Iraq is a country where corruption plays a role in everyday
life. Politicians hire not only their followers, but also family members into
the government. Bribes are the most common way to receive services from the
authorities. Public procurement is notoriously manipulated by officials to skim
money, and funnel it to their supporters. Theft and graft not only undermines the
country’s democracy, but its economy as well as huge amounts of money are
siphoned off, usually to foreign bank accounts, instead of used to rebuild the
nation. After the 2003 invasion, the United States was hoping to prevent all
that from happening in Iraq when it created two new anti-corruption agencies.
The lead in this fight was going to be the Integrity Commission. The Americans
however, failed to come up with an adequate structure for the agency, didn’t
support it, and it was eventually undermined by politicians who did not want a
check on their ability to make off with Iraq’s wealth.
The Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) came up with the
idea of new offices to counter the threat of corruption in Iraq. In January
2004, it created the Integrity Commission with CPA Order 55. It was supposed to be the lead anti-graft agency in the new Iraq. The Commission
was to investigate cases, and then turn them over to the Central Criminal Court
of Iraq, which would decide whether to prosecute or not. The Americans thought
this was a great idea, but didn’t fully back it. The CPA for instance, did not
appointed a head of the Commission, Judge Radhi Hamza Radhi, until it was about
to end its work in Iraq in June. The Coalition didn’t really fund the office
either, which led it to struggle. Eventually, the State Department ended up
providing $11 million to train both the Commission staff and the new Inspector
Generals. Perhaps because the CPA was busy dealing with other matters such as
appointing an interim Iraqi government or writing the Transitional
Administration Law, which was to rule Iraq until a new constitution was
drafted, it didn’t give the time and money to the Integrity Commission, which
it needed in its inception. Then again, because the Coalition was such a
chaotic institution the neglect of the Commission could be just another example
of how the U.S. acted in an ad hoc manner in the 2003-2004 period.
Either way, the Americans left the Integrity Commission with
an unnecessarily bureaucratic set of rules to follow. The Commission had to
rely upon the Inspector Generals, which operated within each ministry to gain
information about what was going wrong with the government. That was because
the Commission had no power to demand files from the authorities. The
Inspectors are largely under the control of their ministers and the prime
minister, which means they don’t pass along much substantive data. When it does
receive something, the Commission has to review it, and then request more
information if it thinks it is important. It then turns over its findings to
the Criminal Court that has final say on whether something will be done or not.
Then the Interior Ministry would have to issue arrest warrants for the
suspects. (1) A 2007 U.S. Embassy report noted that the Ministry often refused
to do so when it involved corruption cases. Sometimes Interior officials would
even check with the people they were supposed to arrest or take bribes to do
nothing. Rather than being at the forefront of investigations, this web of red
tape largely made the Integrity Commission a reviewer of material, dependent
upon others to actually procure information and arrest and prosecute people.
That greatly limited its ability to keep its work secret, and follow through
with anything important it might find.
There were legal barriers the Integrity Commission faced as
well. A major one was Article 136(b) of the Iraqi Penal Code. It allowed
ministers to stop any cases from going to court. In June 2004, the CPA
suspended the Law, only for interim Prime Minister Iyad Allawi to bring it back later that year. From 2005-2008 136(b) was used 210 times. It wasn’t until
April 2011 that parliament finally eliminated the article. Then there was the
February 2008 Amnesty Law, which was aimed at reconciliation, but included a provision that covered public employees involved in corruption. By
November, the Commission complained that 1,721 cases had to be closed as a result of the new legislation. The environment in which the Integrity
Commission was working in was not conducive to its work. Both the executive and
legislative branches used their power to inhibit the Commission for carrying
out any meaningful investigations. That limited it to only low-level cases,
where no one in power would be threatened.
Of greater consequence to the staff was the insecurity that
reigned in Iraq from 2004-2008. The Integrity Commission became a victim of
this violence. From 2004-2007, 31 workers were killed, as well as 12 family
members. The first Commission head Judge Radhi became a target as well. Some of
this came from elements of the government. The Interior Ministry for example,
was considered a rogue element that had death squads running out of it, so it
was off limits. The Sadrists controlled the Health Ministry and was using it to
carry out extra judicial killings as well. It openly feuded with the Commission
over charges of bribery and stealing drugs and equipment. Agency personnel
couldn’t go to the Ministry building or the hospitals it controlled out of fear
of the Mahdi Army. The Oil Ministry too was considered out of bounds, because the parties that controlled it would also threaten or attack Integrity officials if they pocked around. The intimidation level became so high that
the Commission could barely do any of its work during this period, especially
with some of the most powerful ministries out of bounds.
The disadvantage this put the Integrity Commission at was
apparent early on. In the first eighteen months of its existence it sent 541
cases to the Criminal Court of Iraq, including 42 against ministers, deputy
ministers, and director generals. The judiciary however hardly acted on any of
these either because they were unwilling or unable. The result was that from
2004-2007, only 241 guilty verdicts were given, a pitiful 8% of those sent for
prosecution. The number of convictions has greatly increased since then, but
that hides the lack of effectiveness of such cases. In 2008 for example, there
were 97 guilty verdicts, followed by 296 in 2009, and 481 in 2010. Hardly any
of these involved any official of standing however. As a U.S. official noted to
the International Crisis Group, the number of cases successfully going to court
has had no impact upon corruption. In turn, the U.S. Embassy claimed that the
Commission was a largely passive entity, because it was too dangerous for it to
anything substantive. Given the opposition that the agency faced, going after
the lower hanging fruit was probably all that it could hope for.
When violence died down, and Iraq became more stable things
did not get any better. Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki and Vice President Adel
Abdul al-Mahdi both actively went after the independence of the Integrity
Commission. In 2007, the premier told U.S. officials that he opposed
independent agencies investigating corruption. That led to a spring executive
order being issued that no action against a minister could take place without
his permission. Judge Radhi claimed that blocked $80 million in cases that were
being investigated. Even worse, for a short period of time in 2007, the prime minister had the official link to the Commission on the government’s webpage go to a porn site. Ironically, the next year the premier declared Baghdad was going to focus upon fighting corruption. He showed his commitment to that
cause by pardoning 1,023 people who were under investigation at the end of the
year. Behind the scenes, Maliki issued secret orders to stop the Commission
from sending cases to the Central Criminal Court that involved high-ranking
officials. The next year, the premier tried to limit the agency even more by
saying that it could not start any investigations on its own, and attempted to
get rid of specific Commission personnel. Vice President Mahdi tried similar
tactics. He demanded the right to vet all corruption cases. When the Commission
refused, it got a call from the head of the Iraqi Supreme Court, Judge Medhat
Mahmoud telling it to give into Mahdi’s request. It was nearly impossible for
the Integrity Commission to escape such pressure from the prime minister and
vice president of the country. This put another huge damper on its ability to
do its work properly, again reducing it to something akin to a beat cop who
could arrest a common criminal, but never the big fish who committed the real
crimes.
The influence Prime Minister Maliki was able to garner over
the Integrity Commission allowed him to manipulate their investigations. In May
2011 for instance, the government accused the director of the Trade Bank of
Iraq Hussein al-Azri of corruption. The charges however, dated back to 2007. A
senior Iraqi official questioned why it took four years for any action to be
taken on them, leading him and others to believe that the premier was just
using them to gain control of the bank.
The constant outside interference, and lack of any
meaningful accomplishments led to a high turnover rate with the heads of the
Integrity Commission. Judge Radhi resigned in September 2007. He claimed that
there was $4 billion worth of corruption going on at the Defense Ministry, and
$2 billion worth in the Interior Ministry. Afterward, there was an attack on
his house, which he blamed the Iraqi security forces for. In addition, he said that the government was stopping him from doing his job, and that Maliki
was against investigating corruption. That same year, factions in parliament attempted to impeach him. That all led to him stepping down. Radhi’s deputy Mossa Farj was then appointed his replacement. He discovered
massive corruption at the Oil Ministry, which he went public with. He was
dismissed before he could do anything about it. Then in January 2008, Judge
Rahim al-Ogaili was named the new head. He was never confirmed by parliament
however, which meant he could be dismissed at any time. The prime minister used
that fact to constantly pressure him. Ogaili ended up leaving in September
2011. He, along with the Inspector Generals and Board of Supreme Audit were
looking into hundreds of shell companies set up by officials and political
parties, which were involved in a massive scam to skim off money from
government contracts. Any time a major development deal was signed by Baghdad,
it included some of these front companies, so that relatives and followers of
politicians could siphon off funds. When the Integrity Commission turned over
its findings to the Criminal Court, it refused to act. Ogaili quit as a result.
The political differences within parliament then kept it from naming a new
Commission head. That allowed the premier to place Izzat Tawfiq in on an interim basis, and in effect, finally gain control of the agency. Since
2007, the prime minister has demanded that the Integrity Commission bend to his
will. In 2011, he achieved his goal when he was able to place one of his people
at the top of the organization. Now he can intervene on any cases that involve
his supporters, and use the Commission against his rivals and enemies.
To top it all off, the Commission has not been immune from
the problems it was created to solve. The organization has hired people who
were not qualified, were corrupt, and members of political parties. Starting in
2008, as violence receded, the Commission did try to address some of these
issues. Judge Ogaili for one, started some internal reforms, and fired some
personnel. Still, in 2011, some of the leadership in the commission was accused of embezzling money and taking funds. An inquiry turned up nothing, but
then it was revealed that bribes had been given to look the other way. That
made the Commission much like the rest of the government. It’s just ironic in
this case, since the agency is supposed to be fighting against these illegal
activities, but ended up falling victim to them.
The Americans created the Integrity Commission to be at the
forefront in the fight against corruption in the new Iraq. The U.S.’s lack of
support, and bad planning however, undermined the new institution. When the CPA
closed shop in 2004, the Integrity Commission faced an unfriendly legal, political,
and security reality. It came out on the short end, and although it continues
to do its work, and reports more arrests and convictions each year, it has
hardly made an impact upon corruption, which has been institutionalized within
the country. Like the other anti-graft agencies today it finds itself
emasculated, and under the control of the prime minister.
FOOTNOTES
1. U.S. Embassy, “Review of Anticorruption Efforts in Iraq
Working Draft,” 2007
SOURCES
Brinkley, Joel, “Iraq quietly tackles rampant corruption,”
San Francisco Chronicle, 1/24/09
Corn, David, “Secret Report: Corruption is ‘Norm’ Within
Iraqi Government,” The Nation, 8/30/07
Ibrahim, Haidar, “Lack of Political Consensus Hinders
Assigning New Integrity Head,” AK News, 12/16/11
International Crisis Group, “Failing Oversight: Iraq’s
Unchecked Government,” 9/26/11
Ramzi, Kholoud, “the integrity commission is accused of
corruption,” Niqash, 3/23/11
Reuters, “Iraq Says 300 Officials Charged With Corruption,”
11/18/08
Rubin, Alissa, “Blaming Politics, Iraqi Antigraft Official
Vows to Quit,” New York Times, 9/7/07
Schoof, Renee, “Iraqi judge: Corruption undermines Iraq’s
future,” McClatchy Newspapers, 10/4/07
Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, Hard Lessons, 1/22/09
- “Quarterly Report and Semiannual Report to the United
States Congress,” 1/30/12
- “Quarterly Report to the United States Congress,” 10/30/08
- “Quarterly Report to the United States Congress,” 4/30/09
U.S. Embassy, “Review of Anticorruption Efforts in Iraq Working
Draft,” 2007
Visser, Reidar, “Anti-Corruption Measure Sparks
Constitutional Confusion in Iraq,” Iraq and Gulf Analysis, 5/10/11
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