U.S. Diplomatic Presence Due To Wind Down In Iraq Within 5 Years

U.S. troops are due to draw down to 50,000 by the end of August 2010 before completely leaving at the end of 2011. The incoming ambassador to Iraq James Jeffrey told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee during his confirmation hearing that America’s diplomatic presence would also be winding down in Iraq in the next five years. The U.S. currently has a series of branch embassy offices throughout Iraq that would be closed down by 2014. The State Department is also due to take over the police training program in Iraq from the military, and that too will come to end in 3-5 years. The 16 Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) would also be consolidated into three offices and two consulates, before being phased out as well. After five years then, the U.S. diplomatic presence in Iraq would consist of the American embassy in Baghdad, an office in charge of military sales, and a consulate in southern Iraq and one in the north based upon the PRTs. James Jeffrey is currently the ambassador to Turkey, but is due to replace Christopher Hill as the American representative to Iraq.

Jeffrey was outlining the State Department’s plan to treat Iraq more like other countries in the future. Instead of having a large military force present, and the U.S. Iraq command being on equal terms with the U.S. embassy, the State Department will take over primary relations with Baghdad, although everyone expects at least a large training mission and military bases to remain in Iraq after 2011 since their security forces will not be capable of defending the country from external threats. This is a controversial policy with both the U.S. military and Iraqi politicians. Iraqi officials told the Los Angeles Times for example, that their country can not be treated like a regular country because it has too many problems. This is a view shared by some in the American military who are worried that the State Department will have too much of a hands off approach with Iraq’s weak and divided political class who tend to use brinkmanship when any major issue arises. Iraqi and U.S. military officials, as well as some think tanks, believe that this all comes down to the Obama administration’s focus upon withdrawing troops at the expense of creating a long-term relationship with Iraq. Administration officials have countered by saying that it is time for the Iraqis to take the lead securing and governing their own country, that maintaining a large U.S. presence could undermine the legitimacy of Baghdad, and that it is simply not politically viable anymore to maintain a large force in Iraq due to America’s domestic concerns. Since President Obama has the final say and believes in this policy, Iraqis and Americans are going to have to adapt to this new situation in the coming years.

SOURCES

Burns, Robert, “US envoy: Diplomatic presence in Iraq to shrink,” Associated Press, 7/20/10

Hanna, Michael Wahid, “Stay the Course of Withdrawal,” Foreign Affairs, 4/4/10

Londono, Ernesto and DeYoung, Karen, “U.S. grapples with shift from military- to diplomatic-run effort in Iraq,” Washington Post, 5/25/10

Parker, Ned, “Iraqi officials see U.S. as neglecting the country,” Los Angeles Times, 6/25/10

Oil Companies Voice Their Concerns About Doing Business In Iraq

On July 18 and 19, 2010 Iraq’s Oil Ministry held a conference in Baghdad with the 16 oil companies that won 11 contracts in 2009. British Petroleum, Exxon Mobile, Royal Dutch Shell, Italy’s ENI, China’s CNPC, and others were all in attendance. The point of the meeting was for energy executives and Iraqi officials to go over the details of their deals, which Iraq is hoping will boost oil production from around 2.4 million barrels a day currently to 12 million barrels in six years. The corporations named a number of problems that they faced, which all foreign companies are dealing with in Iraq: lack of infrastructure, security, bureaucracy, etc. The energy giants came away with mixed feelings about whether any of them would be addressed by the government.

One thing the executives complained about was the delays due to the bureaucracy. Companies could not get their people into Iraq because of visa problems. The Oil Minister Hussain Shahristani said that a new process would start where visas could be issued at the airports for all oil workers and businesspeople, but the companies said that was already happening, and it still took 6-7 hours to get through the Basra airport. Two other problems were that many had not set up offices in Iraq yet because of red tape that held up licenses and permits, and the inconsistent application of customs where they had to be paid sometimes, and other times not. Those both pointed to the contradictory regulations in place and the lack of cooperation between Iraq’s ministries, which slowed down the companies even beginning their work in the country.

The facilities and protection at Um Qasr, Iraq’s main port in Basra, was brought up. Um Qasr doesn’t have the capacity to handle all of its shipping traffic. The government has plans to expand it, but that is years away. In the meantime, Baghdad has asked Kuwait to open a special border crossing just for the oil businesses. Kuwait has okayed the plan, but has not given a date for when it will be finalized. Security at the port was also raised as millions of dollars worth of equipment needs to be stored there until it is sent to the oil fields. Basra is a major smuggling point in the Middle East, so some businesses are afraid that their goods could go missing.

Other infrastructure and supply issues discussed were the lack of storage facilities, pipelines, gas equipment, and water. Iraq is currently suffering the third year of drought, its neighbors Iran, Syria, and Turkey have built a series of dams severely restricting the flow down Iraq’s rivers, and the country’s water system has been neglected, is inefficient, and full of leaks. Water is necessary to create pressure during the oil extraction process. The country’s oil infrastructure has been in steady decline since 1990 when United Nations sanctions were imposed for Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait. Equipment is old, aging, breaking down, and currently lacks the capacity to handle any increase. The oil companies and government will have to work together to invest millions of dollars to repair and expand the infrastructure, and water will have to be imported as well.

Finally, central and southern Iraq has millions of land mines and unexploded ordinance left over from the Iran-Iraq War and Gulf War that need to be removed and destroyed so that the oil companies can work safely. The Oil and Environmental Ministries have created a joint committee to remove these explosives, but they have just started their work, one year after the first oil deal was awarded. A non-government organization involved in mine clearing said that there are 25 million mines alone in Iraq, and that the government’s effort would not be enough. This could cause a major delay, and threaten the deadlines the corporations have to meet. 

Press reports on the conference mentioned mixed feelings by the oil companies. Some thought that it was good that these issues were raised, while others complained that there were no concrete solutions presented. Many were also worried what a new Iraqi government might do. They could void any agreements that came out of the meeting, and more importantly might delay, change or end the contracts signed in 2009. For those reasons, a few executives warned that not all of these oil deals would be successful because there are so many barriers that need to be overcome. If Iraq were to reach the 12 million barrels a day mark that it has set for itself in six years, it would be the greatest petroleum expansion in history. It’s that potential that keeps oil corporations excited about Iraq, and willing to deal with all the delays and problems that it poses.

SOURCES

Chulov, Martin, “Iraq: Water, Water Nowhere,” World Policy Journal, Winter 2009/2010

El Gamal, Rania, “Baghdad oil talks do little to ease firms’ concerns,” Reuters, 7/21/10

Lando, Ben, “IOCs and ministries air concerns in long haul to 12.5 M bpd,” Iraq Oil Report, 7/21/10

Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, “Iraqi Oil-Industry Development Hampered By Mines, Bombs,” 7/21/10

Sabean Mandeans Celebrate Their New Year In Iraq

July 19, 2010 was the Sabean Mandean new year. Followers of the ancient religion gathered in the Tigris river in Baghdad for the beginning of their festivities by cleansing themselves in the water. Sabeans were upset at how few attended. In the 1980s there were over 100,000 in Iraq. By 2003 there were only 35,000 left. Today there are only 3,500-5,000 in the country. Of the 28 religious leaders that were in the country during Saddam’s time, only five are left. Many have been killed by insurgents and militias who consider them apostates. More have fled the country including their top leader Sheikh Sattar Jabbar al-Hulu who now resides in Australia. The situation has grown so bad that Sabeans have asked that their entire community be relocated to another country for their safety. 

Sabeans originated in southern Iraq around the 2nd century A.D. They are followers of John the Baptist, and some think they started as a breakaway sect from Judaism. They speak their own language that is a derivative of Aramaic, which is an ancient Semitic one that early Jews spoke. A person can only be born into the religion, and they are also pacifists, which has complicated their plight in Iraq since they can’t fight back, and are finding it harder and harder to procreate since so many have either left or been killed in Iraq. Some fear that they will cease to exist in the country.

SOURCES

Agence France Presse, “Iraq’s last Sabeans take sad New Year dip in Tigris,” 7/20/10

United States Commission on International Religious Freedom, “Annual Report of the United States Commission on International Religious Freedom,” May 2010
- “Iraq Report – 2008,” December 2008

Poverty Rate Unchanged In Iraq

The United Nations Trust Fund and the Iraqi Planning Ministry recently issued a report that found that poverty in Iraq had remained constant in the last couple years. In the latest survey 22.9% of the population, roughly 7 million people, were found to be living in poverty. That was unchanged from a 2008 survey on the topic by the government’s Central Organization for Statistics and Information Technology that covered 2006-2007. The poverty level was set at 77,000 dinars per capita, or $67 per month.  39.3% of the poor lived in rural areas, compared to 16.1% in urban ones.

The United Nations found that those most likely to fall into poverty were households that did not work in the public sector. The U.N. reported that the average per capita income for a home with one government worker and no other employees was 14% higher than a family with just one member in the non-public sector. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) claimed that 30% of households got their income from government jobs in 2006-2007. Another 15% earned their money from government pensions.

The IMF also said that while poverty was widespread in Iraq, it was also shallow. Many Iraqis are vulnerable to fall into poverty, but the gap between the average income in the country and the poverty level was very small. That meant a small increase in income could lift many out of danger.

Iraq’s 2010 budget is attempting to address the problem, but it’s unlikely to work. The government wants to increase personal income, provide jobs, and housing for the poor this fiscal year. They plan to achieve that by attracting private investment, increasing trade, oil sales, and promoting the private sector. By doing that they hope to reduce poverty to 14% by 2014. The only part of that plan that’s likely to happen is boosting oil production and exports as Baghdad has signed several new contracts with international energy companies. As for the rest, Iraq’s laws and business environment currently discourage investment, and the government has no real plans on how they’re going to make the business sector grow in the country. A member of the Justice Ministry also told the press that officials were siphoning money off from the anti-poverty campaign. As with almost everything in the country, corruption is always a threat to undermine progress in Iraq.

There is good news and bad news about Iraq’s poverty rate. First, it has not increased for the past several years. On the other hand, it does not look to improve either as the government’s anti-poverty campaign is bound to fail. That will mean nearly a quarter of Iraq’s population will continue to live off of $2 a day, with little hope to improve their lot. Until the government can function better and private business increases in Iraq there will probably be no relief for these millions of people.

SOURCES

AK News, “Corruption led to poverty in Iraq,” 3/28/10
- “Iraq fights poverty with new plan,” 4/10/10

Aswat al-Iraq, “COSIT: Unemployment, poverty drop in Iraq,” 12/13/09
- “Poverty in Iraq in 2007 at 23% - COSIT,” 5/19/09

Inter-Agency Information and Analysis Unit, “Iraq Labour Force Analysis 2003-2008,” United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, January 2009

International Monetary Fund, “Staff Report for the 2009 Article IV Consultation and Request for Stand-By Arrangement,” 2/16/10

IRIN, “IRAQ: Over 20 percent of Iraqis live below the poverty line,” 5/24/09

Radio Nawa, “United Nations: Iraq will be a “demographic gift” This year,” 7/12/10

How Long Can Al Qaeda In Iraq Last?

Abu Omar Baghdadi (L) and Abu Masri (R) Al Qaeda In Iraq’s Top Two Leaders Were Reported Killed In April 2010 Yet Their Organization Continues On

Every week brings more news of Al Qaeda in Iraq’s demise. Leaders are rounded up, fighters are killed, etc. Most recently Jabbar Zeidan who was in charge of Al Qaeda’s network in northern Baghdad and Zaid Hamed Ali, the group’s number 2 man in Diyala were both arrested. That’s a sign that the group has lost most of its popular support, and Iraqis, even Al Qaeda members, are willing to turn them in. Despite those losses however, the organization has shown great staying power. In June 2010 Paris-based researcher Myriam Benraad wrote a piece for West Point’s CTC Sentinel on why Al Qaeda in Iraq remains a threat to the country. The article was divided into three parts. The first dealt with Al Qaeda’s recent history, the next covered why the Islamists are still able to gain new recruits, and the final section made some suggestions for how the group may finally be defeated.

Since 2006 Al Qaeda in Iraq and its umbrella organization the Islamic State of Iraq have faced a steady diet of defeats. In June 2006 it lost its first leader, the Jordanian Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. In 2007 the Surge and the Sons of Iraq program deprived Al Qaeda of most its bases. By 2010 the head of Al Qaeda in Iraq the Egyptian Abu Masri, and the emir of the Islamic State Abu Omar Baghdadi were killed in Salahaddin. Afterward the U.S. commander in Iraq General Ray Odierno claimed that 90% of the group’s leadership had been killed or captured. These operations show the increased abilities of the American and Iraqi forces, and their understanding of the militants.

Despite these setbacks Benraad believes that Al Qaeda in Iraq will still be around for the foreseeable future. One reason is that the group is largely Iraqi now. At first, it was mostly made up of and led by foreigners like Zarqawi and Masri. Today it is almost all locals.  Another factor is that in June 2009 U.S. forces withdrew from Iraq’s cities. That gave more room for the Islamists to operate in. The Americans are due to drawdown to just 50,000 troops by August 31, 2010 as well, which could increase Al Qaeda’s opportunities to sow mayhem. The group also plays upon the lingering resentment amongst some Sunnis that the United States is an occupier. That wont end even when the U.S. withdraws as Al Qaeda has painted the new Iraqi government as American puppets and the new occupier. The United States has also been emptying its prisons as it pulls out. Some of these detainees came into contact with or were recruited by Al Qaeda while they were incarcerated. The American military claims that the recidivism rate amongst these former convicts is low, but the Iraqis claim otherwise. One notorious example was Manaf Abdul Rahim al-Rawi, Al Qaeda’s governor of Baghdad. Rawi joined the insurgency early on, and took part in the fighting in Fallujah where he met and was recruited by Zarqawi. In 2004 the Americans arrested him. While imprisoned he became friends with Haji Abdul Wahid, Baghdad’s emir. After Rawi was released, he went right back to operating with Al Qaeda, and eventually replaced Wahid as Al Qaeda’s governor of Baghdad. Before his arrest in 2010 he was the mastermind behind the bombings of the Foreign Affairs Ministry, Finance Ministry, Justice Ministry, Planning Ministry, and provincial council buildings in Baghdad. Another factor is the Iraqi budget. In 2009 the government’s revenues collapsed when the world recession hit and oil prices dropped. The Iraqi budget took a large hit, and the security forces didn’t get as much funding as they needed. While the nation’s finances have rebounded this year, the appropriations for the Defense and Interior Ministry have not. Last, during the later years of Saddam Hussein’s rule Islamism spread amongst Sunnis in Iraq. Abu Omar Baghdadi for instance, the recently deceased emir of the Islamic State was a security officer in Haditha, Anbar when he joined a Salafist group in the 1990s. That led him to join violent jihadist groups when the United States invaded, and he eventually became a leader in Al Qaeda. All of these factors explain the organization’s staying power despite its losses. It can still draw on local ties, it has a new body of recruits and old members being released from prison, the American withdrawal presents it with more operating space, the Iraqi forces have not been able to expand recently because of budget restraints, and its anti-occupation and Islamist ideology all provide it with opportunities and resiliency.

It’s continued impact is shown by monthly headline grabbing attacks. It was blamed for the July 18 bombing of Sons of Iraq members in Baghdad who were waiting for their pay that killed at least 43. Earlier in that month it sent suicide bombers against Shiite pilgrims. In June it carried out a daring raid on the Iraqi Central Bank and bombed the Iraq Trade Bank, both in the capital. These show Al Qaeda’s new emphasis upon attacking the Iraqi government, security forces, and Shiites, which is what the group’s new leadership called for after the deaths of Masri and Baghdadi. It also highlights the Islamists determination to continue with their operations even after the U.S. leaves the country.

Benraad believes the only way that Al Qaeda can be countered is through a coordinated political and military strategy. U.S. and Iraqi forces need to continue their raids and intelligence gathering against the organization. That includes American training and support for the Iraqi police and military. Iraq’s prisons also need to be reformed so that they can keep track of and counter the spread of radicalism within them, and stop ex-cons from joining militant groups once they are released. Finally, Al Qaeda’s ideology needs to be countered by promoting moderate imams. Some of these proposals are now in affect, but others are unlikely to happen. Counterinsurgency operations are obviously still occurring as the continuous news about Al Qaeda’s leaders being killed and captured proves. The U.S. also plans to stay in Iraq until 2011 and beyond as Iraqi forces will still need their help. Many religious leaders, including Sunnis, have condemned Al Qaeda’s continued attacks upon Iraqis, but there is nothing organized to stop the spread of jihadist ideas. Finally, Iraqi prisons are infamous for being overcrowded, under funded, and being abusive. The transfer of detainees from American to Iraqi hands is going to worsen their conditions, which can only help with recruitment and re-enforce the militants’ claims that the Iraqi government is the new enemy. That offers hope and apprehension about the future. On the one hand, continued losses can be expected, but Al Qaeda can still adapt and survive. That means it will have to collapse of its own accord. That could eventually happen after the U.S. pulls out and if the Iraqi government becomes more affective. The problem is that could take years.

SOURCES

AK News, “Al-Qaeda wanted man arrested in Baghdad,” 7/15/10

Associated Press, “Al Qa’eda in Iraq vows attacks,” 5/14/10

Aswat al-Iraq, “AQI’s man no. 2 in Diala captured,” 7/17/10

Benraad, Myriam, “Assessing AQI’s Resilience After April’s Leadership Decapitations,” CTC Sentinel, June 2010

Chulov, Martin, “Iraq prison system blamed for big rise in al-Qaida violence,” Guardian, 5/23/10

Hazimeh, Mayssa, “Governor of Baghdad in Al-Qaeda organization reveals details about it,” Islam Times, 6/10/10

Peterson, Scott, “Sunni Awakening resolute in face of Iraq bombing,” Christian Science Monitor, 7/19/10

Williams, Timothy and al-Jawoshy, Omar, “Iraq Suicide Bombing Strikes Shiites,” New York Times, 7/7/10

Average Daily Casualties In Iraq Drop In June 2010

As in previous months, the four organizations that cover deaths in Iraq, Iraq Body Count, icasualties.org, Iraq's ministries, and the Associated Press, showed mixed trends. As always, Iraq Body Count recorded the highest number of deaths for June at 379 compared to 370 in May. They were the only group that showed a steady increase in monthly deaths in 2010. In January for example, they noted 258 deaths, going up to 296 in February, 311 in March, 376 in April, before slightly dropping to 370 in May. Iraq Body Count regularly revises their initial numbers down after they go through their sources, so June's mark may decline as well. Icasualties had the fewest deaths at 176 in June compared to 279 in May. They tend to solely rely upon Western reports, and ignore English language Iraqi sources like Aswat al-Iraq that track daily security incidents. On their site they note that the actual number of Iraqi deaths are much higher than their count. In 2009 a monthly pattern emerged where casualties would go up and down every month. The Associated Press is the only organization that continues to report that trend. In January 2010 they had 177 deaths, going up to 255 in February, down to 230 in March, up to 321 in April, declining to 278 in May, before increasing to 294 in June. 

Iraqi deaths are at the lowest level since 2003, and are unlikely to see any serious change in the near-term. The average number of deaths in Iraq has been going up since the beginning of the year, but is just below the rate set in 2009. In January 2010 there was an average of 6.1 Iraqis killed per day. By June that rate had gone up to 9.4 per day. In the first six months of the year there have been an average of 9.2 Iraqi casualties per day, compared to 10.5 in 2009. Also warnings about increased violence due to political stalemate over forming a new government are only partially true. The average number of deaths went up the month after the March 2010 parliamentary elections, but have been inching downward since then. Overall, Iraq has hit what some military analysts have called the "irreducible minimum." Casualties are unlikely to see any sizeable change for the foreseeable future until there is a shakeup in the current status quo. Previous sea changes have been the Anbar tribes turning against Al Qaeda in Iraq, the U.S. Surge, the formation of the Sons of Iraq, Moqtada al-Sadr's cease-fire, and high Sunni participation in the 2009 provincial elections. Until another such event happens Iraq will continue to see the daily attacks and deaths that it is currently experiencing.

Monthly Death Counts

Month	Iraq Body Count	Icasualties	Iraqi Ministries	Associated Press	Avg. Deaths Per Day
Jan. 10	258	135	196	177	6.1
Feb.	296	236	352	255	10.1
Mar.	311	183	367	230	8.7
Apr.	376	259	328	321	10.7
May	370	279	337	278	10.3
June	379	176	284	294	9.4
1st 6 Months 2010	331.6	211.3	310.6	259.1	9.2

SOURCES

Agence France Presse, "Iraq death toll falls sharply in June: ministries," 6/30/10

Associated Press, "Iraq: Key figures since the war began," 7/1/10

Cordesman, Anthony, "Victory And Violence In Iraq: Reducing the 'irreducible minimum,'" Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2/25/08

icasualties

Iraq Body Count

Attacks and Casualties In Mosul Unchanged By Al Qaeda’s Losses

Mosul is the insurgency’s last urban stronghold in Iraq. Recently Al Qaeda, and its umbrella organization, the Islamic State of Iraq, has lost some of its top leadership in the city. On April 20, 2010 Ahmed al-Obeidi, aka Abu Shuhabi, the head of Al Qaeda’s military operations in Tamim, Ninewa, and Salahaddin was killed by a joint U.S.-Iraqi patrol. A few weeks later on May 6, the Iraqi Army captured Mahmoud Mohammad Salama, Al Qaeda’s leader for Mosul. Then in early June, Abdul Kareem al-Hamadani, the Islamic State of Iraq’s emir of Mosul was also captured.

The decimation of Al Qaeda and the Islamic State in Mosul, has had no lasting impact upon violence there. In February and March 2010 there were 61 and 67 attacks respectively. That dropped to 47 in April, but then climbed back up to 57 in May and 65 in June. Casualties have gone up and down the entire year. In January there were an average of 4.09 a day. That shot up to 6.25 per day in February, the highest of the year, before dropping to 4.90 in March, 4.56 in April, then climbed back up to 7.19 in May, and then declined to 5.33 in June. Overall, the first six months of 2010 is not much different from the last half of 2009, except for deaths. In the last half of 2009 there were an average of 2.19 attacks per day and 5.69 casualties, compared to 1.96 attacks and 5.38 casualties in 2010. Only deaths are noticeably down from 2.10 per day in the end of 2009, compared to 1.42 this year.

The insurgency in Mosul is largely self-sustaining today, and does not appear to be affected by events in the rest of the country. Not even the loss of Al Qaeda’s top leadership for the city seems to have slowed down attacks, but then again the Islamists have always been a minority of Iraq’s Sunni militants. The insurgency is deeply entrenched in Mosul, with its own funding operations, and have infiltrated the local forces. They also prey upon the population’s distrust of the Army and federal police who are largely Shiites from central and southern Iraq, while Mosul is a majority Sunni area. Those are all reasons why violence has hardly changed in the city for the last three years.

Attacks and Casualty Statistics for Mosul

Month	Attacks/ Avg. Per Day	Deaths/Avg. Per Day	Wounded/ Avg. Per Day	Casualties Overall/ Avg. Per Day
Jul.	73/2.35	79/2.54	169/5.45	248/8.00
Aug.	77/2.48	102/3.29	171/5.51	273/8.80
Sep.	72/2.40	65/2.16	60/2.00	125/4.16
Oct.	66/2.12	60/1.93	82/2.64	142/4.58
Nov.	55/1.83	37/1.23	71/2.36	108/3.60
Dec.	60/1.93	44/1.41	108/3.48	152/4.90
Jan. 10	59/1.90	38/1.22	89/2.87	127/4.09
Feb.	61/2.17	66/2.35	109/3.89	175/6.25
Mar.	67/2.16	27/0.87	125/4.03	152/4.90
Apr.	47/1.56	43/1.43	94/3.13	137/4.56
May	57/1.90	41/1.36	182/6.06	223/7.19
Jun.	65/2.16	49/1.63	111/3.70	160/5.33
Averages
July-Dec. 09	67.1/2.19	64.5/2.10	110.1/3.59	175.6/5.69
Jan.-May 10	59.3/1.96	44.0/1.42	118.3/3.92	162.3/5.38

SOURCES

Aswat al-Iraq, “1 killed, 27 wounded in blast in Mosul,” 6/14/10
- “2 civilians wounded by hand grenade in Mosul,” 6/23/10
- “2 cops, civilian wounded in eastern Mosul,” 6/3/10
- “2 cops killed by gunmen in Mosul,” 6/13/10
- “2 cops wounded as sticky bomb explodes in Mosul,” 6/16/10
- “2 IEDs target security forces in Mosul,” 6/10/10
- “3 army soldiers wounded in IED blast in Mosul,” 6/4/10
- “3 killed, wounded by sticky bomb in Mosul,” 6/22/10
- “4 policemen wounded in Mosul blast,” 6/20/10
- “5 mortar shells hit court in Mosul,” 6/29/10
- “6 wounded in two separate blasts in Mosul,” 6/19/10
- “7 Syrian gunmen captured in Mosul,” 6/3/10
- “14 wounded in suicide bombing in Mosul,” 6/16/10
- “Civilian shot dead by gunmen in Mosul,” 6/27/10
- “Cop killed, civilian injured by sticky bomb in Mosul,” 6/30/10
- “Dual blast hit army patrol in Mosul,” 6/7/10
- “Former army general wounded in Mosul,” 6/13/10
- “Gunmen kill 3 policemen in Mosul,” 6/24/10
- “Gunmen kill civilian in Mosul,” 6/7/10
- “Gunmen kill civilian in Mosul,” 6/7/10
- “Gunmen kill civilian in Mosul,” 6/21/10
- “Gunmen kill civilian in western Mosul,” 6/21/10
- “Gunmen kill, injure 2 brothers in Mosul,” 6/29/10
- “Gunmen kill Iraqi soldier inside his home in Mosul,” 6/26/10
- “Gunmen kill woman in western Mosul,” 6/1/10
- “Gunmen shoot down civilian in Mosul,” 6/27/10
- “Al-Hadbaa Faculty mortared in Mosul,” 6/21/10
- “Hand grenade wounds army officer in northern Mosul,” 6/9/10
- “IED blast kills 2 civilians, wounds 4 in Mosul,” 6/4/10
- “IED kills soldier, injures 3 in Mosul,” 6/15/10
- “IED wounds 3 persons in Mosul,” 6/8/10
- “IED wounds civilian in Mosul,” 6/24/10
- “IED wounds civilian in Mosul,” 6/30/10
- “IED wounds cop in Mosul,” 6/28/10
- “Key ISI member netted, arms cache seized in Mosul,” 6/4/10
- “Kidnapped soldier found dead in Mosul,” 6/2/10
- “Man, his son wounded in blast in Mosul,” 6/7/10
- “Mortar shell wounds soldier in Mosul,” 6/15/10
- “Ninewa official survives assassination,” 6/13/10
- “Officer killed, 5 policemen wounded in Mosul,” 6/26/10
- “Police find bullet-ridden body in Mosul,” 6/16/10
- “Police kill gunman in western Mosul,” 6/16/10
- “Policemen find unknown body in Mosul,” 6/18/10
- “Policeman wounded in IED blast in Mosul,” 6/3/10
- “Policeman wounded in Mosul blast,” 6/17/10
- “Al-Qaeda leader captured in Mosul,” 5/6/10
- “Soldier killed, another wounded in Mosul,” 6/6/10
- “Soldier killed, officer wounded in Mosul blast,” 6/27/10
- “Sticky bomb hits civilian car in Mosul,” 6/14/10
- “Unidentified body found in Mosul,” 6/3/10
- “Unknown gunmen kill cop in eastern Mosul,” 6/8/10
- “Woman killed, 2 wounded in Mosul,” 6/29/10
- “Woman killed inside her house in Mosul,” 6/12/10
- “Woman shot down by gunmen in Mosul,” 6/13/10
- “Woman wounded in blast in Mosul,” 6/8/10
- “Worker’s body found in Mosul,” 6/28/10

DPA, “Nine killed, six injured in string of Iraq violence – Update,” 6/8/10

Issa, Sahar, “Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq – Friday 11 June 2010,” McClatchy Newspapers, 6/11/10

Meyer, Sebastian, “Iraq withdrawal: A US unit prepares Mosul police for self-rule,” Christian Science Monitor, 7/9/10

Mosuli, Saad, “Al-Qaeda Turns to Mafia Tactics in Mosul,” Institute for War & Peace Reporting, 6/7/10

Reuters, “FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, June 4,” 6/4/10
- “FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, June 12,” 6/12/10
- “FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, June 15,” 6/15/10
- “FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, June 25,” 6/25/10
- “Suicide bombers target Iraq troops, police; kill 5,” 6/24/10

Williams, Timothy, “Wider Recount of Iraq Ballots Is Requested by Vote Leader,” New York Times, 4/20/10