Iraq’s Oil Ministry was going to hold an auction for three natural gas fields on September 1, 2010. That has now been delayed a month until October. 1. The reason is to get more energy companies interested.
Iraq is putting up three natural gas fields for bidding. One is Akkas in Anbar that has 5.6 trillion cubic feet of reserves. Another is Mansuriya in Diyala with 4.5 trillion cubic feet of reserves, and the last is Siba in Basra with 1.13 trillion cubic feet of reserves. Akkas and Mansuriya were originally put up for auction in June 2009. Only one company bid on Akkas, but it was rejected, while none showed interest in Mansuriya.
In total, Iraq has an estimated 112 trillion cubic feet of natural gas, the 11th largest amount in the world. It currently produces 1.64 cubic feet of gas per day, 70% of which is flared at oil fields where the gas is produced as part of the extraction process.
48 companies have been pre-approved for the October bidding round. 45 of the businesses are the same ones that participated in the two rounds of auctions in 2009 for oil and gas fields. Three more, TNK-BP, Itochu Corporation and Kuwait Energy were just added.
The reason for the delay, is that the Oil Ministry is concerned about the lack of interest by these corporations. Iraq has huge untapped potential in natural gas, but like its oil industry, doesn't have the infrastructure to fully exploit it. The government for example, is offering the companies the right to export half of the gas produced, but there’s currently no way to do that. The Akkas field is only a few miles from Syria, while Siba borders Kuwait, but there are no pipelines connecting the countries to transport the gas. Iraq also needs storage facilities, better roads, and to provide security. Businesses have also complained that the terms offered by the Oil Ministry are confusing.
Iraq has ambitious plans to develop its energy resources. In 2009 it signed eleven contracts to develop its oil industry. This year it wants to auction three gas fields. If successful, the new deals would not only bring in more money, but also provide fuel for the country’s electricity generators. Like petroleum, the major impediment is infrastructure. If Akkas, Mansuriya or Siba were successfully auctioned off, the corporations may not be able to do anything with the majority of gas produced for years until pipes, reservoirs, roads, etc. were built. There’s also the issue of who would have to pay for all that. That may mean new exploitation of Iraq’s gas reserves will have to wait.
SOURCE
Agence France Presse, “Iraq delays gas bid round until October,” 8/2/10
Hafidh, Hassan, “2nd UPDATE: Iraq Delays Gas Bidding Round Until Oct 1-Source,” Dow Jones, 8/1/10
- “Iraq Needs Gas Infrastructure Investment Before Bid Round – Executives,” Dow Jones, 8/2/10
Yackley, Ayla Jean, “Iraq delays gas bidding round to Oct 1,” Reuters, 8/1/10
Saturday, August 7, 2010
Friday, August 6, 2010
Al Qaeda In Iraq Continues With Propaganda Attacks
Amongst the daily violence in Iraq, Al Qaeda continues with dramatic attacks meant to keep its high profile and garner propaganda victories. Two recent incidents in Baghdad where Al Qaeda raised its flag in public are examples.
First, on July 29, 2010 35-40 insurgents attacked a checkpoint in Adhamiya, northern Baghdad. The militants overran the post, killing three soldiers. Their bodies were then set on fire, and Al Qaeda’s black flag was raised in place of the Iraqi one. When Iraqi police and army vehicles approached the scene, they were hit by five IEDs. The Al Qaeda fighters than fled. In total, 16 were killed in the raid, 10 soldiers and policemen, four Sons of Iraq members, and two civilians. A policeman claimed that some residents even came out and cheered the attack because the local Sunni population has complained of abuses by the Shiite army unit in the neighborhood.
Then on August 3, another similar incident occurred in the Mansour district’s Azamiya neighborhood of western Baghdad. Fighters pulled up to a checkpoint in three cars, used pistols with silencers to kill five Iraqi soldiers, raised the Al Qaeda flag, and then sped off.
Al Qaeda has lost most of its popular support, and has been reduced to individual cells, but they are still a dangerous and persistent group. They are still able to carry out operations, many of them meant to garner press coverage, and make them seem larger and more powerful than they actually are. Just recently, four members of their umbrella organization the Islamic State of Iraq, escaped from an Iraqi prison in a heavily guarded section of Baghdad at the international airport. Before that they carried out attacks on Iraq’s Central Bank and Trade Bank in June, and attacked Shiite pilgrims and Sons of Iraq in July. The withdrawal of U.S. forces, the largely Iraqi composition of the organization, continued resentment amongst some Sunnis against the U.S. presence and a Shiite run government, and other factors all contribute to Al Qaeda’s staying power. That means they will continue to be a feature of Iraq’s insurgency despite their setbacks.
SOURCES
Benraad, Myriam, “Assessing AQI’s Resilience After April’s Leadership Decapitations,” CTC Sentinel, June 2010
Sly, Liz and Salman, Raheem, “Deadly assault exposes Iraq’s delicate state of security,” Los Angeles Times, 7/29/10
Yacoub, Sameer, “Al-Qaida Militants Kill 5 Iraqi Troops, Plant Flag,” Associated Press, 8/3/10
First, on July 29, 2010 35-40 insurgents attacked a checkpoint in Adhamiya, northern Baghdad. The militants overran the post, killing three soldiers. Their bodies were then set on fire, and Al Qaeda’s black flag was raised in place of the Iraqi one. When Iraqi police and army vehicles approached the scene, they were hit by five IEDs. The Al Qaeda fighters than fled. In total, 16 were killed in the raid, 10 soldiers and policemen, four Sons of Iraq members, and two civilians. A policeman claimed that some residents even came out and cheered the attack because the local Sunni population has complained of abuses by the Shiite army unit in the neighborhood.
Then on August 3, another similar incident occurred in the Mansour district’s Azamiya neighborhood of western Baghdad. Fighters pulled up to a checkpoint in three cars, used pistols with silencers to kill five Iraqi soldiers, raised the Al Qaeda flag, and then sped off.
Al Qaeda has lost most of its popular support, and has been reduced to individual cells, but they are still a dangerous and persistent group. They are still able to carry out operations, many of them meant to garner press coverage, and make them seem larger and more powerful than they actually are. Just recently, four members of their umbrella organization the Islamic State of Iraq, escaped from an Iraqi prison in a heavily guarded section of Baghdad at the international airport. Before that they carried out attacks on Iraq’s Central Bank and Trade Bank in June, and attacked Shiite pilgrims and Sons of Iraq in July. The withdrawal of U.S. forces, the largely Iraqi composition of the organization, continued resentment amongst some Sunnis against the U.S. presence and a Shiite run government, and other factors all contribute to Al Qaeda’s staying power. That means they will continue to be a feature of Iraq’s insurgency despite their setbacks.
SOURCES
Benraad, Myriam, “Assessing AQI’s Resilience After April’s Leadership Decapitations,” CTC Sentinel, June 2010
Sly, Liz and Salman, Raheem, “Deadly assault exposes Iraq’s delicate state of security,” Los Angeles Times, 7/29/10
Yacoub, Sameer, “Al-Qaida Militants Kill 5 Iraqi Troops, Plant Flag,” Associated Press, 8/3/10
Wednesday, August 4, 2010
Iraq’s Newest Shiite Extremist Group: Swords Of Righteousness
Nasiriyah, the provincial capital of Dhi Qar, has given birth to a new religious extremist group known as Suyuf al-Haq, Swords of Righteousness. According to a young Iraqi who was unsuccessfully recruited by the group, the organization started amongst young religious men in their 20s who felt that Iraqi society was becoming corrupted. They condemn drinking, prostitution, corruption, premarital sex, listening to loud music, and using the internet. The group began patrolling Nasiriyah at night during the summer and attacked people they felt were acting immorally. Some locals claimed that the organization has killed, although that’s disputed.
This eventually caught the attention of the authorities. On July 24, 10 members were arrested in Nasiriyah, and charged with terrorism. On August 1, the local police conducted a raid against the group that netted 20 more. That same day, a source in the Interior Ministry said that they received intelligence that the Swords of Righteousness may be spreading to Baghdad and Diyala provinces, and that they had already established themselves in Maysan.
A cleric and professor interviewed by The National paper said that Iraq was ripe for these types of groups. High unemployment, poor services, political instability, on going violence, etc. provided ample reasons for young men to become radicalized. That’s been seen before in the various Shiite militias that rose up after the 2003 invasion, as well as a series of messianic cults in southern Iraq such as the Soldiers of Heaven. Whether Swords of Righteousness will rise to the popularity and stature of these groups, or just be a passing fad is yet to be seen, but it’s probably not the last radical religious group that will spring up in Iraq.
SOURCES
AK News, “Feared group may move closer to Baghdad, says security source,” 8/1/10
Aswat al-Iraq, “10 swordsmen admitted to judiciary in Thi-Qar,” 7/24/10
- “20 swordsmen nabbed in Nassiriya,” 8/1/10
Latif, Nizar, “Deadly morality squad patrols Iraqi city,” The National, 7/31/10
Reuters, “Iraqi forces battle cult gunman,” 1/18/08
This eventually caught the attention of the authorities. On July 24, 10 members were arrested in Nasiriyah, and charged with terrorism. On August 1, the local police conducted a raid against the group that netted 20 more. That same day, a source in the Interior Ministry said that they received intelligence that the Swords of Righteousness may be spreading to Baghdad and Diyala provinces, and that they had already established themselves in Maysan.
A cleric and professor interviewed by The National paper said that Iraq was ripe for these types of groups. High unemployment, poor services, political instability, on going violence, etc. provided ample reasons for young men to become radicalized. That’s been seen before in the various Shiite militias that rose up after the 2003 invasion, as well as a series of messianic cults in southern Iraq such as the Soldiers of Heaven. Whether Swords of Righteousness will rise to the popularity and stature of these groups, or just be a passing fad is yet to be seen, but it’s probably not the last radical religious group that will spring up in Iraq.
SOURCES
AK News, “Feared group may move closer to Baghdad, says security source,” 8/1/10
Aswat al-Iraq, “10 swordsmen admitted to judiciary in Thi-Qar,” 7/24/10
- “20 swordsmen nabbed in Nassiriya,” 8/1/10
Latif, Nizar, “Deadly morality squad patrols Iraqi city,” The National, 7/31/10
Reuters, “Iraqi forces battle cult gunman,” 1/18/08
Tuesday, August 3, 2010
Iran’s New Ambassador To Iraq Has His Work Cutout For Him
Danafar’s first order of business will be to try to bring Iraq’s feuding Shiite parties together so that they can maintain control of the government. Currently, talks between Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s State of Law and the Sadrist-Supreme Council led Iraqi National Alliance (INA) have broken down. Three weeks ago the INA sent an official letter to the premier telling him that they would not support his return to power. Since then there have been no talks between the two. The Sadrists are resentful that Maliki sent the security forces after them in 2008 and that their followers continue to be arrested. Both they and the Supreme Council are afraid of the premier’s steps to centralize authority around himself and his Dawa Party. The Supreme Council is also worried that they will only have a minor role in the next government because they are outnumbered by the Sadrists and State of Law in parliament. As a result, the National Alliance has continually demanded that someone other than Maliki be nominated as prime minister, but to no avail.
Into this mix comes Tehran, which has been pushing its allies in both lists to compromise. In July 2010 for example, it was reported that Iran had told Ammar Hakim, the head of the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council that he should support Maliki to preserve Shiite dominance in Iraqi politics. Iran is afraid that if the National Alliance and State of Law fail to compromise Iyad Allawi will return to power, which they would see as a Sunni victory. Tehran was originally behind the formation of the National Alliance before the March 2010 parliamentary elections, and the May merger between State of Law and the INA.
Danafar’s presence is unlikely to accomplish anything for now. Iraqi politics is deadlocked, and officials aren’t talking about any breakthroughs until September after Ramadan is over. In the long-run however, Tehran has a much greater chance at success than the Americans or Arab states who are hoping for an Allawi-Maliki alliance. The Shiite parties and Iran have the same ultimate goal, to remain in power. After the premier is either pushed out of the way, or the National Alliance gives into Danafar’s lobbying for Maliki, things should move forward quickly to seat a new government. The problem as ever is that is still months away.
SOURCES
AK News, “Pressure from Iran on the Supreme Council to accept Al-Maliki, source reveals,” 7/19/10
- “SLC to adopt new position toward INA,” 8/1/10-
Aswat al-Iraq, “Iran’s presence in Iraq relies on NC’s existence – Shiite source,” 7/17/10
- “Zebari receives copy of credentials of Iranian amb.,” 8/2/10
Londono, Ernesto, “Iraqis don’t expect political impasse to be resolved by fall,” Washington Post, 8/1/10
MEMRI Staff, “After a Lull in Activity Yesterday, Al-Maliki and Allawi Meet Again Today,” MEMRI Blog, 7/22/10
Al-Sharq al-Awsat, “Senior Official: Iran Demands We Accept al-Maliki At Any Cost,” MEMRI Blog, 7/29/10
Tehran Times, “New Iranian ambassador starts his work in Iraq,” 8/1/10
Monday, August 2, 2010
Origins Of Iraq’s WMD Programs
Iraq had a long relationship with weapons of mass destruction (WMD). It first became interested in them in the early 1960s. By the 1970s it started its first chemical weapons (CW) program, and then added a biological weapons (BW) element in the 1980s. Saddam Hussein, who came to power in 1979 was largely responsible for making WMD a strategic element of Iraq’s arsenal. His main concern at first was to defeat Iran in the Iran-Iraq war, and to later deter Tehran and Israel. By 1991 he and the Baathist leadership had come to believe that WMD had saved the government several times. After the Gulf War, Saddam largely lost interest in WMD and almost all the programs were ended and stocks were destroyed. That was ironically never picked up by Western intelligence, and he was eventually overthrown because of their belief that he still possessed chemical and biological weapons.
In the early 1960s Iraq started its WMD program under General Ahmed Hasan al-Bakr who came to power in a Baathist coup in 1963. Iraq first became aware of the uses of WMD when it sent officers abroad and learned about chemical weapons (CW). In 1964 the Iraqi Chemical Corps was formed. In 1971 it was ordered to produce its first CW, and built the al-Rashad facility near Baghdad as a result. It also contacted a New York based company to build a pesticide plant that would be used for the program, but the Americans became suspicious and pulled out of the project. (1) This first effort turned out to be a failure. Afterward, the CW program was taken over by Iraqi intelligence.
By the end of the 1970s both the CW and BW programs were re-organized, and then greatly expanded in the early 1980s. The impetus was the Iran-Iraq War. Saddam believed that he could achieve a quick victory over Tehran, but when he was proved wrong, he turned to WMD to defeat the Iranians. CW for example, was used to stop human wave attacks, and in 1984 Iraq was the first country to use a nerve agent in a war. By June 1981 it began industrial production of CW like mustard gas, tabun, sarin, VX, and white phosphorus. By 1983 it also added BW production. From 1981-1984 it bought 40,000 artillery shells and 7,500 bombs, and produced 10,000 bombs and 18,500 rockets itself all for CW.
In the mid-1980s Saddam set out to make Iraq more self-sufficient in CW. It started by buying large quantities of chemicals from foreign companies to boost its production capabilities. (2) In 1983 and 1984 it bought pesticides and precursors from U.S. companies that could be used for mustard gas. A Singapore corporation made the most sales with 3,300 tons of chemicals that could be used for nerve agents and 950 tons of another for mustard gas and sarin. It had a German company build a pesticide plant in Samarra that was really for its WMD program. By 1984 it had several facilities producing large amounts of CW each year. That was accomplished by taking short cuts in the production process that made agents with very short shelf lives. Western governments including the United States became worried about Iraq’s activities at this time, and attempted to impose export controls on certain products, but so many of them could be used for legitimate purposes that it was impossible to stop Iraq’s activities.
The Iran-Iraq War convinced Saddam that WMD were an essential part of Iraq’s defense, but afterward the programs were largely scaled back. By the end of the war in 1988 Baghdad believed that WMD had saved the country from the larger Iranian army. CW had become fully integrated into Iraqi military’s tactics and strategy. Ironically, the war left Iraq with such a huge debt, that its WMD programs had to be scaled back. In August 1988 Iraq stopped producing CW agents, and turned those factories into producing commercial products, but research still continued.
The much smaller BW program however grew from 1988-1990. In 1988 the Al Hakam facility was built for BW research and development into anthrax, botulinum toxin, and clostridium perfringens. In 1990 BW was weaponized and placed in bombs and missiles, while four more plants were adapted for production.
The 1991 Gulf War and its aftermath were a turning point in Iraq’s ambitions for unconventional weapons. By that time Iraq had a large stockpile of WMD. It had CW rockets, artillery shells, bombs, and agents, and to a smaller extent BW weapons. During the war many of its facilities were bombed, but in the end Saddam actually believed that his stocks had saved him once again. He was convinced that the U.S. led Coalition did not turn towards Baghdad because they were afraid that they would be attacked by WMD. The war did destroy Iraq’s capability to produce large quantities of CW, and it also ended most of its research into BW afterward.
More importantly, the 1991 cease-fire and United Nations resolutions called for Iraq to disarm and declare all of its WMD programs. Saddam didn’t want outsiders to know about the extent of his CW and BW projects, so he at first tried to hide them from U.N. inspectors, and denied even having biological weapons. Within a few months Baghdad found out how intrusive inspectors intended to be and began secretly destroying its WMD stocks, while trying to retain the facilities and know how so that the programs could be restarted later. By the end of 1991 for example, all of its CW were destroyed. In 1995 Saddam’s son-in-law and head of his weapons programs Hussein Kamal defected. He revealed Iraq’s BW program and more about its facilities which were eventually all dismantled and monitored. By 1996 Iraq no longer had any major stocks of WMD or large facilities. Only Iraqi intelligence continued low level research and production of BW, which it used to assassinate Iraqi dissidents living abroad. Things were done in such a haphazard and secret manner however that some small quantities of WMD munitions were left at sites, but not on purpose. These would later turn up during the 2002-2003 U.N. inspections and after the U.S. invasion.
Iraq’s activities during the 1990s caused huge problems for it later on, and eventually led to the U.S. overthrowing Saddam. First, Iraq never documented the destruction of its WMD stocks. That meant it had no proof to show inspectors in the 1990s and 2000s that it had unilaterally disarmed. Second, Saddam wanted to keep up the image that it still had WMD because he was always concerned about Iran, which was considered the number one threat. Therefore ambiguous findings by the U.N. were considered helpful in deterring Tehran. Third, Iraq objected to how much access the inspectors wanted. They were considered an affront to national sovereignty, some were spying for Western governments, and they were expanding into Iraq’s conventional military capabilities. Baghdad tried to obstruct their activities as much as possible, which convinced the inspectors, the U.S., and most of the Western world that Iraq must still have WMD. In fact, by the mid-1990s Saddam lost most of his interest in those programs as he was more concerned about the survival of his regime under sanctions. He would ask about WMD, but had no strategy to revive them. All of this was completely missed by U.S. and western intelligence, so when inspectors were kicked out in 1998, most assumed that Iraq went right back to working on its chemical and biological weapons. That eventually played a major role in the U.S. decision to invade in 2003.
Iraq considered WMD a sign of its power and security. When Saddam came into office he greatly expanded the CW and BW programs that were floundering, and used them in the Iraq-Iraq War. That convinced him that WMD were the ultimate guarantor against his regime being overthrown. Even when he was defeated in the Gulf War, he thought that WMD had saved him from being deposed once again. The following inspections and sanctions led him to destroy all of his stockpiles, and largely end his WMD programs, but he did so in such a way that it convinced the world that he still must have them. This was partly done on purpose because Saddam was still afraid of Iran sitting next door. That helped lead to the 2003 invasion, and the end of Saddam’s government and life. It’s ironic that the weapons Saddam believed had saved him again and again in the past, would ultimately lead to his undoing when he had none.
FOOTNOTES
1. Ignatius, David, “Iraq’s Protracted Hunt for Chemical Weapons,” Washington Post National Weekly Edition, 10/3-9/88
2. Fialka, John, “Fighting Dirty Western Industry Sells Third World the Means To Produce Poison Gas,” Wall Street Journal, 9/16/88
SOURCES
Fialka, John, “Fighting Dirty Western Industry Sells Third World the Means To Produce Poison Gas,” Wall Street Journal, 9/16/88
Ignatius, David, “Iraq’s Protracted Hunt for Chemical Weapons,” Washington Post National Weekly Edition, 10/3-9/88
Iraq Survey Group, “Comprehensive Report of the Special Advisor to the DCIA on Iraq’s WMD,” 9/30/04
Olson, William, “Mistakes Were Made: How Not to Conduct Post-Conflict Management And Counterinsurgency,” Small Wars Journal, 7/16/09
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, “Report On the U.S. Intelligence Community’s Prewar Intelligence Assessments On Iraq,” U.S. Senate, 7/7/04
Shenon, Philip, “Declaration Lists Companies That Sold Chemicals to Iraq,” New York Times, 12/21/02
In the early 1960s Iraq started its WMD program under General Ahmed Hasan al-Bakr who came to power in a Baathist coup in 1963. Iraq first became aware of the uses of WMD when it sent officers abroad and learned about chemical weapons (CW). In 1964 the Iraqi Chemical Corps was formed. In 1971 it was ordered to produce its first CW, and built the al-Rashad facility near Baghdad as a result. It also contacted a New York based company to build a pesticide plant that would be used for the program, but the Americans became suspicious and pulled out of the project. (1) This first effort turned out to be a failure. Afterward, the CW program was taken over by Iraqi intelligence.
By the end of the 1970s both the CW and BW programs were re-organized, and then greatly expanded in the early 1980s. The impetus was the Iran-Iraq War. Saddam believed that he could achieve a quick victory over Tehran, but when he was proved wrong, he turned to WMD to defeat the Iranians. CW for example, was used to stop human wave attacks, and in 1984 Iraq was the first country to use a nerve agent in a war. By June 1981 it began industrial production of CW like mustard gas, tabun, sarin, VX, and white phosphorus. By 1983 it also added BW production. From 1981-1984 it bought 40,000 artillery shells and 7,500 bombs, and produced 10,000 bombs and 18,500 rockets itself all for CW.
In the mid-1980s Saddam set out to make Iraq more self-sufficient in CW. It started by buying large quantities of chemicals from foreign companies to boost its production capabilities. (2) In 1983 and 1984 it bought pesticides and precursors from U.S. companies that could be used for mustard gas. A Singapore corporation made the most sales with 3,300 tons of chemicals that could be used for nerve agents and 950 tons of another for mustard gas and sarin. It had a German company build a pesticide plant in Samarra that was really for its WMD program. By 1984 it had several facilities producing large amounts of CW each year. That was accomplished by taking short cuts in the production process that made agents with very short shelf lives. Western governments including the United States became worried about Iraq’s activities at this time, and attempted to impose export controls on certain products, but so many of them could be used for legitimate purposes that it was impossible to stop Iraq’s activities.
The Iran-Iraq War convinced Saddam that WMD were an essential part of Iraq’s defense, but afterward the programs were largely scaled back. By the end of the war in 1988 Baghdad believed that WMD had saved the country from the larger Iranian army. CW had become fully integrated into Iraqi military’s tactics and strategy. Ironically, the war left Iraq with such a huge debt, that its WMD programs had to be scaled back. In August 1988 Iraq stopped producing CW agents, and turned those factories into producing commercial products, but research still continued.
The much smaller BW program however grew from 1988-1990. In 1988 the Al Hakam facility was built for BW research and development into anthrax, botulinum toxin, and clostridium perfringens. In 1990 BW was weaponized and placed in bombs and missiles, while four more plants were adapted for production.
The 1991 Gulf War and its aftermath were a turning point in Iraq’s ambitions for unconventional weapons. By that time Iraq had a large stockpile of WMD. It had CW rockets, artillery shells, bombs, and agents, and to a smaller extent BW weapons. During the war many of its facilities were bombed, but in the end Saddam actually believed that his stocks had saved him once again. He was convinced that the U.S. led Coalition did not turn towards Baghdad because they were afraid that they would be attacked by WMD. The war did destroy Iraq’s capability to produce large quantities of CW, and it also ended most of its research into BW afterward.
More importantly, the 1991 cease-fire and United Nations resolutions called for Iraq to disarm and declare all of its WMD programs. Saddam didn’t want outsiders to know about the extent of his CW and BW projects, so he at first tried to hide them from U.N. inspectors, and denied even having biological weapons. Within a few months Baghdad found out how intrusive inspectors intended to be and began secretly destroying its WMD stocks, while trying to retain the facilities and know how so that the programs could be restarted later. By the end of 1991 for example, all of its CW were destroyed. In 1995 Saddam’s son-in-law and head of his weapons programs Hussein Kamal defected. He revealed Iraq’s BW program and more about its facilities which were eventually all dismantled and monitored. By 1996 Iraq no longer had any major stocks of WMD or large facilities. Only Iraqi intelligence continued low level research and production of BW, which it used to assassinate Iraqi dissidents living abroad. Things were done in such a haphazard and secret manner however that some small quantities of WMD munitions were left at sites, but not on purpose. These would later turn up during the 2002-2003 U.N. inspections and after the U.S. invasion.
Iraq’s activities during the 1990s caused huge problems for it later on, and eventually led to the U.S. overthrowing Saddam. First, Iraq never documented the destruction of its WMD stocks. That meant it had no proof to show inspectors in the 1990s and 2000s that it had unilaterally disarmed. Second, Saddam wanted to keep up the image that it still had WMD because he was always concerned about Iran, which was considered the number one threat. Therefore ambiguous findings by the U.N. were considered helpful in deterring Tehran. Third, Iraq objected to how much access the inspectors wanted. They were considered an affront to national sovereignty, some were spying for Western governments, and they were expanding into Iraq’s conventional military capabilities. Baghdad tried to obstruct their activities as much as possible, which convinced the inspectors, the U.S., and most of the Western world that Iraq must still have WMD. In fact, by the mid-1990s Saddam lost most of his interest in those programs as he was more concerned about the survival of his regime under sanctions. He would ask about WMD, but had no strategy to revive them. All of this was completely missed by U.S. and western intelligence, so when inspectors were kicked out in 1998, most assumed that Iraq went right back to working on its chemical and biological weapons. That eventually played a major role in the U.S. decision to invade in 2003.
Iraq considered WMD a sign of its power and security. When Saddam came into office he greatly expanded the CW and BW programs that were floundering, and used them in the Iraq-Iraq War. That convinced him that WMD were the ultimate guarantor against his regime being overthrown. Even when he was defeated in the Gulf War, he thought that WMD had saved him from being deposed once again. The following inspections and sanctions led him to destroy all of his stockpiles, and largely end his WMD programs, but he did so in such a way that it convinced the world that he still must have them. This was partly done on purpose because Saddam was still afraid of Iran sitting next door. That helped lead to the 2003 invasion, and the end of Saddam’s government and life. It’s ironic that the weapons Saddam believed had saved him again and again in the past, would ultimately lead to his undoing when he had none.
FOOTNOTES
1. Ignatius, David, “Iraq’s Protracted Hunt for Chemical Weapons,” Washington Post National Weekly Edition, 10/3-9/88
2. Fialka, John, “Fighting Dirty Western Industry Sells Third World the Means To Produce Poison Gas,” Wall Street Journal, 9/16/88
SOURCES
Fialka, John, “Fighting Dirty Western Industry Sells Third World the Means To Produce Poison Gas,” Wall Street Journal, 9/16/88
Ignatius, David, “Iraq’s Protracted Hunt for Chemical Weapons,” Washington Post National Weekly Edition, 10/3-9/88
Iraq Survey Group, “Comprehensive Report of the Special Advisor to the DCIA on Iraq’s WMD,” 9/30/04
Olson, William, “Mistakes Were Made: How Not to Conduct Post-Conflict Management And Counterinsurgency,” Small Wars Journal, 7/16/09
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, “Report On the U.S. Intelligence Community’s Prewar Intelligence Assessments On Iraq,” U.S. Senate, 7/7/04
Shenon, Philip, “Declaration Lists Companies That Sold Chemicals to Iraq,” New York Times, 12/21/02
Sunday, August 1, 2010
The Growth Of Organized Crime And Gangs In Iraq
With violence decreasing in Iraq, organized crime is becoming a larger issue. Gangs were initially co-opted by the Baath Party, and then after the state collapsed with the U.S. invasion, they had free reign in the country. They eventually helped swell the ranks of the insurgency and militias, and funded their activities. Today, many militants have gone back to being criminals to make a living, where they continue to threaten the security and development of the country.
Modern organized crime had its birth in Iraq in the 1970s. Two events helped its spread. One was the 1972 nationalization of the oil industry. The second was the creation of a trust for the Baath Party’s funds. Both created a huge amount of money that could be manipulated by officials. Some tapped gangs to buy and sell items illegally such as petroleum or launder money. In return, the government allowed the criminals to operate within set boundaries. That created a close connection between the Baath party and organized crime.
The sanctions period changed that relationship, making the government rely upon gangs. In 1990 Iraq was hit by international sanctions due to its invasion of Kuwait. They strangled the economy that was largely dependent upon oil exports. Per capita GDP dropped from $2,304 in 1989 to $938 in 1990 to $507 or below from 1991-1996. Saddam became focused upon preserving his regime, and turned to criminals to undermine the United Nations’ restrictions and shore up domestic support. This took many forms. One was that Sunni tribes in western and central Iraq were allowed to smuggle, loot, and hijack along the highways in their areas, in return for backing the government and providing local security. Another was using gangs to smuggling goods and oil through Jordan, Syria, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Iran, and Egypt. The government itself also began acting something like a criminal organization under the U.N. run Oil for Food program, demanding kickbacks, making companies increase their prices and having the difference paid to Baghdad, making illegal oil deals, attempting to bribe officials and companies to work against the sanctions by offering them oil vouchers. All of these profits were also money laundered through front companies and foreign banks before they arrived in Iraq. These activities allowed Saddam to stay in power, while bringing in millions of dollars in illicit funds to keep the government running. Organized crime also grew in strength, and became an almost legitimate operation within Iraq.
The U.S. invasion in 2003 removed all restrictions upon Iraq’s gangs. First, before the U.S. attack Saddam released 30,000-100,000 criminals in October 2002. Second, the Americans invaded without enough troops to secure the country. Then the government collapsed, followed by the economy falling apart. Finally the U.S. disbanded the Iraqi military. All of those factors together emboldened gangs, and the anarchic situation that Iraq found itself in created powerful incentives towards lawlessness to make a living.
Crimes from the Baath period continued after the fall of Saddam, while new ones developed. Murder, looting, and kidnappings exploded immediately after the fall of the government, which lasted for months. All of the smuggling through neighboring countries expanded as the police were emasculated, the army was disbanded and then had to be rebuilt, there was no border control, and the U.S. military was caught up chasing militants. Stealing copper from the electricity grid and selling it on the black market became a major business. Gangs could basically do whatever they wanted.
Eventually the insurgency and militias also became intertwined with organized crime. Many criminals joined militant groups, while militants turned to crime for funding. They would steal fuel from refineries, and then sell it on the black market. They would kidnap children and fathers and ransom them off to their family. They would smuggle crude out of Basra. They would demand protection money from businesses to operate. They would tap into power lines or water pipes and sell the services. This allowed groups to be financially independent, while expanding the reach of organized crime.
Today, as militant groups are in decline, their former members need to find a living. Many have continued with their criminal activities as their new jobs. That’s shown in Iraqi headlines where every week there’s news of bank robberies, jewelry stores being held up, gang members being arrested, kidnappings, the selling of women and children for prostitution and sex slaves, etc.
Organized crime has seen a steady expansion in Iraq since the 1970s. At first, gangs were organized by the Baath Party to steal from the government. Then Saddam came to depend upon them to break the U.N. sanctions. The U.S. invasion increased the opportunities and incentives to partake in crime, and those have hardly changed up to the present time. The Iraqi government still does not consider this a major issue, and many officials are corrupted themselves either being directly involved in crimes or getting payoffs to look the other way. There’s no other way that such large-scale criminal activity could continue without it. Until the economy improves, the government gains more strength, and there’s a real concerted effort to fight corruption gangs and crime will continue to flourish in Iraq.
SOURCES
Aswat al-Iraq, “Mafias in Baghdad, clever in changing masks,” 2/5/08
Cordesman, Anthony, “The Changing Situation in Iraq: A Progress Report,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, 4/4/09
Dodge, Toby, “The failure of sanctions and the evolution of international policy towards Iraq, 1990-2003,” Journal Contemporary Arab Affairs, January 2010
Iraq Survey Group, “Comprehensive Report of the Special Advisor to the DCIA on Iraq’s WMD,” 9/30/04
Kelly, Dr. Terrence, “An Iraqi Modus Vivendi How Would It Come About and What Would It Look Like?” Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 4/3/08
Williams, Phil, “Criminals, Militias, And Insurgents: Organized Crime In Iraq,” Strategic Studies Institute, June 2009
Modern organized crime had its birth in Iraq in the 1970s. Two events helped its spread. One was the 1972 nationalization of the oil industry. The second was the creation of a trust for the Baath Party’s funds. Both created a huge amount of money that could be manipulated by officials. Some tapped gangs to buy and sell items illegally such as petroleum or launder money. In return, the government allowed the criminals to operate within set boundaries. That created a close connection between the Baath party and organized crime.
The sanctions period changed that relationship, making the government rely upon gangs. In 1990 Iraq was hit by international sanctions due to its invasion of Kuwait. They strangled the economy that was largely dependent upon oil exports. Per capita GDP dropped from $2,304 in 1989 to $938 in 1990 to $507 or below from 1991-1996. Saddam became focused upon preserving his regime, and turned to criminals to undermine the United Nations’ restrictions and shore up domestic support. This took many forms. One was that Sunni tribes in western and central Iraq were allowed to smuggle, loot, and hijack along the highways in their areas, in return for backing the government and providing local security. Another was using gangs to smuggling goods and oil through Jordan, Syria, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Iran, and Egypt. The government itself also began acting something like a criminal organization under the U.N. run Oil for Food program, demanding kickbacks, making companies increase their prices and having the difference paid to Baghdad, making illegal oil deals, attempting to bribe officials and companies to work against the sanctions by offering them oil vouchers. All of these profits were also money laundered through front companies and foreign banks before they arrived in Iraq. These activities allowed Saddam to stay in power, while bringing in millions of dollars in illicit funds to keep the government running. Organized crime also grew in strength, and became an almost legitimate operation within Iraq.
The U.S. invasion in 2003 removed all restrictions upon Iraq’s gangs. First, before the U.S. attack Saddam released 30,000-100,000 criminals in October 2002. Second, the Americans invaded without enough troops to secure the country. Then the government collapsed, followed by the economy falling apart. Finally the U.S. disbanded the Iraqi military. All of those factors together emboldened gangs, and the anarchic situation that Iraq found itself in created powerful incentives towards lawlessness to make a living.
Crimes from the Baath period continued after the fall of Saddam, while new ones developed. Murder, looting, and kidnappings exploded immediately after the fall of the government, which lasted for months. All of the smuggling through neighboring countries expanded as the police were emasculated, the army was disbanded and then had to be rebuilt, there was no border control, and the U.S. military was caught up chasing militants. Stealing copper from the electricity grid and selling it on the black market became a major business. Gangs could basically do whatever they wanted.
Eventually the insurgency and militias also became intertwined with organized crime. Many criminals joined militant groups, while militants turned to crime for funding. They would steal fuel from refineries, and then sell it on the black market. They would kidnap children and fathers and ransom them off to their family. They would smuggle crude out of Basra. They would demand protection money from businesses to operate. They would tap into power lines or water pipes and sell the services. This allowed groups to be financially independent, while expanding the reach of organized crime.
Today, as militant groups are in decline, their former members need to find a living. Many have continued with their criminal activities as their new jobs. That’s shown in Iraqi headlines where every week there’s news of bank robberies, jewelry stores being held up, gang members being arrested, kidnappings, the selling of women and children for prostitution and sex slaves, etc.
Organized crime has seen a steady expansion in Iraq since the 1970s. At first, gangs were organized by the Baath Party to steal from the government. Then Saddam came to depend upon them to break the U.N. sanctions. The U.S. invasion increased the opportunities and incentives to partake in crime, and those have hardly changed up to the present time. The Iraqi government still does not consider this a major issue, and many officials are corrupted themselves either being directly involved in crimes or getting payoffs to look the other way. There’s no other way that such large-scale criminal activity could continue without it. Until the economy improves, the government gains more strength, and there’s a real concerted effort to fight corruption gangs and crime will continue to flourish in Iraq.
SOURCES
Aswat al-Iraq, “Mafias in Baghdad, clever in changing masks,” 2/5/08
Cordesman, Anthony, “The Changing Situation in Iraq: A Progress Report,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, 4/4/09
Dodge, Toby, “The failure of sanctions and the evolution of international policy towards Iraq, 1990-2003,” Journal Contemporary Arab Affairs, January 2010
Iraq Survey Group, “Comprehensive Report of the Special Advisor to the DCIA on Iraq’s WMD,” 9/30/04
Kelly, Dr. Terrence, “An Iraqi Modus Vivendi How Would It Come About and What Would It Look Like?” Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 4/3/08
Williams, Phil, “Criminals, Militias, And Insurgents: Organized Crime In Iraq,” Strategic Studies Institute, June 2009
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)
This Day In Iraqi History - Nov 14 British army ordered to seize Basra vilayet WWI
1914 Sheikh of Islam called for jihad against British and French during WWI Call was repeated in all Sunni mosques in Mosul, Baghdad a...
-
Napoleoni, Loretta, Insurgent Iraq, Al Zarqawi and the New Generation , New York: Seven Stories Press, 2005 In Insurgent Iraq autho...
-
Dr. Michael Izady of Columbia’s School of International and Public Affairs recently gave an interview to the Swiss-based International Relat...
-
Professor Nadje Al-Ali is a professor of gender studies at SOAS, University of London. She has authored several books and articles...