Wednesday, October 6, 2010

June 2010 Poll Finds Iraqis Have Mixed Views About Their Country

In June 2010, the International Republican Institute conducted a poll of 2,988 Iraqis on contemporary issues. The survey was held from June 3-13. The results were weighted based upon each province’s voting population, and the gender and ethnosectarian breakdown of the country. The results were recorded for the country as a whole, as well as for six regions, Kurdistan, the disputed territories, the northern triangle, the southern belt, Baghdad, and Basra. Kurdistan consisted of the three provinces of Sulaymaniya, Dohuk, and Irbil, the disputed territories were Ninewa and Tamim, the northern triangle was Anbar, Salahaddin, and Anbar, while the southern belt was made up of Babil, Najaf, Karbala, Maysan, Muthanna, Qadisiyah, Dhi Qar, and Wasit. Overall, the Republican Institute found that Iraqis have mixed views of their current political and economic situation, and the future.

59% of Iraqis said that Iraq was going in the wrong direction. In December 2009 51% said that it was going in the right direction. When broken down by region, the northern triangle at 67% and Basra at 71% had the most negative opinions of the country’s situation. Only in the southern belt did 51% feel that Iraq was doing well, compared to 49% who said otherwise. When broken down by ethnosectarian identity all three groups had a bad view of Iraq, with Sunni Arabs having the worst view at 68% negative, while Shiite Arabs were at 52%, and Kurds at 56%.
Click on image for larger view
Source: Republican Institute
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Source: Republican Institute
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Source: Republican Institute
When asked what was the biggest problem in the country 66% said it was the lack of services. Security was second at 24%, and unemployment third at 8%. That was a sharp change from December 2009 when 43% said security was the most pressuring issue, followed by services, 23%, and unemployment 11%. Only in the northern triangle was security, 43%, close to services, 44% in the 2010 poll.
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Source: Republican Institute
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Source: Republican Institute
When asked about security, 73% said the situation had gotten better over the last year, with only 23% saying it had gotten worse. That was a slight drop from December 2009 when 81% said things had gotten better, compared to 18% who said it was worse.
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Source: Republican Institute
Click on image for larger view
Source: Republican Institute
The poll then asked Iraqis what they thought of their institutions. 61% said they approved of the national government. The disputed territories, 68%, and Baghdad 66%, had the most positive views of the government, with Kurdistan, 48%, and the northern triangle 53%, having the lowest positive ratings. The Army and police were also held in high regard. 73% said they approved of the Army, and 68% said the same of the police. The Kurdistan Regional Government engendered a much more mixed view with 48% disapproving, compared to 35% that approved. Kurdistan obviously, was the only part of the country with an overwhelming positive view at 83%. That compared to 54% with a negative view in the disputed territories, 49% in Baghdad, and 50% in Basra. The new Iraqi parliament also got mixed reviews. 38% approved of it, 37% disapproved, and 25% didn’t know yet. Kurdistan, 49%, the northern triangle, 40%, and the southern belt, 41%, had positive views of the new legislature, compared to 57% with a negative view in Basra. Provincial councils were given the same ranking with 50% approving, and 43% disapproving. Kurdistan, 60%, the disputed territories, 52%, the northern triangle, 53%, and the southern belt, 51%, all had positive views, while Baghdad, 44%, and Basra, 63%, disapproved of their local representatives.
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Source: Republican Institute
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Source: Republican Institute
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Source: Republican Institute
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Source: Republican Institute
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Source: Republican Institute
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Source: Republican Institute
The March 2010 parliamentary elections were also addressed. 67% said they were free and fair, with 27% dissenting. The disputed territories had the smallest gap between the two with 50% saying they were fair, and 47% saying they weren’t. When questioned about what issue influenced their vote the most, 24% said ethnicity, and 17% said religion. That was 41% who were influenced by their ethnosectarian identity. That compared to 24% who said individual candidates, 19% who said incumbents, and 8% who said party platform, 44% total, were more important. That showed that political concerns were almost dead even with religion and sect. When broken down by group, Kurds said ethnicity, 57%, and religion, 12%, influenced them the most. For Sunni Arabs, candidates, 32%, incumbents, 23%, and parties, 7%, 62% total, and Shiite Arabs, candidates, 25%, incumbents, 21%, and parties, 6%, 52% total, had larger impacts. 74% said that it was important that Iyad Allawi, who won the most seats in the election, be included in a new government. That idea was supported in all six regions. Conversely, 56% said that if Allawi were not included in a new government it would be illegitimate, compared to 31% who said it would. That opinion held true in all regions, except for the southern belt where 50% said a government would still be legitimate without Allawi, compared to 42% who said it would not.
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Source: Republican Institute
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Source: Republican Institute
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Source: Republican Institute
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Source: Republican Institute
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Source: Republican Institute
The economic situation was tackled next. 56% thought the economy was doing badly compared to 43% who thought it was doing well. The disputed territories was the only region that thought differently with 50% thinking the economy was doing well. The northern triangle had the most negative view with 69% saying things were going badly. At the same time, when they were asked about their personal financial situation, 55% said things were better, compared to 37% who said they were doing worse. Again, the northern triangle was the only part of the country that felt their situation had gotten worse at 54%, compared to 42% who said things were better. When asked about the future, 63% thought they would do better next year, compared to only 13% who thought they would do worse. That was an overwhelming feeling in all parts of Iraq, even in the northern triangle.
Click on image for larger view
Source: Republican Institute
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Source: Republican Institute
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Source: Republican Institute
Iraqis were then asked about individual issues in Iraq. Electricity, unemployment, corruption, and water/sewage were all seen as getting worse over the last year. 60% said electricity, 63% said unemployment, 62% said corruption, and 52% said water and sewage had all declined. Only wages and salaries were seen as improving with 36% saying it was better, and 19% worse. Kurdistan was the only region that had a slightly different view from the rest of the country. For electricity, 60% said it had improved with 32% saying it had gotten worse, and 60% said water and sewage had gotten better, with 25% saying it had gotten worse. That was likely due to new power plants opening in Kurdistan in 2009 that boosted its electricity supply.
Click on image for larger view
Source: Republican Institute
Finally, the issues of regionalism and centralism were addressed. 63% said that oil revenues should go to the central government. Predictably, Kurdistan was the only part of the country that disagreed at 62%. When asked which should be stronger, 63% said the central government compared to 33% who said the provincial government. Kurdistan was the exception with 80% saying the provinces compared to 15% who said the central government.
Click on image for larger view
Source: Republican Institute
Click on image for larger view
Source: Republican Institute
What the Republican Institute’s poll shows is that Iraq is divided on many issues. Iraqis feel that their own personal situation has improved, but they are upset with the government’s inability to provide services, and are apprehensive about the economy. The lack of consistent electricity, water, etc. now outweighs security as the main issue on Iraqis’ minds. At the same time, the central government, Army, and police were all held in high regard. This points to a disconnect in public opinion. On the one hand, many citizens think that their government is inept, corrupt, and can’t provide enough jobs, yet still think overall the central government should have more power, get all the oil revenue, and approve of the institution. They think they’ve improved financially, and will continue into the next year, but at the same time, believe that the overall economy is doing poorly. It appears that depending on how a question is posed, an Iraqi will have very different views of the same issue, and those differences defy easy categorizations such as local and national.

SOURCES

International Republican Institute, “Survey of Iraqi Public Opinion, June 3 – July 3, 2010,” 9/16/10

Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, “Quarterly Report to the United States Congress,” 10/30/09

Tuesday, October 5, 2010

Baghdad Bans Kurdish Natural Gas Exports To Turkey

On September 20, 2010 AK News reported that Iraq and Turkey had signed an agreement that would prevent the Kurds from exporting natural gas to Europe. According to the article Istanbul said they would not allow any Kurdish gas sales through its territory without Baghdad’s approval. The Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) immediately condemned the announcement.

The Iraq-Turkey deal came as a result of the KRG signing a gas pipeline and distribution network contract with Germany’s RWE at the end of August. The Kurds are hoping that it will allow them to join the Nabucco project, which is to export gas from the Middle East to Turkey and Europe. The Oil Ministry threatened to cut half of its fuel deliveries to the region in retaliation. It has now gone a step further by trying to squash any Kurdish aspirations to sell its gas independent of the central government by blocking their exports to Turkey.

The dispute arises from an argument over who has the authority to sign natural resource deals, Baghdad or the KRG. This has led to a war of words between the two, and over a dozen contracts being signed by both sides. This latest tit for tat over natural gas is just the latest episode of this on going disagreement.

SOURCES

Ahmed, Hevidar, “Iraq and Turkey agree to prevent future KRG gas exports,” AK News, 9/20/10

Monday, October 4, 2010

Iran Activates Another Shiite Special Group

UPI reported that the Iranian Revolutionary Guards’ Qods Force has activated Abu Yaser Mustafa Sheibani’s Special Group. As noted before, Tehran is hoping to step up attacks by its Shiite allies so that it can claim that it forced the Americans to withdraw from Iraq. The U.S. commander for western and central Iraq for example, recently said that Iranian supported groups were behind a series of missiles fired at the U.S. Embassy and Green Zone in Baghdad. Back in August 2010 Asharq al-Awsat claimed that another notorious Special Groups commander Abu Dura, aka Ismail Hafiz al-Lami, had also returned to Iraq from Iran to carry out operations. Dura was known as the Shiite Zarqawi during the sectarian civil war because of his brutal attacks on Sunnis.

Sheibani was originally a Badr Brigade commander, which was the militia of the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council. In the 1990s he was in charge of their operations in Baghdad and central Iraq. After the U.S. invasion he began smuggling weapons to Shiite militiamen using the networks he created under Saddam’s rule. That was a way for Iran to influence violence in Iraq by controlling the amount of weapons and money available to Shiite militants. He allegedly introduced the Explosively Formed Penetrator (EFP) shaped charge to Iraq. He also ferried Iraqis to Iran for training, received aid from Lebanon’s Hezbollah, and his network was responsible for some high profile attacks as well. In 2006 he was placed on Iraq's most wanted list, and ended up fleeing to Iran. His return could mean an attempt to reconstitute this flow of men and material between Iraq and Iran.

While the number of operations by Special Groups has significantly increased, their overall numbers are rather insignificant, and their damage inconsequential. In the last week of September for example, there were 11 rocket attacks upon the Green Zone, and one in Basra that were believed to be carried out by Shiite groups. That was only 10.7% of all security incidents in the country that week. Abu Sheibani and Abu Dura’s presence in Iraq can only be bad news, but it is largely a sideshow. Even when former U.S. commander General Ray Odierno originally warned about an up tick in Iranian-backed activity, he said that it was only short-term, posed no threat to stability or the Iraqi government, and that Tehran was much more interested in its political and economic influence. Hopefully then in a few months these attacks will subside. The question is what will these Special Groups commanders be doing afterward? They have very little support within Iraq and are only good at spreading violence. They could turn to crime, which is a new favorite pastime of many militants, or they could go back to Iran. Their future is the real question that should be explored rather than their current mayhem.

SOURCES

Babnews, Al-Rafidayn, “U.S. General: Iran Behind Attacks on Green Zone,” MEMRI Blog, 9/24/10

Fadel, Leila, “Amid threat, U.S. heightens security at its Iraq bases,” Washington Post, 7/13/10

Felter, Joseph and Fishman, Brian, “Iranian Strategy in Iraq, Politics and ‘Other Means,’” Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, 10/13/08

Olive Group, “Weekly Security Update for 30th September 2010,” Iraq Business News, 9/30/10

Peterson, Scott, “Odierno: Militants trained in Iran prepare to attack US bases in Iraq,” Christian Science Monitor, 7/13/10

UPI, “Iraq: Return of Sheibani’s killer squads,” 9/30/10

Confrontation Between Wasit Provincial Council and Oil Ministry At Al-Ahdab Field

On September 27, 2010 members of the Wasit Provincial Council and local police raided the Al-Ahdab oil field that is jointly operated by the Chinese National Petroleum Company (CNPC) and the Iraqi Oil Ministry. The council members charged executives at the field of embezzlement and misconduct, and demanded to see all of their financial records. Members of the Oil Security Force unsuccessfully attempted to stop the local officials at the gates. Afterward the Oil Ministry complained that the council’s actions were illegal as the field was under federal jurisdiction, and no local authority had the right to enter. 

CNPC was the first foreign oil company to do business in Iraq after the 2003 invasion. In August 2008 Baghdad re-worked a 1997 contract the company had signed during the Saddam era. The corporation has run into several problems since then. Farmers claimed their land was being destroyed by CNPC, and retaliated by damaging some of their equipment. Others protested at the provincial council because the Chinese hardly provided any jobs as they expected, and also demanded that CNPC pay $1 for every barrel of oil they produced. This shut down operations at the field for a short period of time in mid-2009, and caused the central government to deploy extra security there. Since then, other petroleum firms have begun work in Iraq, and there have been no reports of similar disputes. Hopefully none will because that could pose serious problems for Baghdad’s hopes of almost quadrupling production in the next few years.

SOURCES

AK News, “”Corruption” at Al-Ahdab, Execs Dismissed,” Iraq Business News, 9/27/10

DPA, “Iraq’s oil ministry denounces police raid on Chinese-run oil field,” 9/28/10

Sunday, October 3, 2010

Iraqi National Alliance Splits Over Nominating Maliki, New Iraqi Government Still On Hold

Source: Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty 
Moqtada al-Sadr and PM Nouri Al-Maliki seen together in 2006. Sadr just went from one of Maliki’s greatest opponents to his main supporter to form a new Iraqi government

On October 1, 2010 Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki got the support of half of the Iraqi National Alliance to stay in power. The Sadrists, the Badr Organization, the Iraqi National Congress, and Ibrahim al-Jaafari’s National Reform Trend came out for Maliki. That gives the premier 139 seats in the new parliament, 24 short of the 163 necessary for a majority, and the right to form a new government. State of Law came in second in March with 89 seats, the Sadrists won the most in the National Alliance with 39, while Badr got nine,  and the National Trend and Iraqi National Congress have one apiece.

The Sadrists hinted at their about face towards Maliki at the end of September. First, a letter from Moqtada al-Sadr addressed to his followers included a question about what the movement should do if Maliki won a second term in office. Sadr replied that politics was about give and take, and that Sadrists needed to go along with whatever the leadership decided upon. There was also a fatwa by Ayatollah Kadhem al-Hussein al-Haeri, Sadr’s mentor in Iran, calling for Maliki to be supported. Coming out for the prime minister was a dramatic change for Sadr who was previously one of the greatest opponents of Maliki, having called him a liar and hypocrite. This could cause internal dissension within the movement, but at the same time provide them with huge opportunities. The Sadrists are asking for six of 34 ministries, including the Trade Ministry and either the Defense or Interior Ministries. This would mark their return to government after they left the original Maliki coalition in November 2006, giving up 5 cabinet positions in the process. Ministries mean patronage, and a way to expand their base.

The Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council (SIIC) and the Fadhila Party did not attend the National Alliance vote. Instead, they met with Deputy Prime Minister Rafi Issawi of Iyad Allawi’s Iraqi National Movement to discuss how to counter Maliki. That means the effective split of the National Alliance. An adviser to Allawi said that the National Movement was now hoping to form a counter coalition made up of the Supreme Council and the Kurdish Alliance. If that were to come to fruition they would have 163 seats with the National Movement’s 91, the Kurdish Coalition’s 57, the Supreme Council’s eight, and Fadhila’s seven, enough to have a majority.

There are major barriers to this happening. First, the Supreme Council is hoping that allying with the National Movement will keep them relevant as they have lost most of their support in both the 2009 provincial and 2010 parliamentary elections compared to the 2005 votes when they were the largest Shiite party in Iraq. That means they will be pushing Vice President Adel Abdul Mahdi as premier, putting them at odds with Allawi who also wants the position. The Kurds are also weary of the Al-Hadbaa component of the National Movement, which controls Ninewa province. Not only that, but in August the Kurdish Coalition issued a 19-paragraph paper outlining their demands which included the presidency, the creation of a National Security Council and Federal Council, which would require new laws, a number of ministries, the implementation of Article 140 to determine the fate of the disputed territories, the passage of an oil and gas law, the federal government paying for the peshmerga, and the right to bring down any government that did not follow its program. The Kurds might also be afraid that the Sunni component of the National Movement will be less likely to agree upon Article 140. On the other hand, the Kurds have said they would not join any government that did not include Allawi and the Supreme Council.

The Kurds will be in the driver’s seat now that the Sadrists have made their choice. The Kurdish Coalition are now the largest uncommitted bloc, and can determine whether the National Movement or State of Law will achieve a majority. That will give them the upper hand in negotiations.

A new Iraqi government is still weeks, possibly months away. Allawi, Maliki, the Supreme Council, and the Kurds all have long days ahead of them trying to win over others to their positions. What the course of events so far points out is that Maliki has been the main focus of talks. His rise to power after being a weak and compromise candidate back in 2006 has worried all of the other parties about what he might do if he stays in office. Foreign powers such as the U.S., Iran, Syria, Turkey, and Saudi Arabia only have limited influence in these negotiations. Tehran for example, put together the National Alliance before the March vote, then got Maliki to join them afterward, and many believe their pressure led to Sadr's about face on the premier. At the same time, the Supreme Council has now split from the Badr Organization, which use to be its militia, and divided the Shiite vote in the process, which Iran spent so much time trying to unite. That shows other countries can help shape events, but Iraqis will ultimately decide on the future of the next government. The problem as ever is that very few are willing to compromise. That’s the reason why a new ruling coalition is still a long way off.

SOURCES

Abdul-Zahra, Qassim and Jakes, Lara, “Anti-American cleric views for more power in Iraq,” Associated Press, 10/1/10

Aswat al-Iraq, “Deal reached to have Abdulmahdi as PM, Allawi as president – Iraqiya,” 9/17/10
- “Iraqi National Alliance seats: Sadrists 39, SIIC 20, Fadila 7, two for Jaafari, Jalabi,” 4/4/10

Barzanji, Yahya and Murphy, Brian, “Iraq’s Kurds hold political cards for al-Maliki,” Associated Press, 10/2/10

Fadel, Leila, “Shiite bloc backs Maliki for Iraqi prime minister; election deadlock nears end,” Washington Post, 10/1/10

Gharib, Sirwan, “Kurdish plan ignored as crisis continues,” Niqash, 9/2/10

Hanna, Michael Wahid, “Meet the new boss, same as the old boss,” Middle East Channel, Foreign Policy, 10/1/10

Ibrahim, Haider, “Coalition parties refuse to back Maliki if his candidature wins internal vote,” AK News, 9/20/10

Independent Press Agency, “Hani ashour: the map of alliances will change in the next couple of days including is opportunities at the renewal of the mandate of Al-Maliki,” 9/30/10
- “Mahmoud Othman: external pressures contributed to change the position of the sadrists to nominate Al-Maliki,” 10/1/10

Iraq The Model, “Government formation update,” 10/1/10

Al Rafidayn, “Al-Maliki’s Nomination for a second presidential term in the absence of the Supreme Council of Virtue Party and the battle in the coming parliament,” 10/1/10

Roads To Iraq, “Maliki’s nomination, Iranian pressure or a secret deal?” 10/1/10

Shat News, Wasat Online, Alsumaria TV, Almowaten News, Al-Zaman and al-Sharq al-Awsat, “Al-Iraqiya: Abd Al-Mahdi Would Form New Government,” MEMRI Blog, 9/29/10

Visser, Reidar, “208 Days and Counting: Iraq Beats the World Record in Slow Government Formation,” Historiae, 10/1/10
- “Muqtada al-Sadr Preparing His Supporters for the Dirty Game of Politics,” Iraq and Gulf Analysis, 9/29/10
- “The Sadrist Watershed Confirmed,” Iraq and Gulf Analysis, 3/29/10

Wagner, Thomas and Yacoub, Sameer, “Deadly Fighting Shuts Down City in Iraq,” Washington Post, 11/29/06

Friday, October 1, 2010

Ninewa Unwilling To Hold Census As Long As Kurdish Peshmerga Are Present

Source: U.S. Embassy, Baghdad
Ninewa’s governor Atheel Nujafi told the press that he would block the national census as long as there were Kurdish peshmerga present in his province. Iraq’s Planning Ministry intends on conducting the census on October 24, 2010, and Ninewa is the only governorate that has not prepared for it. Since Nujafi was elected in the January 2009 provincial elections, he and his Al-Hadbaa Party have been calling for all Kurdish forces to withdraw, and be replaced by the Iraqi Army and police. Al-Hadbaa is opposed to Kurdish desires to annex the disputed territories in the province, and believe that the peshmerga are in Ninewa to achieve that goal. Not only that, but after al-Hadbaa took all the positions in the governorate’s council after the 2009 elections, the Kurdish Fraternal List has been boycotting the provincial government, and the peshmerga even refused to allow al-Hadbaa officials from visiting areas under their control. In mid-2010 the United Nations and Iyad Allawi’s Iraqi National Movement began mediating between the parties. The two sides have agreed upon a number of issues such as the budget and distributing government positions, but not security.

If the census were not conducted in Ninewa, the second largest governorate in the country, it would be a major setback. The last time Iraq held a census was in 1997, but it did not include the three provinces in Kurdistan that were not under the administration of Saddam Hussein’s government. They were included in the 1987 census. This year’s census has already been postponed twice before. It was originally planned for 2007, but was cancelled because of the lack of security. The Planning Ministry tried two years later, but political parties were afraid of political manipulation in the disputed territories in Ninewa, Tamim, and Diyala. It’s those same types of objections al-Hadbaa is currently voicing and may hold up this year’s attempt.

SOURCES

Karim, Karzan, “Nineveh governor says no census in his province,” AK News, 9/21/10

Khallat, Khudr, “Kurdish delegation go to Baghdad to discuss census,” AK News, 9/21/10

Shell-Mitsubishi Natural Gas Deal In Basra Delayed Again

For over two years now Shell and Iraq have been in negotiations over extracting natural gas from the oil fields in Basra. The latest news is that the deal is being held up again. The latest problem is that the Oil Ministry is trying to change the contract so that it can create a joint venture with Shell and Mitsubishi, who joined the planned consortium in February 2009. Under the proposed contract the Iraqi government will own 51% of the company with Shell having 44% and Mitsubishi 5%. The deal is worth $12 billion and would give the foreign companies a 25-year contract. 

Iraq has an estimated 112 trillion cubic feet of gas reserves. It produces approximately 1.5 billion cubic feet per day, but only half of that is actually used with the rest being burned off and wasted. The Oil Ministry originally came to an agreement with Shell on September 8, 2008, but it took until June 29, 2010 for the cabinet to approve the deal. Now three months later and there’s another delay. The negotiations have been particularly difficult because of political objections within parliament, and the fact that the gas will be taken from oil fields that are currently in operation, some of which were just auctioned off in 2009. That means not only would the Oil Ministry, Shell and Mitsubishi have to come to terms, but that they would in turn have to make deals with the energy companies running the petroleum wells. Baghdad is now hoping to aggressively develop this industry, with an auction for three natural gas fields this October. Hopefully that will go better as they are for underdeveloped areas, meaning the deals should not be so complicated. They in turn could theoretically come on line before the Shell-Mitsubishi contract, which seems to be perpetually in limbo.

SOURCES

AK News, “Iraq delays multi-billion dollar oil deals,” 9/27/10

Salaheddin, Sinan, “Iraq-Shell gas deal likely to be delayed until after January elections, official says,” Associated Press, 9/5/09
- “Iraqi official: Mitsubishi to join Iraq gas deal,” Associated Press, 2/12/09

Iran Charging Huge Fees To Allow Iraq To Export Oil

   Iraq recently announced that it was exporting over 3 million barrels a day in oil but this is coming at a huge cost due to...