Violence In Iraq, April 2016

Violence has been slowly creeping back up in Iraq in 2016. The number of reported incidents was higher in the first four months of the year compared to the last quarter of 2015. This was in part due to new government offensives, which led to Islamic State counterattacks. At the same time the militants were carrying out more operations in places like Diyala, Baghdad, and the south. All together that led to a rising tide of attacks.

In April there were 599 reported incidents. That was lower than the 665 recorded in March, the highest amount of the year, but above the 549 in February, and the same as January’s 598. When averaged out there have were 19.2 attacks per day in January, 18.9 in February, 21.4 in March, and 19.9 in April. Those figures compared to 21.9 incidents per day in the third quarter of 2015, and 18.1 in the fourth.

Avg. Attacks Per Day

3^rd Qtr 2015 21.9

4^th Qtr 2015 18.1

Jan 19.2

Feb 18.9

Mar 21.4

Apr 19.9

There have been two causes for the increase in violence in the country. The first was counterattacks to government offensives. That accounted for the 92 incidents in Anbar in April, the 81 in Ninewa, and the 50 in Kirkuk. In Anbar, the government continued to clear out the Ramadi sector, while also freeing Hit and moving into the Hit-Haditha Valley. The operations in Fallujah and Garma however continued to stall going through the same areas that have been fought over for months. In Kirkuk the Hashd and Peshmerga freed Bashir, and in Ninewa a move was made in the Makhmour district south of Mosul. Those all evoked violent responses from the Islamic State. Meanwhile, in Baghdad and Diyala, IS has been launching new terrorist operations, along with bombings in southern Iraq.

The increase was seen in the average attacks per day. In December 2015 there were 2.4 incidents per day in Anbar, than reaching 3.0-3.1 in 2016. Baghdad went from 7.7 per day in December to over 9 in March and April. Diyala saw an average of 0.7 attacks per day in December, and then went to 1.4 per day in March and April. Ninewa was already high at 3.0 attacks per day in December, then dipped to 1.8 and 1.6 in February, before going back up to 2.7 in March and April. Finally, Kirkuk saw 0.7 incidents per day in December and January, and then more than doubled to 1.6 by April.

Attacks In Most Violence Provinces In Iraq Dec 2015-Apr 2016

	Anbar	Baghdad	Diyala	Ninewa	Kirkuk
Dec	2.4	7.7	0.7	3.0	0.7
Jan	3.0	8.5	1.3	1.8	0.7
Feb	3.1	8.9	1.1	1.6	1.7
Mar	3.1	9.9	1.4	2.7	1.4
Apr	3.0	9.1	1.4	2.7	1.6

In Anbar there were 92 attacks, 226 dead and 234 wounded reported in the media for April. Almost all of those casualties came in the center of the province as IS tried to fight back government advances in places like Hit, Baghdadi, Subhait, Kubaisa, while holding its ground in the Fallujah and Garma districts. Almost all of the 111 civilian deaths and 147 injured came from Ramadi. Two mass graves were discovered there, while around 200 people were killed and injured when local leaders encouraged people to return to the city before it was cleared of IEDs. 4 suicide car bombs and 6 suicide bombers also hit the security forces, while they claimed to have killed 65 suicide bombers and blown up 87 car bombs. Those numbers are regularly inflated, and usually can be detected in press reports that start off with one car bomb destroyed in the morning, which becomes several by the end of the day along with some suicide bombers thrown in. Overall, the government has steadily gained ground in the governorate, but has been unable to hold onto the smaller towns, which consistently change hands.

12 were killed in Babil, and another 38 wounded there in 17 incidents. Violence returned to its normally low level in the province in April after two large suicide bombings in March. Almost all of the incidents occurred in the northern section of the governorate where IS moved into after it lost its long time base in Jurf al-Sakhr. Usually there are just a couple shootings and IEDs, which was what occurred in April with 2 sticky bombs, 3 gunfire incidents, and 13 IEDs.

The capital has become the main target of the Islamic State as it loses territory in the country. There were 273 incidents there leading to 413 dead and 1,006 wounded. IS picked up its bombings in the governorate with 4 suicide bombers and 8 car bombs. In comparison there was just 1 suicide bomber and no successful car bombs in Baghdad in March, 4 suicide bombers and 1 car bomb in February, and 3 suicide bombers and 3 car bombs in January. The 8 car bombs in April was the most the province had seen since 11 went off in August 2015.

Southern Baghdad continued to face the most violence. There were 101 incidents there versus 55 in the east, 53 in the north, 43 in the west, 16 in the center, and 5 in unknown locations. The south witnessed a mortar attack, 2 car bombs, 2 grenade attacks, 7 sticky bombs, 16 shootings, and 71 IEDs. In the east incidents were a mixture of IS attacks along with vigilantes, criminals, and Hashd elements, which was shown with 1 stabbing, 3 kidnappings, 4 major robberies, and 13 bodies being dumped there. The capital like the rest of the country has seen a growth in crime with the insecurity. There were 10 kidnappings reported, 14 robberies of sizeable sums of money, and 34 bodies found in the streets during the month.

Violence in Baghdad Apr 2016

Center: 16 – 1 Suicide Bomber Arrested, 1 Kidnapping, 1 Sticky Bombs, 1 Robbery, 3 Shootings, 9 IEDs

East: 42 –1 Suicide Bomber, 1 Grenade, 1 Stabbing, 2 Suicide Car Bombs, 2 Kidnappings, 2

Shooting/Robberies, 5 Sticky Bombs, 3 Robbers, 8 IEDs, 17 shooting

Outer East: 13 – 1 Suicide Truck Bomb, 1 Kidnapping, 1 Shooting/Robbery, 2 Sticky Bombs, 2 Shootings,

6 IEDs

North: 20 – 1 Suicide Bomber, 1 Suicide Car Bomb, 1 Robbery, 1 Mortar, 2 Kidnappings, 2 Sticky Bombs,

4 Shootings, 8 IEDs

Outer North: 33 – 1 Suicide Bomber, 1 Shooting/Robbery, 1 Gunfire/Kidnapping, 2 Suicide Car Bombs,

2 Sticky Bombs, 6 Shootings, 20 IEDs

South: 48 – 1 Kidnapping, 1 Robbery, 5 Sticky Bombs, 8 Shootings, 33 IEDs

Outer South: 53 – 1 Car Bomb, 1 Suicide Car Bomb, 1 Mortar, 2 Sticky Bombs, 2 Grenades, 8 Shootings,

38 IEDs

West: 24 – 1 Robbery, 1 Shooting/Kidnapping, 1 Shooting/Robbery, 3 Sticky Bombs, 3 Shootings, 14 IEDs

Outer West: 19 – 1 Suicide Bomber Killed, 1 Suicide Bomber, 2 Suicide Car Bombs Destroyed, 2 Mortars,

2 Shootings, 13 IEDs

Unknown: 5 – 1 Newspaper Raided, 1 Shooting/Robbery, 1 Shooting, 2 Kidnappings

Basra witnessed a change from its usual low-level political violence and tribal conflicts when a suicide car bomb went off in Basra City that killed 5 and wounded 13. That was the first such incident since October 2015. Since IS lost its base in Jurf al-Sakhr, Babil there have been hardly any car bombings in all of southern Iraq. Hitting Basra was another sign that the Islamic State was moving towards terrorism to make up for its defeats on the battlefield.

Similarly, there was a suicide bombing in Dhi Qar, while another was arrested before he could set off his device. The successful bombing killed 14 and wounded another 27. The last time the governorate was bombed was June 2013 when a car bomb went off.

IS has picked up its operations in Diyala with a suicide bomber, another one killed, and a car bomb destroyed. Overall, there were 43 incidents there in April with 29 dead and 40 wounded. Those were spread out over almost every region of the governorate. IS still holds several bases in the province such as Abu Saida and the Hamrin Mountains, which it has used to attack the surrounding provinces, but now is using to hit Diyala as well.

In Karbala there was one incident when some rockets were found before they could be triggered and launched.

During the month the Peshmerga and Hashd were able to liberate the town of Bashir in the south. That provoked a large number of counter attacks by IS, which accounted for reports that 8 suicide bombers were killed, and 15 car bombs destroyed. The fighting in that area accounted for most of the 54 dead, 124 wounded, and 50 incidents in April.

The Iraqi forces continued to struggle with its Makhmour campaign. Very little ground was freed due to bad weather, an initial lack of air support, and green troops who were deploying to combat as a unit for the first time. That led to several stalls, and the government still has not had any major breakthroughs, only some heavy casualties. The operation was launched to secure several bases in the district that house both American and Turkish trainers. Those were still being hit during the month.

In the territory still held by IS in Ninewa, it was carrying out its regular executions. The group reportedly killed 163 people in April. Two mass graves were also discovered with Yazidis and members of the security forces in them. There was also a report that the group executed 250 women for not cooperating. All together there were 81 reported incidents, 612 killed, and 167 wounded for the month.

Violence has dropped off considerably in Salahaddin, which used to regularly have some of the highest attack numbers each month. After the Hashd led offensive freed Baiji, most of the fighting has been limited to skirmishes in the Ajeel and Alas oil fields and the Makhmour Mountains in the northeast, and the rural areas surrounding Samarra in the center. What has changed is that IS elements have re-infiltrated into Baiji and Tikrit. Every week now there are reports of shootings, IEDs, and occasional clashes there as well. With most of the major units moving on to other areas of the province and country that has allowed space for insurgents to move back in. This points to the continuing dilemma for the government to maintain security in freed districts.

There were 13 successful vehicle borne improvised explosive devices (VBIEDs) in April. Those occurred in Basra, 1, Anbar, 4, and Baghdad, 8. The government claimed it destroyed another 171, an obvious exaggeration. Too many times Iraqi forces claim every major attack includes at least one VBIED and then increase the number blown up as the day progresses. That makes it impossible to determine how many car bombs were actually launched each month, and whether they have gone up or down overall.

Violence In Iraq 2015-16

Date	Incidents	Dead	Wounded
JAN	911	2,656	3,032 + 150
FEB	730	2,345	2,366
MAR	820	2,665	2,529
APR	751	2,753	2,621
MAY	674	2,565 + 1,499	1,952 + 646
JUN	708	2,153 + 405	2,174
JUL	688	2,716	3,198 + 4,024
AUG	684	2,440 + 760	1,777
SEP	649	1,731	1,668 + 3,003
OCT	589	1,144	1,555
NOV	530	1,174	1,455 + 124 + 1,322
DEC	553	1,155	1,252 + 5,920
Jan 1-7	150	808	421
Jan 8-14	140	436	417
Jan 15-21	135	275	227
Jan 22-28	132	392	322
Jan 29-31	41	81	334
JAN	598	2,052	1,721
Feb 1-7	146	575	313
Feb 8-14	119	146	323
Feb 15-21	130	225	239
Feb 22-29	153	371	690
FEB	549	1,281	1,566
Mar 1-7	183	321	478
Mar 8-14	168	408	415
Mar 15-21	130	349	409
Mar 22-28	135	213	420
Mar 29-31	49	172	121
MAR	665	1,463	1,843
Apr 1-7	144	239	444
Apr 8-14	141	271	391
Apr 15-21	124	436	242
Apr 22-28	160	413	524
Apr 29-30	30	61	121
APR	599	1,420	1,722

Security By Province Apr 15-21, 2016

Province	Incidents
Anbar	92 Incidents 226 Killed: 1 Sahwa, 1 Hashd, 111 Civilians, 113 ISF 234 Wounded: 1 Hashd, 2 Sahwa, 84 ISF, 147 Civilians 35 Shootings 13 IEDs 6 Suicide Bombers 4 Suicide Car Bombs 5 Rockets 10 Mortars 65 Suicide Bombers Killed 36 Suicide Car Bombs Destroyed 51 Car Bombs Destroyed
Babil	17 Incidents 12 Killed: 2 Hashd, 4 ISF, 6 Civilians 38 Wounded: 9 Hashd, 13 ISF, 16 Civilians 3 Shootings 13 IEDs 2 Sticky Bombs
Baghdad	273 Incidents 413 Killed: 8 Sahwa, 21 Hashd, 38 ISF, 346 Civilians 1,006 8 Sahwa, 34 Hashd, 107 ISF, 857 Civilians 62 Shootings 148 IEDs 24 Sticky Bombs 4 Suicide Bombers 7 Suicide Car Bombs 1 Car Bomb 4 Mortars 3 Grenades 2 Suicide Bombers Killed/Arrested 2 Suicide Car Bombs Destroyed
Basra	3 Incidents 6 Killed: 6 Civilians 13 Wounded: 13 Civilians 1 Shooting 1 IED 1 Sound Bomb 1 Suicide Car Bomb
Dhi Qar	2 Incidents 14 Killed: 14 Civilians 27 Wounded: 27 Civilians 1 Suicide Bomber 1 Suicide Bomber Killed
Diyala	43 Incidents 29 Killed: 2 Hashd, 3 ISF, 24 Civilians 40 Wounded: 2 Hashd, 4 ISF, 34 Civilians 15 Shootings 9 IEDs 1 Suicide Bomber 6 Mortars 1 Suicide Bomber Killed 1 Car Bomb Destroyed
Karbala	1 Incident 1 Rockets
Kirkuk	50 Incidents 54 Killed: 1 Peshmerga, 3 ISF, 20 Hashd, 30 Civilians 124 Wounded: 3 ISF, 3 Civilians, 9 Peshmerga, 109 Hashd 22 Shootings 8 IEDs 1 Suicide Bomber 3 Rockets 3 Mortars 8 Suicide Bombers Killed/Arrested 8 Suicide Car Bombs Destroyed 7 Car Bombs Destroyed
Ninewa	81 Incidents 612 Killed: 1 Volunteer, 1 Hashd, 50 Peshmerga, 81 ISF, 479 Civilians 167 Wounded: 20 Volunteers, 35 ISF, 112 Peshmerga 28 Shootings 68 IEDs 6 Mortars 4 Rockets 45 Suicide Bombers Killed 24 Suicide Car Bombs Destroyed 30 Car Bombs Destroyed
Salahaddin	37 Incidents 54 Killed: 6 ISF, 9 Peshmerga, 10 Civilians, 29 Hashd 73 Wounded: 6 Peshmerga, 7 ISF, 13 Civilians, 47 Hashd 27 Shootings 1 IED 3 Mortars 13 Suicide Bombers Killed 3 Suicide Car Bombs Destroyed 9 Car Bombs Destroyed

Car Bombs In Iraq Apr, 2016

Date	Car Bombs	Dead	Wounded
Apr 1	Hit, Anbar
Apr 2	Hit, Anbar – 3 destroyed
Apr 3
Apr 4	Baghdadi x2, Anbar Meshada & Taji, Baghdad Basra, Basra Baghdadi, Rashad, Shihabi, Subhait, Anbar – 21 destroyed Abu Ghraib, Baghdad – 2 destroyed Nasir, Ninewa – 6 destroyed Siniya, Salahaddin – 2 destroyed	16	35
Apr 5	New Baghdad, Baghdad Baghdadi & Subhait, Anbar – 9 destroyed Tal Ahmed, Kirkuk – 1 destroyed Makhmour, Nasir, Ninewa – 13 destroyed	3	14
Apr 6	Kubaisa, Anbar – 3 destroyed Nasir, Ninewa – 7 destroyed
Apr 7	160 Kilo, Garma, Hit, Anbar – 7 destroyed Tal Ahmed, Kirkuk – 3 Destroyed Hardan, Ninewa – 2 destroyed Shirqat-Baiji Road, Salahaddin – 2 destroyed
Totals	7 – 81 Destroyed	19	49
Apr 8	Hit, Anbar – 10 destroyed Makhmour, Ninewa – 7 destroyed
Apr 9	Albu Bali, Anbar Hit & Subhait, Anbar – 6 destroyed	12	2
Apr 10	Bashir, Kirkuk – 3 destroyed Nasir, Ninewa – 1 destroyed Baiji, Salahaddin – 2 destroyed
Apr 11
Apr 12	Hit, Anbar – 1 destroyed Nasir, Ninewa – 2 destroyed
Apr 13	Makhmour & Nasir, Ninewa – 3 destroyed
Apr 14	Makhoul, Salahaddin – 1 destroyed
Totals	1 – 36 Destroyed	12	2
Apr 15
Apr 16	Haj Ali, Ninewa – 4 destroyed
Apr 17	Khasfa, Anbar – 1 destroyed
Apr 18	Bashir & Tel Ahmed, Kirkuk – 5 destroyed
Apr 19	Baghdadi, Anbar – 3 destroyed
Apr 20
Apr 21	Saqlawiya, Anbar – 1 destroyed Bashir, Kirkuk – 1 destroyed Siniya, Salahaddin – 4 destroyed
Totals	0 – 19 Destroyed	-	-
Apr 22
Apr 23	Arab Jabour & Rashidiya, Baghdad Siniya, Salahaddin – 1 destroyed	10	36
Apr 24
Apr 25	New Baghdad & Shakha, Baghdad Baghdadi, Anbar – 3 destroyed	13	43
Apr 26
Apr 27	Albu Tapah, Garma, Hit Valley & Thar Thar, Anbar – 10 destroyed
Apr 28	Boutaya & Dolab, Anbar – 6 destroyed Baquba, Diyala – 1 destroyed Mahana, Ninewa – 7 destroyed
Totals	4 – 28 Destroyed	23	79
Apr 29	Khazraj, Anbar – 2 destroyed Muhana, Ninewa – 1 destroyed
Apr 30	Nahrawan, Baghdad Noaam, Anbar – 1 destroyed Bashir, Kirkuk – 1 destroyed Makhmour, Ninewa – 1 destroyed	43	19
TOTALS	1 – 6 Destroyed	43	19
GRAND TOTAL	13 – 171 Destroyed	97	149

SOURCES

Adel, Loaa, "International coalition foils suicide attack on Baghdadi's eastern entrance," Iraqi News, 4/25/16

Alsumaria, "Baghdad Operations announced the death of one soldier and wounding four others blown up in Husseiniya," 4/23/16

Al Forat, "Foil Daash car bomb east of Baghdadi district Anbar," 4/30/16

Al Maalomah, "17 martyrs and wounded from the security forces north of Baghdad from a suicide bomber blowing up," 4/23/16

- "The destruction of a booby-trapped vehicle by Daash south of Mosul," 4/30/16

- "The destruction of three Daash car bombs east of Fallujah," 4/27/16

- "Two suicide bombers killed by aerial bombardment in Thar Thar," 4/27/16

Al Mada, "Daash bombed in al-Baghdadi complex by International Alliance targeting rocket launchers," 4/27/16

- "Death toll in suicide bombing north Baghdad up to 35 dead and wounded," 4/23/16

- "Thwarted a suicide car bomb attack targeting security forces south of Mosul," 4/29/16

- "Turkmen crowd thwarted a suicide car bomb east of al-Bashir," 4/30/16

Mamoun, Abdelhak, "6 Iraqi army members killed, wounded in car bomb explosion south of Baghdad," Iraqi News, 4/25/16

- "Jazeera Operations forces kill 21 ISIS members west of Ramadi, 203 IEDs dismantled," Iraqi News, 4/28/16

- "Security forces foil suicide attack in Karma District, 7 ISIS members killed," Iraqi News, 4/28/16

Morris, Loveday, "Islamic State targets Shiite pilgrims in Iraq, but detonates truck bomb in a market instead," Washington Post, 4/30/16

New Sabah, "Security file," 4/26/16

NINA, "Defense Ministry announces the return of more than /41/ thousand families to Haditha District," 4/23/16

- "Security Forces Foil An Attack For Daash South Of Mosul," 4/28/16

Salaheddin, Sinan, "Iraq: Car Bombing in Baghdad Kills at Least 12 Civilians," Associated Press, 4/25/16

Shafaq News, "Iraqi police finds 2 mass graves in Islamic State-free Ramadi," 4/20/16

Sotaliraq, "Car Bomb dismantled near Baquba government building," 4/28/16

- "Killing and wounding of 11 soldiers in a second car bomb attack in Baghdad," 4/23/16

- "Security committee in Basra council declares the killing and wounding of 18 civilian in bombing in Kakh Street," 4/4/16

- "Some 80 people killed in separate attacks across Iraq," 4/4/16

Xinhua, "24 killed in truck bomb explosion near Iraq's Baghdad," 4/30/16

- "Security forces free 2 villages in Iraq's Anbar, 27 IS militants killed," 4/30/16

Musings On Iraq In The News

eKurd re-printed my interview with Wladimir van Wilgenburg on the relationship between Iraq and Syria’s Kurds. I was mentioned in "Who is Muqtada al-Sadr? The Man Leading Iraq's Anti-Government Protests" by Alessandria Masi in the International Business Times.

MIDDLE EAST INSTITUTE VIDEO: Recruiting For Jihad The Allure of ISIS

COLLEGE OF THE MAINLAND VIDEO: The Islamic State And US Foreign Policy Dr Daniel Byman

More On Syria’s Support For Iraq’s Insurgency 2011-2012

The Syrian government was one of the earliest supporters of the Iraq insurgency. Fearing that U.S. presence next door, Damascus began allowing its nationals and other foreign fighters go to Iraq even before the 2003 invasion. The Syrians maintained that backing all the way up to 2012 even when their own country fell into war.  

Iraqi officials complained about Syria’s support for militants throughout 2011. At the end of January a group of insurgents were caught in Anbar crossing over from Syria. (1) The head of the provincial security committee claimed they got aid from the Syrian government. He went on to say that Syria would remain a threat to Iraq as long as President Assad remained in power. That was before the Syrian conflict had started however. When that finally began, Damascus still found time to maintain its role in Iraq. In April the Anti-Terrorism Police arrested 12 officers who were involved in insurgent attacks over the last two years with help from Syrian intelligence. (2) The next month a member of the Anbar council blamed Damascus for the lack of security in Iraq because it was still allowing militants to use its territory. (3) Finally, in November Deputy Interior Minister Adnan al-Asadi claimed that Baathists in Syria were working with the Islamic State of Iraq to carry out suicide bombings. Those all showed that as Syria fell into its own armed conflict that first year it was still actively involved in trying to undermine Baghdad. Foreign fighters and Iraqis were still based in its territory and using it as a safe haven to bring in money, material, and men for operations in Iraq. These networks were all created before the U.S. invasion under the supervision and active support of Damascus and its various security and intelligence agencies.

Another sign of Syria’s nefarious activities was its hosting of the Iraq Baath party. Many top Baathist functionaries fled to Syria after the U.S. invasion where President Assad attempted to co-opt them. For example, in November 2011, Syria’s Arrai TV aired a recording of Izzat al-Duri, the head of the Naqshibandi insurgent group criticizing Baghdad’s arrest of Baathists. By July 2012 when the Syrian war was really getting underway the two wings of the Baathist Party, one led by Mohammed Yunis al-Ahmad and the other by Duri were still being hosted by Syrian intelligence. (4) Their situation was getting difficult at that time as Iranians and Hebzollah fighters were trying to hunt them down, forcing many to move to other countries. Today the Naqshibandi is no longer active having been eclipsed and beaten into submission by the Islamic State. Its suspected that some of its cadres are still in Syria however.

Damascus was an active supporter of Iraq’s insurgency at least up to 2012. That was only abated when the Syrian war fully broke out and the Assad government had other things to deal with. Ironically, today there are thousands of Iraqis organized by Iran fighting for the same Syrian government. Some of the insurgent groups it supported are now fighting Assad as well. The instability and violence that Syria helped foster has now come back to haunt it.

SOURCES

1. Alsumaria, “Anbar: Syria still poses a risk on Iraq if regime is not changed,” 6/17/11

2. Al-Sabah, “12 Arrested Iraqi Policeman Acted For Syrian Intelligence Officers,” MEMRI Blog, 4/18/11

3. Aswat al-Iraq, “Better Security Due Syrian Occupation With Internal Affairs,” 5/24/11

4. “Iraqi Baathists in Syria Are Running Out of Friends,” Al-Zaman

SOURCES

Aswat al-Iraq, “Better Security Due Syrian Occupation With Internal Affairs,” 5/24/11

Ibrahim, Waleed, “Saddam deputy surfaces in audio recording: TV report,” Reuters, 11/11/11

Al-Laithi, Nidal, “Iraqi Baathists in Syria Are Running Out of Friends,” Al-Zaman, 7/22/12

Al-Sabah, “12 Arrested Iraqi Policeman Acted For Syrian Intelligence Officers,” MEMRI Blog, 4/18/11

Al-Salhy, Suadad, “U.S. pullout gives al Qaeda space in north, west Iraq,” Reuters, 11/18/11

Al-Sumaria, “Anbar: Syria still poses a risk on Iraq if regime is not changed,” 6/17/11

United States Department of State Bureau of Counterterrorism, “Country Reports on Terrorism 2011,” July 2012

Sadr Trying To Play Kingmaker In Iraq

Moqtada al-Sadr is attempting to become the pre-eminent party boss in Iraqi politics. After years of trying he finally co-opted the anti-corruption protest movement in Baghdad. That culminated in his followers temporarily taking over the Green Zone in the heart of the capital during the weekend. He has also become one of Prime Minister Haidar Abadi’s only supporters as he attempts to push through his reform package for the government. As Sadr has done before he wants to turn his pull with the Iraqi street into political power by dictating terms to the prime minister and threatening the other elites with future demonstrations if they do not comply.

Moqtada al-Sadr was able to take over the protest movement in Iraq to push his agenda. The latest demonstrations started in 2015. As usual they demanded an end to corruption, better services like electricity, and political reform. Sadr first called out his followers to join them in August. He then attempted to gain credibility with the masses by ordering his deputy premier Bahaa al-Araji to resign his position when Prime Minister Haidar Abadi announced that he was dismissing his deputies to save money. Then in February 2016 Sadr announced his own reform program that included a new non-partisan, technocratic cabinet like the one the prime minister suggested. He then gave Abadi a 45 day deadline to enact change. In the meantime he would hold more demonstrations. By March his people started a sit-in outside the Green Zone, culminating in Sadr himself walking into that sector and having his own personal protest. Finally, on April 30 Sadrists led crowds into the Green Zone occupying the area for the weekend. There were all kinds of complaints by Iraqi politicians against these actions, calling it mob rule to claiming it was the end of the post-2003 political order. Similar views were expressed in the foreign press. Mob rule might be the closest of those evaluations. Sadr has tried to take over these demonstrations unsuccessfully for years now. In 2016, he finally succeeded. His followers were able to co-opt the protesters’ and then impose his demands. He can now use them to threaten and intimidate the other ruling elite. That’s exactly what the march through the Green Zone was meant to do. Sadr did not want to overthrow the governing system as some claimed, but control it instead.

Sadr has also thrown around his weight in parliament and with Prime Minister Abadi. First, as Abadi pushed his reform package the other parties that backed him began peeling away, while Sadr’s Ahrar bloc remained with him. At the same time, the Sadrists became increasingly critical of the premier. For example, in November 2015 and January 2016 the bloc complained that Abadi wasn’t pushing hard enough on his changes. In February, a Sadr spokesman claimed the prime minister had missed a great opportunity to reform the government. Later that month the movement threatened to withdraw their support for Abadi if he didn’t move forward with his program, followed by remarks about a no confidence vote against him. Sadr then created a committee, which came up with 90 nominations for Abadi’s new cabinet. Finally, when the PM got his ministerial candidates before parliament in April the Sadrist MPs joined a sit in protest, which attempted to dismiss Speaker of Parliament Salim al-Jabouri, a strong ally of Abadi. Sadr then pulled his members and said the demonstrations should end so they could vote on Abadi’s ministers. All of these moves highlighted Sadr’s attempts to become the new boss in Iraqi politics. He wasn’t just satisfied with being a backer of the premier, he wanted to dictate the terms of his reform package using threats, protests, and jabs. His move to join the protesting MPs who tried to vote out Speaker Jabouri was meant to cut Abadi’s allies so that he would become more dependent upon Sadr. Just as the protests outside and eventually inside the Green Zone were meant to pressure the premier’s actions, Sadr’s machinations within the government were meant to strong arm Abadi to comply with Moqtada’s demands.

It is unclear what will become of Sadr’s strategy. Abadi’s attempt to take the ministries away from the ruling parties has angered almost everyone. That has fractured the dominate Shiite National Alliance with Dawa splitting between pro-Abadi and pro-Maliki factions, and the Supreme Council abandoning the PM. Again that is part of Sadr’s plans to make Ahrar the only bloc that Abadi can rely upon outside of his own Dawa members. On the other hand, the political discord makes it almost impossible to get anything through parliament, which is necessary to change the government. Sadr’s coercive methods must also be trying on Abadi’s nerves. In the end, Sadr could just be adding to the dysfunction in Baghdad, which would undermine his goal of becoming the kingmaker as paralysis will ensure rather than any meaningful change.

SOURCES

AIN, “Araji responds to Sadr order and resigns,” 8/10/15

eKurd, “Iraqi Kurds demand fair share in next cabinet to support Abadi,” 2/23/16

Iraq News Network, “Sadr directed his deputies to vote on the dismissal of the president of parliament,” 4/19/16

- “Sadrist: Abadi failed and weak,” 3/19/16

Kazimi, Nibras, “What is happening in Iraq?” Talisman Gate, Again, 2/23/16

Al Mada, “Abadi facing criticism from the Liberals and Citizens and dissatisfaction by the marjariya on the reluctance on reforms,” 1/11/16

- “Abadi mortgages the small committee and excludes the Ministers of Defense and Electricity,” 3/28/16

- “The Citizens and Liberals: the formation of a front for reform depends on Abadi obeying his partners,” 11/6/15

- “Karbala backstage meeting: the coalition parties proposed the nomination of technocrats for the ministries and independent bodies,” 3/7/16

- “Prime Minister will resort to Plan B in event of failure to convince the masses of his reforms,” 3/14/16

- “Protest in solidarity with Abadi’s decisions and want to hold the corrupt accountable,” 8/9/15

- “Rapprochement between State of Law and the Supreme Council paves the way for partial modification of nine ministries,” 3/17/16

- “Sit in deputies in parliament hall sign a code of conduct for the formation of a new government,” 4/12/16

Martin, Patrick with Anagnostos, Emily, Bessette, Rachel and Werman, Hannah, “Warning: Iraq’s Shi’a Parties Split Over Cabinet Reshuffle Amidst Protests,” Institute for the Study of War, 3/25/16

Middle East Eye, “Iraq’s Abadi unveils new cabinet list as Sadr ends protests,” 3/31/16

Morris, Loveday, “Protesters leave Baghdad’s Green Zone a day after ransacking parliament,” Washington Post, 5/1/16

New Sabah, “Abadi identifies two paths of reform and choice of ministers reached an advanced stage,” 2/29/16

NINA, “Tens Of Thousands Of Sadrist And Civil Activists Arrive To Tahir Square,” 3/11/16

Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, “Iraq’s Sadr Calls On Followers To Join Protests,” 8/24/15

Raheem, Kareem and Kalin, Stephen, “Iraq’s Sadr begins sit-in inside Green Zone to push for reforms,’ Reuters, 3/27/16

Reuters, “Powerful Iraq Shi’ite cleric says PM’s position at stake unless he reforms,” 2/26/16

Sotaliraq, “Sadr calls for demonstration in their millions next Friday in Tahrir Square,” 2/22/16

- “Sadr’s spokesman: Abadi missed a great opportunity and he could have overcome the crisis,” 2/21/16

Trofimov, Yaroslav, “Cleric’s Role Reversal Upends Iraq’s Political Order,” Wall Street Journal, 3/30/16

Xinhua, “Followers of Shiite cleric begin sit-in protest near Baghdad’s Green Zone,” 3/18/16

- “Prominent Shiite cleric urges Iraq’s protesting legislators to end sit-in,” 4/20/16

Zeed, Adnan Abu, “How religious movements gained the upper hand in Iraqi protests,” Al Monitor, 4/6/16