Over 8,000 Killed In Iraq So Far In 2013

Iraq went through another brutal month in November 2013. Three of the four organizations that track deaths saw a slight decline from last month, but the figures were still high overall. Two of the groups have now surpassed 8,000 fatalities for the year. Most of the violence is due to Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) and its Soldiers’ Harvest campaign, but other militants are active as well contributing to the high number of killed. There are also increasing fears of retaliatory attacks by Shiites against Sunnis. That does not mean that Iraq is facing another civil war, but the insurgency has been re-born, and the current level of violence is likely to be the new norm.

November saw a slight decline in the number of people killed. Iraq Body Count (IBC) went from 1,095 deaths in October to 903 in November. The United Nations saw a more dramatic drop going from 979 in October to 695. Agence France Presse’s (AFP) numbers went in the same direction going from 743 to 692 in November. The Iraqi government released two separate figures. The Health and Defense Ministries said there were 948 killed, while the Interior Ministry had 1,121. The previous month Baghdad reported 964 deaths. While most of the organizations that tracked violence in Iraq saw a decrease in the number of dead violence was still extremely high. Both IBC and the the Iraqi government averaged over 30 deaths per day for the month, while the U.N. and AFP had over 20. During the summer the number of attacks and casualties took off and have been at a high level since then. The result is that Iraq Body Count has recorded 8,310 deaths so far this year, while the U.N. has 8,189. Those figures already surpass the individual totals for 2009, 2010 and 2011.

Deaths In Iraq 2003-2013

Month/Year	Iraq Body Count	Avg. Daily Deaths	Iraqi Ministries	Avg. Daily Deaths	United Nations	Avg. Daily Deaths	Agence France Presse	Avg. Daily Deaths
2003	4,675	19.0	-	-	-	-	-	-
2004	11,608	31.8l	11,313	30.99	-	-	-	-
2005	16,186	44.2	15,817	43.3	-	-	-	-
2006	29,144	79.8	32,622	89.3	34,452	94.3	-	-
2007	25,519	69.9	19,155	52.4	-	-	-	-
2008	9,839	26.9	9,046	24.7	11,536	31.6	-	-
2009	5,132	14.0	3,682	10.0	4,611	12.6	-	-
2010	4,109	11.2	3,949	10.8	4,855	13.3	-	-
2011	4,147	11.3	2,781	7.6	4,150	11.3	-	-
2012	4,573	12.5	2,174	5.9	3,878	10.6	1,531 (7 mo.)	7.1
Jan. 2013	357	11.5	177	5.7	319	10.2	246	7.9
Feb.	360	12.7	136	4.8	418	14.9	220	7.8
Mar.	400	12.7	163	5.2	456	14.7	271	8.7
Apr.	545	18.1	208	6.9	712	23.7	461	15.3
May	888	28.6	681	21.9	1,045	33.7	614	19.8
Jun.	659	21.9	240	8.0	761	25.3	452	15.0
Jul.	968	31.2	989	31.9	1,057	34.0	848	27.3
Aug.	915	29.5	365	11.7	804	25.9	693	22.3
Sep.	1,220	40.6	971	32.3	979	32.6	880	29.3
Oct.	1,095	35.3	964	31.0	979	31.5	743	23.9
Nov.	903	30.1	948/1,121	31.6/ 37.3	659	21.9	692	23.0
2013 Totals	8,310	24.7	5,842/ 6,015	17.3/ 17.8	8,189	24.4	6,120	18.2

Days With 30 Or More Fatalities Per Month In 2013, Iraq Body Count

January 2013 – 5 Total

1/3/13 – 34 killed

1/16/13 – 46 killed

1/17/13 – 31 killed

1/22/13 – 34 killed

1/23/13 – 46 killed

February 2013 – 3 Total

2/3/13 – 40 killed

2/8/13 – 38 killed

2/17/13 – 59 killed

March 2013 – 3 Total

3/14/13 – 34 killed

3/19/13 – 73 killed

3/29/13 – 30 killed

April 2013 – 7 Total

4/1/13 – 55 killed

4/6/13 – 34 killed

4/15/13 – 62 killed

4/18/13 – 30 killed

4/23/13 – 71 killed

4/24/13 – 32 killed

4/29/13 – 34 killed

May 2013 – 10 Total

5/1/13 – 31 killed

5/15/13 – 40 killed

5/17/13 – 93 killed

5/18/13 – 33 killed

5/20/13 – 134 killed

5/21/13 – 46 killed

5/27/13 – 81 killed

5/28/13 – 45 killed

5/29/13 – 35 killed

5/30/13 – 34 killed

June 2013 – 7 Total

6/10/13 61 killed

6/16/13 49 killed

6/18/13 39 killed

6/23/13 36 killed

6/24/13 46 killed

6/25/13 45 killed

6/27/13 34 killed

July 2013 – 14 Total

7/1/13 43 killed

7/2/13 59 killed

7/11/13 59 killed

7/12/13 49 killed

7/13/13 37 killed

7/14/13 66 killed

7/19/13 36 killed

7/20/13 80 killed

7/21/13 41 killed

7/23/13 38 killed

7/24/13 37 killed

7/25/13 48 killed

7/29/13 60 killed

7/30/13 50 killed

August 2013 – 11 Total

8/6/13 – 50 killed

8/7/13 – 34 killed

8/10/13 – 94 killed

8/12/13 – 37 killed

8/15/13 – 42 killed

8/20/13 – 34 killed

8/23/13 – 46 killed

8/25/13 – 55 killed

8/28/13 – 98 killed

8/29/13 – 41 killed

8/31/13 – 30 killed

September 2013 – 18 Total

9/1/13 73 killed

9/2/13 33 killed

9/3/13 87 killed

9/10/13 34 killed

9/11/13 57 killed

9/13/13 50 killed

9/14/13 54 killed

9/16/13 67 killed

9/17/13 50 killed

9/19/13 33 killed

9/20/13 33 killed

9/21/13 116 killed

9/22/13 39 killed

9/23/13 46 killed

9/25/13 47 killed

9/26/13 49 killed

9/29/13 85 killed

9/30/13 62 killed

October 2013 – 14 Total

10/5/13 100 killed

10/6/13 46 killed

10/7/13 59 killed

10/10/13 30 killed

10/12/13 41 killed

10/13/13 68 killed

10/17/13 69 killed

10/20/13 80 killed

10/23/13 74 killed

10/25/13 33 killed

10/26/13 30 killed

10/27/13 74 killed

10/30/13 39 killed

10/31/13 39 killed

November 2013 – 13 Total

11/4/13 – 50 killed

11/7/13 – 33 killed

11/13/13 – 39 killed

11/14/13 – 54 killed

11/17/13 – 48 killed

11/20/13 – 82 killed

11/21/13 – 58 killed

11/23/13 – 48 killed

11/25/13 – 38 killed

11/27/13 – 75 killed

11/28/13 – 38 killed

11/29/13 – 55 killed

11/30/13 – 30 killed

The general decline in the number of deaths was due to the up and down nature of violence seen last month. November was characterized by a few days of extreme death followed by ones of relative peace. There were a total of 13 days with 30 or more killed according to Iraq Body Count with November 20 being the bloodiest with 82 fatalities. On the other hand November 1, 9 and 16 only had 8 killed each, and November 19 saw 9. The U.N. believed this was due to fewer bombings being carried out, which tend to lead to a greater number of casualties. That’s not for a want of trying. Al Qaeda in Iraq launched its Soldiers’ Harvest campaign in July, which is aimed at taking and holding territory and attacking the Iraqi security forces. If there were fewer explosions in November it might have just been a period when AQI was reloading for the next wave of attacks, which has been seen throughout the year. Al Qaeda has also continued with its bombing of the south. On November 10 four car bombs went off in Basra and Diwaniya in Qadisiyah province wounding 15. Then on November 28 there were nine car bombs including one in Najaf, four in Babil in the cities of Imam, Qaryeh Asiriya, Hindiya, and Hillah, and two in Wasit’s Kut and Essaouria. Another bomb was discovered and dismantled in Dhi Qar’s Nasiriyah. In total, five were killed and 44 wounded that day. The goal is to hit Shiite cities and hopefully cause enough anger that people will attack Sunnis, and restart the sectarian war. There are already fears that might be happening. In July, after a suicide bombing of a funeral Shiites attacked Sunnis in Muqtadiya, Diyala causing several hundred families to flee. In September members of the Basra provincial council claimed that Sunnis were being targeted in Basra City, while the Sunni Endowment called for an investigation into some of its members being murdered and threats upon Sunni families in the governorate. A Basra police officer told the Associated Press that 17 Sunnis had been killed in the city over the course of a few weeks. That same month members of the Sadoun tribe in Dhi Qar claimed they were fleeing the province after they were blamed for two shootings, and 15 men were found blindfolded and shot in parts of Baghdad. Finally last month 31 bodies of men, women, and children were found executed with some having their heads cut off in various part of the capital. The U.N. said it was especially worried about these recent incidents, because they could point towards another civil war. Iraq is not at that point yet, but these are very worrying signs. Some people were obviously being vigilantes and murdering people in retaliation in various southern cities and Baghdad. If they spread and become more prevalent then the country is definitely descending into a state of sectarian conflict.

Since the summer the insurgency, and especially Al Qaeda in Iraq, have carried out a concerted campaign to destabilize the country. AQI is responsible for the wave of bombings seen across the country. It has been able to hit every part from the north to the center to the south. The government has been helpless to stop this wave of attacks. In a few isolated incidents people have let their anger get the best of them and they have attacked others who they blame for this violence. This is one of the goals of the Islamists to turn Iraqis against each other and tear the country apart. Things are getting worse in the country, but they have not reached that level yet. The problem is that the insurgency has been revitalized and looks to be able to maintain this level of attacks for the foreseeable future. This will be a battle of wills between the militants, the government, and the people, and the outcome is yet to be determined.

SOURCES

Agence France Presse, “Iraq casualties from violence (2013)”

AIN, "Najaf suicide bombing causes 17 deaths, injuries," 11/28/13

- "Urgent….2 car bombs explode successively in Diwaniya," 11/10/13

Associated Press, “UN in Iraq worried about uptick in bodies found,” 12/1/13

Aswat al-Iraq, "10 casualties in two explosions in Wassit province," 11/28/13

- "Bombed car dismantled in Nassiriya city," 11/28/13

Iraq Body Count, “Monthly Table”

- “Recent Events”

Lewis, Jessica, “AQI’s “Soldiers’ Harvest” Campaign,” Institute for the Study of War, 10/9/13

- “Al-Qaeda In Iraq Resurgent, The Breaking The Walls Campaign, Part I,” Institute for the Study of War, September 2013

National Iraqi News Agency, "Blasts in Babil resulted in 33 killed, wounded," 11/28/13

- "Breaking news. Explosion of two car bombs in Essaourira and Kut," 11/28/13

- "Interior Ministry: Najaf blast resulted in 4 killed, 5 wounded," 11/28/13

- “Ten people injured in two car bombs explosion in Basra," 11/10/13

Russia Today, “Iraq death total for November hits over 900 – officials,” 12/1/13

Explaining Iraqi Kurdistan’s Policy Towards Syria, Interview With Wladimir van Wilgenburg

 

The conflict in neighboring Syria has provided both opportunities and problems for Iraq’s Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG). Kurdish President Massoud Barzani and to a lesser extent the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) have attempted to forge ties with Syrian Kurds and shape events there to their benefit. These have only met with limited success as the Syrians have their own agendas. To help explain this policy is Wladimir van Wilgenburg who until recently was based in Irbil, and is an analyst for the Jamestown Foundation out of Washington DC, and writes for Al Monitor.

Pres. Barzani saw the war in Syria as an opportunity to expand his influence into that country (Xinhua)

1. When the Syrian war started it seemed like the KRG saw this as an opportunity to expand its influence into that country. In general terms what was the KRG’s policy towards the conflict when it began?

Both the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) saw it as an opportunity to expand their influence after the Syrian government left large parts of northern Syria and focused on combating the insurgency in the major cities. The policy of Massoud Barzani, the leader of the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), and the president of the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) was limited to a Kurdish agenda in Syria, and not on toppling Assad or supporting Assad.

On 26 October 2011, he tried to unite the Kurdish political parties by forming the Kurdish National Council (KNC). This was also supported by Jalal Talabani, the leader of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK). Since the PKK-affiliated Democratic Union Party (PYD) increasingly became the strongest actor on the ground, he was forced to recognize their role.

In 2012, he supported a deal between the PYD and the KNC to form the Supreme Kurdish Council, a political body, to administer the Kurdish areas. Turkey was not happy with this and also the Western countries wanted the KNC joining the Syrian opposition. But Masoud Barzani didn’t want the Syrian Kurdish parties to join the opposition without the recognition of Kurdish rights. KDP officials such as Falah Mustafa Bakir, the KRG’s head of foreign relations, and Fuad Hussein, chief of staff for president Barzani criticized the Syrian opposition for not giving Kurds more rights,

Moreover, Barzani tried to empower the Kurdish Democratic Party of Syria (KDP-S) within the KNC in order to increase the influence of the KDP-S inside Syria. Although the KNC was backed by Barzani, there are many different Kurdish parties inside the KNC, and only the KDP-S is affiliated with Barzani’s KDP.

However, since the PYD is the strongest actor on the ground as a result of it’s military control over the Kurdish areas in Syria through the People’s Defense Units (YPG) backed up by the PKK, Barzani’s influence is limited inside Syria.

Salih Muslim and his PYD have become the dominant Kurdish group in Syria (Tracking Terrorism)

2. What are the differences between Barzani and the PYD?

They have differences in ideology and strategy. The PKK follows Abdullah Öcalan’s ideology of democratic confederalism. This strategy focuses on creating semi-autonomous Kurdish areas in Iraq, Iran, Syria and Iran without threatening the countries’ respective borders. Therefore, when the PYD announced it plans last summer 2013 to form a transitional government or democratic self-rule, they always emphasise it doesn’t threaten the unity or territorial integrity of Syria. For instance, an official of PKK’s Iranian affiliate, PJAK, Ferhad Abdullazadegan, said, that “Before the fallout of Syria’s crises in 2011, the Kurdish struggle continued to establish a democratic structure that does not jeopardize the unity and integration of Syria as well.” In its ideology the PKK is also different from the KDP. While the KDP is much more conservative, a Kurdistan Communities Union (KCK) Executive Council Co-President Bese Hozat says the PKK is a “democratic socialist movement against nationalism, religionism and sexism which all are ideologies that lead up to fascism, nationalism and militarism.” Russia, Iran, and allegedly the Syrian government have been supporting the PYD since it opposes Turkish support for the toppling of the Assad government, although the PYD and the PKK say they follow a ‘third line’.
 
The Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) of Masoud Barzani is closely allied to Turkey and aims to build a more autonomous Kurdistan region in Iraq and even possibly an independent Iraqi Kurdistan, through economic ties and oil deals with Turkey. Nechirvan Barzani, the Prime Minister of the Kurdistan region, said that “We have a door of hope, which is Turkey. And if that door, that hope is closed, it will be impossible for us to surrender to Baghdad. We will do something that will put in danger the interests of all those concerned.” But at the same time he also said that Turkey is opposed to Kurdish independence. Nevertheless, the KDP has tried to attract Western and other international oil companies in order to become less dependent on Baghdad, while the United States has opposed independent oil deals of the KRG and supported Baghdad against the Iraqi Kurds. While the PKK is very Marxist, against ‘imperialism’ and ‘capitalism’, the KDP is much more conservative and works with tribes in Iraqi Kurdistan, while the PKK in its ideology is against Kurdish tribes.

3. The KRG has tried to provide some training for Syrian Kurds to counter the influence of the PDY. Has that been successful?

By October 2012, the KDP had trained around one thousand and two hundred Syrian Kurdish fighters suggested a Kurdwatch report. However, the KDP didn’t want to risk a civil war with the PKK in Syria. Although some KDP-trained Kurdish fighters returned to Syria, the PYD didn’t allow them to create rival militias to the YPG. In May 2013, 74 members of the KDP-S were arrested at the border by the PYD security. Attempts by other Kurdish parties to create rival militias were also stopped by the YPG and Asayesh. For instance, the Kurdish Unity party in Syria tried to create militias in the province of Hasakah, but the PYD didn’t allow them. They hoped their militias would be part of an united Kurdish army under the control of the Supreme Kurdish Council, but the YPG says it cannot allow any other Kurdish armed militias since it would lead to a civil war and it sees itself as a legitimate Kurdish army.

The PYD's YPG militia has attempted to stop other Kurdish parties from forming their own armed groups (Al Jazeera)

4. What is the relationship between the various Syrian Kurdish parties?

The Kurds in Syria are divided between various power blocs: Damascus (Assad), Erbil (Barzani), Sulaymaniya (Talabani), Qandil (PKK) and Istanbul (Turkey – Erdogan). The Sulaymaniya, Qandil, and Damascus axis had similar policies, while the Erbil, Istanbul and the Western countries also had similar policies.

The Kurdish National Council recently joined the Syrian opposition. The Barzani-backed parties are the strongest Kurdish parties within the KNC, but some smaller Kurdish parties in the KNC worked with the PYD and joined their security forces.

For instance, the Kurdish Democratic Progressive Party of Syria, led by Abdulhamid Darwish, is affiliated with Talabani’s PUK. Nevertheless, while the PUK still supports the PYD, the party of Darwish left the militias of the PYD after Kurdish protestors were shot in the city of Amuda in June 2013, and its party supported the KNC move to join the Syrian National Coalition. Nevertheless, still some smaller Kurdish parties inside the KNC still back the PYD plan of creating an interim administration, this while the majority of the KNC is supporting it. Initially the KNC backed the plan, but it seems the negotiations failed.

The PYD on the other hand is still part of so-called ‘Internal Syrian Opposition Group’, the National Coordination Body for Democratic Change (NCB) that is against foreign intervention and wants a dialogue between the opposition and the Syrian regime. Both the PYD and the NCB support a dialogue in Geneva between the different competing political powers. As mentioned, the PYD has relations with some smaller Kurdish parties inside the KNC, but also has relations with the Iraqi Kurdish opposition party Gorran (Change) and the PUK. Off course, it also has good relations with PKK-affiliates in Iran, Iraq, and Turkey.

5. The KRG has shut down some of its border crossings with Syria for short periods of time. How were those closings connected to events in Syria?

The KRG has no official border with Syria. There is only a border crossing controlled by the KDP, the Peshkhabour border point in Dohuk, 260 miles northwest of Baghdad, which is also known as the Saemalka border crossing by Kurds. The border crossing was closed several times as a result of the disputes between the KDP and PKK, and as a result the PYD accused Turkey and the KDP of imposing an embargo on them.

The KDP closed down the border crossing after the PYD arrested KDP-militia members trying to cross the border in May, and the border crossing was closed by both sides after 23 October, Salih Muslim, the PYD-leader, was refused entry by the KDP and he crossed the Iraqi border through a smuggling route. The PYD says the border crossing is still open to foreign journalists, but the KDP doesn’t allow foreign journalists to cross at this point. The border crossing was not always completely closed. On 15 July 2013, 700 Syrian refugees were allowed to cross for medical aid. And in August 2013, around 30,000 crossed the border to the KRG. And before the closure in October, Syrian Kurds were going back to Syria to visit their relatives for the holiday.

Currently, the PYD hopes it can use the recently captured Iraqi border crossing in Yaroubiya as an alternative to the Turkish and Barzani-controlled border crossings and build relations with the Iraqi government of Nouri al-Maliki.

Kurdish areas of Syria, which the PYD has now dubbed Rojava (Institute for the Study of War)

6. You mentioned that in November 2013 the PYD declared its own region in northern Syria in what it calls Rojava. What was the KRG’s response?

Initially, there were talks between the Kurdish National Council (KNC) and PYD, and there was an agreement between the two over the interim administration. This despite the fact the KNC made the decision to join the Turkey-supported Syrian opposition. There were several talks between the KNC and the PYD over power-sharing and the interim administration, but especially the KDP-affiliated party was very suspicious about the plan, and in the end the agreement between the KNC and the PYD broke down to a certain extent, and the PYD moved ahead with the plan in November. There are around 35 organizations supporting the PYD plan now, according to pro-PYD media. As a result, Barzani in a statement said the PYD declaration in November was a unilateral decision and accused the PYD of working with the Baath-regime and imposing its will on other Kurdish parties. He indirectly suggested that since the PYD joined the war on the side of the Syrian regime, tens of thousands of Kurds became refugees. Also as a result, the opposition is opposed to the PYD.  Barzani thinks Syrian Kurds are losing their golden opportunity to achieve more rights. After the tensions increased between the PYD and the KDP in October and November, and the Kurdish National Congress scheduled for 25^th of November was delayed as a result, Barzani visited the Kurdish city of Diyarbakir together with the Turkish Prime Minister, and there are claims the KDP plans to create a party inside Turkey.

7. Pres. Barzani has forged very close ties to Turkey over the last couple years. What influence has Ankara had on the KRG’s Syrian policy?

I doubt the KRG’s policy is much related to Turkish influence since Barzani supports cooperation between the KNC and the PYD in Syria and also supports Kurdish autonomy, while Ankara only supports Kurdish autonomy if it follows the fall of Syrian president Bashar al-Assad, and if the opposition agrees with it. The Syrian opposition is very opposed to autonomy. Even the Islamist armed groups are against any form of ethnic nationalism. Since Turkey realized the PYD moved ahead with its plans for de-facto Kurdish autonomy, it seems that Turkey has supported Jihadi groups and Free Syrian Army-groups against the PYD in Afrin, Ras al-Ain, and Aleppo. Since cooperation between the KNC and PYD failed, Barzani has supported the KNC decision to join the Syrian opposition and has tried to empower the KDP-affiliated party inside the KNC. Nevertheless, the PYD claims Turkey is working together with Barzani to impose an embargo on the PYD.

8. This seems ironic because Ankara is holding peace talks with the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) in Turkey, which is backed by the KRG, but they both oppose the PKK-affiliated PYD in Syria. Can you explain this contradictory stance?

Both Ankara and Irbil (not Talabani-factions and Gorran) prefer peace and stability in Turkey. Irbil wants a safe transport route to Turkey for it’s oil, while Ankara prefers stability and peace in Turkey. Nevertheless, both of them do not want a PYD or PKK-controlled Kurdish area in Syria. Turkey fears it could have a spill-over effect through the PKK in the future, while the PYD claims that Barzani is afraid of a ‘PYD-model’ that could threaten his popularity. One shouldn’t forget that one of the reasons why Turkey engaged in peace talks with the PKK, is their power inside Syria.

9. Have Jalal Talabani’s Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) or the Change List (Gorran) tried a different Syrian strategy or criticized Barzani for his?

Yes, PUK and Gorran politicians are supporting the PYD and the PKK, and politicians of Gorran and PUK also criticized Barzani’s recent trip to Turkey. It seems they want to use the PKK to counterbalance the KDP’s power inside Iraqi Kurdistan. Both of them seem to think that the KDP is too strong and has too much power inside the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG).

10. Today does it look like the KRG is going to get any more involved in Syria or is it just going to continue with its current policy of aiding refugees and backing friendly parties?

I doubt that the KDP would get military involved in the chaos of the war in Syria and will continue to support refugees inside the KRG and back Kurdish parties in Syria. Most likely there will be more negotiations between the PYD and the KDP in the future. And in some way Turkey and Barzani will have to deal with a de-facto PYD-controlled area in the future (unless the Syrian government changes it’s policies and decides to actively combat the PYD inside Syria). But for the moment the tensions between the KDP and PKK are very high. Nevertheless, it will not lead to a Kurdish civil war inside of Syria.

SOURCES

Devi, Sharmila, “KRG to train Syrian Kurds to stop extremists gaining ground,” Financial Times, 5/9/13

Francis, Bassem, “Tensions Rise Between Iraqi, Syrian-Kurdish Parties,” Al-Hayat, 5/22/13

Gittleson, Ben, “Syria’s Kurds Look to Iraqi Minority for Support,” New York Times, 1/31/13

Kakal, Aral, “truth comes out: iraqikurds are training syrian brothers in arms,” Niqash, 8/2/12

Karakaya, Irem and Hacaoglu, Selcan, “Turkey, Iraqi Kurdish to Act Against Kurdish Rebels,” Associated Press, 8/1/12

Landis, Josh, “Nuri al-Maliki’s Strategy towards Syria and Syrian Kurds,” Syria Comment, 8/22/12

Miller, Elhanan, “Syrian Kurds ‘training in Iraq for the day after Assad,’” Times of Israel, 3/30/12

Redvers, Louise, “A rare welcome for Syria’s Kurdish refugees,” The National, 8/12/13

Rudaw, “Harsh Iraqi Reaction to Report of Training Syrian Soldiers in Kurdistan,” 7/27/12

- “President Barzani Slams PYD in Syria, Rejects Autonomy Declaration,” 11/14/13

Zebari, Abdel Hamid, “Iraqi Kurds Reportedly Among Jihadists in Syria,” Al-Monitor, 5/14/13