Iraq’s Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi is facing his newest challenge with disarming the pro-Iran Resistance groups. This time he is in the middle of a heated dispute with Kataib Hezbollah that could lead to an armed confrontation.
On November 13 PM Zaidi ordered a military raid upon the Kataib Hezbollah base in Jurf al-Sakhr in Babil. Three brigades were ready to enter the area based upon accusations that Kataib Hezbollah was involved in oil smuggling. The operation was leaked and the ruling Coordination Framework got the premier to call it off.
A government investigative committee did arrive to look into the accusations against Kataib Hezbollah. Before that the group had been able to change the composition of the committee to a more friendly orientation. When it was allowed in it only went to pre-determined sites where predictably they found nothing.
Out of frustration PM Zaidi fired nine security and oil officials in Babil, the Oil Ministry and Interior Ministry. His office of commander in chief said that the intelligence about smuggling was right and then gave Kataib Hezbollah until the end of the week to turn over Jurf al-Sakrh to government control.
This began with an intelligence report and photos being leaked to the press. On November 9 the media reported that a government report detailed oil smuggling in Jurf al-Sakhr. As a result on November 12 Zaidi ordered an investigative committee formed to look into the matter. This was led by the head of the Hashd Commission’s Director General of Security. This meant that the committee was compromised because the Hashd Commission is controlled by the Pro-Iran Resistance which Kataib Hezbollah is a member of.
The origins of this quarrel started when PM Zaidi personally took control of negotiations with the Resistance over giving up their weapons. The first thing he did was reject a tentative agreement the Coordination Framework made with the factions that included having the Turkish military withdraw from northern Iraq, making Iranian opposition groups leave the country, and giving them more positions in the government and security forces. Kataib Hezbollah wanted control of some border crossings, several border guard units, the investment commissions in Basra, Baghdad, Karbala, Muthanna, and Najaf, five deputy ministers, 32 director generals and positions in the Defense and Interior Ministries, the National Intelligence Service and the National Security Service. Getting members into the bureaucracy is important to all armed and political factions because it allows them to give out positions to their followers in patronage networks, loot the state treasury, and gain influence over the government. This greatly angered Kataib Hezbollah whose political wing the Hoquq Movement publicly accused the premier of abandoning the deal.
Kataib Hezbollah then went on the offensive accusing the prime minister and his family of corruption. It asked why Iraq was selling oil to the UAE for discounted prices and claimed that U.S. special envoy to Iraq and Syria Tom Barrack and Zaidi’s brother Hassan al-Zaidi were profiting from it. Kataib Hezbollah also questioned how Zaidi made his fortune and became a wealthy businessman. It also claimed that Zaidi had far more advisers then were allowed by law and asked about their salaries and bonuses implying that the prime minister was using his office to enrich his supporters.
PM Zaidi fired back by cancelling three contracts at Mosul airport linked to the Resistance. The anti-corruption Integrity Commission said that deals were being manipulated by armed groups.
At the same time the government has been worried that Kataib Hezbollah and the Resistance would drag Iraq back into the Iran War if it restarted. On November 4 Iranian Revolutionary Guard Quds Force commander General Ismail Qaani said the Resistance responded to orders by Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Mojtaba Khamenei that they would respond to any attack upon Tehran. Kataib Hezbollah stated that there would be no limits on its strikes upon the U.S. which would be targeted everywhere if Iran were to be attacked.
The security forces were deployed to certain areas to try to deter any operations by the pro-Iran groups. This resulted in three Hashd members being arrested in Latifiya in southern Baghdad province on November 6 with 35 missiles. It was implied that they came from Babil which is where Kataib Hezbollah has its base at Jurf al-Sakhr.
Next the Khor Mor gas field in Sulaymaniya was struck by drones on November 8. This caused major damage to storage and loading facilities and pipelines. The field is still offline and has cost Kurdistan 2,800 megawatts of electricity. It was reported that the drones came from Tuz Kharmato in Salahaddin governorate which has been the site of previous attacks by the Resistance upon the Kurds. It’s not much of an assumption that Kataib Hezbollah might be behind this incident.
As it stands PM Zaidi and Kataib Hezbollah are still heading towards a collision course. The Framework has been able to mediate and stop a military clash but it has not stopped either side from attacking the other. This only means that tensions will continue to rise and the chances of the two sides shooting at each other will continue to increase.
SOURCES
Al Alam, “After the Collapse of the Denial Narrative: How Satellite Imagery Redrew the Map of Influence and Accountability in Jurf al-Sakhr,” 11/15/26
- “The Scent of Oil and the “Alert Level C” Gunpowder: Jurf al-Sakhr Brings the State and the “Coordination Framework” Face-to-Face,’ Unmasked,” 11/14/26
Asharq Al-Awsat, “Fears of Armed Factions Spiraling Out of Control in Renewed War Spur Iraqi Contacts,” 11/4/26
- “Iraqi Investigation Accuses Armed Factions of Manipulating Airport Contracts,” 11/5/26
- “PMF-Led Government Committee Enters Iraq’s Jurf al-Sakhar,” 11/14/26
Al Hurra, “Exclusive: Leak Forced Iraq’s PM to Call Off Raid on Kataib Hezbollah Stronghold Sources Say,” 11/13/26
- “Exclusive: Potential Violence Looms between Al-Zaidi and Iran-Backed Militias,” 11/9/26
Hussein, Mohammed, Van Heuvelen, Ben, “Attack knocks Khor Mor field offline threatening weeks of power cuts,” Iraq Oil Report, 11/10/26
Kurdistan 24, “Iraq Weapons Deal Claim Disputed,” 11/2/26
- “Iraqi Sources Say Drone That Hit Khor More Was Launched from Tuz Khurmatu,” 11/9/26
- “Kataib Hezbollah: No Line Will Limit Our Strikes,” 11/5/26
- “Zaidi Cancels Three Companies; Contracts At Mosul Airport,” 11/7/26
Al Mada, “Behind the Scenes of the “Kata’ib Hezbollah” Attack: Why Did Al-Zaidi Exclude the Shiite Committee from Arms Negotiations?” 11/5/26
- “The Factions’ Arms: An Agreement with Open-Ended Outcomes; Ambiguity Surrounds Al-Zaidi’s Signature,” 11/3/26
- “Factions Backtrack on Disarmament Understandings, Clinging to Weapons in Anticipation of War with Iran,” 11/8/26
NINA, “Qaani announces that the “Resistance Front” has responded to Khamenei’s orders regarding dealing “without limits” with the enemy,” 11/4/26
Reuters, “Drone attack targets Iraq's Khor More gas field, sources say,” 11/8/26
Rudaw, “Pro-Iran Kataib Hezbollah lambasts Iraqi PM over UAE oil deal, sovereignty violations,” 11/4/26
Al-Samarraie, Jawad, "Shia leaders launch urgent mediation to defuse standoff between Al Zaidi and armed factions," Iraqi News, 11/8/26
Shafaq News, “Exclusive: Al-Zaidi threatens military intervention in Jurf Al-Sakhr,” 11/15/26
- “Kataib Hezbollah-linked MP questions Al-Zaidi’s wealth and advisers,” 11/8/26
- “On the road to Babylon … Members of the Popular Mobilization Forces arrested in possession of 35 missiles,” 11/6/26
- “PMF security chief to lead Jurf al-Sakhr smuggling probe,” 11/12/26
- “Satellite report flags suspected oil smuggling in Iraq’s Jurf al-Sakhr,” 11/9/26


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