The United States has a huge amount of captured Al Qaeda in
Iraq (AQI) documents that are archived at West Point’s Combating Terrorism
Center’s Harmony
Program. Patrick Johnston of the RAND Corporation has been going through
these records studying the group’s finances from 2005-2010. They show that
while AQI might have been started by the Jordanian Abu Musab al-Zarqawi it soon
became a self-sufficient organization based upon fund raising within Iraq, and
that this money played a crucial role in sustaining the group through its ups
and downs.
1. Since 2003 the
U.S. has captured thousands of papers from the Islamic State’s predecessors in
Iraq. What do all those documents say about the group’s organization?
They reveal both a great deal of complexity but also a very
well organized terrorist outfit. AQI and ISI were both dynamic organizations.
They were similar in some ways, such as their looting and targeting of the
Iraqi Shia population and their emphasis on establishing bureaucratic
structures intended to foster the administrative requirements of an Islamic
state. But as the war changed, so did AQI and ISI. As ISI was increasingly
pushed into northern Iraq by heavy U.S. and Iraqi military pressure, it adapted
to the environment and successfully pursued new sources of financing that
helped it remain viable and resilient despite heavy leadership losses. AQI and
ISI’s adaptability to a wide range of different challenges, while maintaining a
significant amount of organizational continuity, shows how well institutionalized
its basic organizing principles and standard operating procedures were.
2. Al Qaeda in Iraq
(AQI) started as Tawhid wal Jihad, which Abu Musab al-Zarqawi founded in the
1990s with a loan from Osama bin Laden. When he came to Iraq he relied upon his
network throughout the Middle East and Europe and foreign fighters to finance
his operation. Then in 2004 Zarqawi pledged allegiance to Al Qaeda central,
which brought in new sources of funding from places like the Persian Gulf.
Today this image persists that the Islamic State (IS) gets most of its money
from places like Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. What do the captured AQI documents
say about where it was getting most of its money from?
My RAND colleagues and I have analyzed several large volumes
of AQI and ISI financial documents from AQI’s zenith in Anbar to one of the
ISI’s lower points in Mosul in 2008-09. What’s striking in the documents is how
self-sufficient the organization remained throughout. In 2005 and 2006, it was generating
the bulk of its funding from stolen goods and vehicle sales. By 2009, the
majority of its funding came from mafia-style protection rackets it ran against
contractors of local projects and from extorting the oil sector. There is no
indication from the documents that AQI or ISI ever relied heavily on outside
financing. But it’s possible that has changed. The documents I’m analyzing only
run through 2010. More research on subsequent years is possible, and it’s work
I hope to do next.
3. Another common
argument is that Iraqis joined the insurgency because of the lack of jobs and a
steady income. Was that true for members of AQI?
My colleagues and I have done extensive research on this
question; the answer is unequivocally “no.” We’ve published two studies that
focus partly or solely
on the economics of how AQI and ISI compensated its members. Each time we analyzed
new sets of documents from AQI or ISI elements operating in different
governorates at different points in time. What remained a constant was that AQI
and ISI paid their members astonishingly low
wages. Especially considering the degree of personal risk assumed by joining
AQI/ISI. To put it in perspective, AQI /ISI tended to pay members about a third
of what an experienced bricklayer could expect to earn in Baghdad.
So to get back to your question, no, the documents strongly
suggest AQI members did not
join for the money. In fact, AQI/ISI might have kept wages intentionally low
partly to deter potential recruits interested in a livelihood but not in committing
fully to their cause.
4. Like many
underground groups AQI is broken up into cells. How did these small units
contribute to the central leadership?
Sector AQI units would set up “mini-AQI/ISI emirates” at the
local level that were structured almost identically to the group’s
hierarchical, bureaucratic structures at higher levels. These structures were
also similar to core al-Qa’ida’s. The documents show that support went both
ways: local AQI sectors were expected to send a standard 20 percent of each
month’s revenue to the provincial AQI headquarters; the provincial level
administrators tended to reallocate these funds rapidly to sectors in their
province that needed the support or to funding to maintain a high ops-tempo.
5. You found that
even during the Surge in 2007 the group was able to increase its fund raising.
How was it able to do that while many of its members were being rounded up or
killed, and how did it use money to try to maintain its operations and counter
the Americans?
Two main things: AQI/ISI’s structures and capabilities are
highly bureaucratic and are well institutionalized. So as an organization, it
was fairly resilient to the degradation wrought on its senior leadership by U.S.
and Iraqi countermeasures, even though its violence levels declined.
6. After the Surge
was over IS started the slow process of rebuilding its cadres, which allowed it
to eventually recover and launch its current offensive. What role did the
steady flow of money from places like Mosul play in this reconstruction of its
network?
It played a key role. Rebuilding an organization as capable
as the Islamic State is now—both in Iraq and Syria —would not likely have been
possible without access to financial resources like Mosul has offered them.
SOURCES
Allam,
Hannah, “Records show how Iraqi extremists withstood U.S. anti-terror efforts,”
McClatchy Newspapers, 6/23/14
Miller,
Greg, “ISIS rapidly accumulating cash, weapons, U.S. intelligence official
say,” Washington Post, 6/24/14
Nordland,
Rod and Rubin, Alissa, “Iraq Insurgents Reaping Wealth as They Advance,” New
York Times, 6/20/14
PRI’s
The World, “The world’s richest jihadi group could ignite the entire Middle
East,” 6/24/14
Temple-Rason,
Dina, “U.S. Moves To Lock Up ISIS’s Abundant War Chest,” NPR, 6/20/14
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