Report Finds Iraq A Hybrid Democracy

In December 2010 the Economist Intelligence Unit released a report on the state of democracy in the world. This was the third edition by the group. The first was in 2006 and the second was issued in 2008. The new one includes 165 countries and two territories. Each was compared using five categories: electoral process and pluralism, civil liberties, governance, political participation, and political culture. Those were given a score of 0-10, and then averaged out. The states were then placed within four categories: full democracies, flawed democracies, hybrid regimes, and authoritarian ones. Iraq was one of three hybrid governments in the Middle East and North Africa, which was the least democratic region of the world according to the Intelligence Unit.

The Economist Intelligence Unit found a decline in democratic governments since 2008. In 2010 the report ranked 26 countries, 15.6% of the total as full democracies, 53 countries as flawed democracies, 31.7%, 33 countries as hybrid democracies, 19.8%, and 55 countries, 32.9%, as authoritarian. What the Unit found alarming was that the average scores between 2008 and 2010 declined for 91 countries out of the 167 in its Democracy Index. 48 countries saw an increase, and 28 stayed the same.

In the Middle East and North Africa the Intelligence Unit ranked twenty nations. None of them were full democracies, one was flawed, three were hybrids, and 16 were authoritarian. Israel was the one flawed government with an average score of 7.48, and was ranked 37 overall. Lebanon, score 5.82, Palestine, score 5.44, and Iraq, score 4.00, were the three hybrid democracies. Kuwait, Morocco, Jordan, Bahrain, Algeria, Egypt, Oman, Iran, Libya, Qatar, Tunisia, Yemen, the United Arab Emirates, Sudan, Syria, and Saudi Arabia were all ranked authoritarian in that order. The average score for the region was 3.43 compared to 4.23 in Sub-Saharan Africa, 5.53 in Asia and Australia, 5.55 in Eastern Europe, 6.37 in Latin America and the Caribbean, 8.45 in Western Europe, and 8.63 in North America, firmly placing the Middle East and North Africa as the least democratic region in the world.

Ballot box after 2010 Iraqi election

Of the hybrid regimes in the area, Iraq had the lowest score, and was barley above some of the authoritarian ones. A hybrid democracy has irregularities in elections, opposition parties and the media are often intimidated by the government, there is a weakness in political culture, government, participation, rule of law, corruption is common, and the judiciary is not independent. Iraq’s overall score was 4.00. It did best in political participation at 6.11. That was followed by 5.00 in civil liberties, 4.33 in electoral process and pluralism, 3.75 in political culture, and 0.79 in governance. The country did best in participation probably because of its relatively high voter turnout in the recent elections. It did worse in functioning government since Baghdad is largely dysfunctional. It has not dealt with any of the major issues facing it such as oil, the disputed territories, Arab-Kurdish relations, etc., and misses just about any deadline that it sets for itself, which can be seen in the fact that ten months since the parliamentary vote Iraq still does not have a full cabinet. Even so, Iraq is doing relatively better than it did before because of the greatly improved security situation allows the government to function better. In 2008 for example, it was ranked 116 overall, and in 2010 it was 111. As the Economist Unit points out, voting is not all that democracies are about. Iraq has had three elections since 2009, but the other elements of Iraq’s politics have some deep flaws. That’s why its score was only slightly above the 3.88 of Kuwait, the 3.79 of Morocco, and the 3.74 of Jordan even though they are ranked as authoritarian ones.

Governments In The Middle East/North Africa (Avg. Score/Rank Overall)
Israel: 7.48 #37
Lebanon: 5.82 #86
Palestine: 5.44 #93
Iraq: 4.00 #111
Kuwait: 3.88 #114
Morocco: 3.79 #116
Jordan: 3.74 #117
Bahrain: 3.49 #122
Algeria: 3.44 #125
Egypt: 3.07 #138
Oman: 2.86 #143
Iran: 1.94, #158
Libya: 1.94 #158
Qatar: 3.09 #137
Tunisia: 2.79 #144
Yemen: 2.64 #146
UAE: 2.52 #148
Sudan: 2.42 #151
Syria: 2.31 #152
Saudi Arabia: 2.31 #152

Iraq is one of the few anomalies within the Middle East and North Africa. Despite its problems, it is one of only three hybrid democracies in a region that is thoroughly authoritarian. Iraq really needs to improve upon its governance however, if it wants to move up the Economist Intelligence Unit’s Index. That will be hard to accomplish with this group of political elites. Too many are leaders from the Saddam era who were suppressed and sometimes cajoled by the former regime, which fostered a culture of secrecy and distrust. Many went into exile, came under the influence of the neighboring dictatorships, and are divided by sometimes decades long rivalries. That makes finding compromises difficult. That was on full display when Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki and former premier Iyad Allawi could not agree upon a government after the 2010 elections even though they had the most in common ideologically. Instead their personal differences were what dominated their negotiations, as neither was willing to let the other have power. These disagreements have wide ranging affects upon all kinds of issues throughout Iraq, and are a major barrier to further democratization.

SOURCES

BBC, “Iraq election voter turnout ‘62%,’” 3/8/10

Economist Intelligence Unit, “The Economist Intelligence Unit’s Index of Democracy 2010,” December 2010

Knights, Michael, “Iraqi Election Success? Not So Fast,” Foreign Policy Online, February 2009

How Many Iraqi Refugees Are There?

The United Nations used to say that Iraq was one of the worst refugee problems in the world. Most of the displacement came after the February 2006 bombing of the shrine in Samarra, Salahaddin that accelerated the civil war to its highest point. By 2007, many aid groups were claiming that 60,000 Iraqis were being displaced a month. Thousands of people fled throughout the conflict, but the exact amount is unclear. From 2006-2009 the most common number given was 2.5 million. Almost 2 million of those were said to reside in Syria and Jordan. Many experts now think those numbers were far too high.

Iraqis registering at a Syrian immigration center (UNHCR)

Syria and the United Nations have said that between 1.2 million to 1.5 million Iraqis came to the country from 2003-2009, but that’s now disputed. From February 2006 to October 2007 the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) claimed that up to 600,000 Iraqis entered the country. From 2003-2010 however, the UNHCR had only registered around 260,000. Damascus has also always acknowledged a constant flow of people back and forth between the two nations. In February 2007, the UNHCR for example, reported that a Syrian immigration official told them that 1,200 Iraqis had entered Syria in January, but around 700 went back at the same time. In 2010 that led the United Nations to revise its number of Iraqis refugees in the country. People that didn’t contact the UNHCR offices for four months or did not pick up food vouchers for two months were dropped from its rosters. That led to 58,000 being eliminated. By April 2010 the U.N. only had 165,493 Iraqi refugees on its books in Syria. Returns, deaths, and moves to other countries were reasons given for the decline. The United Nations and other aid agencies believe that there are more Iraqis in the country than are registered, but not many more. In a March 2008 survey, the UNHCR found that 86% of refugees had signed up with them. Despite the changes in the U.N. numbers, the Syrian government has stuck with its own figures.

Iraqis at aid agency offices in Amman, Jordan (New York Times)

Jordan’s experience with Iraqi refugees has been almost the same as Syria’s. Amman claimed that around 500,000 Iraqis had fled to their country, but the UNHCR only registered 65,000. In 2007, the Norwegian Institute Fafo conducted a survey of Iraqis in Jordan and estimated that 161,000 were there. The Jordanian government disagreed with the findings, delayed the release of the paper, and when it did finally come out, had the government’s official number of 450,000-500,000 included in it. In 2007 Jordan opened its schools to Iraqi students and expected 50,000 to show up. Instead, less than 12,000 arrived, and in 2008 the Jordanian Education Ministry issued a report saying that the actual number was even less than that. Just like Syria, Amman continues to claim that around half a million Iraqi refugees are still in their country.

There are a couple reasons offered for why Syria and Jordan have stuck with the high numbers, but the main culprit appears to be that both governments have used the refugees crisis for their own benefit. When both countries have asked for assistance with Iraqi refugees, they have included the demands of their own publics within the requests. The governments claim they need to provide something for their own people so that they don’t turn on the Iraqis. Jordan for example has received around $400 million to help Iraqis. Most of that went directly to the Jordanian government who spent it on schools, hospitals, water and sanitation projects. With far fewer Iraqis in the country than the government claims however, that means most of this aid went to poor Jordanians rather than refugees. To maintain this aid Amman and Damascus have refused to revise their estimates for Iraqi refugees in their countries.

The state of Iraqi refugees has changed over the last couple years. Many have returned to Iraq, while others have moved on to Western Europe, the United States and other industrial countries. Host countries in the region continue to claim that there are around 1.5 million refugees, but Refugees International recently estimated that there may be only 500,000. Originally, the international community and aid groups were caught by surprise by the flood of Iraqis out of the country due to the civil war. Without adequate studies of the event, the U.N., aid groups, and the media began calling it a crisis. Syria, Jordan, and others took advantage of the situation by claiming hundreds of thousands of refugees had come to them. They requested and received huge amounts of aid as a result that they mostly spent on their own people rather than Iraqis. Not wanting to loose that assistance, they have continued to talk of the costs Iraqis impose on them. The question now is whether aid will shift to be more targeted towards Iraqis or whether it will eventually wither as world attention focuses on other crisis points because there are still large communities of Iraqis throughout the Middle East that need help.

SOURCES

Cohen, Robert, “Iraq’s Displaced: Where To Turn?” American University International Law Review, Fall 2008

Dagher, Sam, “In quieter Baghdad, perils still lurk,” Christian Science Monitor, 12/24/07

International Crisis Group, “Failed Responsibility: Iraqi Refugees In Syria, Jordan and Lebanon,” 7/10/08

International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, “Middle East: Population Displaced from Iraq,” 4/29/10

IRIN, “MIDDLE EAST: Iraqi refugees – interpreting the statistics,” 12/28/10
- “SYRIA: Number of Iraqi refugees revised downwards,” 6/20/10

Refugees International, “Iraq: Preventing the Point of No Return,” 4/9/09

Seeley, Nicholas, “In Jordan, aid for Iraqi refugees is often redirected,” Christian Science Monitor, 7/2/08
- “The Politics of Aid to Iraqi Refugees in Jordan,” Middle East Report, Fall 2010

UNHCR Briefing Notes, “Iraq: Latest return survey shows few intending to go home soon,” UNHCR, 4/29/08

United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, “UNHCR Syria Update on Iraqi Refugees,” February 2007

United Nations Security Council, “Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to paragraph 6 of resolution 1770 (2007),” 1/14/08

United States Government Accountability Office, “Iraqi Refugee Assistance Improvements Needed in Measuring Progress, Assessing Needs, Tracking Funds, and Developing an International Strategic Plan,” April 2009

Moqtada al-Sadr’s Religious Training

In February 2007 Moqtada al-Sadr fled Iraq for neighboring Iran. At first, his movement denied that he had left, but eventually they said that he had gone to Iran for religious training. Who he studied under seems to be under contention, but all of the figures named believe in Khomeini’s clerical rule, and have tied Sadr closer to Tehran.

Reports said that Sadr had gone to Iran in 2007 to study in Qom, one of the centers of Shiite religious studies. Sadr supposedly was going for weekly classes there to become a mujtahid, a learned scholar. If he attained that rank he would have the power to issue religious decrees. Many believed that Sadr was striving to become an ayatollah, which would give him greater religious and political standing when he returned to Iraq.

Ayatollah Haeri (Al-Shahed)

The Sadr Trend initially claimed that Moqtada was studying under Ayatollah Kadhem al-Hussein al-Haeri. Haeri is an Iraqi born cleric that lives in Qom. He was a follower of Sadr’s uncle Ayatollah Baqir al-Sadr. After Sadr’s father, Ayatollah Mohammad Sadiq al-Sadr, was killed by Saddam Hussein in 1999, many in the Sadr movement argued that Haeri should be his successor. He became Moqtada’s spiritual leader, and after the U.S. invasion of Iraq in April 2003, Haeri appointed Sadr his representative in Iraq. That meant Sadr could collect religious taxes from Haeri, which became the main source of funds for the movement in 2003. The two had a falling out in 2004, but patched up their relationship when Sadr came to Iran in 2007. 

Ayatollah Shahroudi (Reuters)

Besides Ayatollah Haeri, several other prominent clerics in Iran have been tied to Sadr’s training there. The Associated Press mentioned Ayatollah Mahmoud Hashemi Shahroudi, the former head of Iran’s judiciary. Shahroudi was born in Najaf, Iraq where he attended religious studies, including classes given by Ayatollah Baqir al-Sadr and Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini. Shahroudi was a member of the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council in Iraq, before returning to Iran to help establish the Islamic state after the 1979 Iranian revolution. He later ascended to be the chief justice, but after the disputed 2009 Iranian elections, Shahroudi went back to full time teaching in Qom. The Washington Post recently reported that Sadr spent more time in Tehran under Ayatollah Mohammad Taghi Mesbah Yazidi. Yazidi, an ultra conservative, is the spiritual adviser to Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadenijad, is close to the Iranian Revolutionary Guards, and is a member of the Assembly of Experts, which can elect and remove the country’s supreme leader. A senior Sadrist in Najaf also claimed that Sadr was studying under a cleric close to Iran’s  Supreme leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei.

All of the mentors mentioned for Sadr are followers of Ayatollah Khomeini’s version of clerical rule, many of them are close to the hardliners in Iran, and have followed Iran’s foreign policy towards Iraq. Ayatollah Haeri for example, came out against Sadr’s April 2004 uprising, opposed Iraq signing the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) with the U.S., and came out for Maliki’s second term in office after the March 2010 elections, all of which mirrored Iran’s stance. Yazidi on the other hand is an adviser to President Ahmadenijad. Shahroudi has been called a moderate conservative in Iran, and seemed to be dissatisfied with the 2009 elections there, but he was a student of Ayatollah Khomeini, and took part in the Iranian Revolution.

While in Qom, Sadr was inculcated in Khomeini’s theology, which is different than the Shiism prevalent in Najaf. Both schools believe that ayatollahs should play a leading role in society and politics. Khomeini however advocated the direct supervision of the government by clerics. Sadr has now transferred his studies to Najaf. If he hopes to become an ayatollah and join the religious hierarchy there, the marjaiya, he would traditionally have to gain the support of powerful clerics. On the other hand, he could try to force his way in rather than integrate into the establishment. With a militia and his movement’s new political standing after the March 2010 elections Sadr could be a serious threat to the marjaiya in the coming years. If he were successful that would also be a coup for Tehran because Sadr has grown closer to its leadership, and it sees Najaf, as a rival. Sadr has to make the right decisions for this to happen however, and that has always been a problem for him. 

SOURCES

Associated Press, “Shiite militia may be disintegrating,” 3/21/07

Beaumont, Peter, “Battle for Iran shifts from the streets to the heart of power,” Guardian, 6/28/09

Cochrane, Marisa, “The Fragmentation of the Sadrist Movement,” Institute for the Study of War, January 2009

Dareini, Ali Akbar, “Cleric in Iran issues fatwa against US-Iraqi pact,” Associated Press, 10/22/08

Faith World, “Former Iranian chief justice rises to senior Shi’ite rank, eligible to be next leader,” Retuers, 9/24/10

Felter, Joseph and Fishman, Brian, “Iranian Strategy in Iraq, Politics and ‘Other Means,’” Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, 10/13/08

Hendawi, Hamza and Abdul-Zahra, Qassim, “Aide: Iraq’s al-Sadr may stay in Iran for years,” Associated Press, 8/22/08

Kagan, Kimberly, “Iran’s Proxy War against the United States and the Iraqi Government,” Institute for the Study of War, 8/20/07

Haugh, Maj. Timothy, “The Sadr II Movement: An Organizational Fight for Legitimacy within the Iraqi Shi’a Community,” Strategic Insights, May 2005

Los Angeles Times, “Sadr aides deny the cleric is in Iran,” 2/14/07

O’Connell, Barry, “Biography of Ayatollah Shahrudi,” Leaders of Iran12/22/04

Rahimi, Babak, “Iraq’s Muqtada al-Sadr Seeks Regional Influence with Visit to Ankara,” Terrorism Monitor, Jamestown Foundation, 5/26/09
- “The Rise of Ayatollah Moqtada al-Sadr,” Foreign Policy, 7/27/09

Sarhan, Saad and Davis, Aaron, “Cleric Moqtada al-Sadr returns to Iraq after self-imposed exile,” Washington Post, 1/6/11

Visser, Reidar, “The Sadrists of Basra and the Far South of Iraq,” Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, May 2008

Wong, Edward, Fathi, Nazila, “The Reach Of War: Looming Presence; Iran Is in Strong Position to Steer Iraq’s Political Future,” New York Times, 7/3/04

2010 Ends With A Slight Drop In Iraqi Casualties (REVISED)

December saw the fewest Iraqi deaths of 2010. Iraq Body Count recorded 215 killed in December,  Iraq’s ministries reported 151 deaths, while icasualties had 128. For all three organizations those were the lowest numbers of the year. Iraq Body Count’s previous low for example was 248 killed in September. When all three groups’ statistics were averaged out there were 165 deaths, and 5.3 casualties per day compared to 215 in November and 7.1 killed per day. Again December’s averages were the lowest of the year, surpassing January when there was an average of 197 and 6.3 casualties per day.

2010 Iraqi Death Counts And Averages

2010	Iraq Body Count	Icasualties	Iraqi Ministries	Avg. Monthly Deaths	Avg. Daily Deaths
Jan.	260	135	196	197	6.3
Feb.	297	236	352	295	10.5
Mar.	334	183	367	294	9.5
Apr.	380	259	328	322	10.7
May	377	279	337	331	10.6
Jun.	368	176	284	276	9.2
Jul.	430	534	535	499	16.1
Aug.	517	363	426	435	14.0
Sep.	252	174	273	233	7.7
Oct.	311	185	293	263	8.4
Nov.	300	174	171	215	7.1
Dec.	217	128	151	165	5.3

Total Iraqi Deaths 2003-2010

	Brookings Institution	Iraq Body Count	U.S. Military	Icasualties	Iraqi Ministries	Avg. Daily Deaths
2003	7,298	4,661	N/A	N/A	N/A	16.3
2004	16,894	10,834	8,993	N/A	N/A	28.8
2005	20,163	15,031	8,993	8,225	N/A	35.8
2006	30,514	27,850	31,253	18,655	N/A	74.1
2007	23,550	24,677	28,041	18,938	N/A	65.2
2008	6,360	9,245	8,310	5,929	N/A	20.4
2009	3,000	4,681	2,891	3,119	3,492	9.4
2010	2,405 to Nov.	4,043	N/A	2,826	3,713	8.8
Totals	110,184 (to Nov. 10)	101,022	83,300 (2004-2009)	57,692 (2005-2010)	7,205 (2009-2010)

Click on image for larger view

Click on image for larger view

Iraq Body Count and icasualties noted a slight decrease in annual deaths from 2009 to 2010, while the Iraqi government actually had an increase. Iraq Body Count went from 4,681 deaths in 2009 to 4,043 in 2010, and icasualties dropped from 3,119 to 2,826. Iraq's ministries on the other hand, had a rise. There were three different figures attributed to Baghdad. By adding up the monthly reports it gave to the press there were 3,492 killed in 2009, going up to 3,713 in 2010. The Associated Press said the government told them were 3,525 killed last year. Reuters counted 3,605 fatalities based upon official releases in 2010, up from 3,481 in 2009. The authorities attributed the increase to the number of soldiers and police killed going up from 204 in 2009 to 215 last year.

What the statistics reveal is that violence in Iraq has hit a plateau since 2009. From 2003 to 2006 the war in Iraq dramatically increased from an average of 16.3 killed per day in 2003 to 28.8 in 2004, 35.8 in 2005, before reaching a high of 74.1 in 2006 as the civil war hit full throttle. Since then fighting has steadily decreased as the sectarian conflict ended, dropping to an average of 65.2 killed in 2007, to 20.4 in 2008, and then hitting an all time low of 9.4 in 2009 and 8.8 in 2010. The averages were calculated using numbers provided by the Brookings Institution, Iraq Body Count, icasualties, the U.S. military, and the Iraqi government. The actual numbers are likely much higher because the U.S. military from 2004-2005 was only casually collecting data on Iraqi violence, resulting in very low numbers for those first two years, while icasualties only uses Western sources for its statistics, and notes that it misses many fatalities. Both tend to drag down the averages. In 2004 for example, if only Brookings and Iraq Body Count are used, and not the U.S. forces’ numbers, there would be an average of 37.9 killed per day instead of 28.8. Likewise, at the height of the fighting in Iraq in 2006, icasualties only recorded around two-thirds as many deaths as Brookings, Iraq Body Count, and the Americans.

Overall, Iraq has hit what some U.S. officers have called the “irreducible minimum.” That means most of the militias and insurgents have been disbanded, disbursed, killed, arrested, or turned, leaving only the most irreconcilable to continue on with the fight. It would require political compromises to change this current status quo. Iraq Body Count, in an end of the year report “Iraqi deaths from violence in 2010,” came to a similar conclusion, predicting that violence in Iraq would continue at the same level for the foreseeable future. While many Iraqis are moving on with their life, and the security situation has dramatically improved with the end of the civil war, several thousand Iraqis will continue to die each year until the political and economic situation improves in the country.

SOURCES

Associated Press, “Iraq: December the least deadly month of the year,” 1/1/11

Cordesman, Anthony, “Victory And Violence In Iraq: Reducing the ‘Irreducible Minimum,’” Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2/25/08

Dunlop, W.G., "2010 Iraq death toll tops 2009: government," Agence France Presse, 1/1/10

icasualties

Iraq Body Count, “Iraqi deaths from violence in 2010,” 12/30/10
- “Monthly table”
- “Recent Events”

O’Hanlon, Michael Livingston, Ian, “Iraq Index,” Brookings Institution, 12/9/10

AL-SABAH CARTOON: "You are accused of integrity"

Source: Al-Sabah, 1/7/11 via MEMRI Blog

Iraq’s Parliament Approves Creation Of Three Vice Presidencies

On January 9, 2011 Iraq’s parliament passed a new law creating three vice presidencies. The positions will be funded from President Jalal Talabani’s office, rather than having their own budget. A member of the Kurdish Coalition said that Talabani will now have the power to select his deputies. It’s assumed that former Vice Presidents Tariq al-Hashemi of the Renewal Party, which is part of Iyad Allawi’s Iraqi National Movement, and Adel Abdul Mahdi of the Iraqi National Coalition’s Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council (SIIC) will retain their positions. Who will be the third vice president is still up in the air. As reported before, the Turkmen Front from the National Movement is demanding that they receive the office. Both Kurdish President Massoud Barzani and Iraqi President Talabani have voiced support for this idea, so it may be just a matter of finding the right politician to fill the spot.

Unlike previous governments, the president and vice presidents will have no powers this time around. In 2004 the outgoing Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) created the three person Presidential Council to represent Shiites, Sunnis, and Kurds. Mahdi, Hashemi, and Talabani filled those slots respectively. Each member had veto power over any legislation. The Council has now been dissolved, and the presidency will revert to a symbolic head of state as is common in many other countries. The vice presidents are completely unnecessary however, and are simply being created to maintain the ethnosectarian quota system within the new government, and reward all the parties in the national unity coalition. The third presidency specifically is being created just to give the image that a minority is in a leading position in Iraq. This is part of the government inflation process that has gone on since Maliki won his second term. Probably the best that can be said about this situation is that each vice president isn’t going to have their own independent budget, which would be an added cost to the state, but will rather be funded from existing monies allotted for Talabani.

SOURCES

Ali, Saman, “Parliament voted for 1-3 presidential vices,” AK News, 1/9/11

Alsumaria, "Iraq Parliament to approve 3 Vice Presidents," 1/10/11

Collier, Robert, “Iraqi constitution in danger of being undone by factions,” San Francisco Chronicle, 3/9/04

Al-Ziyadi, Kholud, “Parliament passes bill permitting 3 Vice Presidents,” AK News, 1/9/11

Sadr’s Return To Public View

On January 5, 2011 Moqtada al-Sadr returned to Iraq. It was not the first time he’d come back since his self-imposed exile in 2007. It was also not his first public appearance. Sadr had increasingly been making trips outside of Iran since 2009. In fact, Sadr had been building up to this event for quite some time.

In February 2007, Moqtada al-Sadr left Iraq for Iran. Sadr was afraid that the U.S. was going to target him as part of the Surge, and he was also losing control over his militia, the Mahdi Army, which had grown exponentially since the start of the sectarian civil war far beyond anything he’d imagined. He thought religious training in Iran would reform his image, and give him greater standing amongst the public. That same month, Sadr actually tried to go back to his hometown, Najaf, but turned around and went back to Iran when he heard that U.S. checkpoints had been established along the road to the city. In May, he did make it back, and even gave a sermon on May 15 in Kufa, Najaf. Sadr might have actually been in the country for several months before that. General Ray Odierno, who was then General David Petraeus’ number two in Iraq, said that Sadr was in Iraq to re-organize his movement that was increasingly fracturing. 

On March 29, 2008 Sadr was seen again, this time in an interview with Al-Jazeera because his movement was in crisis again. At the time, Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki had launched an offensive against the Sadrists in Basra, which spread to the rest of southern Iraq and Baghdad. Sadr was asked by Al-Jazeera whether the Mahdi Army was still under his control, and he said that the majority was. He then went on to call for Arab governments to support him as the legitimate opposition to the U.S. occupation in Iraq. The next month there was a report that he came back to Iraq temporarily, probably to assess Maliki’s offensive. What ended up happening was that the government crushed most of his militia, hundreds of his fighters were killed or arrested, and the Mahdi Army leadership went into hiding or fled to Iran like Sadr himself.

Sadr’s March 2008 interview with Al-Jazeera

After those setbacks, Sadr began rehabilitating his image. That came in preparation for the March 2010 parliamentary elections. First, in April 2009 Sadr traveled to Turkey where he met top officials, and members of his own movement. Those included Turkish Prime Minister Tayyip Recept Erdogan and President Abdullah Gul, along with 70 top leaders from the Sadr Trend. Sadr told the press that he had given up on the armed struggle against the United States, and that his followers would be concentrating upon politics. One member said that Sadr would be returning to Iraq soon. In July, Sadr was seen again, this time visiting Syrian politicians in Damascus. He went back a year later to meet with President Bashar al-Assad, and Iyad Allawi to talk about forming a new government after the March 2010 election. All of those meetings were meant to show the new Sadr. One who was not only an influential man in Iraq, but a regional figure as well, capable of having high level discussions with men like President Assad and Premier Erdogan.

Sadr meeting with Allawi in Damascus, July 2010. It was meetings like these that were meant to show Sadr in a new light as a political leader in Iraq (New York Times)

The Sadrists’ surprising showing in the 2010 vote, and their role as kingmakers in assuring Prime Minister Maliki of a second term in office, led to Sadr’s return to Iraq. 2007-2008 were years of crisis for the Sadr Trend, with militiamen breaking away and preying upon their own people, Iran trying to co-opt his movement and control Sadr, while Maliki went from an ally to an enemy. Rather than making a dramatic return during those periods, Sadr is now coming back when his movement has proven itself to be a force in Iraqi politics. Part of the reason why he left in 2007, was to rehabilitate his image and movement. That played a role in his 2009 appearances where he met with regional leaders in Turkey and Syria. He probably feels that this endeavor now has to be done in person, rather than from Iran, which is why he is back. Whether he can stick to politics is his next challenge. Iraq does have a new status quo where most parties are focusing upon parliament, the premier, and the cabinet, which offers many opportunities for Sadr, but he could also fail unless he and his followers show more discipline and maturity than they did in the past. That breakdown was why he left the country in 2007, and whether he stays this time may be determined by whether he is successful or not.

SOURCES

Agence France Presse, “Iraq radical cleric meets fellow Shiites,” 5/2/09
- “Iraqi cleric Sadr visits Syria from exile in Iran,” 7/17/10

Associated Press, “Shiite militia may be disintegrating,” 3/21/07

Baker, Peter, DeYoung, Karen, Ricks, Thomas, Tyson, Ann Scott, Warrick, Joby, and Wright, Robin, “Among Top Officials, ‘Surge’ Has Sparked Dissent, Infighting,” Washington Post, 9/9/07

Cobanoglu, Cagri, “Al-Sadr asks Ankara to play bigger role in Middle East,” Today’s Zaman, 5/4/09

DPA, “Iraqi cleric Moqtada al-Sadr arrives in Syria,” 7/20/09

Fayad, Ma’ad, “Iran Ordered Muqtada al-Sadr to Return to Al-Najaf – Iraqi Sources,” Asharq Alawsat, 4/14/08

Al-Jazeera, “Al-Sadr calls for support of Arab states – 29 Mar 08,” 3/29/08

Mohsen, Amer, “Iraq Papers Thu: The Convention,” IraqSlogger.com, 5/6/09

Myers, Steven Lee, “Sadr Calls for New Iraqi Government,” New York Times, 7/19/10

Raghavan, Sudarsan, “Sadr Casts a Shadow Over Bush-Maliki Meeting,” Washington Post, 11/30/06

Rahimi, Babak, “Iraq’s Muqtada al-Sadr Seeks Regional Influence with Visit to Ankara,” Terrorism Monitor, Jamestown Foundation, 5/26/09

Reuters, “Iraq’s Sadr back in Iran – U.S. military sources,” 7/8/07

Ricks, Thomas and Raghavan, Sudarsan, “Sadr Back in Iraq, U.S. Generals Say,” Washington Post, 5/25/07

Roggio, Bill, “Attacking Sadr’s Mahdi Army,” Long War Journal.org, 5/26/07