General Nouri al-Din Abdul al-Karim Muhlif al-Fahadawi was
appointed the head of intelligence in Anbar in May 2007. Before that he worked
with the local police in Anbar, and then the Defense Ministry in Baghdad. In
2009 the U.S. Marine Corps interviewed him about his experiences in the
province. He talked about how the Americans initially mishandled the security
situation in Anbar, but then how Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) lost its support as a
result of its own mistreatment of the population.
In April 2003 U.S. forces entered Anbar without a fight, but
in less than a year the province would become a center for the insurgency. Local
tribes set up a delegation to meet the Americans so that they could enter
the province peacefully. General Fahadawi said that the governorate was secure
and quite at that time and escaped the looting that was taking place in areas
such as Baghdad. A government was set up, and the tribes and police were
keeping order. In the next eight months however things dramatically changed as
the insurgency emerged. Many local clerics began calling for jihad against the
Americans, and there were plenty of those willing to answer them. Fahadawi
didn’t explain why things changed, but other Anbar notables such as clerics and
sheikhs gave a laundry list of mistakes the U.S. made including not securing
the border, which allowed foreign fighters in, not understanding the local
dynamics and who to work with, dissolving the military and Baath party, and the
shooting of protesters in Fallujah, amongst others. The problem was that the
Americans continued to take similar actions after the insurgency emerged only
making the situation worse. Fahadawi thought the mass arrests were the most
egregious because they turned so many people against the U.S. forces.
Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) eventually emerged as the most
organized and best armed group in Anbar, but made its own set of missteps,
which cost it dearly. AQI won followers using its money and military hardware.
It then started demanding that other insurgent groups follow it or be attacked.
Not only that it carried out indiscriminate killings of Iraqis. Together that
led to resistance against the group. Some Anbaris began providing intelligence
to the Americans on AQI. Fahadawi claimed that eventually 95% of the province
were against the insurgency, and were just waiting for a cause that would lead
them into action. That was what eventually led to the emergence of the
Awakening in 2006.
In March 2006 General Fahadawi decided to stand up to the
insurgency. He went to Baghdad to get weapons for the provincial police. He also
began working with local tribes in what became known as the Anbar
Revolutionaries. The group was formed in November 2005 after a meeting with the
Americans, provincial officials, and local security members. (1) At first,
there was only
about 100 fighters in the group, and it claimed that it wanted to expel Al
Qaeda so that the U.S. would leave the country as well. The general said that
the Revolutionaries and the police were responsible for the heavy fighting in
the province against the insurgency, and that brought him public support. That led
to more recruits, and allowed for the opening of more police stations. He
complained that the Interior Ministry did not acknowledge his accomplishments
and would not pay for all the new policemen he brought in. Like many Anbar
notables General Fahadawi liked to lay claim to turning around the security
situation in the governorate. In reality, the Anbar Revolutionaries were too
small a force to do much. The police were also under constant attack, and had
largely fallen apart until the U.S. began supporting the Awakening and their
effort to institutionalize their fighters into the local security forces. That
was when the Americans began giving more backing and protection to the local
police, helped open more police stations, and set up a program to send them to
Jordan for training.
General Fahadawi’s remembrances are poignant today, because
the mistakes the U.S. made are being repeated in Anbar right now by the Iraqi
Security Forces (ISF). They too have carried out mass arrests and mistreated
the locals, which have turned many against the central government. While
Baghdad has some tribal allies in the province there are plenty of others who
are now in open revolt against it. That’s largely because Prime Minister Nouri
al-Maliki has played divide and conquer with the various sheikhs in Anbar. At
the same time, the current manifestation of Al Qaeda in Iraq, the Islamic State
of Iraq and the Levant (ISIS) is still capable of repeating its own missteps. Right
now it is working with other militant groups in Anbar, but in Syria it has
demanded the fealty of others and attacked those that have not followed its
lead. It also continues to carry out bloody attacks upon civilians in Iraq. It
appears that some Iraqis are angry enough with the Maliki government to now
accept ISIS’s help. Others claim that ISIS is not in Anbar’s cities or say that
they are not playing a large role in the fighting. The Islamic State however
remains the largest, most well organized militant group in not only Anbar but the
entire country. It may take a while but there’s every indication that history
will repeat itself and those that now welcome the group will eventually turn on
it. The question is whether Baghdad will be able to take advantage of it as the
Americans once did.
FOOTNOTES
1. Cahill, Lydia, “Anbar Revenge Brigade Makes Progress in
the Fight Against al-Qaeda,” Terrorism Focus, Jamestown Foundation, 3/28/06
SOURCES
Anderson, John Ward, “Iraqi Tribes Strike Back at
Insurgents,” Washington Post, 3/7/06
Cahill, Lydia, “Anbar Revenge Brigade Makes Progress in the
Fight Against al-Qaeda,” Terrorism Focus, Jamestown Foundation, 3/28/06
McWilliams, Chief Warrant Officer-4 Timothy, and Wheeler,
Lieutenant Colonel Kurtis, ed., Al-Anbar
Awakening Volume II, Iraqi Perspectives, From Insurgency to Counterinsurgency
in Iraq, 2004-2009, Virginia: Marine Corps University, 2009
No comments:
Post a Comment