The International Struggle Over Iraq is a study by David Malone of the relationship between the United Nations, its permanent members and Iraq from the Iran-Iraq War to the U.S. occupation. The book is up and down in parts but the conclusions are sound. The author argues that from the 1980s-90s the U.N. was increasingly effective in dealing with Iraq because the great powers agreed on using it as a tool in their foreign policy but afterwards the U.S. and U.K. acted increasingly on their own sidelining the organization until it was largely irrelevant although Malone wouldn’t agree with that last point.
The book can roughly be divided into two parts. The first covers how the permanent members of the Security Council cooperated and worked to try to end the Iran-Iraq War and then punished Iraq for its invasion of Kuwait. The second part is how the U.S. and U.K. acted more unilaterally in the 1990s-2000s and saw the United Nations as an impediment to their strategy against Baghdad.
The first section is epitomized by the Gulf War. Whereas before the Soviets and U.S. would constantly veto each other’s resolutions when Iraq invaded Kuwait the two issued a joint declaration demanding that Saddam withdraw and agreed to imposing sanctions. This was due to Mikhal Gorbachev coming to power who wanted to end the Cold War. The USSR did not object to the U.S. using force to expel the Iraqis. As Malone writes this seemed to usher in President Bush’s New World order where the U.N. would be used as a global police to enforce international law. This was a both a brand new role for the organization but also a fulfillment of its ideal of global cooperation.
That didn’t last which was the point of the rest of the book. After the Gulf War the U.S. and U.K. acted more and more unilaterally against Iraq with things like declaring a no fly zone over northern and southern Iraq which was not explicitly authorized by the U.N. The biggest example was when President Bush and Prime Minister Blair accused Iraq of not following U.N. resolutions to disarm and then did not get a resolution authorizing war in 2003. The two countries were picking and choosing when to turn to the Security Council when dealing with Saddam. The author said the results were ironic because on the one hand an international approach at conflict resolution failed but at the same time the U.N. proved it could not be bullied by the U.S. to do as it pleased.
Along the way there are some interesting little tidbits. For one, France told the U.S. that it should use older resolutions to go to war with Iraq in 2003 and avoid going for a new one that would divide the Security Council. After the invasion the U.S. could ask for international help and Paris would respond. Instead, because of PM Blair’s insistence on a second resolution authorizing war the U.S. ended up spying on members and accusing France of sabotaging everything. Most American and British accounts blame everything on France but never mention that it was actually open to the invasion if done in a certain way.
One of the low points in the book is its coverage of the U.S. occupation. Because the Bush administration largely sidelined the U.N. those parts are just a summary of what the Americans did with little on the United Nations other than its role in setting up the 2005 elections and an annual resolution authorizing the continued Coalition presence. Malone said that it still had a role but it really didn’t.
Overall, The International Struggle Over Iraq is still a worthwhile read. The United Nations was intimately involved in Iraq for over twenty years from trying to end wars to authorizing the Gulf War to a decades’ worth of sanctions, weapons inspections and more. Malone goes through each one of those stages in great detail with some good analysis of how the organization was seen and used by the permanent members to achieve their goals.
Link to all of Musings On Iraq’s book reviews listed by topic
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