U.S. Post-Iraq War Planning (2001-08)

This timeline covers the Bush administration’s planning for postwar Iraq

 

Musings On Iraq review Liberate And Leave, Fatal Flaws In The Early Strategy For Postwar Iraq

Musings On Iraq review Hard Lessons, The Iraq Reconstruction Experience

Musings On Iraq review Losing Iraq, Inside The Post War Reconstruction Fiasco

Musings On Iraq review The Occupation of Iraq, Winning The War, Losing The Peace

Musings On Iraq review Leap of Faith, Hubris Negligence, and America’s Greatest Foreign Policy Tragedy

Musings On Iraq review Bush At War

Musings On Iraq review Fiasco: The American Military Adventure In Iraq

Musings On Iraq review Plan of Attack: The Definitive Account Of The Decision To

Invade Iraq

Musings On Iraq review The Report of the Iraq Inquiry, Executive Summary

Musings On Iraq review Wanting War: Why the Bush Administration Invaded Iraq

Musings On Iraq review State of Denial, Bush At War, Part III

Musings On Iraq Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction’s “Hard Lessons” – Part I: Planning for Postwar Iraq September 2001 to May 2003

Musings On Iraq on Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction Hard Lessons Chapter 2 The Agencies Engage

Musings On Iraq on Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction Hard Lessons Chapter 3 The Department of Defense Takes Charge

Musings On Iraq Special Inspector General For Iraq Reconstruction Hard Lessons Chapter 4 Staging in Kuwait

 

2001

 

Dec 28 CENTCOM commander Gen Franks presented Iraq war plan to Bush Had no postwar

component

Dec 28 Def Sec Rumsfeld told Bush Iraq war would be over fast and quick US would quickly

turn over power to Iraqis and withdraw

(Musings On Iraq Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction’s “Hard Lessons” – Part I: Planning for Postwar Iraq September 2001 to May 2003)

(Musings On Iraq review Liberate And Leave, Fatal Flaws In The Early Strategy For Postwar Iraq)

 

2002

Feb 4 Work on State Dept’s Future of Iraq Project began 17 working groups on Iraq’s postwar

needs Worked mostly with Iraqi exiles

(Musings On Iraq review Hard Lessons, The Iraq Reconstruction Experience)

 

Apr 9 State Dept started Future of Iraq project bringing together 240 Iraqi exiles to chart

out post-Saddam Iraq

(Musings On Iraq Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction’s “Hard Lessons” – Part I: Planning for Postwar Iraq September 2001 to May 2003)

(Musings On Iraq review Leap of Faith, Hubris Negligence, and America’s Greatest

Foreign Policy Tragedy)

(Musings On Iraq review Losing Iraq, Inside The Post War Reconstruction Fiasco)

(Musings On Iraq review Hard Lessons, The Iraq Reconstruction Experience)

 

Apr 23 Pentagon memo said UN would hold a postwar conference to pick Iraqi leaders like

what happened in Afghanistan Said Iraqi exiles would be put in charge of POW camps for former regime members and would take over Iraqi military Said provisional govt would be set up as quickly as possible so US could withdraw

 

May 9 Pentagon memo to Rumsfeld said that US had to pick who would fill vacuum after

Saddam Said Iraqi opposition would help

 

May 24 Rumsfeld issued order to Joint Chiefs to begin Phase Four postwar planning for

Iraq

(Musings On Iraq Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction’s “Hard Lessons” – Part I: Planning for Postwar Iraq September 2001 to May 2003)

(Musings On Iraq review of Shaping the Plan for Operation Iraqi Freedom, The Role of Military Intelligence Assessment)

(Musings On Iraq review Hard Lessons, The Iraq Reconstruction Experience)

 

Ju l Pentagon memo said US should organize Iraqi opposition to help with regime change

and fill vacuum after Saddam Said exiles would help ensure no chaos after invasion Said if US tried to run Iraq without opposition leaders would backfire

 

Jul 2 UK Defense Minister Hoon told Blair he had to push US to think about postwar Iraq

            planning

 

Aug 1 Senate held hearing on postwar Iraq Senator Biden warned that unless US gained

support it could spend $70-$80 bil rebuilding Iraq

 

Aug 5 Secretary of State Powell told Bush that Iraq invasion would dominate 1st term and

US would be responsible for Iraq afterward

(Musings On Iraq Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction’s “Hard Lessons” – Part I: Planning for Postwar Iraq September 2001 to May 2003)

(Musings On Iraq review Leap of Faith, Hubris Negligence, and America’s Greatest

Foreign Policy Tragedy)

(Musings On Iraq review Bush At War)

(Musings On Iraq review Plan of Attack: The Definitive Account Of The Decision To

Invade Iraq)

Aug 5 CENTCOM cmdr Gen Franks briefed Bush on latest version of Iraq war plan

Said there was no postwar plan and he wanted to withdraw US forces as quickly as possible

 

Aug 6 Natl Sec Adv Rice paper Liberation Strategy for Iraq Said goal was to transform Iraq

into a democracy Had no strategy on how to achieve that Said when US overthrew Saddam can’t act like an invader Had to pose war as a liberation of the Iraqi people Same time US would have to stay in Iraq for many years

(Musings On Iraq review What Happened, Inside the Bush White House and Washington’s Culture of Deception)

(Musings On Iraq review Fiasco: The American Military Adventure In Iraq)

(Musings On Iraq review Plan of Attack: The Definitive Account Of The Decision To Invade

Iraq)

(Musings On Iraq review The Assassins’ Gate, America In Iraq)

(Musings On Iraq review State of Denial, Bush At War, Part III)

(Musings On Iraq review Hard Lessons, The Iraq Reconstruction Experience)

 

Aug 9 Def Sec Rumsfeld at White House meeting said that US would not occupy Iraq for a

long time and shouldn’t promote democracy

(Musings On Iraq review Liberate And Leave, Fatal Flaws In The Early Strategy For Postwar Iraq)

Aug 9 After White House meeting UnderSecDef Feith told Def Sec Rumsfeld he should not

be so critical of creating a democracy in Iraq Rumsfeld said building democracy complex and not just holding an election

 

Aug 17 Pentagon memo argued against State suggestion that US would have to run Iraq

after invasion State didn’t think Iraqi exiles could run Iraq Said agreed exiles had problems but US had to push them to prepare for the challenge Rejected a US occupation and said Iraq invasion should be like invasion of France in WWII when US fought with French forces to liberate their country Said were many bad elements in Iraq like radical Shiites communists Wahabis Al Qaeda that could fill vacuum after war so US had to put exiles into power

(Musings On Iraq review Leap of Faith, Hubris Negligence, and America’s Greatest

Foreign Policy Tragedy)

(Musings On Iraq review Fiasco: The American Military Adventure In Iraq)

(Musings On Iraq review Losing Iraq, Inside The Post War Reconstruction Fiasco)

 

Aug 29 Bush signed Iraq: Goals, Objectives, Strategy that said US would use all means to

remove Saddam Said US would work with Iraqi exiles and not occupy Iraq Would build democracy in Iraq and help rebuild country Contradicted Pentagon’s vision of postwar Iraq that wouldn’t include rebuilding

(Musings On Iraq review of Shaping the Plan for Operation Iraqi Freedom, The Role of Military Intelligence Assessment)

(Musings On Iraq review Wanting War: Why the Bush Administration Invaded Iraq)

(Musings On Iraq review Leap of Faith, Hubris Negligence, and America’s Greatest

Foreign Policy Tragedy)

(Musings On Iraq review Hubris, The Inside Story of Spin, Scandal, And The Selling Of The Iraq War)

(Musings On Iraq review The Bush Administrations and Saddam Hussein, Deciding on Conflict)

Aug 29 Bush’s Iraq: Goals, Objectives, Strategy led CENTCOM to start postwar planning

Was never a priority

(Musings On Iraq review Hard Lessons, The Iraq Reconstruction Experience)

 

Sep 4 Rep Ike Skelton wrote letter to Pres Bush “To win victory is easy, to preserve its

fruits, difficult”

Sep 4 UK Defense Ministry paper said that US had no clear postwar strategy for Iraq and

that meant no winning plan

 

Sep 7 NSC meeting briefing book for meeting included argument for invading Iraq, how

Iraq would be run after Saddam Lessons learned from occupation of Germany and Japan after WWII

 

Sep 20 Pentagon set up planning group to deal with rebuilding Iraq’s oil industry after

invasion

(Musings On Iraq review Leap of Faith, Hubris Negligence, and America’s Greatest Foreign

Policy Tragedy)

(Musings On Iraq review Hard Lessons, The Iraq Reconstruction Experience)

 

Oct 2 Feith office memo Said exiles should organize a conference to create bill of rights for

Iraq before war US wanted a federal system of govt US military would run Iraq after war and work with exiles

 

Oct 4 State Dep Future of Iraq Project met in London INC presented plan written by Kanan

Makiya calling for exiles to set up transitional govt

(Musings On Iraq review Leap of Faith, Hubris Negligence, and America’s Greatest Foreign

Policy Tragedy)

(Musings On Iraq review Losing Iraq, Inside The Post War Reconstruction Fiasco)

(Musings On Iraq review The Assassins’ Gate, America In Iraq)

(Musings On Iraq review Hard Lessons, The Iraq Reconstruction Experience)

 

Oct 7 Pentagon drafted 2 memos on postwar Iraq 1st said military would assume control of

Iraqi govt maintain security so rebuilding could begin and govt could restart 2nd memo said a military governor would run Iraq and appoint US specialists to run each ministry Didn’t say who would do this as invasion plan was to withdraw quickly Gen Franks said he would not run Iraq after invasion

(Musings On Iraq review State of Denial, Bush At War, Part III)

(Musings On Iraq review Hard Lessons, The Iraq Reconstruction Experience)

 

Oct 15 Undersecretary of Defense Feith briefed NSC on plan for governing postwar Iraq

with 3-star general in charge of military and civilian administrator

(Musings On Iraq review State of Denial, Bush At War, Part III)

(Musings On Iraq review Hard Lessons, The Iraq Reconstruction Experience)

Oct 15 Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld wrote list of 29 things that could go wrong with Iraq

war Went over them with Bush Included not finding WMD another state taking advantage of US focus on Iraq, oil shocks Iraq could strike US or allies beforehand could be high collateral damage could lead to ethnosectarian conflict in Iraq Iraq would use WMD on Shiites Iraq could convince world US at war with Muslims Had no follow up on how to deal with any problems listed

(Musings On Iraq Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction’s “Hard Lessons” – Part I: Planning for Postwar Iraq September 2001 to May 2003)

 

Oct 18 Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld told Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Feith to

create postwar planning office for Iraq Cancelled few days later by White House that worried postwar planning could derail invasion

(Musings On Iraq Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction’s “Hard Lessons” – Part I: Planning for Postwar Iraq September 2001 to May 2003)

(Musings On Iraq on Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction Hard Lessons Chapter 3 The Department of Defense Takes Charge)

(Musings On Iraq review Leap of Faith, Hubris Negligence, and America’s Greatest Foreign

Policy Tragedy)

(Musings On Iraq review Hard Lessons, The Iraq Reconstruction Experience)

 

Dec 2 White House officials told US News & World Report they were making extensive

            plans for postwar Iraq

(Musings On Iraq Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction’s “Hard Lessons” – Part I: Planning for Postwar Iraq September 2001 to May 2003)

(Musings On Iraq review Leap of Faith, Hubris Negligence, and America’s Greatest Foreign

Policy Tragedy)

(Musings On Iraq review Hard Lessons, The Iraq Reconstruction Experience)

 

Dec 5 Rumsfeld aid Herbits said he was taking over postwar Iraq planning because it was a

mess Herbits said Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Feith was screwing up planning

(Musings On Iraq review Leap of Faith, Hubris Negligence, and America’s Greatest Foreign

Policy Tragedy)

(Musings On Iraq review State of Denial, Bush At War, Part III)

(Musings On Iraq review Hard Lessons, The Iraq Reconstruction Experience)

 

Dec 10 USAID said Iraq would be small intervention but security needed to be first priority

Dec 10 NSC committee presented humanitarian plan for postwar Iraq based upon secure

            environment and small US role

(Musings On Iraq Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction’s “Hard Lessons” – Part I: Planning for Postwar Iraq September 2001 to May 2003)

(Musings On Iraq on Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction Hard Lessons Chapter 2 The Agencies Engage)

(Musings On Iraq review Leap of Faith, Hubris Negligence, and America’s Greatest Foreign

Policy Tragedy)

(Musings On Iraq review Hard Lessons, The Iraq Reconstruction Experience)

 

Dec 11 Pentagon started another post-war planning group just 3 months before invasion

(Musings On Iraq review Leap of Faith, Hubris Negligence, and America’s Greatest Foreign

Policy Tragedy)

(Musings On Iraq Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction’s “Hard Lessons” – Part I: Planning for Postwar Iraq September 2001 to May 2003)

(Musings On Iraq review State of Denial, Bush At War, Part III)

(Musings On Iraq review Hard Lessons, The Iraq Reconstruction Experience)

 

Dec 14 CENTCOM briefed Joint Chiefs on postwar Iraq Warned that US could win the war

and lose the peace Warned there would be no Iraqi govt after the invasion so there could be chaos in the country Warned that US was only planning for the war and not the peace Said Iraq’s economy was a wreck and that US should maintain the military and not carry out an extensive deBaathification because could fracture Iraq

(Musings On Iraq Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction’s “Hard Lessons” – Part I: Planning for Postwar Iraq September 2001 to May 2003)

(Musings On Iraq review State of Denial, Bush At War, Part III)

(Musings On Iraq review Hard Lessons, The Iraq Reconstruction Experience)

(Musings On Iraq review State of Denial, Bush At War, Part III)

Dec 14 CENTCOM briefing on postwar Iraq led Joint Chiefs to set up its own postwar

planning cell Was not coordinated with CENTCOM

 

Dec 18 Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld ordered start of civil administration to run postwar

Iraq 3 months before invasion

(Musings On Iraq Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction’s “Hard Lessons” – Part I: Planning for Postwar Iraq September 2001 to May 2003)

(Musings On Iraq on Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction Hard Lessons Chapter 3 The Department of Defense Takes Charge)

(Musings On Iraq review Leap of Faith, Hubris Negligence, and America’s Greatest Foreign

Policy Tragedy)

(Musings On Iraq review Hard Lessons, The Iraq Reconstruction Experience)

 

2003

Jan 4 US Natl Intel Council report said building democracy in Iraq would be long and

            difficult

 

Jan 10 Kanan Makiya told Pres Bush that U.S. forces would be greeted with sweets

            and flowers in Iraq

Jan 10 Hatim Mukhlis told Pres Bush if US troops didn’t win support of Iraqis Iraq

            would turn into Somalia in 2 months 

 

Jan 13 Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Feith called ex-Gen Jay Garner to run postwar

Iraq and he accepted

(Musings On Iraq on Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction Hard Lessons Chapter 3 The Department of Defense Takes Charge)

(Musings On Iraq review Hard Lessons, The Iraq Reconstruction Experience)

 

Jan 15 Bush received 1st brief on postwar Iraq plans from NSC’s Abrams Went over

humanitarian aid Emphasized feeding public Abrams said money had to be secretly sent to aid groups that would work in Iraq because they didn’t want to be seen supporting war Abrams said Oil for Food program would be maintained after invasion to feed public Abrams said that 2 mil Iraqis might be displaced during invasion NSC officials had gone to military to make sure things like health centers weren’t bombed during invasion Bush thought humanitarian aid after war very important Thought could change image of US in Middle East Plans made irrelevant when Pentagon given control of postwar Iraq

(Musings On Iraq Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction’s “Hard Lessons” – Part I: Planning for Postwar Iraq September 2001 to May 2003)

(Musings On Iraq on Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction Hard Lessons Chapter 2 The Agencies Engage)

(Musings On Iraq review Hard Lessons, The Iraq Reconstruction Experience)

(Musings On Iraq review Leap of Faith, Hubris Negligence, and America’s Greatest Foreign

Policy Tragedy)

Jan 15 Aid groups that met with USAID about postwar Iraq plans asked to meet with

Pentagon leadership Nothing happened

 

Jan 16 Future Office for Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA) head Garner

met with Rumsfeld and Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Feith Rumsfeld said no coordination of postwar planning Told Garner he needed to consult with different agencies and coordinate postwar plans Garner said in WWII US spent years planning for postwar situation and he was only given a few weeks for Iraq

(Musings On Iraq on Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction Hard Lessons Chapter 3 The Department of Defense Takes Charge)

(Musings On Iraq review Hard Lessons, The Iraq Reconstruction Experience)

(Musings On Iraq review Iraq and Back, Inside The War To Win The Peace)

(Musings On Iraq review Leap of Faith, Hubris Negligence, and America’s Greatest Foreign

Policy Tragedy)

(Musings On Iraq review State of Denial, Bush At War, Part III)

(Musings On Iraq Only 3 of 13 Reconstruction Contracts Were Signed Before War)

 

Jan 17 Pentagon memo said no decision on postwar govt in Iraq Said would be a military

administration transitional authority elections leading to an Iraqi govt Didn’t match Pentagon plans to quickly withdraw US troops

(Musings On Iraq review Leap of Faith, Hubris Negligence, and America’s Greatest Foreign

Policy Tragedy)

(Musings On Iraq review State of Denial, Bush At War, Part III)

 

Jan 20 National Sec Presidential Dir 24 gave Pentagon control of postwar Iraq Pentagon

would dismiss previous NSC planning for postwar Iraq and kick out State Dept officials

(Musings On Iraq review Losing Iraq, Inside The Post War Reconstruction Fiasco)

(Musings On Iraq review Hard Lessons, The Iraq Reconstruction Experience)

Jan 20 Office for Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA) created to

            run post-war Iraq 2 months before invasion

(Musings On Iraq on Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction Hard Lessons Chapter 3 The Department of Defense Takes Charge)

(Musings On Iraq review Iraq and Back, Inside The War To Win The Peace)

(Musings On Iraq Only 3 of 13 Reconstruction Contracts Were Signed Before War)

 

Jan 27 ORHA began contracting for supplies and personnel 2 months before invasion

(Musings On Iraq on Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction Hard Lessons Chapter 3 The Department of Defense Takes Charge)

 

Jan 28 ORHA head Garner met with NSC’s Zalimay who said goal of postwar Iraq should

be getting Iraqis to govern as soon as possible

(Musings On Iraq on Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction Hard Lessons Chapter 3 The Department of Defense Takes Charge)

(Musings On Iraq review State of Denial, Bush At War, Part III)

 

Jan 29 Aid groups warned that if Pentagon ran postwar Iraq many international donors

            would be reluctant to give relief

(Musings On Iraq review Losing Iraq, Inside The Post War Reconstruction Fiasco)

 

Jan 30 Aid group warned that breakdown of law and order likely right after Iraq invasion

            unless US immediately established control

 

Jan 31 Bush told Blair fighting between Iraqi factions would be unlikely after invasion

Jan 31 Blair’s advisers told him had to prioritize pushing Bush on postwar planning for

Iraq but Blair failed to do so

 

Feb 1 US Army War College study suggested 135 tasks US had to take care of

to ensure stability of postwar Iraq Said US would have to occupy Iraq for a long time and building democracy a huge challenge

(Musings On Iraq Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction’s “Hard Lessons” – Part I: Planning for Postwar Iraq September 2001 to May 2003)

(Musings On Iraq review Iraq’s Future The aftermath of regime change)

 

Feb 5 3rd meeting of US UK Australia on postwar Iraq planning US rejected any role for UN

 

Feb 6 Pentagon memo on postwar Iraq justice system said US needed to deploy 4,000 police

or 3,000 international police to assure law and order Said military had no plans for that Asked if US was going to train a new Iraqi police force Estimated that would cost $700 mil the first year Asked if that money was available

(Musings On Iraq review Leap of Faith, Hubris Negligence, and America’s Greatest

Foreign Policy Tragedy)

(Musings On Iraq interview w/fmr police adv Jerry Burke on failure to plan for security postwar Iraq)

 

Feb 7 State Dept memo warned of serious problems in postwar Iraq and possible security

vacuum after war Were told military couldn't spare troops to ensure security

 

Feb 9 Pentagon memo said that there would be security vacuum after invasion leading to

disorder Said civilians at Pentagon expected military to come up with troops to preserve order but military wanted troops for other tasks Memo was rejected by CENTCOM that said war plan was to get to Baghdad and couldn’t leave troops behind to maintain order

 

Feb 11 Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Feith and State Dept’s Grossman testified to

Senate Foreign Relations Committee on postwar Iraq plans Didn’t give any details Grossman said US would only stay in Iraq as long as necessary Would go through 4 phases to postwar Iraq 1st stability 2nd handing authority to Iraqis 3rd New constitution 4th electing new Iraqi govt Told Senate US would not create a govt in exile before invasion Committees would be formed to create new Iraq Iraqi institutions would still be running to help govern country Feith said Iraqi oil would pay for all reconstruction and running govt Said US would not impose any leaders or govt on Iraq

(Musings On Iraq on Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction Hard Lessons Chapter 3 The Department of Defense Takes Charge)

(Musings On Iraq Iraq Oil Would Pay For Reconstruction)

(Musings On Iraq review State of Denial, Bush At War, Part III)

(Musings On Iraq review Hard Lessons, The Iraq Reconstruction Experience)

(Musings On Iraq review Leap of Faith, Hubris Negligence, and America’s Greatest Foreign

Policy Tragedy)

Feb 11 Former CENTCOM commander Gen Zinni testified to Senate Said U.S. had to

maintain law and order peacekeeping civil unrest had to be stopped and prevent revenge develop local police

 

Feb 13 CENTCOM Cmdr Gen Franks told Bush he had Iraqi mayors for each city to run

            things after invasion He didn’t

(Musings On Iraq on Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction Hard Lessons Chapter 3 The Department of Defense Takes Charge)

 

Feb 14 Rumsfeld gave speech that U.S. was opposed to nation building in Iraq

(Musings On Iraq review Liberate And Leave, Fatal Flaws In The Early Strategy For Postwar Iraq)

(Musings On Iraq review Leap of Faith, Hubris Negligence, and America’s Greatest Foreign

Policy Tragedy)

(Musings On Iraq on Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction Hard Lessons Chapter 3 The Department of Defense Takes Charge)

 

Feb 19 ORHA head Garner briefed Natl Sec Adv Rice to use Iraqi army and police to

            help rebuilding Iraq after war

(Musings On Iraq on Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction Hard Lessons Chapter 3 The Department of Defense Takes Charge)

 

Feb 21 ORHA staff met in DC to have run through their Iraq postwar plans

(Musings On Iraq on Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction Hard Lessons Chapter 3 The Department of Defense Takes Charge)

 

Feb 22 ORHA drill found US would not have enough troops for Iraq postwar security Was

worried not enough funding for postwar Iraq that could leave behind unstable country ORHA found US had no plans for what kind of govt they wanted in Iraq and how to achieve it ORHA Dep Head thought US had faulty assumptions overly optimistic lacked reality on what postwar Iraq would be like

(Musings On Iraq on Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction Hard Lessons Chapter 3 The Department of Defense Takes Charge)

(Musings On Iraq review State of Denial, Bush At War, Part III)

(Musings On Iraq review Hard Lessons, The Iraq Reconstruction Experience)

 

Feb 24 NSC meeting on Iraq oil sector Said US should not determine industry Went over

rebuilding and getting sector back on line after war Bush told NSC important to get Iraqis to be seen running oil sector after war Bush also worried about oil shocks due to invasion Saudis said they would handle prices

(Musings On Iraq on Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction Hard Lessons Chapter 2 The Agencies Engage)

Feb 24 US outlined general humanitarian relief plan for postwar Iraq including finances

            and implementation

(Musings On Iraq on Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction Hard Lessons Chapter 3 The Department of Defense Takes Charge)

 

Feb 25 Army chief Gen Shinseki told Senate US needed several hundred thousand troops to

            successfully occupy Iraq

Feb 25 Blair told CENTCOM commander Gen Franks UN had to play a major role in

postwar Iraq

Feb 25 Gen Franks told UK commander Adm Boyce US not thinking of WWII type

Japanese or German rebuilding effort in Iraq

(Musings On Iraq on Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction Hard Lessons Chapter 3 The Department of Defense Takes Charge)

 

Feb 27 Deputy Defense Secretary Wolfowtiz told House Comm admin had no estimates of

costs of reconstructing Iraq and wouldn’t know until it got there Said calls for more troops to handle postwar Iraq were “outlandish” Said crazy to think postwar Iraq would take more troops than invasion Said Iraqis would greet US as liberators and that meant didn’t need more troops Said there would be large numbers of Free Iraqi Forces to restore order Said Iraq had no history of ethnic violence like in Bosnia that required long term peace keepers

(Musings On Iraq review Leap of Faith, Hubris Negligence, and America’s Greatest Foreign

Policy Tragedy)

(Musings On Iraq review Fiasco: The American Military Adventure In Iraq)

(Musings On Iraq review Hard Lessons, The Iraq Reconstruction Experience)

Feb 27 ORHA head Garner learned he only had $27 mil to run postwar Iraq

(Musings On Iraq on Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction Hard Lessons Chapter 3 The Department of Defense Takes Charge)

 

Feb 26 Bush speech at American Enterprise Institute Said US had experience in stability

operations and putting reformers in power Said other nations would help rebuild Iraq and US would stay in Iraq as long as necessary but “not a day more” Said spreading democracy to Iraq would be an inspiration to Middle East

(Musings On Iraq review Iraq’s Future The aftermath of regime change)

(Musings On Iraq review Wanting War: Why the Bush Administration Invaded Iraq)

(Musings On Iraq review Fiasco: The American Military Adventure In Iraq)

(Musings On Iraq review Hard Lessons, The Iraq Reconstruction Experience)

 

Feb 28 ORHA head Garner made 1st brief of postwar Iraq plans to Bush 1 month before war

(Musings On Iraq on Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction Hard Lessons Chapter 3 The Department of Defense Takes Charge)

Feb 28 Defense Policy Board warned by peacekeeping expert Perito could be

breakdown in law order right after invasion if Iraqi police didn’t go back to work Said that US troops could not take over police duties because not trained for that job

 

Mar 1 1st high level US meeting on creating Iraqi interim govt held just days before

invasion Undersecretary of Defense Feith said US would set up an Iraqi authority as soon as possible and would pick the members with majority being exiles because they would understand democracy better

(Musings On Iraq review Leap of Faith, Hubris Negligence, and America’s Greatest Foreign

Policy Tragedy)

(Musings On Iraq review State of Denial, Bush At War, Part III)

(Musings On Iraq review Hard Lessons, The Iraq Reconstruction Experience)

 

Mar 3 ORHA head Garner went to UN to try to get support for postwar Iraq UN said no

Garner’s move was against administration policy that opposed any role for UN in Iraq which was why it said no

Mar 3 US memo on setting up an Iraqi interim govt after invasion Said that Iraqi govt had

to promise equal rights to citizens, ban Baath party, deBaathify security forces

(Musings On Iraq review Hard Lessons, The Iraq Reconstruction Experience)

 

Mar 4 Undersecretary of Defense for Policy Feith briefed Bush and NSC on Pentagon’s

postwar plans Goals were to maintain integrity of Iraq improves living standards create a democracy destroy WMD fight war on terror get international support for rebuilding gain support of Iraqis get Iraqis to rule as quickly as possible to accomplish all tasks quickly Had no strategy on how to achieve goals

(Musings On Iraq Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction’s “Hard Lessons” – Part I: Planning for Postwar Iraq September 2001 to May 2003)

(Musings On Iraq on Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction Hard Lessons Chapter 3 The Department of Defense Takes Charge)

(Musings On Iraq review Hard Lessons, The Iraq Reconstruction Experience)

(Musings On Iraq review Iraq’s Future The aftermath of regime change)

(Musings On Iraq review Fiasco: The American Military Adventure In Iraq)

(Musings On Iraq review Leap of Faith, Hubris Negligence, and America’s Greatest Foreign

Policy Tragedy)

(Musings On Iraq review State of Denial, Bush At War, Part III)

 

Mar 5 ORHA head Garner got ok from Rice to use frozen Iraqi assets to pay for postwar

Plans He told Rice he didn’t think there would be enough troops to maintain security after invasion When asked if the White House had put together any plans for a post-Saddam govt he got no answer

 

Mar 7 2nd high level US meeting on creating an interim Iraqi authority after invasion held

just days before war

(Musings On Iraq review Leap of Faith, Hubris Negligence, and America’s Greatest Foreign

Policy Tragedy)

(Musings On Iraq review State of Denial, Bush At War, Part III)

(Musings On Iraq review Hard Lessons, The Iraq Reconstruction Experience)

 

Mar 10 ORHA head Garner briefed Bush on postwar Iraq plans including using Iraqi army

for reconstruction and interim govt Said would only remove top Baath leadership Bush approved plans

(Musings On Iraq review Hard Lessons, The Iraq Reconstruction Experience)

(Musings On Iraq review The Endgame, The Inside Story of the Struggle for Iraq, from

George W. Bush to Barack Obama)

Mar 10 NSC briefed on postwar Iraq plans Included excluding 25,000 top Baathists from

govt Prosecuting Iraqi war criminals Discussed truth and reconciliation commission Using Iraqi courts and police Establishing law and order Bush said US needed to get Iraqis running new govt and US would not pick new Iraqi leaders Powell said US had to get a new UN resolution for the US led interim administration in postwar Iraq US Treasury Sec Snow said that US dollars could be used as interim currency in Iraq until new dinar created Bush approved light deBaathification after war Using dollars as temporary currency in Iraq Retaining Iraqi police

Mar 10 Gen Franks told White House mayors would be appointed to run Iraq after

            invasion Was not in any postwar plans

(Musings On Iraq on Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction Hard Lessons Chapter 3 The Department of Defense Takes Charge)

 

Mar 11 Bush and NSC met Agreed to keep Iraqi police

Mar 11 ORHA head Garner told press US would keep Iraqi army and would quickly

turn over control of country to Iraqis When asked Garner dismissed talk of US turning over power to Chalabi and INC

(Musings On Iraq review Leap of Faith, Hubris Negligence, and America’s Greatest Foreign

Policy Tragedy)

(Musings On Iraq review The Endgame, The Inside Story of the Struggle for Iraq, from

George W. Bush to Barack Obama)

(Musings On Iraq review Hard Lessons, The Iraq Reconstruction Experience)

Mar 11 After press conference Deputy Defense Secretary Wolfowitz and Under Secretary of

            Defense for Policy Feith chastised Garner for his comments about Chalabi

Mar 11 Garner was later told by Pentagon he could no longer give press conferences

Mar 11 National Security Advisor Rice issued memo on postwar Iraq plans Said interim

Iraqi authority consisting of Iraqis Kurds and exiles would be formed followed by meeting in Baghdad to bring in more Iraqis like what happened in Afghanistan Included previous NSC decisions on oil and currency

(Musings On Iraq Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction’s “Hard Lessons” – Part I: Planning for Postwar Iraq September 2001 to May 2003)

(Musings On Iraq review State of Denial, Bush At War, Part III)

 

Mar 12 Bush endorsed Pentagon plan for quick transition to Iraqi authority made up of

            exiles and Kurds after war

(Musings On Iraq review Leap of Faith, Hubris Negligence, and America’s Greatest Foreign

Policy Tragedy)

(Musings On Iraq review State of Denial, Bush At War, Part III)

(Musings On Iraq review Hard Lessons, The Iraq Reconstruction Experience)

Mar 12 Undersecretary of Defense for Policy Feith briefed NSC on postwar plans for Iraq’s

Foreign Ministry military and intelligence services Said Foreign Ministry and embassies needed to be purged of top Baathists and intelligence officers Wanted to disband intelligence agencies Special Republican Guard Republican Guard State Security Office and militias Wanted to reduce military to just 3-5 army divisions

(Musings On Iraq Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction’s “Hard Lessons” – Part I: Planning for Postwar Iraq September 2001 to May 2003)

 

Mar 13 USAID official told aid groups Iraq war would be quick Needs would be met Iraqis

            would regain control US would be out in a year

(Musings On Iraq on Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction Hard Lessons Chapter 2 The Agencies Engage)

 

Mar 14 Rumsfeld told ORHA head Garner he was going to pick all the advisers that were

going to run Iraqi ministries

(Musings On Iraq on Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction Hard Lessons Chapter 3 The Department of Defense Takes Charge)

(Musings On Iraq Special Inspector General For Iraq Reconstruction Hard Lessons Chapter 4 Staging in Kuwait)

(Musings On Iraq review State of Denial, Bush At War, Part III)

(Musings On Iraq review Leap of Faith, Hubris Negligence, and America’s Greatest Foreign

Policy Tragedy)

 

Mar 15 ORHA head Garner told Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld plan was only to dismiss

top two officials from each Iraqi ministry and not carry out any deBaathification policy Rumsfeld okayed plan

Mar 15 Rumsfeld complained Garner picked non-Pentagon people to run some Iraqi

            ministries Wanted them all from Defense

(Musings On Iraq on Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction Hard Lessons Chapter 3 The Department of Defense Takes Charge)

(Musings On Iraq review State of Denial, Bush At War, Part III)

 

Mar 16 VP Cheney told NBC that Americans would be greeted as liberators in Iraq

(Musings On Iraq review Fiasco: The American Military Adventure In Iraq)

(Musings On Iraq review Hard Lessons, The Iraq Reconstruction Experience)

Mar 16 Cheney said that Army Chief of Staff Gen Shinseki wrong that US would need

            more troops to occupy Iraq than invade

 

Mar 17 On flight to Kuwait ORHA head Garner met with his oil team Garner said he was

concerned Rumsfeld picked ex-Shell CEO Philip Carroll to join group Said was bad image wise to have an ex-US oil executive involved Oil teams said if Iraq’s oil sector was destroyed by war would need someone with standing of Carroll to deal with it

 

Mar 18 Joint Chief of Staff met to discuss withdrawal plans for post-invasion Iraq

 

Mar 19 Army Chief Gen Shinseki told Congress he couldn’t say how much rebuilding

Iraq would cost

 

Mar 20 ORHA staff went to CENTCOM in Qatar and found military had parallel

            post-war admin set up isolated from ORHA

(Musings On Iraq on Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction Hard Lessons Chapter 3 The Department of Defense Takes Charge)

(Musings On Iraq Special Inspector General For Iraq Reconstruction Hard Lessons Chapter 4 Staging in Kuwait)

(Musings On Iraq review Leap of Faith, Hubris Negligence, and America’s Greatest Foreign

Policy Tragedy)

(Musings On Iraq review Losing Iraq, Inside The Post War Reconstruction Fiasco)

(Musings On Iraq review Hard Lessons, The Iraq Reconstruction Experience)

 

Mar 21 Rice briefed Bush and NSC and all agreed on war goals democracy and put Iraqi

            face on occupation

(Musings On Iraq review Hard Lessons, The Iraq Reconstruction Experience)

(Musings On Iraq review Fiasco: The American Military Adventure In Iraq)

(Musings On Iraq review Iraq’s Future The aftermath of regime change)

(Musings On Iraq review Wanting War: Why the Bush Administration Invaded Iraq)

(Musings On Iraq review Leap of Faith, Hubris Negligence, and America’s Greatest

Foreign Policy Tragedy)

(Musings On Iraq review State of Denial, Bush At War, Part III)

(Musings On Iraq Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction’s “Hard Lessons” – Part I: Planning for Postwar Iraq September 2001 to May 2003)

 

Mar 22 Rumsfeld demanded that all Americans to run Iraqi ministries be from Pentagon

            ORHA head Garner said no time for replacements

(Musings On Iraq Special Inspector General For Iraq Reconstruction Hard Lessons Chapter 4 Staging in Kuwait)

(Musings On Iraq on Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction Hard Lessons Chapter 3 The Department of Defense Takes Charge)

(Musings On Iraq review State of Denial, Bush At War, Part III)

 

Mar 26 ORHA sent list of 16 sites that needed to be protected in Baghdad to US military

            HQ in Kuwait but was ignored

Mar 26 Rumsfeld told Garner he had some replacements for Americans going to run Iraq

            ministries Wanted them all from Pentagon

(Musings On Iraq on Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction Hard Lessons Chapter 3 The Department of Defense Takes Charge)

(Musings On Iraq review State of Denial, Bush At War, Part III)

 

Mar 27 ORHA had meeting of all 4 postwar groups to come up with unified plan for Iraq

Didn’t happen The 4 groups had all been created separately within Bush administration with no coordination between them

(Musings On Iraq on Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction Hard Lessons Chapter 3 The Department of Defense Takes Charge)

(Musings On Iraq Special Inspector General For Iraq Reconstruction Hard Lessons Chapter 4 Staging in Kuwait)

(Musings On Iraq review Leap of Faith, Hubris Negligence, and America’s Greatest Foreign

Policy Tragedy)

(Musings On Iraq review Losing Iraq, Inside The Post War Reconstruction Fiasco)

(Musings On Iraq review Iraq’s Dysfunctional Democracy)

(Musings On Iraq review Hard Lessons, The Iraq Reconstruction Experience)

Mar 27 Deputy Secretary of Defense Wolfowitz told House of Representatives committee

Iraq oil would pay for reconstruction

(Musings On Iraq Iraq Oil Would Pay For Reconstruction)

 

Mar 30 Pentagon memo on creating an Iraqi authority after war Said had to be friendly to

the US Had to end Sunni rule Wanted rule of law individual liberty representative govt private enterprise Didn’t say how that was to be achieved

(Musings On Iraq review Leap of Faith, Hubris Negligence, and America’s Greatest Foreign Policy Tragedy)

(Musings On Iraq review State of Denial, Bush At War, Part III)

(Musings On Iraq review The Endgame, The Inside Story of the Struggle for Iraq, from

George W. Bush to Barack Obama)

(Musings On Iraq review Hard Lessons, The Iraq Reconstruction Experience)

 

Mar 31 Def Sec Rumsfeld memo said important to create Iraqi interim authority as quickly

as possible so Iraqis were in power Had to pick pro-US Iraqis Said exiles could be core for new authority because they supported US goals in Iraq

(Musings On Iraq review Leap of Faith, Hubris Negligence, and America’s Greatest Foreign

Policy Tragedy)

(Musings On Iraq review State of Denial, Bush At War, Part III)

(Musings On Iraq review The Endgame, The Inside Story of the Struggle for Iraq, from

George W. Bush to Barack Obama)

(Musings On Iraq review Hard Lessons, The Iraq Reconstruction Experience)

Mar 31 Def Sec Rumsfeld memo to Bush said interim Iraqi authority was important to

convince Iraqis they not the US was going to run the country Said had to create one immediately

 

Apr 8 Bush said UN would play crucial role in creating an interim Iraqi govt

Apr 8 Rumsfeld had meeting to find replacement for ORHA head Garner for new

presidential envoy to Iraq

 

Apr 12 Head of CENTCOM postwar planning Col Benson briefed Gen Webster Deputy

Commander US ground forces in Iraq on revised plans Said would be resistance by former regime elements after war sectarian violence revenge ethnic cleaning Warned foreign jihadists would start coming to Iraq Predicted US occupation would last 3-5 years

 

Sep 9 Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Feith said Pentagon prepared for all kinds of

contingencies for postwar Iraq but they never happened

(Musings On Iraq review Hard Lessons, The Iraq Reconstruction Experience)

 

2005

 

Mar 31 RAND study showed post-war planning for Iraq was inadequate and never

            considered security of Iraqi public

(Musings On Iraq review Hard Lessons, The Iraq Reconstruction Experience)

 

2007

 

Mar 22 Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction issued review US reconstruction

Said Pentagon had no strategy before and after invasion No unity of effort Little oversight and coordination between US agencies

(Musings On Iraq review Losing Iraq, Inside The Post War Reconstruction Fiasco)

(Musings On Iraq review State of Denial, Bush At War, Part III)

(Musings On Iraq review Hard Lessons, The Iraq Reconstruction Experience)

 

Sep 2 UK Gen Cross said he raised concerns about postwar planning with Sec Def Rumsfeld

who dismissed warnings Told Rumsfeld reconstruction should be internationalized and said more troops needed Said US war plan fatally flawed

(Musings On Iraq review Fiasco: The American Military Adventure In Iraq)

 

2008

 

Jul 1 Report US didn’t have people or plans for postwar Iraq Chaos that ensued set conditions

for insurgency Were many groups working on postwar plans but few made it into the war plans Top officials had best case scenario for postwar Iraq which overrode plans for bad situations Almost all planning went to war as a result Gen Franks only cared about war which made accomplishing postwar goals harder NSC provided no strategy despite multiple requests Left each agency to carry out individual plans Meant no coordination of planning NSC never mediated between Defense and State Pentagon given control of postwar plans but cared about war more Created ORHA to run Iraq only 8 weeks before invasion but didn’t have expertise or personnel to run it Problems lasted postwar State Dept’s Future of Iraq Project was not a postwar plan

(Musings On Iraq review Hard Lessons, The Iraq Reconstruction Experience)

 

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This Day In Iraqi History - Jan 17

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