Attacks and Casualties In Mosul Unchanged By Al Qaeda’s Losses

Mosul is the insurgency’s last urban stronghold in Iraq. Recently Al Qaeda, and its umbrella organization, the Islamic State of Iraq, has lost some of its top leadership in the city. On April 20, 2010 Ahmed al-Obeidi, aka Abu Shuhabi, the head of Al Qaeda’s military operations in Tamim, Ninewa, and Salahaddin was killed by a joint U.S.-Iraqi patrol. A few weeks later on May 6, the Iraqi Army captured Mahmoud Mohammad Salama, Al Qaeda’s leader for Mosul. Then in early June, Abdul Kareem al-Hamadani, the Islamic State of Iraq’s emir of Mosul was also captured.

The decimation of Al Qaeda and the Islamic State in Mosul, has had no lasting impact upon violence there. In February and March 2010 there were 61 and 67 attacks respectively. That dropped to 47 in April, but then climbed back up to 57 in May and 65 in June. Casualties have gone up and down the entire year. In January there were an average of 4.09 a day. That shot up to 6.25 per day in February, the highest of the year, before dropping to 4.90 in March, 4.56 in April, then climbed back up to 7.19 in May, and then declined to 5.33 in June. Overall, the first six months of 2010 is not much different from the last half of 2009, except for deaths. In the last half of 2009 there were an average of 2.19 attacks per day and 5.69 casualties, compared to 1.96 attacks and 5.38 casualties in 2010. Only deaths are noticeably down from 2.10 per day in the end of 2009, compared to 1.42 this year.

The insurgency in Mosul is largely self-sustaining today, and does not appear to be affected by events in the rest of the country. Not even the loss of Al Qaeda’s top leadership for the city seems to have slowed down attacks, but then again the Islamists have always been a minority of Iraq’s Sunni militants. The insurgency is deeply entrenched in Mosul, with its own funding operations, and have infiltrated the local forces. They also prey upon the population’s distrust of the Army and federal police who are largely Shiites from central and southern Iraq, while Mosul is a majority Sunni area. Those are all reasons why violence has hardly changed in the city for the last three years.

Attacks and Casualty Statistics for Mosul

Month	Attacks/ Avg. Per Day	Deaths/Avg. Per Day	Wounded/ Avg. Per Day	Casualties Overall/ Avg. Per Day
Jul.	73/2.35	79/2.54	169/5.45	248/8.00
Aug.	77/2.48	102/3.29	171/5.51	273/8.80
Sep.	72/2.40	65/2.16	60/2.00	125/4.16
Oct.	66/2.12	60/1.93	82/2.64	142/4.58
Nov.	55/1.83	37/1.23	71/2.36	108/3.60
Dec.	60/1.93	44/1.41	108/3.48	152/4.90
Jan. 10	59/1.90	38/1.22	89/2.87	127/4.09
Feb.	61/2.17	66/2.35	109/3.89	175/6.25
Mar.	67/2.16	27/0.87	125/4.03	152/4.90
Apr.	47/1.56	43/1.43	94/3.13	137/4.56
May	57/1.90	41/1.36	182/6.06	223/7.19
Jun.	65/2.16	49/1.63	111/3.70	160/5.33
Averages
July-Dec. 09	67.1/2.19	64.5/2.10	110.1/3.59	175.6/5.69
Jan.-May 10	59.3/1.96	44.0/1.42	118.3/3.92	162.3/5.38

SOURCES

Aswat al-Iraq, “1 killed, 27 wounded in blast in Mosul,” 6/14/10
- “2 civilians wounded by hand grenade in Mosul,” 6/23/10
- “2 cops, civilian wounded in eastern Mosul,” 6/3/10
- “2 cops killed by gunmen in Mosul,” 6/13/10
- “2 cops wounded as sticky bomb explodes in Mosul,” 6/16/10
- “2 IEDs target security forces in Mosul,” 6/10/10
- “3 army soldiers wounded in IED blast in Mosul,” 6/4/10
- “3 killed, wounded by sticky bomb in Mosul,” 6/22/10
- “4 policemen wounded in Mosul blast,” 6/20/10
- “5 mortar shells hit court in Mosul,” 6/29/10
- “6 wounded in two separate blasts in Mosul,” 6/19/10
- “7 Syrian gunmen captured in Mosul,” 6/3/10
- “14 wounded in suicide bombing in Mosul,” 6/16/10
- “Civilian shot dead by gunmen in Mosul,” 6/27/10
- “Cop killed, civilian injured by sticky bomb in Mosul,” 6/30/10
- “Dual blast hit army patrol in Mosul,” 6/7/10
- “Former army general wounded in Mosul,” 6/13/10
- “Gunmen kill 3 policemen in Mosul,” 6/24/10
- “Gunmen kill civilian in Mosul,” 6/7/10
- “Gunmen kill civilian in Mosul,” 6/7/10
- “Gunmen kill civilian in Mosul,” 6/21/10
- “Gunmen kill civilian in western Mosul,” 6/21/10
- “Gunmen kill, injure 2 brothers in Mosul,” 6/29/10
- “Gunmen kill Iraqi soldier inside his home in Mosul,” 6/26/10
- “Gunmen kill woman in western Mosul,” 6/1/10
- “Gunmen shoot down civilian in Mosul,” 6/27/10
- “Al-Hadbaa Faculty mortared in Mosul,” 6/21/10
- “Hand grenade wounds army officer in northern Mosul,” 6/9/10
- “IED blast kills 2 civilians, wounds 4 in Mosul,” 6/4/10
- “IED kills soldier, injures 3 in Mosul,” 6/15/10
- “IED wounds 3 persons in Mosul,” 6/8/10
- “IED wounds civilian in Mosul,” 6/24/10
- “IED wounds civilian in Mosul,” 6/30/10
- “IED wounds cop in Mosul,” 6/28/10
- “Key ISI member netted, arms cache seized in Mosul,” 6/4/10
- “Kidnapped soldier found dead in Mosul,” 6/2/10
- “Man, his son wounded in blast in Mosul,” 6/7/10
- “Mortar shell wounds soldier in Mosul,” 6/15/10
- “Ninewa official survives assassination,” 6/13/10
- “Officer killed, 5 policemen wounded in Mosul,” 6/26/10
- “Police find bullet-ridden body in Mosul,” 6/16/10
- “Police kill gunman in western Mosul,” 6/16/10
- “Policemen find unknown body in Mosul,” 6/18/10
- “Policeman wounded in IED blast in Mosul,” 6/3/10
- “Policeman wounded in Mosul blast,” 6/17/10
- “Al-Qaeda leader captured in Mosul,” 5/6/10
- “Soldier killed, another wounded in Mosul,” 6/6/10
- “Soldier killed, officer wounded in Mosul blast,” 6/27/10
- “Sticky bomb hits civilian car in Mosul,” 6/14/10
- “Unidentified body found in Mosul,” 6/3/10
- “Unknown gunmen kill cop in eastern Mosul,” 6/8/10
- “Woman killed, 2 wounded in Mosul,” 6/29/10
- “Woman killed inside her house in Mosul,” 6/12/10
- “Woman shot down by gunmen in Mosul,” 6/13/10
- “Woman wounded in blast in Mosul,” 6/8/10
- “Worker’s body found in Mosul,” 6/28/10

DPA, “Nine killed, six injured in string of Iraq violence – Update,” 6/8/10

Issa, Sahar, “Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq – Friday 11 June 2010,” McClatchy Newspapers, 6/11/10

Meyer, Sebastian, “Iraq withdrawal: A US unit prepares Mosul police for self-rule,” Christian Science Monitor, 7/9/10

Mosuli, Saad, “Al-Qaeda Turns to Mafia Tactics in Mosul,” Institute for War & Peace Reporting, 6/7/10

Reuters, “FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, June 4,” 6/4/10
- “FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, June 12,” 6/12/10
- “FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, June 15,” 6/15/10
- “FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, June 25,” 6/25/10
- “Suicide bombers target Iraq troops, police; kill 5,” 6/24/10

Williams, Timothy, “Wider Recount of Iraq Ballots Is Requested by Vote Leader,” New York Times, 4/20/10

Back To Square One In Forming New Iraqi Government

After Iyad Allawi and his Iraqi National Movement claimed that they had made a breakthrough in forming a new government, facilitated by reports that talks between Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s State of Law and the Sadrist-Supreme Council led Iraqi National Alliance had broken down, everything appears back to square one. A member of the Iraqi Accordance Front said that the negotiations between Allawi and Maliki were simply to pressure the National Alliance. Now a State of Law official said that they would go back to talking with the National Alliance after a two-week hiatus. Tehran’s new point man on Iraq, speaker of the Iranian parliament Ali Larijani, is also due to arrive in Baghdad soon to pressure the two to work out their differences and name a candidate for prime minister. Iran helped push State of Law and the Iraqi National Alliance to merge together in the first place.

As always, Maliki is the main barrier to forming a new government. He insists that he return as prime minister, which is opposed by almost all the other parties. The negotiations with the Iraqi National Alliance and the Iraqi National Movement have gone nowhere because of him, while the Kurds are largely staying on the sidelines willing to support any coalition that emerges that will agree to their demands. Maliki has the luxury of being able to drag out the process because he still holds onto his office. That means four months after Iraq’s election, the country’s politicians are still no closer to forming a government.

SOURCES

AK News, “Accordance List Leader: “State of Law use Al-Iraqiya to wage pressure on other blocs.”” 7/17/10

Alsumaria, “Larijani to meet Iraqi officials,” 7/16/10

Aswat al-Iraq, “Iran’s presence in Iraq relies on NC’s existence – Shiite source,” 7/17/10

U.S. General Warns Of Iranian Supported Attacks Upon American Forces In Iraq This Summer

On July 13, 2010 commander of U.S. forces in Iraq General Ray Odierno gave a press conference where he warned that the Iranian backed Khataib Hezbollah group may carryout attacks upon American forces this summer as they drew down to 50,000 troops. Odierno said that Iran and the Shiite Special Groups it supported have long claimed that they were the ones responsible for making the U.S. leave, so they wanted to harass Americans on their way out to prove their point. One of their recent attacks was a missile fired at the Green Zone while Vice President Joe Biden was visiting Iraq. U.S. forces have carried out some raids in July in response, and netted two criminal associates of Khataib Hezbollah who were thought to be arms smugglers in Baghdad on July 10, and a Hezbollah member suspected of planting roadside bombs the next day.

Despite the warning, Odierno mentioned that this was a short-term threat to U.S. troops only, and not to the Iraqi government. The general stressed that Iran has largely moved away from its military policy in Iraq since 2008, and is instead focusing upon its political and economic influence. That’s led U.S. officials to constantly warn against undo Iranian pressure on Iraqi politicians while they form a new government. Odierno’s comments show the many levers Tehran has at its disposal in Iraq. It can use military means when it wants through the various Shiite militias it supports. At the same time, it has close ties to many Iraqis in the government and is a major trade partner as well. While its power ebbs and flows depending upon the situation within Iraq, it looks to be a long-time player in the country.

SOURCES

Department of Defense, “Iraqi Forces Arrest Several Terrorism Suspects,” 7/12/10

Fadel, Leila, “Amid threat, U.S. heightens security at its Iraq bases,” Washington Post, 7/13/10

Peterson, Scott, “Odierno: Militants trained in Iran prepare to attack US bases in Iraq,” Christian Science Monitor, 7/13/10

Roggio, Bill, “Iranian-backed Shia terror group remains a threat in Iraq: General Odierno,” Long War Journal, 7/13/10

Ur Agency, “U.S. General Accuses Iran of Targeting Biden With Missiles Fired at Green Zone,” MEMRI Blog, 7/13/10

Williams, Timothy and Arango, Tim, “U.S. Commander in Iraq Warns of Summer Attacks,” New York Times, 7/13/10

Iraqi Air Force To Begin Training On F-16 Fighters

Since 2008 Iraq has been talking about buying American F-16 jets from Lockheed Martin. In March 2010 they officially put in a request for 24 of the fighters. The planes are due to be delivered by 2012-2013. Baghdad is hoping to increase that number to 96 by 2020. The second stage in acquiring the planes has just started as it was announced in July that 10 pilots would begin training on the fighters. This is another step in Iraq being able to protect itself from foreign threats.

As of today, Iraq has no real air defense, and no fighters to protect its skies. The Air Force has just over 4,000 officers, and its current inventory includes 44 training planes, 36 transports, 19 surveillance/reconnaissance aircraft, 3 ground attack planes, and some helicopters. In 2009 the U.S. donated a radar system to cover northern Iraq, with another on its way for southern Iraq, but that still left central and western Iraq unguarded. That’s a far cry from what the Iraqi Air Force was in the past. In the late 1980s under Saddam it had 750 combat aircraft, 40,000 officers, and 24 bases. The Gulf War destroyed most of that, and international sanctions led to many of the remaining planes to be stripped for spare parts. By the time of the U.S. invasion, Iraq was down to only 100 serviceable jets.

Acquiring the F-16s and getting the proper support for them in place is still years away. Until that happens Iraq will have to depend upon the United States for air support. By the end of 2011 however all U.S. military personnel are supposed to exit the country as part of the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA). By that time Iraq will not have the ability to defend itself, so a new agreement will have to be worked out between Baghdad and Washington so that U.S. forces can stay in the country. That will be the next big challenge in U.S.-Iraq relations as there are plenty in Iraq’s parliament who are opposed to any U.S. presence.

SOURCES

Alsumaria, “Iraq to purchase F-16 fighters this year,” 4/1/09

Bumiller, Elisabeth, “Iraq Can’t Defend Its Skies by Pullout Date, U.S. Says,” New York Times, 7/29/09

Juul, Peter, “Re-Arming Iraq,” Wonk Room Blog, 1/14/09

Kratovac, Katarina, “Nascent Iraqi air force struggles to rebuild as US exit nears, hopes to get F-16 fighter jets,” Associated Press, 4/22/10

Lake, Eli, “Iraqi army wants U.S. help past withdrawal deadline,” Washington Times, 12/8/09

Sahib, Mazin, “rearming the Iraqi army,” Niqash, 10/23/09

Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, “Quarterly Report to the United States Congress,” 4/30/10

World Tribune, “Iraq’s makes wish list official: Two dozen F-16s,” 4/14/10
- “Iraqi pilots to be trained in plan to acquire F-16s,” 7/15/10

Was Al Qaeda Used As Guns For Hire In Attack Upon Iraq Central Bank?

A senior official from Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s office told Iraq’s al-Rafidayn paper that the June 13, 2010 attack upon the Central Bank of Iraq in Baghdad was to cover-up corruption. The official said that the preliminary investigation of the incident has allegedly found that senior members of the government and bank workers coordinated with Al Qaeda in Iraq to attack the bank and destroy documents. If true, this would confirm suspicions that Al Qaeda in Iraq is connected to parts of the government, and some militants might have become guns for hire.

SOURCE

Al-Rafidayn, “Iraqi Government Source: Corruption behind Fire at Central Bank,” MEMRI Blog, 7/16/10

For more on the bank robbery see:

Was Attack Upon Iraq Central Bank To Cover Up Corruption Case?

Al Qaeda In Iraq Takes Responsibility For Central Bank Attack In Baghdad

Iran Replaces Its Point Man On Iraq

Suleimani's Iraq file will be given to Iran's speaker of parliament Ali Larijani who is due to arrive in Baghdad soon to hold discussions with Iraqi politicians about forming a new government

Iraq’s al-Rafidayn newspaper recently reported that Iran’s Qods Force Commander General Qassim Suleimani was relieved from handling Tehran’s Iraq policy, and that file was given to the speaker of Iran’s parliament Ali Larijani. Rafidayn claimed that Suleimani was being replaced because he failed to overcome the differences between Iraq’s Shiite parties in forming a new government. Larijani’s first mission is allegedly to bring together Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s State of Law and the Sadrist-Supreme Council led Iraqi National Alliance, so that they can name the next premier. He is supposed to work more openly in achieving Iran’s goals than behind the scenes as was Suleimani’s style.

General Suleimani took charge of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards’ Qods Force in 1998, which is empowered to carry out its own foreign policy, and is under the direct control of Iran’s supreme leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. During the Saddam period he coordinated with Iraq’s Kurdish parties and exiled Shiite parties, many of which were based within Iran. After the 2003 invasion the general believed that the United States should pay for occupying Iraq, and organized Shiite militants to achieve that goal. He brought in Lebanon’s Hezbollah to be trainers and advisers to Shiite militias, helped breakaway factions of Moqtada al-Sadr’s Madhi Army become Special Groups in 2006, and was instrumental in ending the Iraqi-U.S. crackdown on Sadr in 2008. He was also responsible for the more important political strategy of maintaining relations with Iraq’s leaders. He provided aid to the United Iraqi Alliance in Iraq’s 2005 elections, which was made up of the country’s leading Shiite parties, and helped break the deadlock over who would be the prime minister in 2006 that led to the selection of Nouri al-Maliki. More recently, he helped put together the Iraqi National Alliance made up of the Sadrists, the Supreme Council, the Iraqi National Congress, the Fadhila Party, and others for the 2010 parliamentary election, After the March vote, it was believed that Suleimani helped State of Law and the National Alliance merge together. That coalition ultimately didn’t work since so many members of the National Alliance are opposed to Maliki retaining the premiership. That ultimately led to Suleimani being relieved of his Iraq responsibilities.

General Suleimani’s replacement, Speaker Ali Larijani has been an advocate of Tehran’s shift towards a more political stance towards Iraq. In 2008 it was reported that he was an opponent of Tehran’s support for Sadr and his militia, and instead advocated for backing the Iraqi government. In 2009 he worked with Suleimani to push Iraq’s Shiite parties to run together in the 2010 vote. According to al-Rafidayn, that will be his main priority now that he is in charge of Iran’s Iraq policy, and he is due to arrive in Iraq shortly to hold discussions with Iraq’s politicians. 

Iran continues to play a large role within Iraq, although its goals are becoming more difficult to attain. While Iran still supports Shiite militants, today it is much more focused upon shaping the next Iraqi government. That has always been Tehran’s top priority as it is determined to make sure that Baghdad is never a threat again, and that friendly Shiite parties rule the country. General Suleimani managed this policy for over a decade, and is now going to be replaced by Speaker Larijani. That’s symbolic of Iran’s current emphasis upon politics and Iraq’s 2010 election. He will have his work cut out for him as the Shiite lists have fractured, and are more concerned about getting their own man into the premiership than working together or giving into Iranian pressure. That shows that while Teheran will continue to have close ties to many of Iraq’s leader, they are beginning to focus upon their own concerns, which lessons what Iran can achieve.

SOURCES

Allam, Hannah, Landay, Jonathan, and Strobel, Warren, “Iranian outmaneuvers U.S. in Iraq” McClatchy Newspapers, 4/28/08

Alsumaria, “Larijani to meet Iraqi officials,” 7/16/10

Cochrane, Marisa, “Asaib Ahl al-Haq and the Khazali Special Groups network,” Institute for the Study of War,” 1/13/09

Dickey, Christopher, “The Sandman Cometh,” Newsweek, 3/4/10

Fadel, Leila, “Iranian general played key role in Iraq cease-fire,” McClatchy Newspapers, 3/30/08

Al-Fayhaa TV, Al-Sharq Al-Awsat, Al-Zaman, “Will ‘They’ or Will ‘They’ Not Meet?” MEMRI Blog, 5/11/10

Felter, Joseph and Fishman, Brian, “Iranian Strategy in Iraq, Politics and ‘Other Means,’” Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, 10/13/08

Ignatius, David, “Tehran’s Vote Buying in Iraq,” Washington Post, 2/25/10

Kagan, Kimberly, “Iran’s Proxy War against the United States and the Iraqi Government,” Institute for the Study of War, 8/20/07

Nasr, Vali, “Iran on Its Heels,” Washington Post, 6/19/08

Peterson, Scott and LaFranchi, Howard, “Iran shifts attention to brokering peace in Iraq,” Christian Science Monitor, 5/14/08

Al-Rafidayn, “Tehran Takes IRGC Official Suleimani Off Iraq Dossier,” MEMRI Blog, 7/14/10

Rahimi, Babak, “The Mumahidun: Muqtada Al-Sadr’s New Militia,” Terrorism Monitor, Jamestown Foundation, 9/4/08

Strobel, Warren and Fadel, Leila, “Iranian who brokered Iraqi peace is on U.S. terrorist watch list,” McClatchy Newspaper, 3/31/08

Youssef, Nancy, Fadel, Leila, and Strobel, Warren, “U.S. again cuts off Chalabi, this time over rivalry with Maliki,” McClatchy Newspapers, 5/18/08

Al-Zaman, Al-Mada, “Larijani Mediates Between Al-Maliki And Al-Hakim,” MEMRI Blog, 11/5/09

Basra Represents Iraq’s Problems In Attracting Foreign Investment

At the end of June 2010 Basra held an international trade fair. 150 companies participated from Turkey, Germany, and Iraq. The event was portrayed as a success due to the number of businesses that were involved, but nothing was said about whether any companies actually decided to invest in the province. In fact, Basra has attracted very few foreign firms so far.

In 2009 Basra’s new provincial council passed its investment plan. The idea was to attract foreign companies to its industry, services, tourism, agriculture, and housing. The council was hoping for joint ventures with state-run industries in iron, steel, petrochemicals, fertilizers, paper, and cement. So far, no businesses have invested in the governorate outside of its oil sector. The main reason is that the state-run businesses employ a huge number of useless workers, which foreigners are unwilling to pay for. The general manager of the state-run Iron and Steel Company in Basra for example, said that they had gotten some initial interest from Italy and South Korea, but the talks failed because they were unwilling to pay for the company’s excess labor. The business has 6,300 registered workers, many of which lack any actual experience or skill in their trade. Most of those were appointed by political parties looking to create patronage systems by giving people government jobs in return for their support. Another instance was the Basra steel plant. An Italian company was interested in the firm, but disagreed with the local authorities about how many workers it was willing to pay for. The government also failed to provide any specifics on how the investment and production deal would work.

Basra’s experience with foreign companies is an example of the country’s overall problems in attracting outside investment. Iraq’s investment laws are confusing, contradictory, and prohibit foreigners from owning land except when building houses. Iraq also has a state-run economy, so international businesses are asked to form joint ventures with government owned Iraqi companies. The problem is that these are old and unattractive because of their lack of productivity and their huge workforces, which have been forced upon them by politicians. Finally, the Iraqi government has no real commitment to economic reform. There’s plenty of talk about privatization, and the free market right now, but it is largely just rhetoric. Everything continues to rely upon the government, there’s lots of opposition to capitalism, and many officials are afraid of the economic and political consequences of getting rid of state employees. Until those things change, most foreigners will stay away from anything but Iraq’s energy industry.

SOURCES

A.A.I.B. Insurance Brokers, “Companies Seeking Investment Prospects in Basra,” AAIB View, 6/29/10

Abbas, Mohammed, “Iraq aims to allow foreign investors to own land,” Reuters, 5/25/09

Al-Ansary, Khalid, “Iraq investors bemoan red tape and lack of credit,” Reuters, 3/29/09

Aswat al-Iraq, “100 firms take part int’l trade fair in Basra Friday,” 6/24/10

Daood, Mayada, “what’s the plan? fears of renewed central control,” Niqash, 5/25/10

Desai, Raj, “Iraq’s Economy Needs More Than Security,” Brookings Institution, 10/23/09

Ibrahim, Waleed and Benham, Jason, “Iraq passes key investment law,” Reuters, 11/23/09

Levinson, Charles, “Leaders have vision of burgeoning Baghdad,” USA Today, 9/9/08

Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, “Quarterly Report to the United States Congress,” 4/30/09

Al-Wazzan, Saleem, “investors steering clear,” Niqash, 6/28/10