Kurdistan Democratic Party About To Assume Kurdish Premiership

The long awaited transfer of power over the Kurdistan Regional Government’s (KRG) premiership is about to happen. In January 2011, it was announced that the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) would be taking the prime minister’s position from the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK). Nechirvan Barzani of the KDP who held the position previously will replace current Premier Barham Saleh. Saleh had a tough two years in office, with his PUK party facing defections, the emergence of the Change List opposition group, and demonstrations in its base province Sulaymaniya.

Nechirvan Barzani of the Kurdistan Democratic Party is about to return as the Kurdish prime minister (KRG)

The transfer of power between the two ruling Kurdish parties has been talked about for months. In November 2011, a leading member in the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) said that the two parties would swap the premiership. Then on January 16, 2012, the KDP officially announced that Nechirvan Barzani would return to be prime minister. Members in the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) wanted to hold onto the position for four years, just as Barzani did previously, but that did not happen.

Barham Saleh (KRG)

Barham Saleh originally took office in 2009 at a disadvantage, because of the change in fortunes for his PUK. Before, Saleh was the deputy premier to Nouri al-Maliki, and the number three man in the PUK hierarchy. By 2009, the PUK was losing its standing vis-a-vis the KDP. It was facing internal divisions, and defections. Then in July 2009, Kurdistan held regional parliamentary elections and the new Change List, which was formed by ex-PUK members won in Sulaymaniya, the PUK’s base. The voting solidified the KDP as the stronger of the two ruling parties. Afterward, KDP members discussed ending its 50-50 split of the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) administration with the PUK, and perhaps even denying Saleh the premiership. The transfer between Nechirvan Barzani and Saleh went ahead anyway in August. The PUK and KDP had been roughly equal beforehand, and had a series of power sharing agreements, which divided power between the two in Kurdistan. As part of that, the two parties would switch the premiership every two years. The loss in standing by the PUK would change that relationship, and that put Saleh in a tough position even before he became the new KRG premier.

Thousands protested in Sulaymaniya in 2011 until the government put an end to them (Matt Willingham)

In his two years in office, Saleh faced even more challenges. There were reports that he wanted to replace Kurdish Natural Resource Minister Ashti Hawrami for example, because he disagreed with his oil policies, but he was overruled by the KDP. More importantly, in February 2011, protests broke out in Sulaymaniya. As a result, Saleh was called before the Kurdish parliament for questioning about the demonstrations, and survived a no confidence vote. (1) Saleh said that he agreed with all of the protesters’ main demands, and privately wrote a letter to Iraq’s President and PUK head Jalal Talabani saying that their party was not able to deal with the public’s outrage. Saleh allegedly offered to resign, and said that the KRG needed deep political reform and a change in ministers. The KRG ended up using force to break up the protests in April. During Saleh’s two years in office, the regional government continued to go after journalists and media outlets that criticized it as well. Saleh had a difficult two years. While he sometimes spoke of change within the Kurdistan region, the government showed no real signs that it was willing to do so. In fact, its authoritarian side was revealed when it cracked down on demonstrators, and went after the media. The KDP and PUK were not willing to let go of power or even allow citizens to openly criticize it for that long whether in the streets or in the press.

Nechirvan Barzani will now become the new KRG prime minister. There will be changes in the cabinet, but no real difference in policies. Politics are still dominated by the KDP and PUK who rely upon a huge bureaucracy, patronage system, and tribal and family ties. Even with the emergence of the Change List and other opposition parties, this hold on power has not really been shaken. When Barzani last took office in 2006 he was also facing public discontent over corruption and other issues, but did nothing substantive about it. What Barzani’s assumption of power will mean is that the KDP will solidify itself as the main Kurdish party as it will hold both the premiership and the presidency in the KRG. Otherwise, the status quo will be maintained in the region.

Saleh’s time as the KRG’s prime minister will go down as a turbulent one. His PUK lost standing in the region, which led to it losing seats in the regional parliamentary elections and protests in its base of Sulaymaniya. He was not able to reverse these trends, and gain more support for his party. Now he gives way to Nechirvan Barzani who will further entrench the KDP’s power. Rather than ushering in a new administration and new policies, Barzani will simply be more of the same.

FOOTNOTES

1. Ahmed, Hevidar, “KRG survives confidence vote,” AK News, 3/10/11

SOURCES

Abubkir, Idris, “Gorran will stay opposition in new cabinet,” AK News, 1/24/12

- “Islamic Group leader refutes confiscating govt. premises,” AK News, 2/2/11

Agence France Presse, “Top Iraq Kurd leader offers to resign amid demos,” 4/19/11

Ahmed, Hevidar, “KRG survives confidence vote,” AK News, 3/10/11

Ahmad, Zanko, “demonstrations in sulaymaniyah turn violent but protesters vow to go on,” Niqash, 4/21/11

AK News, “KRG Prime Minister responds to protesters’ demands,” AK News, 3/14/11

Alaaldin, Ranj, “Troubled times in Iraqi Kurdistan,” Guardian, 7/23/09

Ali, Ahmed, “Patriotic Union of Kurdistan: Revival or Mere Survival?” Arab Reform Bulleting, 2/24/10

Aswat al-Iraq, “Fears of potential security vacuum following US troop withdrawal,” 5/15/11

- “Kurdistan Democratic Party insists to apoint Nichervan Barzani to replace Barham Saleh,” 11/20/11

Chomani, Kamal, “Nothing New Under The Sun,” Kurdistan Tribune, 1/25/12

Hamad, Qassim Khidhir, “kurdish election lists,” Niqash, 6/30/09

Hassan, Rebin, “Opposition forces leave parliament after raw with parliament speaker,” AK News, 4/4/11

Hiltermann, Joost, “Elections in Iraqi Kurdistan: Results and Implications,” International Crisis Group, 1/1/10

Human Rights Watch, “Iraqi Kurdistan: Growing Effort to Silence Media,” 5/24/11

Katzman, Kenneth, “The Kurds in Post-Saddam Iraq,” Congressional Research Service, 10/1/10

Knights, Michael, “’Managed Democracy’ Gives Way in Iraqi Kurdistan,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 8/3/09

Mandi, Samira Ali, “Barzani welcomed a statement on the achievements of the reform program in Kurdistan,” Radio Free Iraq, 6/15/11

Natali, Denise, “Stifled Kurdish opposition,” Middle East Channel, Foreign Policy, 2/23/11

National Iraqi News Agency, “KDP names Neijarvan Barzani for the Kurdistan Regional Government Premiership,” 1/16/12

Rudaw, “Source: Salih To Serve As Prime Minister Until 2013,” 6/15/11

Saifaddin, Dilshad, “Protesters dissatisdied with Kurdistan authority vows, says council,” AK News, 3/21/11

Stansfield, Gareth, “Can the Unified Regional Government Work?” Arab Reform Bulletin, June 2006

CNN FAREED ZAKARIA GPS VIDEO: The War In Iraq: Was It Worth It?

Iraqi National Movement Ends Its Boycott In Face Of Possible Break-Up Of Party

Iraqi Natonal Movement spokeswoman Maysoun al-Damlouji announcing the end of the list's boycott of parliament (Reuters)

The Iraqi National Movement (INM) gave up on its boycott of parliament after a meeting on January 29, 2012. Official spokesmen said the decision was made to improve the political atmosphere in the country, and to prepare the way for a planned national conference. Behind the scenes one leader anonymously said that the real reason was that the list was about to break-up if it continued on with its course of action. The party was deeply divided over not attending the legislature and the cabinet. The hopes for a successful meeting of national leaders is also not likely to resolve anything either. That shows that the National Movement has overplayed its hand once again due to its bad leadership.

On January 28, 2012, the major leaders of the Iraqi National Movement (INM) met to discuss their stance towards the government. Those in attendance included Iyad Allawi, Speaker of Parliament Osama Nujafi, Finance Minister Rafi Issawi, and Deputy Premier Saleh al-Mutlaq. The major topic of discussion was whether they would maintain their boycott of parliament. At first, the list denied that it would return to the legislature, but the next day it revealed that it actually would. The official explanation was that they wanted to help with the planned national conference of the country’s leaders, which is supposed to work out all of the political differences between the major parties. One senior leader however, told Reuters that it was because the list was about to break-up if it didn’t change direction. The main players within the INM had different positions on how to deal with their problems with Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki. Allawi and Vice President Tariq Hashemi were for leaving the government, and moving into the opposition. Speaker Nujafi and Jamal Karbuli, who leads the Solution Movement within the INM felt that they should stay part of the national coalition, and Deputy Premier Mutlaq was split between the two sides. At the beginning of January, six members of the National Movement also attended parliament, and were kicked out of the INM as a result. The list has always been a large and unwieldy collection of parties. Maliki was able to play upon these differences when putting the government together by giving many of the individual leaders positions within the government to buy them off, while excluding Allawi. The boycott was also ineffective, because the INM did not have enough seats to stop parliament from having a quorum to conduct business. Important laws like the 2012 budget were coming up as well, which all parties will benefit from as they run ministries that they use to dole out patronage and projects to their followers. All together, this put tremendous pressure upon the National Movement to give up its boycott.

The Iraqi National Movement is supposed to have another meeting to decide what to do with not attending the cabinet. That has been poorly followed by the list, with up to five of the nine INM ministers attending the cabinet at one time or another. Again, the ministers hold actual power with large staffs and budgets to administer. Those were too much for the majority of INM members to give up, and thus they went to sessions of the cabinet despite the directions of their list. That boycott is likely to collapse officially as well.

Finally, the hopes of a successful conference are disappearing with every day. On January 27 for example, Moqtada al-Sadr said he would not attend, because he was a religious figure, not a politician. Allawi has called for all of the major leaders to be there, so this was another major setback. Not only that, but there is no reason for Maliki to compromise if the meeting ever takes place. The INM does not have the votes to hold a no confidence vote against him, they do not have the seats in parliament to stop it from holding a quorum, and half the INM ministers are showing up to the cabinet anyway. The National Movement simply does not have any leverage in this dispute with Maliki.

The Iraqi National Movement ended up winning the most seats in the 2010 parliamentary elections, but has been consistently outmaneuvered since then. Its major leaders were each given top positions in the new government, and left Allawi out in the cold hoping for a committee to be formed, which he would lead, but that has been completely dropped. Since then, Allawi has been left to constantly snipe at Maliki, while he barely attends parliament, and spends large amounts of time outside the country. This latest crisis was badly played by the list once again. Its responses to Mailiki’s call for a no confidence vote against Deputy Premier Mutlaq and the arrest warrant for Vice President Hashemi have been completely ineffective. Not only that, but they have shown how deeply divided and fragile the list is. That has left Maliki in the enviable position of simply waiting out the crisis knowing full well that the INM could not keep up its tactics, and in this case, would likely come out even weaker than before. The final episode of this drama has not been played out, but it shows that the party may do better without following Allawi and Mutlaq the next time something like this happen, which it definitely will given the personal animosities amongst Iraq’s leading politicians.

SOURCES

AIN, “Majority of IS members supports withdraw from Government,” 1/26/12

- “MP rules out IS withdrawal from political process,” 1/26/12

Mardini, Ramzy, “Iraq’s Post-Withdrawal Crisis, Update 6,” Institute for the Study of War, 1/27/12

National Iraq News Agency, “BREAKING NEWS Iraqiya decides that its law makers attend Parliament’s session to debate the Budge, General Amnesty Law,” 1/28/12

Al-Salhy, Suadad, “Iraq’s Sunni-backed bloc faces key decision,” Reuters, 1/25/12

- “Iraq’s Sunni-backed bloc to end parliament boycott,” Reuters, 1/29/12

Al-Shummari, Yazn, “Where? Not bothered really – no red lines for Allawi on conference location,” AK News, 1/17/12

Sowell, Kirk, “Inside Iraqi Politics No. 31,” 1/25/12

PRESS TV VIDEO: Iraqiya party ends parliament boycott

AP VIDEO: Bomb Kills Dozens At Iraq Funeral Procession

Iraq In The Middle East And North Africa, A Regional Comparison

From 1990 to 2003, Iraq was under United Nations sanctions for its invasion of Kuwait. As a result, the country’s living standards and infrastructure all deteriorated as it was cut off from many trade goods, and was still suffering the affects of the 1991 Gulf War. It has been almost nine years since those restrictions were lifted. Despite its constant political disputes and the sectarian civil war that lasted from 2005-2008, Iraq is finally beginning to show some signs of recovery. Now seems as good as time as any to see how it is doing in comparison to other countries in the Middle East and North Africa. Iraq finds itself with an incredibly young and growing population, but with persistent health issues, and an oil dependent economy that needs to be diversified if it hopes to provide jobs and income for its people.

Out of the 17 countries in the Middle East and North Africa, Iraq has the fifth largest population at approximately 30,399,572 in 2011. Only Morocco, Algeria, Iran, and Egypt have more people. Having a large population in the region is both a cost and a potential benefit. It can provide a large workforce, but at the same time huge demands upon the government to provide services and jobs for them.

 

Population 2011

Egypt 82,079,636

Iran 77,891,220

Algeria 34,994,937

Morocco 31,968,361

Iraq 30,399,572

Saudi Arabia 26,131,703

Yemen 24,133,492

Syria 22,517,750 (2010)

Tunisia 10,629,186

Israel 7,473,052 (2010)

Libya 6,597,960

Jordan 6,508,271

UAE 5,148,664

Oman 3,027,959

Kuwait 2,595,628

Bahrain 1,214,705

Qatar 848,016

Iraq’s large populace is incredibly young, and getting younger. It has the second youngest median age in the region at 20.9 years old. Only Yemen at 18.1 has a lower median figure. Incredibly, the country is getting younger, with 38% of Iraqis only 14 years or under, a 2.399% population growth rate, the fourth highest in the region, and 28.81 births per 1,000 people, which is the second highest. This is a trend in much of the Middle East and North Africa with 13 out of 17 countries having a median age under 30.

Median Age 2011

Yemen 18.1

Iraq 20.9

Syria 21.9

Jordan 22.1

Oman 24.1

Egypt 24.3

Libya 24.5

Saudi Arabia 25.3

Iran 26.8

Morocco 26.9

Algeria 27.6

Kuwait 28.5

Israel 29.4

Tunisia 30

UAE 30.2

Qatar 30.8

Bahrain 30.9

2011	Age Structure
Yemen	0-14 43% 15-64 54.4% 65+ 2.6%
Iraq	0-14 38% 15-64 58.9% 65+ 3.1%
Jordan	0-14 35.3% 15-64 59.9% 65_ 4.8%
Syria	0-14 35.2% 15-64 61% 65_ 3.8%
Libya	0-14 32.8% 15-64 62.7% 65+ 4.6%
Egypt	0-14 32.7% 15-64 62.8% 65+ 4.5%
Oman	0-14 31.2% 15-64 65.7% 65+ 3.1%
Saudi Arabia	0-14 29.4% 15-64 67.6% 65+ 3%
Morocco	0-14 27.8% 15-64 66.1% 65+ 6.1%
Israel	0-14 27.6% 15-64 62.2% 65+ 10.1%
Kuwait	0-14 25.8% 15-64 72.2% 65+ 2%
Algeria	0-14 24.2% 15-64 70.6% 65+ 5.2%
Iran	0-14 24.1% 15-64 70.9% 65+ 5%
Tunisia	0-14 23.2% 15-64 69.3% 65+ 7.5%
Qatar	0-14 21.8% 15-64 76.7% 65+ 1.5%
Bahrain	0-14 20.5% 15-64 77% 65+ 2.6%
UAE	0-14 20.4% 15-64 78.7% 65+ 0.9%

	Pop. Growth Rate
Qatar	0.81%
Syria	0.913%
Tunisia	0.978%
Jordan	0.984%
Morocco	1.067%
Algeria	1.173%
Iran	1.248%
Saudi Arabia	1.536%
Israel	1.584%
Egypt	1.96%
Kuwait	1.986%
Oman	2.023%
Libya	2.064%
Iraq	2.399%
Yemen	2.647%
Bahrain	2.814%
UAE	3.282%

2011	Birth Rate
Bahrain	14.64 per 1,000
Qatar	15.48 per 1,000
UAE	15.87 per 1,000
Algeria	16.69 per 1,000
Tunisia	17.4 per 1,000
Iran	18.55 per 1,000
Morocco	19.19 per 1,000
Israel	19.24 per 1,000
Saudi Arabia	19.34 per 1,000
Kuwait	21.32 per 1,000
Syria	23.99 per 1,000
Libya	24.04 per 1,000
Oman	24.15 per 1,000
Egypt	24.63 per 1,000
Jordan	26.79 per 1,000
Iraq	28.81 per 1,000
Yemen	33.49 per 1,000

Iraq is towards the bottom in terms of urbanization at 66%. That is tied with Algeria for 12 out of the 17 regional nations. In comparison, most of the people in Saudi Arabia, the Gulf States and Israel are anywhere from 82%-98% living in cities. With two famous rivers the Tigris and Euphrates running through it, and a history of agriculture dating back to the birth of civilization it should be no surprise that Iraq still has lots of people living in the countryside. Unfortunately, that lifestyle is running into huge environmental problems with a recent drought lasting several years, increasing salinization, and neighboring countries building dams that will only decrease the amount of water flowing through the country in coming years.

 

	Urbanization
Yemen	32%
Egypt	43.4%
Syria	56%
Morocco	58%
Iraq	66%
Algeria	66%
Tunisia	67%
Iran	71%
Oman	73%
Libya	78%
Jordan	79%
Saudi Arabia	82%
UAE	84%
Bahrain	89%
Israel	92%
Qatar	96%
Kuwait	98%

One major problem that resulted from the international sanctions was the destruction of Iraq’s health care system. Many medicines and modern equipment were denied to the country under the guise that they could be used for the creation of weapons of mass destruction. It is just beginning to emerge from this period with the free flow of trade, and is trying to make up for those lost years. As a sign of that, it spends the highest percentage of its GDP, 9.7%, of any country in the Middle East and North Africa on health.

	Health Expenditures
Syria	2.9% of GDP (2009)
Iran	3.9% of GDP (2009)
Qatar	2.5% of GDP
UAE	2.8% of GDP
Oman	3% of GDP
Bahrain	4.5% of GDP
Jordan	4.5% of GDP (2009)
Saudi Arabia	5% of GDP (2009)
Morocco	5.5% of GDP
Yemen	5.6% of GDP
Algeria	5.8% of GDP (2009)
Tunisia	6.2% of GDP
Egypt	6.4% of GDP  (2009)
Libya	6.6% of GDP (2009)
Kuwait	6.8% of GDP (2009)
Israel	9.5% of GDP  (2009)
Iraq	9.7% of GDP (2009)

The affects of the 1990s are still visible. Iraq ranks fifth worst in terms of maternal mortality rate with 75 deaths per 100,000 live births. Only Egypt, 83 deaths, Morocco, 110 deaths, Algeria, 120 deaths, and Yemen at a whopping 210 deaths, did worse. In contrast, only 10 mothers die on average per 100,000 births in the United Arab Emirates, only 8 in Qatar, and 7 in Israel.

	Maternal Mortality Rates
Kuwait	NA
Israel	7 deaths per 100,000 live births
Qatar	8 deaths per 100,000 live births
UAE	10 death per 100,000 live births
Bahrain	19 death per 100,000 per live births
Oman	20 deaths per 100,000 live births
Saudi Arabia	24 deaths per 100,000 live births
Iran	30 deaths per 100,000 live births
Syria	46 deaths per 100,000 live births
Jordan	59 deaths per 100,000 live births
Tunisia	60 deaths per 1,000 live births
Libya	64 deaths per 100,000 live births
Iraq	75 deaths per 100,000 live births (2008)
Egypt	82 deaths per 100,000 live births
Morocco	110death per 100,000 live births (2008)
Algeria	120 deaths per 100,000 live births (2008)
Yemen	210 deaths per 100,000 live births

Iraq didn’t do much better with its infant mortality rate. It has the third worse rate at 41.68 deaths per 1,000 live births. Iran with 42.26 deaths and Yemen at 55.11 were at the bottom of the region. Again, these are both signs that Iraq still has a long way to go to repair its health care system.

	Infant Mortality Rate
Israel	4.12 deaths per 1,000 births
Kuwait	8.07 deaths per 1,000 live births
Bahrain	10.43 deaths per 1,000 live births
UAE	11.94 deaths per 1,000 live births
Qatar	12.05 death per 1,000 live births
Oman	15.47 deaths per 1,000 live births
Syria	15.62 deaths per 1,000 live births
Saudi Arabia	16.16 deaths per 1,000 live births
Jordan	16.42 deaths per 1,000 live births
Libya	20.09 deaths per 1,000 live births
Egypt	25.2 deaths per 1,000 live births
Algeria	25.82 deaths per 1,000 live births
Tunisia	25.92 deaths per 1,000 live births
Morocco	27.53 deaths per 1,000 live births
Iraq	41.68 death per 1,000 live births
Iran	42.26 deaths per 1,000 live births
Yemen	55.11 deaths per 1,000 live births

A third sign of its problems is Iraq’s low life expectancy. Iraqis live an average 70.55 years. That was the third lowest in the region. Yemen, 63.74, and Iran 70.06 had the shortest average life spans, while Bahrain, 78.15, Jordan, 80.05, and Israel, 80.96, had the highest. That showed that while Iraq has many children, they will on average, not live as long as many of their neighbors. The civil conflict and sanctions were two major factors that put Iraq towards the bottom in this category.

2011	Life Expectancy
Yemen	63.74
Iran	70.06
Iraq	70.55
Egypt	72.66
Saudi Arabia	74.11
Oman	74.22
Algeria	74.5
Syria	74.69
Tunisia	75.01
Qatar	75.7
Morocco	75.9
UAE	76.51
Libya	77.065
Kuwait	77.09
Bahrain	78.15
Jordan	80.05
Israel	80.96

Serviceable water and sanitation facilities can have a huge impact upon a country’s health as they help control the spread of diseases and sickness. Again, Iraq is almost at the bottom in both of these categories. Only 79% of Iraqis drink from an improved drinking source, which was third worse in the region, and only 73% used improved sanitation facilities, second worse. Improving major infrastructure such as pipes, and building waste water plants have been difficult for Iraq. The fighting in the country made such large projects almost impossible to complete such as the Waste Water Treatment Plant in Fallujah. Now that the civil war is over, red tape, the lack of capacity, and budget execution by the government still hinders such work. That means Iraq will likely remain lacking in these services for the foreseeable future.

	Drinking Water Source
Bahrain	NA
Libya	54% improved, 46% unimproved
Yemen	62% improved 38% unimproved
Iraq	79% improved 21% unimproved
Morocco	81% improved 19% unimproved
Algeria	83% improved 17% unimproved
Oman	88% improved 12% unimproved
Syria	89% improved, 11% unimproved
Saudi Arabia	89% improved 11% unimproved
Iran	93% improved 7% unimproved
Tunisia	94% improved 6% unimproved
Jordan	96% improved 4% unimproved
Egypt	99% improved, 1% unimproved
Kuwait	99% improved 1% unimproved
Israel	100% improved
Qatar	100% improved
UAE	100% improved

	Sanitation Facility Access
Saudi Arabia	N/A
Yemen	52% improved 48% unimproved
Iraq	73% improved 27% unimproved
Morocco	69% improved 31% unimproved
Iran	83% improved 17% unimproved
Tunisia	85% improved 15% unimproved
Oman	87% improved 13% unimproved
Egypt	94% improved 6% unimproved
Algeria	95% improved 5% unimproved
Syria	96% improved 4% unimproved
Libya	97% improved 3% unimproved
UAE	97% improved 3% unimproved
Jordan	98% improved 2% unimproved
Israel	100% improved
Kuwait	100% improved
Bahrain	100% improved
Qatar	100% improved

A more recent casualty in Iraq was the school system. During the chaos that was unleashed by the fall of Saddam, it was unsafe for many children to get an education. Kids were routinely kidnapped and ransomed by gangs and militants to raise money. As a result, a whole generation of Iraqis might have missed out on their formative years to build up their skills. As a result, Iraq has a poor literacy rate of 74.1%, fifth lowest in the region.

	Literacy
Yemen	50.2%
Morocco	52.3%
Algeria	69.9%
Egypt	71.4%
Iraq	74.1%
Tunisia	74.3%
Iran	77%
UAE	77.9%
Saudi Arabia	78.8%
Syria	79.6%
Oman	81.4%
Libya	82.6%
Bahrain	86.5%
Qatar	89%
Jordan	89.9%
Kuwait	93.3%
Israel	97.1%

One thing that has finally begun to recover since 2003 is the Iraqi economy. Gross Domestic Product (GDP) Purchasing Power Parity is a way to compare costs across different countries. From 2003-2008 Iraq’s economy declined, because the violence disrupted businesses and work. Since then, things have begun to get better. Today Iraq has a GDP Purchasing Power Parity figure of $113.4 billion in 2010, which places it right in the middle of the region. It is doing better than Syria, Tunisia, Libya, Oman, Yemen, Jordan, and Bahrain in that category.

2010	GDP Purchasing Power Parity
Bahrain	$29.71 bil
Jordan	$34.53 bil
Yemen	$63.4 bil
Oman	$75.84 bil
Libya	$90.57 bil
Tunisia	$100 bil
Syria	$107.4 bil
Iraq	$113.4 bil
Kuwait	$136.5 bil
Qatar	$150.6 bil
Morocco	$151.4 bil
Israel	$219.4 bil
UAE	$246.8 bil
Algeria	$251.1 bil
Egypt	$497.8 bil
Saudi Arabia	$622 bil
Iran	$818.7 bil

Its overall GDP was estimated at $82.15 billion in 2010, again placing it right in the middle of the Middle East and North Africa. Much of the growth in its economy is due to its oil industry, which has finally returned to pre-invasion levels.

2010	GDP
Bahrain	$22.66 bil
Jordan	$27.53 bil
Yemen	$31.27 bil
Tunisia	$44.29 bil
Oman	$55.62 bil
Syria	$59.33 bil
Libya	$74.23 bil
Iraq	$82.15 bil
Morocco	$103.5 bil
Qatar	129.5 bil
Kuwait	$131.3 bil
Algeria	$160.3 bil
Israel	$213.1 bil
Egypt	$218.5 bil
UAE	$301.9 bil
Iran	$357.2 bil
Saudi Arabia	$443.7 bil

According to the Central Intelligence Agency, Iraq had a anemic 0.8% GDP growth rate in 2010. That was because of the lingering affects of the world recession. Since then, Iraq is expected to have one of the fastest growing economies in the world. The IMF for example, predicted that the GDP would grow 12.2% in 2011. Again, this is because Baghdad has signed deals with foreign companies to develop its oil industry, which drives the entire country.

 

2010	GDP Growth Rate
Iraq	0.8%
Iran	1%
Kuwait	2%
Jordan	3.1%
Morocco	3.2%
UAE	3.2%
Syria	3.2%
Algeria	3.3%
Tunisia	3.7%
Libya	4.2%
Oman	4.2%
Israel	4.6%
Egypt	5.1%
Saudi Arabia	3.7%
Bahrain	4.1%
Yemen	8%
Qatar	16.3%

The dominance of petroleum is shown by what contributes to Iraq’s GDP. 60.5% comes from industry, 58% of which is oil. Another 9.7% comes from agriculture, which is still one of the largest employers in Iraq. Finally services, contribute 29.8%. Similar trends are apparent in other major oil producing countries from the region.

 

2011	GDP By Sector
Iraq	Agriculture 9.7% Industry 60.5% Services 29.8% (2010)
Algeria	Agriculture 8.3% Industry 61.6% Services 30.1% (2010)
Bahrain	Agriculture 0.5% Industry 58% Services 41.5%
Egypt	Agriculture 14% Industry 35.7% Services 48.3%
Iran	Agriculture 10.9% Industry 41.2% Services 47.9% (2010)
Israel	Agriculture 2.4% Industry 32.6% Services 65% (2010)
Jordan	Agriculture 4.4% Industry 30.3% Services 65.3%
Kuwait	Agriculture 0.3% Industry 48% Services 51.7%
Libya	Agriculture 2.7% Industry 66.7% Services 30.5%
Morocco	Agriculture 17.1% Industry 31.6% Services 51.4%
Oman	Agriculture 1.6% Industry 51% Services 47.5% (2010)
Qatar	Agriculture 0.1% Industry 71.8% Services 28.1% (2010)
Saudi Arabia	Agriculture 2.6% Industry 61.8% Services 35.6%
Syria	Agriculture 17.1% Industry 27.3% Services 55.7%
Tunisia	Agriculture 10.6% Industry 34.6% Services 54.8% (2010)
UAE	Agriculture 0.9% Industry 55.5% Services 43.6%
Yemen	Agriculture 8.3% Industry 38.5% Services 53.3%

Because Iraq has such a large population it has a large work force. There are approximately 8.5 million laborers in Iraq, the fifth most in the region. Only Algeria, 10.81 million, Morocco, 11.44 million, Iran, 25.7 million, and Egypt, 26.2 million, have more people at work. Because of its high population growth rate, it is adding hundreds of thousands of new workers to the economy each year as well, placing huge strains on the economy to find gainful employment for them.

	Labor Force
Bahrain	654,900
Oman	968,800
Qatar	1.242 mil
Jordan	1.719 mil
Libya	1.728 mil
Kuwait	2.158 mil
Israel	3.147 mil
UAE	3.705 mil
Tunisia	3.769 mil
Syria	5.529 mil
Yemen	6.823 mil
Saudi Arabia	7.337 mil
Iraq	8.5 mil
Algeria	10.81 mil
Morocco	11.44 mil
Iran	25.7 mil
Egypt	26.2 mil

The problems with having an oil dependent country are shown in what fields people work in. In 2008, services were the largest employer at 59.8%, but that sector only contributes 29.8% of the GDP. 21.6% also work in agriculture, which is less than 10% of GDP. 18.7% work in industry, which would seem to point out that a large number of people find work in the petroleum and related businesses, but that would be untrue. That only employs 1% of workers, and almost 58% of the GDP. Most of the country’s industrial workers are at state-run businesses, which specialize in useless employees who are simply given jobs to keep people off the streets, or for political patronage. Again, this is a common problem amongst many of the oil dependent countries in the region.

	Labor Force by Occupation
Iraq	Agriculture 21.6% Industry 18.7% Services 59.8% (2008)
Algeria	Agriculture 14% Industry 13.4% Construction 10% Trade 14.6% Government 32% (2003)
Bahrain	Agriculture 1% Industry 79% Services 20% (1997)
Egypt	Agriculture 32% Industry 17% Services 51% (2001)
Iran	Agriculture 25% Industry 31% Services 45% (2007)
Israel	Agriculture 2% Industry 16% Services 82% (2008)
Jordan	Agriculture 2.7% Industry 20% Services 77.4% (2007)
Kuwait	NA
Libya	Agriculture 17% Industry 23% Services 59% (2004)
Morocco	Agriculture 44.6% Industry 19.8% Services 35.5% (2006)
Oman	NA
Qatar	NA
Saudi Arabia	Agriculture 6.7% Industry 21.4% Services 71.9%
Syria	Agriculture 17% Industry 16% Services 67% (2008)
Tunisia	Agriculture 18.3% Industry 31.9% Services 49.8%
UAE	Agriculture 7% Industry 15% Services 78% (2000)
Yemen	NA

That also has an affect upon people finding work. In 2009, Iraq had a 15.3% jobless rate. Recently, a survey done by the Iraqi government and United Nations found that the jobless rate had gone down to 11% in 2011, but unofficially the rate is at 30%. Underemployment is even higher. That places Iraq towards the bottom in finding jobs for people, with only Libya and Yemen doing worse. Obviously, with the largest business in Iraq, providing hardly any work opportunities causes tremendous strains upon the country. Until it diversifies its economy, this will continue. Instead of trying to find new industries however, Baghdad has just attempted to create more public sector work, which does not solve anything, because many of these positions are useless, and only adds to underemployment.

	Unemployment
Qatar	0.5% (2010)
Kuwait	2.2% (2004)
UAE	2.4% (2001)
Israel	6.7% (2010)
Syria	8.3% (2010)
Egypt	9% (2010)
Morocco	9.1% (2010)
Algeria	10% (2010)
Saudi Arabia	10.8% (2010)
Jordan	12.5% (2010)
Tunisia	13% (2010)
Iran	13.2% (2010)
Oman	15% (2004)
Bahrain	15% (2005)
Iraq	15.3% (2009)
Libya	30% (2004)
Yemen	35% (2003)

Along with high unemployment, Iraq also suffers from high rates of poverty. In 2008, 25% of the population was below the poverty line, which is just $2 per day. That is the third worse rate out of the figures available in the region. Poverty is said to be shallow in Iraq however, which means a small increase in income would raise a large number of people up out of the bottom. (1) Again, a major problem in the government’s anti-poverty programs is reliance upon public sector jobs. Better solutions have been proposed by government agencies, but Iraq has a bad rate of implementing its development plans, while making more government positions is much easier.

	Pop. Below poverty level
Tunisia	3.8% (2005)
Syria	11.9% (2006)
Jordan	14.2% (2002)
Morocco	15% (2007)
Iran	18% (2007)
UAE	19.5% (2003)
Egypt	20% (2005)
Algeria	23% (2006)
Israel	23.6% (2007)
Iraq	25% (2008)
Libya	Approx. 33%
Yemen	45.2%
Bahrain	NA
Kuwait	NA
Oman	NA
Qatar	NA
Saudi Arabia	NA

An economic issue that has recently improved for Iraq is inflation. The insurgency and civil war shot up prices in the country. It has only just recovered from this, and inflation stood at a modest 2.4% in 2010.

2010	Inflation Rate
Qatar	-2.4%
UAE	0.9%
Morocco	1%
Bahrain	2%
Iraq	2.4%
Libya	2.5%
Israel	2.7%
Oman	3.2%
Algeria	3.9%
Kuwait	4%
Tunisia	4.4%
Syria	4.4%
Jordan	5%
Saudi Arabia	5.4%
Iran	10.1%
Egypt	11.1%
Yemen	11.2%

Electricity is another service that has suffered since the 1990 invasion of Kuwait. During the 1991 Gulf War, the Coalition bombed the power network to try to undermine Saddam. This was partially rebuilt afterward. Then after the 2003 American invasion, the power grid became a target of insurgents. Despite that, electricity output has steadily increased. The problem is that so has consumption, which has taken off at an even higher rate. That’s because Iraqis have been able to buy a wide variety of consumer goods since 2003 that were once denied them under sanctions such as refrigerators and air conditioners. Most Iraqis also do not pay electricity bills, so there is no control over usage. Together this means that Iraq does not produce enough power to meet demand, which leads to a reliance upon private generators. There are also constant blackouts through much of the country. It was no surprise then when electricity became a major cause of protests in Iraq in 2010 and 2011. The government’s plans to build new power plants to finally fix this problem have largely failed, because the bureaucracy cannot handle such large projects for a variety of reasons. That’s why Iraq is one of only two countries, Morocco, being the other in the Middle East and North Africa that has a power deficit.

	Power Production	Power Consumption	Difference
Iraq	46.39 bil kilowatts/hr (2009)	52 bil kilowatts/hr (2009)	-5.61 bil kilowatts/hr
Morocco	19.49 bil kilowatts/hr (2008)	21.47 bil kilowatts/hr (2008)	-1.98 bil kilowatts/hr
Qatar	19.18 bil kilowatts/hr (2009)	18.79 bil kilowatts/hr (2008)	+0.38 bil kilowatts/hr
Bahrain	11.22 bil kilowatts/hr (2008)	10.48 bil kilowatts/hr (2008)	+0.74 bil kilowatts/hr
Yemen	6.153 bil kilowatts/hr (2008)	4.646 bil kilowatts/hr (2008)	+1.507 bil kilowatts/hr
Jordan	13.01 bil kilowatts/hr (2008)	11.3 bil kilowatts/hr (2008)	+1.71 bil kilowatts/hr
Tunisia	14.4 bil kilowatts/hr (2008)	12.49 bil kilowatt/hr (2008)	+1.91 bil kilowatts/hr
Libya	26.95 bil kilowatts/hr (2008)	22.89 bil kilowatts/hr (2008)	+4.06 bil kilowatts/hr
Oman	17.63 bil kilowatts/hr (2009)	13.25 bil kilowatts/hr (2008)	+4.38 bil kilowatts/hr
Israel	53.04 bil kilowatts (2008)	47.16 bil kilowatts/hr (2008)	+5.88 bil kilowatts/hr
Iran	212.8 bil kilowatts/hr (2009)	206.7 bil kilowatts/hr (2009)	+6.1 bil kilowatts/hr
Kuwait	49.82 bil kilowatts/hr (2009)	42.58 bil kilowatts/hr (2008)	+7.24 bil kilowatts/hr
Algeria	40.11 bil kilowatts/hr (2009)	30.5 bil kilowatts/hr (2008)	+9.61 bil kilowatts/hr
Syria	38.71 bil kilowatts/hr (2008)	28.99 bil kilowatts/hr (2008)	+9.72 bil kilowatts/hr
UAE	80.94 bil kilowatts/hr (2009)	70.58 bil kilowatts/hr (2008)	+10.36 bil kilowatts/hr
Egypt	123.9 bil kilowatts/hr (2008)	109.1 bil kilowatts/hr (2008)	+14.8 bil kilowatts/hr
Saudi Arabia	194.4 bil kilowatts/hr (2009)	174.5 bil kilowatts/hr (2008)	+19.9 bil kilowatts/hr

Even with all of the conflict, political disputes, and aging infrastructure, Iraq is still one of the largest oil producers and exporters in the region. It is the 5^th largest producer overall. After it signed a number of deals with foreign companies, the Oil Ministry announced aspirations to surpass Iran and Saudi Arabia who are the two largest producers in the Middle East. It will probably take a decade to reach Iran’s level because of Iraq’s bureaucracy, politics, and delays in development projects that are endemic to the country.

	Oil Prod.	Oil Exp.
Jordan	88 bar/day (2010)	0 bar/day
Morocco	3,938 bar/day (2010)	25,090 bar/day (2009)
Israel	4,029 bar/day (2010)	86,010 bar/day (2009)
Tunisia	83,720 bar/day (2010)	91,200 bar/day (2009)
Bahrain	46,430 bar/day (2010)	239,900 bar/day (2009)
Yemen	258,800 bar/day (2010)	207,700 bar/day (2009)
Syria	401,000 bar/day (2010)	263,000 bar/day (2009)
Egypt	662,600 bar/day (2010)	163,000 bar/day (2009)
Oman	867,900 bar/day (2010)	592,300 bar/day (2009)
Qatar	1.437 mil/bar/day (2010)	1.038 mil/bar/day (2009)
Libya	1.789 mil/bar/day (2010)	1.385 mil/bar/day (2009)
Algeria	2.078 mil/bar/day (2010)	1.694 mil/bar/day (2009)
Iraq	2.408 mil/bar/day (2010)	1.91 mil/bar/day (2009)
Kuwait	2.45 mil/bar/day (2010)	2.127 mil/bar/day (2009)
UAE	2.813 mil/bar/day (2010)	2.395 mil/bar/day (2009)
Iran	4.252 mil/bar/day (2010)	2.523 mil/bar/day (2009)
Saudi Arabia	10.52 mil/bar/day (2010)	7.635 mil/bar/day (2009)

The reason Iraq wants to move towards the top of oil producing countries is that it has huge untapped oil reserves. At 115 billion barrels, it has the fourth most proven reserves in the Middle East and North Africa. It could have even more if more exploration work was done. Much of this is untapped potential however, since it does not have the infrastructure at this date to exploit all of this oil.

	Oil Reserves
Morocco	680,000 bar
Jordan	1 mil/bar
Tunisia	425 mil/bar
Israel	1.94 mil/bar
Syria	2.5 bil/bar
Yemen	3 bil/bar
Egypt	4.4 bil/bar
Oman	5.5 bil/bar
Algeria	12.2 bil
Qatar	25.38 bil/bar
Libya	46.42 bil/bar
UAE	97.8 bil/bar
Kuwait	104 bil/bar
Iraq	115 bil/bar
Bahrain	124.6 mil/bar
Iran	137 bil/bar
Saudi Arabia	262.6 bil/bar

All of the countries in the region also have large natural gas reserves. Iraq would like to exploit this resource more, and eventually export it. It is just beginning to sign deals with foreign companies to achieve that. Iraq has the 6^th largest gas reserves in region at 3.17 trillion cubic meters. Only 1.149 billion cubic meters were actually produced in 2009, because it lacks the pipelines and storage facilities to use much more. Most of the gas produced in Iraq comes from the extraction of oil, and is burned off. This is a huge waste of resources and money.

2011	Natural Gas Proven Reserves
Morocco	1.444 bil cu. meters
Jordan	6.031 bil cu. meters
Tunisia	65.13 bil cu. meters
Bahrain	92.03 bil cu. meters
Israel	198.2 bil cu. meters
Syria	240.7 bil cu. meters
Yemen	478.5 bil cu. meters
Oman	849.5 bil cu. meters
Libya	1.548 tril cu. meters
Kuwait	1.798 tril cu. meters
Egypt	2.186 tril cu. meters
Iraq	3.17 tril cu. meters
Algeria	4.502 tril cu. meters
UAE	6.453 tril cu. meters
Saudi Arabia	7.807 tril cu. meters
Qatar	25.37 tril cu. meters
Iran	29.61 tril cu. meters

	Natural Gas Prod	Natural Gas Cons.	Natural Gas Exports	Natural Gas Imports
Morocco	60 mil cu. Meters (2009)	560 mil cu. Meters (2009)	0	500 mil cu. Meters (2009)
Jordan	250 mil cu. meters (2009)	3.1 bil cu. meters 92009)	0	2.85 bil cu. meters (2009)
Yemen	520 mil cu. meters (2009)	100 mil cu. meters (2009)	420 mil cu. meters (2009)	0
Iraq	1.149 bil cu. meters (2009)	1.149 bil cu. meters (2009)	0	0
Israel	1.55 bil cu. meters (2009)	3.25 bil cu. meters (2009)	0	1.7 bil cu. meters (2009)
Tunisia	3.6 bil cu. meters (2009)	4.85 bil cu. meters (2009)	0	1.25 bil cu. meters (2009)
Syria	6.19 bil cu. meters (2009)	7.1 bil cu. meters (2009)	0	910 mil cu. meters (2009)
Kuwait	11.49 bil cu. meters (2009)	12.38 bil cu. meters (2009)	0	890 mil cu. meters (2009)
Bahrain	12.58 bil cu. meters (2009)	12.58 bil cu. meters (2009)	0	0
Libya	15.9 bil cu. meters (2009)	6.01 bil cu. meters (2009)	9.89 bil cu. meters (2009)	0
Oman	24.76 bil cu. meters (2009)	14.72 bil cu. meters (2009)	11.54 bil cu. meters (2009)	1.5 bil cu. meters (2009)
UAE	48.84 bil cu. meters (2009)	59.08 bil cu. meters (2009)	7.01 bil cu. meters (2009)	17.25 bil cu. meters (2009)
Egypt	62.69 bil cu. meters (2009)	44.37 bil cu. meters (2009)	18.32 bil cu. meters (2009)	0
Saudi Arabia	83.94 bil cu. meters (2010)	83.94 bil cu. meters (2010)	0	0
Algeria	85.14 bil cu. meters (2010)	29.86 bil cu. meters (2010)	55.28 bil cu. meters (2010)	4.502 tril cu. meters (2011)
Qatar	116.7 bil cu. meters (2010)	21.89 bil cu. meters (2010)	94.81 bil cu. meters (2010)	0
Iran	138.5 bil cu. meters (2010)	137.5 bil cu. meters (2010)	7.87 bil cu. meters (2010	6.9 bil cu. meters (2010)

Iraq has a healthy trade balance with a surplus due to its oil exports. The amount it earned from that industry went up last year as prices soared with the unrest in the Middle East. However, just a slight drop in price could quickly reverse that trend.

2010	Exports	Imports	Difference
Jordan	$7.333 bil	$12.97 bil	-$5.637 bil
Yemen	$7.718 bil	$8,701 bil	-$0.983 bil
Bahrain	$13.83 bil	$11.19 bil	+$2.14 bil
Syria	$14.03 bil	$16.98 bil	-$2.95 bil
Tunisia	$16.43 bi	$21.01 bil	-$4.58 bil
Morocco	$17.58 bil	$32.65 bil	-$15.07 bil
Egypt	$25.02 bil	$51.54 bil	-$26.52 bil
Oman	$36.6 bil	$17.87 bil	+$18.73 bil
Libya	$41.8 bil	$24.73 bil	+$17.07 bil
Iraq	$51.76 bil	$43.92 bil	+$7.84 bil
Israel	$55.67 bil	$58.04 bil	+$2.37 bil
Algeria	$57.19 bil	$38.38 bil	+$18.81 bil
Kuwait	$66.96 bil	$19.06 bil	+47.9 bil
Qatar	$72.04 bil	$20.94 bil	+$51.1 bil
Iran	$84.92 bil	$58.97 bil	+$25.95 bil
UAE	$212.3 bil	$161.4 bil	+$50.9 bil
Saudi Arabia	$237.9 bil	$88.35 bil	+149.55 bil

The current account balance calculates the balance of trade (exports minus imports), plus net income, and the transfer of payments such as foreign aid, and in Iraq’s case reparations to Kuwait, all together. Iraq has a middling $3.105 billion current account balance, because it still has to pay Kuwait 5% of its oil exports, plus imports large amounts of food, electricity, fuel, and consumer goods. Another sign that Iraq’s economy is not diversified, and is too reliant upon oil is that it has to import so many goods and services.

2010	Current Account Balance
Morocco	-$4.625 bil
Egypt	-$4.435 bil
Yemen	-$1.944 bil
Syria	-$1.379 bil
Jordan	-$974.5 mil
Tunisia	-$973.4 mil
Bahrain	$239.5 mil
Oman	$2.007 bil
Iraq	$3.105 bil
UAE	$6.053 bil
Israel	$6.699 bil
Algeria	$12.74 bil
Qatar	$15.04 bil
Iran	$15.42 bil
Libya	$16.16 bil
Kuwait	$43.14 bil
Saudi Arabia	$70.1 bil

Iraq has the fifth largest debt in the region. That is mostly due to the expense of the Iran-Iraq War, which was largely financed by regional players like Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, etc., loaning money to Saddam. The Saudis and Kuwait have been unwilling to forgive those debts since 2003 for political reasons. The Saudis do not like Shiite rule in Baghdad, and Kuwait is still weary of Iraq as well. The United Arab Emirates did just forgive its $5.8 billion debt on January 17, 2012, but Iraq still has a large outstanding burden.

	Debt
Algeria	$4.344 bil (2010)
Libya	$6.396 bil (2010)
Yemen	$6.586 bil (2010)
Syria	$7.636 bil (2010)
Oman	$7.921 bil (2010)
Iran	$14.34 bil (2010)
Bahrain	$14.58 bil (2010)
Jordan	$17.46 bil (2011)
Tunisia	$23.09 bil (2011)
Morocco	$30.19 bil (2011)
Egypt	$34.91 bil (2011)
Kuwait	$45.43 bil (2010)
Iraq	$52.58 bil (2010)
Qatar	$75.13 bil (2010)
Saudi Arabia	$80.94 bil (2010)
Israel	$112.4 bil (2011)
UAE	$151.8 bil (2010)

All together, Iraq follows many of the trend seen in the Middle East and North Africa. It has a very young and growing population. This was seen across the region when thousands of young people took to the streets during the Arab Spring, and protests in Iraq itself this past year. It also has an oil dependent economy, which means that it cannot find enough jobs for those young people. The government has responded with more public sector jobs, which solves nothing. To add to these difficulties, Iraq is still trying to recover from two decades of sanctions and war. That has devastated its services, such as health and electricity. Iraq is trying to solve these problems, but to very mixed results. Overall, Iraq is still at the bottom in many important categories when compared to its neighbors, but some things are getting better. The main issue is the government, which seems incapable of successfully implementing any large projects or planning for the future. That makes Iraq a rather typical developing country.

FOOTNOTES

1. Aswat al-Iraq, “Iraq’s poverty 23%, Mideast & North-Africa official says,” 5/14/11

SOURCES

Arraf, Jane, “Iraq’s Arab Spring: Protests rise against persistent poverty in oil-rich nation,” Christian Science Monitor, 5/24/11

Aswat al-Iraq, “Iraq’s poverty 23%, Mideast & North-Africa official says,” 5/14/11

- “Lack of water, soil salinity hamper agriculture in Iraq,” 2/23/10

Central Intelligence Agency, The World Factbook, 2011

Morse, Dan, “Promise of Iraq’s economy remains unfulfilled,” Washington Post, 1/8/12

Salama, Samir, “UAE waives $5.8 billion of Iraq debt,” Gulf News, 1/17/12

Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction,” Quarterly Report and Semiannual Report to the United States Congress,” 1/30/11

- “Quarterly Report and Semiannual Report to the United States Congress,” 7/30/11

- “Quarterly Report to the United States Congress,” 10/30/11

Unger, Christopher, “Planning Ministry promises to fight poverty – again,” AK News, 10/17/11

Al-Wannan, Jaa’far, “Water shortage threatens Iraqi agriculture projects,” AK News, 3/19/11