The 14th chapter in the U.S. Army’s second volume on the Iraq war covers the American withdrawal from the country in 2011. Iraq was still facing major problems with its security forces, militias, the insurgency and the struggle for political power. The Obama administration thought it could keep a stay behind force in the nation to help with stability but failed to do so.
The U.S. had spent billions of dollars on creating new Iraqi security forces (ISF) after it disbanded them in 2003. By the time the Americans were preparing to leave in 2011 the ISF was still a work in progress.
In September 2010 for instance an Iraqi army unit found a small force of Islamic State of Iraq (ISI) fighters and couldn’t defeat them. Seven other units responded and together they couldn’t handle the insurgents. They had to call in the Americans to turn the tide and even then the ISF didn’t surrounded the area so most of the ISI members escaped. The incident made U.S. commanders question the time and money they had spent developing the ISF. After seven years the Iraqi forces were still not up to task of fighting militants on their own. It was estimated that the ISF would not be self-sufficient until 2021.
The U.S. found deep structural problems with the ISF as well. Most commanders were absent leaving their units to fend for themselves which left many combat ineffective. Some officers were incompetent political appointees. The army and police did not cooperate with each other. The security forces lacked logistics to maintain themselves. There was no training program to generate new forces. Finally, the Iraqis were buying U.S. equipment most of which they had trouble maintaining. This meant the ISF was not only lacking in fighting capabilities but in leadership and supplies as well.
At the same time the Islamic State of Iraq was re-organizing after having suffered a defeat at the hands of the Anbar Awakening and Sahwa. In May 2010 the group announced new leadership with Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi becoming caliph. He established a new shura council to rebuild the group after its massive losses. Shortly afterwards ISI started a new campaign which focused upon mass casualty bombings. On January 20, 2011, two suicide car bombers hit Shiite pilgrims in Karbala that left 147 casualties. Within four years ISI would be so strong it seized Mosul and much of northern and western Iraq.
The government of Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki was not helping with security by reneging on promises to integrate the Sahwa. The U.S. had turned tribes and insurgents against ISI which became the Sahwa. They helped push the Islamists out of most of the country. Maliki promised to give them civil service jobs as a reward. By July 2010 only 41,000 of 94,000 Sahwa had employment with the state. Not only that but the Interior Ministry began denying salaries to Sahwa that it had hired. The Americans began looking for other jobs for the Sahwa but largely failed. In the end Maliki never fulfilled this pledge and security was compromised as a result.
The insurgency was not the only threat in the country as militias picked up attacks upon the Americans as they withdrew. On January 5, 2010, Moqtada al-Sadr returned to Iraq from Iran and called for resistance against the U.S. His Promised Day Brigades began rocket attacks on the Green Zone while Kataib Hezbollah fired missiles at U.S. bases. They were doing this to claim victory against the Americans and to say they forced them out of Iraq.
Politically PM Maliki continued his march towards autocracy. After the 2010 elections he was made temporary Defense, Interior and National Security Ministers giving him sweeping power over the security forces. In 2011 he replaced 5 of 15 division commanders with loyalists and removed several generals he considered too close to the U.S. The Chief of Staff General Zebari accused the premier of attempting to take over the security forces through his office of commander in chief. The ruling parties were worried about Maliki’s turn towards authoritarianism and yet not only agreed to a second term in 2010 but gave him control of all the security ministries. His politicization of the security forces would also directly lead to the fall of Mosul in 2014.
The U.S. was very worried about the aftermath of its withdrawal and tried to keep a small stay behind force but failed. The U.S. military fretted over the competency of the Iraqi forces and wanted to maintain some sort of presence in the country as a result. Originally U.S. Iraq commander General Ray Odierno thought 25,000 troops should remain in Iraq after the withdrawal. President Obama however wanted far fewer troops. More importantly he demanded that the Iraqi parliament vote on the issue but it was far too divided. Obama therefore cancelled the idea and all American soldiers and Marines were out of the country at the end of 2011. The ISF continued to deteriorate as a result and wasn’t able to deal with the growing insurgency. The U.S. lost influence as well with the U.S. Embassy not able to do half the things the military was. Finally, Maliki continued to concentrate power.
SOURCES
Rayburn, Colonel Joel, Sobchak, Colonel Frank, Editors, The U.S. Army In The Iraq War Volume 2, Surge And Withdrawal 2007-2011, Strategic Studies institute and U.S. Army War College Press, 2019
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