New Security Statistics For Iraq April 1 to July 21, 2009

The new Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR) quarterly report to Congress has been released and includes new details on the security situation in Iraq. The report has a calendar recording the number of Iraqi casualties by day. It notes that while the number of monthly attacks has stayed at a low level from January to July 2009, mass-casualty attacks have led to an increase in Iraqi casualties. June 20-24 was the deadliest period recorded in the second quarter of 2009 with 136 Iraqis killed and more than 300 wounded in bombings. As noted several times before, attacks and deaths dropped in the second half of 2008 as the January 2009 provincial elections neared. The average number of security incidents for example, went from 1,715.5 from July to September 2008 to 323.0 from January to March 2009. From April to July 24 there was a slight increase to an average of 396.7 attacks per month. This is the new ebb and flow of violence in Iraq, which closely follows major political events.

Below is the statistics provided by the SIGIR.

Iraqi Casualties (Killed/Wounded) and Major Attacks 4/1/09-

7/21/09

April 09 – 435 killed/Avg: 14.5 killed per day

			6	9	5	3
12	44	11	15	5	8	8
5	4	0	11	2	2	3
13	13	3	10	81	75	8
9	3	2	61	9

4/15/09 11 killed in bombing Kirkuk

4/23/09 60 killed in suicide bombings in Baghdad and Diyala

4/24/09 60 Iraqis and Iranian pilgrims killed and 125 wounded by 2 suicide bombers in Baghdad

4/29/09 16 killed and 45 wounded in 3 car bombings in Baghdad

May 09 – 305 killed/Avg. 9.8 killed per day

					8	3
8	13	4	18	5	2	5
4	12	7	6	10	2	8
16	3	5	48	29	7	4
11	11	12	9	8	14	7
9

5/6/09 11 killed and 44 wounded in 2 car bombings in Baghdad

5/11/09 11 killed in car bombing in Kirkuk

5/20/09 35 killed and 72 wounded in car bomb in Baghdad

5/21/09 20 killed and 33 wounded by suicide bombers in Baghdad and Kirkuk

June 09 – 624 killed/Avg. 20.8 killed per day

	9	2	13	1	3	9
8	11	3	36	14	3	6
6	9	1	0	0	6	271
8	80	0	57	0	15	14
0	9	30

6/10/09 26 killed in car bomb in Nassirya

70 killed and more than 200 wounded in attack in Kirkuk

6/22/09 14 killed and 60 wounded in attacks in Baghdad and Abu Ghraib

6/27/09 13 killed in motorcycle bombing in Baghdad

July 1-21/09 – 447 killed/Avg. 21.2 killed per day

			4	35	11	3
25	15	3	40	52	0	6
35	11	1	55	21	0	5
0	10	115

7/8/09 31 killed and wounded in two bombings in Mosul

7/9/09 52 killed or wounded in attacks in Tel Afar, Mosul, Baghdad and Kirkuk

7/20/09 10 killed in attacks in Mosul

7/21/09 15 killed and 100 wounded in attacks in Baghdad

Total Number of Attacks In Iraq April 1, 2008-July 21, 2009 From U.S. Military - Least To Most Violent

Province	Total Attacks 4/1/08-7/1/08	Total Attacks 7/1/08- 9/30/08	Total Attacks 10/1/08- 12/31/08	Total Attacks 1/1/09- 3/20/09	Total Attacks 4/1/09- 7/21/09
Muthanna	2	1	1	1	2
Karbala	1	4	0	1	15
Najaf	4	1	2	1	22
Kurdistan (Dohuk, Irbil, Sulaymaniya)	3	6	3	1	26
Dhi-Qar	17	21	7	4	7
Qadisiyah	17	7	9	2	29
Wasit	34	8	9	8	7
Maysan	12	43	39	24	13
Basra	108	26	11	11	18
Babil	81	54	62	17	15
Anbar	275	209	162	53	92
Tamim	248	245	184	73	129
Diyala	537	533	251	123	122
Salahaddin	717	482	374	138	150
Ninewa	1,041	924	511	219	454
Baghdad	2,221	867	713	293	486
TOTALS:	5,318	3,431	2,338	969	1,587
Avg. Per Month	1,772.6	1,715.5	1,169.0	323.0	396.7

SOURCES

Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, - "Quarterly Report and Semiannual Report to the United States Congress," 1/30/09

-"Quarterly Report and Semiannual Report to the United States Congress," 7/30/09

- "Quarterly Report to the United States Congress," 10/30/08

- "Quarterly Report to the United States Congress," 4/30/09

Governors, Heads of Councils, and Ruling Coalitions In Iraq's Provinces

More information is now available on the ruling coalitions that took power after the 2009 provincial elections. Here’s a rundown of governors and heads of councils, (and where possible their deputies), the parties that are now in control of the fourteen provinces that held balloting in January 2009, and the election results. After each is a short note about the motivations behind the coalitions. At the end is a comparison with the 2005 balloting. The three provinces of Kurdistan will not have provincial voting until the new Kurdish parliament drafts their own election law, while balloting in Tamim is indefinitely postponed because of political disputes.

The 2009 voting dramatically changed the face of provincial politics. Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s State of Law List displaced the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council across most of southern Iraq and Baghdad. New parties also emerged such as the Awakening of Iraq and Independents led by Sheikh Abu Risha in Anbar and the Al-Hadbaa List in Ninewa. They represented the return of Sunnis to local politics after they largely boycotted the 2005 elections. Despite the fact that nationalist and local parties did better than those based upon ethnosectarian identity/politics, Shiites still largely voted for Shiites, Sunnis for Sunnis, and Kurds for Kurds. The 2009 results are also setting the stage for the 2010 parliamentary balloting as everyone is strategizing in relation to Maliki, the big winner. Some want to run with him to ride his coattails into power, while others are hoping to unseat him.



The numbers before each province refer to the numbers on the map above

13. Anbar
Governor Qaseem Muhammad – Independent - Awakening of Iraq and Independents – Sheikh Abu Risha
Head of Council Jassem Mohammed Hamad – Iraqi National Project – Parliamentarian al-Mutlaq
Ruling Coalition
Awakening of Iraq and Independents
Iraqi National Project
4 other parties
Election Results – 29 seats
1. Awakening of Iraq and Independents – Sheikh Abu Risha: 8 seats
2. Iraqi National Project – Parliamentarian al-Mutlaq: 6 seats
2. Alliance of Intellectuals and Tribes – Iraqi Islamic Party – Vice President Hashemi: 6 seats
4. National Movement for Development and Reform – Jamal al-Karbouli: 3 seats
5. Iraqi National List – Ex-Interim Prime Minister Allawi: 2 seats
5. Iraqi Tribes List – Sheikh al-Hayes: 2 seats
5. Iraqi National Unity: 2 seats
Notes: Formed to kick the Iraqi Islamic Party out of office

10. Babil
Governor Salman Hassan al-Zarkani – Independent Trend of the Noble Ones - Sadrists
1st Deputy Governor Iskander Wattout – Civil Society List
2nd Deputy Governor Sadeq al-Mhanna – National Reform Party – Ex-Prime Minister Jaafari
Head of Council Kadum Majid Tuman – Independent Trend of the Noble Ones - Sadrists
Ruling Coalition
State of Law
Civil Society List
Independent Trend of the Noble Ones
Iraqi National List
National Reform Party
Election Results – 30 seats
1. State of Law – Prime Minister Maliki: 8 seats
2. Al-Mihrab Marty List – SIIC: 5 seats
3. Independent Trends of the Noble Ones – Sadrists: 3 seats
3. National Reform Party – Ex-Prime Minister Jaafari: 3 seats
3. Civil Society List: 3 seats
3. Iraqi National List – Ex-Interim Prime Minister Allawi: 3 seats
3. Independent Justice Association: 3 seats
8. Independent Ansar List: 2 seats
Notes: Babil, Dhi Qar, Karbala, Najaf, Qadisiyah are all anti-Supreme Council coalitions put together by State of Law

1. Baghdad
Governor Salah Abd al-Razzaq – State of Law – Prime Minister Maliki
2nd Deputy Governor Kamil Saeed al-Saeedi – State of Law
Head of Council Kamil al-Zaydi – State of Law
Deputy Head of Council Thamir Riyad al-Addad – State of Law
Ruling Coalition
State of Law
Election Results – 57 seats
1. State of Law – Prime Minister Maliki: 28 seats
2. Iraqi Accordance Front – Vice President Hashemi: 7 seats
3. Independent Trend of the Noble Ones – Sadrists: 5 seats
3. Iraqi National List – Ex-Interim Prime Minister Allawi: 5 seats
5. Iraqi National Project – Parliamentarian al-Mutlaq: 4 seats
6. Al-Mihrab Marty List – SIIC: 3 seats
7. National Reform Party – Ex-Prime Minister Jaafari: 3 seats
8. Christians: 1 seat – through quota
8. Mandeans: 1 seat – through quota
Notes: With a majority State of Law needed no coalition partners

6. Basra
Governor Shitagh Abbud – State of Law – Prime Minister Maliki
Deputy Governor Nizar al-Jabiri – State of Law
Head of Council Jabbar Amin – State of Law
Ruling Coalition
State of Law
Election Results – 35 seats
1. State of Law – Prime Minister Maliki: 20 seats
2. Al-Mihrab Martyr List – SIIC: 5 seats
3. Gathering of Justice and Unity: 2 seats
3. Independent Trends of the Noble Ones – Sadrists: 2 seats
5. Iraqi National List – Ex-Interim Prime Minister Allawi: 2 seats
5. Iraqi Islamic Party – Vice President Hashemi: 2 seats
7. Fadhila Party: 1 seat
8. Christians: 1 seat – through quota
Notes: With a majority State of Law needed no coalition partners

7. Dhi Qar
Governor Taleb Kazem Abdulkarim al-Hassan – State of Law- Prime Minister Maliki
Deputy Governor Abdulhadi Mohan – State of Law
2nd Deputy Governor Haydar Bunyan - ?
Head of Council Qusai al-Ibadi – National Reform Trend – Ex-Prime Minister Jaafari
Deputy Head of Council Abdulhadi Mohan – State of Law
Ruling Coalition
State of Law
Independent Trend of the Noble Ones
National Reform Trend
Election Results – 31 seats
1. State of Law – Prime Minister Maliki: 13 seats
2. Independent Trends of the Noble Ones – Sadrists: 7 seats
3. Al-Mihrab Marty List – SIIC: 5 seats
4. National Reform Trend: Ex-Prime Minister Jaafari: 4 seats
5. Fadhila Party: 2 seats
Notes: Babil, Dhi Qar, Karbala, Najaf, Qadisiyah are all anti-Supreme Council coalitions put together by State of Law

3. Diyala
Governor Abdulnasir al-Muntasirbillah – Iraqi Accordance Front – Vice President Hashemi
Deputy Governor Furat Mohammed – Diyala Coalition – SIIC
Head of Council Taleb Mohammed Hassan – Kurdish Alliance – KDP-PUK
Ruling Coalition
Iraqi Accordance Front
Kurdish Alliance
Diyala Coalition
Election Results – 29 seats
1. Iraqi Accordance Front – Vice President Hashemi: 9 seats
2. Iraqi National Project – Parliamentarian al-Mutlaq: 6 seats
2. Kurdish Alliance – KDP-PUK: 6 seats
4. Iraqi National List – Ex-Interim Prime Minister Allawi: 3 seats
5. State of Law – Prime Minister Maliki: 2 seats
5. Diyala Coalition – SIIC: 2 seats
7. National Reform Party – Ex-Prime Minister Jaafari: 1 seat
Notes: Puts together coalition partners from parliament that shut out State of Law

11. Karbala
Governor Amaleddin Majeed Hameed Kadhem – State of Law – Prime Minister Maliki
Deputy Governor Abbas al-Musawai – Independent Trend of the Noble Ones - Sadrists
Deputy Governor Youssef Majid al-Habboubi –Independent
Head of Council Hamid al-Musawi – Independent Trend of the Noble Ones
Ruling Coalition
State of Law
Hope of Rafidain
Independent Trend of the Noble Ones
Youssef Majid al-Habboubi
Election Results – 27 seats
1. Youssef Majid al-Habboubi – Independent: 1 seat
2. Hope of Rafidain – Parliamentarian Yunadam Kanna - Christians: 9 seats
2. State of Law – Prime Minister Maliki: 9 seats
4. Al-Mihrab Marty List – SIIC: 4 seats
4. Independent Trends of the Noble Ones – Sadrists: 4 seats
Notes: Habboubi won the most votes in the election, but because he ran independently and not part of a list, he only got 1 seat on the council. Babil, Dhi Qar, Karbala, Najaf, Qadisiyah are all anti-Supreme Council coalitions put together by State of Law

5. Maysan
Governor Muhammed al-Sudani – State of Law – Prime Minister Maliki
Head of Council Hashim al-Shawki – Al-Mihrab Martyr List – SIIC
Ruling Coalition
State of Law
Al-Mihrab Martyr List
Election Results – 27 seats
1. State of Law – Prime Minister Maliki: 8 seats
1. Al-Mihrab Martyr List – SIIC: 8 seats
3. Independent Trends of the Noble Ones – Sadrists: 7 seats
4. National Reform Party – Ex-Prime Minister Jaafari: 4 seats
Notes: State of Law could’ve formed another anti-SIIC coalition here but instead decided to join with them

8. Muthanna
Governor Ibrahim Salman al-Mayali – Al-Mihrab Martyr List – SIIC
Head of Council Abd al-Latyif Abbas al-Hasani – Al-Mihrab Martyr List
Ruling Coalition
Al-Mihrab Martyr List
Local lists
Election Results – 26 seats
1. State of Law – Prime Minister Maliki: 5 seats
1. Al-Mihrab Martyr List – SIIC: 5 seats
3. The People’s List: 3 seats
3. National Reform Party – Ex-Prime Minister Jaafari: 3 seats
4. Independent Trend of the Noble Ones – Sadrists: 2 seats
4. Gathering of Muthanna: 2 seats
4. Independent National List: 2 seats
4. Gathering of Iraqi Professionals: 2 seats
4. Gathering of Middle Euphrates: 2 seats
Notes: Muthanna’s council was split between the State of Law and the SIIC, but Dawa member Ibrahim Salman al-Mayali switched sides at the last minute to give the Al-Mihrab Marty List the majority. Al-Mayali became governor as a result, and State of Law walked out on the council

12. Najaf
Governor Adnan al-Zurfi – Independent - State of Law – Prime Minister Maliki
Head of Council Fayad al-Shamari – State of Law
Ruling Coalition
State of Law
Locals
Election Results – 28 seats
1. State of Law – Prime Minister Maliki: 7 seats
1. Al-Mihrab Martyr List – SIIC: 7 seats
3. Independent Trend of the Noble Ones – Sadrists: 6 seats
4. Loyalty to Najaf: 4 seats
5. National Reform Party – Ex-Prime Minister Jaafari: 2 seats
5. Union of Independent Najaf: 2 seats
Notes: State of Law dropped possible coalitions with the Sadrists and SIIC and joined with local lists to take this council. The Supreme Council and Sadrists sued in response

14. Ninewa
Governor Atheel al-Nujafi – Al-Hadbaa List
2nd Deputy Governor Hassan Mahmoud Ali – Independent – Al-Hadbaa List
Head of Council Faisal Abdullah al-Yawir – Al Hadbaa List
Deputy Head of Council Wild-dar Zebari – Al Hadbaa List
Ruling Coalition
Al-Hadbaa List
Iraqi Islamic Party
Election Results – 37 seats
1. Al-Hadbaa List: 19 seats
2. Ninewa Brotherhood List – PUK-KDP: 12 seats
3. Iraqi Islamic Party – Vice President Hashemi: 3 seats
4. Shabaks: 1 seat - through quota
4. Christians: 1 seat - through quota
4. Yazidis: 1 seat - through quota
Notes: Al-Hadbaa is a new Sunni party that emerged in the voting, running on Iraqi nationalism and anti-Kurdish sentiments. The Kurdish parties are boycotting the council as a result

9. Qadisiyah
Governor Salim Husayn – State of Law – Prime Minister Maliki
Head of Council Jubeir al-Juburi – State of Law
Ruling Coalition
State of Law
Iraqi National List
Election Results – 28 seats
1. State of Law – Prime Minister Maliki: 11 seats
2. Al-Mihrab Martyr List – SIIC: 5 seats
3. Iraqi National List – Ex-Interim Prime Minister Allawi: 3 seats
3. National Reform Party – Ex-Prime Minister Jaafari: 3 seats
5. Independent Trend of the Noble Ones – Sadrists: 2 seats
5. Islamic Loyalty Party: 2 seats
5. Fadhila Party: 2 seats
Notes: Babil, Dhi Qar, Karbala, Najaf, Qadisiyah are all anti-Supreme Council coalitions put together by State of Law

2. Salahaddin
Governor Mutashar al-Aliwi – Iraqi Accordance Front – Vice President Hashemi
Head of Council ? - Iraqi National List - Ex-Interim Prime Minister Allawi
Ruling Coalition
Iraqi Accordance Front
Iraqi National List
Election Results – 28 seats
1. Iraqi Accordance Front – Vice President Hashemi: 5 seats
1. Iraqi National List – Ex-Interim Prime Minister Allawi: 5 seats
3. Iraq National Project – Parliamentarian al-Mutlaq: 3 seats
3. National Project of Iraq: 3 seats
5. Group of Intellectuals and Scientists: 2 seats
5. Iraqi Turkmen Front: 2 seats
5. Front of Liberation and Building: 2 seats
5. Salahaddin Patriotic List: 2 seats
5. Brotherhood and Peaceful Coexistence: 2 seats
5. State of Law – Prime Minister Maliki: 2 seats
Notes: Province went to Sunnis after the Kurds ran it before because of the 2005 boycott, and shut out State of Law

4. Wasit
Governor Lateef Hamad al-Tarfa – Independent
Head of Council Mahmoud Abdulrida Talal – Al-Mihrab Marty List – SIIC
Ruling Coalition
State of Law
Al-Mihrab Martyr List
Election Results – 28 seats
1. State of Law – Prime Minister Maliki: 13 seats
2. Al-Mihrab Martyr List – SIIC: 6 seats
3. Independent Trend of the Noble Ones – Sadrists: 3 seats
3. Iraqi National List – Ex-Interim Prime Minister Allawi: 3 seats
3. Iraqi Constitutional Party – Interior Minister Jawad al-Bolani
Notes: Another province where State of Law gave up an anti-SIIC coalition to work with them

2009 1st Place Finishes – Provinces
State of Law (Maliki) – Babil, Baghdad, Basra, Dhi Qar, Maysan, Muthanna, Najaf, Qadisiyah, Wasit
Iraqi Accordance Front (Hashemi) – Diyala, Salahaddin (tied)
Iraqi National List (Allawi) – Salahaddin (tied)
Awakening of Iraq and Independents (Sheikh Abu Risha) – Anbar
Al-Hadbaa List - Ninewa
Youssef Majid al-Habboubi - Karbala

2009 Governors By Parties – Provinces
State of Law (Maliki) – Baghdad, Basra, Dhi Qar, Karbala, Maysan, Najaf, Qadisiyah
Iraqi Accordance Front (Hashemi) – Diyala, Salahaddin
Al-Mihrab Martyr List (SIIC) - Muthanna
Independent Trend of the Noble Ones (Sadrists) - Babil
Awakening of Iraq and Independents (Sheikh Abu Risha) – Anbar
Al-Hadbaa List: Ninewa

2009 Heads of Councils By Parties - Provinces
State of Law (Maliki) – Baghdad, Basra, Najaf, Qadisiyah
Al-Mihrab Martyr List (SIIC) – Maysan, Muthanna, Wasit
Independent Trend of the Noble Ones (Sadrists) – Babil, Karbala
Kurdish Alliance (KDP-PUK) - Diyala
National Reform Trend (Jaafari) - Dhi Qar
Iraqi National List (Allaqi) - Salahaddin
Iraqi National Project (Parliamentarian al-Mutlaq) – Anbar
Al-Hadbaa List: Ninewa

2005 1st Place Finishes – Provinces
Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council – Babil, Baghdad, Basra, Dhi Qar (tied), Karbala, Muthanna, Najaf, Qadisiyah
Kurdistan Democratic Party – Dohuk, Irbil, Tamim
Kurdistan Democratic Party & Patriotic Union of Kurdistan – Ninewa, Salahaddin
Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council & Dawa – Diyala
Patriotic Union of Kurdistan - Sulaymaniya
Sadrists – Maysan, Wasit
Fadhila Party – Dhi Qar (tied)
Iraqi Islamic Party (Hashemi) – Anbar

2005 Governors By Parties – Provinces
Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council – Babil, Baghdad, Dhi Qar, Diyala, Karbala, Muthanna, Najaf, Qadisiyah
Kurdistan Democratic Party (Kurdish President Barzani) – Dohuk, Irbil, Tamim
Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (President Talabani) - Sulaymaniya
Kurdish Alliance (Barzani and Talabani) - Salahaddin
Independent (Backed by Kurdish Alliance) – Ninewa
Sadrists - Maysan, Wasit
Iraqi Islamic Party (Vice President Hashemi) – Anbar
Fadhila Party – Basra

2005 Provincial Election Results

Anbar – 41 seats
Governor Mamoun Sami Rashi al-Awani – Iraqi Islamic Party – Vice President Hashemi
Iraqi Islamic Party: 29 seats
Independent Iraqi Group: 8 seats
Reconciliation and Liberation Bloc: 4 seats

Babil – 41 seats
Governor Salim al-Mesalmaoui – SIIC
Faithful Iraqis Association – SIIC: 25 seats
Al-Rasul Association: 6 seats
Imam Ali Society: 6 seats
Security & Reconstruction: 2 seats
Babil Independent Association: 2 seats

Baghdad – 51 seats
Governor Hussein al-Tahan – SIIC
Baghdad Nation – SIIC: 28 seats
Baghdad Peace – Dawa – Prime Minister Maliki/Ex-Prime Minister Jaafari: 11 seats
Fadhila Party: 6 seats
National Democratic Alliance: 2 seats
Iraqi Communist Party: 2 seats
National Independent Cadres and Elites – Sadrists: 1 seat
Iraqi Independent al-Bayan Gathering: 1 seat

Basra – 41 seats
Governor Muhammad al-Waili – Fadhila Party
Islamic Basra – SIIC: 20 seats
Fadhila Party: 12 seats
Iraqi National List – Ex-Interim Prime Minister Allawi: 4 seats
Dawa Party – Prime Minister Maliki/Ex-Prime Minister Jaafari: 3 seats
Iraqi Independent List: 2 seats

Dhi Qar – 41 seats
Governor Aziz Kadum Alwan al-Ogheli – SIIC
Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council: 11 seats
Fadhila Party: 11 seats
Dawa – Iraq Organization: 10 seats
Iraqi National List – Ex-Interim Prime Minister Allawi: 2 seats
Islamic Movement of the 15th of Shaaban: 2 seats
Iraqi Communist Party: 2 seats
Iraqi Independent Gathering: 2 seats
Independent Coalition for the Care of Democracy: 1 seat

Diyala – 41 seats
Governor Raad Hameed al-Mula al-Tamimi – SIIC
Coalition of Islamic & National Forces in Diyala – SIIC & Dawa – Prime Minister Maliki/Ex-Prime Minister Jaafari: 20 seats
Iraqi Islamic Party – Vice President Hashemi: 14 seats
Kurdish Arabic Turkmen Democratic Coalition – Diyala Governorate – KDP-PUK: 7 seats

Dohuk – 41 seats
Governor Tamar Ramadan – Kurdistan Democratic Party
Kurdistan Democratic Party: 33 seats
Kurdistan Islamic Union: 4 seats
Patriotic Union of Kurdistan: 4 seats

Irbil – 41 seats
Governor Ali Nikzad – Kurdistan Democratic Party
Democratic Voice of Kurdistan List – KDP: 23 seats
Patriotic Union of Kurdistan: 16 seats
Kurdistan Islamic Union: 1 seat
Islamic Group of Kurdistan: 1 seat

Karbala – 41 seats
Governor Uqeil al-Khazaali – SIIC
Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council: 21 seats
Fadhila Party: 5 seats
Shiite Political Council: 2 seats
Democratic Progressive Gathering: 2 seats
Independent Council of Tribal Sheikhs & Notables of Karbala Governorate: 2 seats
Iraqi Democratic Current: 2 seats
Independent Unified List for the Governorate of Holy Karbala: 2 seats
Democratic Meeting for Holy Karbala: 2 seats
Democratic Meeting for Holy Karbala: 2 seats
Independent Intellectuals Gathering: 2 seats
Dr. Abbas al-Hasnawi: 1 seat

Maysan – 41 seats
Governor Adil Mahwadar Radi – Al-Hussayni Thought Forum – Sadrists
Al-Hussayni Thought Forum – Sadrists: 15 seats
Islamic Unified Front – SIIC: 6 seats
Dawa – Iraq Organization: 5 seats
Fadhila Party: 4 seats
Al-Rida Center for Culture & Guidance: 3 seats
Gathering of the Independent Sons of Maysan: 2 seats
Iraqi Republican Group: 2 seats
Dawa Party – Prime Minister Maliki/Ex-Prime Minister Jaafari: 1 seat
Maysan Democratic Coalition: 1 seat
Shiite Political Council: 1 seat
Independent National Islamic Congregation: 1 seat

Muthanna – 41 seats
Governor Muhammad ali-Hassan Abbas al-Hassani – SIIC – Killed August 2007
Governor Ahmad Marzouq Salal – Dawa – Prime Minister Maliki/Ex-Prime Minister Jaafari
Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council: 8 seats
Fadhila Party: 6 seats
Al-Furat al-Awsat Assembly: 6 seats
Islamic Independent Society: 5 seats
Dawa Party – Prime Minister Maliki/Ex-Prime Minister Jaafari: 4 seats
Gathering for al-Muthanna: 4 seats
Allegiance Coalition: 3 seats
Iraqi National List – Ex-Interim Prime Minister Allawi: 3 seats
Iraqi Communist Party: 2 seats

Najaf – 41 seats
Governor Asad Abu Gilel al-Taie – SIIC
Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council: 19 seats
Loyalty to Al-Najaf: 9 seats
Banner of the Independents: 4 seats
Iraqi National List – Ex-Interim Prime Minister Allawi: 3 seats
Fadhila Party: 2 seats
Allegiance Coalition: 2 seats
Iraq Future Gathering: 2 seats

Ninewa – 41 seats
Governor Usama Yousif Kashmula – Independent – Killed July 2004
Governor Duraid Kashmoula – Independent
Democratic Patriotic Alliance of Kurdistan - KDP-PUK: 31 seats
Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council: 5 seats
Iraqi Islamic Party – Vice President Hashemi: 2 seats
Council of the United Clans of Mosul: 2 seats

Qadisiyah – 41 seats
Governor Khalil Jalil Hamza – SIIC – Killed August 2007
Governor Hamid al-Khodari – SIIC
Martyr Of the Sanctuary Sayyid Muhammad Baqir al-Hakim – SIIC: 20 seats
Shiite Political Council: 5 seats
Dawa Party – Prime Minister Maliki/Ex-Prime Minister Jaafari: 3 seats
Iraqi National List – Ex-Interim Prime Minister Allawi: 3 seats
Fadhila Party: 3 seats
Independent Brotherhood – Sadrists: 3 seats
Dawa – Islamic Organization: 2 seats
Loyalty to Iraq Coalition – Sadrists: 2 seats

Salahaddin – 41 seats
Governor Hamed Hamood Shekti al-Qaisi – List of the Unified Democratic Coalition in Salahaddin Governorate – KDP-PUK
List of the Unified Democratic Coalition in Salahaddin Governorate – KDP-PUK: 8 seats
Liberation & Reconciliation Gathering: 6 seats
Iraqi Turkmen Front: 5 seats
Coalition of the Iraqi National Unity: 5 seats
Unified List: 4 seats
Iraqi National List – Ex-Interim Prime Minister Allawi: 3 seats
Dawa Party – Prime Minister Maliki/Ex-Prime Minister Jaafari: 3 seats
National Iraqi Gathering: 3 seats
National al-Resalyoon List – pro-Sadrist: 2 seats
Gathering of Independents in Salahaddin: 2 seats

Sulaymaniya – 41 seats
Governor Dana Ahmed Majid – Patriotic Union of Kurdistan
Patriotic Union of Kurdistan: 28 seats
Kurdistan Islamic Union: 5 seats
Islamic Group of Kurdistan: 5 seats
Kurdistan Democratic Party of Iraq: 3 seats

Tamim – 41 seats
Governor Abdulrahman Mustapha Fatah – Kurdistan Democratic Party
List of Kurdistan Brotherhood – KDP: 26 seats
Iraqi Turkmen Front: 8 seats
Iraqi Republican Group: 5 seats
Islamic Turkmen Coalition: 1 seat
National Iraq Union: 1 seat

Wasit – 41 seats
Governor Latif Hamid Turfa – Sadrists
Iraqi Elites Gathering – Sadrists: 31 seats
Shiite Political Council – SIIC-Dawa: 4 seats
Gathering of the Independent in Wasit: 3 seats
Iraqi Communist Party: 2 seats
Democratic Iraq Gathering: 1 seat

SOURCES

Abdullah, Muhammed, “sectarian polarization in diyala,” Niqash, 4/20/09

Associated Press, “Iraqi provincial election results,” 2/19/09

Aswat al-Iraq, “4 blocs to contest the results of Diala council votes,” 4/12/09
- “Atheel Nejefi elected as Ninewa governor,” 4/12/09
- “Babel council elects independent engineer as governor,” 4/18/09
- “Baghdad’s second deputy governor elected,” 4/20/09
- “KA, IAF agree to share leading posts in Diala,” 2/24/09
- “Karbala governor assumes duty after republican decree issued,” 4/19/09
- “New Baghdad governor elected,” 4/12/09
- “New Diala governor elected,” 4/11/09
- “New governor picked for Anbar,” 4/11/09
- “New provincial council’s head, deputy selected in Thi-Qar,” 4/16/09
- “Presidential decrees to appoint governors of Thi-Qar, Babel,” 4/22/09
- “Wassit governor, provincial council chief elected,” 4/15/09
- “Zaydi unanimously elected to chair Baghdad provincial council,” 4/8/09

Barzanji, Yahya, “New candidate emerges among Iraq’s Kurds,” Associated Press, 5/2/09

Hamid, Nirmeen, “anbar’s Islamic party and tribes vie for power,” Niqash, 12/12/08

Knights, Michael and McCarthy, Eamon, “Provincial Politics in Iraq: Fragmentation or New Awakening?” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, April 2008

Meyerson, Thomas, “Provincial Governments in Southern Iraq,” Institute for the Study of War, 5/28/09

Reilly, Corinne and Abbas, Ali, “Kurdish-Arab tensions continue to grow in northern Iraq,” McClatchy Newspapers, 4/14/09

Al-Sa’dawi, Ahmad, “post-election analysis: real change or more of the same?” Niqash, 2/19/09

Shadid, Anthony, “New Alliance In Iraq Cross Sectarian Lines,” Washington Post, 3/20/09

Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, "Quarterly Report and Semiannual Report to the United States Congress," 7/30/09

Visser, Reidar, “After Compromise on Kirkuk, Finally an Elections Law for Iraq’s Governorates,” Historiae.org, 9/24/08
- “Iraq’s New Provincial Councils: A Mixed Picture North of Baghdad, Unexpected Complications in the Centre and the South,” Historiae.org, 4/13/09
- “Maliki Suffers Setbacks as Samarrai is Confirmed as New Speaker and More Governors Are Elected South of Baghdad,” Historiae.org, 4/19/09
- “Mixed Outcome for Maliki as Muthanna and Najaf Elect New Governors,” Historiae.org, 5/1/09

"It's Time for the US to Declare Victory and Go Home" Says U.S. Officer In Baghdad

This paper by Col. Timothy Reese, the head of the U.S. advisory command in Baghdad has been making the rounds of Iraq reporters and hands and got into today's New York Times. Here's the full text of his report.

It's Time for the US to Declare Victory and Go Home

Col. Timothy R. Reese, Chief, Baghdad Operations Command Advisory Team, MND-B, Baghdad, Iraq:

As the old saying goes, "guests, like fish, begin to smell after three days." Since the signing of the 2009 Security Agreement, we are guests in Iraq, and after six years in Iraq, we now smell bad to the Iraqi nose. Today the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) are good enough to keep the Government of Iraq (GOI) from being overthrown by the actions of Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), the Baathists, and the Shia violent extremists that might have toppled it a year or two ago. Iraq may well collapse into chaos of other causes, but we have made the ISF strong enough for the internal security mission. Perhaps it is one of those infamous paradoxes of counterinsurgency that while the ISF is not good in any objective sense, it is good enough for Iraq in 2009. Despite this foreboding disclaimer about an unstable future for Iraq, the United States has achieved our objectives in Iraq. Prime Minister (PM) Maliki hailed June 30th as a "great victory," implying the victory was over the US. Leaving aside his childish chest pounding, he was more right than he knew. We too ought to declare victory and bring our combat forces home. Due to our tendency to look after the tactical details and miss the proverbial forest for the trees, this critically important strategic realization is in danger of being missed.

Equally important to realize is that we aren't making the GOI and the ISF better in any significant ways with our current approach. Remaining in Iraq through the end of December 2011 will yield little in the way of improving the abilities of the ISF or the functioning of the GOI. Furthermore, in light of the GOI's current interpretation of the limitations imposed by the 30 June milestones of the 2008 Security Agreement, the security of US forces are at risk. Iraq is not a country with a history of treating even its welcomed guests well. This is not to say we can be defeated, only that the danger of a violent incident that will rupture the current partnership has greatly increased since 30 June. Such a rupture would force an unplanned early departure that would harm our long term interests in Iraq and potentially unraveling the great good that has been done since 2003. The use of the military instrument of national power in its current form has accomplished all that can be expected. In the next section I will present and admittedly one sided view of the evidence in support of this view. This information is drawn solely from the MND-B area of operations in Baghdad Province. My reading of reports from the other provinces suggests the same situation exists there.

The general lack of progress in essential services and good governance is now so broad that it ought to be clear that we no longer are moving the Iraqis "forward." Below is an outline of the information on which I base this assessment:

1. The ineffectiveness and corruption of GOI Ministries is the stuff of legend.

2. The anti-corruption drive is little more than a campaign tool for Maliki

3. The GOI is failing to take rational steps to improve its electrical infrastructure and to improve their oil exploration, production and exports.

4. There is no progress towards resolving the Kirkuk situation.

5. Sunni Reconciliation is at best at a standstill and probably going backwards.

6. Sons of Iraq (SOI) or Sahwa transition to ISF and GOI civil service is not happening, and SOI monthly paydays continue to fall further behind.

7. The Kurdish situation continues to fester.

8. Political violence and intimidation is rampant in the civilian community as well as military and legal institutions.

9. The Vice President received a rather cool reception this past weekend and was publicly told that the internal affairs of Iraq are none of the US's business.

The rate of improvement of the ISF is far slower than it should be given the amount of effort and resources being provided by the US. The US has made tremendous progress in building the ISF. Our initial efforts in 2003 to mid-2004 were only marginally successful. From 2004 to 2006 the US built the ISF into a fighting force. Since the start of the surge in 2007 we have again expanded and improved the ISF. They are now at the point where they have defeated the organized insurgency against the GOI and are marginally self-sustaining. This is a remarkable tale for which many can be justifiably proud. We have reached the point of diminishing returns, however, and need to find a new set of tools. The massive partnering efforts of US combat forces with ISF isn't yielding benefits commensurate with the effort and is now generating its own opposition. Again, some touch points for this assessment are:

1. If there ever was a window where the seeds of a professional military culture could have been implanted, it is now long past. US combat forces will not be here long enough or with sufficient influence to change it.

2. The military culture of the Baathist-Soviet model under Saddam Hussein remains entrenched and will not change. The senior leadership of the ISF is incapable of change in the current environment.

a) Corruption among officers is widespread

b) Neglect and mistreatment of enlisted men is the norm

c) The unwillingness to accept a role for the NCO corps continues

d) Cronyism and nepotism are rampant in the assignment and promotion system

e) Laziness is endemic

f) Extreme centralization of C2 is the norm

g) Lack of initiative is legion

h) Unwillingness to change, do anything new blocks progress

i) Near total ineffectiveness of the Iraq Army and National Police institutional organizations and systems prevents the ISF from becoming self-sustaining

j) For every positive story about a good ISF junior officer with initiative, or an ISF commander who conducts a rehearsal or an after action review or some individual MOS training event, there are ten examples of the most basic lack of military understanding despite the massive partnership efforts by our combat forces and advisory efforts by MiTT and NPTT teams.

3. For all the fawning praise we bestow on the Baghdad Operations Command (BOC) and Ministry of Defense (MoD) leadership for their effectiveness since the start of the surge, they are flawed in serious ways. Below are some salient examples:

a) They are unable to plan ahead, unable to secure the PM's approval for their actions

b) They are unable to stand up to Shiite political parties

c) They were and are unable to conduct an public relations effort in support of the SA and now they are afraid of the ignorant masses as a result

d) They unable to instill discipline among their officers and units for the most basic military standards

e) They are unable to stop the nepotism and cronyism

f) They are unable to take basic steps to manage the force development process

g) They are unable to stick to their deals with US leaders

It is clear that the 30 Jun milestone does not represent one small step in a long series of gradual steps on the path the US withdrawal, but as Maliki has termed it, a "great victory" over the Americans and fundamental change in our relationship. The recent impact of this mentality on military operations is evident:

1. Iraqi Ground Forces Command (IGFC) unilateral restrictions on US forces that violate the most basic aspects of the SA

2. BOC unilateral restrictions that violate the most basic aspects of the SA

3. International Zone incidents in the last week where ISF forces have resorted to shows of force to get their way at Entry Control Points (ECP) including the forcible takeover of ECP 1 on 4 July

4. Sudden coolness to advisors and CDRs, lack of invitations to meetings,

5. Widespread partnership problems reported in other areas such as ISF confronting US forces at TCPs in the city of Baghdad and other major cities in Iraq.

6. ISF units are far less likely to want to conduct combined combat operations with US forces, to go after targets the US considers high value, etc.

7. The Iraqi legal system in the Rusafa side of Baghdad has demonstrated a recent willingness to release individuals originally detained by the US for attacks on the US.

Yet despite all their grievous shortcomings noted above, ISF military capability is sufficient to handle the current level of threats from Sunni and Shiite violent groups. Our combat forces' presence here on the streets and in the rural areas adds only marginally to their capability while exposing us to attacks to which we cannot effectively respond.

The GOI and the ISF will not be toppled by the violence as they might have been between 2006 and 2008. Though two weeks does not make a trend, the near cessation of attacks since 30 June speaks volumes about how easily Shiite violence can be controlled and speaks to the utter weakness of AQI. The extent of AQ influence in Iraq is so limited as to be insignificant, only when they get lucky with a mass casualty attack are they relevant. Shiite groups are working with the PM and his political allies, or plotting to work against him in the upcoming elections. We are merely convenient targets for delivering a message against Maliki by certain groups, and perhaps by Maliki when he wants us to be targeted. Extremist violence from all groups is directed towards affecting their political standing within the existing power structures of Iraq. There is no longer any coherent insurgency or serious threat to the stability of the GOI posed by violent groups.

Our combat operations are currently the victim of circular logic. We conduct operations to kill or capture violent extremists of all types to protect the Iraqi people and support the GOI. The violent extremists attack us because we are still here conducting military operations. Furthermore, their attacks on us are no longer an organized campaign to defeat our will to stay; the attacks which kill and maim US combat troops are signals or messages sent by various groups as part of the political struggle for power in Iraq. The exception to this is AQI which continues is globalist terror campaign. Our operations are in support of an Iraqi government that no longer relishes our help while at the same time our operations generate the extremist opposition to us as various groups jockey for power in post-occupation Iraq.

The GOI and ISF will continue to squeeze the US for all the "goodies" that we can provide between now and December 2011, while eliminating our role in providing security and resisting our efforts to change the institutional problems prevent the ISF from getting better. They will tolerate us as long as they can suckle at Uncle Sam's bounteous mammary glands. Meanwhile the level of resistance to US freedom of movement and operations will grow. The potential for Iraqi on US violence is high now and will grow by the day. Resentment on both sides will build and reinforce itself until a violent incident break outs into the open. If that were to happen the violence will remain tactically isolated, but it will wreck our strategic relationships and force our withdrawal under very unfavorable circumstances.

For a long time the preferred US approach has been to "work it at the lowest level of partnership" as a means to stay out of the political fray and with the hope that good work at the tactical level will compensate for and slowly improve the strategic picture. From platoon to brigade, US Soldiers and Marines continue to work incredibly hard and in almost all cases they achieve positive results. This approach has achieved impressive results in the past, but today it is failing. The strategic dysfunctions of the GOI and ISF have now reached down to the tactical level degrading good work there and sundering hitherto strong partnerships. As one astute political observer has stated "We have lost all strategic influence with the GoI and trying to influence events and people from the tactical/operational level is courting disaster, wasting lives, and merely postponing the inevitable."

The reality of Iraq in July 2009 has rendered the assumptions underlying the 2008 Security Agreement (SA) overcome by events - mostly good events actually. The SA outlines a series of gradual steps towards military withdrawal, analogous to a father teaching his kid to ride a bike without training wheels. If the GOI at the time the SA was signed thought it needed a long, gradual period of weaning. But the GOI now has left the nest (while continuing to breast feed as noted above). The strategic and tactical realities have changed far quicker than the provisions and timeline of the SA can accommodate. We now have an Iraqi government that has gained its balance and thinks it knows how to ride the bike in the race. And in fact they probably do know how to ride, at least well enough for the road they are on against their current competitors. Our hand on the back of the seat is holding them back and causing resentment. We need to let go before we both tumble to the ground.

Therefore, we should declare our intentions to withdraw all US military forces from Iraq by August 2010. This would not be a strategic paradigm shift, but an acceleration of existing US plans by some 15 months. We should end our combat operations now, save those for our own force protection, narrowly defined, as we withdraw. We should revise the force flow into Iraq accordingly. The emphasis should shift towards advising only and advising the ISF to prepare for our withdrawal. Advisors should probably be limited to Iraqi division level a higher. Our train and equip functions should begin the transition to Foreign Military Sales and related training programs. During the withdrawal period the USG and GOI should develop a new strategic framework agreement that would include some lasting military presence at 1-3 large training bases, airbases, or key headquarters locations. But it should not include the presence of any combat forces save those for force protection needs or the occasional exercise. These changes would not only align our actions with the reality of Iraq in 2009, it will remove the causes of increasing friction and reduce the cost of OIF in blood and treasure. Finally, it will set the conditions for a new relationship between the US and Iraq without the complications of the residual effects of the US invasion and occupation.