Iraq’s Prime Minister Haider Abadi has faced a difficult
situation from the day he entered office in 2014. His latest problem is trying
to deal with protests demanding reforms, while juggling the power struggles
within his own Dawa party and the State of Law list. To help explain what the
premier is going through is Harith al-Qarawee, a fellow at the Crown Center for
Middle East Studies at Brandeis University, and the author of Imagining the Nation:
Nationalism, Sectarianism and Socio-political Conflict in Iraq.
He can be followed on Twitter @harith_hasan.
1. Haider Abadi was
chosen as prime minister in 2014 over Nouri al-Maliki who was seeking a third
term. What happened within Dawa and the larger State of Law list over the
decision to back Abadi?
During his eight years as prime minister, Maliki
consolidated his personal power within state institutions. He created a
constituency and network of support that was relatively independent from the
Dawa Party. This was more obvious in his office where he increased his reliance
on people attached to him through kinship, rather than history or ideology. As
the influence of his son, Ahmed, and his sons-in-law grew stronger, senior
members of Dawa Party felt more alienated. This is often cited as the reason
why Maliki’s former Chief of staff, Tariq Najm, resigned from this office, to
be replaced by a weaker person. During the last Parliamentary elections,
Maliki’s son-in-laws won a larger number of seats in Karbala than the senior
Dawa member, Ali al-Adib.
In addition, there was a growing tension within the State of
Law (SOL) coalition between Dawa senior members who were in the party during
its long presence in exile, and “new-comers” such as Hanan al-Fatlawi and
Khalaf Abd Assamad, who gained more prominence thanks to their personal
attachment to Maliki.
However, those internal strains do not give full explanation
for the undeclared split within SOL and Dawa which led to the nomination of
Abadi as prime minister. It was obvious that the pressure of the U.S.
government to replace Maliki after the shocking fall of Mosul and other major
cities in the hands of ISIS, and Sistani’s call for a change in the leadership
were important factors. Abadi and other senior Dawa members, such as Walid
Al-Hilli, Ali al-Alaq and Ali al-Adib, concluded that the insistence on
granting Maliki a third term would jeopardize the party’s chance to maintain
the position of prime minister. This position might be the only reason this
“elitist” party, which is led by Shi’a laymen rather than a clerical family,
remained a key actor in Iraqi and Shi’a politics. This was why they chose to
write to Sistani asking his advice, which they already knew before they
received his answer. They wanted to refer to a higher ethical authority in
order to justify what Maliki would consider a “betrayal” to him, given the fact
that SOL won most of its seats because of Maliki’s popularity, outreach and
patronage. Interestingly, it was Abadi who first revealed the party’s decision
to comply with the Sistani’s instructions.
I should mention also that Abadi and Maliki have different
backgrounds that created a distance between them. In exile, they belonged to
different wings of the Dawa party. Abadi was part of the UK-based wing which
included Mowafaq al-Rubei, Ibrahim Jaafari and Tariq Najm, while Maliki was
operating in Syria. Given the decentralized nature of the party’s structure, it
was only natural that region-based solidarities became strong over time,
sometimes overpassing ideological affinities. Additionally, Maliki came from
rural origins and seemed to be more inclined to those who shared a similar
social background. Abadi who was born and grew up in Baghdad, came from an
urbanized family in Karada. This division was rarely highlighted, but I argue
that regional and social backgrounds are significant in shaping political
alignments in Iraq.
Maliki accepted Abadi’s premiership, but still thinks he was
betrayed and denied his right as the winner in the election. He repeated in his
interviews that leaders must not be replaced during the war. Abadi feels that
Maliki’s networks within the state are working against him, and Maliki’s
alliance with the Iranian-backed militias is impeding his ability to act as an
effective leader.
Abadi is facing a strong challenge as he tries not to
officially split the SOL, because this will deprive him from the advantage of
acting on behalf of the largest coalition in the parliament and the Shi’a
alliance. At the same time, he seeks to resist pressures from Maliki, who is
still presented as the leader of SOL, and his allies in the coalition and Shi’a
paramilitary groups.
2. Abadi announced a
number of reforms starting in August in response to a new wave of protests in
Iraq calling for better services and ending corruption. How has his program
been received and what effect has it had on his political position?
Abadi saw in the protests an opportunity to build his
personal constituency and to initiate the desperately needed reforms that
became more urgent as a result of the economic crisis and decline in oil
prices. It was also an opportunity to be released from the pressures of Maliki
and his allies without having to make big concessions to other parties. His
first set of reforms were received enthusiastically by protesters to the extent
that some carried Abadi’s pictures during Friday's demonstrations that followed
their announcement. Many Iraqis liked
the idea of having a strong leader who is willing to remove three
vice-presidents and three PM deputies in one decision. The apportionment
‘muhassessa’ system is very hated by most Iraqis and is widely blamed for turning
the state into fiefdoms of ruling parties. Therefore, a leader who is strong
enough to challenge those parties and stop their plundering of state resources
would gain popularity. Let us remember that Maliki’s popularity among Shi’as
was partly based on his promise to end muhassessa and form a majority
government.
However, Abadi’s good days seem to be over. The protesters’
expectations were greater than his ability to deliver. This is not only Abadi’s
problem; it is also the protesters’. Abadi needed momentum to make more drastic
changes. He needed to keep having what can be claimed as a ‘popular mandate’ to
continue his reforms and embarrass reluctant parties. But when the protests
lost their momentum, the ‘exceptional’ mandate given to Abadi by parliament was
withdrawn.
While it was useful to see the word ‘reform’ entering Iraqi
political discourse, it is still unclear the extent to which Iraq’s
dysfunctional state can be reformed without having to create further political
tensions. Some of Abadi’s decisions, especially the sacking of Vice-Presidents,
were not implemented and seemed to be unconstitutional. Now he has to cooperate
with parliament and negotiate with major parties to have the 2016 budget
passed. If the economic crisis deepens, as can be predicted, Abadi will face
more pressure from the street, and might resort to the same language previously
used by Maliki in blaming the parliament and its parties for making his task
more difficult. But Iraq cannot afford more of the same. Political bickering in
the time of economic hardship could be very costly. Therefore, Abadi’s
political future will largely rely on the way he will handle the mounting
economic pressure and the probable social discontent. There is not much he can
do by himself, except in trying to read the political scene rightly and insist
on a clear reform agenda that can be supported by the Shi’a clerical
establishment and civil society.
3. Today there is
talk that the National Alliance that includes the Sadrists, the Supreme Council,
Fadhila, the National Reform list and State of Law has split over Abadi as well
and the premier is attempting to form a new coalition. Who is on what side in
this split and what are your prospects for Abadi’s future?
Some think of the increasing intra-Shi’a divisions as an
outcome of competition between Khameni and Sistani, or more precisely, between
the revolutionary wing of the Iranian regime and the conservative clerical
establishment in Najaf. It is not a secret that Sistani was not happy seeing
the Iranian-backed groups controlling the Hashd and turning it into a tool in
the hand of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards. He does not want to see the state
completely hijacked by those groups, which is why he backed Abadi to stand more
resolutely in the face of Maliki-[Badr’s Hadi] Amiri-[Asaib Ahl Al-Haq’s Qais]
Khaza’ali alliance. The protest movement offered an opportunity to reduce
Maliki’s influence and isolate the most radical trends in the Hashd. But
Sisitani’s moves are very calculated and they will not convert into an explicit
engagement in those political competitions; nor was his support to Abadi
unconditional. Abadi’s latest visit to Najaf showed that the clerical
establishment is more open to him than it was to Maliki in his last years in
office. But Sistani’s reluctance to meet him showed also that Abadi needs to do
more to earn the marja’s trust.
Realizing that he does not control SOL, Abadi looked for
support from outside the coalition. He tried to use the protesters’ demands to
build a personal constituency, but does not seem to have succeeded. Now he
faces the choice between strengthening his ties with Maliki’s rivals,
especially Moqtada al-Sadr and Ammar al-Hakim, or trying again to work from
within SOL which requires a rapprochement with Maliki. His latest visit to
Najaf and insistence that his decision to cancel the positions of
Vice-Presidents indicate that he is more inclined to take the first direction.
But would that lead to forming a new coalition? I doubt it.
Abadi would prefer to maintain the formal existence of SOL to the end of his
current term and work from within the Shi’a alliance. He might become closer to
the Sadrists and Fadhila (ISCI usually prefer to be a free rider in such a
context). This will give him just enough leverage to face the 50-60 MPs block
that is still loyal to Maliki. But in order to strengthen his position further,
he will need to improve his relations with the Sunnis and Kurds. This means
controlling the Hashd and finding a clear formula to integrate Sunni fighters
in the military structure.
As a result of the complications entailed in any major
change in the existing coalitions, my guess is that Abadi will not make big
ventures. He will move tactically to the degree that he can retain his position
and embody the minimum consensus within the Shi’a alliance.
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