Tuesday, November 4, 2014

Violence In Iraq October 2014 IS Massacres & ISF Offensives


A rise in attacks in the first two weeks of the month and a series of massacres by the Islamic State in Anbar led to an increase in violence in Iraq from September to October 2014. For the month, there was still the second fewest reported incidents of the year, but there were slight upticks in casualties in Babil, Baghdad, and Diyala resulting in an overall growth in the number of dead and wounded. IS still appears to be focusing upon taking central Anbar and surrounding Mount Sinjar in Ninewa, while the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) and peshmerga were advancing in Babil, Ninewa, Salahaddin, and to a lesser extent in Diyala.

The number of reported attacks in Iraq has been dipping since the summer. In October there were a total of 797 incidents, up from September’s 690, but below August’s 835, July’s 930, and June’s 882, and were in fact the second fewest for the entire year. Those figures averaged out to 29.4 attacks per day in June, 30.0 in July, 26.9 in August, 23.0 in September, and 25.7 in October. The cause of last month’s increase was a jump in attacks in the first two weeks when there were 358 compared to 315 the next two, plus a surge in violence in the last three days of October with 68 attacks. Part of the reason for the upsurge appeared to be the insurgency launching counter attacks upon the security forces’ advances in several provinces, along with its own offensive in Anbar.

Casualties went up from September to October as well. There were a total of 2,347 killed and 3,151 wounded in the latter compared to 2,176 dead and 3,047 injured in the former. Again, these statistics have been heading downwards since the summer going from a peak average of 135.7 deaths per day in June to 73.5 in July, to 91.4 in August, 72.5 in September, and 75.7 in October. Anbar had the most fatalities, 624, due to IS massacres, followed by 590 in Baghdad, 461 in Salahaddin, 250 in Babil, 201 in Ninewa, 173 in Diyala, 26 in Karbala, 13 in Kirkuk, 6 in Basra, 2 in Wasit, and one in Maysan.   
Violence In Iraq By Week 2014
Date
Incidents
Dead
Wounded
JAN
1,015
1,483
2,890
FEB
945
1,274
2,526
MAR
996
1,606
2,901
APR
999
1,456
2,905
MAY
906
1,468
2,610
JUN
882
4,072
3,684
JUL
930
2,280
3,278
AUG
835
2,834
3,623
SEP
690
2,176
3,047
Oct 1-7
170
451
687
Oct 8-14
188
532
875
Oct 15-21
156
446
769
Oct 22-28
159
345
592 + 1,230
Oct 29-31
68
570
227
OCT
797
2,347
3,151 + 1,230

Violence In Iraq By Province Oct 2014
Province
Sep
Oct
Anbar
105 Incidents
658 Killed: 385 ISF, 5 Sahwa, 268 Civilians
590 Wounded: 67 ISF, 14 Sahwa, 509 Civilians
43 Shootings
68 IEDs
7 Suicide Car Bombs
5 Suicide Bombers
174 Incidents
625 Killed: 105 ISF, 24 Sahwa, 495 Civilians
487 Wounded: 69 ISF, 15 Sahwa, 403 Civilians
122 Shootings
14 IEDs
3 Car Bombs
6 Suicide Car Bombs
3 Suicide Bombers
Babil
43 Incidents
52 Killed: 3 ISF, 49 Civilians
185 Wounded: 20 ISF, 165 Civilians
19 Shootings
13 IEDs
5 Car Bombs
1 Suicide Car Bombs
44 Incidents
250 Killed: 22 ISF, 228 Civilians
202 Wounded: 25 ISF, 177 Civilians
17 Shootings
19 IEDs
1 Sticky Bomb
1 Car Bomb
3 Suicide Car Bombs
Baghdad
189 Incidents
441 Killed: 42 ISF, 7 Sahwa, 392 Civilians
1,179 Wounded: 66 ISF, 1 Sahwa, 1,112 Civilians
51 Shootings
87 IEDs
19 Sticky Bombs
16 Car Bombs
5 Suicide Car Bombs
1 Motorcycle Bomb
1 Sound Bomb
152 Incidents
590 Wounded: 32 ISF, 6 Sahwa, 552 Civilians
1,399 Wounded: 60 ISF, 11 Sahwa, 1,328 Civilians
48 Shootings
73 IEDs
11 Sticky Bombs
16 Car Bombs
7 Suicide Car Bombs
4 Suicide Bombers
Basra
11 Incidents
19 Killed: 19 Civilians
3 Shootings
1 IED
3 Sticky Bombs
1 Car Bomb
15 Incidents
6 Killed: 6 Civilians
1 Wounded: 1 ISF
6 Shootings
2 IEDs
Diyala
57 Incidents
66 Killed: 7 ISF, 3 Peshmerga, 56 Civilians
144 Wounded: 16 ISF, 4 Peshmerga, 124 Civilians
28 Shootings
22 IEDs
2 Sticky Bombs
2 Suicide Bombers
57 Incidents
173 Killed: 41 ISF, 41 Peshmerga, 90 Civilians
205 Wounded: 33 ISF, 16 Peshmerga, 2 Sahwa,
154 Civilians
32 Shootings
25 IEDs
4 Suicide Car Bombs
2 Suicide Bombers
Karbala
5 Incidents
13 Killed: 2 ISF, 11 Civilians
25 Wounded: 25 Civilians
2 IEDs
3 Car Bombs
1 Incident
26 Killed: 26 Civilians
55 Wounded: 55 Civilians
4 Car Bombs
Kirkuk
43 Incidents
89 Killed: 8 ISF, 2 Peshmerga, 79 Civilians
116 Wounded: 24 Peshmerga, 92 Civilians
16 Shootings
34 IEDs
1 Car Bomb
1 Motorcycle Bomb
23 Incidents
13 Killed: 1 ISF, 2 Peshmerga, 10 Civilians
56 Wounded: 5 ISF, 8 Peshmerga, 43 Civilians
11 Shootings
6 IEDs
1 Suicide Car Bomb
2 Motorcycle Bombs
Maysan
-
1 Incident
1 Killed: 1 Civilian
1 Shooting
Najaf
2 Incidents
5 Killed: 5 Civilians
12 Wounded: 12 Civilians
1 IED
1 Car Bomb
1 Incident
1 Car Bomb
Ninewa
52 Incidents
275 Killed: 34 ISF 241 Civilians
27 Wounded: 27 Civilians
24 Shootings
75 IEDs
65 Incidents
201 Killed: 5 ISF, 33 Peshmerga, 163 Civilians
68 + 1,230 Wounded: 2 ISF, 51 Peshmerga,
15 Civilians + 1,230 Peshmerga
40 Shootings
15 IEDs
2 Car Bombs
1 Suicide Car Bomb
1 Suicide Bomber
Qadisiyah
5 Incidents
6 Killed: 6 Civilians
20 Wounded: 20 Civilians
3 IEDs
1 Sticky Bomb
1 Car Bomb
1 Incident
1 IED
Salahaddin
177 Incidents
552 Killed: 67 ISF, 6 Peshmerga, 22 Sahwa,
457 Civilians
749 Wounded: 86 ISF, 41 Peshmerga, 5 Sahwa,
617 Civilians
75 Shootings
175 IEDs
1 Sticky Bomb
6 Car Bombs
13 Suicide Car Bombs
1 Suicide Boat Bomb
1 Suicide Bomber
205 Incidents
461 Killed: 137 ISF, 22 Sahwa, 2 Peshmerga,
300 Civilians
678 Wounded: 154 ISF, 18 Sahwa, 506 Civilians
90 Shootings
196 IEDs
1 Sticky Bomb
13 Car Bombs
12 Suicide Car Bombs
8 Suicide Bombers
1 Motorcycle Bomb
Wasit
1 Incident
1 IED
2 Incidents
2 Killed: 2 Civilians
2 Shootings


One reason for the increase in casualties was that October saw the most car bombs since May. In that month there were 84 vehicle borne improvised explosive devices (VBIEDs). Then the summer offensive started in June and the number of car bombs actually dropped for several months going to 70 in June, 41 in July, 56 in August, and 60 in September. That trend ended in October when there were 74 VBIEDs causing 599 deaths and 1,123 wounded. As usual, Baghdad was the prime target with 20, but Salahaddin also saw 19 as IS used them to attack the security forces that were on the offensive there. There were also bombings in Karbala and Najaf, which were hit the month before as well. 25 out of the 31 days of the month witnessed a car bomb with three waves lasting from October 1-4, October 7-14, and October 19-27. That last one defied recent trends where a single wave would  last for only a few days.

Car Bomb Attacks In Iraq Oct 2014
Date
Location
Dead
Wounded
Oct. 1
New Baghdad, Baghdad
17
59
Oct. 2
Hit x3, Anbar
Great Dam, Diyala
Balad, Salahaddin
46
35
Oct. 3
Outside Samarrra & Tuz Kharmato, Salahaddin
3
8
Oct. 4
Baiji & Tikrit, Salahaddin
12
24
Oct. 5



Oct. 6



Oct. 7
Hit, Anbar
Mashtal & Arboretum, Baghdad
Abassid & Amerli, Salahaddin
40
78
1st Wk Oct Totals
15
118
204
Oct. 8
Garma, Anbar
Sadr City, Baghdad
12
33
Oct. 9
Baquba, Diyala
9
11
Oct. 10



Oct. 11
Amiriya Fallujah, Anbar
Kadhimiya & Shula x2, Baghdad
West of Tikrit, Shajarat al-Dor, Tikrit x2, Camp Speicher x4, Salahaddin
86
164
Oct. 12
Qara Tapa, Diyala x3
Samarra, Salahaddin
58
111
Oct. 13
Sadr City & Kadhimiya, Baghdad
31
86
Oct. 14
Kadhimiya, Baghdad
25
56
2nd Wk Oct Totals
22
221
461
Oct. 15



Oct. 16
Ramadi, Anbar
Mahmudiya, Babil
Dawlai, Kadhimiya & Hurriya, Baghdad
Tuz Kharmato, Salahaddin
43
57
Oct. 17
Suleikh, Baladiyat & Karrada, Baghdad
32
101
Oct. 18



Oct. 19
Baiji & Tarmiya, Salahaddin
8
20
Oct. 20
Amiriya Fallujah, Anbar
Mosul Dam, Ninewa
Karbala x4, Karbala
44
80
Oct. 21
Kadhimiya x3, Baghdad
40
31
3rd Wk Oct Totals
20
167
289
Oct. 22
Amiriya Fallujah, Anbar
Sadr City & Karrada, Baghdad
32
75
Oct. 23
Mazraa, Salahaddin


Oct. 24
Najaf, Najaf
Baiji Refinery x2, Salahaddin


Oct. 25
Zummar, Ninewa
7

Oct. 26
Dayum, Salahaddin


Oct. 27
Jurf al-Sakhr, Babil
Karrada, Baghdad
38
51
Oct. 28



4th Wk Oct Totals
11
77
126
Oct. 29
Yusifiya, Babil
Hamam al-Aleel, Ninewa
Baiji, Salahaddin
10
31
Oct. 30
Yusifiya, Babil
Southwest of Baiji x2, Salahaddin
6
12
Oct. 31



OCT TOTALS
74
599
1,123


Government shelling and air strikes continued on civilian targets. Fallujah, Hit, and Khalidiya in Anbar, Rabia in Ninewa, and Dour, Baiji, Rabad and Tikrit in Salahaddin were all hit during the month. That cost the lives of 178 people and wounded another 285. Coalition air strikes also killed civilians twice on October 25 and October 26 in Ninewa leaving 12 dead and 13 wounded.

Casualties From Government Shelling & Air Strikes In Iraq Oct. 2014
Date
Location
Dead
Wounded
Oct. 1
Fallujah, Anbar

6
Oct. 3
Fallujah, Anbar
4
11
Oct. 4
Rabad, Salahaddin
3
5
Oct. 6
Hit, Anbar
15


Fallujah, Anbar
1
8

Rabia, Ninewa
12

Oct. 7
Fallujah, Anbar
3
5

Khalidiya, Anbar
5
7
1st Wk Oct Totals
-
43
42
Oct. 8
Fallujah, Anbar
7
16

Tikrit, Salahaddin
14

Oct 9
Dour, Salahaddin
7
3
Oct. 10
Fallujah, Anbar
4
13
Oct. 11
Fallujah, Anbar
2
6
Oct. 14
Fallujah, Anbar
3
3

Baiji, Salahaddin
4

2nd Wk Oct Totals
-
41
41
Oct. 15
Fallujah, Anbar
3
6
Oct. 18
Fallujah, Anbar
4
7

North of Tikrit, Salahaddin
18
4
Oct. 19
Fallujah, Anbar
3
9
Oct. 20
Fallujah, Anbar
18
17
Oct. 21
Fallujah, Anbar
1
13








3rd Wk Oct Totals
-
47
56
Oct. 23
Fallujah, Anbar
1
39
Oct. 24
Fallujah, Anbar
1
6

Tikrit, Salahaddin
9
11
Oct 25
Fallujah, Anbar
8
29
Oct. 27
Fallujah, Anbar
19
39
4th Wk Oct Totals
-
38
124
Oct. 29
Fallujah, Anbar
5
11
Oct. 30
Fallujah, Anbar
2
7
Oct. 31
Fallujah, Anbar
2
4
OCT TOTALS
-
178
285


Anbar remained a major battlefield at the close of the month. There was fighting throughout the center and eastern sections of the province. There were reported clashes in Amiriya Fallujah, Furat, Fallujah, Ramadi, Baghdadi, outside of Hit, Al-Assad base, Jazeera and several other small towns during the last ten days of October. Several of those locations like Baghdadi and Al-Assad are completely surrounded by insurgents.

Starting on October 29, IS began executing members of the Albu Nimr tribe, which it had captured in the Hit area after its fall at the beginning of the month. On that day alone approximately 255 people were killed in 2-3 different incidents. From then until the end of the month around 306 were executed in total. These murders have continued into November. Albu Nimr has been one of the longest standing anti-insurgent tribes in Anbar fighting against them since at least 2004. IS also has a legacy of going after Iraqi tribes that oppose it, especially in Anbar, they just never had the opportunity to kill so many as they have today due to their command of up to 80-85% of the governorate.

Insurgents have also been able to make minor advances since their surge earlier in October. October 22 for instance, it was reported that IS took control of the Euphrates area northwest of Hit. It then arrested 98 people including police and local officials, and killed a police chief. The organization also continued with attempts to take Amiriya Fallujah, which is on the eastern border with Babil. These attacks have been repulsed so far.

The ISF has been carrying out a haphazard defense of the province. Many of the army units stationed in the province have fallen back to their bases leaving most of the fighting to the police and tribes. The sheikhs and the Anbar council have repeatedly complained that Baghdad has done nothing to help their plight with the latter warning that the whole province could go at any time. At the same time, fresh troops have been sent to Amiriya Fallujah, and some counter attacks made in the area. The Anbar Operations Command also launched an attempt to retake the Euphrates area after its fall, as well as some towns in between Hit and Baghdadi in the west, and was able to take back the Thar Thar Dam. A larger push to defend Amiriya Fallujah appears to be in the works after the ISF was able to take Jurf al-Sakhr in neighboring Babil. Until then, the province remains at great risk.

The end of October saw the 14th and most successful operation to clear the long-time IS stronghold in Jurf al-Sakhr. That started on October 23, and was led by the Badr Organization’s Hadi Ameri who has become the main commander in Iraq even though he holds no official position within the ISF. Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps Quds Force Commander General Qasim Suleimani was also involved. According to the Washington Post up to 10,000 militiamen were deployed to the area alone. This overwhelming force reached the town center the next day. Part of the success of this plan was also due to the fact that all of the inhabitants were driven out leaving the area abandoned. The residents will not be allowed back in anytime soon because many are considered pro-insurgent, and the entire place is being turned into a military camp. Afterward Prime Minister Haider Abadi and others all praised the victory, and noted that it was one of the first steps towards defeating IS.

The fighting wasn’t over yet however, as the Islamic State pulled back to just north of Jurf al-Sakhr, which is now a focus of the militias and ISF. There has been a resulting increase in attacks in places like Yusifiya and Latifiya.

This might be the first major setback for the Islamic State since the summer. It has faced some other reverses such as losing Mosul Dam and the Tuz Kharmato district of Salahaddin, but Jurf al-Sakhr was different. This had been a base of operations for the group for years, and thirteen other sweeps of the area had all failed. Not only that but taking the area denied IS its plans to expand into northern Babil and southern Baghdad, as well as cut off some of its supply routes to Anbar. It is now on the defensive in the province.

After some early insurgent advances in June fighting in Diyala has calmed down. October witnessed a more than doubling of casualties however. That was largely due to three suicide car bombs hitting the offices of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan in Qara Tapa in the northern section of the province on October 12, which killed 58 and wounded 107. That was a precursor to IS seizing the town for a day. On October 24, the group also launched an attack upon the Edheim district north of Baquba. Otherwise the security forces continued with their clearing operations in Mansuriya, the Soudor Dam area, and the Hamrin Mountains. It’s hard to gauge progress there as the ISF has been working in many of these areas for weeks if not months. It’s likely that the areas remain contested with the insurgents and security forces going back and forth over the same territory.

Ninewa had been relatively quiet as well until this month. IS surrounded all of Mount Sinjar in the middle of October, and have gotten into intermittent clashes with the Yazidi militias defending it. They have asked for relief, as there are several thousand people still living on the mountain that are endangered. In the surrounding area and farther north the peshmerga are fighting back. On October 25 they claimed to have taken Zummar after clearing the surrounding villages. Two days later they announced a four-pronged attack upon the Sinjar district, and then more advances in the Rabia border region with Syria. The progress of the Kurds appears slow, but steady. They need to act faster if they want to make sure that the people on Mount Sinjar will be saved.

Finally, Bas News had an article on Kurdish casualties in the province. Comparing its numbers with other reports around 1,230 peshmerga were wounded in Ninewa from June to October. Both Baghdad and Irbil have kept mum about casualties after major clashes between their forces and the insurgents since this summer. Only sporadically do officials release these rough numbers, and they are always very high pointing out that what gets in the press is only a small fraction of the true casualties going on in the country.

Along with Anbar, Salahaddin remains the other major zone of conflict in Iraq. The ISF has gone on the offensive there recently. It is carrying out a two-part operation to first clear Baiji north of Tikrit, and then move on the provincial capital itself. On October 22, the move on Baiji was announced. By the end of the month the ISF and militias were within 1.2 miles of Baiji itself, and then on the last day of October entered two of its neighborhoods. Once again Quds Force Commander Gen Suleimani was said to be involved in the planning and implementation of this campaign.

In the eastern Tuz Kharmato district, which was cleared by the ISF at the end of September there have been continued reports of sectarian cleansing and clashes between the militias and peshmerga. October 24, the Washington Post quoted a Kurdish commander who said that militias were killing Sunni civilians and burning their houses in the area out of the belief that they were insurgent supporters. Up to 7,000 families were said to have fled as a result. Around the same time, there was a gun battle between the peshmerga and Badr militia resulting in 2 militiamen killed and four injured. The fighting started when Badr men refused to stop at a Kurdish checkpoint. Badr ended up arresting 6 peshmerga and threatened to take them to court in Baghdad. A few days later a similar incident occurred with Badr firing on a Kurdish checkpoint injuring two peshmerga, and again the militiamen ended up seizing several peshmerga. Now that the district is being emptied of Sunnis the Kurds and militias are vying for control of it. They have set up their own zones of control, checkpoints, etc. These small flare ups are the result of the conflict of interests, and more will be reported in the future until the central or regional government assert their control over the area, which will not happen anytime soon given the fighting in the rest of the country.

SOURCES

Agence France Presse, “Iraqi forces enter jihadist-held town,” 10/31/14

AIN, "ISIL executes 55 young guys from Albu Nimr tribe in Heet," 10/29/14
- “Reports over execuritn chieftain of Albu Nimir tribe,” 10/31/14
- “Security Forces start operation to break in Beji District,” 10/22/14

Alsumaria, “Commander of the Tigris announce liberation of four farming villages east of Baquba,” 10/25/14

Awara, Omar, “Shiite Militia Arrest Number of Peshmerga,” Bas News, 10/27/14

BBC, "Islamic State: Militants 'pushed back' in Iraq," 10/25/14

Buratha News, “Anbar and Babil Operations are implementing cleansing operation between Jurf al-Sakhr and Amiriyat Fallujah,” 10/28/14
- “Anbar Operations launched a massive operation to free the area of the Euphrates from the Daash terrorists and reinforces its troops in Amiriyat al-Fallujah,” 10/23/14
- “Babil Operations Announces Clearing Fadiliyah area between the province and Anbar,” 10/27/14
- “Daash jihadist forces rallied again from four axes to try to break into Amiriyat Fallujah,” 10/23/14
- “Diyala police announced the killing of 40 Daash terrorists north east of Baquba,” 10/30/14
- “Peshmerga forces launch an attack on the four themes of Sinjar,” 10/27/14
- “The start of a military operation to liberate Hit, in Anbar,” 10/27/14

Faqie, Nuwar, “Peshmerga Takes Control of Three Strategic Roads Near Mosul,” Bas News, 10/28/14

Al Forat, "2 Policemen wounded southern Baghdad," 10/29/14
- “37 Terrorists killed in Hemren Hills,” 10/28/14
- "255 tribesmen and police killed by ISIL militants in Anbar," 10/31/14
- “Babel….Volunteers brigades liberate Fadiliya area from ISIL terrorists,” 10/23/14
- "Car bomb explodes in Najaf," 10/24/14
- "ISF detonate suicide car bomb in Baiji district," 10/23/14
- “Tikrit: Major offensive launched to clear Mazraa village from ISIL terrorists,” 10/25/14

Hubbard, Ben, “Sunni Tribesmen Say ISIS Exacts Brutal Revenge,” New York Times, 10/30/14

Iraq Times, "47 martyrs and injured in the car bomb explosion in Sadr City in eastern Baghdad," 10/22/14

Kozak, Christopher, “ISF Withdraws to Defensive Positions in Anbar Province,” Institute for the Study of War, 10/29/14

Al Mada, “Daash hold area north of Jurf al-Sakhr..and clearing explosives will require 6 months,” 10/27/14
- “Iraqi army and the militias entering the center of Jurf al-Sakhr on the one hand and waving the Iraqi flag over the main buildings,” 10/24/14
- "Karrada bombing toll rises to 40 dead and wounded," 10/27/14

Margon, Sarah, “For Iraq’s Sunnis, sectarian militias pose an extra threat,” Washington Post, 10/24/14

Morris, Loveday, “Iraq’s victory over militants in Sunni town underlines challenges government faces,” Washington Post, 10/29/14

NINA, “/14/ Villages liberated near Hit and al- Baghdadi, western Anbar,” 10/26/14
- "/16/ Military elements killed and wounded in a suicide attack southwest of Tikrit," 10/30/14
- “/30/ Elements of the IS killed in a military operation northeast of Baquba,” 10/27/14
- “Armed Forces secures al-Thar Thar Dam and restore the stream of water and the Tigris River toward the the Tigris canal,” 10/29/14
- “Army begins a military operation to liberate Albu Nimer besieged families by ISIS,” 10/30/14
- “An army force liberate in an airdrop two factories east of Fallujah,” 10/22/14
- “Army forces backed by army aviation and air force in al-Qarma, cordoned the IS in al-Qarma and Amiriyat al-Fallujah,” 10/29/14
- "Breaking News../10/ civilians and /13/ elements of the IS killed by bombing of the coalition aircraft to areas northwest of Mosul," 10/26/14
- "Breaking News../19/ people including two policemen killed and wounded, in a suicide attack on a police checkpoint south of Baghdad," 10/29/14
- "Breaking News../20/ civilians killed and wounded by a car bomb driven by a suicide bomber in Baiji, north of Tikrit," 10/29/14
- "Breaking News…Car Bomb Goes Of South of Baghdad," 10/30/14
- "Breaking News..Two car bombs exploded near the Baiji refinery and security forces stormed the surrounding areas," 10/24/14
- "Breaking News….Two Suicide Bombers Blow Themselves Up In Amiriyat Al-Fallujah," 10/22/14
- “The IS elements control on the Euphrates district near Hit completely,” 10/22/14
- "The Is execute /170/ people from Albu Nimr tribe west of Ramadi," 10/29/14
- “(IS) Takes Control on A district Nearby Government Departments Complex Amid Ramadi,” 10/31/14
- “Liberation of the eastern and western perimeters areas surrounding al-Soudor dam in Diyala from the IS control,” 10/25/14
- “Massive Military Operation Northwest Of Hilla to Expel Terrorists,” 10/23/14
- “The operation of Jurf al-Sakhar will have a deep impact in the final defeat of the IS,” 10/24/14
- “The security forces and the popular crowd liberated al- Hujayr area north of Jurf al-Sakhar,” 10/26/14
- “Security forces liberated the farm village south of Baiji,” 10/29/14
- “Ten Terrorists Killed North of Baquba,” 10/24/14
- "A US raid kills two civilians south of Mosul," 10/25/14

Radio Free Iraq, “22 October 2014,” Daily Updates from Anbar, 10/22/14
- “29 October 2014,” Daily Updates from Anbar, 10/29/14

Rasheed, Ahmed, “Iraq’s Abadi struggles to gain Sunni tribal support,” Rasheed, 10/29/14
- “Iraqi forces advance in new bid to end Baiji refinery siege,” Reuters, 10/30/14

Al Rayy, “Liberation of three villages from Dash west of Anbar,” 10/24/14
- “Security forces launched a large attack on the city of Hit,” 10/30/14

Reuters, “After victory in key Iraqi town, time for revenge,” 10/26/14

Rudaw, “Shia militiamen arrest Peshmerga near Kirkuk,” 10/30/14
- “UPDATE: Peshmerga take control of strategic town northeast of Mosul,” 10/25/14

Salaheddin, Sinan, "Car bombings in Iraq kill at least 38 people," Associated Press, 10/27/14

Salih, Hemin, "450 Peshmerga Killed in IS Fightings," Bas News, 10/22/14

Sameer, Saif and Parker, Ned, “Islamic State militants seize Iraq village, press assault on Yazidis,” Reuters, 10/23/14

Shafaq News, "Baghdad operations : 53 people killed and injured in Karrada and Sadr City bombings," 10/23/14
- “Military forces and the popular crowd control Tal al-Faransi western Tikrit,’ 10/30/14
- “Senior security official: More than 100 ISIS elements killed in the biggest attack of the army and tribes near Fallujah,” 10/25/14

Zair, Kareem, “Islamic State militants encircle air base as they reinforce control of Anbar Province,” Azzaman, 10/23/14

Monday, November 3, 2014

The Rise And Fall Of The Sons Of Iraq Interview With Abu Abed

 
Abu Abed was the head of the Sons of Iraq (SOI)/Sahwa in Baghdad’s Amiriya. He cut a deal with the American forces to create security units in his district, and was known as a fierce fighter. When the civil war ended however he was at a loss as to his future. Both the government and Al Qaeda in Iraq went after him with an arrest warrant and assassination attempts. He ended up fleeing to Jordan and then Sweden for his safety. To help explain his story and the rise and fall of the Sahwa is an interview with Abu Abed, which was facilitated by Diane Maye, Associate Dean of Terrorism and Counterterrorism Studies at Henley-Putnam University.
(New York Times)
1. Could you explain what Amiriya was like in 2005-2006 before the Sahwa was formed there?

In 2005-2006 Al Qaeda had complete control over Ameriya and every aspect of our daily lives.  Al Qaeda used to conduct their own judgment processes according to their beliefs. They would hang citizens for minor infractions and publicly whip them. Nothing was off limits; they conducted themselves however they pleased. There was no law enforcement in the area to stop them, and they declared Ameriya as the capital of the Islamic State.

2. How did you get in touch with the U.S. military, what did you tell them about your plans to form a local security force, and what was their reaction?

Initially we didn't have contact with the U.S. military, but over time we started coordinating our movements with them. We would also inform them when we knew something about Al Qaeda's movements, and then we started sharing some of our intelligence with them. The U.S. forces couldn't believe that some young Iraqi Sunnis could help win the fight against Al Qaeda (especially when the Iraqi Army and Iraqi Security Forces couldn't). Most of them thought that we either had a death wish or that we were insane. 

3. 2006-2007 many Sunnis across central Iraq from Anbar to Diyala decided to turn on Al Qaeda in Iraq. What caused this turn in opinion against the Islamists?

By 2006 the people of Anbar and Diyala had endured years of harassment by Al Qaeda. Al Qaeda challenged them on the rule of law, and started extorting money from the people for security. There came a point for the people when they realized that neither the Americans nor the Iraqi Army would be able to secure the area. So, in order to regain security, they realized they would have to organize local police forces themselves.

4. How did you go about cleansing Al Qaeda in Iraq from your neighborhood?

It started with people that were courageous enough to gather intelligence and penetrate Al Qaeda's network. We gathered all the information we could on the Al Qaeda members in the neighborhood: names, addresses, car plate numbers, their criminal intentions, and their weapons cashes. The second thing we did was try and ruin their operations by finding out where they put IED's, or telling the U.S. about their operations. Finally, we ended up having to fight them in close combat on the streets of Ameriya.

5. Did you work with other local leaders and institutions like imams and mosques to build up support for your fighting force?

My relationship with local leaders consisted of meetings with imams from the local mosques.  At that time, the relationship I had between relatives, friends, policy makers, and religious leaders was very complicated.  There were some that were completely against Al Qaeda and their operations. Others were neutral, and they did not want to interfere for either side. Others were trying to sustain Al Qaeda. Considering this, we had to very careful in our relationship with imams and other local leaders.

6. The U.S. promised that the Sahwa would receive public jobs after the fighting was over as a means of reconciliation between the Shiite led government and Sunni communities like Amiriya. What was the Iraqi government’s attitude towards your group, and did any of your fighters get integrated into the security forces or civil service?

The Americans promised to merge the SOI [Sons of Iraq] with the security forces and other governmental organizations. Most of the people I know that were hired ended up being arrested, trapped or killed by the Shi'ia militias. Initially, this was rather surprising for me because we had worked so hard on national reconciliation. For instance, I personally promised all of the displaced Shi'ia families from Ameriya that they could return home, and I ensured their protection. Over time, I began to realize that the new Iraqi government had no intention of reconciliation, and this never seemed to come up in the media.  

7. When the heavy fighting was over do you think that the Americans did a good job maintaining its relationship with the Sahwa?

The relationship I had with 1-5 CAV, the U.S. Army unit I worked with in the beginning, was great. These folks were professional and courteous and had every intent on getting the job done in the proper way. The next Army unit that came in really had no knowledge of the situation on the ground or Iraqi culture. So, we suffered because of this, and the relationship spiraled downward.

8. Today Iraq’s new Premier Haider Abadi is pushing legislation to create a National Guard that would help raise local forces once more to battle the insurgency. What do you think of the idea, and do you think it will work?

Prime Minister Abadi wants to build a National Guard. I'm skeptical about his ability to do this effectively. First, I'm not confident he will be able to build consensus with the Sunni members of parliament. Second, it is going to be difficult to get Iran to concede on such a measure. There is going to be strong opposition to any sort of arming of Sunni forces, and I point to former Prime Minister Maliki's staunch position on the SOI as an example of this. 

SOURCES

Abdul-Ahad, Ghaith, “Meet Abu Abed: the US’s new ally against al-Qaida,” Guardian, 11/10/07

Ghaffoori, Sa’ad, “How to get Sunnis to turn against ISIS,” New York Daily News, 9/22/14

Kuehl, Dale, “Inside the Surge: 1-5 Cavalry in Amiriyah,” Small Wars Journal, 10/26/08

Najm, Hayder, “government crackdown and internal feuds weaken awakening councils,” Niqash, 9/30/09

Parker, Ned, “Iraq clings to a rickety calm between war and peace,” Los Angeles Times, 7/28/08
- “The rise and fall of a Sons of Iraq warrior,” Los Angeles Times, 6/29/08
- “Ruthless, shadowy – and a U.S. ally,” Los Angeles Times, 12/22/07

Updike, Nancy, “416: Iraq After Us: What Just Happened?” This American Life, 10/15/10

Sunday, November 2, 2014

Musings On Iraq In The News


I was quoted in “The Plight Of The Yazidis Still Isn’t Over, Ctd,” in Andrew Sullivan’s Daily Dish. My article on Iraq finally getting rid of its fake bomb detectors was republished in Al Mada.

UNICEF VIDEO: Iraq: Children Urgently Need Warm Clothes For The Winter


HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH VIDEO: ISIS Executes Hundreds of Prison Inmates In Iraq


JOURNEYMAN PICTURES: Inside The Militia's That Fractured Iraq


MEMRI TV VIDEO: Syrian Intelligence Officer Captured In Iraq 2005 Orders To Slaughter People Came From Syrian Government


This Day In Iraqi History - Nov 14 British army ordered to seize Basra vilayet WWI

1914 Sheikh of Islam called for jihad against British and French during WWI Call was repeated in all Sunni mosques in Mosul, Baghdad a...