Iraq's Oil Exports And Revenue Continue To Climb In 2011

Iraq's Oil Ministry recently released its figures for February's oil exports and profits in January 2011. The Kurds were allowed to sell their petroleum to foreign markets again, boosting exports, while the crisis in Libya increased prices. Both resulted in jumps in production and revenue for Iraq.

In the last two months, the Oil Ministry has achieved the highest levels of exports since the fall of Saddam Hussein. In February, the country exported an average of 2.202 million barrels a day. That was an increase from 2.161 million barrels a day recorded in January. Both of those months surpassed the previous high mark of 2.05 million barrels a day achieved in February 2010. As usual, the bulk of Iraq's production flowed to the southern port of Basra where an average of 1.708 million barrels a day was pumped into tanker ships. The northern pipeline to Turkey exported an average of 484,000 barrels a day. That included an average of 80,000 barrels a day from Kurdistan. An additional 10,000 barrels a day were trucked to Jordan. These achievements were largely the result of foreign oil deals signed in 2009. International companies have finally started working in southern Iraq where the bulk of Iraq's oilfields reside, and raised output.

Iraqi Oil Exports January 2010-February 2011 (Avg. million barrels per day)
2010
Jan. 1.92 
Feb. 2.05
Mar. 1.84
Apr. 1.80
May 1.88
Jun. 1.86
Jul. 1.82
Aug. 1.82
Sep. 2.02
Oct. 1.91
Nov. 1.92
Dec. 1.95
2011
Jan. 2.16
Feb. 2.20

Iraq has also benefited from the recent sharp increase in global oil prices. In January 2011, the country earned $6.082 billion. The average price for a barrel of Iraqi crude sold for $90.78. Only partial figures for February have been released so far, but the Oil Ministry did say that Iraq earned another $6 billion last month, while prices had soared to around $97-$98 a barrel. In comparison, in December 2010 Iraq earned $5.222 billion, while selling oil for an average of $86.31 per barrel. Political instability in Libya, which has cut its petroleum production in half, and the waves of protests hitting North Africa and the Middle East have been responsible for the sharp rise in prices. This looks to continue for the next several months until the situation is resolved, making Iraq an unintended beneficiary of other countries' instability.

Iraqi Oil Production & Earnings January 2010-January 2011

Month	Total Production (Mil/Bar)	Revenue	Avg. Price Per Barrel
Jan. 2010	59.7	$4.441 bil	$73.97
Feb.	57.9	$4.229 bil	$73.04
Mar.	57.1	$4.351 bil	$76.20
Apr.	53.0	$4.222 bil	$79.66
May	58.7	$4.335 bil	$73.85
Jun.	54.7	$3.889 bil	$71.10
Jul.	56.3	$4.009 bil	$71.21
Aug.	55.4	$3.957 bil	$71.43
Sep.	60.6	$4.428 bil	$73.07
Oct.	58.7	$4.526 bil	$77.10
Nov.	57.3	$4.618 bil	$80.59
Dec.	60.5	$5.222 bil	$86.31
Jan. 2011	67.0	$6.082 bil	$90.78

Iraq looks like it will be benefiting from both rising prices and output for at least the near term. Oil production has been largely stagnant since 2008. Now foreign companies' investments have finally started paying off. That couldn't come at a better time as international petroleum prices are reaching new highs after bottoming out during the world recession. The question now becomes whether Baghdad will wisely spend these new found riches, or will it waste it or not even get around to appropriating it as has happened in every year since sovereignty was returned in 2005.

SOURCES

AFP, Bloomberg, SOMO, "Iraq Oil Exports Up Again in January," Iraq Business news, 2/27/11

Agence France Presse, "Iraq oil exports highest since Saddam: ministry," 2/23/11

Associated Press, "Iraq's February oil export highest since invasion," 3/1/11

Iraq Business News, "Iraq Oil Exports: 2011 Volume Down, Revenue Up," 1/27/11

Tensions Rise In Iraq’s Kirkuk Over Protests And The Peshmerga

A new deployment of Kurdish peshmerga outside of Kirkuk has set off tensions between Iraq’s Kurds, Arabs, and Turkmen. During national protests peshmerga were sent to just outside of the city. While security against terrorists was the official reason for their presence, they were actually deployed to help quell demonstrations. Since then Arab and Turkmen politicians in Kirkuk have demanded that they leave, while Baghdad has sided with the Kurds.

On February 23, 2011, Kurdish politicians in Tamim claimed that they had evidence of plots against Kurds in the province. A Kurdish parliamentarian said that the Arab Council, a tribal group, planned on attacking the Kurdish Asayesh, government offices, and police stations run by Kurds. Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki was also worried about the upcoming Day of Rage protests planned across the country, and requested 1,000 peshmerga to be deployed to the west of Kirkuk on February 25 as a result. The matter was discussed with the governor of Tamim, and welcomed by the United States military. Provincial and national leaders were obviously nervous about what might happen during the demonstrations.

(Asia Times)

On the 25th there were three protests in the governorate, all of which turned violent. In Kirkuk, mostly Arabs with a few Turkmen turned out. They called for better services, the end of Article 140 that sets up a process for the Kurds to annex the disputed territories in northern Iraq, more jobs, and to fight corruption. The Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) warned Kurds not to participate. Protesters ended up storming a police station and the governor’s offices, which led the security forces to fire shots to disperse them. Three people ended up dying, and ten policemen were wounded. A curfew was imposed immediately afterward. Protests also occurred in Riyadh, where the city council and municipal offices were set on fire, and Hawija where the crowd held pictures of Saddam Hussein and waved the old Iraqi flag. Police opened fire in Hawija as the masses moved towards the town hall, leading to three deaths, and fifteen being wounded. Similar events happened across the country that day in nine other provinces and fifteen different cities. 

In the following days the PUK and KDP condemned the Day of Rage in Tamim. They claimed that the Arab Council was trying to exploit the demonstrations for their own ends, condemned the attacks upon government buildings and the pictures of Saddam shown in Hawija, and went as far as to accuse the people of trying to stage a coup. The Kurdish Peshmerga Minister also noted that his forces were going to stay in the governorate until it was stable, meaning free of protests. The ruling Kurdish parties were already facing growing protests in Sulaymaniya, and were now confronted with angry Arabs and Turkmen in Tamim. If they grew in intensity, they could disrupt the fragile status quo between Kurds, Arabs, and Turkmen in the governorate.

Arabs and Turkmen responded by attacking the new peshmerga presence outside Kirkuk. Arab members of the provincial council called for the Kurdish forces to withdraw on February 26. On March 1, the Iraqi Turkmen Front made the same demand, saying that the peshmerga were illegally in the area. They too were worried that an increased peshmerga presence in Tamim would be a step towards greater Kurdish control there.

Baghdad came down on the side of the Kurds, showing that the protests had scared all those in power. The Deputy Interior Minister condemned the Day of Rage as a coup attempt as well, parroting the KDP and PUK. He mentioned Tamim as one province where protesters were trying to undermine the political process, and criticized the Arab leaders in Kirkuk who called for the peshmerga to withdraw. In turn, he blamed the Day of Rage for the peshmerga being deployed to Tamim in the first place, and that they were only there to help with security. Maliki has increasingly attacked the motivations of the protesters, and tried to limit their scope by using the army and police. Like the PUK and KDP, the premier is worried about the consequences of growing demonstrations.

The 1,000 peshmerga in Tamim has upset the balance within the governorate. Previously, the Kurdish forces were only north of Kirkuk, while the Iraqi army was in the south. Now there are peshmerga to the west of Kirkuk as well. National leaders such as Prime Minister Maliki and Kurdish President Massoud Barzani support the new move out of fear that the protests might challenge their power. Local Arabs and Turkmen however, are afraid that the peshmerga may stay, providing greater Kurdish control over the province, and another step towards annexing Kirkuk and other disputed areas of Tamim to Kurdistan. The new Kurdish forces are probably only in the area as long as there are threats of demonstrations. The arguments they have caused however, show the tensions that exist in the province between the three main ethnic groups that result from the disputed territories. They also display how those in power have found common cause in putting down demonstrations. This intersection of local and national concerns has always been present in Tamim, and this is just the latest example.

SOURCES

Ahmed, Hevidar, “Minister rejects U.S. demand for Kurdish troops’ withdrawal from Kirkuk,” AK News, 3/4/11

AK News, “Peshmerga forces protect Kirkuk,” 3/3/11

Aswat al-Iraq, “Iraq’s Turkoman Front demands Kurdish Peshmerga forces withdrawal from Kirkuk:,” 3/1/11
- “Kurdish Peshmerga Minister denies his forces entered Kirkuk,” 2/28/11
- “Peshmerga forces stationed near Kirkuk,” 2/26/11
- “Two wounded demonstrators die in Tikrit, hundreds demonstrate in Balad city:,” 2/26/11

Davis, Aaron, “In Kirkuk, a test of U.S. peacekeepers’ lasting impact,” Washington Post, 2/8/11

Hamad, Qassim Khidhir, “ethnic division makes any protest suspicious,” Niqash, 3/2/11

Hameed, Leila, “Protesters control part of Kirkuk,” AK News, 2/26/11

Horami, Sirwa, “Kurdish ruling parties news statement on Kirkuk,” AK News, 2/27/11

Karim, Karzan, “Interior official: Recent demos were coups against Iraqi govt.,” AK News, 3/1/11

McCrummen, Stephanie, “13 killed in Iraq’s ‘Day of Rage’ protests,” Washington Post, 2/25/11
- “23 killed in Iraq’s ‘Day of Rage,’” Washington Post, 2/25/11

Rostam, Nabaz, “Second curfew imposed in Kirkuk,” AK News, 3/1/11

Salaheddin, Sinan, “6 killed in as Iraqis protest in ‘Day of Rage,’” Associated Press, 2/25/11

AL MOWATEN NEWS CARTOON: We Demand An Incease In Parliamentarians' Salaries And Benefits!

"The Iraqi people under the poverty level… food rationing gone, prices on fire, no electricity, no public services, nonexistent security, smuggling. Our first demand... We demand an increase in parliamentarians' salaries and benefits!" Source: Al Mowaten News via MEMRI Blog, 3/3/11

Iraq Deaths Continue To Fluctuate Up And Down Each Month

Deaths in Iraq have continually fluctuated up and down since January 2009. The last twelve months have been no different. In February 2011 Iraq Body Count reported a tentative 254 killed, icasualties had 216, and for a change, Iraq’s ministries had the lowest amount at 167. That averaged out to 212 casualties for the month, and 7.5 deaths per day. That was a drop from January when an average of 285 were killed, and the third lowest average in the last year. The other two lows were in December 2010 when an average of 165 were killed, and November with 215.

Last 12 Months Iraqi Death Counts And Averages

	Iraq Body Count	Icasualties	Iraqi Ministries	Avg. Monthly Deaths	Avg. Daily Deaths
Mar.10	334	183	367	294	9.5
Apr.	380	259	328	322	10.7
May	377	279	337	331	10.6
Jun.	368	176	284	276	9.2
Jul.	430	534	535	499	16.1
Aug.	517	363	426	435	14.0
Sep.	252	174	273	233	7.7
Oct.	311	185	293	263	8.4
Nov.	300	174	171	215	7.1
Dec.	217	128	151	165	5.3
Jan. 11	388	210	259	285	9.2
Feb.	254	216	167	212	7.5

 February was characterized by a series of small security incidents. February 12 was the deadliest day of the month with 48 killed and 80 wounded when a suicide bomber attacked a bus stop in Samarra, Salahaddin aimed at Shiite pilgrims. Most other days had a series of small explosions and shootings that only took a few lives each as is the norm for security incidents in the country.

Overall, February represented just the latest dip in casualties in Iraq. 2010 actually saw a small increase in daily casualties reaching a high point in July and August when insurgents launched a series of high profile, mass casualty attacks to attract media attention. Since then deaths have been in a steady decline, with a small surge in January when militants struck Shiite pilgrims and Iraqi security forces. Anti-government forces obviously do not have the means or wherewithal to do much else these days. They look for targets of opportunity such as Shiite pilgrims traveling throughout the county, security forces at a checkpoint, or people standing in line to get paid or applying for jobs. These incidents pose no threat to the Iraqi government, and gain few supporters within the country, but they are persistent and cost hundreds of lives each month. Until there is another change in the status quo, this level of violence will unfortunately continue into the near future.

SOURCES

Icasualties

Iraq Body Count

Reuters, “Iraq has fewer violent deaths in February,” 3/1/11

New Example Of Financial Mismanagement In Iraq

Back in September 2010 the United States Government Accountability Office (GAO) released a report on Iraq’s budget to see whether the country had a surplus or not. The GAO found that the Iraqi government’s financial records were such a wreck that it didn’t know how much it spent each year, or even how much it had in the bank. In mid-February 2011 Speaker of Parliament Osama Nujafi gave the latest example of this problem when he announced that $30-$40 billion was missing from the Development Fund for Iraq (DFI).

On February 21, 2011 Speaker Nujafi said that $40 billion from the Development Fund for Iraq (DFI) could not be found. The next day he changed the figure to $34 billion. Two parliamentary committees were going to be created to look into the matter. Nujafi stated that he didn’t know whether the money had been spent or not. A member of the Kurdistan Coalition later claimed that the funds had in fact been used by the Finance Ministry with the approval of Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki. The DFI was created in 2003 to handle Iraq’s oil and gas revenues, which were under United Nations control since sanctions were applied in 1990 for Saddam Hussein’s invasion of Kuwait.

Some of the billions of dollars could’ve been stolen, but more likely it was just another instance of Baghdad not keeping track of its finances. As the GAO found, each fiscal year the government not only has money from the budget to spend, but additional billions of dollars in advances, which cannot be completely accounted for. The Finance Ministry also deposits its money in state run banks like the Central Bank of Iraq. Those institutions don’t have good record keeping either. That means the $30-$40 billion reported missing by Speaker Nujafi could’ve been spent or it’s sitting in a bank or a mixture of both. Hopefully most of it was expended, but there’s simply no way of telling due to the backward state of Iraq’s bureaucracy.

SOURCES

Agence France Presse, “$40 billion ‘missing’ from Iraq accounts,” 2/21/11

Al-Jawari, Fulaih, “Nujaifi orders investigation into $34m development fund expenditures,” AK News, 2/22/11

United States Government Accountability Office, “Iraqi-U.S. Cost-Sharing Iraq Has a Cumulative Budget Surplus, Offering the Potential for Further Cost-Sharing,” September 2010

Amnesty International Finds Abuse Going On In Iraq With Impunity

In February 2011, Amnesty International (AI) released, “Broken Bodies, Tortured Minds, Abuse And Neglect Of Detainees In Iraq.” Amnesty reported that torture and abuse were common in Iraq under Saddam Hussein, and that similar conditions continue to exist to this day. Since 2004, prisoners have been systematically tortured, and AI believes that will persist into the future with nothing being done about it.

The insurgency that took off shortly after the 2003 U.S. invasion led government forces to conduct arbitrary arrests, hold prisoners without charges and trials, and abuse and torture suspects. Some have been held incommunicado, and some have been placed in secret prisons. In April 2010 for example, a secret detention facility was discovered in Muthanna Airport in Baghdad, with many prisoners having been tortured. In January and February 2011, the Los Angeles Times, and Human Rights Watch revealed abuses at Camp Honor and Camp Justice in Baghdad. Cases like these have gone on with impunity despite official announcements that investigations were being created to look into them. No results have ever been made public, and no one has ever been punished.

Iraqi officials are increasingly reporting these cases themselves. Iraq’s Human Rights Ministry’s 2009 annual report said it had received 509 allegations of torture by security forces. Amnesty believes the actual number is much higher. In May 2009, a delegation from parliament’s human rights committee visited Kadhimiya women’s prison in Baghdad, and heard two women say that they had been raped after their arrest. In June, prisoners at the Rusafa prison went on a hunger strike against mistreatment. A lawmaker claimed that 21 prisoners at that facility and in Diwaniya prison, had been raped. That same month, the human rights committee in Qadisiyah accused security forces of torturing prisoners. A video was also found from an Iraqi prison and posted on the internet that showed prisoners being whipped and shocked with electricity. Just when the Amnesty report was released, six security officials told Reuters that torture and abuse were on-going in Iraq. They said Islamist terrorist suspects got it the worse, especially those that bragged about their exploits. Reuters also reported that the Supreme Judiciary Council got more than 400 complaints last year from detainees or their families about mistreatment. Only 90 of hose cases were ever probed however. Again, despite these official reports and announcements, nothing has been done about the prisons, or the abuse.

Amnesty has received evidence of rape, threat of rape, beatings, electric shock, suspension by limbs, the use of drills, asphyxiation, taking off nails, and breaking limbs being applied to men, women, and children. The report included the story of Ramze Shihad Ahmed, a 68 year old man with dual Iraqi and English citizenship. He returned to Iraq to free his son. Upon his arrival, he was arrested, held incommunicado, tortured, and raped with a stick. He and his son were then beaten, suffocated, given electric shock to the genitals, and suspended by their ankles. Interrogators threatened to rape Ahmed’s wife in front of him, and told his son that he would be forced to rape his father if they didn’t admit to a series of killings. Both men ended up signing confessions.

The main cause of the abuse in Iraq is the criminal justice system, which relies upon confessions. Torture and abuse have been common ways to extract a confession both before and after 2003. Those are accepted in court even if there is clear evidence of abuse.

Baghdad Jail, 2009 (New York Times)

Even without all the abuses, Iraqi prisons and jails are known for being overcrowded and unhealthy. On May 12, 2010 around 100 prisoners were put into two vans that had a capacity of only 20 people each to be transferred from Camp Taji to Rusafa prison in Baghdad. The vans had no ventilation or windows, and when they arrived at their destination, 22 detainees collapsed, with seven later dying. On February 7, 2011 prisoners in Hillah went on a hunger strike. The prison they were in was built to hold 750, but had almost 1,600. Health problems and sickness are constant problems in prisons as well.

After Amnesty released “Broken Bodies, Tortured Minds,” Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s office denied its findings. It said such papers only hurt Iraq’s image, and said that that there were no secret prisons and stories of torture were untrue. That has been the general response by all three post-2003 Iraqi governments. When human rights groups accuse the authorities of mistreatment, they say nothing happened. When Iraqi officials complain about abuses, Baghdad says it will investigate, but then there’s no follow up. Both reflect the official neglect of this issue, and the tacit support of the use of these extreme tactics. As long as that is Baghdad’s stance, the mistreatment and overcrowding in the country’s jails and prisons will continue.

SOURCES

Amnesty International, “Broken Bodies, Tortured Minds, Abuse And Neglect Of Detainees In Iraq,” February 2011

Brosek, Raman, “Amnesty International report compromises Iraq’s credibility says PM advisor,” AK News, 2/10/11

Juhl, Bushra, “Lawyers lead anti-government protest in Baghdad,” Associated Press, 2/10/11

Al-Salhy, Suadad, “Torture common for Iraq prisoners: security sources,” Reuters, 2/8/11

Iraq’s Interior Ministry Finally Deals With Fake Bomb Detectors

Iraq’s three security ministries, Interior, Defense, and National Security, remain leaderless, and under the temporary control of Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, but one positive has emerged from this otherwise frustrating political stalemate. The Interior Ministry has returned several million dollars to the Finance Ministry, and a general has been arrested for the purchase of the bogus bomb detector wands.

In February 2011, the Interior Ministry finally took action on the ADE-651 bomb detectors that had been at the center of a controversy since they were first purchased in 2007. On February 2, the inspector general at the Interior Ministry announced that it was returning $20 million to the central government for buying the devices. The Ministry also said that senior officials had been sent to court for not revealing who was responsible for ordering the detectors. Then on February 12, the commander of the Ministry’s bomb squad, General Jihad al-Jabiri, was arrested for purchasing the devices. This was a dramatic change for the Ministry that had stuck by the bomb wands, and refused to persecute anyone for them.

Under Maliki’s previous administration, then Interior Minister Jawad Bolani stood by the ADE-651. He stopped prosecution of six officers charged with importing the bomb detectors, and blocked any further investigation into the matter in late-2010. The Ministry also stuck by the devices. General Jabiri for example, told the New York Times in November 2009 that the wands were effective and worked. This was despite repeated warnings by American forces that they didn’t, a similar announcement by the Ministry’s own inspector general in October 2010, and the British manufacturer being convicted of fraud that same year.

The bomb wands were first purchased in 2007 from the British company ATSC. The devices had no batteries, and were supposedly run by static electricity created by the operator walking in circles. The corporation claimed that they could detect guns, ammunition, drugs, human bodies, truffles, and contraband ivory. Such a description should have scared off any serious government official. Instead, Baghdad bought around 1,500 for $122 million.

Interior may not have a minister yet, but the clearing out of the old leadership has allowed it to finally deal with the bomb detectors. It took Interior four years to handle them despite nearly everyone saying they didn’t work. The purchase of the ADE-651 was a crime that not only wasted over one hundred million dollars, but also endangered millions of people as they were deployed throughout the country.

SOURCES

Dazzayi, Saman, “Iraqi Interior Ministry returns $20m to 2010 budget over explosive detector controversy,” AK News, 2/2/11

Nordland, Rod, “Iraq Swears by Bomb Detector U.S. Sees as Useless,” New York Times, 11/3/09

Reuters, “Iraq: Official Arrested in Connection With Bogus British Bomb Detectors,” Reuters, 2/17/11