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June 30, 2009 is a historic day for Iraq. The U.S. has officially withdrawn its combat troops from Iraqi cities in accordance with the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA). There are reports that Iraqis were out in the streets celebrating and fireworks could be seen in the skies. The date is more symbolic than anything else however.
Americans will still be in many Iraqi cities having their bases re-designated outside their borders. American advisers will still be with Iraqi units, U.S. troops will still go out on patrols with their Iraqi counterparts, and the Provincial Reconstruction Teams will continue their work in the provinces. U.S. officials are also scattered throughout Iraq’s ministries in Baghdad.
Iraqi forces will probably be able to handle their duties, as most of the country is actually relatively quiet, and the sectarian war is over. The insurgency is a shell of its former self, fears of the Sons of Iraq or the Mahdi Army returning to the fight are overblown, and even the Iranian-backed Special Groups have been mostly inactive lately. This doesn’t mean Iraqis won’t still be killed daily, just that the ebb and flow of the fighting has changed from what it was in the past.
The bigger problems today are political, economic, and social. Iraq is on the eve of its fifth election since 2003, which only increases the on-going struggle for power amongst elites. Tensions between Arabs and Kurds are increasing, and could tear the country apart, while the conflict between Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki could lead to the beginning of democratic norms of ruling and opposing parties, or lead to autocratic rule. This has largely prevented Iraq’s leaders from thinking about how to improve the country, which is seen in the fact that the government is still largely dysfunctional, corruption is rampant, there is little rule by law, the economy is a mess, services do not meet demand, and only around 5% of Iraq’s 4-5 million refugees have returned.
It is unfortunate that Iraqis find themselves in this situation after three wars and years of international sanctions. Getting rid of Saddam offered many hopes and promises, yet Iraq still finds itself plagued by a slew of new problems that complicate everyday life for its people. The situation there is neither victory, nor a total collapse. The real question is will anyone care in the coming years?
Tuesday, June 30, 2009
Monday, June 29, 2009
Administration Needs to Prepare Congress and Public For A Long Stay In Iraq Says Iraq Analyst
As U.S. combat troops prepare to withdraw from Iraq’s cities, Anthony Cordesman, one of the top military analysts on Iraq from the Center for Strategic and International Studies, argues that the administration needs to build up support for a long-term presence there. This is a position that he has consistently called for. Cordesman worries that too much emphasis is being put on withdrawal, when the goal should be institutionalizing support for Iraq so that it can become a strong U.S. ally in the region. This is especially important because Cordesman does not believe that the U.S. has won in Iraq, but rather will continue to face challenges there before Iraq becomes a stabile and independent state. Cordesman wrote about these issues in a memorandum to General Ray Odierno after a recent trip to Iraq.
The main problems America faces in Iraq today are not what they use to be. Violence is down, and the Iraqi security forces are better. The sectarian war is over, and he does not believe that the Sunnis and Shiites want to return to fighting each other. Rather the main divisions today are over politics. The two main ones are between Arabs and Kurds, and with Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki and his critics. The ethnic divisions are now the most pressing issue in his opinion as tensions are rising between Arabs and Kurds, and the two sides are losing patience with each other. Politically, Iraq is still dealing with integrating the Sunnis, and they themselves still lack strong leadership. This struggle has now become entangled with the Prime Minister, as the Sunnis have become the major opponent of Maliki trying to assert power.
Iraq faces an additional problem developing its economy. Iraq is almost completely dependent upon oil for revenues. That industry and the rest are all underdeveloped. Iraq needs to diversify, and open up to foreign investment so that it can build up its infrastructure and provide better services. The Iraqi government has been incapable of doing either so far, even with better security. Cordesman believes that Baghdad lacks the knowledge of how to create effective business deals and legislation, and politicians are too caught up in either defending their country against the perceived threats of foreign corporations or thinking about the possible profits, rather than on how to make things better.
Cordesman believes that these two issues will require constant attention and mediation by the Americans. The main tool he believes in using is aid. First, the U.S. needs to maintain its level of financial assistance flowing to Iraq. This is especially hard now with most Americans focused upon getting out of Iraq and the economic crisis at home. The U.S. also needs to help with the country’s political and economic troubles. American aid and mediation for example, could help integrate the Kurdish peshmerga into the security forces, an idea that is now dead due to the political divisions. This could assure the Kurds of security, while allowing Baghdad to continue with its plans of expanding its military. On the economic side, the U.S. should provide business models for Iraq to improve their contacts with foreign companies. The Americans have been working to revive the State Owned Enterprises, which have the potential to add much needed jobs as well. The U.S. should also get the World Bank involved with development more because the U.S. presence will shrink with the withdrawal of combat forces. To accomplish this the U.S. needs to maintain both military and civilian advisers in Iraq past the 2011 deadline for withdrawal.
Cordesman found that some planning for this is already being done in Iraq. The military especially is trying to transition from a security operation to a rebuilding mode. He did not see as much evidence of that on the civilian side however. Too many political and economic plans he saw were focused upon finishing specific programs rather than looking at the bigger picture of what needs to be done in the future.
Overall, Cordesman argues that the U.S. will be remembered for what they leave behind in Iraq, rather than on how they got there. The U.S. military and diplomatic staff in Iraq is thinking this way, but he’s not sure Washington is. Too much emphasis is being put on short-term goals such as pulling out of the cities this summer, and the withdrawal in 2011. Cordesman, like many other American Iraq experts, believes that the U.S. should have a long-term presence in Iraq that may last as long as 2020 or further. Unless the administration begins setting the groundwork for this by telling the public and Congress of the sacrifices needed, and the journey ahead, no one will support it, and Cordesman worries that will mean all the blood and money spent in Iraq will go to waste.
This will ultimately come down to whether President Obama wants to make this kind of commitment. There will be a diplomatic presence in Iraq no matter what. His real task is deciding on whether he will maintain troops there or not. He has been very open to his military commanders, and they will assuredly ask for tens of thousands of American advisers to stay past 2011. Coming up with the money for a robust assistance package however after most combat troops are out will be much harder as the public and Congress have already lost interest in Iraq.
The main problem with Cordesman and other similar analysts is that they often overlook the system of dependence the Iraqis have built up upon the Americans, which a long-term presence will only continue. Cordesman mentions this once when discussing the opening of the oil sector to foreign investment. He writes that Baghdad has offered oil contracts, but then expects Washington to do the rest of the work, pushing international companies to sign them. This is true for a whole range of other issues as well. As reported earlier, the U.S. has spent millions trying to build up the maintenance and logistics capacity of the Iraqi Army, but they have refused responsibility for much of it, leading to the Americans to do most of the work instead. The Americans need to get the Iraqis to do more rather than hold their hands for the next ten years. That’s basically what Cordesman and others want the administration to do. They want every issue in Iraq to be dealt with before a full withdrawal. This will not be like the U.S. presence in South Korea either as President Bush once suggested, because Iraq is likely to see violence during that entire stay. The Obama White House needs to do a cost-benefit analysis of what its willing to expend on Iraq, and how much responsibility they want to have for it because Cordesman, other Iraq experts, and the U.S. military are asking for an open-ended commitment.
SOURCES
Cordesman, Anthony, “Observations From a Visit to Iraq,” 6/15/09
Gwertzman, Bernard, “U.S. ‘Winning’ Unpopular War in Iraq, but ‘Losing’ Popular War in Afghanistan,” Council on Foreign Relations, 9/8/08
Nagl, John and Burton, Brian, “After the Fire: Shaping the Future U.S. Relationship with Iraq,” Center for a New American Security, June 2009
The main problems America faces in Iraq today are not what they use to be. Violence is down, and the Iraqi security forces are better. The sectarian war is over, and he does not believe that the Sunnis and Shiites want to return to fighting each other. Rather the main divisions today are over politics. The two main ones are between Arabs and Kurds, and with Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki and his critics. The ethnic divisions are now the most pressing issue in his opinion as tensions are rising between Arabs and Kurds, and the two sides are losing patience with each other. Politically, Iraq is still dealing with integrating the Sunnis, and they themselves still lack strong leadership. This struggle has now become entangled with the Prime Minister, as the Sunnis have become the major opponent of Maliki trying to assert power.
Iraq faces an additional problem developing its economy. Iraq is almost completely dependent upon oil for revenues. That industry and the rest are all underdeveloped. Iraq needs to diversify, and open up to foreign investment so that it can build up its infrastructure and provide better services. The Iraqi government has been incapable of doing either so far, even with better security. Cordesman believes that Baghdad lacks the knowledge of how to create effective business deals and legislation, and politicians are too caught up in either defending their country against the perceived threats of foreign corporations or thinking about the possible profits, rather than on how to make things better.
Cordesman believes that these two issues will require constant attention and mediation by the Americans. The main tool he believes in using is aid. First, the U.S. needs to maintain its level of financial assistance flowing to Iraq. This is especially hard now with most Americans focused upon getting out of Iraq and the economic crisis at home. The U.S. also needs to help with the country’s political and economic troubles. American aid and mediation for example, could help integrate the Kurdish peshmerga into the security forces, an idea that is now dead due to the political divisions. This could assure the Kurds of security, while allowing Baghdad to continue with its plans of expanding its military. On the economic side, the U.S. should provide business models for Iraq to improve their contacts with foreign companies. The Americans have been working to revive the State Owned Enterprises, which have the potential to add much needed jobs as well. The U.S. should also get the World Bank involved with development more because the U.S. presence will shrink with the withdrawal of combat forces. To accomplish this the U.S. needs to maintain both military and civilian advisers in Iraq past the 2011 deadline for withdrawal.
Cordesman found that some planning for this is already being done in Iraq. The military especially is trying to transition from a security operation to a rebuilding mode. He did not see as much evidence of that on the civilian side however. Too many political and economic plans he saw were focused upon finishing specific programs rather than looking at the bigger picture of what needs to be done in the future.
Overall, Cordesman argues that the U.S. will be remembered for what they leave behind in Iraq, rather than on how they got there. The U.S. military and diplomatic staff in Iraq is thinking this way, but he’s not sure Washington is. Too much emphasis is being put on short-term goals such as pulling out of the cities this summer, and the withdrawal in 2011. Cordesman, like many other American Iraq experts, believes that the U.S. should have a long-term presence in Iraq that may last as long as 2020 or further. Unless the administration begins setting the groundwork for this by telling the public and Congress of the sacrifices needed, and the journey ahead, no one will support it, and Cordesman worries that will mean all the blood and money spent in Iraq will go to waste.
This will ultimately come down to whether President Obama wants to make this kind of commitment. There will be a diplomatic presence in Iraq no matter what. His real task is deciding on whether he will maintain troops there or not. He has been very open to his military commanders, and they will assuredly ask for tens of thousands of American advisers to stay past 2011. Coming up with the money for a robust assistance package however after most combat troops are out will be much harder as the public and Congress have already lost interest in Iraq.
The main problem with Cordesman and other similar analysts is that they often overlook the system of dependence the Iraqis have built up upon the Americans, which a long-term presence will only continue. Cordesman mentions this once when discussing the opening of the oil sector to foreign investment. He writes that Baghdad has offered oil contracts, but then expects Washington to do the rest of the work, pushing international companies to sign them. This is true for a whole range of other issues as well. As reported earlier, the U.S. has spent millions trying to build up the maintenance and logistics capacity of the Iraqi Army, but they have refused responsibility for much of it, leading to the Americans to do most of the work instead. The Americans need to get the Iraqis to do more rather than hold their hands for the next ten years. That’s basically what Cordesman and others want the administration to do. They want every issue in Iraq to be dealt with before a full withdrawal. This will not be like the U.S. presence in South Korea either as President Bush once suggested, because Iraq is likely to see violence during that entire stay. The Obama White House needs to do a cost-benefit analysis of what its willing to expend on Iraq, and how much responsibility they want to have for it because Cordesman, other Iraq experts, and the U.S. military are asking for an open-ended commitment.
SOURCES
Cordesman, Anthony, “Observations From a Visit to Iraq,” 6/15/09
Gwertzman, Bernard, “U.S. ‘Winning’ Unpopular War in Iraq, but ‘Losing’ Popular War in Afghanistan,” Council on Foreign Relations, 9/8/08
Nagl, John and Burton, Brian, “After the Fire: Shaping the Future U.S. Relationship with Iraq,” Center for a New American Security, June 2009
Sunday, June 28, 2009
Argument For Maliki Being Iraq’s Next Strongman
Reports that Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki may be becoming a strongman have become part and parcel of Iraq reporting today. In the Spring 2009 edition of World Policy Journal Los Angeles Times’ reporter Ned Parker laid out a good argument for this in an article entitled “Machiavelli in Mesopotamia.” Parker’s position is that Maliki has successfully used a divide and conquer and carrot and stick approach with various groups across the country that is a move towards authoritarian government. The Prime Minister has also promised security and stability for a population that has been traumatized by the invasion and civil war. This has them looking towards a leader, Maliki, rather than institutions or democracy to provide a normal life, allowing the Prime Minister to become an autocrat.
This change in Iraq began with the end of the sectarian war in 2007. The Shiites won, and the Sunnis were defeated. This was shown when the majority of the insurgency switched sides to the Americans to escape the pressure from the Surge, Iraqi forces, Shiite militias, and Al Qaeda in Iraq. With the threat of the insurgency largely contained, Maliki was freed to move against his former supporter Moqtada al-Sadr. In 2008 Maliki sent the Iraqi army and police to crush the Mahdi Army in Basra, Sadr City, and Maysan. By mid-2008 the government was now free of two of its largest threats. In turn, this changed Maliki’s image from a weak and feckless leader to a nationalist one willing to impose order from the chaos that was engulfing Iraq.
Parker provides three examples of how Maliki has used his newfound power and position since then. First, the Prime Minister built up his own independent base by forming Tribal Support Councils across southern Iraq. These became a huge patronage system for Maliki, which helped his State of Law list win a majority in Basra, and pluralities in the rest of the south in the 2009 provincial elections. In Diyala, the Prime Minister used force to try to break the alliance between the Iraqi Islamic Party and the Sons of Iraq. In July 2008 and May 2009, he used the security forces to arrest and intimidate Sunni leaders, while trying to peel others away to join his Tribal Support Councils. Finally, in the Saydiya district of Baghdad, Maliki convinced the local Sunnis there that he was the center of power. At first, they felt intimidated into electing a Shiite from the SIIC’s Badr Brigade to head the local council, but later when that same official was arrested, the Sunnis took it to be a sign that Maliki had turned against the Shiite militia, and that he was becoming a fair and just ruler. All of these moves are examples of the carrot and stick, divide and conquer strategy Maliki has employed since 2008. He has wooed both Sunnis and Shiites to his side, while threatening others with the security forces and the threat of arrests. It shows that the new status quo in Iraq is not based upon the rule of law or institutions, but rather the relationship between individuals and groups to the Prime Minister. He is now the center of Iraqi politics, able to wield his power to give some jobs and position, or to send others to jail.
Parker believes that the new Iraq that has emerged from the sectarian war is actually a return to its autocratic tradition. After the bloody years of the past, the most important thing to Iraqis is stability so that they can return to their normal lives. This is what Maliki has offered them. He has crushed or wooed his opponents including the Shiite militias and the Sons of Iraq, while offering protection, jobs and patronage to those that side with him such as Iraq’s tribes. It’s one man, Maliki that the people now look to. He represents the Iraqi state, much as Saddam or other past Iraqi leaders did. This is what makes “Machiavelli in Mesopotamia” one of the better arguments for the strongman theory that is becoming popular in analyses of Iraq. It is still up to debate however, whether Maliki is really moving in this direction. Many of the powers he is assuming are those that the government should have, but that it was not able to exert since it was so weak after the U.S. invasion. A regular government for example, should have a monopoly on force, so Baghdad should’ve cracked down on the Shiite militias. At the same time, Maliki has built up organizations like the Tribal Support Councils, which are outside the authority of the government, and used the security forces to take care of his opponents. Iraq seems to have gone from one extreme where the state had no real authority to where Maliki is using it everywhere for his own ends. Now however, the new speaker of the parliament is trying to strengthen the legislature to provide a check on Maliki’s power. This will be the real test as to whether the Prime Minister can become an autocrat. If he can shape the parliament after the 2010 elections then there will be no others in the country that can limit him.
SOURCES
Nordland, Rod and Santora, Marc, “Iraq Leader Omits a Bit in Lauding U.S. Pullout,” New York Times, 6/11/09
Parker, Ned, “Machiavelli in Mesopotamia,” World Policy Journal, Spring 2009
- “U.S. prepares to withdraw, Iraqi resistance prepares for battle,” Los Angeles Times, 5/25/09
Rosen, Nir, “The big sleep,” The National, 4/24/09
Russo, Claire, “Countdown To Diyala’s Provincial Election: Maliki & The IIP,” Institute for the Study of War, 1/30/09
Serwer, Daniel and Parker, Sam, “Maliki’s Iraq between Two Elections,” United States Institute of Peace, May 2009
Shadid, Anthony, “In Iraq, a Different Struggle for Power,” Washington Post, 6/25/09
Wiseman, Paul, “U.S.-supported Iraqi militias clash with government,” USA Today, 5/27/09
This change in Iraq began with the end of the sectarian war in 2007. The Shiites won, and the Sunnis were defeated. This was shown when the majority of the insurgency switched sides to the Americans to escape the pressure from the Surge, Iraqi forces, Shiite militias, and Al Qaeda in Iraq. With the threat of the insurgency largely contained, Maliki was freed to move against his former supporter Moqtada al-Sadr. In 2008 Maliki sent the Iraqi army and police to crush the Mahdi Army in Basra, Sadr City, and Maysan. By mid-2008 the government was now free of two of its largest threats. In turn, this changed Maliki’s image from a weak and feckless leader to a nationalist one willing to impose order from the chaos that was engulfing Iraq.
Parker provides three examples of how Maliki has used his newfound power and position since then. First, the Prime Minister built up his own independent base by forming Tribal Support Councils across southern Iraq. These became a huge patronage system for Maliki, which helped his State of Law list win a majority in Basra, and pluralities in the rest of the south in the 2009 provincial elections. In Diyala, the Prime Minister used force to try to break the alliance between the Iraqi Islamic Party and the Sons of Iraq. In July 2008 and May 2009, he used the security forces to arrest and intimidate Sunni leaders, while trying to peel others away to join his Tribal Support Councils. Finally, in the Saydiya district of Baghdad, Maliki convinced the local Sunnis there that he was the center of power. At first, they felt intimidated into electing a Shiite from the SIIC’s Badr Brigade to head the local council, but later when that same official was arrested, the Sunnis took it to be a sign that Maliki had turned against the Shiite militia, and that he was becoming a fair and just ruler. All of these moves are examples of the carrot and stick, divide and conquer strategy Maliki has employed since 2008. He has wooed both Sunnis and Shiites to his side, while threatening others with the security forces and the threat of arrests. It shows that the new status quo in Iraq is not based upon the rule of law or institutions, but rather the relationship between individuals and groups to the Prime Minister. He is now the center of Iraqi politics, able to wield his power to give some jobs and position, or to send others to jail.
Parker believes that the new Iraq that has emerged from the sectarian war is actually a return to its autocratic tradition. After the bloody years of the past, the most important thing to Iraqis is stability so that they can return to their normal lives. This is what Maliki has offered them. He has crushed or wooed his opponents including the Shiite militias and the Sons of Iraq, while offering protection, jobs and patronage to those that side with him such as Iraq’s tribes. It’s one man, Maliki that the people now look to. He represents the Iraqi state, much as Saddam or other past Iraqi leaders did. This is what makes “Machiavelli in Mesopotamia” one of the better arguments for the strongman theory that is becoming popular in analyses of Iraq. It is still up to debate however, whether Maliki is really moving in this direction. Many of the powers he is assuming are those that the government should have, but that it was not able to exert since it was so weak after the U.S. invasion. A regular government for example, should have a monopoly on force, so Baghdad should’ve cracked down on the Shiite militias. At the same time, Maliki has built up organizations like the Tribal Support Councils, which are outside the authority of the government, and used the security forces to take care of his opponents. Iraq seems to have gone from one extreme where the state had no real authority to where Maliki is using it everywhere for his own ends. Now however, the new speaker of the parliament is trying to strengthen the legislature to provide a check on Maliki’s power. This will be the real test as to whether the Prime Minister can become an autocrat. If he can shape the parliament after the 2010 elections then there will be no others in the country that can limit him.
SOURCES
Nordland, Rod and Santora, Marc, “Iraq Leader Omits a Bit in Lauding U.S. Pullout,” New York Times, 6/11/09
Parker, Ned, “Machiavelli in Mesopotamia,” World Policy Journal, Spring 2009
- “U.S. prepares to withdraw, Iraqi resistance prepares for battle,” Los Angeles Times, 5/25/09
Rosen, Nir, “The big sleep,” The National, 4/24/09
Russo, Claire, “Countdown To Diyala’s Provincial Election: Maliki & The IIP,” Institute for the Study of War, 1/30/09
Serwer, Daniel and Parker, Sam, “Maliki’s Iraq between Two Elections,” United States Institute of Peace, May 2009
Shadid, Anthony, “In Iraq, a Different Struggle for Power,” Washington Post, 6/25/09
Wiseman, Paul, “U.S.-supported Iraqi militias clash with government,” USA Today, 5/27/09
Friday, June 26, 2009
Iraq Ranked No. 6 On Failed State List
Foreign Policy Magazine run by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and the Fund for Peace released their latest Failed States Index for 2009. Iraq was ranked number 6 out of 177 countries. That was a very minor improvement from 2008 when Iraq was number 5. In 2007 it got its lowest mark as the second worst country in the index. Each nation was ranked from 1.0 to 10.0 with one being the best and ten the worst in twelve different social, economic, and political categories. In 2009 Iraq received a total score of 108.6. Only the Congo, Chad, Sudan, Zimbabwe, and Somalia got lower marks. In 2008 Iraq was only behind Chad, Zimbabwe, Sudan and Somalia. While missing some of the major changes in Iraq since the end of the sectarian war, the report does highlight the instability and challenges that remain in the country.
Four social indicators were covered first. Iraq received an 8.7 on demographic pressures, down 0.3 from 2008. Much of Iraq is urbanized, but that is also where most of the violence takes place. Travel within many cities is limited due to checkpoints. The report believes that as security improves, Iraq will improve in this category. On refugees and displaced it got an 8.9, down 0.1 from 2008. Due to the violence 4-5 million Iraqis were forced from their homes, one of the largest refugees crises in the world. The process of return has begun, which accounts for the minor improvement in the score, but it is still happening at very low levels. Iraq received a 9.7 in group grievances, again a 0.1 improvement from 2008. The report sees the country still largely divided between Sunni and Shiites and between Arabs and Kurds. All of their examples however were from 2005 to 2008. While there are still plenty of differences between Sunnis and Shiites, much of this is now being played out in the political rather than military world as most of their events show. The dispute between Arabs and Kurds on the other hand has increased. This could be one area where Iraq could earn a better mark since there is not even half as much violence as there was before resulting from these differences. On human flight Iraq went from a 9.3 in 2008 to a 9.1 in 2009. The report cited the continued absence of much of Iraq’s professional class, and oddly attacks on journalists as a reason why the nation continues to score poorly in this category. Very few Iraqis have been displaced since 2007, which is what the category seems to be about. The latest report by the International Organization for Migration for example, found that only 2.0% of Iraq’s displaced lost their homes in 2008. The fact that Iraq’s middle class has left and not returned yet would seem to go under the refugees’ category, so the country should’ve scored better here. Overall, the study could’ve done better in ranking Iraq in group grievances and human flight.
Economic concerns were next. In uneven development Iraq did worse going from 8.5 to 8.6. The report found that Shiites areas still did better than Sunni ones. This could be partly due to the fact that Sunni areas have little to no oil, but the study also believes this has been done on purpose because of sectarian biases. United Nations reports on Iraq however, would partly dispute this finding. The Shiite south for example, has the highest rates of poverty. Since violence has been concentrated in Sunni areas, that could also be a reason why there has been less development there. In terms of the economy overall, Iraq improved 0.1 with 7.6 in 2009. The improved security meant there was more opportunity for Iraqis to return to their normal lives and conduct business. Iraq is also on the verge of its first round of bidding for long-term oil and natural gas contracts with foreign oil companies. While the study notes that Iraq is largely dependent on oil, it seemed to have missed the fact that the world recession and subsequent drop in crude prices have imposed severe limits on revenues this year. The rest of the economy is still largely underdeveloped due to wars, sanctions, and neglect.
Last the Failed State Index went through six political and military categories. First was legitimacy of the state where Iraq moved from 9.4 in 2008 to 9.0 in 2009. Iraq’s government still suffers from massive corruption, but has been able to bring back different groups that were boycotting the cabinet in 2007. The report does not take into account the new found standing of Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki who has increasingly presented himself as an Iraqi nationalist that is intent upon rebuilding the Iraqi state and government authority. The strength of his argument was displayed in Maliki’s strong showing in the 2009 provincial elections. In public services Iraq received an 8.4. Baghdad is still not able to meet many of the public’s needs, but it is making small improvements. On human rights, Iraq moved up from 9.6 to 9.3 due to the weakening of the insurgency. Iraq’s security forces are still accused of human rights abuses. For security forces Iraq went from 9.9 to 9.7. In this category, the study seems stuck in the sectarian war mentioning the fighting between Sunnis and Shiites, which ended in 2007, and the role of militias. That is now largely over however. Iraq received a 9.6 for factionalized elite. Here the study was right on noting that Iraq’s Sunni, Shiite and Kurdish politicians are still deeply divided upon the direction of the country. Finally Iraq maintained a 10.0 score on external intervention since the United States is still occupying the country. On legitimacy and security apparatus Iraq should’ve done much better, but the Failed State Index seemed to do okay on the other marks.
The Index gets the general idea that Iraq is still a very troubled country. There are deep political divisions within the country, the economy is dependent upon oil, services are bad, and Iraq has one of the largest number of refugees and displaced in the world, very few of which have come home. At the same time there has been a huge improvement in the security situation, very few Iraqis are being forced from their homes anymore, and Maliki has begun the process of rebuilding the image of the state. On those issues, the Failed State report is stuck in the past. This was a more marked problem in the 2008 report. While the study had problems with some individual categories, it highlights the massive problems that are still ahead to make Iraq a stable and prosperous country. This raises the question of course, of who will be responsible for trying to improve Iraq, Baghdad or Washington.
Top 10 Failed States And Total Scores
1. Somalia 114.7
2. Zimbabwe 114.0
3. Sudan 112.4
4. Chad 112.2
5. Congo 108.7
6. Iraq 108.6
7. Afghanistan 108.2
8. Central African Republic 105.4
9. Guinea 104.6
10. Pakistan 104.1
2009/2008 Marks for Iraq on Failed State Index
Total Score: 108.6/110.6
Demographic Pressures: 8.7/9.0
Refugees & Displaced: 8.9/9.0
Group Grievances: 9.7/9.8
Human Flight: 9.1/9.3
Uneven Development: 8.6/8.5
Economy: 7.6/7.8
Legitimacy of State: 9.0/9.4
Public Services: 8.4/8.5
Human Rights: 9.3/9.6
Security Apparatus: 9.7/9.9
Factionalized Elites 9.6/9.8
External Intervention 10.0/10.0
SOURCES
Foreign Policy and The Fund for Peace, “The Failed States Index 2009,” June 2009
The Fund for Peace, “Country Profiles – Iraq,” June 2009
World Food Programme, “Comprehensive Food Security And Vulnerability Analysis In Iraq,” November 2008
Four social indicators were covered first. Iraq received an 8.7 on demographic pressures, down 0.3 from 2008. Much of Iraq is urbanized, but that is also where most of the violence takes place. Travel within many cities is limited due to checkpoints. The report believes that as security improves, Iraq will improve in this category. On refugees and displaced it got an 8.9, down 0.1 from 2008. Due to the violence 4-5 million Iraqis were forced from their homes, one of the largest refugees crises in the world. The process of return has begun, which accounts for the minor improvement in the score, but it is still happening at very low levels. Iraq received a 9.7 in group grievances, again a 0.1 improvement from 2008. The report sees the country still largely divided between Sunni and Shiites and between Arabs and Kurds. All of their examples however were from 2005 to 2008. While there are still plenty of differences between Sunnis and Shiites, much of this is now being played out in the political rather than military world as most of their events show. The dispute between Arabs and Kurds on the other hand has increased. This could be one area where Iraq could earn a better mark since there is not even half as much violence as there was before resulting from these differences. On human flight Iraq went from a 9.3 in 2008 to a 9.1 in 2009. The report cited the continued absence of much of Iraq’s professional class, and oddly attacks on journalists as a reason why the nation continues to score poorly in this category. Very few Iraqis have been displaced since 2007, which is what the category seems to be about. The latest report by the International Organization for Migration for example, found that only 2.0% of Iraq’s displaced lost their homes in 2008. The fact that Iraq’s middle class has left and not returned yet would seem to go under the refugees’ category, so the country should’ve scored better here. Overall, the study could’ve done better in ranking Iraq in group grievances and human flight.
Economic concerns were next. In uneven development Iraq did worse going from 8.5 to 8.6. The report found that Shiites areas still did better than Sunni ones. This could be partly due to the fact that Sunni areas have little to no oil, but the study also believes this has been done on purpose because of sectarian biases. United Nations reports on Iraq however, would partly dispute this finding. The Shiite south for example, has the highest rates of poverty. Since violence has been concentrated in Sunni areas, that could also be a reason why there has been less development there. In terms of the economy overall, Iraq improved 0.1 with 7.6 in 2009. The improved security meant there was more opportunity for Iraqis to return to their normal lives and conduct business. Iraq is also on the verge of its first round of bidding for long-term oil and natural gas contracts with foreign oil companies. While the study notes that Iraq is largely dependent on oil, it seemed to have missed the fact that the world recession and subsequent drop in crude prices have imposed severe limits on revenues this year. The rest of the economy is still largely underdeveloped due to wars, sanctions, and neglect.
Last the Failed State Index went through six political and military categories. First was legitimacy of the state where Iraq moved from 9.4 in 2008 to 9.0 in 2009. Iraq’s government still suffers from massive corruption, but has been able to bring back different groups that were boycotting the cabinet in 2007. The report does not take into account the new found standing of Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki who has increasingly presented himself as an Iraqi nationalist that is intent upon rebuilding the Iraqi state and government authority. The strength of his argument was displayed in Maliki’s strong showing in the 2009 provincial elections. In public services Iraq received an 8.4. Baghdad is still not able to meet many of the public’s needs, but it is making small improvements. On human rights, Iraq moved up from 9.6 to 9.3 due to the weakening of the insurgency. Iraq’s security forces are still accused of human rights abuses. For security forces Iraq went from 9.9 to 9.7. In this category, the study seems stuck in the sectarian war mentioning the fighting between Sunnis and Shiites, which ended in 2007, and the role of militias. That is now largely over however. Iraq received a 9.6 for factionalized elite. Here the study was right on noting that Iraq’s Sunni, Shiite and Kurdish politicians are still deeply divided upon the direction of the country. Finally Iraq maintained a 10.0 score on external intervention since the United States is still occupying the country. On legitimacy and security apparatus Iraq should’ve done much better, but the Failed State Index seemed to do okay on the other marks.
The Index gets the general idea that Iraq is still a very troubled country. There are deep political divisions within the country, the economy is dependent upon oil, services are bad, and Iraq has one of the largest number of refugees and displaced in the world, very few of which have come home. At the same time there has been a huge improvement in the security situation, very few Iraqis are being forced from their homes anymore, and Maliki has begun the process of rebuilding the image of the state. On those issues, the Failed State report is stuck in the past. This was a more marked problem in the 2008 report. While the study had problems with some individual categories, it highlights the massive problems that are still ahead to make Iraq a stable and prosperous country. This raises the question of course, of who will be responsible for trying to improve Iraq, Baghdad or Washington.
Top 10 Failed States And Total Scores
1. Somalia 114.7
2. Zimbabwe 114.0
3. Sudan 112.4
4. Chad 112.2
5. Congo 108.7
6. Iraq 108.6
7. Afghanistan 108.2
8. Central African Republic 105.4
9. Guinea 104.6
10. Pakistan 104.1
2009/2008 Marks for Iraq on Failed State Index
Total Score: 108.6/110.6
Demographic Pressures: 8.7/9.0
Refugees & Displaced: 8.9/9.0
Group Grievances: 9.7/9.8
Human Flight: 9.1/9.3
Uneven Development: 8.6/8.5
Economy: 7.6/7.8
Legitimacy of State: 9.0/9.4
Public Services: 8.4/8.5
Human Rights: 9.3/9.6
Security Apparatus: 9.7/9.9
Factionalized Elites 9.6/9.8
External Intervention 10.0/10.0
SOURCES
Foreign Policy and The Fund for Peace, “The Failed States Index 2009,” June 2009
The Fund for Peace, “Country Profiles – Iraq,” June 2009
World Food Programme, “Comprehensive Food Security And Vulnerability Analysis In Iraq,” November 2008
Thursday, June 25, 2009
Oil Minister Under Attack On Eve Of Awarding New Contracts
Oil Minister Hussain Shahristani is under attack from all sides as he is about to award new long-term oil contracts to foreign companies. There are those that are afraid of the influence of international corporations, others that object to the legality of the contracts, some that want to go after Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki since Shahristani is an ally, and finally those that oppose the Minister’s direction overall. Despite these troubles, Shahristani is intent on going forward with his plan to boost Iraq’s oil production through these deals.
On June 29 and 30, 2009 the Oil Minister will award 20-year oil contracts for six of Iraq’s largest oil fields and two undeveloped natural gas ones. 35 companies have been pre-approved for bidding on these deals including Exxon-Mobile, Shell, Italy’s Eni SpA, Russia’s Lukoil, and China’s Sinopec. The oil fields have up to 44 billion barrels, while the gas ones hold up to 22 trillion cubic feet in reserves. This is part of the Oil Minister’s plan to boost overall oil production to 2.9 million barrels per day by the end of 2009, and 6 million barrels per day in several years. Iraq currently is production about 2.3 million barrels per day.
Before the bidding begins however, the Oil Minister has come under increasing attacks from all sides. On June 23 he appeared before parliament’s oil and gas committee who demanded that the oil deals be approved by parliament. These complaints are motivated by a number of factors. First, the head of the committee is a Kurd. The Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) has had a running battle with Oil Minister Shahristani over its independent oil policy for over a year now. Many lawmakers that are opponents of the Prime Minister want to assert the authority of the parliament to be a check on his power, hence their demand that the legislature confirm the contracts. Oil Minister Shahristani is also a close ally of Maliki who ran as part of his State of Law list in the 2009 provincial elections.
The KRG itself has warned the Oil Minister about his plans as well. The Kurds demand that they be included in any negotiations over oil deals in Kirkuk. They have warned that they will reject any deals that they are not consulted about, and will not provide security or their cooperation with oil companies that conduct work there as a result. The governor of Tamim province, the home of Kirkuk, who is a Kurd, said he and the provincial council should also be brought into the process. The Kurds consider Kirkuk there’s, even though it’s a disputed territory whose future is caught up in the political divisions within the country. Their threats about oil deals there are part of their attempt to establish de facto control of the area.
Members of the state-run South Oil Company, the largest in the country, have also come out against the oil contracts. The Oil Unions’ Federation in Basra demanded that the 1st round of bidding be cancelled. They said that Iraq’s oil could be sufficiently developed by the Oil Ministry with no outside help. The Director General of the company also sent a memo to Shahristani a few days earlier saying that the deals would cripple the economy, and objected to their length. He said that the government run oil companies were already doing much of the same work, and that they only need technical help from foreigners. The director also warned that the deals could be held up in court because they could conflict with existing laws and projects. The Director General suggested that the Oil Ministry only give out short-term technical service agreements instead. This group of critics is motivated by fear of neo-colonialism. They want to protect Iraq’s natural resources from foreign oil companies who they believe will exploit the nation for themselves and leave nothing for Iraq.
Finally, two former Oil Ministers and current officials of the ministry have also come out against the contracts. Saddam’s Minister Esam al-Chalabi said that it was a mistake to start with fields that were already producing, because that would create conflicts between the existing and future work. He warned that any new contracts could be annulled as a result. Prime Minister Ibrahim al-Jaafari’s Oil Minister Ibrahim Bahr al-Ulum voiced the same concerns as the South Oil Company about the potential for foreign control of Iraq’s resources. There are allegedly several high Oil Ministry officials that are also against the contracts complaining about technical issues. This is another group of former and current members of the oil industry that are concerned about Shahristani’s approach to boosting Iraq’s production. They are worried about conflicts his policy might lead to, and the overall direction Shahristani is going in.
There is plenty more to criticize the Oil Minister about as well. His plans have been haphazard at best. In 2008 he was ready to give out short-term oil contracts, and then suddenly cancelled them. Since then the Ministry and state-run petroleum companies have begun giving out a slew of contracts for new work, some of which will happen in fields that are up for bid. Those deals and contracts for foreign consultants should’ve been given out last year when the country was flush with money. It’s also not clear that the Ministry has any ideas about how to create effective business models to effectively develop the field. All of these problems may be due to the fact that Shahristani had no experience in the oil business until Prime Minister Maliki appointed him. Beforehand, Shahristani was a nuclear physicist who after the U.S. invasion was best known for his contacts with Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani.
Iraq’s oil business is a mess. After several wars, years of sanctions, and attacks from the insurgency the infrastructure is falling apart, and many technocrats have fled. Oil is especially important because it accounts for the vast majority of the country’s revenues. Oil Minister Shahristani believes that the industry needs up to $50 billion to be developed. The only way that it can obtain that is through partnership with foreign companies. It’s difficult to enter into these contracts since Iraq has been unable to pass a new oil law since the U.S. invasion. That has led the Minister to push ahead with his own strategy to gain investment and boost production, which has been full of missteps. This has drawn the ire of all sides from those afraid of foreigners, to ones opposed to Maliki and the central government, to ones with different views of Shahristani’s approach. None of these groups are likely to stop the bidding round at the end of June, but it’s likely they will continue to stand in the way of Shahristani’s policy at every turn, making the deals very risky for any companies that win them. That will mean more problems for Iraq’s most important resource.
SOURCES
Abbas, Mohammed, “Iraq Kurds say must have say on Kirkuk oil fields,” Reuters, 6/1/09
Aswat al-Iraq, “Kirkuk governor urges coordination over oil contracts,” 6/17/09
Chon, Gina, “Big Oil Ready for Big Gamble in Iraq,” Wall Street Journal, 6/24/09
Cockburn, Patrick, “Iraqi Oil Minister accused of mother of all sell-outs,” The Independent, 6/18/09
Cordesman, Anthony, “Observations From a Visit to Iraq,” 6/12/09
Dow Jones, “2nd UPDATE: Iraqi Oil Workers Demand Bid Round Cancellation,” 6/22/09
Ibrahim, Waleed, “UPDATE 1-Iraq oil min in parliament, facing foes of deals,” Reuters, 6/23/09
Mohsen, Amer, “Iraq Papers Sat: The I’tilaf is Back!” IraqSlogger.com, 6/19/09
Raphaeli, Dr. Nimrod, “The Oil Sector in Iraq: Prospects and Problems,” Middle East Media Research Institute, 6/11/09
Reuters, “ANALYSIS-Risk rises on Iraq oil deals after industry revolt,” 6/21/09
Shadid, Anthony and Vick, Karl, “Candidate Slate Shows Shiites Closing Ranks,” Washington Post, 12/7/04
UPI, “Iraqi oil director wants to scrap deals,” 6/18/09
Visser, Reidar, “The Map of Electoral Coalitions South of Baghdad Is Taking Shape,” 10/31/08
On June 29 and 30, 2009 the Oil Minister will award 20-year oil contracts for six of Iraq’s largest oil fields and two undeveloped natural gas ones. 35 companies have been pre-approved for bidding on these deals including Exxon-Mobile, Shell, Italy’s Eni SpA, Russia’s Lukoil, and China’s Sinopec. The oil fields have up to 44 billion barrels, while the gas ones hold up to 22 trillion cubic feet in reserves. This is part of the Oil Minister’s plan to boost overall oil production to 2.9 million barrels per day by the end of 2009, and 6 million barrels per day in several years. Iraq currently is production about 2.3 million barrels per day.
Before the bidding begins however, the Oil Minister has come under increasing attacks from all sides. On June 23 he appeared before parliament’s oil and gas committee who demanded that the oil deals be approved by parliament. These complaints are motivated by a number of factors. First, the head of the committee is a Kurd. The Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) has had a running battle with Oil Minister Shahristani over its independent oil policy for over a year now. Many lawmakers that are opponents of the Prime Minister want to assert the authority of the parliament to be a check on his power, hence their demand that the legislature confirm the contracts. Oil Minister Shahristani is also a close ally of Maliki who ran as part of his State of Law list in the 2009 provincial elections.
The KRG itself has warned the Oil Minister about his plans as well. The Kurds demand that they be included in any negotiations over oil deals in Kirkuk. They have warned that they will reject any deals that they are not consulted about, and will not provide security or their cooperation with oil companies that conduct work there as a result. The governor of Tamim province, the home of Kirkuk, who is a Kurd, said he and the provincial council should also be brought into the process. The Kurds consider Kirkuk there’s, even though it’s a disputed territory whose future is caught up in the political divisions within the country. Their threats about oil deals there are part of their attempt to establish de facto control of the area.
Members of the state-run South Oil Company, the largest in the country, have also come out against the oil contracts. The Oil Unions’ Federation in Basra demanded that the 1st round of bidding be cancelled. They said that Iraq’s oil could be sufficiently developed by the Oil Ministry with no outside help. The Director General of the company also sent a memo to Shahristani a few days earlier saying that the deals would cripple the economy, and objected to their length. He said that the government run oil companies were already doing much of the same work, and that they only need technical help from foreigners. The director also warned that the deals could be held up in court because they could conflict with existing laws and projects. The Director General suggested that the Oil Ministry only give out short-term technical service agreements instead. This group of critics is motivated by fear of neo-colonialism. They want to protect Iraq’s natural resources from foreign oil companies who they believe will exploit the nation for themselves and leave nothing for Iraq.
Finally, two former Oil Ministers and current officials of the ministry have also come out against the contracts. Saddam’s Minister Esam al-Chalabi said that it was a mistake to start with fields that were already producing, because that would create conflicts between the existing and future work. He warned that any new contracts could be annulled as a result. Prime Minister Ibrahim al-Jaafari’s Oil Minister Ibrahim Bahr al-Ulum voiced the same concerns as the South Oil Company about the potential for foreign control of Iraq’s resources. There are allegedly several high Oil Ministry officials that are also against the contracts complaining about technical issues. This is another group of former and current members of the oil industry that are concerned about Shahristani’s approach to boosting Iraq’s production. They are worried about conflicts his policy might lead to, and the overall direction Shahristani is going in.
There is plenty more to criticize the Oil Minister about as well. His plans have been haphazard at best. In 2008 he was ready to give out short-term oil contracts, and then suddenly cancelled them. Since then the Ministry and state-run petroleum companies have begun giving out a slew of contracts for new work, some of which will happen in fields that are up for bid. Those deals and contracts for foreign consultants should’ve been given out last year when the country was flush with money. It’s also not clear that the Ministry has any ideas about how to create effective business models to effectively develop the field. All of these problems may be due to the fact that Shahristani had no experience in the oil business until Prime Minister Maliki appointed him. Beforehand, Shahristani was a nuclear physicist who after the U.S. invasion was best known for his contacts with Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani.
Iraq’s oil business is a mess. After several wars, years of sanctions, and attacks from the insurgency the infrastructure is falling apart, and many technocrats have fled. Oil is especially important because it accounts for the vast majority of the country’s revenues. Oil Minister Shahristani believes that the industry needs up to $50 billion to be developed. The only way that it can obtain that is through partnership with foreign companies. It’s difficult to enter into these contracts since Iraq has been unable to pass a new oil law since the U.S. invasion. That has led the Minister to push ahead with his own strategy to gain investment and boost production, which has been full of missteps. This has drawn the ire of all sides from those afraid of foreigners, to ones opposed to Maliki and the central government, to ones with different views of Shahristani’s approach. None of these groups are likely to stop the bidding round at the end of June, but it’s likely they will continue to stand in the way of Shahristani’s policy at every turn, making the deals very risky for any companies that win them. That will mean more problems for Iraq’s most important resource.
SOURCES
Abbas, Mohammed, “Iraq Kurds say must have say on Kirkuk oil fields,” Reuters, 6/1/09
Aswat al-Iraq, “Kirkuk governor urges coordination over oil contracts,” 6/17/09
Chon, Gina, “Big Oil Ready for Big Gamble in Iraq,” Wall Street Journal, 6/24/09
Cockburn, Patrick, “Iraqi Oil Minister accused of mother of all sell-outs,” The Independent, 6/18/09
Cordesman, Anthony, “Observations From a Visit to Iraq,” 6/12/09
Dow Jones, “2nd UPDATE: Iraqi Oil Workers Demand Bid Round Cancellation,” 6/22/09
Ibrahim, Waleed, “UPDATE 1-Iraq oil min in parliament, facing foes of deals,” Reuters, 6/23/09
Mohsen, Amer, “Iraq Papers Sat: The I’tilaf is Back!” IraqSlogger.com, 6/19/09
Raphaeli, Dr. Nimrod, “The Oil Sector in Iraq: Prospects and Problems,” Middle East Media Research Institute, 6/11/09
Reuters, “ANALYSIS-Risk rises on Iraq oil deals after industry revolt,” 6/21/09
Shadid, Anthony and Vick, Karl, “Candidate Slate Shows Shiites Closing Ranks,” Washington Post, 12/7/04
UPI, “Iraqi oil director wants to scrap deals,” 6/18/09
Visser, Reidar, “The Map of Electoral Coalitions South of Baghdad Is Taking Shape,” 10/31/08
Wednesday, June 24, 2009
Don’t Expect Vote on SOFA Anytime Soon
On November 27, 2008 Iraq’s parliament passed the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA), which set the future relationship between Iraq and the United States. The only real concession the Sunni Iraqi Accordance Front was able to get included in the agreement was a referendum on the deal to be held in July 2009. That date is quickly approaching, but there’s no rush in Baghdad to have the vote happen.
Having the Americans go is popular in Iraq right now, and politicians like to talk about it to gain favor before the January 2010 parliamentary election, but in practice there is no real effort behind having the July referendum. In mid-May 2009 the Iraqi Election Commission said that it was ready to hold the vote, but that parliament needed to pass a law and budget for it. On July 9 it appeared that this was moving forward when the Councils of Ministers, Maliki’s cabinet, allocated $99.575 million for the referendum. It was then reported that the cabinet wanted to delay the vote for six months so that it would happen at the same time as the January 2010 parliamentary balloting. If Iraq’s legislature acts like normal, it could take six months or longer to pass a law to regulate the referendum. In addition, the U.S. is also working behind the scenes to try to have Baghdad cancel the vote altogether.
If the referendum is held, many American observers believe that it will not pass. That would mean U.S. combat troops would have one year to withdraw from Iraq after the voting day. The White House and Pentagon need to make contingency planning for this possible outcome. At the same time, given Iraq’s parliament’s recent history, it’s unlikely that they can pass any legislation on time. One that is political sensitive like a referendum on SOFA is likely to drag out even longer. At the same time, since Iraqi nationalism is on the rise the referendum could very likely correspond with the parliamentary elections, so Iraqi politicians could use it to their personal advantage. Also of importance is the fact that a large training/advising force will probably stay behind to provide logistics, air and sea support, and intelligence for the Iraqi forces whether the U.S. pulls out in January 2011 or December 2011.
SOURCES
Alsumaria, “IHEC ready to hold referendum on US pact,” 5/14/09
Aswat al-Iraq, “Iraqi govt. allocates $100 million for referendum on security agreement,” 6/9/09
Rubin, Alissa, “Iraq Moves Ahead With Vote on U.S. Security Pact,” New York Times, 6/10/09
Rubin, Alissa, Robertson, Campbell and Farrell, Stephen, “Iraqi Parliament Approves U.S. Security Pact,” New York Times, 11/27/08
Having the Americans go is popular in Iraq right now, and politicians like to talk about it to gain favor before the January 2010 parliamentary election, but in practice there is no real effort behind having the July referendum. In mid-May 2009 the Iraqi Election Commission said that it was ready to hold the vote, but that parliament needed to pass a law and budget for it. On July 9 it appeared that this was moving forward when the Councils of Ministers, Maliki’s cabinet, allocated $99.575 million for the referendum. It was then reported that the cabinet wanted to delay the vote for six months so that it would happen at the same time as the January 2010 parliamentary balloting. If Iraq’s legislature acts like normal, it could take six months or longer to pass a law to regulate the referendum. In addition, the U.S. is also working behind the scenes to try to have Baghdad cancel the vote altogether.
If the referendum is held, many American observers believe that it will not pass. That would mean U.S. combat troops would have one year to withdraw from Iraq after the voting day. The White House and Pentagon need to make contingency planning for this possible outcome. At the same time, given Iraq’s parliament’s recent history, it’s unlikely that they can pass any legislation on time. One that is political sensitive like a referendum on SOFA is likely to drag out even longer. At the same time, since Iraqi nationalism is on the rise the referendum could very likely correspond with the parliamentary elections, so Iraqi politicians could use it to their personal advantage. Also of importance is the fact that a large training/advising force will probably stay behind to provide logistics, air and sea support, and intelligence for the Iraqi forces whether the U.S. pulls out in January 2011 or December 2011.
SOURCES
Alsumaria, “IHEC ready to hold referendum on US pact,” 5/14/09
Aswat al-Iraq, “Iraqi govt. allocates $100 million for referendum on security agreement,” 6/9/09
Rubin, Alissa, “Iraq Moves Ahead With Vote on U.S. Security Pact,” New York Times, 6/10/09
Rubin, Alissa, Robertson, Campbell and Farrell, Stephen, “Iraqi Parliament Approves U.S. Security Pact,” New York Times, 11/27/08
Tuesday, June 23, 2009
United Iraqi Alliance Ready To Be Reconstituted
As recently reported, both the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council (SIIC) and Iran are desperately trying to put together the United Iraqi Alliance (UIA) before the 2010 parliamentary elections. Al-Hayat newspaper recently reported that Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki has agreed to rejoin the List as long as he gets to set the agenda. According to the paper, the coalition will be called the Coalition of the State of Law, after Maliki’s successful list in the 2009 provincial vote. The alliance will also be open to any party, and not just be a Shiite one like it was when it was originally formed. The Prime Minister has talked to Grand Ayatollah Ali Sistani about creating such a list.
An SIIC member was also quoted in the Azzaman paper that they were consulting with the Sadrists to bring them back into the fold as well. Sadr’s followers left the alliance in September 2007 after there were efforts to push him out of the ruling coalition behind Maliki’s government. The Sadrists and SIIC are long-time rivals who carried out a running battle against each other across the south after the U.S. invasion. Maliki launched a crackdown on the Mahdi Army in March 2008 that largely broke up the militia. That didn’t stop the State of Law List from reaching out to the Sadrists after the January 2009 elections. The Sadrists have recently been protesting against their followers still being in prison, and being abused after the government’s offensives. They have blamed Maliki and the Supreme Council for these arrests, and their release may be a precondition for them to rejoin the alliance. Until then the Sadrists have said they will run on their own like they did in the provincial vote.
If Maliki goes ahead and rejoins the Supreme Council they could be a powerful force in the 2010 balloting. Maliki’s State of Law won the most seats in the provincial elections, but only came away with a majority in two provinces. Including the Supreme Council, and other parties would make the alliance a dominant force, and give Maliki say over any new coalition that was put together in parliament, thus cementing his role as kingmaker and center of Iraqi politics.
SOURCES
Mohsen, Amer, “Iraq Papers Sat: The I’tilaf is Back!” IraqSlogger.com, 6/19/09
Parker, Ned, “Sadr’s bloc quits Iraq’s ruling coalition,” Times of London, 9/16/07
Al-Sharqiyah Television, “Iraq Al-Sadr bloc leader speaks of unjustified detentions, views spat with Kuwait,” BBC Monitoring International Reports, 6/11/09
- “Iraq detains Interior Ministry employee over prison rights violations; update,” BBC Monitoring International Reports, 6/15/09
- “’Special groups’ leaders arrested in Iraq; political, security roundup,” BBC Monitoring International Reports, 6/15/09
- “US troops start withdrawal from Al-Sadr City; Iraq roundup,” BBC Monitoring International Reports, 5/29/09
Tavernise, Sabrina and Mizher, Qais, “In Iraq’s Mayhem, Town Finds Calm Through Its Tribal Links,” New York Times, 7/10/06
An SIIC member was also quoted in the Azzaman paper that they were consulting with the Sadrists to bring them back into the fold as well. Sadr’s followers left the alliance in September 2007 after there were efforts to push him out of the ruling coalition behind Maliki’s government. The Sadrists and SIIC are long-time rivals who carried out a running battle against each other across the south after the U.S. invasion. Maliki launched a crackdown on the Mahdi Army in March 2008 that largely broke up the militia. That didn’t stop the State of Law List from reaching out to the Sadrists after the January 2009 elections. The Sadrists have recently been protesting against their followers still being in prison, and being abused after the government’s offensives. They have blamed Maliki and the Supreme Council for these arrests, and their release may be a precondition for them to rejoin the alliance. Until then the Sadrists have said they will run on their own like they did in the provincial vote.
If Maliki goes ahead and rejoins the Supreme Council they could be a powerful force in the 2010 balloting. Maliki’s State of Law won the most seats in the provincial elections, but only came away with a majority in two provinces. Including the Supreme Council, and other parties would make the alliance a dominant force, and give Maliki say over any new coalition that was put together in parliament, thus cementing his role as kingmaker and center of Iraqi politics.
SOURCES
Mohsen, Amer, “Iraq Papers Sat: The I’tilaf is Back!” IraqSlogger.com, 6/19/09
Parker, Ned, “Sadr’s bloc quits Iraq’s ruling coalition,” Times of London, 9/16/07
Al-Sharqiyah Television, “Iraq Al-Sadr bloc leader speaks of unjustified detentions, views spat with Kuwait,” BBC Monitoring International Reports, 6/11/09
- “Iraq detains Interior Ministry employee over prison rights violations; update,” BBC Monitoring International Reports, 6/15/09
- “’Special groups’ leaders arrested in Iraq; political, security roundup,” BBC Monitoring International Reports, 6/15/09
- “US troops start withdrawal from Al-Sadr City; Iraq roundup,” BBC Monitoring International Reports, 5/29/09
Tavernise, Sabrina and Mizher, Qais, “In Iraq’s Mayhem, Town Finds Calm Through Its Tribal Links,” New York Times, 7/10/06
Monday, June 22, 2009
Update On Political Dispute In Ninewa
Things remain tense in Ninewa province. Since the January 2009 elections, the province has been divided between the ruling Al-Hadbaa party and the Ninewa Fraternal List. The Kurdish Fraternal List was previously in power, but was defeated by Al-Hadbaa who ran on a largely anti-Kurdish campaign. Since the new council was seated in April the Fraternal List has been boycotting it. They have been steadily upping the ante.
On June 9 there was a shootout between Kurdish peshmerga forces and police in Zammar as Al-Hadba council member Ahmed Awad al-Sheikh Issa was visiting. Issa claimed that he was seeing local officials there when peshmerga forces surrounded the building. When the police came, they exchanged gunfire with the peshmerga. According to IraqSlogger, the officials that Issa met with were later arrested by the peshmerga and taken to Dohuk in Kurdistan.
Four days later Al-Sharqiyah Television reported that the Fraternal List was considering setting up their own administration of districts and towns in Ninewa with Kurdish majorities that were refusing to cooperate with the Ninewa council. The head of the List Khisru Guran said that the move would be unconstitutional, but that there were all kinds of violations of the law such as not implementing Article 140 that is to resolve the future of disputed territories.
Finally, on June 20 former Deputy Governor of Ninewa and Fraternal List member Khasro Ghoran told teachers in Bashiqa that they should only run their classes in Kurdish from now on. The town was the sight of an earlier confrontation when Kurdish forces refused to allow the Al-Hadbaa governor of Ninewa Atheel al-Najafi to attend a sporting event there in early May.
As would be expected, the Al-Hadbaa party has condemned all of these moves. Various officials have said that the Kurds are trying to divide the people of Ninewa and sow dissent. They have also said any attempt to form a separate Kurdish led government in the province would be illegal. They have also accused the peshmerga of human rights abuses and violating the law. Overall, Governor Najafi has said he will only cooperate with the Kurds if they give up their aspirations to annex parts of Ninewa and withdraw their militia.
Outside forces are in the process of trying to mediate this dispute. At the beginning of June the Iraqi Islamic Party said they were sending officials to Ninewa to talk with both sides. The Islamic Party holds three seats on the Ninewa council, and has an alliance with the Kurds in parliament. The new U.S. Ambassador to Iraq Christopher Hill has also offered his assistance. The Kurds have talked to him, and the brother of Governor Najafi, a parliamentarian said that he hopes that the U.S. can help. Finally, the Sadrists in parliament have sent a delegation to meet with the parties.
Neither side seems willing to compromise in this dispute. While three different groups have gone to Ninewa, there has been no word of any breakthroughs or dialogue between Al-Hadbaa and the Fraternal List. The Kurds are demanding that they be given leading positions in the council, while Al-Hadbaa is asking that the Kurds given up any aspirations they might have over disputed areas in the province. The bigger threat of course, is that this might lead to violence. The shoot out in Zammar could’ve easily escalated. The Americans are especially worried about this as they withdraw. In the short-term at least, things look like they will only get worse in the province.
SOURCES
Aswat al-Iraq, “IIP delegation to visit Ninewa to work out solutions to power sharing,” 6/2/09
- “Ninewa chieftains protest Peshmerga, Asayesh presence,” 5/12/09
- “Sadrist delegation in Mosul to defuse crisis,” 6/13/09
Dagher, Sam, “Tensions Stoked Between Iraqi Kurds and Sunnis,” New York Times, 5/18/09
Hamad, Qassim Khidhir, “arab domination rejected by kurds in makhmour,” Niqash, 5/22/09
Al-Hayat, “US ambassador to Iraq offers to mediate between Kurds, Arabs in Mosul – paper,” BBC Monitoring International Reports, 6/4/09
Sbay, “Iraq Kurdish officials and Ninewa governor’s exchange accusations – website,” BBC Monitoring International Reports, 5/30/09
Al-Sharqiyah Television, “Iraq roundup: Al-Sadr Trend mediates in Ninawa; security incidents,” BBC Monitoring Service, 6/14/09
Smith, Daniel, “Arabic Language Barred in Ba’shiqa Schools,” IraqSlogger.com, 6/20/09
- “Gunfire Between Pesh Merga and Al-Hadba Guards,” IraqSlogger.com, 6/12/09
On June 9 there was a shootout between Kurdish peshmerga forces and police in Zammar as Al-Hadba council member Ahmed Awad al-Sheikh Issa was visiting. Issa claimed that he was seeing local officials there when peshmerga forces surrounded the building. When the police came, they exchanged gunfire with the peshmerga. According to IraqSlogger, the officials that Issa met with were later arrested by the peshmerga and taken to Dohuk in Kurdistan.
Four days later Al-Sharqiyah Television reported that the Fraternal List was considering setting up their own administration of districts and towns in Ninewa with Kurdish majorities that were refusing to cooperate with the Ninewa council. The head of the List Khisru Guran said that the move would be unconstitutional, but that there were all kinds of violations of the law such as not implementing Article 140 that is to resolve the future of disputed territories.
Finally, on June 20 former Deputy Governor of Ninewa and Fraternal List member Khasro Ghoran told teachers in Bashiqa that they should only run their classes in Kurdish from now on. The town was the sight of an earlier confrontation when Kurdish forces refused to allow the Al-Hadbaa governor of Ninewa Atheel al-Najafi to attend a sporting event there in early May.
As would be expected, the Al-Hadbaa party has condemned all of these moves. Various officials have said that the Kurds are trying to divide the people of Ninewa and sow dissent. They have also said any attempt to form a separate Kurdish led government in the province would be illegal. They have also accused the peshmerga of human rights abuses and violating the law. Overall, Governor Najafi has said he will only cooperate with the Kurds if they give up their aspirations to annex parts of Ninewa and withdraw their militia.
Outside forces are in the process of trying to mediate this dispute. At the beginning of June the Iraqi Islamic Party said they were sending officials to Ninewa to talk with both sides. The Islamic Party holds three seats on the Ninewa council, and has an alliance with the Kurds in parliament. The new U.S. Ambassador to Iraq Christopher Hill has also offered his assistance. The Kurds have talked to him, and the brother of Governor Najafi, a parliamentarian said that he hopes that the U.S. can help. Finally, the Sadrists in parliament have sent a delegation to meet with the parties.
Neither side seems willing to compromise in this dispute. While three different groups have gone to Ninewa, there has been no word of any breakthroughs or dialogue between Al-Hadbaa and the Fraternal List. The Kurds are demanding that they be given leading positions in the council, while Al-Hadbaa is asking that the Kurds given up any aspirations they might have over disputed areas in the province. The bigger threat of course, is that this might lead to violence. The shoot out in Zammar could’ve easily escalated. The Americans are especially worried about this as they withdraw. In the short-term at least, things look like they will only get worse in the province.
SOURCES
Aswat al-Iraq, “IIP delegation to visit Ninewa to work out solutions to power sharing,” 6/2/09
- “Ninewa chieftains protest Peshmerga, Asayesh presence,” 5/12/09
- “Sadrist delegation in Mosul to defuse crisis,” 6/13/09
Dagher, Sam, “Tensions Stoked Between Iraqi Kurds and Sunnis,” New York Times, 5/18/09
Hamad, Qassim Khidhir, “arab domination rejected by kurds in makhmour,” Niqash, 5/22/09
Al-Hayat, “US ambassador to Iraq offers to mediate between Kurds, Arabs in Mosul – paper,” BBC Monitoring International Reports, 6/4/09
Sbay, “Iraq Kurdish officials and Ninewa governor’s exchange accusations – website,” BBC Monitoring International Reports, 5/30/09
Al-Sharqiyah Television, “Iraq roundup: Al-Sadr Trend mediates in Ninawa; security incidents,” BBC Monitoring Service, 6/14/09
Smith, Daniel, “Arabic Language Barred in Ba’shiqa Schools,” IraqSlogger.com, 6/20/09
- “Gunfire Between Pesh Merga and Al-Hadba Guards,” IraqSlogger.com, 6/12/09
Sunday, June 21, 2009
Center for a New American Security – Maintain The Status Quo In Iraq
In June 2009 the Center for a New American Security (CNAS) released a position paper on what U.S. policy towards Iraq should be under the new administration entitled, “After the Fire: Shaping the Future U.S. Relationship with Iraq.” The two authors, John Nagl, a famous former Army officer, and Brian Burton argue that the U.S. should foster Iraq as a long-term ally in the Middle East. The problem is that the U.S. is pulling out, the American public has grown tired of the war, and there is a recession. The CNAS paper worries that short-term thinking will outweigh the long-term goal of the U.S. to have stability in the Middle East. Almost all of the paper’s recommendations however are already being implemented, so what it’s really about is asking for the status quo to be maintained in Iraq past the U.S. withdrawal.
The paper sees four major challenges for the U.S. in Iraq. First, is the increasing divide between Arabs and Kurds. As reported before, a recent journal piece in Middle East Policy argued that this dispute could lead to the fall of the government, become a new source of violence, and even break up the country. Second, is integration of the Sunnis, who still need to find their place in the new political order. Third, is whether Iraq will slide back to authoritarianism. As a paper by two United States Institute of Peace officials recently noted, Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki is now at the center of Iraqi politics. His opponents are worried that he may become an autocrat. Finally, Iraq’s future is threatened by its over reliance upon oil, which provides almost all of its revenue. The economic downturn has affected Baghdad’s hopes for development, jobs, services, and maintaining the security forces to name just a few.
To meet these challenges and ensure that Iraq is a long-term ally, the CNAS paper suggests five strategies Washington should follow. To deal with the Arab-Kurd divide, the U.S. should act as mediators, and support the United Nations effort to resolve the disputed territories, especially Kirkuk. The U.S. is already trying to help talks between the two sides across northern Iraq, and has stepped in to stop military confrontations. The U.S. also backs the U.N.’s plans for the disputed territories. With regards to the integration of the Sunnis, the writers believe supporting elections is the best course of action. The U.S. has been largely unsuccessful pushing Baghdad to reconcile with the Sunnis, so backing free and open voting where Sunni parties can gain power is the best alternative. This is something Washington has done since 2005. The U.S. also needs to help Iraq diversify its economy. CNAS suggests agriculture should be cultivated. The last few Defense Department quarterly reports to Congress have said the same thing. The problem is that Iraq’s farm sector faces so many institutional barriers such as a lack of tariffs and government support, inadequate irrigation, etc. that it could take over a decade for it to recover. To prevent the return of an autocratic leader in Iraq, the two writers suggest supporting institutions and professionalism. The U.S. already has advisers throughout the Iraqi military and ministries. Washington should also emphasize that it stands behind the Iraqi government, and not just Maliki, something that the Obama administration has already done as well. Finally, to encourage Iraq as a long-term ally the U.S. needs to re-integrate it into the region, and foster more ties between Washington and Baghdad. Getting Iraq’s neighbors to accept the Shiite led government in Baghdad has proven more difficult than expected. Countries like Saudi Arabia have given Iraq a cold shoulder since the invasion. Turkey on the other hand has changed its policy and become much closer recently. Other steps could be bringing more Iraqi military officers and students for training and education in the United States. The authors also believe that the U.S. needs to keep both civilian and military advisers in Iraq past the 2011 deadline for a U.S. withdrawal of combat troops.
Almost everything that the CNAS paper advocates is already being done by the U.S. administration. It is working with the Iraqi government and military, it is trying to mediate internal disputes, it is helping with the economy, it is trying to bring its allies in the region to open up to Baghdad, etc. The only question is whether President Obama will be open to keeping up this support for Iraq after 2011. That’s what “After the Fire” is really about, trying to ensure that all of these programs are maintained into 2012 and beyond.
SOURCES
Anatolia News Agency, “Turkish general says MoU between Turkey and Iraq to contribute to peace,” Today’s Zaman, 6/12/09
Department of Defense, “Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq,” March 2009
- “Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq,” September 2008
- “Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq,” December 2008
Al-Hayat, “US ambassador to Iraq offers to mediate between Kurds, Arabs in Mosul – paper,” BBC Monitoring International Reports, 6/4/09
International Crisis Group, “Oil For Soil: Toward A Grand Bargain On Iraq And The Kurds,” 10/28/08
Kazimi, Nibras, “Iraq: Trouble for Maliki,” Hudson New York, 4/24/09
Nagl, John and Burton, Brian, “After the Fire: Shaping the Future U.S. Relationship with Iraq,” Center for a New American Security, June 2009
Serwer, Daniel and Parker, Sam, “Maliki’s Iraq between Two Elections,” United States Institute of Peace, May 2009
Stansfield, Gareth Anderson, Liam, “Kurds in Iraq: the struggle between Baghdad and Erbil,” Middle East Policy, Spring 2009
Williams, Timothy and al-Salhy, Saudad, “Allotting of Iraqi Oil Rights May Stoke Hostility,” New York Times, 5/29/09
The paper sees four major challenges for the U.S. in Iraq. First, is the increasing divide between Arabs and Kurds. As reported before, a recent journal piece in Middle East Policy argued that this dispute could lead to the fall of the government, become a new source of violence, and even break up the country. Second, is integration of the Sunnis, who still need to find their place in the new political order. Third, is whether Iraq will slide back to authoritarianism. As a paper by two United States Institute of Peace officials recently noted, Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki is now at the center of Iraqi politics. His opponents are worried that he may become an autocrat. Finally, Iraq’s future is threatened by its over reliance upon oil, which provides almost all of its revenue. The economic downturn has affected Baghdad’s hopes for development, jobs, services, and maintaining the security forces to name just a few.
To meet these challenges and ensure that Iraq is a long-term ally, the CNAS paper suggests five strategies Washington should follow. To deal with the Arab-Kurd divide, the U.S. should act as mediators, and support the United Nations effort to resolve the disputed territories, especially Kirkuk. The U.S. is already trying to help talks between the two sides across northern Iraq, and has stepped in to stop military confrontations. The U.S. also backs the U.N.’s plans for the disputed territories. With regards to the integration of the Sunnis, the writers believe supporting elections is the best course of action. The U.S. has been largely unsuccessful pushing Baghdad to reconcile with the Sunnis, so backing free and open voting where Sunni parties can gain power is the best alternative. This is something Washington has done since 2005. The U.S. also needs to help Iraq diversify its economy. CNAS suggests agriculture should be cultivated. The last few Defense Department quarterly reports to Congress have said the same thing. The problem is that Iraq’s farm sector faces so many institutional barriers such as a lack of tariffs and government support, inadequate irrigation, etc. that it could take over a decade for it to recover. To prevent the return of an autocratic leader in Iraq, the two writers suggest supporting institutions and professionalism. The U.S. already has advisers throughout the Iraqi military and ministries. Washington should also emphasize that it stands behind the Iraqi government, and not just Maliki, something that the Obama administration has already done as well. Finally, to encourage Iraq as a long-term ally the U.S. needs to re-integrate it into the region, and foster more ties between Washington and Baghdad. Getting Iraq’s neighbors to accept the Shiite led government in Baghdad has proven more difficult than expected. Countries like Saudi Arabia have given Iraq a cold shoulder since the invasion. Turkey on the other hand has changed its policy and become much closer recently. Other steps could be bringing more Iraqi military officers and students for training and education in the United States. The authors also believe that the U.S. needs to keep both civilian and military advisers in Iraq past the 2011 deadline for a U.S. withdrawal of combat troops.
Almost everything that the CNAS paper advocates is already being done by the U.S. administration. It is working with the Iraqi government and military, it is trying to mediate internal disputes, it is helping with the economy, it is trying to bring its allies in the region to open up to Baghdad, etc. The only question is whether President Obama will be open to keeping up this support for Iraq after 2011. That’s what “After the Fire” is really about, trying to ensure that all of these programs are maintained into 2012 and beyond.
SOURCES
Anatolia News Agency, “Turkish general says MoU between Turkey and Iraq to contribute to peace,” Today’s Zaman, 6/12/09
Department of Defense, “Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq,” March 2009
- “Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq,” September 2008
- “Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq,” December 2008
Al-Hayat, “US ambassador to Iraq offers to mediate between Kurds, Arabs in Mosul – paper,” BBC Monitoring International Reports, 6/4/09
International Crisis Group, “Oil For Soil: Toward A Grand Bargain On Iraq And The Kurds,” 10/28/08
Kazimi, Nibras, “Iraq: Trouble for Maliki,” Hudson New York, 4/24/09
Nagl, John and Burton, Brian, “After the Fire: Shaping the Future U.S. Relationship with Iraq,” Center for a New American Security, June 2009
Serwer, Daniel and Parker, Sam, “Maliki’s Iraq between Two Elections,” United States Institute of Peace, May 2009
Stansfield, Gareth Anderson, Liam, “Kurds in Iraq: the struggle between Baghdad and Erbil,” Middle East Policy, Spring 2009
Williams, Timothy and al-Salhy, Saudad, “Allotting of Iraqi Oil Rights May Stoke Hostility,” New York Times, 5/29/09
One Year Anniversary Of Musings!
June 17 was the one-year anniversary of Musings On Iraq. I obviously got into the blogging game late. I’d been reading and writing about Iraq since 2002, but I only posted on message boards and comment sections. I never knew how easy it was to start a blog until last year.
This is obviously a labor of love, which takes up a lot of my free time after teaching and taking care of the family. You don’t know how many complaints I hear from them about working on Musings. I guess it’s all worth it. I’d especially like to thank all the loyal readers. I hope more will check out the site, but this is a bad time, since Iraq is becoming the “forgotten war.” The U.S. is likely to be heavily involved there for the next decade so I should have enough to write about in the future. Thanks to everyone that stops by. - Joel
This is obviously a labor of love, which takes up a lot of my free time after teaching and taking care of the family. You don’t know how many complaints I hear from them about working on Musings. I guess it’s all worth it. I’d especially like to thank all the loyal readers. I hope more will check out the site, but this is a bad time, since Iraq is becoming the “forgotten war.” The U.S. is likely to be heavily involved there for the next decade so I should have enough to write about in the future. Thanks to everyone that stops by. - Joel
Friday, June 19, 2009
Iraqis Unwilling To Maintain Their Army
Nearly every official report on Iraq’s security forces notes that they do not have the ability to supply and support themselves. Few if any details however, are ever given on what exactly this means. In April 2009 the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR) conducted an audit on the U.S. military’s effort to build up the Iraqi Army’s logistics capabilities. The SIGIR found that the Iraqi Defense Ministry has refused to take responsibility of the maintenance program created by the Americans, has not sent soldiers to be trained in these duties, and that the Iraqi Army cannot operate independently as a result.
Beginning in early 2005 the U.S. command in Iraq began working on Iraq’s supply system. The goal was to allow the Iraqi Army to act autonomously without U.S. support. The program focused upon maintenance, supply, transportation, and health services. The plan has gone through six phases, two of which are still operating. In total the program has received $682.2 million in funding, $572.0 million of which has been spent. The orders for the plan were never clear, they have been changed 161 times, there was little oversight, and has not been supported by the Ministry of Defense. The result is that costs have increased $420.5 million, and are expected to go up an additional $60 million until the last order expires in January 2010.
The SIGIR audit focused upon Orders 3, 5 and 6. Order 3 was started in May 2005 and completed in June 2007. It set up ten maintenance facilities, one for each Iraqi Army division. The order was also to provide training for Iraqi soldiers so that they could operate the bases. Order 5 was a follow up to provide training and maintain the ten facilities. It was supposed to end on May 31, 2009, but has been extended to November 30, 2009. Order 6 was for maintenance on 8,500 HUMVEES that were transferred from the Americans forces to the Iraqis. It is due to expire on July 6, 2009, but will be extended until January 6, 2010.
The three orders have faced daunting challenges since they began. On the American side, the U.S. never assigned enough personnel to oversee the orders, which could have led to corruption and waste. Many of the benchmarks were unclear, changed, or never followed. For example, 80% of the Iraqi vehicles were to be operational at all times, but this was never enforced. Order 3 and 5 had no details on how they were to be evaluated as successful or not. The U.S. has also transferred eight of the 10 maintenance facilities to Iraqi control, despite the fact that the Defense Ministry has not accepted responsibility for them. There is no agreed upon process for the handover of these bases, yet they are happening anyway. The Iraqi Army also only sent one class of soldiers to be trained. Many of them lacked the education for the training. That is not uncommon. An on-going Iraqi Army audit has found that 24% of the force is not qualified for their jobs, and that 15% are illiterate. This is mostly blamed on the Americans drive to increase the security forces as quickly as possible, which emphasized quantity over quality. Most of the soldiers that did show up for training complained about not getting paid for weeks, and quit before they were finished. The Defense Ministry has not sent any new soldiers since then. That was the major reason why Order 5 was issued when Order 3 ended, and why the U.S. military is looking to extend Order 5 and 6 as well.
In the end, the Special Inspector General does not believe that the Iraqi Army has improved at all under this program. There is no evidence that the Iraqi forces are any more capable of maintaining their equipment now than when the plan began in 2005. The main reason is that the Defense Ministry has given no support to the effort at all. That leaves the Iraqi armed forces almost completely dependent upon the Americans for their logistics. The two existing programs have already been extended, and will probably be again and again until Baghdad does something about this problem. This will likely be another cause for the U.S. military and the Iraqi government to ask President Obama to maintain a residual force in Iraq after the December 31, 2010 deadline for all combat troops to be withdrawn from Iraq. The Iraqi security forces still don’t have the equipment to protect themselves from outside threats. The SIGIR audit shows that they can’t even sustain their counterinsurgency campaign without the Americans as well.
SOURCES
Arraf, Jane, “Iraqi Army: almost one-quarter lacks minimum qualifications,” Christian Science Monitor, 5/22/09
Department of Defense, “Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq,” March 2009
Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, “Quarterly Report to the United States Congress,” 4/30/09
- “Security Forces Logistics Contract Experienced Certain Cost, Outcome, and Oversight Problems,” 4/26/09
Beginning in early 2005 the U.S. command in Iraq began working on Iraq’s supply system. The goal was to allow the Iraqi Army to act autonomously without U.S. support. The program focused upon maintenance, supply, transportation, and health services. The plan has gone through six phases, two of which are still operating. In total the program has received $682.2 million in funding, $572.0 million of which has been spent. The orders for the plan were never clear, they have been changed 161 times, there was little oversight, and has not been supported by the Ministry of Defense. The result is that costs have increased $420.5 million, and are expected to go up an additional $60 million until the last order expires in January 2010.
The SIGIR audit focused upon Orders 3, 5 and 6. Order 3 was started in May 2005 and completed in June 2007. It set up ten maintenance facilities, one for each Iraqi Army division. The order was also to provide training for Iraqi soldiers so that they could operate the bases. Order 5 was a follow up to provide training and maintain the ten facilities. It was supposed to end on May 31, 2009, but has been extended to November 30, 2009. Order 6 was for maintenance on 8,500 HUMVEES that were transferred from the Americans forces to the Iraqis. It is due to expire on July 6, 2009, but will be extended until January 6, 2010.
The three orders have faced daunting challenges since they began. On the American side, the U.S. never assigned enough personnel to oversee the orders, which could have led to corruption and waste. Many of the benchmarks were unclear, changed, or never followed. For example, 80% of the Iraqi vehicles were to be operational at all times, but this was never enforced. Order 3 and 5 had no details on how they were to be evaluated as successful or not. The U.S. has also transferred eight of the 10 maintenance facilities to Iraqi control, despite the fact that the Defense Ministry has not accepted responsibility for them. There is no agreed upon process for the handover of these bases, yet they are happening anyway. The Iraqi Army also only sent one class of soldiers to be trained. Many of them lacked the education for the training. That is not uncommon. An on-going Iraqi Army audit has found that 24% of the force is not qualified for their jobs, and that 15% are illiterate. This is mostly blamed on the Americans drive to increase the security forces as quickly as possible, which emphasized quantity over quality. Most of the soldiers that did show up for training complained about not getting paid for weeks, and quit before they were finished. The Defense Ministry has not sent any new soldiers since then. That was the major reason why Order 5 was issued when Order 3 ended, and why the U.S. military is looking to extend Order 5 and 6 as well.
In the end, the Special Inspector General does not believe that the Iraqi Army has improved at all under this program. There is no evidence that the Iraqi forces are any more capable of maintaining their equipment now than when the plan began in 2005. The main reason is that the Defense Ministry has given no support to the effort at all. That leaves the Iraqi armed forces almost completely dependent upon the Americans for their logistics. The two existing programs have already been extended, and will probably be again and again until Baghdad does something about this problem. This will likely be another cause for the U.S. military and the Iraqi government to ask President Obama to maintain a residual force in Iraq after the December 31, 2010 deadline for all combat troops to be withdrawn from Iraq. The Iraqi security forces still don’t have the equipment to protect themselves from outside threats. The SIGIR audit shows that they can’t even sustain their counterinsurgency campaign without the Americans as well.
SOURCES
Arraf, Jane, “Iraqi Army: almost one-quarter lacks minimum qualifications,” Christian Science Monitor, 5/22/09
Department of Defense, “Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq,” March 2009
Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, “Quarterly Report to the United States Congress,” 4/30/09
- “Security Forces Logistics Contract Experienced Certain Cost, Outcome, and Oversight Problems,” 4/26/09
Thursday, June 18, 2009
Trying To Revive the United Iraqi Alliance
Almost as soon as the new provincial councils were named after the January 2009 elections, campaigning began for the January 2010 parliamentary vote. One major move afoot is an attempt to revive the United Iraqi Alliance (UIA). The UIA was once the dominant force in Iraq’s legislature, but quickly broke apart in 2007. Several Shiite parties, including the Sadrists, left the coalition then, and in 2008, an emboldened Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki began moving away from the group as well. Now there is a drive by both internal and external forces to bring the alliance back together.
The United Iraqi Alliance was a grouping of several different parties, brought together under the urging of Iraq’s leading Shiite cleric, Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, and Iran. The current Oil Minister Hussain al-Shahristani was tasked by Sistani to put the coalition together in 2004. Iran’s Qods Force of the Revolutionary Guards also played a role providing advisers, printing presses, broadcast equipment, etc. The leading members of the group were the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council (SIIC) and its allies the Badr Organization and Hezbollah Movement in Iraq, the Dawa Party, and later the Sadrist movement. Together they ran 228 candidates in the January 2005 elections for the transitional parliament, coming away with 140 seats. In April they named Ibrahim al-Jaafari, the head of the Dawa Party, to be Prime Minister. In the December 2005 elections for the permanent parliament, the UIA, this time with a slightly different line-up including the Sadrists, again came out victorious with 128 seats. Months later in April they named Nouri al-Maliki, again of the Dawa Party, the new Prime Minister.
The electoral victories of the United Alliance covered up the fact that the coalition was one of convenience rather than shared vision. As early as December 2005 there were reports of dissatisfaction with the UIA’s performance. On December 9, 2005 the New York Times for example, ran an article where the coalition was criticized for not having a vision for the country, and not appointing qualified people for office. Iraqis were also voicing dissatisfaction with the administration of Prime Minister Jaafari. The lack of coordination within the alliance should’ve been apparent from the beginning as it was made up of so many different parties with different views. The SIIC for example, proposed a nine province Shiite federal region in the south, but the Sadrists who wanted a strong central government opposed this. There were also Shiites in the south that wanted just a Basra, Maysan, Dhi Qar region, and some that wanted Basra federalism. After the December elections, the rivalary between the Supreme Council and Sadrists came to the fore, as they split over naming a replacement for Jaafari. It took them five months to pick Maliki as a compromise candidate.
By 2007 the alliance began to crumble. In March the Fadhila party withdrew its 15 seats. The Fadhila was a breakaway Sadrist movement from Basra that had long disagreed with the Supreme Council over the direction of the south. In April the Sadrists withdrew their five ministers from Maliki’s cabinet, and then boycotted parliament from June to July. By September Sadr had officially withdrawn from the UIA, taking his 30 legislators with him. The Alliance’s control of parliament was greatly reduced by these defections going from 128 to 83.
When campaigning for the January 2009 provincial elections began, it was apparent that the UIA was dead. Most importantly Prime Minister Maliki formed his own State of Law List rather than run with the Supreme Council. Former Prime Minister Jaafari and the Fadhila party also ran independently, while the Sadrists supported two independent groups. That left the SIIC to put forward their own group, the Al-Mihrab Martyr List, as well. When the different parties were forming ruling coalitions, Maliki’s State of Law also attempted to shut the SIIC out, which worked in many provinces.
Now all of the parties are focusing upon the January 2010 parliamentary elections. The Supreme Council is trying to reform itself after its defeat in the 2009 vote. As part of this they are hoping to revive the United Iraqi Alliance by bringing Maliki back into the fold. Iran too is pushing for the UIA to be rebuilt, so that Shiite power is maintained as well as Iranian influence over the leading Iraqi parties. The Prime Minister on the other hand, has everyone guessing as to what he’s going to do. In February 2009 Asharq al-Awsat reported that Dawa wanted to form a new alliance that was more in line with Maliki’s policies of a strong central authority, and better government and services. At the end of May however, he flew to Tehran to meet with SIIC leader and head of the United Alliance Abdul Aziz al-Hakim, who is undergoing cancer treatment there. It’s also been reported that Maliki is willing to rejoin the UIA if he is its leader, and his Dawa Party is given a more prominent role.
The UIA is also in contact with other former members, and may reach out to new ones. According to Al-Sharqiyah TV, the United Alliance has approached the Sadrists, but they appear to be leaning towards the same strategy they took in the provincial vote, backing independents. Ex-Prime Minister Jaafari has also recently commented on the UIA saying that it needs to learn from its mistakes and be more issue oriented. There is also talk of the UIA reaching out to independent Sunnis. That could be an important step for the UIA’s image, as it is most associated with sectarian politics. A member of the Islamic Union of Iraqi Turkmen also said that the UIA will focus more upon national issues and appointing technocrats rather than giving out positions based upon sect.
Whether the UIA will be a major player in the 2010 parliamentary elections all depends upon Prime Minister Maliki. If he rejoins the alliance then it will be a real force in the voting. If he doesn’t, it could very well go down to defeat like the Supreme Council did in the provincial balloting. Maliki’s position is unknown. He could run as part of his State of Law List again. The problem is that while his coalition was the biggest winner in 2009, he only gained two majorities in Baghdad and Basra, and pluralities in the rest. If he is given the leadership of the UIA he could finish much stronger, and be assured of being the kingmaker again as he tried when the ruling provincial councils were being put together. That might also lead to some of the smaller Shiite parties such as Jaafari’s Reform Party to rejoin as they didn’t do as well as they thought in the provincial vote. Iran is also applying a lot of pressure upon Shiite politicians to run together. This fits into their policy of assuring Shiite rule, which Tehran hopes will mean Iraq will not become an enemy again. The future of the UIA therefore, is one of the most important early moves in the campaign for Iraq’s new parliament.
Members of the United Iraqi Alliance In the January 2005 Election
Badr Organization (SIIC)
Center Grouping Party
Dawa
Dawa-Iraq Organization
Fadhila
First Democratic National Party
Future Iraq Grouping
Hezbollah Movement in Iraq (SIIC)
Iraqi National Congress
Islamic Action Organization
Islamic Grouping in Iraq
Islamic Master of Martyrs Movement
Islamic Union of Iraqi Turkmen
Justice and Equality Grouping
Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council
Turkeman al-Wafa Party
Members of the United Iraqi Alliance In the December 2005 Election
Al-Shabak Democratic Grouping
Badr Organization (SIIC)
Center Grouping Party
Community of Justice
Dawa
Dawa-Iraq Organization
Fadhila
Free Iraq
Hezbollah Movement in Iraq (SIIC)
Iraqi Democratic Movement
Islamic Master of Martyrs Movement
Islamic Union of Iraqi Turkmen
Justice and Equality Grouping
Malhan al Mukatir
SadristsSupreme Islamic Iraqi Council
Turkomen Loyalty Movement
SOURCES
Allam, Hannah, Landay, Jonathan, and Strobel, Warren, “Iranian outmaneuvers U.S. in Iraq” McClatchy Newspapers, 4/28/08
Asharq al-Awsat, “Al Maliki Wants An Alternative To The Current Shiite Alliance That Will Support The Central Government And Reject The Sectarian Quota System,” 2/16/09
Associated Press, “Six parliamentary factions to coordinate efforts in Iraqi parliament, lawmakers say,” 6/8/08
Aswat al-Iraq, “Politician calls on UIA to reach out to people,” 6/8/09
BBC News, “Guide to Iraqi political parties,” 1/20/06
- “Iraqi Shias unveil poll coalition,” 12/9/04
Cole, Juan, “Platform of the United Iraqi Alliance,” Informed Comment Blog, 12/31/04
Filkins, Dexter, “Split Veredict in Iraqi Vote Sets Stage for Weak Government,” New York Times, 2/14/05
Hendawi, Hamza and Abdul-Zahra, Qassim, “Iraqi Shiites try to revive sectarian coalition,” Associated Press, 6/8/09
Ignatius, David, “In Iraq’s Choice, A Chance For Unity,” Washington Post, 4/26/06
Kaplow, Larry, “Iraq Steps Out of Iran’s Shadow,” Newsweek, 6/6/09
Katzman, Kenneth, “Iraq: Government Formation and Benchmarks,” Congressional Research Service, 1/31/08
Najm, Hayder, “shiite parties look to renew grand alliance,” Niqash, 6/9/09
Parker, Ned, “Sadr’s bloc quits Iraq’s ruling coalition,” Times of London, 9/16/07
Press TV, “Iraq’s Maliki at Hakim’s bedside in Tehran,” 5/31/09
Reuters, “Small party breaks away from Iraq Shi’ite bloc,” 3/7/07
Rossmiller, Alex, “Fickle Attraction,” American Prospect, 4/11/07
Serwer, Daniel and Parker, Sam, “Maliki’s Iraq between Two Elections,” United States Institute of Peace, May 2009
Shadid, Anthony and Vick, Karl, “Candidate Slate Shows Shiites Closing Ranks,” Washington Post, 12/7/04
Al-Sharqiyah TV, “US troops start withdrawal from Al-Sadr City; Iraq roundup,” BBC Monitoring International Reports, 5/29/09
Visser, Reidar, “Beyond SCIRI and Abd al-Aziz al-Hakim: The Silent Forces of the United Iraqi Alliance,” Historiae.org, 1/20/06
Wong, Edward, “Iraq’s Powerful Shiite Coalition Shows Signs of Stress as Parliamentary Elections Loom,” New York Times, 12/9/05
Worth, Robert, “Iraq’s New President Names Shiite Leader as Prime Minister,” New York Times, 4/7/05
Xinhua, “Sadrist bloc quits ruling Shiite parliament bloc,” 9/16/07
The United Iraqi Alliance was a grouping of several different parties, brought together under the urging of Iraq’s leading Shiite cleric, Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, and Iran. The current Oil Minister Hussain al-Shahristani was tasked by Sistani to put the coalition together in 2004. Iran’s Qods Force of the Revolutionary Guards also played a role providing advisers, printing presses, broadcast equipment, etc. The leading members of the group were the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council (SIIC) and its allies the Badr Organization and Hezbollah Movement in Iraq, the Dawa Party, and later the Sadrist movement. Together they ran 228 candidates in the January 2005 elections for the transitional parliament, coming away with 140 seats. In April they named Ibrahim al-Jaafari, the head of the Dawa Party, to be Prime Minister. In the December 2005 elections for the permanent parliament, the UIA, this time with a slightly different line-up including the Sadrists, again came out victorious with 128 seats. Months later in April they named Nouri al-Maliki, again of the Dawa Party, the new Prime Minister.
The electoral victories of the United Alliance covered up the fact that the coalition was one of convenience rather than shared vision. As early as December 2005 there were reports of dissatisfaction with the UIA’s performance. On December 9, 2005 the New York Times for example, ran an article where the coalition was criticized for not having a vision for the country, and not appointing qualified people for office. Iraqis were also voicing dissatisfaction with the administration of Prime Minister Jaafari. The lack of coordination within the alliance should’ve been apparent from the beginning as it was made up of so many different parties with different views. The SIIC for example, proposed a nine province Shiite federal region in the south, but the Sadrists who wanted a strong central government opposed this. There were also Shiites in the south that wanted just a Basra, Maysan, Dhi Qar region, and some that wanted Basra federalism. After the December elections, the rivalary between the Supreme Council and Sadrists came to the fore, as they split over naming a replacement for Jaafari. It took them five months to pick Maliki as a compromise candidate.
By 2007 the alliance began to crumble. In March the Fadhila party withdrew its 15 seats. The Fadhila was a breakaway Sadrist movement from Basra that had long disagreed with the Supreme Council over the direction of the south. In April the Sadrists withdrew their five ministers from Maliki’s cabinet, and then boycotted parliament from June to July. By September Sadr had officially withdrawn from the UIA, taking his 30 legislators with him. The Alliance’s control of parliament was greatly reduced by these defections going from 128 to 83.
When campaigning for the January 2009 provincial elections began, it was apparent that the UIA was dead. Most importantly Prime Minister Maliki formed his own State of Law List rather than run with the Supreme Council. Former Prime Minister Jaafari and the Fadhila party also ran independently, while the Sadrists supported two independent groups. That left the SIIC to put forward their own group, the Al-Mihrab Martyr List, as well. When the different parties were forming ruling coalitions, Maliki’s State of Law also attempted to shut the SIIC out, which worked in many provinces.
Now all of the parties are focusing upon the January 2010 parliamentary elections. The Supreme Council is trying to reform itself after its defeat in the 2009 vote. As part of this they are hoping to revive the United Iraqi Alliance by bringing Maliki back into the fold. Iran too is pushing for the UIA to be rebuilt, so that Shiite power is maintained as well as Iranian influence over the leading Iraqi parties. The Prime Minister on the other hand, has everyone guessing as to what he’s going to do. In February 2009 Asharq al-Awsat reported that Dawa wanted to form a new alliance that was more in line with Maliki’s policies of a strong central authority, and better government and services. At the end of May however, he flew to Tehran to meet with SIIC leader and head of the United Alliance Abdul Aziz al-Hakim, who is undergoing cancer treatment there. It’s also been reported that Maliki is willing to rejoin the UIA if he is its leader, and his Dawa Party is given a more prominent role.
The UIA is also in contact with other former members, and may reach out to new ones. According to Al-Sharqiyah TV, the United Alliance has approached the Sadrists, but they appear to be leaning towards the same strategy they took in the provincial vote, backing independents. Ex-Prime Minister Jaafari has also recently commented on the UIA saying that it needs to learn from its mistakes and be more issue oriented. There is also talk of the UIA reaching out to independent Sunnis. That could be an important step for the UIA’s image, as it is most associated with sectarian politics. A member of the Islamic Union of Iraqi Turkmen also said that the UIA will focus more upon national issues and appointing technocrats rather than giving out positions based upon sect.
Whether the UIA will be a major player in the 2010 parliamentary elections all depends upon Prime Minister Maliki. If he rejoins the alliance then it will be a real force in the voting. If he doesn’t, it could very well go down to defeat like the Supreme Council did in the provincial balloting. Maliki’s position is unknown. He could run as part of his State of Law List again. The problem is that while his coalition was the biggest winner in 2009, he only gained two majorities in Baghdad and Basra, and pluralities in the rest. If he is given the leadership of the UIA he could finish much stronger, and be assured of being the kingmaker again as he tried when the ruling provincial councils were being put together. That might also lead to some of the smaller Shiite parties such as Jaafari’s Reform Party to rejoin as they didn’t do as well as they thought in the provincial vote. Iran is also applying a lot of pressure upon Shiite politicians to run together. This fits into their policy of assuring Shiite rule, which Tehran hopes will mean Iraq will not become an enemy again. The future of the UIA therefore, is one of the most important early moves in the campaign for Iraq’s new parliament.
Members of the United Iraqi Alliance In the January 2005 Election
Badr Organization (SIIC)
Center Grouping Party
Dawa
Dawa-Iraq Organization
Fadhila
First Democratic National Party
Future Iraq Grouping
Hezbollah Movement in Iraq (SIIC)
Iraqi National Congress
Islamic Action Organization
Islamic Grouping in Iraq
Islamic Master of Martyrs Movement
Islamic Union of Iraqi Turkmen
Justice and Equality Grouping
Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council
Turkeman al-Wafa Party
Members of the United Iraqi Alliance In the December 2005 Election
Al-Shabak Democratic Grouping
Badr Organization (SIIC)
Center Grouping Party
Community of Justice
Dawa
Dawa-Iraq Organization
Fadhila
Free Iraq
Hezbollah Movement in Iraq (SIIC)
Iraqi Democratic Movement
Islamic Master of Martyrs Movement
Islamic Union of Iraqi Turkmen
Justice and Equality Grouping
Malhan al Mukatir
SadristsSupreme Islamic Iraqi Council
Turkomen Loyalty Movement
SOURCES
Allam, Hannah, Landay, Jonathan, and Strobel, Warren, “Iranian outmaneuvers U.S. in Iraq” McClatchy Newspapers, 4/28/08
Asharq al-Awsat, “Al Maliki Wants An Alternative To The Current Shiite Alliance That Will Support The Central Government And Reject The Sectarian Quota System,” 2/16/09
Associated Press, “Six parliamentary factions to coordinate efforts in Iraqi parliament, lawmakers say,” 6/8/08
Aswat al-Iraq, “Politician calls on UIA to reach out to people,” 6/8/09
BBC News, “Guide to Iraqi political parties,” 1/20/06
- “Iraqi Shias unveil poll coalition,” 12/9/04
Cole, Juan, “Platform of the United Iraqi Alliance,” Informed Comment Blog, 12/31/04
Filkins, Dexter, “Split Veredict in Iraqi Vote Sets Stage for Weak Government,” New York Times, 2/14/05
Hendawi, Hamza and Abdul-Zahra, Qassim, “Iraqi Shiites try to revive sectarian coalition,” Associated Press, 6/8/09
Ignatius, David, “In Iraq’s Choice, A Chance For Unity,” Washington Post, 4/26/06
Kaplow, Larry, “Iraq Steps Out of Iran’s Shadow,” Newsweek, 6/6/09
Katzman, Kenneth, “Iraq: Government Formation and Benchmarks,” Congressional Research Service, 1/31/08
Najm, Hayder, “shiite parties look to renew grand alliance,” Niqash, 6/9/09
Parker, Ned, “Sadr’s bloc quits Iraq’s ruling coalition,” Times of London, 9/16/07
Press TV, “Iraq’s Maliki at Hakim’s bedside in Tehran,” 5/31/09
Reuters, “Small party breaks away from Iraq Shi’ite bloc,” 3/7/07
Rossmiller, Alex, “Fickle Attraction,” American Prospect, 4/11/07
Serwer, Daniel and Parker, Sam, “Maliki’s Iraq between Two Elections,” United States Institute of Peace, May 2009
Shadid, Anthony and Vick, Karl, “Candidate Slate Shows Shiites Closing Ranks,” Washington Post, 12/7/04
Al-Sharqiyah TV, “US troops start withdrawal from Al-Sadr City; Iraq roundup,” BBC Monitoring International Reports, 5/29/09
Visser, Reidar, “Beyond SCIRI and Abd al-Aziz al-Hakim: The Silent Forces of the United Iraqi Alliance,” Historiae.org, 1/20/06
Wong, Edward, “Iraq’s Powerful Shiite Coalition Shows Signs of Stress as Parliamentary Elections Loom,” New York Times, 12/9/05
Worth, Robert, “Iraq’s New President Names Shiite Leader as Prime Minister,” New York Times, 4/7/05
Xinhua, “Sadrist bloc quits ruling Shiite parliament bloc,” 9/16/07
Wednesday, June 17, 2009
Iraq’s Lack Of Budget Execution
In April 2009 Iraq passed its latest budget. It is larger than the 2008 one, but not as big as originally planned. The increases that individual ministries have received are largely for operational costs that go towards things like salaries and pensions, rather than for investing in the future. Another problem is that the major ministries responsible for revenues and services are still incapable of spending most of their capital budgets. This comes at a time when Iraq desperately needs to boost its growth.
Iraq’s 2009 budget is for $58.6 billion. That’s a 25.8% cut from the original amount of $79.8 billion, but still a 17% increase from the 2008 budget of $49.9 billion. Both Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki and the Finance Minister Bayan Jabr were against the cuts saying that it would hamper services and the development of the economy, which is still mostly state run. It would have been impossible for Iraq to cover that original amount however. Even with the lower figure, Iraq is still expected to have a $20 billion deficit.
Most of the 2009 budget is for operational costs, with a cut in capital spending. The operational budget is for $45.9 billion, 78% of the total. The capital budget went down from $13.1 billion in 2008 to $12.7 billion in 2009, a 3% cut. In 2008 oil revenues were so large that a supplemental budget was passed, which increased the overall capital budget to $21.1 billion.
With U.S. reconstruction funding coming to an end, Iraq’s capital spending is the largest source of funding for rebuilding the country. Appropriately than, most of this year’s money will go to the Oil, Electricity, Finance, Water, and Industry and Minerals Ministries. Iraq’s Oil Ministry’s capital budget went up slightly from $2 billion in 2008 to $2.2 billion in 2009. The Electricity Ministry on the other hand, will face a 17% decrease in its capital spending from $1.3 billion in 2008 to $1.08 billion in 2009. The Ministry is worried that it won’t be able to increase capacity with that amount, as they originally asked for $7 billion. The Health Ministry will have the largest capital increase at +489%, going from $83.3 million to $408.1 million.
The problem is that Iraq has rarely been able to spend its capital budget. In 2005, when Iraq formally got its sovereignty back from the United States, it only spent 23% of its capital budget. That went down to 19% in 2006, and then up to 28% in 2007. In 2008 Baghdad made a huge leap when it expended 39% of its capital budget. Iraq’s main revenue, budget, and services ministries did worse however. The Oil, Water, and Electricity Ministries for example, appropriated $11.9 billion for capital spending from 2005 to 2007, but only spent $985 million of it. In 2007 Oil and Electricity only expended $1 million each from their capital budgets.
What are skyrocketing instead are the operational budgets. Nearly every ministry will see an increase in that department. The Oil Ministry for example will see a jump from $103.7 million in 2008 to $954.4 million this year in its operational account. The Electricity Ministry’s operational budget will go from $89.1 million in 2008 to $2.31 billion in 2009. The Health Ministry’s will increase from $1.872 billion in 2008 to $3.095 billion in 2009. Most of this money will be spent if Iraq follows its past trends. From 2005 to 2007 it spent $67 billion, 90% of which went to operating costs.
Iraq’s poor budget execution has led to massive surpluses. In 2005 Iraq had a $6.5 billion surplus. That went up to $29 billion leftover from the 2008 budget. The GAO estimated that Iraq built up a $47.3 billion surplus from 2005 to 2008. When parliament was drafting the 2009 budget they believed that they could tap into this money to pay for the expected deficit, but after the bill was passed the Finance Ministry and Central Bank of Iraq let them know that they were not obligated to use the surplus to cover the budget. Baghdad has had to get a loan from the International Monetary Fund instead to cover the difference.
Each year Iraq has passed a larger budget, and each year it has been able to spend more of its money. The major ministries however, are still only spending a measly portion of their budgets, and most of that is going towards salaries and pensions, rather than investing in Iraq’s future. The 2009 budget will pose an additional problem for Iraq, as it still has not earned enough from oil to pay its bills. Many ministries did not get the money they requested either, and each still needs billions. The Ministry of Oil said it requires $25 to $75 billion to reach its target of 6 million barrels per day. The Electricity Ministry estimated that it needs $27 billion over the next 6 to 10 years to meet all of the country’s demand by 2015. The U.S. thinks the actual amount might be twice as high. The World Bank believes that Iraq has to have $14.4 billion to fix its water system. These amounts will largely have to come from Baghdad from now on as foreign investors are still largely staying away, while U.S. and international donations are coming to an end. The inability to spend its capital budget, while operational costs are skyrocketing do not point to meeting these goals anytime soon in Iraq.
Major Revenue And Service Ministries’ Budgets 2008-2009
Oil Ministry
2008: $103.7 mil operational, $2 bil capital. TOTAL $2.103 bil, 16% spent
2009: $954.4 mil operational, $2.2 bil capital. TOTAL: $3.160 bil
2008-2009 Changes: +920% operational, +10% capital
Electricity Ministry
2008: $89.1 mil operational, $1.3 bil capital. TOTAL: $1.389 bil, 12% spent
2009: $2.31 bil operational, $1.08 bil capital. TOTAL: $3.39 bil
2008-2009 Changes: +259% operational, -16% capital
Water Ministry
2008: $109.6 mil operational, $375 mil capital. TOTAL: $484. mil. 48% spent
2009: $168.6 mil operational, $563.5 mil capital. TOTAL: $732.1 mil
2008-2009 Changes: +53% operational, +50% capital
Municipalities and Public Works Ministry
2008: $42.6 mil operational, $416.7 mil capital. TOTAL: $459.3 mil, 22% spent
2009: $479.6 mil operational, $468.2 mil capital. TOTAL: $947.8 mil
2008-2009 Changes: +1125% operational, +12% capital
Transportation Ministry
2008: $121.6 mil operational, $250 mil capital. TOTAL: $371.6 mil, 29% spent
2009: $209.7 mil operational, $324.2 mil capital. TOTAL: $533.8 mil
2008-2009 Changes: +72% operational, +29% capital
Communications Ministry
2008: $14.4 mil operational, $250 mil capital. TOTAL: $264.4 mil, 30% spent
2009: $88.2 mil operational, $216.1 mil capital. TOTAL: $304.3 mil
2008-2009 Changes: +612% operational, -15% capital
Health Ministry
2008: $1.872 bil operational, $83.3 mil capital. TOTAL: $1.956 bil
2009: $3.095 bil operational, $408.1 mil capital. TOTAL: $3.503 bil
2008-2009 Changes: +65% operational, +489% capital
Budget Expenditures 2005-2007
Iraqi Budget Expenditures 2005-2007
2005: $16.151 bil operational, $1.432 bil capital. TOTAL: $17.583 bil
2006: $21.173 bil operational, $1.615 bil capital. TOTAL: $22.788 bil
2007: $23.164 bil operational, $3.434 bil capital. TOTAL: $26.599 bil
Oil, Water, Electricity Ministries’ Capital Appropriations Versus Spending
2005: $3,482 mil appropriated, $373 mil spent
2006: $4,473 mil appropriated, $502 mil spent
2007: $4.034 mil appropriated, $110 mil spent
TOTAL: $11,990 mil appropriated, $985 mil spent
Oil Ministry Spending
2005: $160 mil spent, $49 mil operational, $111 mil capital
2006: $191 mil spent, $48 mil operational, $143 mil capital
2007: $36 mil spent, $35 mil operational, $1 mil capital
Water Ministry Spending
2005: $163 mil spent, $42 mil operational, $120 mil capital
2006: $145 mil spent, $54 mil operational, $91 mil capital
2007: $236 mil spent, $128 mil operational, $109 mil capital
Electricity Ministry Spending
2005: $147 mil spent, $5 mil operational, $142 mil capital
2006: $281 mil spent, $13 mil operational, $268 mil capital
2007: $78 mil spent, $77 mil operational, $1 mil capital
SOURCES
Agence France Presse, “Iraq presidency approves slashed budget,” 4/3/09
Cordesman, Anthony, “The Changing Situation in Iraq: A Progress Report,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, 4/1/09
Department of Defense, “Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq,” March 2009
Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, “Quarterly Report to the United States Congress,” 4/30/09
United States Government Accountability Office, “IRAQ Key Issues for Congressional Oversight,” March 2009
- “Iraqi Revenues, Expenditures, and Surplus,” August 2008
Iraq’s 2009 budget is for $58.6 billion. That’s a 25.8% cut from the original amount of $79.8 billion, but still a 17% increase from the 2008 budget of $49.9 billion. Both Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki and the Finance Minister Bayan Jabr were against the cuts saying that it would hamper services and the development of the economy, which is still mostly state run. It would have been impossible for Iraq to cover that original amount however. Even with the lower figure, Iraq is still expected to have a $20 billion deficit.
Most of the 2009 budget is for operational costs, with a cut in capital spending. The operational budget is for $45.9 billion, 78% of the total. The capital budget went down from $13.1 billion in 2008 to $12.7 billion in 2009, a 3% cut. In 2008 oil revenues were so large that a supplemental budget was passed, which increased the overall capital budget to $21.1 billion.
With U.S. reconstruction funding coming to an end, Iraq’s capital spending is the largest source of funding for rebuilding the country. Appropriately than, most of this year’s money will go to the Oil, Electricity, Finance, Water, and Industry and Minerals Ministries. Iraq’s Oil Ministry’s capital budget went up slightly from $2 billion in 2008 to $2.2 billion in 2009. The Electricity Ministry on the other hand, will face a 17% decrease in its capital spending from $1.3 billion in 2008 to $1.08 billion in 2009. The Ministry is worried that it won’t be able to increase capacity with that amount, as they originally asked for $7 billion. The Health Ministry will have the largest capital increase at +489%, going from $83.3 million to $408.1 million.
The problem is that Iraq has rarely been able to spend its capital budget. In 2005, when Iraq formally got its sovereignty back from the United States, it only spent 23% of its capital budget. That went down to 19% in 2006, and then up to 28% in 2007. In 2008 Baghdad made a huge leap when it expended 39% of its capital budget. Iraq’s main revenue, budget, and services ministries did worse however. The Oil, Water, and Electricity Ministries for example, appropriated $11.9 billion for capital spending from 2005 to 2007, but only spent $985 million of it. In 2007 Oil and Electricity only expended $1 million each from their capital budgets.
What are skyrocketing instead are the operational budgets. Nearly every ministry will see an increase in that department. The Oil Ministry for example will see a jump from $103.7 million in 2008 to $954.4 million this year in its operational account. The Electricity Ministry’s operational budget will go from $89.1 million in 2008 to $2.31 billion in 2009. The Health Ministry’s will increase from $1.872 billion in 2008 to $3.095 billion in 2009. Most of this money will be spent if Iraq follows its past trends. From 2005 to 2007 it spent $67 billion, 90% of which went to operating costs.
Iraq’s poor budget execution has led to massive surpluses. In 2005 Iraq had a $6.5 billion surplus. That went up to $29 billion leftover from the 2008 budget. The GAO estimated that Iraq built up a $47.3 billion surplus from 2005 to 2008. When parliament was drafting the 2009 budget they believed that they could tap into this money to pay for the expected deficit, but after the bill was passed the Finance Ministry and Central Bank of Iraq let them know that they were not obligated to use the surplus to cover the budget. Baghdad has had to get a loan from the International Monetary Fund instead to cover the difference.
Each year Iraq has passed a larger budget, and each year it has been able to spend more of its money. The major ministries however, are still only spending a measly portion of their budgets, and most of that is going towards salaries and pensions, rather than investing in Iraq’s future. The 2009 budget will pose an additional problem for Iraq, as it still has not earned enough from oil to pay its bills. Many ministries did not get the money they requested either, and each still needs billions. The Ministry of Oil said it requires $25 to $75 billion to reach its target of 6 million barrels per day. The Electricity Ministry estimated that it needs $27 billion over the next 6 to 10 years to meet all of the country’s demand by 2015. The U.S. thinks the actual amount might be twice as high. The World Bank believes that Iraq has to have $14.4 billion to fix its water system. These amounts will largely have to come from Baghdad from now on as foreign investors are still largely staying away, while U.S. and international donations are coming to an end. The inability to spend its capital budget, while operational costs are skyrocketing do not point to meeting these goals anytime soon in Iraq.
Major Revenue And Service Ministries’ Budgets 2008-2009
Oil Ministry
2008: $103.7 mil operational, $2 bil capital. TOTAL $2.103 bil, 16% spent
2009: $954.4 mil operational, $2.2 bil capital. TOTAL: $3.160 bil
2008-2009 Changes: +920% operational, +10% capital
Electricity Ministry
2008: $89.1 mil operational, $1.3 bil capital. TOTAL: $1.389 bil, 12% spent
2009: $2.31 bil operational, $1.08 bil capital. TOTAL: $3.39 bil
2008-2009 Changes: +259% operational, -16% capital
Water Ministry
2008: $109.6 mil operational, $375 mil capital. TOTAL: $484. mil. 48% spent
2009: $168.6 mil operational, $563.5 mil capital. TOTAL: $732.1 mil
2008-2009 Changes: +53% operational, +50% capital
Municipalities and Public Works Ministry
2008: $42.6 mil operational, $416.7 mil capital. TOTAL: $459.3 mil, 22% spent
2009: $479.6 mil operational, $468.2 mil capital. TOTAL: $947.8 mil
2008-2009 Changes: +1125% operational, +12% capital
Transportation Ministry
2008: $121.6 mil operational, $250 mil capital. TOTAL: $371.6 mil, 29% spent
2009: $209.7 mil operational, $324.2 mil capital. TOTAL: $533.8 mil
2008-2009 Changes: +72% operational, +29% capital
Communications Ministry
2008: $14.4 mil operational, $250 mil capital. TOTAL: $264.4 mil, 30% spent
2009: $88.2 mil operational, $216.1 mil capital. TOTAL: $304.3 mil
2008-2009 Changes: +612% operational, -15% capital
Health Ministry
2008: $1.872 bil operational, $83.3 mil capital. TOTAL: $1.956 bil
2009: $3.095 bil operational, $408.1 mil capital. TOTAL: $3.503 bil
2008-2009 Changes: +65% operational, +489% capital
Budget Expenditures 2005-2007
Iraqi Budget Expenditures 2005-2007
2005: $16.151 bil operational, $1.432 bil capital. TOTAL: $17.583 bil
2006: $21.173 bil operational, $1.615 bil capital. TOTAL: $22.788 bil
2007: $23.164 bil operational, $3.434 bil capital. TOTAL: $26.599 bil
Oil, Water, Electricity Ministries’ Capital Appropriations Versus Spending
2005: $3,482 mil appropriated, $373 mil spent
2006: $4,473 mil appropriated, $502 mil spent
2007: $4.034 mil appropriated, $110 mil spent
TOTAL: $11,990 mil appropriated, $985 mil spent
Oil Ministry Spending
2005: $160 mil spent, $49 mil operational, $111 mil capital
2006: $191 mil spent, $48 mil operational, $143 mil capital
2007: $36 mil spent, $35 mil operational, $1 mil capital
Water Ministry Spending
2005: $163 mil spent, $42 mil operational, $120 mil capital
2006: $145 mil spent, $54 mil operational, $91 mil capital
2007: $236 mil spent, $128 mil operational, $109 mil capital
Electricity Ministry Spending
2005: $147 mil spent, $5 mil operational, $142 mil capital
2006: $281 mil spent, $13 mil operational, $268 mil capital
2007: $78 mil spent, $77 mil operational, $1 mil capital
SOURCES
Agence France Presse, “Iraq presidency approves slashed budget,” 4/3/09
Cordesman, Anthony, “The Changing Situation in Iraq: A Progress Report,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, 4/1/09
Department of Defense, “Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq,” March 2009
Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, “Quarterly Report to the United States Congress,” 4/30/09
United States Government Accountability Office, “IRAQ Key Issues for Congressional Oversight,” March 2009
- “Iraqi Revenues, Expenditures, and Surplus,” August 2008
Tuesday, June 16, 2009
Open Season On Out-Going Provincial Officials
In January 2009 Iraq conducted its second provincial elections since the U.S. invasion. All of the new provincial councils and governors have been named. As national leaders in Baghdad have been caught up in an anti-corruption fury, so too have these new local politicians. Several have gone after their outgoing peers, but for much different reasons than their counterparts in the capital.
In early June 2009 the new Diyala council issued arrest warrants for the two former deputy governors Razzaq al-Khalisi and Aouf Rahoumi. Both were accused of stealing money. Rahoumi, who belonged to the Iraqi Islamic Party, fled to Germany as soon as he found out about the charges. Khalisi, an independent Shiites, escaped to Kurdistan. The Public Integrity Committee, the main anti-corruption agency in Iraq, believes that the two were involved in stealing up to $130 million from the province. In April the former head of the Diyala council Ibrahim Hassan Bajilan of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan also had a warrant put out for him. He is allegedly involved with embezzling up to $128 million. The former provincial council was ruled by the Coalition of Islamic & National Forces in Diyala, an alliance of the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council and the Dawa Party, the Iraqi Islamic Party, and the Kurdish Arabic Turkmen Democratic Coalition – Diyala, made up of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan and the Kurdistan Democratic Party.
At the same time Salahaddin went after its health director, while the former head of the Karbala council was arrested. On June 8, Salahaddin fired the provincial director of the health department Hassan Zein al-Abedeen Naqi. He was accused of signing fake contracts, making illegal deals over medicine purchases, and housing relatives in Health Ministry buildings. The council said that his case was being sent to the Integrity Committee. On June 1, police arrested the outgoing head of the Karbala provincial council Abdulaal al-Yasseri for corruption as well. The Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council controlled the governorate after the 2005 elections.
Baghdad is currently embroiled in corruption investigations as well. In May 2009 the Trade Minister Abdulfalah al-Sudani was forced to resign, and later arrested. Sudani and his two brothers were accused of misappropriating money meant for the country’s food ration system, the largest in the world. Parliament, and its new speaker Ayad al-Samarraie of the Iraqi Islamic Party forced Sudani’s resignation. Samarraie is intent on increasing the power of the legislature to provide a check on Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s power. Sudani was a member of Maliki’s Dawa Party and reportedly close to the Prime Minister. In response, Maliki has promised a crackdown on corruption as well. It’s likely that he will use this against his opponents in retaliation for Sudani’s arrest.
National and local leaders appear to have different intentions when it comes to corruption. The leaders of the main political parties in Baghdad seem most concerned about obtaining power at each other’s expense. The main struggle now appears to be between Maliki and the Iraqi Islamic Party, which has become the Prime Minister’s main critic. At the provincial level, many politicians are more concerned about getting their governments working. In Diyala for example, the three major parties that ruled the province after 2005 still rule it today. That didn’t stop them from going after some of their own. Politics are so divided in Iraq that it’s likely this difference will continue for quite some time.
SOURCES
Agence France Presse, “Former Iraqi officials accused of corruption flee to Germany via Kurdistan,” 6/10/09
Alsumaria, “Diyala former governor deputies to be held,” 6/10/09
Aswat al-Iraq, “Ex-trade minister appears before Samawa court on corruption charges,” 6/1/09
- “Former deputy governor escapes to Germany following corruption charges,” 6/8/09
- “Karbala provincial council ex-chairman arrested,” 6/1/09
- “Salah el-Din council sacks health official over financial corruption,” 6/8/09
Bakri, Nada, “Iraqi Leader Sees Fraud as a Top Worry,” Washington Post, 5/10/09
Chon, Gina, “Graft Case Against Ex-Minister Splits Iraq Parties,” Wall Street Journal, 6/1/09
Serwer, Daniel and Parker, Sam, “Maliki’s Iraq between Two Elections,” United States Institute of Peace, May 2009
Sly, Liz, “Ex-trade minister arrested after attempting to flee Iraq,” Los Angeles Times, 5/31/09
In early June 2009 the new Diyala council issued arrest warrants for the two former deputy governors Razzaq al-Khalisi and Aouf Rahoumi. Both were accused of stealing money. Rahoumi, who belonged to the Iraqi Islamic Party, fled to Germany as soon as he found out about the charges. Khalisi, an independent Shiites, escaped to Kurdistan. The Public Integrity Committee, the main anti-corruption agency in Iraq, believes that the two were involved in stealing up to $130 million from the province. In April the former head of the Diyala council Ibrahim Hassan Bajilan of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan also had a warrant put out for him. He is allegedly involved with embezzling up to $128 million. The former provincial council was ruled by the Coalition of Islamic & National Forces in Diyala, an alliance of the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council and the Dawa Party, the Iraqi Islamic Party, and the Kurdish Arabic Turkmen Democratic Coalition – Diyala, made up of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan and the Kurdistan Democratic Party.
At the same time Salahaddin went after its health director, while the former head of the Karbala council was arrested. On June 8, Salahaddin fired the provincial director of the health department Hassan Zein al-Abedeen Naqi. He was accused of signing fake contracts, making illegal deals over medicine purchases, and housing relatives in Health Ministry buildings. The council said that his case was being sent to the Integrity Committee. On June 1, police arrested the outgoing head of the Karbala provincial council Abdulaal al-Yasseri for corruption as well. The Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council controlled the governorate after the 2005 elections.
Baghdad is currently embroiled in corruption investigations as well. In May 2009 the Trade Minister Abdulfalah al-Sudani was forced to resign, and later arrested. Sudani and his two brothers were accused of misappropriating money meant for the country’s food ration system, the largest in the world. Parliament, and its new speaker Ayad al-Samarraie of the Iraqi Islamic Party forced Sudani’s resignation. Samarraie is intent on increasing the power of the legislature to provide a check on Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s power. Sudani was a member of Maliki’s Dawa Party and reportedly close to the Prime Minister. In response, Maliki has promised a crackdown on corruption as well. It’s likely that he will use this against his opponents in retaliation for Sudani’s arrest.
National and local leaders appear to have different intentions when it comes to corruption. The leaders of the main political parties in Baghdad seem most concerned about obtaining power at each other’s expense. The main struggle now appears to be between Maliki and the Iraqi Islamic Party, which has become the Prime Minister’s main critic. At the provincial level, many politicians are more concerned about getting their governments working. In Diyala for example, the three major parties that ruled the province after 2005 still rule it today. That didn’t stop them from going after some of their own. Politics are so divided in Iraq that it’s likely this difference will continue for quite some time.
SOURCES
Agence France Presse, “Former Iraqi officials accused of corruption flee to Germany via Kurdistan,” 6/10/09
Alsumaria, “Diyala former governor deputies to be held,” 6/10/09
Aswat al-Iraq, “Ex-trade minister appears before Samawa court on corruption charges,” 6/1/09
- “Former deputy governor escapes to Germany following corruption charges,” 6/8/09
- “Karbala provincial council ex-chairman arrested,” 6/1/09
- “Salah el-Din council sacks health official over financial corruption,” 6/8/09
Bakri, Nada, “Iraqi Leader Sees Fraud as a Top Worry,” Washington Post, 5/10/09
Chon, Gina, “Graft Case Against Ex-Minister Splits Iraq Parties,” Wall Street Journal, 6/1/09
Serwer, Daniel and Parker, Sam, “Maliki’s Iraq between Two Elections,” United States Institute of Peace, May 2009
Sly, Liz, “Ex-trade minister arrested after attempting to flee Iraq,” Los Angeles Times, 5/31/09
Monday, June 15, 2009
Baghdad Hoping For Supplemental Budget Later In 2009
World oil prices have slowly crept back up in recent months. A barrel of oil is selling for around $70 per barrel on international markets. Iraq crude sells at a lower price, but it has been going up as well, along with exports. Baghdad is hoping that if the trend continues, the government will be able to pass a supplemental budget later in 2009 that will help alleviate some of the country’s financial problems.
At the beginning of April Iraq passed its 2009 budget. The budget went through three revisions before it was finally passed, and was still expected to run a $20 billion deficit. That was because it was based upon 2 million barrels a day average in exports and a $50 a barrel price, neither of which Iraq was achieving at that time. By May the Oil Ministry claimed Iraqi crude had reached the $50 mark, but was still only selling 1.905 million barrels a day. To make up the difference the Finance Ministry took out a two-year $7 billion loan from the International Monetary Fund.
The budget crunch is being felt already in the provinces. At the end of May, Maysan officials announced that they were going to run a deficit in 2009, and had no new money for development projects. They were looking for outside investment to fund growth. At the beginning of June, IraqSlogger reported a similar situation in Basra. The head of the reconstruction committee there said they too had no money for new projects, and were short about $84 million for what they needed.
With oil prices going up, Baghdad is now more optimistic about its money problems. Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki recently said that he was hoping that the central government could pass a supplementary budget later this year if Iraqi crude continued to accrue in price. That would hopefully add much needed money to the ministries and provinces, all of which have had to cut their budgets. Of course, there’s also the issue of spending their funds, something Baghdad and the provinces still struggle with.
Iraq needs billions of dollars to improve its governance, services, and economy. U.S. reconstruction is coming to an end, so Iraq is increasingly on its own to provide money for development. The 2009 budget problems then, come at a bad time. Even if Iraq is able to meet its oil production and price goals, it will still be in debt to the IMF, and many of Iraq’s provinces will be left wanting until if and when a supplemental budget is passed. That will mean much needed rebuilding will be delayed.
SOURCES
Abdul-Zahra, Qassim, “Iraq passes sharply reduced budget for 2009,” Associated Press, 3/5/09
Agence France Presse, “Iraq presidency approves slashed budget,” 4/3/09
Aswat al-Iraq, “Finance ministry to sign new agreements with IMF,” 5/27/09
- “Increase in oil exports contributes to budget balance – ministry,” 6/2/09
Iraq Directory, “Maysan province seeks to attract foreign investment to compensate the fiscal deficit in budget,” 5/30/09
- “New supplementary budget with the rise of oil prices,” 6/10/09
IraqSlogger.com, “Basra: Moritorium on New Development Projects,” 6/3/09
Reuters, “As oil prices rise, Iraq nurtures budget hopes,” 6/8/09
At the beginning of April Iraq passed its 2009 budget. The budget went through three revisions before it was finally passed, and was still expected to run a $20 billion deficit. That was because it was based upon 2 million barrels a day average in exports and a $50 a barrel price, neither of which Iraq was achieving at that time. By May the Oil Ministry claimed Iraqi crude had reached the $50 mark, but was still only selling 1.905 million barrels a day. To make up the difference the Finance Ministry took out a two-year $7 billion loan from the International Monetary Fund.
The budget crunch is being felt already in the provinces. At the end of May, Maysan officials announced that they were going to run a deficit in 2009, and had no new money for development projects. They were looking for outside investment to fund growth. At the beginning of June, IraqSlogger reported a similar situation in Basra. The head of the reconstruction committee there said they too had no money for new projects, and were short about $84 million for what they needed.
With oil prices going up, Baghdad is now more optimistic about its money problems. Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki recently said that he was hoping that the central government could pass a supplementary budget later this year if Iraqi crude continued to accrue in price. That would hopefully add much needed money to the ministries and provinces, all of which have had to cut their budgets. Of course, there’s also the issue of spending their funds, something Baghdad and the provinces still struggle with.
Iraq needs billions of dollars to improve its governance, services, and economy. U.S. reconstruction is coming to an end, so Iraq is increasingly on its own to provide money for development. The 2009 budget problems then, come at a bad time. Even if Iraq is able to meet its oil production and price goals, it will still be in debt to the IMF, and many of Iraq’s provinces will be left wanting until if and when a supplemental budget is passed. That will mean much needed rebuilding will be delayed.
SOURCES
Abdul-Zahra, Qassim, “Iraq passes sharply reduced budget for 2009,” Associated Press, 3/5/09
Agence France Presse, “Iraq presidency approves slashed budget,” 4/3/09
Aswat al-Iraq, “Finance ministry to sign new agreements with IMF,” 5/27/09
- “Increase in oil exports contributes to budget balance – ministry,” 6/2/09
Iraq Directory, “Maysan province seeks to attract foreign investment to compensate the fiscal deficit in budget,” 5/30/09
- “New supplementary budget with the rise of oil prices,” 6/10/09
IraqSlogger.com, “Basra: Moritorium on New Development Projects,” 6/3/09
Reuters, “As oil prices rise, Iraq nurtures budget hopes,” 6/8/09
Friday, June 12, 2009
One American Attempt At Building Democracy In Iraq Looks To Be Fading
One goal of the United States before it departs Iraq is to leave it a functioning democracy. The U.S. has facilitated four national elections, two provincial, one parliamentary, and a referendum on the 2005 constitution, since the U.S. invasion. In January 2010 Iraq is to have its fifth balloting for a new parliament. Voting is only the most visible form of democracy. Since 2003 the Americans have been building up local councils to give everyday Iraqis a say in their government. These look to disappear however when the U.S. leaves.
The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) was the first government agency in the U.S. to seriously contemplate democracy building in Iraq. It joined the post-war planning in August 2002. The State Department was supposed to be in charge of governance in Iraq after the invasion, but never came up with anything concrete. That left the USAID to create a policy on its own. They wanted to decentralize power away from Baghdad to the local level. Under Saddam, the Baath party was in control of all levels of government. The USAID wanted to break that hold. They wanted to create neighborhood councils that would create jobs, be in charge of reconstruction, and give common Iraqis a say in their government. When they presented their plans to a National Security Council subgroup on humanitarian issues in Iraq, their ideas were rejected. The official stance was the U.S. was not going to be doing nation building in Iraq, and USAID had just crossed that line.
The situation in Iraq after the invasion proved so chaotic, that the U.S. military began implementing some of the USAID’s plans without knowing it. American units wanted Iraqi partners in their area of operation. To find some they began building up local councils across the country. This was done on an ad hoc basis, as there were no orders from above on how to do it. In Mosul for example, General David Petraeus, who was then the commander of the 101st Airborne Division, set up a convention of 270 delegates from the city representing its diverse population, who in turn elected 24 city council members and a mayor. In Najaf, General James Conway of the 1st Marine Expeditionary Force started organizing provincial elections, registering parties, finding candidates, etc. The Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) had to step in at that point letting the general know that he could not carry out such a large undertaking because Iraq did not have an election law to legalize any voting. Some were far less representative and participatory. In the Karkh district of Baghdad only around 2,500 Iraqis of 30,000-35,000 showed up to vote for their council. In al-Kindi, fifty-five Iraqis elected 12 members to the council there. The U.S. military funded all of the councils they created, but believed that they would eventually hand them over to some other government body. That never happened, as the USAID lacked the money and personnel to deal with them. The U.S. military is still in charge of running these councils to this day.
The USAID was doing a similar job independent of the military. Iraq’s bureaucracy disappeared with the invasion. The tie between Baghdad and the rest of the country was severed in the process. The USAID tried to step in, offering three contracts to companies to create local councils. One company set up 22 offices across Iraq in the spring and summer of 2003 to complete this task. In April, the USAID also allocated $120 million to start local reconstruction that would assist these local groups. $61.7 million was spent in the end on 1,700 projects.
The U.S. military and USAID’s work eventually clashed with the CPA and the fledgling new Iraqi government. By 2005 437 neighborhood, 195 sub-district, and 96 district councils had been created by the Americans. CPA head Pual Bremer wanted to build a democracy in Iraq and decentralize power as well, but was more focused upon the provincial governments than local councils. The councils also ended up clashing with the Iraqi ministries and director generals over priorities and power.
This became more complicated after the two Iraqi elections in 2005. The provincial and parliamentary votes were closed list, meaning Iraqis voted for coalitions, which in turn picked the politicians. This was a blow to the U.S. military and USAID’s effort to empower local forces as the large national parties were in control of the process. The Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council (SIIC) and the two main Kurdish parties, the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) came out the major winners in both votes. They too wanted to disperse power outside of Baghdad, but into their hands. As the new rulers of the provincial councils and ministries they too came into conflict with the U.S. created councils over authority. A mid-2006 report by the Americans for example noted that the SIIC and its militia the Badr Brigade had tightened their grip on the provincial governments, and were against any new elections or reforms that would weaken their power. The result was that provinces and ministries largely refused to work with the U.S.-backed local councils.
By the time the Surge started in 2007, the situation had grown no better. Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) were created to build up local and provincial governance, reconciliation, and reconstruction. They spread out across Iraq and began working with the local and district councils. They still had no real authority in the Iraqi government however. They had a small budget to pay salaries, which they got from the Americans, and some small scale U.S.-funded rebuilding projects, but no real say in ordinances, taxes, larger reconstruction efforts, provincial councils, or Baghdad.
Today it seems like only the U.S. military still considers these councils relevant. Stars and Stripes reported that few Iraqis go to the councils. The Iraqi political parties ignore them as well. If Iraqis want something done they go to the U.S. or Iraqi security forces, sheikhs, or other local leaders. Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki is also intent upon recentralizing authority in his hands. The attempt to give everyday Iraqis a say in their government was an admirable move. Simply voting does not make a democracy. A culture and norms also have to be created. The local councils were a move in that direction, but they were another sign that the Americans cannot dictate to the Iraqis how to develop their society. For better or worse, the post-invasion Iraqi elites are now in control of this process. That will mean these councils will all but disappear when the U.S. leaves. After all, they will have no more money to run, and have never been able to integrate into the new Iraqi political system.
SOURCES
Special Inspector General For Iraq Reconstruction, “Hard Lessons,” 1/22/09
Warden, James, “Focus turns to matching old, new Iraqi institutions,” Stars and Stripes, 3/1/09
- “Local leaders are making a comeback in Iraq,” Stars and Stripes, 3/2/09
The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) was the first government agency in the U.S. to seriously contemplate democracy building in Iraq. It joined the post-war planning in August 2002. The State Department was supposed to be in charge of governance in Iraq after the invasion, but never came up with anything concrete. That left the USAID to create a policy on its own. They wanted to decentralize power away from Baghdad to the local level. Under Saddam, the Baath party was in control of all levels of government. The USAID wanted to break that hold. They wanted to create neighborhood councils that would create jobs, be in charge of reconstruction, and give common Iraqis a say in their government. When they presented their plans to a National Security Council subgroup on humanitarian issues in Iraq, their ideas were rejected. The official stance was the U.S. was not going to be doing nation building in Iraq, and USAID had just crossed that line.
The situation in Iraq after the invasion proved so chaotic, that the U.S. military began implementing some of the USAID’s plans without knowing it. American units wanted Iraqi partners in their area of operation. To find some they began building up local councils across the country. This was done on an ad hoc basis, as there were no orders from above on how to do it. In Mosul for example, General David Petraeus, who was then the commander of the 101st Airborne Division, set up a convention of 270 delegates from the city representing its diverse population, who in turn elected 24 city council members and a mayor. In Najaf, General James Conway of the 1st Marine Expeditionary Force started organizing provincial elections, registering parties, finding candidates, etc. The Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) had to step in at that point letting the general know that he could not carry out such a large undertaking because Iraq did not have an election law to legalize any voting. Some were far less representative and participatory. In the Karkh district of Baghdad only around 2,500 Iraqis of 30,000-35,000 showed up to vote for their council. In al-Kindi, fifty-five Iraqis elected 12 members to the council there. The U.S. military funded all of the councils they created, but believed that they would eventually hand them over to some other government body. That never happened, as the USAID lacked the money and personnel to deal with them. The U.S. military is still in charge of running these councils to this day.
The USAID was doing a similar job independent of the military. Iraq’s bureaucracy disappeared with the invasion. The tie between Baghdad and the rest of the country was severed in the process. The USAID tried to step in, offering three contracts to companies to create local councils. One company set up 22 offices across Iraq in the spring and summer of 2003 to complete this task. In April, the USAID also allocated $120 million to start local reconstruction that would assist these local groups. $61.7 million was spent in the end on 1,700 projects.
The U.S. military and USAID’s work eventually clashed with the CPA and the fledgling new Iraqi government. By 2005 437 neighborhood, 195 sub-district, and 96 district councils had been created by the Americans. CPA head Pual Bremer wanted to build a democracy in Iraq and decentralize power as well, but was more focused upon the provincial governments than local councils. The councils also ended up clashing with the Iraqi ministries and director generals over priorities and power.
This became more complicated after the two Iraqi elections in 2005. The provincial and parliamentary votes were closed list, meaning Iraqis voted for coalitions, which in turn picked the politicians. This was a blow to the U.S. military and USAID’s effort to empower local forces as the large national parties were in control of the process. The Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council (SIIC) and the two main Kurdish parties, the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) came out the major winners in both votes. They too wanted to disperse power outside of Baghdad, but into their hands. As the new rulers of the provincial councils and ministries they too came into conflict with the U.S. created councils over authority. A mid-2006 report by the Americans for example noted that the SIIC and its militia the Badr Brigade had tightened their grip on the provincial governments, and were against any new elections or reforms that would weaken their power. The result was that provinces and ministries largely refused to work with the U.S.-backed local councils.
By the time the Surge started in 2007, the situation had grown no better. Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) were created to build up local and provincial governance, reconciliation, and reconstruction. They spread out across Iraq and began working with the local and district councils. They still had no real authority in the Iraqi government however. They had a small budget to pay salaries, which they got from the Americans, and some small scale U.S.-funded rebuilding projects, but no real say in ordinances, taxes, larger reconstruction efforts, provincial councils, or Baghdad.
Today it seems like only the U.S. military still considers these councils relevant. Stars and Stripes reported that few Iraqis go to the councils. The Iraqi political parties ignore them as well. If Iraqis want something done they go to the U.S. or Iraqi security forces, sheikhs, or other local leaders. Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki is also intent upon recentralizing authority in his hands. The attempt to give everyday Iraqis a say in their government was an admirable move. Simply voting does not make a democracy. A culture and norms also have to be created. The local councils were a move in that direction, but they were another sign that the Americans cannot dictate to the Iraqis how to develop their society. For better or worse, the post-invasion Iraqi elites are now in control of this process. That will mean these councils will all but disappear when the U.S. leaves. After all, they will have no more money to run, and have never been able to integrate into the new Iraqi political system.
SOURCES
Special Inspector General For Iraq Reconstruction, “Hard Lessons,” 1/22/09
Warden, James, “Focus turns to matching old, new Iraqi institutions,” Stars and Stripes, 3/1/09
- “Local leaders are making a comeback in Iraq,” Stars and Stripes, 3/2/09
Thursday, June 11, 2009
Intentions Of Iraq's Displaced
On June 1, 2009 the International Organization for Migration (IOM) released a report on the intentions of Iraq's internal refugees. The IOM is the main non-governmental organization working with Iraq's displaced. They work as partners with the Iraqi Ministry of Displacement and Migration, and have done extensive polling of Iraqis. Their main focus is upon the estimated 1.6 million people who lost their homes after the February 2006 Samarra bombing, which set off the sectarian war. While this report finds that the majority of Iraqis wish to return to their homes, they are finding problems doing so.
The majority of displacement in Iraq happened after February 2006. Of those surveyed, only 4.5% said they had lost their homes before 2006. In contrast, 67.8% were displaced in 2006, followed by 25.6% in 2007. Only 2.0% reported that they were displaced in 2008. Sulaymaniya and Tamim were the only two provinces that broke that pattern with the 49% or more being displaced in 2007 instead of 2006.
Date of Displacement
Province | Before 2006 | 2006 | 2007 | 2008 |
Iraq | 4.5% | 67.8% | 25.6% | 2.0% |
Anbar | 0.5% | 87.2% | 9.9% | 1.9% |
Babil | 7.4% | 85.0% | 7.3% | 0.3% |
Baghdad | 1.4% | 75.4% | 22.5% | 0.7% |
Basra | 1.1% | 70.9% | 27.9% | 0.0% |
Diyala | 1.9% | 54.1% | 42.7% | 1.1% |
Dohuk | 5.5% | 53.5% | 35.4% | 5.7% |
Dhi Qar | 2.1% | 90.6% | 6.7% | 0.1% |
Irbil | 9.3% | 49.0% | 39.8% | 1.3% |
Karbala | 0% | 85.2% | 14.5% | 0.0% |
Maysan | 1.0% | 94.8% | 4.0% | 0.1% |
Muthanna | 19.5% | 46.3% | 33.8% | 0.1% |
Najaf | 23.0% | 63.1% | 13.9% | 0% |
Ninewa | 1.0% | 67.5% | 23.7% | 7.7% |
Qadisiyah | 1.6% | 92.9% | 5.6% | 0% |
Salahaddin | 18.2% | 56.0% | 25.6% | 0.1% |
Sulaymaniya | 4.5% | 41.7% | 50.1% | 3.2% |
Tamim | 8.6% | 22.9% | 49.3% | 19.2% |
Wasit | 1.3% | 50.5% | 48.1% | 0.1% |
63.2% of the internal refugees came from Baghdad, which was ground zero for the sectarian war. Central, western, and northern Iraq were the other violent areas where people were forced to leave. Southern Iraq was a distant third since it was mostly Shiite. The fighting there largely revolved around disputes between Shiite militias, such as the Badr Brigade and the Mahdi Army.
Origins of Displacement By Province
Baghdad | 63.2% |
Diyala | 18.7% |
Ninewa | 6.0% |
Salahaddin | 3.3% |
Tamim | 3.0% |
Anbar | 2.6% |
Basra | 1.6% |
Babil | 1.0% |
Irbil | 0.2% |
Wasit | 0.2% |
Dhi Qar | 0.1% |
Ethnicity/Religion of Displaced
Shiite Arab | 56.8% |
Sunni Arab | 30.8% |
Sunni Kurd | 4.1% |
Assyrian Christian | 2.9% |
Chaldean Christian | 1.8% |
Shiite Turkmen | 1.2% |
Sunni Turkmen | 0.9% |
Shiite Kurd | 0.6% |
Armenian Christian | 0.1% |
Arab Yazidi | 0.1% |
Kurd Yazidi | 0.1% |
Displacement in Iraq followed a broad pattern. 56.8% of Iraq's internal refugees are Shiite. The majority of them were displaced either within Baghdad or moved south to Babil, Basra, Karbala, Maysan, Muthanna, Najaf, Qadisiya, Dhi Qar, or Wasit. 34.9% of the displaced are Sunni, either Arab or Kurd. They tended to move west to Anbar or north to Irbil, Salahaddin, Sulaymaniya, or Tamim. Finally, the northern provinces of Diyala, Dohuk, and Ninewa have a mixed population of Iraqi refugees. In Diyala, the majority, 57.9%, are Sunni Arabs, but almost a third of the rest, 31.7% are Shiite Arabs. 50% of Dohuk's displaced are either Sunni Kurds, 39.3%, or Chaldean Christians, 30.6%. Finally Ninewa was one of only two provinces where the largest displaced group was not Arab. There 40.4% were Assyrian Christians, followed by Sunni Arabs, 24.4%, Sunni Turkmen, 12.3%, and Chaldean Christians, 11.2%. That province is known for its large minority population.
Provinces With Predominately Displaced Shiites
Babil | 94.8% Shiite Arab, 81.5% from Baghdad |
Baghdad | 72.4% Shiite Arab, 83.2% from Baghdad |
Basra | 99.7% Shiite Arab, 52.4% from Baghdad, 26.0% from Salahaddin |
Dhi Qar | 99.5% Shiite Arab, 65.5% from Baghdad, 14.0% from Salahaddin |
Karbala | 98.5% Shiite Arab, 57.0% from Baghdad, 27.6% from Diyala |
Maysan | 99.9% Shiite Arab, 83.4% from Baghdad |
Muthanna | 99.5% Shiite Arab, 69.6% from Baghdad, 13.6% from Diyala |
Najaf | 97.8% Shiite Arab, 84.1% from Baghdad |
Qadisiyah | 99.6% Shiite Arab, 77.7% from Baghdad |
Wasit | 98.3% Shiite Arab, 66.8% from Baghdad |
Provinces With Predominately Displaced Sunnis
Anbar | 98.4% Sunni Arab, 74.9% from Baghdad |
Irbil | 39.4% Sunni Kurd, 34.4% Sunni Arab, 15.3% Chaldean Christian, 50.3% from Baghdad, 43.1% from Ninewa |
Salahaddin | 96.7% Sunni Arab, 50.1% from Baghdad, 14.6% from Tamim, 11.9% from Basra, 10.6% from Diyala |
Sulaymaniya | 60.1% Sunni Arab, 24.7% Sunni Kurd, 46.9% from Baghdad, 44.9% from Diyala |
Tamim | 53.5% Sunni Arab, 19.5% Sunni Kurd, 16.0% Shiite Turkmen, 24.4% from Diyala, 23.7% from Tamim, 15.8% from Salahaddin, 15.4% from Ninewa, 14.8% from Baghdad |
Provinces With Mixed Displaced Populations
Diyala | 57.9% Sunni Arab, 31.7% Shiite Arab, 92.8% form Diyala, 16.1% from Baghdad |
Dohuk | 39.3% Sunni Kurd, 30.6% Chaldean Christian, 52.5% from Baghdad, 46.0% from Ninewa |
Ninewa | 40.4% Assyrian Christian, 24.4% Sunni Arab, 12.3% Sunni Turkmen, 11.2% Chaldean Christian, 47.5% from Baghdad, 42.5% from Ninewa |
The major point of the June 2009 IOM report was to note the intentions of Iraq's displaced. 58.0% said they wanted to return to their place of origin. 21.4% said they wanted to stay where they were, 19.1% wanted to settle in some new location, either within Iraq or in another country, while 1.4% said they didn't know yet. This varied across the country however. Najaf, 94.1%, Diyala, 81.7%, and Anbar 81.3%, had the most responses for people that wanted to go back to their homes. Basra, 5.5%, and Wasit, 5.8%, had the least. 82.9% of the displaced in Basra said they wanted to stay there, while only 2.3% of the people in Anbar wanted to do so.
Intentions Of The Displaced
Province | Integrate into Location of Displacement | Settle in New Location | Return to Place of Origin | Waiting to Make Decision |
Iraq | 21.4% | 19.1% | 58.0% | 1.4% |
Anbar | 2.3% | 13.8% | 81.3% | 2.0% |
Babil | 26.2% | 28.6% | 44.5% | 0.6% |
Baghdad | 8.2% | 11.3% | 79.1% | 1.2% |
Basra | 82.9% | 11.1% | 5.5% | 0.3% |
Dhi Qar | 57.6% | 11.3% | 30.7% | 0.2% |
Diyala | 7.3% | 10.9% | 81.7% | 0.0% |
Dohuk | 57.0% | 23.1% | 19.7% | 0.2% |
Irbil | 18.3% | 13.5% | 67.4% | 0.1% |
Karbala | 26.3% | 26.6% | 46.4% | 0.6% |
Maysan | 28.1% | 28.0% | 40.7% | 3.1% |
Muthanna | 34.8% | 18.1% | 45.1% | 1.9% |
Najaf | 4.5% | 0.1% | 94.1% | 1.0% |
Ninewa | 7.0% | 33.0% | 59.2% | 0.7% |
Qadisiyah | 40.9% | 35.3% | 23.7% | 0.1% |
Salahaddin | 12.5% | 39.0% | 43.5% | 4.7% |
Sulaymaniya | 27.1% | 8.3% | 64.4% | 0.2% |
Tamim | 22.2% | 3.5% | 71.3% | 3.0% |
Wasit | 54.4% | 37.8% | 5.8% | 2.0% |
While 58.0% of displaced Iraqis want to return to their homes, the previous May 2009 report by the IOM worried that many of them may never have this opportunity. According to the United Nations' latest estimates, only 600,830 displaced Iraqis have gone back so far from 2003 to 2008. Almost 200,000 of these were Iraqis that had lost their homes during Saddam, the U.S. invasion, or subsequent fighting in places like Fallujah. That would mean only about 400,000 of the 1.6 million that lost their homes after the Samarra bombing have returned so far. The plight of the displaced in Iraq is an important indicator of the general situation within the country. So few displaced coming back, shows that Iraq is still an unstable country. There is still violence, although at much lower levels than before. The 2009 Iraqi elections did not settle much politically, but instead marked a new struggle for power between Maliki, his former allies, and independents. The government is still unable to provide many basic services, and the economy is especially bad for young people and women. All together this has given only a small fraction of Iraq's displaced a reason to go back home, even though a majority want to. The IOM and other groups are increasingly fearful that Iraq's refugees may become a permanent class of displaced people if things do not progress inside Iraq.
SOURCES
International Organization for Migration, "IOM Emergency Needs Assessments Post February 2006 Displacement In Iraq 1 June 2009 Monthly Report," 6/1/09
- "IOM Monitoring And Needs Assessments of Iraqi Return, May 2009," May 2009
United Nations High Commission for Refugees, "UNHCR Iraq Operation Monthly Statistical Update on Return – March 2009," UNHCR, March 2009
Wednesday, June 10, 2009
Baghdad-Kurdistan Divide Could Lead To Break Up Of Iraq Argues Journal Piece
In the Spring 2009 edition of the journal Middle East Policy, Professors Gareth Stansfield and Liam Anderson in their article “Kurds in Iraq: the struggle between Baghdad and Erbil,” argue that the growing conflict between Baghdad and the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) could bring down the government, and possibly lead to the break-up of Iraq. Many commentators have pointed out the seriousness of this issue, but still think that the sectarian conflict between Sunnis and Shiites is more important. Stansfield and Anderson believe that no other problem is as central to the future of Iraq. The oil law, the constitution, Kirkuk and other disputed territories, and federalism are all tied to the differences between the central government and Kurdistan. The relations between the two sides has only grown worse since 2008 as both have become distrustful of the others’ intentions. That leaves little room for compromise, and increases the chance for violence.
Many western views of Iraq are based upon past experiences, which makes analysis of newer ones sometimes difficult. For example, many believe that reconciliation between Sunnis and Shiites is the most important issue due to the sectarian war of 2006-2007. If that’s not resolved many believe that Iraq will fall back into civil war. Iraqi nationalism is also making a comeback, which some hope will unify the country and balance outside influences like Iran’s. Commentators do note the conflict between Baghdad and Kurdistan, but think its secondary to sectarianism. They also think that because Turkey and Iran are opposed to Kurdish independence, that it will never happen. Stansfield and Anderson counter that no other issue as important as this one.
After the 2005 provincial and parliamentary elections the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council (SIIC) and the two main Kurdish parties, the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) emerged as the dominant forces in Iraqi politics. The two had been allies since the Iran-Iraq War when both joined with Iran to fight against Saddam Hussein. The U.S. also played a role, supporting the Kurds after the Gulf War, and selecting the SIIC as their main Shiite partner after the 2003 invasion. Together the SIIC and Kurdish parties became the backbone of the Ibrahim al-Jaafari premiership. They were also the main authors of the 2005 constitution, which included federalism, an issue dear to both, and Article 140 that created a process to annex Kirkuk. Later they helped put Nouri al-Maliki in power.
Maliki was considered weak and ineffectual at first, but after the Surge took care of his main rivals, Al Qaeda in Iraq, the Sunni insurgency, and Moqtada al-Sadr’s Mahdi Army militia, the state was strengthened, and the Prime Minister began flexing his muscle in 2008. In the process he began moving away from the SIIC, KDP and PUK to assert his independence. He has now fashioned himself as an Iraqi nationalist that wants to stop the Kurds from annexing the disputed territories, including Kirkuk, and amend the constitution to strengthen the central government. Sunni Arabs, Turkmen, and independent Shiites have supported Maliki’s efforts. This has led to increasing tensions with the Kurds, who feel threatened by Maliki’s actions.
The first real confrontation between Baghdad and Kurdistan occurred in the summer of 2008. In July Maliki launched Operation Promise of Good in Diyala. It was supposed to target insurgents and Al Qaeda in Iraq, but quickly turned into a political move by the Prime Minister. In August 2008 he sent the Iraqi Army into the Khanaqin district in northern Diyala. That area had been under Kurdish control since March 2003, and was home to about 4,000 peshmerga. Kurdistan considered it a disputed territory, which they wished to annex. On August 10, the Iraqi Army told the peshmerga they had 24 hours to leave the area, and a week later began forcing out Kurdish parties from government owned buildings. Finally, on September 27 Iraqi police and peshmerga got into a shoot out in the town of Jalawlaa. Things seemed headed for a military confrontation until KRG President Massoud Barzani flew to Baghdad to hold talks with Maliki. With the assistance of the Americans they came up with a deal where the peshmerga and Iraqi security forces would withdraw from the town of Khanaqin, turning over duties there to the local police, while the Iraqi Army would take up patrolling the Arab areas to the south, and the peshmerga the Kurdish areas of the north.
This was the opening shot in changing the dynamic between Baghdad and Kurdistan. After Khanaqin, Maliki went on to confront the Kurds across the disputed territories that stretch from Diyala to Ninewa, to Tamim to Salahaddin. In Mosul, Maliki ordered the Interior Ministry to take over responsibility for security from the peshmerga in November 2008, and began reaching out to the Arab population by offering them reconstruction money. He also set up tribal support councils across all four provinces, and began transferring predominately Kurdish units and Kurdish officers out, and replacing them with Arab ones. This was not only a way to push the Kurds, but for Maliki to build up his own independent power base and armed supporters independent of both the government and the SIIC and Kurds.
The major disputed territory of course is Tamim province, home of Kirkuk. The Kurds claim that Kirkuk is historically theirs, and was Turkified under the Ottomans. When Iraq gained independence the Arab governments, and especially Saddam went on to Arabize the area. Since 2003 the Kurdish leadership has promised their constituency that they would annex the area. During the U.S. invasion they occupied Kirkuk, and then handed it over to the Americans when local Arabs and Turkmen complained about their presence. In 2004 they set up a process of normalization, a census, and then a referendum on the future of Kirkuk in Article 58 of the Transitional Administration Law created by the Coalition Provisional Authority. Then the Kurds had the same measures included in the 2005 constitution in Article 140. The Kurds claim this was a huge sacrifice for them because they could have just kept Kirkuk after 2003. Instead they have tried to work within Iraq’s new political system to legally annex it. The referendum on Kirkuk was supposed to happen by December 31, 2007, but didn’t. It was then extended until June 2008 but with nothing done again. Now the United Nations is supposed to handle Tamim’s future.
The Kurds say the solution to Kirkuk is for Article 140 to be implemented, but other groups in the province would not be happy with that. If there were a referendum, Kirkuk would assuredly be annexed. The problem is that Arabs and Turkmen there would object. They favor equal power sharing amongst the three main groups in the provincial council, and making Tamim an autonomous region. They have become increasingly angered by the Kurds’ expansionist ideas, and treatment by the Kurdish peshmerga and security service the asayesh. Rather than gaining friends to support their aims, the Kurds have created enemies with their policies in the province.
Maliki has inserted himself into this process as well. He has come to the side of the Arabs and Turkmen to frustrate the Kurds’ aspirations for Kirkuk. Like the other disputed areas, the Prime Minister began setting up tribal support councils and Sons of Iraq units in Tamim. This especially angered the Kurds because the councils included many Arab tribes that had fought alongside Saddam’s troops during the Anfal campaign in the 1980s where the government tried to ethnically cleanse the Kurds from northern regions. To drive the point home even more, Maliki helped orchestrate a demonstration of Arabs in two of Tamim’s districts in November 2008 where they chanted an old Baathist slogan replacing Saddam’s name with Kirkuk, “With our souls, with our blood, we sacrifice for you, Kirkuk.” The result of Maliki’s actions has been to ignore Article 140.
This has increasingly frustrated the Kurdish leadership. The KRG has run an extensive public relations campaign in Kurdistan assuring their constituency that Kirkuk would be annexed, and to a lesser extent the other disputed areas. Beginning with Khanaqin, then the other disputed territories, and finally Kirkuk, the Kurds came to distrust Maliki. They openly compared him to Saddam, and said the Prime Minister could no longer be trusted since he wasn’t following the constitution and Article 140. At one meeting, President Barzani even told Maliki, “You smell like a dictator.” As a form of protest, the Kurds held up major legislation in parliament like the provincial election law, the oil law, and amending the constitution. The Kurds were eventually successful in making Maliki back off, but the relationship between Baghdad and Kurdistan, especially between the Prime Minister and President Barzani were ruined in the process. By December 2008, ties between the two sides were at an all time low.
The other major conflict is over politics. Beginning in 2008 Maliki began calling for revisions to the constitution that would strengthen the central government vis a vis the provinces and the KRG. He claims that the constitution reflects the sectarian divide and instability of 2003-2005, and should therefore be amended to reflect the new status quo in Iraq. Maliki would especially like to curtail the Kurds’ oil policy, where they have passed their own law and signed over 20 independent contracts. For the Kurds’ part, they and their allies the Supreme Council were able to dominate the drafting process, and include provisions in it to ensure federalism and Article 140. They claim that this was a major sacrifice because they agreed to a legal framework to annex Kirkuk, rather than take it by force, and shows that they wish to remain part of Iraq in a federal system.
It seems unlikely that Maliki and the Kurds will be able to reconcile on any of these issues. The Prime Minister has pushed and shoved the Kurds over the disputed territories, and allied himself with many of the anti-Kurdish forces in the north, including ones that evoke a dark memory for the Kurds. This has allowed Maliki to create an independent base as well that he used well in the provincial elections. He is also challenging the Kurds’ autonomy by calling for amending the constitution. It’s believed that the 2010 parliamentary elections will only strengthen the Prime Minister more. The question then is what will happen next?
Many believe that Maliki has time on his side. Eventually the central government will have the power to force the Kurds out of the disputed areas for example. Stansfield and Anderson write that ironically, in fashioning himself as the nationalist leader of Iraq, calling for the unity and strength of his country, Maliki may actually lead to its break-up. The Kurds have repeatedly said that they want to stay part of Iraq, but if they are losing on every front, then what motivation will they have to remain part of the country? They will only take losing out on their aspirations and power for so long. Add to this the fact that the conflict could lead to violence. Iraqi forces and the peshmerga have faced off several times since Khanaqin. So far, nothing has come of it, but each time the two sides practice brinkmanship it increases the likelihood of something going wrong.
This is an obvious situation where the United States could play a mediating role. The U.S. has tried to calm nerves in military situations, but on the political side there’s little evidence of much pressure to resolve this growing dispute. On Kirkuk for example, the Americans are now deferring to the United Nations, but they have no hope of bringing the various sides together without the U.S. The policy seems to consist of keeping a lid on possible flashpoints, while letting the Iraqis try to solve their own problems. If something is not done, this feud will only grow in intensity until it reaches the breaking point, and that could either lead to the fall of the Maliki government, or worse, the secession of Kurdistan from Iraq.
SOURCES
Aswat al-Iraq, “Kurdish official condemns Iraqi army raid on Peshmerga HQ,” 8/24/08
- “Military units should be under central govt. control,” 8/19/08
International Crisis Group, “Iraq After The Surge II: The Need for a New Political Strategy,” 4/30/08
- “Shiite Politics In Iraq: The Role Of The Supreme Council,” 11/15/07
Jakes, Lara, “Key UN report to suggest power-sharing plan in Iraq’s divided Kirkuk,” Associated Press, 3/29/09
Paley, Amit, “Strip of Iraq ‘on the Verge of Exploding,’” Washington Post, 9/13/08
Parker, Sam, “Guest Post: Behind the Curtain in Diyala,” Abu Muqawama Blog, 8/20/08
Peterson, Scott, “US referees Iraq’s troubled Kurdish-Arab fault line,” Christian Science Monitor, 10/21/08
Serwer, Daniel and Parker, Sam, “Maliki’s Iraq between Two Elections,” United States Institute of Peace, May 2009
Stansfield, Gareth Anderson, Liam, “Kurds in Iraq: the struggle between Baghdad and Erbil,” Middle East Policy, Spring 2009
Many western views of Iraq are based upon past experiences, which makes analysis of newer ones sometimes difficult. For example, many believe that reconciliation between Sunnis and Shiites is the most important issue due to the sectarian war of 2006-2007. If that’s not resolved many believe that Iraq will fall back into civil war. Iraqi nationalism is also making a comeback, which some hope will unify the country and balance outside influences like Iran’s. Commentators do note the conflict between Baghdad and Kurdistan, but think its secondary to sectarianism. They also think that because Turkey and Iran are opposed to Kurdish independence, that it will never happen. Stansfield and Anderson counter that no other issue as important as this one.
After the 2005 provincial and parliamentary elections the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council (SIIC) and the two main Kurdish parties, the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) emerged as the dominant forces in Iraqi politics. The two had been allies since the Iran-Iraq War when both joined with Iran to fight against Saddam Hussein. The U.S. also played a role, supporting the Kurds after the Gulf War, and selecting the SIIC as their main Shiite partner after the 2003 invasion. Together the SIIC and Kurdish parties became the backbone of the Ibrahim al-Jaafari premiership. They were also the main authors of the 2005 constitution, which included federalism, an issue dear to both, and Article 140 that created a process to annex Kirkuk. Later they helped put Nouri al-Maliki in power.
Maliki was considered weak and ineffectual at first, but after the Surge took care of his main rivals, Al Qaeda in Iraq, the Sunni insurgency, and Moqtada al-Sadr’s Mahdi Army militia, the state was strengthened, and the Prime Minister began flexing his muscle in 2008. In the process he began moving away from the SIIC, KDP and PUK to assert his independence. He has now fashioned himself as an Iraqi nationalist that wants to stop the Kurds from annexing the disputed territories, including Kirkuk, and amend the constitution to strengthen the central government. Sunni Arabs, Turkmen, and independent Shiites have supported Maliki’s efforts. This has led to increasing tensions with the Kurds, who feel threatened by Maliki’s actions.
The first real confrontation between Baghdad and Kurdistan occurred in the summer of 2008. In July Maliki launched Operation Promise of Good in Diyala. It was supposed to target insurgents and Al Qaeda in Iraq, but quickly turned into a political move by the Prime Minister. In August 2008 he sent the Iraqi Army into the Khanaqin district in northern Diyala. That area had been under Kurdish control since March 2003, and was home to about 4,000 peshmerga. Kurdistan considered it a disputed territory, which they wished to annex. On August 10, the Iraqi Army told the peshmerga they had 24 hours to leave the area, and a week later began forcing out Kurdish parties from government owned buildings. Finally, on September 27 Iraqi police and peshmerga got into a shoot out in the town of Jalawlaa. Things seemed headed for a military confrontation until KRG President Massoud Barzani flew to Baghdad to hold talks with Maliki. With the assistance of the Americans they came up with a deal where the peshmerga and Iraqi security forces would withdraw from the town of Khanaqin, turning over duties there to the local police, while the Iraqi Army would take up patrolling the Arab areas to the south, and the peshmerga the Kurdish areas of the north.
This was the opening shot in changing the dynamic between Baghdad and Kurdistan. After Khanaqin, Maliki went on to confront the Kurds across the disputed territories that stretch from Diyala to Ninewa, to Tamim to Salahaddin. In Mosul, Maliki ordered the Interior Ministry to take over responsibility for security from the peshmerga in November 2008, and began reaching out to the Arab population by offering them reconstruction money. He also set up tribal support councils across all four provinces, and began transferring predominately Kurdish units and Kurdish officers out, and replacing them with Arab ones. This was not only a way to push the Kurds, but for Maliki to build up his own independent power base and armed supporters independent of both the government and the SIIC and Kurds.
The major disputed territory of course is Tamim province, home of Kirkuk. The Kurds claim that Kirkuk is historically theirs, and was Turkified under the Ottomans. When Iraq gained independence the Arab governments, and especially Saddam went on to Arabize the area. Since 2003 the Kurdish leadership has promised their constituency that they would annex the area. During the U.S. invasion they occupied Kirkuk, and then handed it over to the Americans when local Arabs and Turkmen complained about their presence. In 2004 they set up a process of normalization, a census, and then a referendum on the future of Kirkuk in Article 58 of the Transitional Administration Law created by the Coalition Provisional Authority. Then the Kurds had the same measures included in the 2005 constitution in Article 140. The Kurds claim this was a huge sacrifice for them because they could have just kept Kirkuk after 2003. Instead they have tried to work within Iraq’s new political system to legally annex it. The referendum on Kirkuk was supposed to happen by December 31, 2007, but didn’t. It was then extended until June 2008 but with nothing done again. Now the United Nations is supposed to handle Tamim’s future.
The Kurds say the solution to Kirkuk is for Article 140 to be implemented, but other groups in the province would not be happy with that. If there were a referendum, Kirkuk would assuredly be annexed. The problem is that Arabs and Turkmen there would object. They favor equal power sharing amongst the three main groups in the provincial council, and making Tamim an autonomous region. They have become increasingly angered by the Kurds’ expansionist ideas, and treatment by the Kurdish peshmerga and security service the asayesh. Rather than gaining friends to support their aims, the Kurds have created enemies with their policies in the province.
Maliki has inserted himself into this process as well. He has come to the side of the Arabs and Turkmen to frustrate the Kurds’ aspirations for Kirkuk. Like the other disputed areas, the Prime Minister began setting up tribal support councils and Sons of Iraq units in Tamim. This especially angered the Kurds because the councils included many Arab tribes that had fought alongside Saddam’s troops during the Anfal campaign in the 1980s where the government tried to ethnically cleanse the Kurds from northern regions. To drive the point home even more, Maliki helped orchestrate a demonstration of Arabs in two of Tamim’s districts in November 2008 where they chanted an old Baathist slogan replacing Saddam’s name with Kirkuk, “With our souls, with our blood, we sacrifice for you, Kirkuk.” The result of Maliki’s actions has been to ignore Article 140.
This has increasingly frustrated the Kurdish leadership. The KRG has run an extensive public relations campaign in Kurdistan assuring their constituency that Kirkuk would be annexed, and to a lesser extent the other disputed areas. Beginning with Khanaqin, then the other disputed territories, and finally Kirkuk, the Kurds came to distrust Maliki. They openly compared him to Saddam, and said the Prime Minister could no longer be trusted since he wasn’t following the constitution and Article 140. At one meeting, President Barzani even told Maliki, “You smell like a dictator.” As a form of protest, the Kurds held up major legislation in parliament like the provincial election law, the oil law, and amending the constitution. The Kurds were eventually successful in making Maliki back off, but the relationship between Baghdad and Kurdistan, especially between the Prime Minister and President Barzani were ruined in the process. By December 2008, ties between the two sides were at an all time low.
The other major conflict is over politics. Beginning in 2008 Maliki began calling for revisions to the constitution that would strengthen the central government vis a vis the provinces and the KRG. He claims that the constitution reflects the sectarian divide and instability of 2003-2005, and should therefore be amended to reflect the new status quo in Iraq. Maliki would especially like to curtail the Kurds’ oil policy, where they have passed their own law and signed over 20 independent contracts. For the Kurds’ part, they and their allies the Supreme Council were able to dominate the drafting process, and include provisions in it to ensure federalism and Article 140. They claim that this was a major sacrifice because they agreed to a legal framework to annex Kirkuk, rather than take it by force, and shows that they wish to remain part of Iraq in a federal system.
It seems unlikely that Maliki and the Kurds will be able to reconcile on any of these issues. The Prime Minister has pushed and shoved the Kurds over the disputed territories, and allied himself with many of the anti-Kurdish forces in the north, including ones that evoke a dark memory for the Kurds. This has allowed Maliki to create an independent base as well that he used well in the provincial elections. He is also challenging the Kurds’ autonomy by calling for amending the constitution. It’s believed that the 2010 parliamentary elections will only strengthen the Prime Minister more. The question then is what will happen next?
Many believe that Maliki has time on his side. Eventually the central government will have the power to force the Kurds out of the disputed areas for example. Stansfield and Anderson write that ironically, in fashioning himself as the nationalist leader of Iraq, calling for the unity and strength of his country, Maliki may actually lead to its break-up. The Kurds have repeatedly said that they want to stay part of Iraq, but if they are losing on every front, then what motivation will they have to remain part of the country? They will only take losing out on their aspirations and power for so long. Add to this the fact that the conflict could lead to violence. Iraqi forces and the peshmerga have faced off several times since Khanaqin. So far, nothing has come of it, but each time the two sides practice brinkmanship it increases the likelihood of something going wrong.
This is an obvious situation where the United States could play a mediating role. The U.S. has tried to calm nerves in military situations, but on the political side there’s little evidence of much pressure to resolve this growing dispute. On Kirkuk for example, the Americans are now deferring to the United Nations, but they have no hope of bringing the various sides together without the U.S. The policy seems to consist of keeping a lid on possible flashpoints, while letting the Iraqis try to solve their own problems. If something is not done, this feud will only grow in intensity until it reaches the breaking point, and that could either lead to the fall of the Maliki government, or worse, the secession of Kurdistan from Iraq.
SOURCES
Aswat al-Iraq, “Kurdish official condemns Iraqi army raid on Peshmerga HQ,” 8/24/08
- “Military units should be under central govt. control,” 8/19/08
International Crisis Group, “Iraq After The Surge II: The Need for a New Political Strategy,” 4/30/08
- “Shiite Politics In Iraq: The Role Of The Supreme Council,” 11/15/07
Jakes, Lara, “Key UN report to suggest power-sharing plan in Iraq’s divided Kirkuk,” Associated Press, 3/29/09
Paley, Amit, “Strip of Iraq ‘on the Verge of Exploding,’” Washington Post, 9/13/08
Parker, Sam, “Guest Post: Behind the Curtain in Diyala,” Abu Muqawama Blog, 8/20/08
Peterson, Scott, “US referees Iraq’s troubled Kurdish-Arab fault line,” Christian Science Monitor, 10/21/08
Serwer, Daniel and Parker, Sam, “Maliki’s Iraq between Two Elections,” United States Institute of Peace, May 2009
Stansfield, Gareth Anderson, Liam, “Kurds in Iraq: the struggle between Baghdad and Erbil,” Middle East Policy, Spring 2009
Britain Withdraws Combat Troops But Trainers Remain, Could This Be A Blueprint For The U.S.?
On December 23, 2008 Iraq’s parliament passed a bill allowing England and several other members of the Coalition of the Willing to stay in the country until July 2009. The English command set May 31, 2009 as the date they would actually have all combat troops out, and began a quick turnover of facilities to the Iraqis and Americans. With that achieved, London went on to sign an agreement with Baghdad to allow trainers to stay for one more year. Could this be what the U.S. will do when its deadline for withdrawal comes?
Beginning in January 2009, Britain began its pull out from Iraq. Originally 26,000 British took part in the 2003 invasion. That was quickly drawn down to 18,000 by the end of May 2003. A year later there were 8,600, and then 5,500 by May 2007. At the end of 2008 there were around 4,000 English troops still in Iraq. On January 1, 2009 Britain turned over Basra airport to the Iraqis. English troops would remain on the military side of the facility however. By the middle of February it was announced that all of its heavy equipment had been shipped back to England. On March 31, England handed over command of Basra to the Americans. 7,000 U.S. soldiers also moved into Basra to take over many of the jobs the British had previously been doing. At the end of April the English announced that all their combat operations were over. Finally May 31 arrived and all combat troops were pulled out. Within two days London negotiated a deal with Baghdad to allow just under 100 British sailors and five ships to remain in Basra to train the fledgling Iraqi Navy for one-year past the withdrawal deadline.
The Iraq Navy is a small, undermanned, and under equipped force. As of January 2009 there were only 1,898 in the Navy. They are authorized to have 3,596. At the beginning of this year they received 44 small craft, but they lack the personnel, knowledge, and leadership to man all of them. They also have no major ships, although they are to receive two from Italy this year. The British are the main advisors to the Iraqi Navy. Besides the troops in Basra, they have also taken Iraqis to England for further training.
Could the Americans repeat England’s recent experience in Iraq? The British drew down their troops, declared combat operations over, met their deadline to be out by May 2009, and then signed a new agreement to keep trainers in the country for another year. Like the British, the U.S. has also set the end of 2011 as the date that it will be out of Iraq. As reported before, by that time the Iraqi security forces will not be ready to protect the country from external threats. The Iraqi Navy is a perfect example of that as it lacks the personnel and ships to carry out that task right now. When December 31, 2011 approaches then, it’s very likely that both the U.S. and Iraqi military will put pressure on the Obama administration to maintain some kind of U.S. presence in Iraq. It will be up the President then to decide whether keeping perhaps several thousand American advisors in Iraq will break his promise to be out of the country in sixteen months of taking office.
SOURCES
Agence France Presse, “Iraq and Britain agree draft naval deal,” 6/3/09
Ashton, Adam and Hammoudi, Laith, “What are ‘combat troops’? Iraq withdrawal depends on answer,” McClatchy Newspapers, 12/23/08
Aswat al-Iraq, “Britain hands over Basra airport to Iraqi authorities,” 1/1/09
Cordesman, Anthony, “How Soon Is Safe? Iraqi Force Development and ‘Conditions-Based’ US Withdrawals,” 4/20/09
Department of Defense, “Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq,” March 2009
Evans, Michael, “Basra gets better beds and burgers as US takes over from the British,” Times of London, 2/16/09
The National, “British military operations end in Iraq,” 4/30/09
Robertson, Campbell and Cowell, Alan, “U.S. Takes Over as Britain Begins Basra Pullout,” New York Times, 4/1/09
Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, “Quarterly Report to the United States Congress,” 4/30/09
Times of London, “Q&A: Iraq inquiry,” 3/26/09
Beginning in January 2009, Britain began its pull out from Iraq. Originally 26,000 British took part in the 2003 invasion. That was quickly drawn down to 18,000 by the end of May 2003. A year later there were 8,600, and then 5,500 by May 2007. At the end of 2008 there were around 4,000 English troops still in Iraq. On January 1, 2009 Britain turned over Basra airport to the Iraqis. English troops would remain on the military side of the facility however. By the middle of February it was announced that all of its heavy equipment had been shipped back to England. On March 31, England handed over command of Basra to the Americans. 7,000 U.S. soldiers also moved into Basra to take over many of the jobs the British had previously been doing. At the end of April the English announced that all their combat operations were over. Finally May 31 arrived and all combat troops were pulled out. Within two days London negotiated a deal with Baghdad to allow just under 100 British sailors and five ships to remain in Basra to train the fledgling Iraqi Navy for one-year past the withdrawal deadline.
The Iraq Navy is a small, undermanned, and under equipped force. As of January 2009 there were only 1,898 in the Navy. They are authorized to have 3,596. At the beginning of this year they received 44 small craft, but they lack the personnel, knowledge, and leadership to man all of them. They also have no major ships, although they are to receive two from Italy this year. The British are the main advisors to the Iraqi Navy. Besides the troops in Basra, they have also taken Iraqis to England for further training.
Could the Americans repeat England’s recent experience in Iraq? The British drew down their troops, declared combat operations over, met their deadline to be out by May 2009, and then signed a new agreement to keep trainers in the country for another year. Like the British, the U.S. has also set the end of 2011 as the date that it will be out of Iraq. As reported before, by that time the Iraqi security forces will not be ready to protect the country from external threats. The Iraqi Navy is a perfect example of that as it lacks the personnel and ships to carry out that task right now. When December 31, 2011 approaches then, it’s very likely that both the U.S. and Iraqi military will put pressure on the Obama administration to maintain some kind of U.S. presence in Iraq. It will be up the President then to decide whether keeping perhaps several thousand American advisors in Iraq will break his promise to be out of the country in sixteen months of taking office.
SOURCES
Agence France Presse, “Iraq and Britain agree draft naval deal,” 6/3/09
Ashton, Adam and Hammoudi, Laith, “What are ‘combat troops’? Iraq withdrawal depends on answer,” McClatchy Newspapers, 12/23/08
Aswat al-Iraq, “Britain hands over Basra airport to Iraqi authorities,” 1/1/09
Cordesman, Anthony, “How Soon Is Safe? Iraqi Force Development and ‘Conditions-Based’ US Withdrawals,” 4/20/09
Department of Defense, “Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq,” March 2009
Evans, Michael, “Basra gets better beds and burgers as US takes over from the British,” Times of London, 2/16/09
The National, “British military operations end in Iraq,” 4/30/09
Robertson, Campbell and Cowell, Alan, “U.S. Takes Over as Britain Begins Basra Pullout,” New York Times, 4/1/09
Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, “Quarterly Report to the United States Congress,” 4/30/09
Times of London, “Q&A: Iraq inquiry,” 3/26/09
Monday, June 8, 2009
No Decrease In Violence For Mosul In May 2009
As reported before, the number of Iraqis killed declined in May 2009 compared to the previous month. According to Iraq’s ministries 165 people died in May. In April the government said 355 lost their lives. Other organizations that keep track of violence in Iraq had higher numbers, but also noted a drop. That could not be said for Mosul, which is the second deadliest city in Iraq. Last month the number of attacks and deaths went up, with only the wounded decreasing.
According to English-language press reports in May 2009 64 Iraqis were killed in Mosul. That made an average of 2.06 deaths per day. 146 were also wounded, for an average of 4.7 per day. These were the result of 95 attacks and incidents, an average of 3.06 per day. There were two mass casualty bombings that month, one on May 24 that wounded 34, and another on May 1 that killed five and wounded six. There were also a series of deadly home invasions where gunmen stormed houses and killed women and children. In April 53 died, 1.76 per day, and 191 wounded, 6.36 per day, due to 79 attacks and incidents, 2.63 average. From May to April then, the number of security incidents and killed went up, while the wounded went down.
The recent rise in violence has also been occurring while a major joint Iraqi-U.S. military operation has been going on in the city. In February 2009, Baghdad launched Operation New Hope. There are now 36,000 Iraqi soldiers and police, along with 5,000 U.S. troops in the city, in what some think might be the last major U.S. military operation before the withdrawal. The Iraqi units however, are said to be undermanned and underequipped, and the Iraqi Army commander does not think they can do the job without American support. For that reason, U.S. combat troops are expected to stay in the city past the June 30, 2009 deadline for them to be removed from all Iraqi cities. There is also a major U.S. base outside of Mosul that is not expected to be shut down either. This offensive so far, has not had its intended effects as the casualty numbers show.
Like the rest of the country, the number of attacks and casualties in Mosul declined towards the end of 2008 reaching a low in January 2009 as the provincial elections neared. In 2005 the Sunnis boycotted the vote, allowing the Kurdistan Democratic Party and Patriotic Union of Kurdistan to take power in Ninewa. The Sunni Arab majority in the province was eager to reverse this turn of events in 2009, and the insurgents seemed to have accommodated them. Since then the number of casualties has been creeping back up in Mosul as the balloting did not end the Arab-Kurdish divide, the major source of violence in the city, but actually seemed to increase it with the election of the al-Hadbaa party to power and the subsequent boycotting of the provincial council by the two major Kurdish parties.
Attack Statistics In Mosul Based Upon Press Reports
May 2009
83 Attacks/Incidents – 3.06 attacks & incidents/day
64 Deaths – 2.06 deaths/day
164 Wounded – 4.70 wounded/day
April 2009
79 Attacks/Incidents – 2.63 attacks & incidents/day
53 Deaths – 1.76 deaths/day
191 Wounded – 6.36 wounded/day
March 2009
86 attacks/incidents – 2.77 attacks & incidents/day
69 deaths – 2.22 deaths/day
169 wounded – 5.45 wounded/day
February 2009
81 attacks/incidents – 2.89 attacks & incidents/day
58 deaths – 2.0 deaths/day
111 wounded – 3.96 wounded/day
January 2009
52 attacks/incidents – 1.67 attacks & incidents/day
56 deaths – 1.80 killed/day
85 wounded – 2.74 wounded/day
December 2008
65 attacks/incidents – 2.09 attacks & incidents/day
68 deaths – 2.19 deaths/day
181 wounded – 5.83 wounded/day
November 2008
65 attacks/incidents – 2.16 attacks & incidents/day
53 deaths – 1.76 deaths/day
249 wounded – 8.3 wounded/day
October 2008
92 attacks/incidents – 2.96 attacks & incidents/day
112 deaths – 3.61 deaths/day
188 wounded – 6.06 wounded/day
SOURCES
Abass, Ali and Dolan, Jack “Grenade hits U.S. convoy in Iraq,” St. Agustine Record, 5/10/09
Agence France Presse, “Iraq Suicide Bomber Wounds 34 in Mosul Shopping Street,” 5/24/09
Ahmed, Hamid, “Iraqi leader calls for anti-corruption campaign,” Associated Press, 5/9/09
Associated Press, “Iraqis fear U.S. pullout of volatile Mosul,” 3/9/09
Aswat al-Iraq, “2 brothers wounded in gunfire in Mosul,” 5/21/09
- “2 civilians killed, injured in Mosul,” 5/25/09
- “2 soldiers wounded in blast in Mosul,” 5/20/09
- “3 civilians wounded in Mosul blast,” 5/30/09
- “3 injured in explosion in Mosul,” 5/28/09
- “3 wounded in car bomb blast in Mosul,” 5/3/09
- “4 wounded in Mosul blast,” 5/8/09
- “Armed attack injures 3 in Mosul,” 5/21/09
- “Baghdadiya TV correspondent dies from blast wounds,” 5/31/09
- “Car bomb defused in Mosul,” 5/8/09
- “Child killed by U.S. fire in Mosul,” 5/7/09
- “Civilian corpse found in Mosul,” 5/19/09
- “Civilian killed, 2 bombs defused in Mosul,” 5/19/09
- “Civilian wounded by bomb blast in Mosul,” 5/5/09
- “Civilian wounded in explosion in Mosul,” 5/12/09
- “Contractor shot down by gunmen in Mosul,” 5/14/09
- “Cop injured, 2 gunmen busted in Ninewa,” 5/5/09
- “Cop killed, civilians wounded in Mosul attack,” 5/9/09
- “Cop killed, gunman wounded in Mosul,” 5/15/09
- “Corpse of abducted Christian child found in Ninewa,” 5/11/09
- “Five wounded in car bomb blast in Mosul,” 5/13/09
- “Gunmen kill cop in Mosul,” 5/4/09
- “Gunmen kill former army officer in Mosul,” 5/11/09
- “Gunmen kill soldier in Mosul,” 5/1/09
- “Gunman wounds 3 female students in Mosul,” 5/25/09
- “IED injures 2 cops in western Mosul,” 5/26/09
- “IED kills cop, injures 6 in central Mosul,” 5/22/09
- “IED wounds 2 civilians in Mosul,” 5/13/09
- “IED wounds 4 civilians in Mosul,” 5/19/09
- “Mosul blast leaves officer killed, 2 wounded,” 5/31/09
- “Mother, daughter killed in Mosul copycat,” 5/28/09
- “Ninewa police defuse 4 IEDs,” 5/23/09
- “Officer wounded by IED in Mosul,” 5/23/09
- “TNT explosives found under bridge in Mosul,” 5/24/09
- “URGENT/ Mosul suicide blast leaves 5 killed, 6 wounded,” 5/1/09
- “Traffic cop wounded by IED in Mosul,” 5/4/09
- “Woman, daughter shot down by gunmen in Mosul,” 5/21/09
- “Woman injured in western Mosul,” 5/22/09
DPA, “Suicide bomber targets Iraqi governor’s house,” 5/18/09
Druzin, Heath, “Coalition forces fight in insurgent stronghold while residents urge U.S. troops to leave Mosul,” Stars and Stripes, 3/8/09
Hammoudi, Laith, “Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq – Tuesday 5 May 2009,” 5/9/09
Hammoudi, Laith and Kadhim, Hussein, “Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq – Monday 25 May 2009,” 5/25/09
Issa, Sahar and Kadhim, Hussein, “Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq – Monday 11 May 2009,” McClatchy Newspapers, 5/11/09
- “Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq – Thursday 28 May 2009,” McClatchy Newspapers, 5/28/09
- “Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq – Wednesday 6 May 2009,” McClatchy Newspapers, 5/6/09
Israel News, “Prison officer gunned down in northern Iraq,” 5/17/09
Kadhim, Hussein, “Roundup of Daily Violence in Iraq-Monday 4 May 2009,” 5/4/09
KUNA, “Car bomb blast kills three civilians in northern Iraq,” 5/3/09
Loyd, Anthony, “US withdrawal from Mosul leads to fear of Iraqi insurgent attacks,” Times of London, 6/1/09
Press TV, “American soldier kill civilian in Iraq,” 5/19/09
Reid, Robert, “Iraq civilian deaths fall after April spike,” Associated Press, 6/1/09
Reuters, “FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, May 4,” 5/4/09
- “FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, May 5,” 5/5/09
- “FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, May 9,” 5/9/09
- “FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, May 11,” 5/11/09
- “FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, May 13,” 5/13/09
- “FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, May 14,” 5/14/09
- “FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, May 15,” 5/15/09
- “FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, May 16,” 5/16/09
- “FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, May 23,” 5/17/09
- “FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, May 23,” 5/23/09
- “FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, May 24,” 5/24/09
- “FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, May 27,” 5/27/09
- “FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, May 29,” 5/29/09
- “Iraq rules out extension of U.S. withdrawal dates,” 5/3/09
Xinhua, “2 policemen killed in Mosul violence,” 5/17/09
According to English-language press reports in May 2009 64 Iraqis were killed in Mosul. That made an average of 2.06 deaths per day. 146 were also wounded, for an average of 4.7 per day. These were the result of 95 attacks and incidents, an average of 3.06 per day. There were two mass casualty bombings that month, one on May 24 that wounded 34, and another on May 1 that killed five and wounded six. There were also a series of deadly home invasions where gunmen stormed houses and killed women and children. In April 53 died, 1.76 per day, and 191 wounded, 6.36 per day, due to 79 attacks and incidents, 2.63 average. From May to April then, the number of security incidents and killed went up, while the wounded went down.
The recent rise in violence has also been occurring while a major joint Iraqi-U.S. military operation has been going on in the city. In February 2009, Baghdad launched Operation New Hope. There are now 36,000 Iraqi soldiers and police, along with 5,000 U.S. troops in the city, in what some think might be the last major U.S. military operation before the withdrawal. The Iraqi units however, are said to be undermanned and underequipped, and the Iraqi Army commander does not think they can do the job without American support. For that reason, U.S. combat troops are expected to stay in the city past the June 30, 2009 deadline for them to be removed from all Iraqi cities. There is also a major U.S. base outside of Mosul that is not expected to be shut down either. This offensive so far, has not had its intended effects as the casualty numbers show.
Like the rest of the country, the number of attacks and casualties in Mosul declined towards the end of 2008 reaching a low in January 2009 as the provincial elections neared. In 2005 the Sunnis boycotted the vote, allowing the Kurdistan Democratic Party and Patriotic Union of Kurdistan to take power in Ninewa. The Sunni Arab majority in the province was eager to reverse this turn of events in 2009, and the insurgents seemed to have accommodated them. Since then the number of casualties has been creeping back up in Mosul as the balloting did not end the Arab-Kurdish divide, the major source of violence in the city, but actually seemed to increase it with the election of the al-Hadbaa party to power and the subsequent boycotting of the provincial council by the two major Kurdish parties.
Attack Statistics In Mosul Based Upon Press Reports
May 2009
83 Attacks/Incidents – 3.06 attacks & incidents/day
64 Deaths – 2.06 deaths/day
164 Wounded – 4.70 wounded/day
April 2009
79 Attacks/Incidents – 2.63 attacks & incidents/day
53 Deaths – 1.76 deaths/day
191 Wounded – 6.36 wounded/day
March 2009
86 attacks/incidents – 2.77 attacks & incidents/day
69 deaths – 2.22 deaths/day
169 wounded – 5.45 wounded/day
February 2009
81 attacks/incidents – 2.89 attacks & incidents/day
58 deaths – 2.0 deaths/day
111 wounded – 3.96 wounded/day
January 2009
52 attacks/incidents – 1.67 attacks & incidents/day
56 deaths – 1.80 killed/day
85 wounded – 2.74 wounded/day
December 2008
65 attacks/incidents – 2.09 attacks & incidents/day
68 deaths – 2.19 deaths/day
181 wounded – 5.83 wounded/day
November 2008
65 attacks/incidents – 2.16 attacks & incidents/day
53 deaths – 1.76 deaths/day
249 wounded – 8.3 wounded/day
October 2008
92 attacks/incidents – 2.96 attacks & incidents/day
112 deaths – 3.61 deaths/day
188 wounded – 6.06 wounded/day
SOURCES
Abass, Ali and Dolan, Jack “Grenade hits U.S. convoy in Iraq,” St. Agustine Record, 5/10/09
Agence France Presse, “Iraq Suicide Bomber Wounds 34 in Mosul Shopping Street,” 5/24/09
Ahmed, Hamid, “Iraqi leader calls for anti-corruption campaign,” Associated Press, 5/9/09
Associated Press, “Iraqis fear U.S. pullout of volatile Mosul,” 3/9/09
Aswat al-Iraq, “2 brothers wounded in gunfire in Mosul,” 5/21/09
- “2 civilians killed, injured in Mosul,” 5/25/09
- “2 soldiers wounded in blast in Mosul,” 5/20/09
- “3 civilians wounded in Mosul blast,” 5/30/09
- “3 injured in explosion in Mosul,” 5/28/09
- “3 wounded in car bomb blast in Mosul,” 5/3/09
- “4 wounded in Mosul blast,” 5/8/09
- “Armed attack injures 3 in Mosul,” 5/21/09
- “Baghdadiya TV correspondent dies from blast wounds,” 5/31/09
- “Car bomb defused in Mosul,” 5/8/09
- “Child killed by U.S. fire in Mosul,” 5/7/09
- “Civilian corpse found in Mosul,” 5/19/09
- “Civilian killed, 2 bombs defused in Mosul,” 5/19/09
- “Civilian wounded by bomb blast in Mosul,” 5/5/09
- “Civilian wounded in explosion in Mosul,” 5/12/09
- “Contractor shot down by gunmen in Mosul,” 5/14/09
- “Cop injured, 2 gunmen busted in Ninewa,” 5/5/09
- “Cop killed, civilians wounded in Mosul attack,” 5/9/09
- “Cop killed, gunman wounded in Mosul,” 5/15/09
- “Corpse of abducted Christian child found in Ninewa,” 5/11/09
- “Five wounded in car bomb blast in Mosul,” 5/13/09
- “Gunmen kill cop in Mosul,” 5/4/09
- “Gunmen kill former army officer in Mosul,” 5/11/09
- “Gunmen kill soldier in Mosul,” 5/1/09
- “Gunman wounds 3 female students in Mosul,” 5/25/09
- “IED injures 2 cops in western Mosul,” 5/26/09
- “IED kills cop, injures 6 in central Mosul,” 5/22/09
- “IED wounds 2 civilians in Mosul,” 5/13/09
- “IED wounds 4 civilians in Mosul,” 5/19/09
- “Mosul blast leaves officer killed, 2 wounded,” 5/31/09
- “Mother, daughter killed in Mosul copycat,” 5/28/09
- “Ninewa police defuse 4 IEDs,” 5/23/09
- “Officer wounded by IED in Mosul,” 5/23/09
- “TNT explosives found under bridge in Mosul,” 5/24/09
- “URGENT/ Mosul suicide blast leaves 5 killed, 6 wounded,” 5/1/09
- “Traffic cop wounded by IED in Mosul,” 5/4/09
- “Woman, daughter shot down by gunmen in Mosul,” 5/21/09
- “Woman injured in western Mosul,” 5/22/09
DPA, “Suicide bomber targets Iraqi governor’s house,” 5/18/09
Druzin, Heath, “Coalition forces fight in insurgent stronghold while residents urge U.S. troops to leave Mosul,” Stars and Stripes, 3/8/09
Hammoudi, Laith, “Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq – Tuesday 5 May 2009,” 5/9/09
Hammoudi, Laith and Kadhim, Hussein, “Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq – Monday 25 May 2009,” 5/25/09
Issa, Sahar and Kadhim, Hussein, “Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq – Monday 11 May 2009,” McClatchy Newspapers, 5/11/09
- “Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq – Thursday 28 May 2009,” McClatchy Newspapers, 5/28/09
- “Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq – Wednesday 6 May 2009,” McClatchy Newspapers, 5/6/09
Israel News, “Prison officer gunned down in northern Iraq,” 5/17/09
Kadhim, Hussein, “Roundup of Daily Violence in Iraq-Monday 4 May 2009,” 5/4/09
KUNA, “Car bomb blast kills three civilians in northern Iraq,” 5/3/09
Loyd, Anthony, “US withdrawal from Mosul leads to fear of Iraqi insurgent attacks,” Times of London, 6/1/09
Press TV, “American soldier kill civilian in Iraq,” 5/19/09
Reid, Robert, “Iraq civilian deaths fall after April spike,” Associated Press, 6/1/09
Reuters, “FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, May 4,” 5/4/09
- “FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, May 5,” 5/5/09
- “FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, May 9,” 5/9/09
- “FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, May 11,” 5/11/09
- “FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, May 13,” 5/13/09
- “FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, May 14,” 5/14/09
- “FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, May 15,” 5/15/09
- “FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, May 16,” 5/16/09
- “FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, May 23,” 5/17/09
- “FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, May 23,” 5/23/09
- “FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, May 24,” 5/24/09
- “FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, May 27,” 5/27/09
- “FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, May 29,” 5/29/09
- “Iraq rules out extension of U.S. withdrawal dates,” 5/3/09
Xinhua, “2 policemen killed in Mosul violence,” 5/17/09
Sunday, June 7, 2009
The Moribund Kirkuk Committee
The 2009 Provincial Election Law postponed voting in Tamim province because of the disputed city of Kirkuk. Article 23 created a committee made up of seven parliamentarians, two Kurds, two Turkman, 2 Arabs, and one Christian, who were supposed to come up with a power sharing deal for the province before voting would happen there. They were to complete their work by March 31, 2009, but because of their inability to make any decisions they got a two-month extension. May 31 has come and gone and the committee is no closer to finishing their work, so they have been given another week. This is likely to happen again and again as the Article 23 committee appears more for show than actual work.
According to a United States Institute of Peace delegation that went to Iraq in May 2009, the Article 23 Committee was created as a public relations move by parliament. When it was devising the provincial election law the legislators felt they had to show that they were doing something about Kirkuk, so they created the committee. Since it started its work in February 2009 it has hardly met, has little money, and no one thinks that it will lead to anything. The effect is that elections in Tamim are to be delayed indefinitely.
Tamim is a key province in the divide between Arabs and Kurds. The Kurds have been trying to legally annex Kirkuk since the U.S. invasion. They were able to insert Article 140 into the Iraqi constitution in 2005, which said that there should be a census and referendum on the future of all disputed areas by December 31, 2007. That was extended until June 30, 2008, but both deadlines came and passed with no action. Since then the United Nations has taken over the role of finding a resolution to the area. In April 2009 they presented their suggestions. Kurdish officials have called Kirkuk their Jerusalem, and said that they will not rest until it has been annexed by Kurdistan. Kirkuk is also home to one of Iraq’s three largest oil fields, and perhaps two-thirds of its natural gas reserves. Until new voting is held the Kurds want a majority of the seats on the provincial council to reflect their population. The Arabs and Turkmen on the other hand, want the council divided evenly between them and the Kurds, plus a seat for Christians. This situation is likely to remain deadlocked as well. That would seem to suit the Kurds that have de facto control of the provincial council, but in the long-term Arab politicians seem to think that the central government will win. They believe in time, as the Iraqi security forces grow in strength, they will eventually be able to rest control of all of the disputed territories from the Kurds. A U.S. military officer told the United States Institute of Peace officials that as soon as the Iraqi Army had its full compliment of M1 Abrams tanks, the Kirkuk dispute would be over.
The fear of course is that this could lead to violence. The U.S. commander in Iraq General Ray Odierno says that Arab-Kurdish tensions are one of his top priorities. American think tanks have also expressed concern. So far things have remained political, even as Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki began pushing the Kurds over the disputed territories in 2008. Baghdad taking on the Kurds in Kirkuk however, would be a totally different dynamic. This would seem a prime example of a case needing U.S. mediation before it departs, but the Americans have been deferring to the U.N.. The U.N. in turn, can do little without U.S. support. That means not only are provincial elections not going to happen in Tamim, but a resolution to Kirkuk’s final status is going nowhere as well.
SOURCES
Abbas, Mohammed, “Iraq Kurds say must have say on Kirkuk oil fields,” Reuters, 6/1/09
Agence France Presse, “Iraq delays Kirkuk election report by a week: MP,” 5/31/09
Biddle, Stephen, “Reversal in Iraq,” Center for Preventative Action Council on Foreign Relations, May 2009
Daly, John, “Analysis: Kirkuk elections and Iraqi oil,” UPI, 6/2/09
Haynes, Deborah, “Transcript of The Times interview with General Ray Odierno,” Times of London, 4/9/09
International Crisis Group, “Oil For Soil: Toward A Grand Bargain On Iraq And The Kurds,” 10/28/08
Jakes, Lara, “Key UN report to suggest power-sharing plan in Iraq’s divided Kirkuk,” Associated Press, 3/29/09
Al-Khalidi, Diaa, “kirkuk awaits election law,” Niqash, 3/11/09
Londono, Ernesto, “Kurds, Arabs Maneuver Ahead of U.N. Report on N. Iraq,” Washington Post, 4/17/09
Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, “Iraqi Parliament’s Mission To Kirkuk Ends In Failure,” 5/27/09
Reilly, Corinne, “U.N. experts urge power sharing in Kirkuk,” McClatchy Newspapers, 4/22/09
Serwer, Daniel and Parker, Sam, “Maliki’s Iraq between Two Elections,” United States Institute of Peace, May 2009
Visser, Reidar, “The Kirkuk Issue Exposes Weaknesses in Iraq’s Ruling Coalition,” Historiae.org, 8/7/08
According to a United States Institute of Peace delegation that went to Iraq in May 2009, the Article 23 Committee was created as a public relations move by parliament. When it was devising the provincial election law the legislators felt they had to show that they were doing something about Kirkuk, so they created the committee. Since it started its work in February 2009 it has hardly met, has little money, and no one thinks that it will lead to anything. The effect is that elections in Tamim are to be delayed indefinitely.
Tamim is a key province in the divide between Arabs and Kurds. The Kurds have been trying to legally annex Kirkuk since the U.S. invasion. They were able to insert Article 140 into the Iraqi constitution in 2005, which said that there should be a census and referendum on the future of all disputed areas by December 31, 2007. That was extended until June 30, 2008, but both deadlines came and passed with no action. Since then the United Nations has taken over the role of finding a resolution to the area. In April 2009 they presented their suggestions. Kurdish officials have called Kirkuk their Jerusalem, and said that they will not rest until it has been annexed by Kurdistan. Kirkuk is also home to one of Iraq’s three largest oil fields, and perhaps two-thirds of its natural gas reserves. Until new voting is held the Kurds want a majority of the seats on the provincial council to reflect their population. The Arabs and Turkmen on the other hand, want the council divided evenly between them and the Kurds, plus a seat for Christians. This situation is likely to remain deadlocked as well. That would seem to suit the Kurds that have de facto control of the provincial council, but in the long-term Arab politicians seem to think that the central government will win. They believe in time, as the Iraqi security forces grow in strength, they will eventually be able to rest control of all of the disputed territories from the Kurds. A U.S. military officer told the United States Institute of Peace officials that as soon as the Iraqi Army had its full compliment of M1 Abrams tanks, the Kirkuk dispute would be over.
The fear of course is that this could lead to violence. The U.S. commander in Iraq General Ray Odierno says that Arab-Kurdish tensions are one of his top priorities. American think tanks have also expressed concern. So far things have remained political, even as Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki began pushing the Kurds over the disputed territories in 2008. Baghdad taking on the Kurds in Kirkuk however, would be a totally different dynamic. This would seem a prime example of a case needing U.S. mediation before it departs, but the Americans have been deferring to the U.N.. The U.N. in turn, can do little without U.S. support. That means not only are provincial elections not going to happen in Tamim, but a resolution to Kirkuk’s final status is going nowhere as well.
SOURCES
Abbas, Mohammed, “Iraq Kurds say must have say on Kirkuk oil fields,” Reuters, 6/1/09
Agence France Presse, “Iraq delays Kirkuk election report by a week: MP,” 5/31/09
Biddle, Stephen, “Reversal in Iraq,” Center for Preventative Action Council on Foreign Relations, May 2009
Daly, John, “Analysis: Kirkuk elections and Iraqi oil,” UPI, 6/2/09
Haynes, Deborah, “Transcript of The Times interview with General Ray Odierno,” Times of London, 4/9/09
International Crisis Group, “Oil For Soil: Toward A Grand Bargain On Iraq And The Kurds,” 10/28/08
Jakes, Lara, “Key UN report to suggest power-sharing plan in Iraq’s divided Kirkuk,” Associated Press, 3/29/09
Al-Khalidi, Diaa, “kirkuk awaits election law,” Niqash, 3/11/09
Londono, Ernesto, “Kurds, Arabs Maneuver Ahead of U.N. Report on N. Iraq,” Washington Post, 4/17/09
Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, “Iraqi Parliament’s Mission To Kirkuk Ends In Failure,” 5/27/09
Reilly, Corinne, “U.N. experts urge power sharing in Kirkuk,” McClatchy Newspapers, 4/22/09
Serwer, Daniel and Parker, Sam, “Maliki’s Iraq between Two Elections,” United States Institute of Peace, May 2009
Visser, Reidar, “The Kirkuk Issue Exposes Weaknesses in Iraq’s Ruling Coalition,” Historiae.org, 8/7/08
Saturday, June 6, 2009
Troubles Continue In Ninewa Over Results Of Provincial Elections
Disputes between the Ninewa Fraternal List led by the two main Kurdish parties, the Kurdistan Democratic Party and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan, and the new ruling party in Ninewa al-Hadbaa continue. On June 1, 2009 IraqSlogger reported that there was a shoot out between the peshmerga in the Sinjar district and tribesman. Many of the tribes in the province supported al-Hadbaa. Five civilians were killed in the fighting before Iraqi security forces arrived and secured the area. On May 28 300 people gathered in the Telafar district demanding that they become independent from the province. The protestors said they had been neglected by the provincial council, and complained about the new al-Hadbaa governor Atheel al-Najafi. There was a similar protest on May 17 in the Shikhan district. That district, plus Sinjar and Hatra have suspended their cooperation with the al-Hadbaa controlled provincial council. The Kurdistan Regional Government has also ordered the peshmerga to stop any provincial official from entering these areas. As reported before, this led the peshmerga to stop Governor Najafi from going to a sporting event in a Kurdish controlled town. The provincial police chief was also denied entry to another Kurdish area in May as well.
The problems started in April 2009 when al-Hadbaa, who had won 19 of Ninewa’s 37 council seats, took all of the positions in the local government. In response, the Ninewa Fraternal List walked out and announced that they were boycotting the new provincial government. Governor Najafi has said that he will allow the Fraternal List positions if they recognize the borders of Ninewa and withdraw the peshmerga. According to IraqSlogger, a leading Kurdish politician responded by stating that the issue of the peshmerga was between Baghdad and Kurdistan, and that the governor should not be involved. Now deadlocked, both al-Hadbaa and the Fraternal List have been going to Baghdad to try to get the central government to force the other side to give in.
Time is probably on the side of al-Hadbaa. The Americans have told the Fraternal List that since al-Hadbaa won a majority in the provincial elections they have the right to form the government they want. Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki is also looking for new Sunni partners to run with in the 2010 parliamentary elections, and might align with al-Hadbaa. The threat is that without mediation violence could ensue between the two competing parties. Ninewa is already one of the most deadliest provinces in Iraq, and this divide plays into the hands of the insurgents as well who portray themselves as the protectors of Arabs against the Kurds. The U.S. held up the 2009 provincial elections and the participation of Sunnis as an important turning point in Iraqi politics. The situation in Ninewa shows that at least in that part of Iraq, it might have just made things worse.
For more on the political divisions in Ninewa click on the "al-Hadbaa" label below.
SOURCES
Associated Press, “Iraqi provincial election results,” 2/19/09
Aswat al-Iraq, “Shaykhan protest calls for boycotting Ninewa’s local govt.,” 5/17/09
- “Talafar’s residents demand its separation from Ninewa,” 5/28/09
Bakri, Nada, “Dispute Over Land Simmering in Iraq,” Washington Post, 5/18/09
Dagher, Sam, “Tensions Stoked Between Iraqi Kurds and Sunnis,” New York Times, 5/18/09
Hamad, Qassim Khidhir, “arab domination rejected by kurds in makhmour,” Niqash, 5/22/09
IraqSlogger.com, “Ninewa Gov Presses Case with B’dad Officials,” 5/13/09
Reilly, Corinne and Abbas, Ali, “Kurdish-Arab tensions continue to grow in northern Iraq,” McClatchy Newspapers, 4/14/09
Smith, Daniel, “Othman to Najafi “Don’t Interfere,”” IraqSlogger.com, 5/30/09
- “Sinjar-Clashes Leave Five Wounded,” IraqSlogger.com, 6/1/09
The problems started in April 2009 when al-Hadbaa, who had won 19 of Ninewa’s 37 council seats, took all of the positions in the local government. In response, the Ninewa Fraternal List walked out and announced that they were boycotting the new provincial government. Governor Najafi has said that he will allow the Fraternal List positions if they recognize the borders of Ninewa and withdraw the peshmerga. According to IraqSlogger, a leading Kurdish politician responded by stating that the issue of the peshmerga was between Baghdad and Kurdistan, and that the governor should not be involved. Now deadlocked, both al-Hadbaa and the Fraternal List have been going to Baghdad to try to get the central government to force the other side to give in.
Time is probably on the side of al-Hadbaa. The Americans have told the Fraternal List that since al-Hadbaa won a majority in the provincial elections they have the right to form the government they want. Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki is also looking for new Sunni partners to run with in the 2010 parliamentary elections, and might align with al-Hadbaa. The threat is that without mediation violence could ensue between the two competing parties. Ninewa is already one of the most deadliest provinces in Iraq, and this divide plays into the hands of the insurgents as well who portray themselves as the protectors of Arabs against the Kurds. The U.S. held up the 2009 provincial elections and the participation of Sunnis as an important turning point in Iraqi politics. The situation in Ninewa shows that at least in that part of Iraq, it might have just made things worse.
For more on the political divisions in Ninewa click on the "al-Hadbaa" label below.
SOURCES
Associated Press, “Iraqi provincial election results,” 2/19/09
Aswat al-Iraq, “Shaykhan protest calls for boycotting Ninewa’s local govt.,” 5/17/09
- “Talafar’s residents demand its separation from Ninewa,” 5/28/09
Bakri, Nada, “Dispute Over Land Simmering in Iraq,” Washington Post, 5/18/09
Dagher, Sam, “Tensions Stoked Between Iraqi Kurds and Sunnis,” New York Times, 5/18/09
Hamad, Qassim Khidhir, “arab domination rejected by kurds in makhmour,” Niqash, 5/22/09
IraqSlogger.com, “Ninewa Gov Presses Case with B’dad Officials,” 5/13/09
Reilly, Corinne and Abbas, Ali, “Kurdish-Arab tensions continue to grow in northern Iraq,” McClatchy Newspapers, 4/14/09
Smith, Daniel, “Othman to Najafi “Don’t Interfere,”” IraqSlogger.com, 5/30/09
- “Sinjar-Clashes Leave Five Wounded,” IraqSlogger.com, 6/1/09
Friday, June 5, 2009
Iraq Reporting Hits Another New Low In May, 2009
May 2009 saw Iraq take another fall from America’s headlines. The war did not make it into the top ten news stories for any of the four weeks of that month according to the Pew Research Center’s Project for Excellence in Journalism. Not only did Iraq not make the top ten, for two of those four weeks it did not make the top ten in any of the five major media sources in America, newspapers, the internet, network TV, cable TV, or radio.
For the two weeks of May 4 to 10 and May 11 to 17 Iraq was not only absent from the top ten stories in the country, but did not make the top ten in any of the five press outlets. For May 18 to 24 Iraq again did not make the top ten stories, but did reach number 5 in newspapers with 4% of its coverage. That week saw the conviction of Steven Green, a former soldier, for the rape and murder of a 14-year old Iraqi girl, and her parents. From May 25 to 31 the war did a little better. While it did not make the top 10, it was the number 7 and number 8 story in newspapers, and number 10 on network TV. On May 25 three Americans were killed in a bombing in Fallujah, the next day a U.S. soldier died, and another on May 28. In total, 24 U.S. soldiers died in May, the highest number since September 2008.
May’s news coverage was a further drop from April. That month Iraq did make the top ten for one week, but was out for the other four. Not only that, but for the first time since the invasion, the war also did not crack the top ten of any media outlet for one of that months’ five weeks. March 2009 was the first month Iraq did not make the overall top ten stories. America’s press has been decreasing its stories on Iraq since the beginning of 2007. As Washington began turning to other issues like the 2008 presidential campaign, the recession, and Afghanistan-Pakistan, so did the media. Unless American elites begin talking about the war again, Iraq can expect to fade more and more in the news despite the fact that there are still over 100,000 troops in the country.
SOURCES
BBC, “US deaths in Iraq rise sharply in May,” 6/1/09
Dao, James, “Ex-Soldier Gets Life Sentence for Iraq Murders,” New York Times, 5/21/09
Pew Research Center’s Project for Excellence in Journalism, “The Debate Over Gitmo And Waterboarding Drives The News, PEJ News Coverage Index: May 18-24, 2009,” 5/25/09
- “Economy Up And Flu Down In A Stressful Week, PEJ News Coverage Index: May 4-10, 2009,” 5/11/09
- “Politics Punctuate The Terrorism Debate, PEJ News Coverage Index: May 11-17, 2009,” 5/18/09
- “Sotomayor Spin Wars Dominate The Narrative, PEJ News Coverage Index: May 25-31, 2009,” 6/1/09
Robertson, Campbell, “U.S. Soldier and 11 Iraqis Die in Attacks,” New York Times, 5/29/09
Santora, Marc, “State Department Official Is Among 3 Killed in Iraq,” New York Times, 5/26/09
Williams, Timothy, “Bomb Kills G.I. in Baghdad as Attacks Keep Rising,” New York Times, 5/27/09
For the two weeks of May 4 to 10 and May 11 to 17 Iraq was not only absent from the top ten stories in the country, but did not make the top ten in any of the five press outlets. For May 18 to 24 Iraq again did not make the top ten stories, but did reach number 5 in newspapers with 4% of its coverage. That week saw the conviction of Steven Green, a former soldier, for the rape and murder of a 14-year old Iraqi girl, and her parents. From May 25 to 31 the war did a little better. While it did not make the top 10, it was the number 7 and number 8 story in newspapers, and number 10 on network TV. On May 25 three Americans were killed in a bombing in Fallujah, the next day a U.S. soldier died, and another on May 28. In total, 24 U.S. soldiers died in May, the highest number since September 2008.
May’s news coverage was a further drop from April. That month Iraq did make the top ten for one week, but was out for the other four. Not only that, but for the first time since the invasion, the war also did not crack the top ten of any media outlet for one of that months’ five weeks. March 2009 was the first month Iraq did not make the overall top ten stories. America’s press has been decreasing its stories on Iraq since the beginning of 2007. As Washington began turning to other issues like the 2008 presidential campaign, the recession, and Afghanistan-Pakistan, so did the media. Unless American elites begin talking about the war again, Iraq can expect to fade more and more in the news despite the fact that there are still over 100,000 troops in the country.
SOURCES
BBC, “US deaths in Iraq rise sharply in May,” 6/1/09
Dao, James, “Ex-Soldier Gets Life Sentence for Iraq Murders,” New York Times, 5/21/09
Pew Research Center’s Project for Excellence in Journalism, “The Debate Over Gitmo And Waterboarding Drives The News, PEJ News Coverage Index: May 18-24, 2009,” 5/25/09
- “Economy Up And Flu Down In A Stressful Week, PEJ News Coverage Index: May 4-10, 2009,” 5/11/09
- “Politics Punctuate The Terrorism Debate, PEJ News Coverage Index: May 11-17, 2009,” 5/18/09
- “Sotomayor Spin Wars Dominate The Narrative, PEJ News Coverage Index: May 25-31, 2009,” 6/1/09
Robertson, Campbell, “U.S. Soldier and 11 Iraqis Die in Attacks,” New York Times, 5/29/09
Santora, Marc, “State Department Official Is Among 3 Killed in Iraq,” New York Times, 5/26/09
Williams, Timothy, “Bomb Kills G.I. in Baghdad as Attacks Keep Rising,” New York Times, 5/27/09
Thursday, June 4, 2009
USIP Report On Iraqi Politics and The 2010 Parliamentary Elections
In May 2009 two members of the United States Institute of Peace (USIP), Daniel Serwer and Sam Parker, traveled to Baghdad where they met with around 20 top Iraqi politicians and government officials. They wrote a report about their trip called “Maliki’s Iraq between Two Elections.” The major topic of discussion was the 2009 provincial elections, and its repercussions for the 2010 parliamentary vote. The Iraqi elites agreed that Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki had stolen the stage of Iraqi politics. All of the major national parties now operate in relation to him. At the same time, the USIP group worked with the newly elected provincial council in Diyala, who were more concerned about getting their government working than what was going in the capital. The report believes that this could be the beginning of a major change in Iraq with the emergence of issue-based parties rather than sectarian ones. That’s likely to be a long-term process as the major parties with the money, organization, and power are likely to dominate the parliamentary vote, and are still caught up on what to do with Maliki.
The first issue dealt with was the impact of the January 2009 provincial elections. Most of the Iraqis felt that the vote had gone off well, and were now reflecting upon the lessons learned. One was that parties with a strong organization and that could get out the vote did well. Coalition building was also of importance since so many parties participated it was the only way to gain power. Many also talked about “wasted votes,” those that went to parties and candidates that didn’t garner enough ballots to gain seats on the councils. That amounted to about 30% of the overall vote. That compared to Maliki’s State of Law List, which only got 19% of the national returns. 50% of the electorate also did not participate. The major parties were interested in trying to win over some of these populations.
All of the politicians were also focused upon the Prime Minister. Everyone seemed to base their positions upon Maliki. Some want to oppose him, some want to ally with him, and others want to see what will happen after the 2010 vote. No one thought Maliki would face a no confidence vote in parliament before the parliamentary elections. That could make him a martyr, and also deny his critics the chance to blame him for the country’s problems. There are also no clear replacements for him.
This is quite a change from when Maliki first came into office. His Dawa party returned to Iraq in 2003 from exile, weak, divided, lacking support, money and a militia. He was picked for his position because of his weakness compared to the two major Shiite parties the Supreme Iraqi Islamic Party (SIIC) and the Sadrists that dominated the United Iraqi Alliance. His initial inaction in the face of the increasing violence and chaos reinforced his image as an ineffectual leader. This all changed with the Surge. The Americans went after all of Maliki’s opponents from Al Qaeda in Iraq to the Sunni insurgency to the Shiite militias. That made the Iraqi state and the Prime Minister stronger. In 2008 he launched his own security crackdowns on the Sadrists in Basra, Sadr City, and Maysan. This created a new view of the Prime Minister and government as strong and decisive. Maliki was quick to claim all of the success, and make himself synonymous with the state.
In the process Maliki has stepped away from his former friends, and attempted to forge new ones to gain all the glory of the improved situation in the country. Maliki’s main coalition is made up of the Iraqi Islamic Party, the Supreme Council, and the two Kurdish parties, the Kurdistan Democratic Party and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan. Originally Moqtada al-Sadr was also part of that group, but was pushed out with the help of the Americans. In 2008 Maliki moved away from this alliance to establish his independence. That was signaled in the January 2009 provincial elections when he formed his own State of Law List. Afterwards, Maliki has reached out to all groups in preparation for the 2010 vote. The Prime Minister for example, has held discussions with Saleh al-Mutlaq’s Hiwar Party, Ninewa’s al-Hadbaa List, Sheikh Abu Risha’s Anbar Awakening, and attempted to reach out to Baathists in an attempt to find new Sunni partners. Maliki also talked to the Sadrists, and recently flew to Iran to meet with the head of the Supreme Council Abdul Aziz al-Hakim who is in Tehran for cancer treatment. In doing so, he hopes to be the main player in any new ruling coalition that might emerge. He also has everyone guessing as to whom he will run with in the elections, himself, rejoin the United Iraqi Alliance, or some new gathering.
The Iraqi Islamic Party (IIP) has emerged as the strongest critic of the Prime Minister. Like the Dawa, they entered the new Iraqi political scene after the invasion with no real base, but were able to put together the main Sunni alliance the Iraqi Accordance Front, which has since disintegrated. During the Surge, they were able to take advantage of the new Sons of Iraq groups, and successfully co-opt many of them, thus gaining a grass roots organization. The IIP’s victory in Diyala in 2009 was an example of this. The party went on to win the most seats of any Sunni group in the provincial elections. To oppose Maliki they are trying to build up the power of the parliament. The election of Ayad al-Samarraie as speaker of the legislature on April 19, 2009 was the first step in their plan. He wants to make the parliament a check on Maliki’s authority. That was recently seen when the parliament forced the resignation of the Trade Minister, who was from the Dawa Party, over corruption. There are plans to question other members of Maliki’s cabinet about misdeeds as well. Parliament also blocked funding for the Tribal Support Councils, which was a patronage system put together by the Prime Minister in various provinces, and a reconciliation initiative that was aimed at co-opting Baathists. The Islamic Party is also pushing for constitutional reform to limit the Prime Minister’s office.
The Supreme Council has become another major opponent of Maliki, but seems to be turning inwards in the aftermath of their defeat in the provincial elections. In 2005 the SIIC walked away with eight governorships out of eighteen. In 2009 they won none. Since then they have been trying to deal with this loss. In the 2010 vote they want to portray themselves as being independent from Iran, and no longer advocating for a Shiite southern region. Despite their criticisms, they also want to try to convince Maliki to rejoin the United Iraqi Alliance, and run together in the election. Another major distraction is the fact that its leader, al-Hakim, is dying of cancer. When he passes, many think that the SIIC will split in two with old guard Badr Brigade militia leaders like Finance Minister Bayan Jabr running one faction, and newer officials like Vice President Adel Abd al-Mahdi the other.
The Kurds are also in conflict with Maliki. Beginning in 2008 the Prime Minister began moving the Iraqi Army into disputed territories of the north, which have largely been under Kurdish control since 2003. There have been several confrontations with the peshmerga as a result. The main Kurdish parties and the Americans are afraid that the dispute between Kurdistan and Baghdad will lead to violence. The United Nations is trying to mediate, but without strong U.S. support their work is likely to go nowhere. Surprisingly most of the Arab politicians in Baghdad were not that concerned about this issue. They believe that time is on the side of the central government, and as it gets stronger the Kurds will have to give way. Until then this division is likely to fester for the next couple years.
After those three major groups there are a series of smaller Shiite, Sunni, and secular parties that are also related to Maliki. What the paper called the Shiite center is made up of Interior Minister Jawad al-Bolani’s Constitutional Party, government spokesman Ali al-Dabbagh Competents Party, and ex-Prime Minister Ibrahim al-Jaafari’s National Reform Trend. The Sadrists are still a force in Shiite politics as well. The main secular leader is ex-Prime Minister Ilyad Allawi and his Iraqi National List. Finally there are Sunnis like parliamentarian Saleh al-Mutlaq’s Hiwar Party, the al-Hadbaa List of Ninewa, former Islamic Party member Dhafir al-Ani, and Deputy Prime Minister Rafi al-Issawi. All of these parties ran in the 2009 election as nationalists, arguing for a strong central government. That was similar to Maliki’s State of Law platform, so they had mixed results. The Shiite centrists, Sadrists, and Allawi got some provincial seats, but didn’t do as well as they had hoped. The smaller Sunni parties actually did surprisingly well. Maliki also courted all of these groups as potential new allies.
Finally the USIP traveled to Diyala to help the new provincial council there forge a position paper on what their goals would be while in office. There the USIP found that the politicians were much more interested in getting the local government working, especially because the previous one was considered a failure, rather than national politics. The Diyala council members didn’t pay much attention to their party bosses in Baghdad, and were more issue based. The Americans saw this as an important development in Iraqi politics, as the Diyala council was likely to meet the needs of average Iraqis compared to the power struggles going on in the capital.
“Maliki’s Iraq between Two Elections” points out the dynamics of Iraq’s national and local politics. In Baghdad, the major parties are involved in a prolonged struggle for power as Maliki has successfully placed himself as the public face of the government. His former allies have been left out in the cold, and are either challenging him, like the Islamic Party and Kurds, or trying to re-organize like the SIIC. At the same time, this has opened up opportunities for newer and smaller parties by allying with one side or the other. It also appears that this struggle is more important than actually improving the country for many politicians. At the provincial level however, the USIP found different parties, sects, and ethnicities working together on the newly elected council, trying to address their constituents’ needs. The USIP paper believes that the 2010 election could be a turning point if Maliki decides to run on issues like he did in 2009. There is also the possibility that he will go back to sectarian politics and rejoin the United Iraqi Alliance. The USIP hopes for the former outcome, but if it doesn’t happen they believe there will probably be more opportunities in the future to change the political culture of Iraq. It seems likely that this will stay at the local level, and take quite some time to bubble up to the top. The major parties including Maliki are caught up in a serious struggle for the right to rule, which will have to play out before issues become the prime focus of the government, if ever. Until then finding new friends and shifting alliances will continue to dominate the capital.
SOURCES
Bakri, Nada, “In Iraq, Assertive Parliament Emerges Under New Speaker,” Washington Post, 5/27/09
Domergue, Jeremy, “Selection of Speaker Reveals Shifting Coalitions in Iraqi Parliamentary Politics,” Institute for the Study of War, 4/28/09
Press TV, “Iraq’s Maliki at Hakim’s bedside in Tehran,” 5/31/09
Serwer, Daniel and Parker, Sam, “Maliki’s Iraq between Two Elections,” United States Institute of Peace, May 2009
Visser, Reidar, “Maliki Suffers Setbacks as Samarrai is Confirmed as New Speaker and More Governors Are Elected South of Baghdad,” Historiae.org, 4/19/09
Wong, Edward, “Iraqis weigh alliance to marginalize Sadr and bolster Maliki,” International Harold Tribune, 12/11/06
The first issue dealt with was the impact of the January 2009 provincial elections. Most of the Iraqis felt that the vote had gone off well, and were now reflecting upon the lessons learned. One was that parties with a strong organization and that could get out the vote did well. Coalition building was also of importance since so many parties participated it was the only way to gain power. Many also talked about “wasted votes,” those that went to parties and candidates that didn’t garner enough ballots to gain seats on the councils. That amounted to about 30% of the overall vote. That compared to Maliki’s State of Law List, which only got 19% of the national returns. 50% of the electorate also did not participate. The major parties were interested in trying to win over some of these populations.
All of the politicians were also focused upon the Prime Minister. Everyone seemed to base their positions upon Maliki. Some want to oppose him, some want to ally with him, and others want to see what will happen after the 2010 vote. No one thought Maliki would face a no confidence vote in parliament before the parliamentary elections. That could make him a martyr, and also deny his critics the chance to blame him for the country’s problems. There are also no clear replacements for him.
This is quite a change from when Maliki first came into office. His Dawa party returned to Iraq in 2003 from exile, weak, divided, lacking support, money and a militia. He was picked for his position because of his weakness compared to the two major Shiite parties the Supreme Iraqi Islamic Party (SIIC) and the Sadrists that dominated the United Iraqi Alliance. His initial inaction in the face of the increasing violence and chaos reinforced his image as an ineffectual leader. This all changed with the Surge. The Americans went after all of Maliki’s opponents from Al Qaeda in Iraq to the Sunni insurgency to the Shiite militias. That made the Iraqi state and the Prime Minister stronger. In 2008 he launched his own security crackdowns on the Sadrists in Basra, Sadr City, and Maysan. This created a new view of the Prime Minister and government as strong and decisive. Maliki was quick to claim all of the success, and make himself synonymous with the state.
In the process Maliki has stepped away from his former friends, and attempted to forge new ones to gain all the glory of the improved situation in the country. Maliki’s main coalition is made up of the Iraqi Islamic Party, the Supreme Council, and the two Kurdish parties, the Kurdistan Democratic Party and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan. Originally Moqtada al-Sadr was also part of that group, but was pushed out with the help of the Americans. In 2008 Maliki moved away from this alliance to establish his independence. That was signaled in the January 2009 provincial elections when he formed his own State of Law List. Afterwards, Maliki has reached out to all groups in preparation for the 2010 vote. The Prime Minister for example, has held discussions with Saleh al-Mutlaq’s Hiwar Party, Ninewa’s al-Hadbaa List, Sheikh Abu Risha’s Anbar Awakening, and attempted to reach out to Baathists in an attempt to find new Sunni partners. Maliki also talked to the Sadrists, and recently flew to Iran to meet with the head of the Supreme Council Abdul Aziz al-Hakim who is in Tehran for cancer treatment. In doing so, he hopes to be the main player in any new ruling coalition that might emerge. He also has everyone guessing as to whom he will run with in the elections, himself, rejoin the United Iraqi Alliance, or some new gathering.
The Iraqi Islamic Party (IIP) has emerged as the strongest critic of the Prime Minister. Like the Dawa, they entered the new Iraqi political scene after the invasion with no real base, but were able to put together the main Sunni alliance the Iraqi Accordance Front, which has since disintegrated. During the Surge, they were able to take advantage of the new Sons of Iraq groups, and successfully co-opt many of them, thus gaining a grass roots organization. The IIP’s victory in Diyala in 2009 was an example of this. The party went on to win the most seats of any Sunni group in the provincial elections. To oppose Maliki they are trying to build up the power of the parliament. The election of Ayad al-Samarraie as speaker of the legislature on April 19, 2009 was the first step in their plan. He wants to make the parliament a check on Maliki’s authority. That was recently seen when the parliament forced the resignation of the Trade Minister, who was from the Dawa Party, over corruption. There are plans to question other members of Maliki’s cabinet about misdeeds as well. Parliament also blocked funding for the Tribal Support Councils, which was a patronage system put together by the Prime Minister in various provinces, and a reconciliation initiative that was aimed at co-opting Baathists. The Islamic Party is also pushing for constitutional reform to limit the Prime Minister’s office.
The Supreme Council has become another major opponent of Maliki, but seems to be turning inwards in the aftermath of their defeat in the provincial elections. In 2005 the SIIC walked away with eight governorships out of eighteen. In 2009 they won none. Since then they have been trying to deal with this loss. In the 2010 vote they want to portray themselves as being independent from Iran, and no longer advocating for a Shiite southern region. Despite their criticisms, they also want to try to convince Maliki to rejoin the United Iraqi Alliance, and run together in the election. Another major distraction is the fact that its leader, al-Hakim, is dying of cancer. When he passes, many think that the SIIC will split in two with old guard Badr Brigade militia leaders like Finance Minister Bayan Jabr running one faction, and newer officials like Vice President Adel Abd al-Mahdi the other.
The Kurds are also in conflict with Maliki. Beginning in 2008 the Prime Minister began moving the Iraqi Army into disputed territories of the north, which have largely been under Kurdish control since 2003. There have been several confrontations with the peshmerga as a result. The main Kurdish parties and the Americans are afraid that the dispute between Kurdistan and Baghdad will lead to violence. The United Nations is trying to mediate, but without strong U.S. support their work is likely to go nowhere. Surprisingly most of the Arab politicians in Baghdad were not that concerned about this issue. They believe that time is on the side of the central government, and as it gets stronger the Kurds will have to give way. Until then this division is likely to fester for the next couple years.
After those three major groups there are a series of smaller Shiite, Sunni, and secular parties that are also related to Maliki. What the paper called the Shiite center is made up of Interior Minister Jawad al-Bolani’s Constitutional Party, government spokesman Ali al-Dabbagh Competents Party, and ex-Prime Minister Ibrahim al-Jaafari’s National Reform Trend. The Sadrists are still a force in Shiite politics as well. The main secular leader is ex-Prime Minister Ilyad Allawi and his Iraqi National List. Finally there are Sunnis like parliamentarian Saleh al-Mutlaq’s Hiwar Party, the al-Hadbaa List of Ninewa, former Islamic Party member Dhafir al-Ani, and Deputy Prime Minister Rafi al-Issawi. All of these parties ran in the 2009 election as nationalists, arguing for a strong central government. That was similar to Maliki’s State of Law platform, so they had mixed results. The Shiite centrists, Sadrists, and Allawi got some provincial seats, but didn’t do as well as they had hoped. The smaller Sunni parties actually did surprisingly well. Maliki also courted all of these groups as potential new allies.
Finally the USIP traveled to Diyala to help the new provincial council there forge a position paper on what their goals would be while in office. There the USIP found that the politicians were much more interested in getting the local government working, especially because the previous one was considered a failure, rather than national politics. The Diyala council members didn’t pay much attention to their party bosses in Baghdad, and were more issue based. The Americans saw this as an important development in Iraqi politics, as the Diyala council was likely to meet the needs of average Iraqis compared to the power struggles going on in the capital.
“Maliki’s Iraq between Two Elections” points out the dynamics of Iraq’s national and local politics. In Baghdad, the major parties are involved in a prolonged struggle for power as Maliki has successfully placed himself as the public face of the government. His former allies have been left out in the cold, and are either challenging him, like the Islamic Party and Kurds, or trying to re-organize like the SIIC. At the same time, this has opened up opportunities for newer and smaller parties by allying with one side or the other. It also appears that this struggle is more important than actually improving the country for many politicians. At the provincial level however, the USIP found different parties, sects, and ethnicities working together on the newly elected council, trying to address their constituents’ needs. The USIP paper believes that the 2010 election could be a turning point if Maliki decides to run on issues like he did in 2009. There is also the possibility that he will go back to sectarian politics and rejoin the United Iraqi Alliance. The USIP hopes for the former outcome, but if it doesn’t happen they believe there will probably be more opportunities in the future to change the political culture of Iraq. It seems likely that this will stay at the local level, and take quite some time to bubble up to the top. The major parties including Maliki are caught up in a serious struggle for the right to rule, which will have to play out before issues become the prime focus of the government, if ever. Until then finding new friends and shifting alliances will continue to dominate the capital.
SOURCES
Bakri, Nada, “In Iraq, Assertive Parliament Emerges Under New Speaker,” Washington Post, 5/27/09
Domergue, Jeremy, “Selection of Speaker Reveals Shifting Coalitions in Iraqi Parliamentary Politics,” Institute for the Study of War, 4/28/09
Press TV, “Iraq’s Maliki at Hakim’s bedside in Tehran,” 5/31/09
Serwer, Daniel and Parker, Sam, “Maliki’s Iraq between Two Elections,” United States Institute of Peace, May 2009
Visser, Reidar, “Maliki Suffers Setbacks as Samarrai is Confirmed as New Speaker and More Governors Are Elected South of Baghdad,” Historiae.org, 4/19/09
Wong, Edward, “Iraqis weigh alliance to marginalize Sadr and bolster Maliki,” International Harold Tribune, 12/11/06
Wednesday, June 3, 2009
May 2009 International Organization for Migration Report On Iraq's Displaced
At the end of May 2009 the International Organization for Migration (IOM) released its latest report on Iraq's displaced. They specifically are worried about the fate of the two million plus Iraqis that have not returned home yet. They note that while thousands of displaced have gone back to their original provinces, the vast majority have not. Both groups continue to face problems such as finding work and housing, and gaining access to services and assistance. The IOM is concerned that many of these Iraqis will become permanent refugees.
Since 2007 the IOM has noted that Iraqis displaced after the February 2006 Samarra bombing, which triggered the sectarian war, have begun to return. The IOM has counted 49,464 of these families, or 296,598 people, that have come back. Only 7%, of those, 3,443 families, were refugees. That is a small fraction of the estimated 1.6 million that lost their homes after the 2006 attack. They have gone back to 765 different locations in Iraq. 90% of the post-Samarra displaced came from Baghdad, Diyala and Ninewa, so it should be no surprise that those three provinces, plus Anbar have seen the most returns. Qadisiyah, Muthanna, and Dhi Qar had the least with 44, 64, and 108 families respectively. 61% of displaced families surveyed said they wanted to go home.
Post-Feb. 2006 Displaced And Refugee Family Returns (Not Including Kurdistan)
Province | Returning Families | % That Are Refugee Families |
Iraq | 49,464 | 7% |
Baghdad | 31,497 | 4% |
Diyala | 8,779 | 1% |
Anbar | 4,536 | 27% |
Ninewa | 1,602 | 1% |
Maysan | 626 | 49% |
Tamim | 620 | 37% |
Basra | 500 | 0% |
Karbala | 298 | 21% |
Babil | 258 | 9% |
Najaf | 215 | 55% |
Salahaddin | 191 | 35% |
Dhi Qar | 108 | 31% |
Muthanna | 64 | 88% |
Qadisiyah | 44 | 23% |
A major factor in returning is the proximity of the displaced to their original homes. 68% of the families that came back resided within their home province. That compared to 21% that were in another province, and 11% that came back from another country. That varied however across each province. In Muthanna and Najaf for example, 100% of the returnees were refugees, while none of those that came back to Basra and Ninewa were in foreign nation beforehand.
Origins Of Returnees By Province
Location | Refugees | Displaced Within Same Province | Displaced In Another Province |
TOTAL | 11% | 68% | 21% |
Anbar | 36% | 52% | 12% |
Babil | 15% | 52% | 33% |
Baghdad | 6% | 71% | 23% |
Basra | 0% | 0% | 100% |
Diyala | 6% | 61% | 33% |
Karbala | 92% | 0% | 8% |
Maysan | 0% | 0% | 100% |
Muthanna | 100% | 0% | 0% |
Najaf | 100% | 0% | 0% |
Ninewa | 0% | 100% | 0% |
Salahaddin | 88% | 13% | 0% |
Tamim | 58% | 11% | 31% |
Wasit | 50% | 0% | 50% |
Conditions in Iraq appeared to be another major reason why families come back. 36.7% of returnees interviewed by the IOM said that better security was the top cause for returning. That was followed by 35.7% that believed a combination of improved security and difficult conditions where they lived was the major factor. Only 15.5% felt that they left because of the hardships they were going through.
Reasons For Return
Reasons for Return | % |
Improved security in home area | 36.7% |
Improved security in home area and difficult conditions | 35.7% |
Very difficult conditions | 15.5% |
Other | 5.8% |
Government returnee payments | 4.2% |
Improved security in home area, difficult conditions, returnee payments | 1.8% |
Very difficult conditions and returnee payments | 0.3% |
The majority of families feel safe after their returns, but there are still some troubling incidents. 59.6% of those polled by the IOM said they felt safe all of the time after going back, while 39.4% said they only felt safe some of the time. There are various anecdotal stories of attacks and threats against displaced. In the Dora neighborhood of Baghdad an IED targeted displaced. Eighteen families in Abu Ghraib came back, but couldn't stay in their homes and became displaced again. Two families from Diyala went back, but were attacked by a militia, which led to the death of two family members. They left the province again as a result. According to IraqSlogger, in Adhamiya, Baghdad, the Sons of Iraq put "X"s on the houses of Shiites that had been displaced telling them not to come back in April 2009. The state of their property is another issue for returnees. 49.1% said that their houses were in good condition, but 38.7% found some damage to them.
The government has also been actively encouraging Iraqis to come back. Baghdad offered $851 for families that did. The authorities have recently announced that they were no longer registering people anymore, which was a prerequisite to receive the money. Not many returnees signed up for this program in the first place, and the government paid even fewer. The IOM found that only 44% of those surveyed had applied for the money, and of those, only 36% said they got it.
For those still displaced, finding work, services, and aid are major problems. 50.4% of male-headed households were out of work, and 97.3% of female-led ones were. Overall, 35% of those surveyed said they could work, but couldn't find a job. Salahaddin, 75%, Muthanna 70%, and Babil, 64%, had the highest responses in that category. In total, 56% of the displaced are unemployed. 64.2% of those surveyed claimed they had six hours or less of electricity. 83.8% did say they had access to the national water system, but that doesn't mean that it is potable. Almost all of the displaced, 98%, said they had their food ration card, but their access varied. 32% said they regularly got their rations, 60% said it was irregular, and 8% said they never got them. Ninewa was the worst with 99% saying they got their rations infrequently. Getting health care also varied greatly from province to province. 90% or more in Anbar, Maysan, Muthanna, Najaf, Ninewa and Salahaddin said they had adequate access, while 57% of returnees in Baghdad, 65% in Basra, and 78% in Tamim claimed they had none. When asked what their greatest needs were, displaced families said food, 63%, fuel, 51%, and health care, 40% were the top priorities. 88% also said they had received no aid outside of the government.
Unemployment
Total: 44% employed, 56% unemployed
Male-headed household: 49.6% employed, 50.4% unemployed
Female-headed household: 2.7% employed, 97.3% unemployed
Overall the IOM is worried about what will happen to the millions of Iraqis that have lost their homes because of the war. Only a small fraction has returned, and those that haven't face a plethora of problems, most importantly finding work and food. Those that have come back also face a similar set of problems. Neither the government, nor non-government organizations such as the IOM have the resources to deal with such a large population. The fear is that many of them will simply have to fend for themselves, perhaps creating a permanent class of displaced both within and without of Iraq for the foreseeable future.
SOURCES
International Organization for Migration, "IOM Emergency Needs Assessments; Post February 2006 Displacement In Iraq, Monthly Report," 4/1/09
- "IOM Monitoring And Needs Assessments of Iraqi Return, May 2009," May 2009
Smith, Daniel and al-Timimi, Yousif, "Residents: Some Sahwa Still Keeping Shi'a Out," IraqSlogger.com, 4/21/09
Tuesday, June 2, 2009
U.S. Reconstruction In Iraq Coming To An End
U.S. reconstruction in Iraq is coming to an end. The effort to rebuild the country following the 2003 invasion was the largest in American history, with the U.S. budgeting $51 billion for the project. That amount has almost all been spent, and no new large outlays are expected in the future, especially with the U.S. planning on withdrawing. The Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR) believes that most of this money failed to achieve its goals. While the Iraqi security forces were successfully reconstituted, the larger goal of boosting services and the economy of Iraq failed.
Since March 2003 the U.S. has promised $51.0 billion for reconstruction in Iraq. $24.43 billion was for security, and $26.57 for the economy, government, and services. $42.16 billion of the total amount has been obligated for projects, while $37.89 billion was actually spent. Of the remaining $3.01 billion in unspent funds, $2.82 billion is for the Iraqi armed forces and police. The new Obama administration has asked for an additional $700 million, $449 million of which is supposed to go to reconstruction. The White House did not ask for any new money for the Iraqi security forces. Instead, the President wants to extend $1 billion in bridge funds left over from 2008 for that purpose.
The American program was originally aimed at rebuilding Iraq’s infrastructure and building a democracy, but as violence rose in the country, more and more money was appropriated for security. By April 2009 the Iraqi security forces took almost half of the funding at $24.43 billion compared to $11.82 billion for infrastructure like electricity, oil, gas, water, sanitation, transportation, and communications. The SIGIR reported that the rise in attacks in Iraq derailed much of the reconstruction program, delaying projects and adding additional costs.
The U.S. program has not been without success. The one area that the SIGIR believes has seen the best effort is the rebuilding of the Iraqi security forces. They now stand at over 700,000 strong. The Americans have also added 1.2 million cubic meters of sewage treatment capacity, brought up water production to 2.4 million cubic meters of potable water per day, and for three straight quarters electricity production has gone up. Power output is now higher than pre-invasion levels. The problem is since the overthrow of Saddam, demand for services has skyrocketed amongst Iraqis, and the U.S.-funded increases have not kept up. Only around 25% of Iraqis polled say they were satisfied with the sewage system for example.
Today, U.S.-reconstruction is coming to an end, leaving Iraq increasingly in charge. There are no current oil projects on-line for example. There is still $224.39 million going to be spent on electricity however. Now the Iraqi government is the largest source of funding for rebuilding. Its capital budget used for investment has recently gone down from $13.1 billion in 2008 to $12.7 billion this year. Iraq has also never been able to spend all of its money, like the Electricity Ministry that only spent 12% of its budget last year.
Now that Iraqis are taking control, transferring projects is becoming an issue. An April 26, 2009 SIGIR audit found that the U.S. had been turning over projects to Iraqis with no unified plan or process. Many are given to the Iraqi government whether they can handle them or not. Most transfers are also done at the local level, and the information is not passed up to Baghdad or Washington. Of $13.5 billion in projects studied by SIGIR, 72% were handed over to local authorities, and only 13% to the central government. That means neither government has a real idea on what has been done so far. Some of these projects were not even wanted by the Iraqis, and were left unused or were not maintained. The Iraqis in general also don’t have the experience or training in much of the equipment installed by the Americans. For instance, examinations of Iraqi health care facilities found that gear wasn’t always installed and Iraqis didn’t always know how to operate them. The SIGIR is worried that this will mean much of the U.S. investment will be wasted. The U.S. is trying to address this by spending $313.7 million on training and spare parts. That still doesn’t address the larger issue of how the Iraqis will take control of the thousands of projects built by the Americans.
In its review of the U.S. reconstruction effort, the SIGIR believes that much of the U.S. reconstruction project has failed. Iraqis are largely unhappy with the state of the economy, services, and government. Production of many services such as electricity is higher than under Saddam, but it’s only meeting a fraction of demand. The main problem was the lack of security, which was not planned for. That derailed and delayed much of the work. Violence also shifted the focus of the Americans to the point that the security forces received just as much money as building up the economy and government combined. The U.S. also tended to impose their views of what Iraq should have, rather than asking Iraqis what they wanted. Many of the large infrastructure projects therefore were not used properly, left to break down, or were never wanted. Some of the $51 billion budgeted for Iraq has gone to good work, especially the money appropriated by U.S. commanders to local Iraqis. The larger projects however are more of a mixed bag.
Total Outlays By U.S.
Security - $24.43 billion
$21.18 billion obligated
$18.58 billion expended
$3.24 billion unspent
$6.84 billion for equipment and transportation
$5.79 billion for infrastructure
$5.67 billion for training and operations
$2.42 billion for sustainment
$1.72 billion for rule of law
$1.0 billion for other
Infrastructure - $11.82 billion
$11.41 billion obligated
$10.86 billion expended
$553 million unspent
Infrastructure – Electricity - $5.09 billion
$4.98 billion obligated
$4.75 billion spent
Infrastructure – Water and Sanitation - $2.25 billion
$2.17 billion obligated
$2.01 billion spent
Infrastructure – Oil and Gas - $2.05 billion
$1.93 billion obligated
$1.88 billion spent
Infrastructure – Other - $1.31 billion
Infrastructure – Transportation and Communication - $1.12 billion
$1.09 billion obligated
$965 million spent
Governance - $7.02 billion
$5.64 billion spent
$2.38 billion obligated for capacity development
$1.92 billion obligated for democracy and civil society
$1.88 billion obligated for public services
$0.81 billion obligated for humanitarian relief
Economy - $1.47 billion
$1.25 billion spent
SOURCES
Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, “Asset-Transfer Process for Iraq Reconstruction Projects Lacks Unity and Accountability,” 4/26/09
- “Hard Lessons,” 1/22/09
- “Quarterly Report to the United States Congress,” 4/30/09
Since March 2003 the U.S. has promised $51.0 billion for reconstruction in Iraq. $24.43 billion was for security, and $26.57 for the economy, government, and services. $42.16 billion of the total amount has been obligated for projects, while $37.89 billion was actually spent. Of the remaining $3.01 billion in unspent funds, $2.82 billion is for the Iraqi armed forces and police. The new Obama administration has asked for an additional $700 million, $449 million of which is supposed to go to reconstruction. The White House did not ask for any new money for the Iraqi security forces. Instead, the President wants to extend $1 billion in bridge funds left over from 2008 for that purpose.
The American program was originally aimed at rebuilding Iraq’s infrastructure and building a democracy, but as violence rose in the country, more and more money was appropriated for security. By April 2009 the Iraqi security forces took almost half of the funding at $24.43 billion compared to $11.82 billion for infrastructure like electricity, oil, gas, water, sanitation, transportation, and communications. The SIGIR reported that the rise in attacks in Iraq derailed much of the reconstruction program, delaying projects and adding additional costs.
The U.S. program has not been without success. The one area that the SIGIR believes has seen the best effort is the rebuilding of the Iraqi security forces. They now stand at over 700,000 strong. The Americans have also added 1.2 million cubic meters of sewage treatment capacity, brought up water production to 2.4 million cubic meters of potable water per day, and for three straight quarters electricity production has gone up. Power output is now higher than pre-invasion levels. The problem is since the overthrow of Saddam, demand for services has skyrocketed amongst Iraqis, and the U.S.-funded increases have not kept up. Only around 25% of Iraqis polled say they were satisfied with the sewage system for example.
Today, U.S.-reconstruction is coming to an end, leaving Iraq increasingly in charge. There are no current oil projects on-line for example. There is still $224.39 million going to be spent on electricity however. Now the Iraqi government is the largest source of funding for rebuilding. Its capital budget used for investment has recently gone down from $13.1 billion in 2008 to $12.7 billion this year. Iraq has also never been able to spend all of its money, like the Electricity Ministry that only spent 12% of its budget last year.
Now that Iraqis are taking control, transferring projects is becoming an issue. An April 26, 2009 SIGIR audit found that the U.S. had been turning over projects to Iraqis with no unified plan or process. Many are given to the Iraqi government whether they can handle them or not. Most transfers are also done at the local level, and the information is not passed up to Baghdad or Washington. Of $13.5 billion in projects studied by SIGIR, 72% were handed over to local authorities, and only 13% to the central government. That means neither government has a real idea on what has been done so far. Some of these projects were not even wanted by the Iraqis, and were left unused or were not maintained. The Iraqis in general also don’t have the experience or training in much of the equipment installed by the Americans. For instance, examinations of Iraqi health care facilities found that gear wasn’t always installed and Iraqis didn’t always know how to operate them. The SIGIR is worried that this will mean much of the U.S. investment will be wasted. The U.S. is trying to address this by spending $313.7 million on training and spare parts. That still doesn’t address the larger issue of how the Iraqis will take control of the thousands of projects built by the Americans.
In its review of the U.S. reconstruction effort, the SIGIR believes that much of the U.S. reconstruction project has failed. Iraqis are largely unhappy with the state of the economy, services, and government. Production of many services such as electricity is higher than under Saddam, but it’s only meeting a fraction of demand. The main problem was the lack of security, which was not planned for. That derailed and delayed much of the work. Violence also shifted the focus of the Americans to the point that the security forces received just as much money as building up the economy and government combined. The U.S. also tended to impose their views of what Iraq should have, rather than asking Iraqis what they wanted. Many of the large infrastructure projects therefore were not used properly, left to break down, or were never wanted. Some of the $51 billion budgeted for Iraq has gone to good work, especially the money appropriated by U.S. commanders to local Iraqis. The larger projects however are more of a mixed bag.
Total Outlays By U.S.
Security - $24.43 billion
$21.18 billion obligated
$18.58 billion expended
$3.24 billion unspent
$6.84 billion for equipment and transportation
$5.79 billion for infrastructure
$5.67 billion for training and operations
$2.42 billion for sustainment
$1.72 billion for rule of law
$1.0 billion for other
Infrastructure - $11.82 billion
$11.41 billion obligated
$10.86 billion expended
$553 million unspent
Infrastructure – Electricity - $5.09 billion
$4.98 billion obligated
$4.75 billion spent
Infrastructure – Water and Sanitation - $2.25 billion
$2.17 billion obligated
$2.01 billion spent
Infrastructure – Oil and Gas - $2.05 billion
$1.93 billion obligated
$1.88 billion spent
Infrastructure – Other - $1.31 billion
Infrastructure – Transportation and Communication - $1.12 billion
$1.09 billion obligated
$965 million spent
Governance - $7.02 billion
$5.64 billion spent
$2.38 billion obligated for capacity development
$1.92 billion obligated for democracy and civil society
$1.88 billion obligated for public services
$0.81 billion obligated for humanitarian relief
Economy - $1.47 billion
$1.25 billion spent
SOURCES
Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, “Asset-Transfer Process for Iraq Reconstruction Projects Lacks Unity and Accountability,” 4/26/09
- “Hard Lessons,” 1/22/09
- “Quarterly Report to the United States Congress,” 4/30/09
Monday, June 1, 2009
Iraqi Casualties Down For May 2009
April 2009 was marked by a series of mass casualty bombings that took the lives of some 290 Iraqis. The jump in deaths that month had many inside and out of Iraq worried that large-scale violence might be returning. The latest numbers however, show a drop in deaths for May.
The Iraqi Interior Ministry released its latest figures for casualties in Iraq. They reported 165 killed in May, 134 of which were civilians, and the remaining 31 from the Iraqi security forces. In April they recorded 355 deaths, preceded by 252 in March, 258 in February, and 191 in January. January had the lowest toll since the U.S. invasion in 2003, but May’s numbers have now surpassed that according to the Iraqi government.
Other organizations also noted the drop. Iraq Body Count found 483 killed in April, compared to a preliminary number of 344 in May, while icasualties reported 188 dead in May and 347 in April. The Associated Press keeps its own count as well and said that 225 died in May, while 371 were killed in April.
The U.S. command in Iraq noted that attacks were down 50% in mid-May compared to all of April 2009. A U.S. military spokesman said that there had only been 13 major attacks in Iraq from the beginning of May to the 23rd of that month compared to 28 for all of April. General Odierno, the U.S. commander in Iraq believed that attacks were related to two important anniversaries. April 6-7 marked the formation of the Baath Party, while April 9 was the fall of Saddam from power.
Iraq Deaths
Iraqi Ministries
November 08 340
December 08 316
January 09 191
February 09 258
March 09 252
April 09 355
May 09 165
Iraq Body Count
November 08 472
December 08 521
January 09 275
February 09 343
March 09 415
April 09 483
May 09 344
Icasualties.org
November 08 317
December 08 320
January 09 187
February 09 202
March 09 278
April 09 347
May 09 182
Associated Press
January 09 242
February 09 288
March 09 335
April 09 371
May 09 225
As reported before, overall attacks and deaths in Iraq are down compared to 2008, but have begun to creep back up in recent months. From April 1 to September 30, 2008 there were an average of just over 1,700 attacks per month. That went down to 1,169 from October 1 to December 31, 2008, and then to an average of 323 for January 1 to March 20, 2009. Casualties also dropped from July to December 2008, before hitting a low point in January 2009. That corresponded with campaigning for the 2009 provincial elections when Sunnis came out in large numbers compared to 2005 when they boycotted the ballot box. It appears that insurgents backed off for a period of time to allow people to vote. A similar series of events happened in the December 2005 elections when many insurgent groups backed the vote, held off on operations, and even provided security at polling centers. The trend since January 2009 has been for the number of Iraqis killed to go back up until May. Whether that month will turn out to be a temporary dip like January or the beginning of a new trend is yet to be seen.
For more on violence in Iraq see:
New Attack And Death Statistics For Iraq
How Many Have Died In Iraq And By What Means
Is Violence Increasing In Iraq?
Review of 2008 Attack Statistics In Iraq
2008 Iraq Death Totals
Iraqi Death Counts
SOURCES
Chon, Gina, “U.S. Says Attacks in Iraq Are Down 50% So Far in May,” Wall Street Journal, 5/25/09
Cordesman, Anthony, “Iraq: USCENTCOM and Iraqi Government Estimates of the Trends in the Patterns in Violence and Casualties,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, 5/1/09
Haynes, Deborah, “Transcript of The Times interview with General Ray Odierno,” Times of London, 4/9/09
Reid, Robert, “Iraq civilian deaths fall after April spike,” Associated Press, 6/1/09
Sly, Liz, “Iraqi casualties fall to record low in May,” Los Angeles Times, 6/1/09
Steinberg, Guido, “The Iraqi Insurgency,” German Institute for International and Security Affairs, December 2006
The Iraqi Interior Ministry released its latest figures for casualties in Iraq. They reported 165 killed in May, 134 of which were civilians, and the remaining 31 from the Iraqi security forces. In April they recorded 355 deaths, preceded by 252 in March, 258 in February, and 191 in January. January had the lowest toll since the U.S. invasion in 2003, but May’s numbers have now surpassed that according to the Iraqi government.
Other organizations also noted the drop. Iraq Body Count found 483 killed in April, compared to a preliminary number of 344 in May, while icasualties reported 188 dead in May and 347 in April. The Associated Press keeps its own count as well and said that 225 died in May, while 371 were killed in April.
The U.S. command in Iraq noted that attacks were down 50% in mid-May compared to all of April 2009. A U.S. military spokesman said that there had only been 13 major attacks in Iraq from the beginning of May to the 23rd of that month compared to 28 for all of April. General Odierno, the U.S. commander in Iraq believed that attacks were related to two important anniversaries. April 6-7 marked the formation of the Baath Party, while April 9 was the fall of Saddam from power.
Iraq Deaths
Iraqi Ministries
November 08 340
December 08 316
January 09 191
February 09 258
March 09 252
April 09 355
May 09 165
Iraq Body Count
November 08 472
December 08 521
January 09 275
February 09 343
March 09 415
April 09 483
May 09 344
Icasualties.org
November 08 317
December 08 320
January 09 187
February 09 202
March 09 278
April 09 347
May 09 182
Associated Press
January 09 242
February 09 288
March 09 335
April 09 371
May 09 225
As reported before, overall attacks and deaths in Iraq are down compared to 2008, but have begun to creep back up in recent months. From April 1 to September 30, 2008 there were an average of just over 1,700 attacks per month. That went down to 1,169 from October 1 to December 31, 2008, and then to an average of 323 for January 1 to March 20, 2009. Casualties also dropped from July to December 2008, before hitting a low point in January 2009. That corresponded with campaigning for the 2009 provincial elections when Sunnis came out in large numbers compared to 2005 when they boycotted the ballot box. It appears that insurgents backed off for a period of time to allow people to vote. A similar series of events happened in the December 2005 elections when many insurgent groups backed the vote, held off on operations, and even provided security at polling centers. The trend since January 2009 has been for the number of Iraqis killed to go back up until May. Whether that month will turn out to be a temporary dip like January or the beginning of a new trend is yet to be seen.
For more on violence in Iraq see:
New Attack And Death Statistics For Iraq
How Many Have Died In Iraq And By What Means
Is Violence Increasing In Iraq?
Review of 2008 Attack Statistics In Iraq
2008 Iraq Death Totals
Iraqi Death Counts
SOURCES
Chon, Gina, “U.S. Says Attacks in Iraq Are Down 50% So Far in May,” Wall Street Journal, 5/25/09
Cordesman, Anthony, “Iraq: USCENTCOM and Iraqi Government Estimates of the Trends in the Patterns in Violence and Casualties,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, 5/1/09
Haynes, Deborah, “Transcript of The Times interview with General Ray Odierno,” Times of London, 4/9/09
Reid, Robert, “Iraq civilian deaths fall after April spike,” Associated Press, 6/1/09
Sly, Liz, “Iraqi casualties fall to record low in May,” Los Angeles Times, 6/1/09
Steinberg, Guido, “The Iraqi Insurgency,” German Institute for International and Security Affairs, December 2006
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