Anbar has a long history of being both a center for the
insurgency and opposition to it. The many tribes in the governorate have gone
back and forth over whether to oppose the government or not, and that continues
into the present day. In fact there are many parallels between post-03 Anbar
and today with authorities mistreating the population leading to armed
opposition, and then turning on the Islamist militants. General Nouri
al-Fahadawi who was the head of intelligence and security in Anbar and Colonel
Said al-Fahadawi who was a SWAT commander explained some of this history in a
series of interviews
with the U.S. Marines in 2008.
The U.S. got off to a bad start in Anbar, which laid the
foundation for the insurgency. Right after the 2003 invasion, a delegation from
Anbar met with the Americans to negotiate the entry of U.S. forces into the
province. The meeting did not go well, and some claimed that they were mistreated.
In April
soldiers from the 82nd Airborne Division fired on demonstrators in
Fallujah. The Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) then came in and many
locals felt like they were ignored. This was especially true for the tribes as
Paul Bremer did
not want to work with them believing that they were anachronisms with no
place in the new Iraq he was trying to create. Then when the fighting really
started breaking out in Anbar the U.S. started carrying out mass arrests and
there were charges of mistreating prisoners. This all closely mirrored recent
history. Many in Anbar felt like they were being sidelined by the government of
Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki and resented the heavy-handed tactics of the
Iraqi Security Forces (ISF). That all came to a head in December
2012 when the premier issued an arrest warrant for Anbar native Finance
Minister Rafi Issawi. That led to spontaneous protests, which quickly spread to
other provinces. That discontent helped lead to the revival of the insurgency.
In both 2003 and 2012 Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) and its later
manifestation the Islamic State (IS) emerged as the dominant insurgent group in
Anbar. In the earlier period AQI attempted to assert itself over Anbar society.
It didn’t let girls go to school or work, made mosques follow its rules, and
took over the provincial Education and Health Departments, and the Facilities
Protection Service. It would also turn on other militant groups in an attempt
to control them. This led to skirmishes with the likes of the Islamic Army, the
1920 Revolution Brigades, the Islamic Movement, and the Mujahadeen Army.
Colonel Fahadawi claimed that 60% of the insurgents ended up working with AQI,
while 40% resisted. Likewise, when IS started re-emerging in 2012 one of the first
places it targeted was Anbar. It tried to take advantage
of the protest movement and its flags began appearing at the demonstration site
in Fallujah. By June
2013 it announced a new campaign in western Anbar targeting areas like Hit,
Rawa and Qaim, and in December
claimed that it wanted to annex parts of the province to territory it
controlled in Syria. When open fighting broke out in the governorate, IS at
first tried to cooperate with other insurgent groups, but then slowly but
surely asserted its control over large parts of the province. That led to some
disputes and clashes
just like before with other groups such as the Baathist Naqshibandi and Mujahadeen Army. IS has once again
become the dominant force in the province.
The abuses of Al Qaeda in Iraq eventually led some tribes to
turn against it. One of the first was the Albu Mahal in Qaim along the Syrian
border. In 2005 that tribe formed the Hamza
Brigade, which later included the Albu Nimr in central Hit as an anti-insurgent
force. It only lasted a few months before AQI destroyed it due to lack of
support by the Americans. Several other attempts were made before the Awakening
emerged in 2006. Similarly, in 2013 some Anbar tribes immediately sided with
Baghdad against the new insurgency such as Sheikh Ahmed Abu Risha and Sheikhs
Hamid and Mohammed Hayes. All three had been trying to compromise
with the Maliki government beforehand. As IS emerged as the main fighting force
in the governorate other tribes decided to oppose them, some of which had been
with the insurgency. Just like in 2006 there are deep divisions within the
province’s tribes. Some have sided with the militants, some are neutral, and
some are with the government. There are even divisions within groups making the
situation even more complicated.
Then and now the local security forces were not in good
shape to face the insurgency. Both Fahadawi’s claimed that Baghdad was against
forming army and police units in Anbar. The U.S. pushed the idea and did the
recruiting, training and arming of these local units. They were constantly
targeted and faced heavy casualties. Eventually General Fahadawi met with the
CIA and Iraqi intelligence and helped create the Office for Iraqi Intelligence
in Anbar. He set up 15 cells based upon people from his own Albu Fahd tribe and
sent them into the cities to collect intelligence on the militants. Colonel
Fahadawi would later head an elite SWAT police unit. Today the ISF is again in
disarray in the governorate. The army units have fallen
back to their bases leaving most of the fighting to the police and tribes,
but new forces have been sent in from Babil however. The Americans are once
again trying to reverse the situation with the deployment of advisers to the
Al-Assad base in the center of the province. It took years for the U.S. to turn
the Anbar ISF into an effective force, and it may take just as long this time
around.
General Fahadawi ultimately blamed the early mistakes by the
Americans for the violence in Iraq, as many would blame Baghdad for the on
going fighting in the province today. The U.S. quickly turned segments of the
population against them providing fertile ground for insurgent recruiters, and
Maliki did much the same. It was his decision in December 2013 to arrest
parliamentarian Ahmed Alwani who was a fiery and sectarian protest leader and
then close down the Ramadi demonstration site, which directly led to the
outbreak of open fighting in Anbar once again. Today, the Anbar council, tribes
and security forces are again complaining about Baghdad’s neglect. There are
some that believe Baghdad has written off the province so that it might
consolidate its hold on other parts of the country. That’s led to 80% of the
governorate falling into the insurgents’ hand. The U.S. is once again in the
middle of things with new advisers and Apache helicopters deployed to the
center of Anbar. It seems like history is repeating itself in Iraq and today is
much like those early days of 2005 when the insurgency was in the ascendency
and the Americans and Baghdad were struggling to respond.
SOURCES
BBC, “Islamic state crisis; US
troops sent into Iraq’s Anbar,” 11/11/14
Biddle, Stephen, Friedman, Jeffrey, and Shapiro, Jacob,
“Testing the Surge, Why Did Violence Decline in Iraq in 2007?” International
Security, Summer 2012
Habib, Mustafa, “dangerous times
ahead: al qaeda plans to annex one-third of iraq,” Niqash, 12/27/13
Klein, Joe, “Saddam’s Revenge,” Time, 9/26/05
Kozak, Christopher, “ISF Withdraws to Defensive Positions in
Anbar Province,” Institute for the Study of War, 10/29/14
Al-Mada, “Al Qaeda announces the launch of the “New Battle”
for western Anbar and police decide on comprehensive curfew,” 6/24/13
Al Masalah, “Clashes between Daash
militants and the Army of the Majahideen after the latter refused to swear
allegiance to the Islamic State in Anbar,” 7/7/14
- “Organization “Naqshibandi” deny
entry in an armed conflict with “Daash,”” 6/3/14
McWilliams, Chief Warrant Officer-4 Timothy, and Wheeler,
Lieutenant Colonel Kurtis, ed., Al-Anbar
Awakening Volume II, Iraqi Perspectives, From Insurgency to Counterinsurgency
in Iraq, 2004-2009, Virginia: Marine Corps University, 2009
Al Rayy, “Differences between
“Daash” and “Army of the Mujahideen” in Anbar,” 6/5/14
Sowell,
Kirk, “Iraq’s Second Sunni Insurgency,” Hudson Institute, 8/4/14
Al-Tamimi, Aymenn, “Behind the
Iraq Protests,” American Spectator, 4/18/13
Walt, Vivienne, “Civilian deaths stoke Iraqis’ resentment,”
San Francisco Chronicle, 8/4/03
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