Britain Withdraws Combat Troops But Trainers Remain, Could This Be A Blueprint For The U.S.?

On December 23, 2008 Iraq’s parliament passed a bill allowing England and several other members of the Coalition of the Willing to stay in the country until July 2009. The English command set May 31, 2009 as the date they would actually have all combat troops out, and began a quick turnover of facilities to the Iraqis and Americans. With that achieved, London went on to sign an agreement with Baghdad to allow trainers to stay for one more year. Could this be what the U.S. will do when its deadline for withdrawal comes?

Beginning in January 2009, Britain began its pull out from Iraq. Originally 26,000 British took part in the 2003 invasion. That was quickly drawn down to 18,000 by the end of May 2003. A year later there were 8,600, and then 5,500 by May 2007. At the end of 2008 there were around 4,000 English troops still in Iraq. On January 1, 2009 Britain turned over Basra airport to the Iraqis. English troops would remain on the military side of the facility however. By the middle of February it was announced that all of its heavy equipment had been shipped back to England. On March 31, England handed over command of Basra to the Americans. 7,000 U.S. soldiers also moved into Basra to take over many of the jobs the British had previously been doing. At the end of April the English announced that all their combat operations were over. Finally May 31 arrived and all combat troops were pulled out. Within two days London negotiated a deal with Baghdad to allow just under 100 British sailors and five ships to remain in Basra to train the fledgling Iraqi Navy for one-year past the withdrawal deadline.

The Iraq Navy is a small, undermanned, and under equipped force. As of January 2009 there were only 1,898 in the Navy. They are authorized to have 3,596. At the beginning of this year they received 44 small craft, but they lack the personnel, knowledge, and leadership to man all of them. They also have no major ships, although they are to receive two from Italy this year. The British are the main advisors to the Iraqi Navy. Besides the troops in Basra, they have also taken Iraqis to England for further training.

Could the Americans repeat England’s recent experience in Iraq? The British drew down their troops, declared combat operations over, met their deadline to be out by May 2009, and then signed a new agreement to keep trainers in the country for another year. Like the British, the U.S. has also set the end of 2011 as the date that it will be out of Iraq. As reported before, by that time the Iraqi security forces will not be ready to protect the country from external threats. The Iraqi Navy is a perfect example of that as it lacks the personnel and ships to carry out that task right now. When December 31, 2011 approaches then, it’s very likely that both the U.S. and Iraqi military will put pressure on the Obama administration to maintain some kind of U.S. presence in Iraq. It will be up the President then to decide whether keeping perhaps several thousand American advisors in Iraq will break his promise to be out of the country in sixteen months of taking office.

SOURCES

Agence France Presse, “Iraq and Britain agree draft naval deal,” 6/3/09

Ashton, Adam and Hammoudi, Laith, “What are ‘combat troops’? Iraq withdrawal depends on answer,” McClatchy Newspapers, 12/23/08

Aswat al-Iraq, “Britain hands over Basra airport to Iraqi authorities,” 1/1/09

Cordesman, Anthony, “How Soon Is Safe? Iraqi Force Development and ‘Conditions-Based’ US Withdrawals,” 4/20/09

Department of Defense, “Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq,” March 2009

Evans, Michael, “Basra gets better beds and burgers as US takes over from the British,” Times of London, 2/16/09

The National, “British military operations end in Iraq,” 4/30/09

Robertson, Campbell and Cowell, Alan, “U.S. Takes Over as Britain Begins Basra Pullout,” New York Times, 4/1/09

Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, “Quarterly Report to the United States Congress,” 4/30/09

Times of London, “Q&A: Iraq inquiry,” 3/26/09

No Decrease In Violence For Mosul In May 2009

As reported before, the number of Iraqis killed declined in May 2009 compared to the previous month. According to Iraq’s ministries 165 people died in May. In April the government said 355 lost their lives. Other organizations that keep track of violence in Iraq had higher numbers, but also noted a drop. That could not be said for Mosul, which is the second deadliest city in Iraq. Last month the number of attacks and deaths went up, with only the wounded decreasing.

According to English-language press reports in May 2009 64 Iraqis were killed in Mosul. That made an average of 2.06 deaths per day. 146 were also wounded, for an average of 4.7 per day. These were the result of 95 attacks and incidents, an average of 3.06 per day. There were two mass casualty bombings that month, one on May 24 that wounded 34, and another on May 1 that killed five and wounded six. There were also a series of deadly home invasions where gunmen stormed houses and killed women and children. In April 53 died, 1.76 per day, and 191 wounded, 6.36 per day, due to 79 attacks and incidents, 2.63 average. From May to April then, the number of security incidents and killed went up, while the wounded went down.

The recent rise in violence has also been occurring while a major joint Iraqi-U.S. military operation has been going on in the city. In February 2009, Baghdad launched Operation New Hope. There are now 36,000 Iraqi soldiers and police, along with 5,000 U.S. troops in the city, in what some think might be the last major U.S. military operation before the withdrawal. The Iraqi units however, are said to be undermanned and underequipped, and the Iraqi Army commander does not think they can do the job without American support. For that reason, U.S. combat troops are expected to stay in the city past the June 30, 2009 deadline for them to be removed from all Iraqi cities. There is also a major U.S. base outside of Mosul that is not expected to be shut down either. This offensive so far, has not had its intended effects as the casualty numbers show.

Like the rest of the country, the number of attacks and casualties in Mosul declined towards the end of 2008 reaching a low in January 2009 as the provincial elections neared. In 2005 the Sunnis boycotted the vote, allowing the Kurdistan Democratic Party and Patriotic Union of Kurdistan to take power in Ninewa. The Sunni Arab majority in the province was eager to reverse this turn of events in 2009, and the insurgents seemed to have accommodated them. Since then the number of casualties has been creeping back up in Mosul as the balloting did not end the Arab-Kurdish divide, the major source of violence in the city, but actually seemed to increase it with the election of the al-Hadbaa party to power and the subsequent boycotting of the provincial council by the two major Kurdish parties.

Attack Statistics In Mosul Based Upon Press Reports

May 2009
83 Attacks/Incidents – 3.06 attacks & incidents/day
64 Deaths – 2.06 deaths/day
164 Wounded – 4.70 wounded/day

April 2009
79 Attacks/Incidents – 2.63 attacks & incidents/day
53 Deaths – 1.76 deaths/day
191 Wounded – 6.36 wounded/day

March 2009
86 attacks/incidents – 2.77 attacks & incidents/day
69 deaths – 2.22 deaths/day
169 wounded – 5.45 wounded/day

February 2009
81 attacks/incidents – 2.89 attacks & incidents/day
58 deaths – 2.0 deaths/day
111 wounded – 3.96 wounded/day

January 2009
52 attacks/incidents – 1.67 attacks & incidents/day
56 deaths – 1.80 killed/day
85 wounded – 2.74 wounded/day

December 2008
65 attacks/incidents – 2.09 attacks & incidents/day
68 deaths – 2.19 deaths/day
181 wounded – 5.83 wounded/day

November 2008
65 attacks/incidents – 2.16 attacks & incidents/day
53 deaths – 1.76 deaths/day
249 wounded – 8.3 wounded/day

October 2008
92 attacks/incidents – 2.96 attacks & incidents/day
112 deaths – 3.61 deaths/day
188 wounded – 6.06 wounded/day

SOURCES

Abass, Ali and Dolan, Jack “Grenade hits U.S. convoy in Iraq,” St. Agustine Record, 5/10/09

Agence France Presse, “Iraq Suicide Bomber Wounds 34 in Mosul Shopping Street,” 5/24/09

Ahmed, Hamid, “Iraqi leader calls for anti-corruption campaign,” Associated Press, 5/9/09

Associated Press, “Iraqis fear U.S. pullout of volatile Mosul,” 3/9/09

Aswat al-Iraq, “2 brothers wounded in gunfire in Mosul,” 5/21/09
- “2 civilians killed, injured in Mosul,” 5/25/09
- “2 soldiers wounded in blast in Mosul,” 5/20/09
- “3 civilians wounded in Mosul blast,” 5/30/09
- “3 injured in explosion in Mosul,” 5/28/09
- “3 wounded in car bomb blast in Mosul,” 5/3/09
- “4 wounded in Mosul blast,” 5/8/09
- “Armed attack injures 3 in Mosul,” 5/21/09
- “Baghdadiya TV correspondent dies from blast wounds,” 5/31/09
- “Car bomb defused in Mosul,” 5/8/09
- “Child killed by U.S. fire in Mosul,” 5/7/09
- “Civilian corpse found in Mosul,” 5/19/09
- “Civilian killed, 2 bombs defused in Mosul,” 5/19/09
- “Civilian wounded by bomb blast in Mosul,” 5/5/09
- “Civilian wounded in explosion in Mosul,” 5/12/09
- “Contractor shot down by gunmen in Mosul,” 5/14/09
- “Cop injured, 2 gunmen busted in Ninewa,” 5/5/09
- “Cop killed, civilians wounded in Mosul attack,” 5/9/09
- “Cop killed, gunman wounded in Mosul,” 5/15/09
- “Corpse of abducted Christian child found in Ninewa,” 5/11/09
- “Five wounded in car bomb blast in Mosul,” 5/13/09
- “Gunmen kill cop in Mosul,” 5/4/09
- “Gunmen kill former army officer in Mosul,” 5/11/09
- “Gunmen kill soldier in Mosul,” 5/1/09
- “Gunman wounds 3 female students in Mosul,” 5/25/09
- “IED injures 2 cops in western Mosul,” 5/26/09
- “IED kills cop, injures 6 in central Mosul,” 5/22/09
- “IED wounds 2 civilians in Mosul,” 5/13/09
- “IED wounds 4 civilians in Mosul,” 5/19/09
- “Mosul blast leaves officer killed, 2 wounded,” 5/31/09
- “Mother, daughter killed in Mosul copycat,” 5/28/09
- “Ninewa police defuse 4 IEDs,” 5/23/09
- “Officer wounded by IED in Mosul,” 5/23/09
- “TNT explosives found under bridge in Mosul,” 5/24/09
- “URGENT/ Mosul suicide blast leaves 5 killed, 6 wounded,” 5/1/09
- “Traffic cop wounded by IED in Mosul,” 5/4/09
- “Woman, daughter shot down by gunmen in Mosul,” 5/21/09
- “Woman injured in western Mosul,” 5/22/09

DPA, “Suicide bomber targets Iraqi governor’s house,” 5/18/09

Druzin, Heath, “Coalition forces fight in insurgent stronghold while residents urge U.S. troops to leave Mosul,” Stars and Stripes, 3/8/09

Hammoudi, Laith, “Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq – Tuesday 5 May 2009,” 5/9/09

Hammoudi, Laith and Kadhim, Hussein, “Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq – Monday 25 May 2009,” 5/25/09

Issa, Sahar and Kadhim, Hussein, “Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq – Monday 11 May 2009,” McClatchy Newspapers, 5/11/09
- “Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq – Thursday 28 May 2009,” McClatchy Newspapers, 5/28/09
- “Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq – Wednesday 6 May 2009,” McClatchy Newspapers, 5/6/09

Israel News, “Prison officer gunned down in northern Iraq,” 5/17/09

Kadhim, Hussein, “Roundup of Daily Violence in Iraq-Monday 4 May 2009,” 5/4/09

KUNA, “Car bomb blast kills three civilians in northern Iraq,” 5/3/09

Loyd, Anthony, “US withdrawal from Mosul leads to fear of Iraqi insurgent attacks,” Times of London, 6/1/09

Press TV, “American soldier kill civilian in Iraq,” 5/19/09

Reid, Robert, “Iraq civilian deaths fall after April spike,” Associated Press, 6/1/09

Reuters, “FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, May 4,” 5/4/09
- “FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, May 5,” 5/5/09
- “FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, May 9,” 5/9/09
- “FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, May 11,” 5/11/09
- “FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, May 13,” 5/13/09
- “FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, May 14,” 5/14/09
- “FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, May 15,” 5/15/09
- “FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, May 16,” 5/16/09
- “FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, May 23,” 5/17/09
- “FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, May 23,” 5/23/09
- “FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, May 24,” 5/24/09
- “FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, May 27,” 5/27/09
- “FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, May 29,” 5/29/09
- “Iraq rules out extension of U.S. withdrawal dates,” 5/3/09

Xinhua, “2 policemen killed in Mosul violence,” 5/17/09

The Moribund Kirkuk Committee

The 2009 Provincial Election Law postponed voting in Tamim province because of the disputed city of Kirkuk. Article 23 created a committee made up of seven parliamentarians, two Kurds, two Turkman, 2 Arabs, and one Christian, who were supposed to come up with a power sharing deal for the province before voting would happen there. They were to complete their work by March 31, 2009, but because of their inability to make any decisions they got a two-month extension. May 31 has come and gone and the committee is no closer to finishing their work, so they have been given another week. This is likely to happen again and again as the Article 23 committee appears more for show than actual work.

According to a United States Institute of Peace delegation that went to Iraq in May 2009, the Article 23 Committee was created as a public relations move by parliament. When it was devising the provincial election law the legislators felt they had to show that they were doing something about Kirkuk, so they created the committee. Since it started its work in February 2009 it has hardly met, has little money, and no one thinks that it will lead to anything. The effect is that elections in Tamim are to be delayed indefinitely.

Tamim is a key province in the divide between Arabs and Kurds. The Kurds have been trying to legally annex Kirkuk since the U.S. invasion. They were able to insert Article 140 into the Iraqi constitution in 2005, which said that there should be a census and referendum on the future of all disputed areas by December 31, 2007. That was extended until June 30, 2008, but both deadlines came and passed with no action. Since then the United Nations has taken over the role of finding a resolution to the area. In April 2009 they presented their suggestions. Kurdish officials have called Kirkuk their Jerusalem, and said that they will not rest until it has been annexed by Kurdistan. Kirkuk is also home to one of Iraq’s three largest oil fields, and perhaps two-thirds of its natural gas reserves. Until new voting is held the Kurds want a majority of the seats on the provincial council to reflect their population. The Arabs and Turkmen on the other hand, want the council divided evenly between them and the Kurds, plus a seat for Christians. This situation is likely to remain deadlocked as well. That would seem to suit the Kurds that have de facto control of the provincial council, but in the long-term Arab politicians seem to think that the central government will win. They believe in time, as the Iraqi security forces grow in strength, they will eventually be able to rest control of all of the disputed territories from the Kurds. A U.S. military officer told the United States Institute of Peace officials that as soon as the Iraqi Army had its full compliment of M1 Abrams tanks, the Kirkuk dispute would be over.

The fear of course is that this could lead to violence. The U.S. commander in Iraq General Ray Odierno says that Arab-Kurdish tensions are one of his top priorities. American think tanks have also expressed concern. So far things have remained political, even as Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki began pushing the Kurds over the disputed territories in 2008. Baghdad taking on the Kurds in Kirkuk however, would be a totally different dynamic. This would seem a prime example of a case needing U.S. mediation before it departs, but the Americans have been deferring to the U.N.. The U.N. in turn, can do little without U.S. support. That means not only are provincial elections not going to happen in Tamim, but a resolution to Kirkuk’s final status is going nowhere as well.

SOURCES

Abbas, Mohammed, “Iraq Kurds say must have say on Kirkuk oil fields,” Reuters, 6/1/09

Agence France Presse, “Iraq delays Kirkuk election report by a week: MP,” 5/31/09

Biddle, Stephen, “Reversal in Iraq,” Center for Preventative Action Council on Foreign Relations, May 2009

Daly, John, “Analysis: Kirkuk elections and Iraqi oil,” UPI, 6/2/09

Haynes, Deborah, “Transcript of The Times interview with General Ray Odierno,” Times of London, 4/9/09

International Crisis Group, “Oil For Soil: Toward A Grand Bargain On Iraq And The Kurds,” 10/28/08

Jakes, Lara, “Key UN report to suggest power-sharing plan in Iraq’s divided Kirkuk,” Associated Press, 3/29/09

Al-Khalidi, Diaa, “kirkuk awaits election law,” Niqash, 3/11/09

Londono, Ernesto, “Kurds, Arabs Maneuver Ahead of U.N. Report on N. Iraq,” Washington Post, 4/17/09

Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, “Iraqi Parliament’s Mission To Kirkuk Ends In Failure,” 5/27/09

Reilly, Corinne, “U.N. experts urge power sharing in Kirkuk,” McClatchy Newspapers, 4/22/09

Serwer, Daniel and Parker, Sam, “Maliki’s Iraq between Two Elections,” United States Institute of Peace, May 2009

Visser, Reidar, “The Kirkuk Issue Exposes Weaknesses in Iraq’s Ruling Coalition,” Historiae.org, 8/7/08

Troubles Continue In Ninewa Over Results Of Provincial Elections

Disputes between the Ninewa Fraternal List led by the two main Kurdish parties, the Kurdistan Democratic Party and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan, and the new ruling party in Ninewa al-Hadbaa continue. On June 1, 2009 IraqSlogger reported that there was a shoot out between the peshmerga in the Sinjar district and tribesman. Many of the tribes in the province supported al-Hadbaa. Five civilians were killed in the fighting before Iraqi security forces arrived and secured the area. On May 28 300 people gathered in the Telafar district demanding that they become independent from the province. The protestors said they had been neglected by the provincial council, and complained about the new al-Hadbaa governor Atheel al-Nujafi. There was a similar protest on May 17 in the Shikhan district. That district, plus Sinjar and Hatra have suspended their cooperation with the al-Hadbaa controlled provincial council. The Kurdistan Regional Government has also ordered the peshmerga to stop any provincial official from entering these areas. As reported before, this led the peshmerga to stop Governor Nujafi from going to a sporting event in a Kurdish controlled town. The provincial police chief was also denied entry to another Kurdish area in May as well.

The problems started in April 2009 when al-Hadbaa, who had won 19 of Ninewa’s 37 council seats, took all of the positions in the local government. In response, the Ninewa Fraternal List walked out and announced that they were boycotting the new provincial government. Governor Nujafi has said that he will allow the Fraternal List positions if they recognize the borders of Ninewa and withdraw the peshmerga. According to IraqSlogger, a leading Kurdish politician responded by stating that the issue of the peshmerga was between Baghdad and Kurdistan, and that the governor should not be involved. Now deadlocked, both al-Hadbaa and the Fraternal List have been going to Baghdad to try to get the central government to force the other side to give in.

Time is probably on the side of al-Hadbaa. The Americans have told the Fraternal List that since al-Hadbaa won a majority in the provincial elections they have the right to form the government they want. Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki is also looking for new Sunni partners to run with in the 2010 parliamentary elections, and might align with al-Hadbaa. The threat is that without mediation violence could ensue between the two competing parties. Ninewa is already one of the most deadliest provinces in Iraq, and this divide plays into the hands of the insurgents as well who portray themselves as the protectors of Arabs against the Kurds. The U.S. held up the 2009 provincial elections and the participation of Sunnis as an important turning point in Iraqi politics. The situation in Ninewa shows that at least in that part of Iraq, it might have just made things worse.

For more on the political divisions in Ninewa click on the "al-Hadbaa" label below.

SOURCES

Associated Press, “Iraqi provincial election results,” 2/19/09

Aswat al-Iraq, “Shaykhan protest calls for boycotting Ninewa’s local govt.,” 5/17/09
- “Talafar’s residents demand its separation from Ninewa,” 5/28/09

Bakri, Nada, “Dispute Over Land Simmering in Iraq,” Washington Post, 5/18/09

Dagher, Sam, “Tensions Stoked Between Iraqi Kurds and Sunnis,” New York Times, 5/18/09

Hamad, Qassim Khidhir, “arab domination rejected by kurds in makhmour,” Niqash, 5/22/09

IraqSlogger.com, “Ninewa Gov Presses Case with B’dad Officials,” 5/13/09

Reilly, Corinne and Abbas, Ali, “Kurdish-Arab tensions continue to grow in northern Iraq,” McClatchy Newspapers, 4/14/09

Smith, Daniel, “Othman to Najafi “Don’t Interfere,”” IraqSlogger.com, 5/30/09
- “Sinjar-Clashes Leave Five Wounded,” IraqSlogger.com, 6/1/09

Iraq Reporting Hits Another New Low In May, 2009

May 2009 saw Iraq take another fall from America’s headlines. The war did not make it into the top ten news stories for any of the four weeks of that month according to the Pew Research Center’s Project for Excellence in Journalism. Not only did Iraq not make the top ten, for two of those four weeks it did not make the top ten in any of the five major media sources in America, newspapers, the internet, network TV, cable TV, or radio.

For the two weeks of May 4 to 10 and May 11 to 17 Iraq was not only absent from the top ten stories in the country, but did not make the top ten in any of the five press outlets. For May 18 to 24 Iraq again did not make the top ten stories, but did reach number 5 in newspapers with 4% of its coverage. That week saw the conviction of Steven Green, a former soldier, for the rape and murder of a 14-year old Iraqi girl, and her parents. From May 25 to 31 the war did a little better. While it did not make the top 10, it was the number 7 and number 8 story in newspapers, and number 10 on network TV. On May 25 three Americans were killed in a bombing in Fallujah, the next day a U.S. soldier died, and another on May 28. In total, 24 U.S. soldiers died in May, the highest number since September 2008.

May’s news coverage was a further drop from April. That month Iraq did make the top ten for one week, but was out for the other four. Not only that, but for the first time since the invasion, the war also did not crack the top ten of any media outlet for one of that months’ five weeks. March 2009 was the first month Iraq did not make the overall top ten stories. America’s press has been decreasing its stories on Iraq since the beginning of 2007. As Washington began turning to other issues like the 2008 presidential campaign, the recession, and Afghanistan-Pakistan, so did the media. Unless American elites begin talking about the war again, Iraq can expect to fade more and more in the news despite the fact that there are still over 100,000 troops in the country.

SOURCES

BBC, “US deaths in Iraq rise sharply in May,” 6/1/09

Dao, James, “Ex-Soldier Gets Life Sentence for Iraq Murders,” New York Times, 5/21/09

Pew Research Center’s Project for Excellence in Journalism, “The Debate Over Gitmo And Waterboarding Drives The News, PEJ News Coverage Index: May 18-24, 2009,” 5/25/09
- “Economy Up And Flu Down In A Stressful Week, PEJ News Coverage Index: May 4-10, 2009,” 5/11/09
- “Politics Punctuate The Terrorism Debate, PEJ News Coverage Index: May 11-17, 2009,” 5/18/09
- “Sotomayor Spin Wars Dominate The Narrative, PEJ News Coverage Index: May 25-31, 2009,” 6/1/09

Robertson, Campbell, “U.S. Soldier and 11 Iraqis Die in Attacks,” New York Times, 5/29/09

Santora, Marc, “State Department Official Is Among 3 Killed in Iraq,” New York Times, 5/26/09

Williams, Timothy, “Bomb Kills G.I. in Baghdad as Attacks Keep Rising,” New York Times, 5/27/09

USIP Report On Iraqi Politics and The 2010 Parliamentary Elections

In May 2009 two members of the United States Institute of Peace (USIP), Daniel Serwer and Sam Parker, traveled to Baghdad where they met with around 20 top Iraqi politicians and government officials. They wrote a report about their trip called “Maliki’s Iraq between Two Elections.” The major topic of discussion was the 2009 provincial elections, and its repercussions for the 2010 parliamentary vote. The Iraqi elites agreed that Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki had stolen the stage of Iraqi politics. All of the major national parties now operate in relation to him. At the same time, the USIP group worked with the newly elected provincial council in Diyala, who were more concerned about getting their government working than what was going in the capital. The report believes that this could be the beginning of a major change in Iraq with the emergence of issue-based parties rather than sectarian ones. That’s likely to be a long-term process as the major parties with the money, organization, and power are likely to dominate the parliamentary vote, and are still caught up on what to do with Maliki.

The first issue dealt with was the impact of the January 2009 provincial elections. Most of the Iraqis felt that the vote had gone off well, and were now reflecting upon the lessons learned. One was that parties with a strong organization and that could get out the vote did well. Coalition building was also of importance since so many parties participated it was the only way to gain power. Many also talked about “wasted votes,” those that went to parties and candidates that didn’t garner enough ballots to gain seats on the councils. That amounted to about 30% of the overall vote. That compared to Maliki’s State of Law List, which only got 19% of the national returns. 50% of the electorate also did not participate. The major parties were interested in trying to win over some of these populations.

All of the politicians were also focused upon the Prime Minister. Everyone seemed to base their positions upon Maliki. Some want to oppose him, some want to ally with him, and others want to see what will happen after the 2010 vote. No one thought Maliki would face a no confidence vote in parliament before the parliamentary elections. That could make him a martyr, and also deny his critics the chance to blame him for the country’s problems. There are also no clear replacements for him.

This is quite a change from when Maliki first came into office. His Dawa party returned to Iraq in 2003 from exile, weak, divided, lacking support, money and a militia. He was picked for his position because of his weakness compared to the two major Shiite parties the Supreme Iraqi Islamic Party (SIIC) and the Sadrists that dominated the United Iraqi Alliance. His initial inaction in the face of the increasing violence and chaos reinforced his image as an ineffectual leader. This all changed with the Surge. The Americans went after all of Maliki’s opponents from Al Qaeda in Iraq to the Sunni insurgency to the Shiite militias. That made the Iraqi state and the Prime Minister stronger. In 2008 he launched his own security crackdowns on the Sadrists in Basra, Sadr City, and Maysan. This created a new view of the Prime Minister and government as strong and decisive. Maliki was quick to claim all of the success, and make himself synonymous with the state.

In the process Maliki has stepped away from his former friends, and attempted to forge new ones to gain all the glory of the improved situation in the country. Maliki’s main coalition is made up of the Iraqi Islamic Party, the Supreme Council, and the two Kurdish parties, the Kurdistan Democratic Party and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan. Originally Moqtada al-Sadr was also part of that group, but was pushed out with the help of the Americans. In 2008 Maliki moved away from this alliance to establish his independence. That was signaled in the January 2009 provincial elections when he formed his own State of Law List. Afterwards, Maliki has reached out to all groups in preparation for the 2010 vote. The Prime Minister for example, has held discussions with Saleh al-Mutlaq’s Hiwar Party, Ninewa’s al-Hadbaa List, Sheikh Abu Risha’s Anbar Awakening, and attempted to reach out to Baathists in an attempt to find new Sunni partners. Maliki also talked to the Sadrists, and recently flew to Iran to meet with the head of the Supreme Council Abdul Aziz al-Hakim who is in Tehran for cancer treatment. In doing so, he hopes to be the main player in any new ruling coalition that might emerge. He also has everyone guessing as to whom he will run with in the elections, himself, rejoin the United Iraqi Alliance, or some new gathering.

The Iraqi Islamic Party (IIP) has emerged as the strongest critic of the Prime Minister. Like the Dawa, they entered the new Iraqi political scene after the invasion with no real base, but were able to put together the main Sunni alliance the Iraqi Accordance Front, which has since disintegrated. During the Surge, they were able to take advantage of the new Sons of Iraq groups, and successfully co-opt many of them, thus gaining a grass roots organization. The IIP’s victory in Diyala in 2009 was an example of this. The party went on to win the most seats of any Sunni group in the provincial elections. To oppose Maliki they are trying to build up the power of the parliament. The election of Ayad al-Samarraie as speaker of the legislature on April 19, 2009 was the first step in their plan. He wants to make the parliament a check on Maliki’s authority. That was recently seen when the parliament forced the resignation of the Trade Minister, who was from the Dawa Party, over corruption. There are plans to question other members of Maliki’s cabinet about misdeeds as well. Parliament also blocked funding for the Tribal Support Councils, which was a patronage system put together by the Prime Minister in various provinces, and a reconciliation initiative that was aimed at co-opting Baathists. The Islamic Party is also pushing for constitutional reform to limit the Prime Minister’s office.

The Supreme Council has become another major opponent of Maliki, but seems to be turning inwards in the aftermath of their defeat in the provincial elections. In 2005 the SIIC walked away with eight governorships out of eighteen. In 2009 they won none. Since then they have been trying to deal with this loss. In the 2010 vote they want to portray themselves as being independent from Iran, and no longer advocating for a Shiite southern region. Despite their criticisms, they also want to try to convince Maliki to rejoin the United Iraqi Alliance, and run together in the election. Another major distraction is the fact that its leader, al-Hakim, is dying of cancer. When he passes, many think that the SIIC will split in two with old guard Badr Brigade militia leaders like Finance Minister Bayan Jabr running one faction, and newer officials like Vice President Adel Abd al-Mahdi the other.

The Kurds are also in conflict with Maliki. Beginning in 2008 the Prime Minister began moving the Iraqi Army into disputed territories of the north, which have largely been under Kurdish control since 2003. There have been several confrontations with the peshmerga as a result. The main Kurdish parties and the Americans are afraid that the dispute between Kurdistan and Baghdad will lead to violence. The United Nations is trying to mediate, but without strong U.S. support their work is likely to go nowhere. Surprisingly most of the Arab politicians in Baghdad were not that concerned about this issue. They believe that time is on the side of the central government, and as it gets stronger the Kurds will have to give way. Until then this division is likely to fester for the next couple years.

After those three major groups there are a series of smaller Shiite, Sunni, and secular parties that are also related to Maliki. What the paper called the Shiite center is made up of Interior Minister Jawad al-Bolani’s Constitutional Party, government spokesman Ali al-Dabbagh Competents Party, and ex-Prime Minister Ibrahim al-Jaafari’s National Reform Trend. The Sadrists are still a force in Shiite politics as well. The main secular leader is ex-Prime Minister Iyad Allawi and his Iraqi National List. Finally there are Sunnis like parliamentarian Saleh al-Mutlaq’s Hiwar Party, the al-Hadbaa List of Ninewa, former Islamic Party member Dhafir al-Ani, and Deputy Prime Minister Rafi al-Issawi. All of these parties ran in the 2009 election as nationalists, arguing for a strong central government. That was similar to Maliki’s State of Law platform, so they had mixed results. The Shiite centrists, Sadrists, and Allawi got some provincial seats, but didn’t do as well as they had hoped. The smaller Sunni parties actually did surprisingly well. Maliki also courted all of these groups as potential new allies.

Finally the USIP traveled to Diyala to help the new provincial council there forge a position paper on what their goals would be while in office. There the USIP found that the politicians were much more interested in getting the local government working, especially because the previous one was considered a failure, rather than national politics. The Diyala council members didn’t pay much attention to their party bosses in Baghdad, and were more issue based. The Americans saw this as an important development in Iraqi politics, as the Diyala council was likely to meet the needs of average Iraqis compared to the power struggles going on in the capital.

“Maliki’s Iraq between Two Elections” points out the dynamics of Iraq’s national and local politics. In Baghdad, the major parties are involved in a prolonged struggle for power as Maliki has successfully placed himself as the public face of the government. His former allies have been left out in the cold, and are either challenging him, like the Islamic Party and Kurds, or trying to re-organize like the SIIC. At the same time, this has opened up opportunities for newer and smaller parties by allying with one side or the other. It also appears that this struggle is more important than actually improving the country for many politicians. At the provincial level however, the USIP found different parties, sects, and ethnicities working together on the newly elected council, trying to address their constituents’ needs. The USIP paper believes that the 2010 election could be a turning point if Maliki decides to run on issues like he did in 2009. There is also the possibility that he will go back to sectarian politics and rejoin the United Iraqi Alliance. The USIP hopes for the former outcome, but if it doesn’t happen they believe there will probably be more opportunities in the future to change the political culture of Iraq. It seems likely that this will stay at the local level, and take quite some time to bubble up to the top. The major parties including Maliki are caught up in a serious struggle for the right to rule, which will have to play out before issues become the prime focus of the government, if ever. Until then finding new friends and shifting alliances will continue to dominate the capital.

SOURCES

Bakri, Nada, “In Iraq, Assertive Parliament Emerges Under New Speaker,” Washington Post, 5/27/09

Domergue, Jeremy, “Selection of Speaker Reveals Shifting Coalitions in Iraqi Parliamentary Politics,” Institute for the Study of War, 4/28/09

Press TV, “Iraq’s Maliki at Hakim’s bedside in Tehran,” 5/31/09

Serwer, Daniel and Parker, Sam, “Maliki’s Iraq between Two Elections,” United States Institute of Peace, May 2009

Visser, Reidar, “Maliki Suffers Setbacks as Samarrai is Confirmed as New Speaker and More Governors Are Elected South of Baghdad,” Historiae.org, 4/19/09

Wong, Edward, “Iraqis weigh alliance to marginalize Sadr and bolster Maliki,” International Harold Tribune, 12/11/06

May 2009 International Organization for Migration Report On Iraq's Displaced

At the end of May 2009 the International Organization for Migration (IOM) released its latest report on Iraq's displaced. They specifically are worried about the fate of the two million plus Iraqis that have not returned home yet. They note that while thousands of displaced have gone back to their original provinces, the vast majority have not. Both groups continue to face problems such as finding work and housing, and gaining access to services and assistance. The IOM is concerned that many of these Iraqis will become permanent refugees.

Since 2007 the IOM has noted that Iraqis displaced after the February 2006 Samarra bombing, which triggered the sectarian war, have begun to return. The IOM has counted 49,464 of these families, or 296,598 people, that have come back. Only 7%, of those, 3,443 families, were refugees. That is a small fraction of the estimated 1.6 million that lost their homes after the 2006 attack. They have gone back to 765 different locations in Iraq. 90% of the post-Samarra displaced came from Baghdad, Diyala and Ninewa, so it should be no surprise that those three provinces, plus Anbar have seen the most returns. Qadisiyah, Muthanna, and Dhi Qar had the least with 44, 64, and 108 families respectively. 61% of displaced families surveyed said they wanted to go home.

Post-Feb. 2006 Displaced And Refugee Family Returns (Not Including Kurdistan)

Province	Returning Families	% That Are Refugee Families
Iraq	49,464	7%
Baghdad	31,497	4%
Diyala	8,779	1%
Anbar	4,536	27%
Ninewa	1,602	1%
Maysan	626	49%
Tamim	620	37%
Basra	500	0%
Karbala	298	21%
Babil	258	9%
Najaf	215	55%
Salahaddin	191	35%
Dhi Qar	108	31%
Muthanna	64	88%
Qadisiyah	44	23%

A major factor in returning is the proximity of the displaced to their original homes. 68% of the families that came back resided within their home province. That compared to 21% that were in another province, and 11% that came back from another country. That varied however across each province. In Muthanna and Najaf for example, 100% of the returnees were refugees, while none of those that came back to Basra and Ninewa were in foreign nation beforehand.

Origins Of Returnees By Province

Location	Refugees	Displaced Within Same Province	Displaced In Another Province
TOTAL	11%	68%	21%
Anbar	36%	52%	12%
Babil	15%	52%	33%
Baghdad	6%	71%	23%
Basra	0%	0%	100%
Diyala	6%	61%	33%
Karbala	92%	0%	8%
Maysan	0%	0%	100%
Muthanna	100%	0%	0%
Najaf	100%	0%	0%
Ninewa	0%	100%	0%
Salahaddin	88%	13%	0%
Tamim	58%	11%	31%
Wasit	50%	0%	50%

Conditions in Iraq appeared to be another major reason why families come back. 36.7% of returnees interviewed by the IOM said that better security was the top cause for returning. That was followed by 35.7% that believed a combination of improved security and difficult conditions where they lived was the major factor. Only 15.5% felt that they left because of the hardships they were going through.

Reasons For Return

Reasons for Return	%
Improved security in home area	36.7%
Improved security in home area and difficult conditions	35.7%
Very difficult conditions	15.5%
Other	5.8%
Government returnee payments	4.2%
Improved security in home area, difficult conditions, returnee payments	1.8%
Very difficult conditions and returnee payments	0.3%

The majority of families feel safe after their returns, but there are still some troubling incidents. 59.6% of those polled by the IOM said they felt safe all of the time after going back, while 39.4% said they only felt safe some of the time. There are various anecdotal stories of attacks and threats against displaced. In the Dora neighborhood of Baghdad an IED targeted displaced. Eighteen families in Abu Ghraib came back, but couldn't stay in their homes and became displaced again. Two families from Diyala went back, but were attacked by a militia, which led to the death of two family members. They left the province again as a result. According to IraqSlogger, in Adhamiya, Baghdad, the Sons of Iraq put "X"s on the houses of Shiites that had been displaced telling them not to come back in April 2009. The state of their property is another issue for returnees. 49.1% said that their houses were in good condition, but 38.7% found some damage to them.

The government has also been actively encouraging Iraqis to come back. Baghdad offered $851 for families that did. The authorities have recently announced that they were no longer registering people anymore, which was a prerequisite to receive the money. Not many returnees signed up for this program in the first place, and the government paid even fewer. The IOM found that only 44% of those surveyed had applied for the money, and of those, only 36% said they got it.

For those still displaced, finding work, services, and aid are major problems. 50.4% of male-headed households were out of work, and 97.3% of female-led ones were. Overall, 35% of those surveyed said they could work, but couldn't find a job. Salahaddin, 75%, Muthanna 70%, and Babil, 64%, had the highest responses in that category. In total, 56% of the displaced are unemployed. 64.2% of those surveyed claimed they had six hours or less of electricity. 83.8% did say they had access to the national water system, but that doesn't mean that it is potable. Almost all of the displaced, 98%, said they had their food ration card, but their access varied. 32% said they regularly got their rations, 60% said it was irregular, and 8% said they never got them. Ninewa was the worst with 99% saying they got their rations infrequently. Getting health care also varied greatly from province to province. 90% or more in Anbar, Maysan, Muthanna, Najaf, Ninewa and Salahaddin said they had adequate access, while 57% of returnees in Baghdad, 65% in Basra, and 78% in Tamim claimed they had none. When asked what their greatest needs were, displaced families said food, 63%, fuel, 51%, and health care, 40% were the top priorities. 88% also said they had received no aid outside of the government.

Unemployment

Total: 44% employed, 56% unemployed

Male-headed household: 49.6% employed, 50.4% unemployed

Female-headed household: 2.7% employed, 97.3% unemployed

Overall the IOM is worried about what will happen to the millions of Iraqis that have lost their homes because of the war. Only a small fraction has returned, and those that haven't face a plethora of problems, most importantly finding work and food. Those that have come back also face a similar set of problems. Neither the government, nor non-government organizations such as the IOM have the resources to deal with such a large population. The fear is that many of them will simply have to fend for themselves, perhaps creating a permanent class of displaced both within and without of Iraq for the foreseeable future.

SOURCES

International Organization for Migration, "IOM Emergency Needs Assessments; Post February 2006 Displacement In Iraq, Monthly Report," 4/1/09

- "IOM Monitoring And Needs Assessments of Iraqi Return, May 2009," May 2009

Smith, Daniel and al-Timimi, Yousif, "Residents: Some Sahwa Still Keeping Shi'a Out," IraqSlogger.com, 4/21/09