As fighting continues in
Iraq’s western Anbar province, the various tribes there have found themselves
in a precarious situation. Some have aligned themselves with the central
government against insurgents, some are opposed to both the federal forces and the
militants, while still others have joined the gunmen. Anbar was always a very
divisive place in part because of the deep-seated tribal rivalries. Those are
all being exasperated by the current rebellion in the governorate.
Anbar’s various sheikhs are
taking sides in the brewing conflict in their governorate. The two brothers
Sheikh Mohammed al-Hayes and Sheikh Hamid al-Hayes were aligned with Baghdad
before the fighting started. The Hayes brothers were
opponents of the Anbar protests and accused the Ramadi site of harboring
the murders of Mohammed’s son in December 2013. When the prime minister began
threatening to shut down the demonstrations the Hayes’ were enthusiastic
supporters. On December 27 for example, Mohammed al-Hayes met with delegations
from the Albu Diab, Albu Jaber, Albu Ali al-Jassim, Albu Fahd, Albu Shaban, and
Albu Hamza tribes, and they pledged to support the central government, while
Hayes called for Maliki to burn down the protest camps. Then when the
Ramadi site was closed Hamid al-Hayes called for all
the rest to be shut down as well saying they were connected to terrorism. When
fighting broke out, he wanted
the army to be sent to Anbar’s cities to secure them from the Islamic State
of Iraq and The Levant (ISIS). Sheikh Ahmed Abu Risha is another tribal leader
who has been moving towards Baghdad in recent months. In January he said that
the people of Anbar should
fight the Islamic State. His men have created joint patrols with
SWAT forces in Ramadi, and claimed to have killed
62 ISIS fighters. Sheikh Wisam Hardan is a third local leader who has
thrown in his lot with Baghdad. All three of these sheikhs have different
reasons for working with the central government. Some wanted the money that
came along with cooperating with the prime minister, which could then be used
in their patronage networks to maintain their followers. Some wanted to use
their ties with Maliki against their rivals in Anbar. Others were concerned
about the rise of the Islamic State and the increasing violence in the
province, because they fought them during the Awakening, knew about their past
crimes, and could be targeted by the Islamists in the future.
A second group of sheikhs is
holding a middle position. They want the insurgents and especially ISIS out of
their areas, but are just as opposed to the federal government. They have been
cooperating with the local police, but refuse to do so with the army, Federal
Police or SWAT. Sheikh Majid Sulaiman called on other sheikhs to take
up arms against the Islamic State, and said they would protect local police
stations. A member of the Anbar Tribes Council Sheikh Naji al-Dulaimi stated
that he
supported the local police, and opposed the armed groups trying to take
over the province. The Albu Bali tribe worked
with police to retake some stations in the Jazeera area outside of Ramadi
that had been taken over by insurgents. The Albu Ghanim arrested three Islamic
State fighters in Ramadi as well. Two unknown tribes have come
to the aid of the police in Haditha. These tribes want to maintain their
local power bases, and see both the militants and Prime Minister Maliki as
threats. Many Anbaris feel that the Shiite led government is sectarian and only
interested in oppressing Sunnis. The federal security forces are seen as an
extension of the premier, and are therefore rejected. The insurgents are
considered just as dangerous, because if they gain a foothold they will try to
take away the tribesmen as fighters, charge taxes, and in the case of the
Islamic State impose its harsh form of Islam, and kill anyone that opposes it.
Almost all of the Anbar sheikhs were involved with the Awakening and remember
the excesses the Islamic State’s predecessor, Al Qaeda in Iraq perpetrated in
the province, and don’t want to see it return.
A third collection of
sheikhs has joined the militants. The Albu Alwan tribe has supposedly split in
half. One part has fought both the Islamic State and SWAT forces. The other is
working with security forces to fight the insurgents. While ISIS is constantly
mentioned as being in control of Fallujah and moving into Anbar in general,
most of the fighters seen in the governorate’s cities are not aligned with
them. Some are tribesmen who have taken up arms, because of their opposition to
Baghdad. They see the security forces conducting mass raids and carrying away
dozens and dozens of people without warrants as part of a sectarian campaign by
the Shiite led government against Sunnis. That led some to the protest
movement, and they were angry when Maliki shut down the Ramadi site. In
general, they do not see a way to have their demands met by legitimate means,
and are now taking up the gun instead.
The sheikhs in Anbar now
find themselves in the middle of a conflict between the insurgents and the
government. Depending upon their position vis-à-vis Baghdad some have supported
the central government, some have joined the insurgency, and others want both
the militants and the federal forces out of Anbar. This is similar to what
happened before following the U.S. invasion. Like then, some tribes decided to
join the insurgency, and some were opposed to it. They were eventually all
brought together under the Anbar Awakening, but then split apart in 2007 over
how to enter politics. The sheikhs have been divided ever since then, and
that’s what’s behind the various positions they are taking on the current
fighting. That will make it all the harder for Baghdad to secure the province,
because its forces can cause just as much conflict as end it. The tribes may
not have the manpower, and definitely don’t have the firepower to take on the
militants by themselves either. A positive result could be that more of them
see a common enemy in the insurgency and decided to take some kind of
assistance from Baghdad. The worse case is that Anbar descends into increasing
violence and the sheikh’s rivalries fuel the fighting. Their short sightedness
will be one of the biggest barriers to overcome to turn things around in the
province.
SOURCES
AIN, “Hayis : Ramadi needs IA forces to clear it from
terrorists,” 1/1/14
- “ISF, Anbar tribes pledge to eliminate all terrorists,”
1/5/14
- “Urgent….4 tribes announce supporting ISF in Anbar,”
1/1/14
Ali, Ahmed, “Iraq Update #42: Al-Qaeda in Iraq Patrols
Fallujah; Aims for Ramadi, Mosul, Baghdad,” Institute for the Study of War,
1/5/14
Jawad, Haider Ali, “Anbar..Maliki issued an amnesty for
wanted..And half of the Albu Alwan tribe organized into Awakening..Al Qaeda
seized money from banks,” Buratha News 1/5/14
Lewis, Jessica, “Iraq Update #41: Showdown in Anbar,”
Institute for the Study of War, 1/2/14
Al-Mada, “Hayes: Ramadi sit-in square has become the
headquarters for Al Qaeda and we will participate in clearing it of its most
wanted,” 12/27/13
National Iraqi News Agency, “Amir of Dulaim clans tribes to
stand with security forces to fight Qaeda and ISIL,” 1/2/13
- “Anbar Tribes
Council: Tribes support local police, do not allow assaulting official
institutions,” 1/1/14
- “Anbar tribes regain /9/ police stations which was
dominated by terrorists yesterday,” 1/2/14
New Sabah, “Anbar Council: army needs to enter,” 1/4/14
Radio Nawa, “Hayes: ending the sit-in squares is essential,”
12/31/13
Shafaq News, “Hardan: We refuse to work with Abu Risha,”
1/5/14
