sunni 24.8%
Arab Shiite 10.2%
Kurd Shiite 2.85
Kurd Yazidi 0.3%
Chaldean Christian 0.3%
Arab Sabean Mandean 0.3%
Turkmen Sunni 0.3%
Assyrian Christian 0.1%
Arab Christian 0.1%

Families With No Members Working
Total 30.1%
Halabja 41.7%
Kalar 25.8%
Sharbazher 0.0%
Sulaymniya 29.3%

Tamim

Origins
Diyala 25.6%
Tamim 22.6%
Salahaddin 15.7%
Ninewa 15.2%
Baghdad 15.1%
Anbar 4.1%
Irbil 1.2%
Basra 0.3%
Sulaymaniya 0.1%
Babil 0.1%

Ethnicity/Religion
Arab Sunni 52.2%
Kurd Sunni 20.0%
Turkmen Shiite 16.5%
Arab Shiite 3.3%
Turkmen Sunni 3.0%
Assyrian Christian 1.8%
Kurd Shiite 1.2%
Chaldean Christian 0.9%
Armenian Christian 0.2%
Arab Yazidi 0.1%

Families With No Members Working
Total 98.6%
Hawiga 100%
Daquq 97.9%
Kirkuk 98.6%

Wasit

Origins
Baghdad 63.8%
Diyala 33.4%
Babil 0.9%
Anbar 0.8%
Tamim 0.6%
Salahaddin 04%
Basra 0.1%

Ethnicity/Religion
Arab Shiite 99.5%
Kurd Shiite 0.2%
Arab Sunni 0.1%

Families With No Member Working
Total 89.7%
Namaniya 93.4%
Suwaira 90.0%
Badra 90.0%
Kut 90.0%
Hai 88.4%

SOURCES

International Organization for Migration, “IOM Emergency Needs Assessments; Post February 2006 Displacement In Iraq, Monthly Report,” 4/1/09

New And Old Provincial Councils in Diyala Embroiled In Controversy

April 6, 2009 was supposed to be the date that the new provincial council in Diyala was to be seated. That was prevented when police raided the council building in Diyala’s capital Baquba. According to authorities and council members, the out going provincial chief, as well as three new members all have arrest warrants for them.

The out-going Diyala provincial council was elected in January 2005. Despite 52% of the population being Sunni, a coalition of the Shiite Islamic Dawa party and the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council won 20 of the 41 provincial seats. This was due to the Sunni boycott that was only half adhered to in Diyala as the Iraqi Islamic Party came in second with 14 seats. The Kurdish Arabic Turkmen Democratic Coalition won the remaining seven positions.

As this council was about to step down an arrest warrant was issued for the provincial chief Ibrahim Hassan Bajilan. Bajilan, a member of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan, was accused of stealing $130 million from the provincial government. Bajilan claimed that he was the one that called the police on the matter, and that the authorities were looking for someone else with the same name. A council member from the Islamic Party however, said that Bajilan was asked to reimburse the money he stole. He refused and an arrest warrant was put out for him as a result.

At the same time there are other warrants for three incoming members of the provincial council. In the January 2009 election the Sunni Accordance Front won nine of twenty-nine seats, followed by the Iraqi National Project of parliamentarian Saleh al-Mutlaq with six, the Kurdish Alliance with six, former Prime Minister Ilyad Allawi’s Iraqi National List with three, Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s State of Law list with two, the Supreme Council with two, and former Prime Minister Ibrahim al-Jaafari’s National Reform Party with one. On the day that these new members were supposed to take office the police raided the provincial council building in Baquba, the capital. No names or parties were mentioned, but the provincial police chief said three were wanted for connections to the insurgency. They were not arrested, and no other details were given.

These series of warrants are not the first time the Diyala provincial council has been embroiled in controversy. In April 2009 it was announced that government officials, employees, contractors, and companies in the province had diverted 40% of Diyala’s investment money to insurgents to protect against attacks. IraqSlogger also reported that most of the police positions in Diyala were given out through secret deals between the police chief and tribes. The head of the agriculture committee in the council also said that $2.6 million had disappeared from the farming department. He continued by claiming prices for farm projects were being exaggerated to scam money.

Corruption is a major problem throughout the Iraqi government. It denies services and infrastructure to the people, and undermines their support for the authorities. Many Sunni politicians have also been accused of having ties to the insurgency. Rival groups have used this against them, while usually overlooking the Shiite and Kurdish militias that were integral parts to most of their own major parties. Whether these warrants will be followed through with, and anyone punished for their alleged crimes is unknown. Very few high officials have ever been prosecuted, so it’s unlikely that anything will happen to these members of the Diyala council.

SOURCES

Agence France Presse, “Iraqi Outgoing Provincial Chief Suspected Of Embezzling $130 Million,” 4/6/09

Associated Press, “Iraqi provincial election results,” 2/19/09

Aswat al-Iraq, “$2.6 million disappears in Diala,” 11/6/08
- “Police prevent Diala council from holding first session,” 4/6/09

IraqSlogger.com, “Official: Illicit ‘Deals’ in Police Hiring,” 11/13/08

Knights, Michael and McCarthy, Eamon, “Provincial Politics in Iraq: Fragmentation or New Awakening?” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, April 2008

Al-Sabah, “Iraq: Funds Invested in the Rehabilitation of the Diala Province Went to Terrorists,” MEMRI Blog, 4/4/09

Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, “Quarterly and Semiannual Report to the United States Congress,” 7/30/08

Special Inspector General For Iraq Reconstruction’s “Hard Lessons” – Chapter 2 The Agencies Engage

The second chapter of the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction’s “Hard Lessons” review of America’s rebuilding project in Iraq focuses upon the pre-war planning. Most of it centers upon the work of the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). That agency was given the largest responsibility of any in the U.S. government even though it didn’t have the capacity to do all that was asked of it. It was also one of the only that understood the task ahead of it. It thought of how much it would cost to rebuild Iraq, and came up with a plan to integrate that task with building a democracy in Iraq. The White House and the Pentagon wanted the latter, while largely rejecting the former, which highlighted the faulty strategy created before the war.

The USAID was included in the post-war planning in August 2002. The National Security Council (NSC) believed that the agency had experience with disasters beforehand that would allow it to handle any problems that might occur in Iraq. The USAID was made part of the NSC’s Humanitarian Working Group, and took over all of the humanitarian and much of the reconstruction planning. By October most of the agency’s personnel had been tasked with working on Iraq. They proved to have a much richer and realistic view of what lay ahead. They saw rebuilding as only a small part of a much longer process to transform the country into a democracy. In a policy paper released in October it said that the job could take years. The White House and Pentagon thought that the U.S. would only be involved for a few months.

The USAID’s main task was dealing with any humanitarian contingencies that might emerge after the invasion, and then rebuilding Iraq. Their major fear was that Saddam might destroy much of the country during the fighting. After those problems were dealt with the agency would then move to reconstruction. That task was thought of as mostly repairing war damage. The NSC’s Humanitarian Working Group broke up this job amongst different parts of the U.S. government. USAID was given health, water, sanitation, electricity, education, transportation, telecommunications, farming, and rural development. The State Department had governance, Treasury had finance and the economy, while the Pentagon had oil and overall control of the country.

The USAID was given the most responsibility. They came up with a series of benchmarks to meet within a year of the invasion. These included providing dependable water to all cities, basic health services to all Iraqis, reconstructing and improving transportation, raising electricity to 75% of pre-Gulf War levels, privatizing state run businesses, and open private banks. Those later two were part of a plan to promote business and capitalism, since Iraq was mostly a state-run socialist country. It’s telling that few of these have been met six years after the invasion.

The USAID was also supposed to help the State Department. It never came up with a detailed plan however, so the USAID was left to its own devices. It planned to decentralize power away from Baghdad down to the local governments to break the tradition of a centralized state that Saddam had imposed. The general idea was that each neighborhood would elect councils that would then be in charge of jobs and local reconstruction, while teachers and other civil servants would go back to work to keep institutions going. All of this was part of the USAID’s larger plan to build a democracy in Iraq.

When the NSC Humanitarian Group heard about the USAID’s plans they were opposed. The White House didn’t believe in large-scale reconstruction or nation building. Following this, the co-chair of the group only wanted the U.S. to focus upon repairing war damage. The task of rebuilding would be the responsibility of the new Iraqi government, which would pay for it using oil money. This led to statements like those by Vice President Dick Cheney when he said that Iraq was a rich country, with vast resources, that could pay for much of its own reconstruction when he was on NBC’s Meet The Press in March 2003 shortly before the war started.

The problem was that the U.S. knew very little about the state of Iraq’s oil industry. The 1991 Gulf War had damaged much of the country’s infrastructure. The United Nation’s sanctions that followed caused a shortage of spare parts, and a subsequent lack of maintenance. These problems could be seen in 1998 when the U.N. authorized Baghdad to double its crude sales under the oil for food program, but couldn’t.

Even if the Americans did know about these problems it didn’t have the personnel to repair them. This led the government to contract out the work. This job was given to Kellogg Brown and Root (KBR), which became the most well-known and controversial deal. The company already had an agreement to provide basic services to the U.S. Army. Giving such a deal to KBR was a problem because Vice President Cheney was the former CEO of its parent company Halliburton. The contract was looked at by a series of lawyers in the government, but the Pentagon went ahead anyway saying that necessity and the coming war overrode any public relations fallout that might occur later. As a result KBR was given a $7 billion contract to repair Iraq’s oil infrastructure. This was the largest amount given during the war. A subsequent review by the Government Accountability Office said that KBR should have never been given the task.

USAID also contracted out much of its own work. After the Cold War, 37% of the government’s staff was cut. That led the USAID to largely rely upon NGOs and private companies to do its work. Following this, the United Nations’ World Food Program was given a $200 million contract to provide aid to Iraqis after the invasion. USAID also gave out $41 million in deals to groups like Mercy Corps and Save The Children to meet the humanitarian disasters they were planning for. From February to May 2003 it gave another $1.3 billion in contracts. Bechtel International for example was added in April 2003 to do $680 million in work on Iraq’s infrastructure. This deal was eventually enlarged to $1.03 billion, the largest amount USAID had ever given.

Overall, USAID’s experience showed the contradictions in America’s pre-war stance. The administration was prepared for the worst-case humanitarian crisis, but the best-case reconstruction situation. The humanitarian planning went ahead smoothly because it had the full backing of President Bush. USAID could call upon any government agency to help with this task. Its work on rebuilding however was much more complicated. The White House did not want the U.S. to be responsible for Iraq beyond a few months. It did not believe in nation building. It also saw no connection between rebuilding Iraq and creating a democracy, something that USAID believed were integral. The USAID was also the only part of the government that believed that reconstruction would be a huge task. In 2002 it predicted that it would cost the U.S. up to $90 billion over three to five years. The rest of the administration argued that Iraq would be doing the work and paying for it. In fact, if the rest of Washington knew what the USAID was thinking it would’ve rejected it. Yet, it was the only agency that had a realistic view of what Iraq was going to be like.

SOURCES

Meet The Press, “Interview with Vice-President Dick Cheney,” NBC, 3/16/03

Special Inspector General For Iraq Reconstruction, “Hard Lessons,” 1/22/09

Criticism of Iraq’s Oil Policy

Iraq’s Oil Minister Hussain Shahristani has been thoroughly criticized for his policies. Oil production has gone up and down since the U.S. invasion, but it has never met the goal of 2 million barrels of oil per day in exports, or come close to the pre-war high of 2.5 million barrels per day. There is now added pressure to boost production as the price of crude has plummeted. The Oil Ministry and the Kurds have also had a running battle over who has the authority to sign contracts with international oil companies, and how the profits are to be distributed. Shahristani has also largely failed to sign major oil deals to bring the capital and know how necessary to boost production. There is now a move afoot to create a Federal Oil and Gas Council and an Iraqi National Oil Company to manage the industry. This would allow for political influence over oil, and could strip Shahristani of much of his authority.

In February 2009, the Deputy Prime Minister Barham Saleh, a Kurd, held a meeting in Baghdad to come up with some recommendations for a new oil policy. The conference said that Iraq was faced with low oil production, and the global financial crisis that has decreased prices. In response, Iraq needed to boost production as soon as possible. The meeting members felt that the current oil policy was failing to achieve this, and recommended that the Oil Ministry be reformed. The two major changes the group called for were the creation of a Federal Oil and Gas Council that would manage the oil system, and be appointed by parliament, and the revival of the Iraqi National Oil Company that would handle production. This would come under the authority of the legislature as well. If implemented, those two institutions would strip Minister Shahristani of much of his power. The Oil Ministry would be left to regulate production, and come up with how to implement plans created by the Oil and Gas Council. Deputy Prime Minister Saleh also said that Iraq should enter into production sharing agreement with oil companies. These are the preferred contracts by international firms because they allow the corporations to claim the oil fields they are working on in their books and boost their stock prices. Iraq’s unions, civil servants, and some politicians are against these types of deals because they are afraid that they give too much power to the companies. Shahristani has only offered technical service agreements so far. These deals pay firms a set fee for their work. With oil companies unwilling to sign these contracts with Baghdad, Minister Shahristani recently hinted in March 2009 that he might be open to production sharing agreements on newer and riskier fields.

There are several problems with the suggestions of the conference. First, it called for experts, rather than political appointees to be in charge of the oil industry, but an Oil and Gas Council and a National Oil Company would both have to go through parliament to be created, and none of Iraq’s political parties have passed on the chance to place their followers in Iraq’s government institutions. Another major problem is that Iraq has had a massive brain drain since the invasion, and may not have the personnel to staff the Council and Company. Third, Arabs may also see the plan as an attempt by Deputy Prime Minister Saleh to help out his fellow Kurds that have criticized the Oil Ministry, called for production sharing agreements, and want to export oil from fields in Kurdistan.

Oil Minister Shahristani is in a weak position to fend off these critiques. As reported before, the Minister has largely made deals on the fly. In 2008 he was going to open up a series of short-term oil contracts, but when the negotiations fell apart, and the parliament criticized his work, he cancelled all of the talks, and turned around to sign a contract with a Chinese company that had never even been part of the discussion. Shahristani then had two rounds of bids for long-term, joint venture technical service deals, but the oil companies have been standoffish. In the meantime, Iraq is offering deals on some of the same fields it is putting up for bidding. His running battle with the Kurds has also gone nowhere. On the positive side for Shahristani is that he ran as part of Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s State of Law list in the January 2009 provincial elections, which may give him sway with the PM to continue on with his plans.

With so many different voices, and arguments going on, it is unlikely that there will be any major change in oil policy in the short-term. That will give Minister Shahristani more time to follow his haphazard deals that have failed to raise production or lead to major oil contracts. It would probably take the political intervention of Maliki or the parliament to pass legislation to strip the Oil Ministry of much of its authority to make any real difference. The legislature has been deadlocked over other oil laws however, so even that is questionable.

SOURCES

Ciszuk, Samuel, “Government hopes two-pronged oil strategy will not discourage IOC investment in Iraq,” UPI, 3/5/09
- “KRG-Baghdad still at odds over IOC pay,” Iraq Oil Report, 3/25/09

International Crisis Group, “Oil For Soil: Toward A Grand Bargain On Iraq And The Kurds,” 10/28/08

Lando, Ben, “Iraqi oil meetings to start crucial, difficult year as ministry faces variety of critics,” UPI, 2/10/09
- “The Politics of Iraqi Oil,” Iraq Oil Report Blog, 3/22/09

Nordland, Rod and Nouawad, Jad, “Iraq Considers Giving Foreign Oil Investors Better Terms,” New York Times, 3/19/09

O’Hanlon, Michael and Campbell, Jason, “Iraq Index,” Brookings Institution, 11/20/08

Robertson, Campbell, “Iraq Poised to Revive Oil Contract With China,” New York Times, 8/20/08

Walt, Vivienne, “What Oil Companies Will Get in Iraq,” Time, 6/20/08

New Challenges To Sadr’s Leadership

Moqtada al-Sadr’s movement has faced an increasing number of splits. After his August 2004 uprising some of his militia commanders began leaving the fold. Many of these went on to form Special Groups. One was Qais Khazali who created Asaib Ahl al-Haq, the League of the Righteous. He moved in and out of the Sadr Trend, but eventually turned to Iran and Hezbollah for aid, and was arrested by the Americans in March 2007. Within days Khazali’s followers responded by kidnapping five Britons. London is now in negotiations to release them in return for Khazali’s freedom. At the same time, moderate members of the Sadr movement have left and formed a new group because they fear leaders like Khazali are undermining their good work. This will add new challengers to Sadr’s leadership.

Qais Khazali was a student of Moqtada’s father Mohammed Sadeq al-Sadr. When he was assassinated by Saddam in 1999, Qais and a small group of other followers kept the movement alive by going underground. When Moqtada took over the group in April 2003 Khazali became one of his main supporters. After the second Sadr uprising that ended in September 2004 with a cease-fire, Khazali went back to Sadr City in Baghdad and continued attacking the American forces. By October 2004 Khazali had created his own independent group that would later be known as Asaib Ahl al-Haq, League of the Righteous. By March 2005 Khazali had been convinced to rejoin the Sadr movement, but he still carried out his own activities as well. In June 2006 Khazali left again, and was chosen to lead the Special Groups, the breakaway militia groups that had become disillusioned with Sadr and were receiving increasing funding and weapons from Iran. Many of these fighters began traveling to Iran for training and also received aid from Hezbollah. Those activities were coordinated through Hezbollah commander Ali Musa Daqduq who was operating in Iraq. On January 20, 2007 Asaib Ahl al-Haq carried out their most brazen attack when they raided a command center in Karbala dressed as U.S. soldiers, and killed five Americans and wounded three others. That eventually led to Khazali, his brother Laith, and Daqduq’s arrest on March 20. Akram al-Kabi took over the leadership of Asaib Ahl al-Haq.

In response to the capture of Khazali, Asaib Ahl al-Haq raided the Finance Ministry building in Baghdad on March 29. They kidnapped Peter Moore, a British computer consultant who was working for a U.S. company Bearing Point that was providing financial training to the Iraqi government. Moore’s two guards, and two others were taken as well. They worked for the Canadian security company Garda World. Two of them were Scottish, and the other two were from Wales. The British Foreign Ministry has been trying to negotiate their release ever since.

With the English stepping up their withdrawal from southern Iraq, pressure is increasing to gain Moore’s release. That began at the beginning of March 2009 when the British announced that they were opening ties with Hezbollah. The Lebanese group is acting as middleman between the British and Asaib Ahl al-Haq. Later in the month the Iraqi group sent a video of Moore to the British Embassy in Baghdad. It was shown on TV, which is supposedly part of the deal to release the hostages. Next ten members of Asaib Ahl al-Haq, including Laith Khazali are to be released for one of the British security guards. If that is successful more will follow with the final trade being Peter Moore for Ali Musa Daqduq and Qais Khazali.

If the Khazali brothers are released it could re-invigorate Asaib Ahl al-Haq, and complicate Sadr’s leadership. Khazali claims that he is the rightful heir to the elder Sadr’s movement. While they have been solely a military group committed to attacking the Coalition forces, in February 2009 they announced that they wanted to run in the parliamentary elections planned for December. Asaib Ahl al-Haq have said they want an Iranian style religious state. A move towards politics could be encouraged by Baghdad, as the government has been giving amnesty to some Special Group members in return for them giving up their weapons. Sadr is aware of this challenge, and has asked Special Group members to return to his group, but he hasn’t been successful.

Of more immediate concern to Sadr is the defection of moderate members of the Sadrist Trend. On March 21, 2009 a group of former Sadrists met in Baghdad to announce a new group, the Clerics Advisory, Shura al-Ullama. They claim to have 200 followers. The group has been formed because they fear that the Sadr movement is being taken over by militants backed by Iran. Shura al-Ullama will run social programs like the original Sadr movement, and is also hoping to set up offices across the country to run in the parliamentary elections. The government supports this group as well. The head of Iraq’s Reconciliation Committee Zuhair Chalabi attended their opening meeting.

As reported before, Sadr has faced a series of defections over the years. Many militia members have left his group, while others have been rounded up after the government’s crackdown in 2008. In June of that year he disbanded his Mahdi Army, and formed a new organization, Mumahidoon, Those Who Pave The Way, which is an unarmed, cultural and religious group. In the January 2009 provincial elections, he backed two independent lists to mixed results. He lost control of Maysan and reportedly Sadr City, but gained seats in more provinces than he did in the last vote in 2005. Now he is facing more problems. Khazali is a rival for the loyalty of many militia members who are dissatisfied with Sadr’s move away from armed struggle. The Clerics Advisory could draw away those more moderate members who are opposed to continuing fighting. Either way it could be another break for an already fractious movement.


SOURCES

Abdul-Zahra, Qassim, “Anti-US Iraqi cleric facing leadership challenge,” Associated Press, 2/20/09
- “Report: Deal close to free Britons seized in Iraq,” Associated Press, 3/29/09

Chon, Gina, “Iraq Hopes Grow on Split in Sadr Body, Amnesties,” Wall Street Journal, 3/30/09

Chulov, Martin, “UK begins Iraq farewell by saying: so long, and thanks for the fish,” Guardian, 3/30/09

Cochrane, Marisa, “Asaib Ahl al-Haq and the Khazali Special Groups network,” Institute for the Study of War,” 1/13/08
- “The Fragmentation of the Sadrist Movement,” Institute for the Study of War, January 2009

Colvin, Marie, “Families told release of UK hostages not a done deal,” Times of London, 3/29/09

Haynes, Deborah, “Peter Moore footage keeps hope alive for five ‘forgotten’ hostages,” Times of London, 3/23/09

Al-Kaabi, Qassim, “Inside Al-Sadr’s Al-Mumahhidun Project,” Asharq Alawsat, 1/8/09

Landler, Mark, “Britain’s Contacts With Hezbollah Vex U.S.,” New York Times, 3/13/09

Rubin, Alissa and Dagher, Sam, “Sadr, Insurgency Icon, Is Silent, but Backers Work Behind Scenes,” New York Times, 1/31/09

Baghdad Failing To Invest In Its Future

Iraq's Presidential Council just vetoed the 2009 budget, and then passed it. Each year spending has increased, and Baghdad has been able to expend about the same percentage, but almost all of this is on operational costs like salaries, pensions, goods and services. The capital budget, which includes investing in infrastructure, vehicles, etc., is hardly spent at all. After decades of war, sanctions, and the U.S. invasion, Iraq needs billions to rebuild and move forward. The government has largely failed at this task, and cannot expect American or foreign funds to make up for their lack of diligence anymore.

Each year since 2005 when Iraq was given back its official sovereignty its revenues and spending have increased. In 2005 Iraq earned $24.1 billion and spent $17.6 billion of it. By 2008 income had increased to $67.8 billion thanks to the skyrocketing price of oil, while expenditures had gone up to $49.5 billion. The 2009 budget is at $58.5 billion.

Iraq Revenues, Spending And Surpluses 2005-2008

	2005	2006	2007	2008	Total 2005-2008
Total Revenues	$24.1 bil	$32 bil	$39.9 bil	$67.8 bil	$163.7 bil
Expenditures	$17.6 bil	$22.8 bil	$26.6 bil	$49.5 bil	$116.5 bil
Surplus	$6.5 bil	$9.2 bil	$13.3 bil	$29.0 bil	$47.3 bil

From 2005-2007 90% of Iraq's spending has been on its operational budget, and only 10% on capital projects. In 2007 for example, Baghdad spent 80% of its $29 billion operational budget, but only 28% of its $12 billion capital one. This is the major reason why Iraq has ended up with large surpluses, which by 2008 stood at around $29 billion. The situation is even worse when broken down by ministry. The main ministries that bring in revenues and provide services such as oil, electricity, and water, only spent 11% of their $8 billion capital budget in 2007. In 2008 they were able to more than double their spending to 23%, but that's still a miniscule amount. The major causes are lack of trained staff, a weak procurement process, the inability to plan and carry out strategies, and violence.

Capital Spending By Iraq 2005-2007

	Appropriated	Spent	% of Total
2005	$6.3 bil	$1.4 bil	23%
2006	$8.3 bil	$1.6 bil	19%
2007	$12.1 bil	$3.4 bil	28%

The U.S. has also far outspent Iraq in reconstruction. The Americans have expended 87% of the money it has allocated for rebuilding Iraq, totaling about $9.5 billion of $10.9 billion since 2003. Iraq on the other hand has only spent 12%, approximately $2 billion, of $17.2 billion. Iraq has also not maintained projects the Americans have built and turned over to them.

Comparing U.S. and Iraqi Allocations and Spending For Reconstruction

	U.S. Fiscal Years 2003-2008	U.S. Fiscal Years 2003-June 2008	Iraqi 2005-2008	Iraqi 2005-2008
Sectors	Allocated	Spent	Allocated	Spent
Oil	$2.7 bil	$2.5 bil	$10.8 bil	$700,000
Electricity	$5.3 bil	$4.8 bil	$5.2 bil	$800,000
Water resources	$2.9 bil	$2.2 bil	$1.3 bil	$600,000
Totals	$10.9 bil	$9.5 bil	$17.2 bil	$2.0 bil

The reason why Iraq's inability to invest in its infrastructure is important is because the country desperately needs billions of dollars to develop. Oil is Iraq's main source of revenue. In 2008 it earned $68 billion, $62 billion of which came from petroleum. According to the State and Defense Departments not enough money is being spent on the industry to sustain output. In March 2009 Iraq produced 2.36 million barrels per day, but that's still below the estimated 2.5 million barrels per day average before the U.S. invasion. Production has also fluctuated up and down each month. According to the Oil Ministry it needs $25-$75 billion to reach its target of 6 million barrels per day. Last year the Ministry only spent $421 million of its capital budget, a mere 19% of the total. Electricity production only meets 52% of demand. There are still blackouts and access to power varies greatly from city to city, neighborhood to neighborhood. Like oil, electricity production is up overall, but the Electricity Ministry estimates it needs $27 billion to meet the entire country's demand by 2015. The U.S. thinks it may need twice that much. The same goes for the water system. 8.1 million Iraqis have access to potable water, but that's short of the American goal of 8.5 million. The U.N. says that 40% of children do not have safe drinking water. The country's treatment plants are also only operating at 17% of capacity. The lack of clean water led to cholera outbreaks in 2007 and 2008. The World Bank estimates that Iraq needs $14.4 billion to fix the water system. In total, that amounts to $66.4-$143.4 billion in investments.

Iraq's ability to spend its overall budget has improved each year, but its capital expenditures remain anemic. Almost all of the government's money has gone towards salaries, pensions, and services. It has spent more and more of its capital budget, but it's still a small percentage of the total. This comes at a time when the U.S. is almost finished transferring reconstruction to Iraqi control. No more major American or foreign aid is expected for Iraq in the future. The billions of dollars needed to improve the oil business and improve services will have to be largely self-generated, borrowed from international financial institutions, or gained from foreign companies. This will pose serious barriers to raising the standard of living for the average Iraqi as it will probably take several years for the government to ever learn how to spend its capital budget and work out successful deals with international corporations.

SOURCES

Aswat al-Iraq, “PB turns down federal budget,” 3/26/09

O’Hanlon, Michael and Campbell, Jason, “Iraq Index,” Brookings Institution, 2/26/09

Department of Defense, “Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq,” March 2009

United States Government Accountability Office, “IRAQ Key Issues for Congressional Oversight,” March 2009

January 2009 U.N. Report On Iraq Refugee Returns

In January 2009 the United Nations High Commissioner on Refugees released a report detailing the latest numbers it had on Iraq's displacement and refugee crisis. There are still Iraqis losing their homes, but at a much lower rate. The big issue now is the plight of those that have left, and those that are returning.

There are approximately 2.8 million internally displaced Iraqis and 2 million that have fled to other countries. There were 1.2 million internal refugees in the country before 2006. After the bombing of the Shiite Samarra shrine in February 2006 that started the sectarian war, 1.6 million more were forced into internal exile. Only 1% of that number was displaced in 2008 however, showing the improved security situation. Most of those displaced after Samarra came from Baghdad, 64%, and Diyala, 19%. Central Iraq accounted for 58% of displacement, compared to 15% for the north and 27% for the south, whereas those two regions had the most internal refugees before the U.S. invasion due to Saddam's policies.

Region	2003	2003-2005	Post Feb. 2006	Totals
North	633,714	798	237,766	872,278
Center	44,394	129,966	938,566	1,112,926
South	343,854	59,382	454,051	857,287
Grand Total	1,021,962	190,146	1,630,383	2,842,491

Displacement within and out of Iraq followed certain patterns. Sunnis moved from the Shiite south to central and western provinces, while Shiites left Sunnis areas in central and western Iraq for the south. Sunnis, Shiites, Kurds, and Christians have all tried to enter Kurdistan because it offered more stability and less violence. There are also trends in Iraq's refugees. 55% of those registered by the United Nations are Sunnis. Another 18-20% are minority groups such as Christians, Mandeans, Yazidis, Turkmen, and Shabaks, even though they only make up 3-4% of Iraq's population.

Iraq's internal refugees face a number of problems. They lack access to food, shelter, water, sanitation, health, and jobs. The International Organization for Migration has conducted detailed surveys of these needs. Women that have lost their homes have been hit especially hard. Even with the lessoning of violence, many families have not been able to go back to their homes. The government is also threatening Iraqis that are squatting with evictions. The UNHCR believes that there are up to 250,000 Iraqis living illegally in public buildings.

The biggest change in Iraq's refugee crisis is that some have begun to return. This began in the summer of 2007 when it was reported that Iraqi refugees from Syria were coming back. So far only a small percentage of the 4.8 million have made this decision, but the rate is increasing. The government has been encouraging this process, and passed Executive Orders 101 and 262 in 2008 that offered money to return. This process may now be ending however as the Ministry of Displacement and Migration has stopped registering Iraqis that have gone back, which was necessary to receive any payments.

The number of displaced coming back has changed month to month. In 2008, August and September saw the highest rates with around 39,950 and 42,610 returns respectively, but that then dropped off to 11,260 in November and 11,910 in December. Almost eight times as many internally displaced have come back compared to refugees. For all of 2008 195,240 displaced returned, compared to 25,370 refugees, for a total of 220,610. Baghdad and Diyala, which saw the most displacement, has seen the most returnees.

U.N.'s Refugee/Displaced Return Estimates 2008

Month	Internally Displaced	Refugees	Total
Jan.-June	66,340	9,000	75,340
July	22,390	2,310	24,700
August	38,380	1,570	39,950
September	38,390	4,220	42,610
October	12,300	2,540	14,840
November	7,620	3,640	11,260
December	9,820	2,090	11,910
2008 TOTALS	195,240	25,370	220,610

Iraq is also home to 39,811 refugees from other countries. There are 12,567 Palestinians living in Baghdad and the Al Waleed Refugee Camp, 15,755 Kurds displaced from neighboring countries, 10,904 Iranians, many of which are in Kurdistan and do not want to go back, 580 Syrians that are afraid of being arrested if they return, and five Egyptians who are married to Palestinians. 2,405 have asked for asylum in Iraq, 1,022 Iranians, 1,001 Syrian Kurds, 380 Turkish Kurds, and two Ethiopians.

The bombing of the Samarra shrine in 2006 made a bad refugee problem turn into a crisis. Iraq already had several thousand Shiites and Kurds who were displaced due to Saddam's policies even before the U.S. invaded. The war and subsequent sectarian fighting added another three million displaced. While over 200,000 have returned, that is still a small amount compared to the total. Those that have gone back face further problems as not all have access to their homes, or jobs and basic services, and some have become displaced again. The U.N. and other humanitarian groups have been overwhelmed by this predicament, and the government has appeared more concerned about its image than really helping these people. That means this humanitarian catastrophe is likely to continue for several more years.

SOURCES

Human Rights First, “How to Confront the Iraqi Refugee Crisis,” December 2008

United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, “Humanitarian Update Iraq February 2009,” 2/28/09

UNHCR, “UNHCR Iraq Operation At A Glance – January 2009,”1/9/09

Iraq Disappearing From America’s News

For the first time since 2002 Iraq did not reach the top 10 news stories in America according to the Pew Research Center’s Project for Excellence in Journalism. For the four weeks from March 2 to 29, 2009 Iraq did not reach the top ten once. The Pew Center covers stories across newspapers, radio, the internet, and network and cable TV. As in previous months the top news stories were the economic crisis and the new Obama administration. For March 2 to 8, Iraq only reached number 6 on the radio, but was absent from the other outlets. That week the news was on the withdrawal of U.S. troops. The next week, March 9-15, Iraq was number 5 and 10 in newspapers, and number eight online, but didn’t rank on any other form of media. The sentencing of Muntader al-Ziadi, the Iraqi journalist who threw his shoes at President Bush, and Saddam Hussein’s former Foreign Minister Tariq Azziz occurred then, along with some mass casualty bombings. From March 16 to 22, the war got into the newspapers at Number 6, and network TV at number 7, and number 10 on Cable TV, but that wasn’t enough to crack the overall top 10. That week former Vice President Cheney claimed success in Iraq in an interview on CNN’s State of the Union, and it was the 6th anniversary of the U.S. invasion. In the last week of the month Iraq was number 8 in the newspapers and network TV. The arrest of a Sons of Iraq leader in Baghdad, followed by a shootout with Iraqi forces marked that period.



U.S. coverage of Iraq has been on a steady decline since 2007. The American media has largely followed policy makers and politicians when reporting on the war. In May 2007, Congress stopped discussing legislating a withdrawal of U.S. forces, and in September General Petraeus and Ambassador Crocker testified in Washington on the Surge. After that news on the war dropped to less than 10% of news coverage. (See graph above) In 2008 major media organizations began withdrawing their staff and reporters from the country, and that trend continued into 2009. As a result, Iraq dropped to 1-3% of U.S. reporting. Now the war is even less than 1% of all stories.

The lack of politicians talking about Iraq on a consistent basis, the economic crisis, the change in administration, the new emphasis upon Afghanistan, along with the lack of reporters in Iraq have all led to March being the first month in over seven years that the war has not been a top story in America. This is something that has been long predicted here. Over 100,000 U.S. troops are expected to be in the country until early next year, and all U.S. forces are not due to depart until December 31, 2011. Dramatic events like bombings or Iraqi elections will still get coverage, but the everyday experiences of both Iraqis and Americans will largely be a fading story for many U.S. news outlets, and hence for the American public.

For more on American reporting on the war click on the "reporting" label at the bottom of the post.

SOURCES

Associated Press, “Former Saddam Cabinet Minister Sentenced,” 3/11/09

CBS/AP, “Iraqis Burn Flags To Mark 6th Anniversary,” 3/20/09

Gold, Matea, “Show Tracker: What you’re watching,” Show Tracker: What You’re Watching Blog, Los Angeles Times, 1/7/09

Kelly, Mary Louise, “A Big Move: Getting Military Equipment Out Of Iraq,” All Things Considered, NPR, 3/2/09

Londono, Ernesto and Paley, Amit, “Western Journalists in Iraq Stage Pullback of Their Own,” Washington Post, 10/11/08

Mohammed, Riyadh and Ali, Anwar, “Iraqi Shoe Thrower Gets Three Years,” New York Times, 3/12/09

Pew Research Center’s Project for Excellence in Journalism, “PEJ News Coverage Index, March 2-8, 2009: Falling Stocks and Rising Rush Fuel The News,” 3/9/09
- “PEJ News Coverage Index, March 9-15, 2009: Media Focus On Economic Villains: Bonuses, Bernie and Blather,” 3/16/09
- “PEJ News Coverage Index, March 16-22, 2009: One Story Dominates: AIG in the Crosshairs,” 3/23/09
- “PEJ News Coverage Index, March 23-29: Geithner’s Plan Drives the Narrative,” 3/30/09

Ricchiardi, Sherry, “How the Media Abandoned Iraq,” American Journalism Review, June/July 2008

Rubin, Alissa and Nordland, Rod, “Troops Arrest an Awakening Council Leader in Iraq, Setting Off Fighting,” New York Times, 3/28/09

Rubin, Alissa and Santora, Marc, “Bomber Kills Dozens in Iraq as Fears of New Violence Rise,” New York Times, 3/10/09

Stetler, Brian, “TV News Winds Down Operation on Iraq War,” New York Times, 12/29/08

Sulzberger, A.G., “Cheney Says Obama Has Increased Risks,” New York Times, 3/15/09