Musings On Iraq review The Achilles Trap, Saddam Hussein, The C.I.A., And The Origins Of America’s Invasion Of Iraq
Musings On Iraq review Against All Enemies, Inside America’s War on Terror
Musings On Iraq review America at the Crossroads, Democracy, Power, and the Neoconservative
Musings On Iraq review Arrows of the Night: Ahmad Chalabi and the Selling of the Iraq War
Musings On Iraq review The Assassins’ Gate, America In Iraq
Musings On Iraq review Blind Into Baghdad, America’s War In Iraq
Musings On Iraq review Blood Money, Wasted Billions, Lost Lives, and Corporate Greed in Iraq
Musings On Iraq review The Bush Administrations and Saddam Hussein, Deciding on Conflict
Musings On Iraq review Bush At War
Musings On Iraq review Days Of Fire, Bush and Cheney in the White House
Musings On Iraq review The Endgame, The Inside Story of the Struggle for Iraq, from George
W. Bush to Barack Obama
Musings On Iraq review Expectation of Valor, Planning For The Iraqi War
Musings On Iraq review The Fall of Baghdad
Musings On Iraq review from storm to Freedom, America’s Long War with Iraq
Musings On Iraq review Hard Lessons, The Iraq Reconstruction Experience
Musings On Iraq review Hoodwinked, The Documents That Reveal How Bush Sold Us a War
Musings On Iraq review Hubris, The Inside Story of Spin, Scandal, And The Selling Of The Iraq War
Musings On Iraq review Invisible War, The United States And The Iraq Sanctions
Musings On Iraq review Iraq’s Future: The aftermath of regime change
Musings On Iraq review Iraqi Perspectives Project, A View of Operation Iraqi Freedom from Saddam’s Senior Leadership
Musings On Iraq review Leap of Faith, Hubris Negligence, and America’s Greatest Foreign
Policy Tragedy
Musings On Iraq review Liberate And Leave, Fatal Flaws In The Early Strategy For Postwar Iraq
Musings On Iraq review Losing Iraq, Inside The Post War Reconstruction Fiasco
Musings On Iraq review The Man Who Pushed America To War, The Extraordinary Life, Adventures, and Obsessions of Ahmad Chalabi
Musings On Iraq review The Master Plan, ISIS, Al-Qaeda, and the Jihadi Strategy For Final Victory
Musings On Iraq review The Next Attack, The Failure of the War on Terror and a Strategy for Getting it Right
Musings On Iraq review The Occupation of Iraq, Winning The War, Losing The Peace
Musings On Iraq review The One Percent Doctrine, Deep Inside America’s Pursuit Of Its Enemies Since 9/11
Musings On Iraq review Operation Hotel California, The Clandestine War Inside Iraq
Musings On Iraq review Overreach, Delusions of Regime Change In Iraq
Musings On Iraq review Plan of Attack: The Definitive Account Of The Decision To
Invade Iraq
Musings On Iraq review A Pretext for War, 9/11, Iraq, and the Abuse of America’s Intelligence Agencies
Musings On Iraq review The Report of the Iraq Inquiry, Executive Summary
Musings On Iraq review The Road to Iraq, The Making of a Neoconservative War
Musings On Iraq review The Regime Change Consensus, Iraq In American Politics 1990-2003
Musings On Iraq review Rise Of The Vulcans, The History of Bush’s War Cabinet
Musings On Iraq review Salam Pax: The Baghdad Blog
Musings On Iraq review Shaping the Plan for Operation Iraqi Freedom, The Role of Military Intelligence Assessment
Musings On Iraq review State of Denial, Bush At War, Part III
Musings On Iraq review State of War, The Secret History of the CIA and the Bush Administration
Musings On Iraq review To Start A War: How The Bush Administration Took America Into Iraq
Musings On Iraq review Wanting War: Why the Bush Administration Invaded Iraq
Musings On Iraq review A War Of Choice, The British In Iraq 2003-9
Musings On Iraq review What Happened, Inside the Bush White House and Washington’s Culture of Deception
Musings On Iraq review The WMD Mirage, Iraq’s Decade of Deception and America’s False Premise for War
Musings On Iraq US Army History Of Iraq Vol 1 – Chapter 2 Regime Change
Musings On Iraq US Army History of Iraq War Vol 1 – Chapter 3 Maneuvering Into Position
2000
Jan 5 Saddam said sanctions would erode by themselves and that already started
Feb 11 Iraq announced UN weapons inspectors would not be allowed back into country
(Musings On Iraq UN Inspectors Were Right Iraq Was Not A Threat)
(Musings On Iraq Iraq’s Rejection of UN Inspectors Led To Mistrust Over WMD and 2003 Invasion)
Mar 31 UN resolution 1293 doubled amount of spare parts Iraq could import to maintain
its oil industry under Oil for Food program
Apr 19 UK intel report said Iraq was continuing with its WMD program Said had an active
biological program and was looking into building mobile labs based upon info from CURVEBALL defector in Germany Admitted couldn’t confirm anything since UN inspectors left in 1998
(Musings On Iraq Chilcot Inquiry Section 4.1 Iraq WMD Assessments, Pre-July 2002)
(Musings On Iraq How Iraqi Defector CURVEBALL Became Basis For US Claim That Iraq Had WMD)
(Musings On Iraq Look Who The LA Times Dug Up – CURVEBALL)
(Musings On Iraq Story of CURVEBALL And Iraq’s Mobile Biological Weapons Labs)
(Musings On Iraq review Curveball, Spies, Lies, And The Con Man Who Caused A War)
May 13 Saddam speech Said Iraq had broken will of US during Gulf War and dismissed US military
technology
(Musings On Iraq review Iraqi Perspectives Project, A View of Operation Iraqi Freedom from Saddam’s Senior Leadership)
Jun 8 UN Resolution 1302 renewed Oil For Food Program
Jun 12 Saddam speech implied that if others in MidEast had WMD Iraq would have them too Later
told FBI interrogator he gave speech to warn Iran not to attack Iraq Said Iraq had to deal with threat from Iran and Israel so had to act like Iraq still had WMD
Jun 30 VP Gore told INC meeting Saddam had to be removed
Aug 17 Iraq reopened Saddam International Airport to get around UN sanctions
Aug 24 Iraq rejected new UN inspectors and Resolution 1284
(Musings On Iraq UN Inspectors Were Right Iraq Was Not A Threat)
(Musings On Iraq Iraq’s Rejection of UN Inspectors Led To Mistrust Over WMD and 2003 Invasion)
Aug 30 US and Russia agreed not to send UN inspectors back to Iraq
(Musings On Iraq UN Inspectors Were Right Iraq Was Not A Threat)
(Musings On Iraq Iraq’s Rejection of UN Inspectors Led To Mistrust Over WMD and 2003 Invasion)
Oct 5 During VP debate Cheney said US might have to take military action to remove
Saddam in future
(Musings On Iraq Overview of America’s Policy Towards Iraq: From The Clinton Years To The
Sectarian War of 2006)
Oct 11 Candidate Bush at presidential debate said he didn’t believe in nation building and military
should only be used for war and could overthrow dictators
Oct 13 Iran’s Foreign Minister Kharrazi visited Iraq for 3 days Highest ranking Iranian official to
visit Iraq since 1979 Revolution After trip Iran announced Iran and Iraq would re-open discussion on border and POW issue largely ended
Oct 15 Iran announced it was returning to 1975 Algiers Treaty Meant rapproachement with Iraq but
also Iraq gained nothing from Iran-Iraq War
Oct 20 UK Foreign Office said wanted to offer end of sanctions to return inspectors to Iraq but
didn’t think US would agree
(Musings On Iraq Review The Report of the Iraq Inquiry, Executive Summary)
(Musings On Iraq Chilcot Report Section 1.2 UK Iraq strategy September 2000 To September 2001)
Oct 21 Izzat al-Duri attended Arab summit saying Iraq believed only jihad could save Palestinians
in latest conflict with Israel
Oct 21 King Hussein of Jordan called for end of sanctions on Iraq at Arab summit
Oct 25 Congress authorized increase in support for Iraqi opposition groups to $25 mil in 2001 $18
mil would go to INC
Nov 1 UK intel report said Saddam had no reason to work with UN because felt US would never
end sanctions as long as he was in power
(Musings On Iraq Review The Report of the Iraq Inquiry, Executive Summary)
(Musings On Iraq Chilcot Report Section 1.2 UK Iraq strategy September 2000 To September 2001)
Nov 5 Syria announced it would re-open pipeline with Iraq once sanctions ended Sign of improved
relations between two
Nov 15 UK Foreign Office report Saddam felt like he was winning in breaking down sanctions
(Musings On Iraq Review The Report of the Iraq Inquiry, Executive Summary)
(Musings On Iraq Chilcot Report Section 1.2 UK Iraq strategy September 2000 To September 2001)
Nov 24 UK Foreign Office report Arab countries no longer supported sanctions on Iraq
(Musings On Iraq Review The Report of the Iraq Inquiry, Executive Summary)
(Musings On Iraq Chilcot Report Section 1.2 UK Iraq strategy September 2000 To September 2001)
Dec 1 UK Intel report Iraq had expanded its activity since inspectors left and speculated it was
producing WMD again Little evidence of a nuclear program Reports that Iraq went to Niger to buy uranium
(Musings On Iraq Chilcot Inquiry Section 4.1 Iraq WMD Assessments, Pre-July 2002)
Dec 5 UN Resolution 1330 renewed Oil for Food Program
2001
Jan 1 Break-in at Niger embassy in Rome to provide cover for how Italian intel
broker Martino got fake Iraq-Niger uranium papers
(Musings On Iraq How US Intelligence Failed The Iraq-Niger Uranium Story)
(Musings On Iraq Review Hubris, The Inside Story of Spin, Scandal, And The Selling Of The Iraq War)
(Musings On Iraq review The WMD Mirage, Iraq’s Decade of Deception and America’s False Premise for War)
Jan 10 Outgoing Clinton Defense Secretary Cohen briefed President elect Bush on Iraq
Said Saddam contained and strong action vs Iraq would cause problems in region
Jan 30 1st NSC talked about how Iraq destabilizing MidEast CIA Dir Tenet said Iraq working
on WMD at factory Def Sec Rumsfeld said sanctions waste of time US should focus on destroying WMD Treasury Sec O’Neil asked about WMD intel Tenet admitted no confirmation that Iraq producing WMD Sec State Powell argued for smart sanctions Bush told Powell to work on sanctions and Rumsfeld to review military options for Iraq
(Musings On Iraq Indecision Over Iraq Policy In Pre-9/11 Bush Administration)
(Musings On Iraq Chilcot Report Section 1.2 UK Iraq strategy September 2000 To September 2001)
(Musings On Iraq review The Price of Loyalty)
(Musings On Iraq review The WMD Mirage, Iraq’s Decade of Deception and America’s False Premise for War)
(Musings On Iraq review The Regime Change Consensus, Iraq In American Politics 1990-2003)
Jan 30 Def Sec Rumsfeld wrote memo noting Iraq and others trying to buy advanced military
technology
Feb 1 2nd Bush NSC meeting again dealt with Iraq policy State Dept said US policy
should be to stop Iraq from threatening Middle East Secretary of State Powell talked again about smart sanctions Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld said removing Saddam and putting in pro-US govt could change Middle East and show world what US policy about Pentagon talked about rebuilding Gulf War coalition against Iraq CIA Director Tenet talked about coup vs Saddam End of meeting Rumsfeld said US objective was not getting rid of Saddam but his WMD
(Musings On Iraq Indecision Over Iraq Policy In Pre-9/11 Bush Administration)
(Musings On Iraq Chilcot Report Section 1.2 UK Iraq strategy September 2000 To September 2001)
(Musings On Iraq review The Price of Loyalty)
Feb 5 National Security Adviser Rice chaired meeting to go over Iraq policy Agreed that
Saddam had won PR war over sanctions by convincing most of international community that they were hurting Iraqi public Also that sanctions were not forcing Saddam from power Secretary of State Powell argued for smart sanctions that would just focus upon military imports to Iraq Rice wanted review of No Fly Zone Led to less flights to try to avoid planes getting shot down Told US agencies to increase Intelligence gathering on WMD
(Musings On Iraq review The Regime Change Consensus, Iraq In American Politics 1990-2003)
(Musings On Iraq Indecision Over Iraq Policy In Pre-9/11 Bush Administration)
(Musings On Iraq Chilcot Report Section 1.2 UK Iraq strategy September 2000 To September 2001)
(Musings On Iraq UN Inspectors Were Right Iraq Was Not A Threat)
(Musings On Iraq Iraq’s Rejection of UN Inspectors Led To Mistrust Over WMD and 2003 Invasion)
Feb 6 US and UK launched largest air strikes on Iraq in 2 yrs to destroy fiber optic
communications system Iraq trying to install for its military
Feb 7 CIA report to Congress no evidence Iraq reconstituted WMD program since 1990s
(Musings On Iraq Origins Of Iraq’s WMD Programs)
Feb 12 Rumsfeld said Iraq was probably not a nuclear threat at this time
Feb 15 US and UK planes bombed Iraq’s air defense system as part of No Fly zone
Feb 16 Bush told speechwriter David Frum that he was going to get rid of Saddam
(Musings On Iraq Indecision Over Iraq Policy In Pre-9/11 Bush Administration)
Feb 16 UK Attorney General Lord Williams approved air attacks out of no fly zones
in Iraq for self defense
Feb 16 US and UK planes bombed 20 radar and command and control centers in Iraq
outside of No Fly Zone US and UK claimed Iraq had upgraded its air defenses Then said bombed Iraq to stop it from upgrading its defenses
Feb 19 Richard Perle wrote letter to Def Sec Rumsfeld Said he’d been friends with Ahmed Chalabi
for years Attacked CIA for incompetence dealing with Iraq and was trying to discredit Chalabi Called out CIA Dir Tenet for being opponent of Chalabi Argued for US to back Chalabi’s revolt plan
(Musings On Iraq review The Man Who Pushed America To War, The Extraordinary Life, Adventures, and Obsessions of Ahmad Chalabi)
(Musings On Iraq review Arrows of the Night: Ahmad Chalabi and the Selling of the Iraq War)
Feb 23 Bush met PM Blair 1st time Said he wanted realistic Iraq policy Said Arab states thought
sanctions were hurting Iraqi people Sec State Powell said Iraq weaker than before but using oil money to develop WMD Powell called for smart sanctions Blair supported idea Bush was afraid US plane would be shot down over No Fly Zones Bush said he wanted to weaken Saddam and make him less of an issue
Feb 24 Secretary of State Powell said Iraq had not developed any significant WMD capability and
UN sanctions worked
(Musings On Iraq Origins Of Iraq’s WMD Programs)
Feb 25 Sunday Times report Said Iraq had nuclear weapons and tested them based upon Iraqi
defector and INC
Feb 27 Secretary of State Powell got Arab states to agree to new smart sanctions on Iraq
Feb 27 Deputy Defense Secretary Wolfowitz told Senate US reviewing Iraq policy and
how to work with groups like INC
(Musings On Iraq Indecision Over Iraq Policy In Pre-9/11 Bush Administration)
(Musings On Iraq review Losing Iraq, Inside The Post War Reconstruction Fiasco)
Mar 1 NSC meeting on Iraq policy Powell told to devise smart sanctions proposal for UN
Powell and Rumsfeld argued over dual use equipment that should be banned from Iraq
(Musings On Iraq review The Price of Loyalty)
Mar 1 Separate NSC meeting discussed working with Iraqi opposition and INC Talked
about arming them but couldn’t agree on anything
(Musings On Iraq Chilcot Report Section 1.2 UK Iraq strategy September 2000 To September 2001)
Mar 4 US told UN Security Council Iraq had been reselling supplies from Oil for Food
program setting up front companies giving kickbacks to get around sanctions
Apr 8 Czech Inter Min claimed 9/11 terrorist Atta met with Iraqi intelligence in Prague
Later proven false
(Musings On Iraq Overview of America’s Policy Towards Iraq: From The Clinton Years To The
Sectarian War of 2006)
Apr 9 NSC Counterterrorism chief Clarke and CIA Dir Tenet said US needed to focus on Al Qaeda
Def Sec Rumsfeld said there were other sources of terrorism like Iraq and US should focus upon Saddam
(Musings On Iraq Indecision Over Iraq Policy In Pre-9/11 Bush Administration)
Apr 10 1st CIA report that Iraq tried to buy aluminum tubes for centrifuges and sign Iraq
renewed nuclear program Didn’t provide any analysis for claim Did say tubes were step backward from centrifuges Iraq used before Gulf War
(Musings On Iraq How A Contested Aluminum Tubes Story Became The Basis For War With Iraq)
(Musings On Iraq review The WMD Mirage, Iraq’s Decade of Deception and America’s False Premise for War)
Apr 11 1st US Energy Dept report on aluminum tubes Iraq tried to buy Said were wrong
size for centrifuges Did not meet specifications for centrifuges Iraq used before Said Iraq was openly buying large amount of tubes Would not be action for a secret nuclear program Thought tubes were for rocket launchers
(Musings On Iraq How A Contested Aluminum Tubes Story Became The Basis For War With Iraq)
(Musings On Iraq review The WMD Mirage, Iraq’s Decade of Deception and America’s False Premise for War)
Apr 17 Dept of Energy report said didn’t have enough info to tell whether Iraq had
restarted its nuclear program
(Musings On Iraq How US Intelligence Created An Iraqi Nuclear Threat In 2002)
Apr 18 Iran fired 60 missiles at Iraq
Apr 23 In response to State Dept asking CIA about coup in Iraq Dep Def Sec Wolfowitz wrote memo
arguing US should give military support to Iraqi rebels to overthrow Saddam
Apr 28 Report 9/11 terrorist Mohammed Atta met with Iraqi intel officer in Prague Story false
(Musings On Iraq Overview of America’s Policy Towards Iraq: From The Clinton Years To The
Sectarian War of 2006)
Apr 30 NSC meeting on Al Qaeda threat Deputy Defense Secretary Wolfowitz asked
why US should focus on bin Laden when Iraq terrorism real threat Brought up Mylroie’s conspiracy theories about Iraq being behind 93 World Trade Center bombing Deputy CIA Director McLaughlin told Wolfowitz no evidence of Iraq terrorist threat to US Deputy Secretary of State Armitage told Wolfowitz Al Qaeda was the main threat to US
(Musings On Iraq review Against All Enemies, Inside America’s War on Terror)
(Musings On Iraq Indecision Over Iraq Policy In Pre-9/11 Bush Administration)
(Musings On Iraq Overview of America’s Policy Towards Iraq: From The Clinton Years To The
Sectarian War of 2006)
(Musings On Iraq Laurie Mylroie’s Convoluted Iraq-Terrorism Conspiracy Theory)
(Musings On Iraq Laurie Mylroie’s Iraq Conspiracy Theory Was Debunked By Captured Baath Documents)
May 5 Iraq told UN it worked on a nuclear bomb in the 1980s but it proved unfeasible In the 90s
IAEA found Iraq no longer working on nuclear program
May 9 US Energy Dept said aluminum tubes Iraq tried to buy fit specifications for rocket
launchers IAEA found similar tubes during inspections in Baghdad
(Musings On Iraq How A Contested Aluminum Tubes Story Became The Basis For War With Iraq)
(Musings On Iraq review The WMD Mirage, Iraq’s Decade of Deception and America’s False Premise for War)
May 15 Secretary of State Powell told Congress UN sanctions had effectively contained
Saddam
(Musings On Iraq review The Regime Change Consensus, Iraq In American Politics 1990-2003)
May 31 1st of four Deputies Committee of NSC meetings on revising Iraq policy
Jun 1 UN Resolution 1352 extended Oil for Food program
Jun 1 White House national security meeting on revising Iraq policy but no decisions
made Asked NSC for new ways to pressure Iraq
(Musings On Iraq Chilcot Report Section 1.2 UK Iraq strategy September 2000 To September 2001)
Jun 3 Saudi Amb to US Prince Bandar gave presentation to Bush saying Saddam taking
advantage of instability in Middle East
Jun 5 During confirmation hearing future Deputy Undersecretary of Defense Feith said
Saddam should be overthrown
Jun 14 CIA report aluminum tubes Iraq tried to buy were probably for centrifuges for
nuke program but could be rockets Still provided no justification for claim tubes for centrifuges
(Musings On Iraq How A Contested Aluminum Tubes Story Became The Basis For War With Iraq)
(Musings On Iraq review The WMD Mirage, Iraq’s Decade of Deception and America’s False Premise for War)
Jun 22 US decided to provide new aid to Iraqi opposition against Saddam
Jun 22 Deputies meeting of NSC went over NSC paper on Iraq strategy Mostly focused on how to
maintain No Fly Zone as Iraq tried to shoot down planes
Jul 2 US intel report on confiscated aluminum tubes Iraq tried to buy Said did not fit rocket
launchers Did match 1950s German centrifuge design
(Musings On Iraq How A Contested Aluminum Tubes Story Became The Basis For War With Iraq)
(Musings On Iraq review The WMD Mirage, Iraq’s Decade of Deception and America’s False Premise for War)
Jul 3 UN Resolution 1360 renewed Oil for Food program
Jul 12 Iraqi Military Alliance opposition group met in London made up of 60 former
officers Called for democratic Iraq Foreign aid Iraqi soldiers to work with it
Jul 13 NSC meeting Talked about maintaining No Fly Zone again Dep Nat Sec Adv Hadley and Dep
Def Sec Wolfowitz said if Iraq fired on US planes retaliation should hurt Iraq and degrade its military threat to others Talked about regime change in Iraq Haldye said he wanted a real Iraq strategy Wolfowitz said US should be working with other countries instead of trying to overthrow Saddam by itself Talked about US recognizing an Iraqi provisional govt based in Kurdistan and southern Iraq Hoped such a govt would get intl support and then get to control Iraq’s frozen assets held in foreign banks Provisional govt would spread and then overthrow Saddam Dep Sec of State Armitage suggested that Bush make Iraq the top foreign policy issue Def Sec Rumsfeld demanded full NSC meeting where Bush would hear plan
(Musings On Iraq Indecision Over Iraq Policy In Pre-9/11 Bush Administration)
(Musings On Iraq review The Man Who Pushed America To War, The Extraordinary Life, Adventures, and Obsessions of Ahmad Chalabi)
(Musings On Iraq review Arrows of the Night: Ahmad Chalabi and the Selling of the Iraq War)
Jul 17 Saddam speech on anniversary of Baath coup said tyrants would not be able to
overthrow him and he would not be defeated
Jul 26 Last of 4 NSC Deputies Committee meetings on revising Iraq policy
Jul 27 Rumsfeld memo to Rice Cheney Powell Called for subcabinet meeting on Iraq Rumsfeld said
Saddam stronger than before Said 3 possible Iraq policies 1st could end no fly zone and go home before US pilot killed/captured Could surveil Iraq from afar Said that could lead to future confrontation 2nd was to use Arab allies for regime change in Iraq Said Saddam would get nuclear bomb soon 3rd option was talking to Iraq
(Musings On Iraq review The Regime Change Consensus, Iraq In American Politics 1990-2003)
(Musings On Iraq Indecision Over Iraq Policy In Pre-9/11 Bush Administration)
Jul 31 Dep Def Sec Wolfowitz presented liberation strategy for Iraq to White House Argued for US
to back safe haven in southern Iraq where Chalabi and INC would organize insurgency vs Saddam
Aug 1 NSC meeting Sec Def Rumsfeld presented plan for US to back Iraqi opposition and possible
military action Included backing INC’s revolt plan
(Musings On Iraq Indecision Over Iraq Policy In Pre-9/11 Bush Administration)
Aug 7 US Energy Dept said aluminum tubes Iraq tried to buy could be for centrifuges
but probably for rockets
(Musings On Iraq How A Contested Aluminum Tubes Story Became The Basis For War With Iraq)
(Musings On Iraq review The WMD Mirage, Iraq’s Decade of Deception and America’s False Premise for War)
Aug 15 UK Foreign Office legal adviser Sir Wood said that British forces could be sued
if not given legal basis for going to war with Iraq
Aug 17 US Energy Dep report said aluminum tubes Iraq tried to buy were probably for
rockets not centrifuges for nuclear weapons program Said tubes didn’t match any designs for operating centrifuges Also refuted CIA analyst who claimed tubes could work for 1950s German centrifuge design Did say that Iraq trying to buy magnets and other moves showed that Iraq restarted its centrifuge program to enrich uranium Didn’t know if nuclear program restarted
(Musings On Iraq How A Contested Aluminum Tubes Story Became The Basis For War With Iraq)
(Musings On Iraq How US Intelligence Created An Iraqi Nuclear Threat In 2002)
(Musings On Iraq review The WMD Mirage, Iraq’s Decade of Deception and America’s False Premise for War)
Sep 1 Mullah Krekar founded Jund al-Islam that would become Ansar al-Islam in
Sulaymaniya province
(Musings On Iraq Why Didn’t Bush Strike Zarqawi And Ansar al-Islam In 2002?)
Sep 4 1st major NSC meeting on Al Qaeda by Bush admin Def Sec Rumsfeld said Iraq was more
important
(Musings On Iraq review Against All Enemies, Inside America’s War on Terror)
Sep 8 German intel terminated CURVEBALL as a source Continued to be used by US intel as
source for Iraq having mobile WMD
labs
(Musings
On Iraq How Iraqi Defector CURVEBALL Became Basis For US Claims That Iraq
Had WMD)
(Musings On Iraq Look Who The LA Times Dug Up – CURVEBALL)
(Musings On Iraq The Story Of CURVEBALL And Iraq’s Mobile Biological Weapons Labs)
(Musings On Iraq review The WMD Mirage, Iraq’s Decade of Deception and America’s False Premise for War)
(Musings On Iraq review Curveball, Spies, Lies, And The Con Man Who Caused A War)
Sep 10 US and UK planes hit three Iraqi air defense systems in largest strikes since Feb
2001
Sep 10 Time reported Bush administration discussed overthrowing Saddam
Sep 11 Bush asked whether Iraq was involved in 9/11 because Saddam backed
Palestinian terrorists
(Musings On Iraq Iraq, 9/11 And The Bush Administration)
(Musings On Iraq From 9/11 To The Invasion of Iraq: Analysis of Bush Administration Decision Making)
(Musings On Iraq Iraq And 9/11, How The Bush Administration Immediately Focused Upon Saddam After The September Attacks)
(Musings On Iraq Was Iraq An Imminent Threat To The West?)
(Musings On Iraq review Wanting War: Why the Bush Administration Invaded Iraq)
(Musings On Iraq review Leap of Faith, Hubris Negligence, and America’s Greatest Foreign
Policy Tragedy)
(Musings On Iraq review Plan of Attack: The Definitive Account Of The Decision To Invade
Iraq)
(Musings On Iraq review The Next Attack, The Failure of the War on Terror and a Strategy for Getting it Right)
(Musings On Iraq review The One Percent Doctrine, Deep Inside America’s Pursuit Of Its Enemies Since 9/11)
(Musings On Iraq review To Start A War: How The Bush Administration Took America Into Iraq)
Sep 11 Rice told UK Amb to US Meyer that White House was looking into whether Iraq
involved in 9/11
(Musings On Iraq Chilcot Report Sec 3.1 Development of UK Strategy and Options on Iraq, 9/11 to Early January 2002)
Sep 11 5 hrs after 9/11 Defense Secretary Rumsfeld wrote memo asking for info on
whether should attack Saddam and Iraq
(Musings On Iraq Overview of America’s Policy Towards Iraq: From The Clinton Years To The
Sectarian War of 2006)
Sep 11 Rumsfeld told Pentagon lawyer to talk to Deputy Secretary of Defense Wolfowitz
about Iraq-Al Qaeda connections
Sep 11 NSC meeting Rumsfeld said he wasn’t sure Afghanistan should be first in war on terror
Asked if Iraq involved Powell argued Al Qaeda had to be first target
Sep 11 Counterterrorism chief Clarke said Rumsfeld and Deputy Defense Secretary
Wolfowitz were taking advantage of 9/11 to push their Iraq agenda
(Musings On Iraq review Against All Enemies, Inside America’s War on Terror)
Sep 11 Bush said that US should get rid of Saddam and told some aides to look into
Iraq-Al Qaeda connections
(Musings On Iraq Review Hubris, The Inside Story of Spin, Scandal, And The Selling Of The Iraq War)
(Musings On Iraq review The Bush Administrations and Saddam Hussein, Deciding on Conflict)
Sep 11 Joint Chiefs of Staff asked Central Command to begin contingency planning against 5
countries including Iraq Request denied because Command too busy with Afghanistan
Sep 11 UndersecDef Feith said that war on terror had to start with Iraq
Sep 11 Joint Chiefs deputy ops chief Gen Newbold told Undersec Def Feith plans were being made
for Al Qaeda and Afghanistan Feith said they should be planning for Iraq instead
Sep 11 In 2003 Bush said that 9/11 changed his mind about the problems Saddam could
pose Said he no longer believed in containment afterward
(Musings On Iraq review The Regime Change Consensus, Iraq In American Politics 1990-2003)
Sep 11 Defense Policy Board member Perle said that Iraq responsible for 9/11 and had to pay
(Musings On Iraq Iraq, 9/11 And The Bush Administration)
(Musings On Iraq From 9/11 To The Invasion of Iraq: Analysis of Bush Administration Decision Making)
(Musings On Iraq review Wanting War: Why the Bush Administration Invaded Iraq)
(Musings On Iraq review Leap of Faith, Hubris Negligence, and America’s Greatest Foreign Policy Tragedy)
Sep 11 Italian intelligence told CIA that Iraq had tried to buy uranium from Niger
(Musings On Iraq How US Intelligence Failed The Iraq-Niger Uranium Story)
(Musings On Iraq Review Hubris, The Inside Story of Spin, Scandal, And The Selling Of The Iraq War)
(Musings On Iraq review The WMD Mirage, Iraq’s Decade of Deception and America’s False Premise for War)
Sep 11 Report that Saddam put his forces on alert and retreated to a bunker in Tikrit area
showing he was involved in 9/11
Sep 12 Saddam said US reaped what it sowed with 9/11 attack
Sep 12 Bush asked Counterterrorism Chief Clarke to look into whether Iraq involved in 9/11 Bush
later told 9/11 Commission natural to ask about Iraq’s involvement because it was an enemy of the US
(Musings On Iraq Iraq, 9/11 And The Bush Administration)
(Musings On Iraq From 9/11 To The Invasion of Iraq: Analysis of Bush Administration Decision Making)
(Musings On Iraq Iraq And 9/11, How The Bush Administration Immediately Focused Upon Saddam After The September Attacks)
(Musings On Iraq Was Iraq An Imminent Threat To The West?)
(Musings On Iraq review Wanting War: Why the Bush Administration Invaded Iraq)
(Musings On Iraq review Leap of Faith, Hubris Negligence, and America’s Greatest Foreign
Policy Tragedy)
(Musings On Iraq review Plan of Attack: The Definitive Account Of The Decision To Invade
Iraq)
(Musings On Iraq review The Next Attack, The Failure of the War on Terror and a Strategy for Getting it Right)
(Musings On Iraq review The One Percent Doctrine, Deep Inside America’s Pursuit Of Its Enemies Since 9/11)
(Musings On Iraq review To Start A War: How The Bush Administration Took America Into Iraq)
Sep 12 Pentagon meeting on 9/11 CIA said was sure Al Qaeda behind attack Deputy
Defense Secretary Wolfowitz questioned that and said Iraq must have been involved
Sep 12 NSC met to discuss how to shape Bush doctrine and war on terror Rumsfeld
brought up attacking Iraq because not enough good targets to bomb in Afghanistan Rumsfeld asked if Iraq not Al Qaeda was behind 9/11 twice Also asked about Iran or Syria being involved Tenet said it was Al Qaeda Powell said US had to focus on Al Qaeda because that was what public wanted not Iraq Rumsfeld said Saddam should be overthrown Joint Chiefs head Gen Shelton said that was only possible via large invasion Bush said not time for Iraq
(Musings On Iraq review Bush At War)
(Musings On Iraq Overview of America’s Policy Towards Iraq: From The Clinton Years To The
Sectarian War of 2006)
Sep 12 White House told CIA to come up with covert plan against Iraq
Sep 12 Dep Sec Def Wolfowitz asked DIA for all info on Iraq’s involvement in terrorism since
Gulf War
Sep 12 Defense Policy Board’s Perle told CIA Dir Tenet Iraq had to pay for 9/11 claiming
it was behind attack
Sep 12 Czech intel source said he saw 9/11 hijacker Atta meet with Iraqi intel in Prague
Apr 2001 Story false
Sep 12 Iraq conspiracy theorist Laurie Mylroie former CIA Dir James Woolsey columnist
Charles Krauthammer all wrote pieces blaming Iraq for 9/11
(Musings On Iraq Laurie Mylroie’s Convoluted Iraq-Terrorism Conspiracy Theory)
(Musings On Iraq Laurie Mylroie’s Iraq Conspiracy Theory Was Debunked By Captured Baath Documents)
Sep 12 Ex-CIA Dir Woolsey told ABC and CNN US should look into Iraq being behind 9/11 Told
CBS Iraq behind 1993 World Trade Center bombing based upon Laurie Mylroie conspiracy theory and Iraq likely behind 9/11
Sep 13 NSC met Sec State Powell asked Joint Chiefs head Gen Shelton for support against
Wolfowitz Shelton agreed war on terror should not expand to Iraq Bush asked CIA Dir Tenet whether he was looking into Iraq-Al Qaeda ties Def Sec Rumsfeld said attacking Iraq would deter countries that supported terrorism Said Iraq was a threat because could give WMD to terrorists Said Iraq had far more targets to hit than Afghanistan Bush asked Rumsfeld and Gen Shelton to come up with new plans for invading Iraq Said if Iraq was taken on would have to be regime change Before meeting Wolfowitz told Rumsfeld US shouldn’t just focus on Al Qaeda but global jihadist networks
(Musings On Iraq Iraq And 9/11, How The Bush Administration Immediately Focused Upon Saddam After The September Attacks)
(Musings On Iraq Iraq, 9/11 And The Bush Administration)
(Musings On Iraq From 9/11 To The Invasion of Iraq: Analysis of Bush Administration Decision Making)
(Musings On Iraq Was Iraq An Imminent Threat To The West?)
(Musings On Iraq review Wanting War: Why the Bush Administration Invaded Iraq)
(Musings On Iraq review Leap of Faith, Hubris Negligence, and America’s Greatest Foreign
Policy Tragedy)
(Musings On Iraq review Plan of Attack: The Definitive Account Of The Decision To Invade
Iraq)
(Musings On Iraq review The Next Attack, The Failure of the War on Terror and a Strategy for Getting it Right)
(Musings On Iraq review The One Percent Doctrine, Deep Inside America’s Pursuit Of Its Enemies Since 9/11)
(Musings On Iraq review To Start A War: How The Bush Administration Took America Into Iraq)
Sep 13 Def Sec Rumsfeld sent memo to 3rd Army to draft plan to seize and hold Iraq’s southern oil
fields
Sep 13 Deputy Defense Secretary Wolfowitz told press US would eliminate states that
sponsor terrorism
(Musings On Iraq Overview of America’s Policy Towards Iraq: From The Clinton Years To The
Sectarian War of 2006)
(Musings On Iraq Iraq And 9/11, How The Bush Administration Immediately Focused Upon Saddam After The September Attacks)
Sep 13 UnderSecDef Feith said that govt officials realized that war on terrorism would involve Iraq
Sep 13 US intelligence and counterterrorism agencies meeting agreed no connection
between Iraq and al Qaeda Report sent to Bush
(Musings On Iraq review Against All Enemies, Inside America’s War on Terror)
Sep 13 Fmr CIA Dir Woolsey said US needed to look into whether Iraq rather than
Al Qaeda was behind 9/11
Sep 13 Iraq conspiracy theorist L. Mylroie Wall St Journal OpEd said Al Qaeda not capable of
9/11 and was probably Iraq
(Musings On Iraq Laurie Mylroie’s Convoluted Iraq-Terrorism Conspiracy Theory)
(Musings On Iraq Laurie Mylroie’s Iraq Conspiracy Theory Was Debunked By Captured Baath Documents)
Sep 13 Time/CNN poll found 78% of Americans believed Iraq involved in 9/11
Sep 14 Bush told Blair that there might be an Iraq-Al Qaeda connection
(Musings On Iraq From 9/11 To The Invasion of Iraq: Analysis of Bush Administration Decision Making)
(Musings On Iraq Was Iraq An Imminent Threat To The West?)
(Musings On Iraq Iraq And 9/11, How The Bush Administration Immediately Focused Upon Saddam After The September Attacks)
(Musings On Iraq review Leap of Faith, Hubris Negligence, and America’s Greatest Foreign
Policy Tragedy)
(Musings On Iraq review Plan of Attack: The Definitive Account Of The Decision To Invade
Iraq)
(Musings On Iraq Review The Report of the Iraq Inquiry, Executive Summary)
(Musings On Iraq review The Next Attack, The Failure of the War on Terror and a Strategy for Getting it Right)
(Musings On Iraq review The One Percent Doctrine, Deep Inside America’s Pursuit Of Its Enemies Since 9/11)
(Musings On Iraq review To Start A War: How The Bush Administration Took America Into Iraq)
(Musings On Iraq Chilcot Report Sec 3.1 Development of UK Strategy and Options on Iraq, 9/11 to Early January 2002)
Sep 14 Fmr CIA Dir Woolsey said Saddam could be working with Al Qaeda
Sep 14 American Enterprise Institute press conference had Iraq conspiracy theorist
Mylroie claimed Iraq behind Al Qaeda and 9/11 David Wurmser said US had to focus on Iraq Michael Ledeen said US had to back INC
(Musings On Iraq review Losing Iraq, Inside The Post War Reconstruction Fiasco)
Sep 14 Iraq conspiracy theorist Mylroie on Fox’s O’Reilly Factor said Iraq behind 1993
World Trade Center Bombing Said getting rid of bin Laden good but Saddam was more important
(Musings On Iraq Laurie Mylroie’s Convoluted Iraq-Terrorism Conspiracy Theory)
(Musings On Iraq Laurie Mylroie’s Iraq Conspiracy Theory Was Debunked By Captured Baath Documents)
(Musings On Iraq review Wanting War: Why the Bush Administration Invaded Iraq)
Sep 14 Pentagon memo said US should go after Al Qaeda Taliban and Iraq Said Iraq could be used as
example for other states that supported terrorism
Sep 15 Before meeting to decide response to 9/11 Nat Sec Adv Rice came up with 3 points to discuss
Just go after Al Qaeda Go after AL Qaeda and Taliban or go after Al Qaeda and Iraq
Sep 15 Camp David meeting on response to 9/11 Iraq brought up several times Pentagon paper said 3
priorities in war on terror: Al Qaeda, Taliban, Iraq Joint Chiefs head Gen Shelton went over Afghanistan war plans and Iraq ones if necessary Natl Sec Adv Rice said US military should think about military action in other places in case Afghanistan went bad Opened up opportunity to bring up Iraq Def Sec Rumsfeld had Dep Def Sec Wolfowitz present position paper on 3 potential targets Al Qaeda Afghanistan Iraq Wolfowitz was afraid Afghanistan would be a quagmire Said Iraq would be easy in comparison and 10-50% chance Iraq behind 9/11 Said US should go after Iraq if serious about war on terror CIA Counterterror Chief Black said Iraq had nothing to do with 9/11 Wolfowitz said Iraq sent intel agents to Sudan and made alliance with bin Laden in 90s Black was Sudan station chief at time Said Iraq agents and bin Laden met but no alliance Natl Sec Adv Rice Chief of Staff Card Joint Chiefs head Shelton all aggravated by Wolfowitz’s ideas Bush said Iraq would be dealt with later Sec State Powell said Wolfowitz had no proof Iraq involved in 9/11 and was just using it for his Iraq agenda During break Wolfowitz brought up Iraq again with Bush Bush told Chief of Staff Card to stop Dep Def Sec Wolfowitz for interrupting After break Wolfowitz said that if US backed rebels in the south Iraq along with Kurds could seize all of Iraq’s oil Def Sec Rumsfeld asked if it was time to attack Iraq Powell objected saying it would cost international support Powell said US had to do Afghanistan first and would make Iraq easier if wanted to deal with it later Bush didn’t want to do more than one war at a time Camp David meeting on US response to 9/11 Restarted Chief of Staff Card and CIA director Tenet said US should go after Al Qaeda not Iraq Later Wolfowitz brought up Iraq again Before lunch Bush said he’d heard enough about Iraq After lunch Bush asked each adviser for their ideas Powell said if US wanted to go after other states they would still be there after Afghanistan Powell said he was against attacking Iraq because US would lose coalition and confuse war on terror Rumsfeld said if hitting Iraq would cost coalition US needed a new coalition Chief of Staff Shelton presented war plans for Afghanistan when Wolfowitz interrupted him Said US had to think about a broader war that included Iraq Wolfowitz said this was perfect opportunity to take on Iraq Shelton said US should build up troops in Persian Gulf that could be used vs Iraq but then said case against Iraq had not been made Bush snapped at Wolfowitz telling him US was not going after Iraq Cheney said if US attacked Iraq would lose its good guy image in war on terror Did say Iraq would be dealt with later on CIA Director Tenet said Afghanistan should be focus Voted on issue with 4-0 against going after Iraq with Rumsfeld abstaining
(Musings On Iraq Iraq And 9/11, How The Bush Administration Immediately Focused Upon Saddam After The September Attacks)
(Musings On Iraq review The One Percent Doctrine, Deep Inside America’s Pursuit Of Its Enemies Since 9/11)
(Musings On Iraq review Bush At War)
(Musings On Iraq review Losing Iraq, Inside The Post War Reconstruction Fiasco)
(Musings On Iraq review The Next Attack, The Failure of the War on Terror and a Strategy for Getting it Right)
(Musings On Iraq Overview of America’s Policy Towards Iraq: From The Clinton Years To The
Sectarian War of 2006)
Sep 15 Bush said he thought Iraq involved in 9/11 but told Rice it would be dealt with
later
(Musings On Iraq Iraq, 9/11 And The Bush Administration)
(Musings On Iraq From 9/11 To The Invasion of Iraq: Analysis of Bush Administration Decision Making)
(Musings On Iraq Was Iraq An Imminent Threat To The West?)
(Musings On Iraq review Wanting War: Why the Bush Administration Invaded Iraq)
(Musings On Iraq review Leap of Faith, Hubris Negligence, and America’s Greatest Foreign Policy
Tragedy)
(Musings On Iraq review To Start A War: How The Bush Administration Took America Into Iraq)
Sep 15 After Camp David meeting ended Dep Sec Def Wolfowitz again talked about Iraq with Bush
and VP Cheney Said he didn’t want to invade Iraq but US should demand Saddam turn over any terrorists and Iraq and allow UN weapons inspectors back in Said if Iraq didn’t comply US could do something like seize oil fields in south and turn them over to Shiites
Sep 15 UK Embassy in US warned that 9/11 would mean those in Bush admin that wanted regime
change in Iraq would push their agenda more
(Musings On Iraq Chilcot Report Sec 3.1 Development of UK Strategy and Options on Iraq, 9/11 to Early January 2002)
Sep 15 Saddam issued letter Said US was getting taste of pain it had inflicted on Arab world
Sep 16 Bush said unless Iraq connected to 9/11 it would be dealt with diplomatically not
with force Told National Security Adviser Rice Iraq would be handled later
(Musings On Iraq review Bush At War)
(Musings On Iraq Overview of America’s Policy Towards Iraq: From The Clinton Years To The
Sectarian War of 2006)
Sep 16 Def Sec Rumsfeld told Dep Def Sec Wolfowitz and Undersec Def Feith to meet with Gen
Newbold and Gen Abizaid from Joint Chiefs about Iraq
Sep 16 VP Cheney on Meet The Press No evidence Iraq was linked to 9/11 Said focus was on Al
Qaeda
Sep 16 Defense Policy Board’s Perle told CNN Iraq linked to Al Qaeda and said Saddam
backed terrorism and states like Iraq had to be dealt with
(Musings On Iraq Iraq, 9/11 And The Bush Administration)
(Musings On Iraq From 9/11 To The Invasion of Iraq: Analysis of Bush Administration Decision Making)
(Musings On Iraq review Wanting War: Why the Bush Administration Invaded Iraq)
(Musings On Iraq review The Next Attack, The Failure of the War on Terror and a Strategy for Getting it Right)
Sep 16 Fmr CIA Dir Woolsey said stories of 9/11 hijacker Atta meeting with Iraqi
intel showed Iraq needed to be investigated
Sep 17 Iraq’s Foreign Minister Sabri said that Muslims and Arabs considered U.S. a
terrorist state
Sep 17 NSC Bush said contingency plans should be drawn up for Iraq including seizing southern oil
field Said he agreed with Def Sec Rumsfeld and Dep Def Sec Wolfowitz that Iraq involved in
9/11 but wasn’t time to confront Saddam
(Musings On Iraq Was Iraq An Imminent Threat To The West?)
(Musings On Iraq review Bush At War)
(Musings On Iraq review Plan of Attack: The Definitive Account Of The Decision To Invade
Iraq)
(Musings On Iraq review The Next Attack, The Failure of the War on Terror and a Strategy for Getting it Right)
(Musings On Iraq review The One Percent Doctrine, Deep Inside America’s Pursuit Of Its Enemies Since 9/11)
(Musings On Iraq review The Endgame, The Inside Story of the Struggle for Iraq, from
George W. Bush to Barack Obama)
(Musings On Iraq review To Start A War: How The Bush Administration Took America Into Iraq)
Sep 17 Bush signed order for war in Afghanistan that also called for Pentagon to look into plans to
seize Iraq’s oil fields Bush told Def Sec Rumsfeld Iraq plans weren’t a priority like Afghanistan
(Musings On Iraq review Leap of Faith, Hubris Negligence, and America’s Greatest Foreign
Policy Tragedy)
(Musings On Iraq review The Endgame, The Inside Story of the Struggle for Iraq, from
George W. Bush to Barack Obama)
(Musings On Iraq Review Hubris, The Inside Story of Spin, Scandal, And The Selling Of The Iraq War)
(Musings On Iraq review The Bush Administrations and Saddam Hussein, Deciding on Conflict)
Sep 17 Bush told Pentagon it needed to be ready to deal with Iraq if it acted against US
interests
Sep 17 Dep Sec of Def Wolfowitz sent memo to Rumsfeld advocating for attacking
Iraq Said better than 10% chance Iraq behind 9/11 Included Iraq conspiracy theorist Mylroie’s claim that Iraq behind 1993 World Trade Center bombing
(Musings On Iraq Laurie Mylroie’s Convoluted Iraq-Terrorism Conspiracy Theory)
(Musings On Iraq Laurie Mylroie’s Iraq Conspiracy Theory Was Debunked By Captured Baath Documents)
(Musings On Iraq review Wanting War: Why the Bush Administration Invaded Iraq)
(Musings On Iraq review Leap of Faith, Hubris Negligence, and America’s Greatest Foreign
Policy Tragedy)
Sep 17 Counterterrorism chief Clarke got memo on antiterrorism strategy back from president’s office
Added Iraq should be added to list of countries Pentagon should war plan for
Sep 17 David Wurmser and Iraq conspiracy theorist Mylroie talked to media about
possible Iraq role in 9/11
Sep 17 Senator Allen told CNN US might think of regime change in Iraq
Sep 18 Richard Clarke’s counterterrorism office sent Natl Sec Adv Rice memo saying no Iraq-9/11
links found Memo given to Bush who was unsatisfied with findings Asked CIA Dir Tenet to look into Iraq-Al Qaeda connections Told Tenet to talk with VP Cheney who heard something about 9/11 hijacker Atta meeting with Iraq intel in Prague
(Musings On Iraq Overview of America’s Policy Towards Iraq: From The Clinton Years To The
Sectarian War of 2006)
(Musings On Iraq Iraq And 9/11, How The Bush Administration Immediately Focused Upon Saddam After The September Attacks)
Sep 18 Deputy Defense Secretary Wolfowitz wrote Rumsfeld that Iraq backed terrorists and
might have been behind 1993 World Trade Center bombing using conspiracy theorist Mylroie’s argument
(Musings On Iraq Laurie Mylroie’s Convoluted Iraq-Terrorism Conspiracy Theory)
(Musings On Iraq Laurie Mylroie’s Iraq Conspiracy Theory Was Debunked By Captured Baath Documents)
(Musings On Iraq Iraq, 9/11 And The Bush Administration)
(Musings On Iraq From 9/11 To The Invasion of Iraq: Analysis of Bush Administration Decision Making)
(Musings On Iraq review Wanting War: Why the Bush Administration Invaded Iraq)
(Musings On Iraq review The Next Attack, The Failure of the War on Terror and a Strategy for Getting it Right)
Sep 18 Reuters reported 9/11 hijacker Atta met with Iraqi intelligence in Europe Story was false
Sep 18 Princeton Prof Bernard Lewis spoke to Pentagon’s Defense Policy Board Said US needed to
support Ahmed Chalabi who was a modernizer Said supporting Iraqi opposition could overthrow Saddam Advocated for US to respond with force to 9/11 otherwise Muslim world would see US as weak Chalabi told meeting US should invade Iraq not Afghanistan
(Musings On Iraq Bernard Lewis And The Invasion of Iraq)
(Musings On Iraq review Losing Iraq, Inside The Post War Reconstruction Fiasco)
(Musings On Iraq review The Man Who Pushed America To War, The Extraordinary Life, Adventures, and Obsessions of Ahmad Chalabi)
(Musings On Iraq review Arrows of the Night: Ahmad Chalabi and the Selling of the Iraq War)
Sep 19 Iraq intelligence paper said Afghan source claimed bin Laden Taliban and Iraq
worked together to target America Story was never confirmed
Sep 19 Bush asked CIA Dir Tenet to look into Iraq Al Qaeda ties and said VP Cheney
had info on links
(Musings On Iraq Iraq And 9/11, How The Bush Administration Immediately Focused Upon Saddam After The September Attacks)
(Musings On Iraq review The Next Attack, The Failure of the War on Terror and a Strategy for Getting it Right)
(Musings On Iraq review Plan of Attack: The Definitive Account Of The Decision To Invade
Iraq)
(Musings On Iraq review The One Percent Doctrine, Deep Inside America’s Pursuit Of Its Enemies Since 9/11)
(Musings On Iraq review To Start A War: How The Bush Administration Took America Into Iraq)
(Musings On Iraq Was Iraq An Imminent Threat To The West?)
(Musings On Iraq Overview of America’s Policy Towards Iraq: From The Clinton Years To The
Sectarian War of 2006)
Sep 19 Deputy Secretary of Defense Wolfowitz sent ex-CIA Dir Woolsey to England to
look into Iraq-9/11 connections
Sec 19 Def Sec Rumsfeld told meeting US needed to attack more than Afghanistan to show world
consequences for attacking US
Sep 19 Def Sec Rumsfeld told Bush routine air strikes on Iraq about to happen as part of No Fly
Zone Bush said had to make sure they were not perceived to be in response to 9/11
Sep 19 Article in Jane’s Defense Weekly’s Foreign Report claimed Israeli military intel Aman
thought Iraq behind 9/11
Sep 20 Bush TV speech Said US would pursue nations that supported terrorism Opened door to Iraq
War
(Musings On Iraq Overview of America’s Policy Towards Iraq: From The Clinton Years To The
Sectarian War of 2006)
Sep 20 Under Secretary of Defense Feith complained about lack of good targets in Afghanistan and
suggested bombing Iraq for 9/11 Said war on terror should be broad and include Iraq
Sep 20 NY Times report DepDefSec Wolfowitz and VP Cheney’s chief of staff Libby were
advocating regime change in Iraq
Sep 20 Project for a New American Century in letter to Bush said Iraq might have
supported 9/11 and Saddam had to be targeted in war on terror
(Musings On Iraq review The Road to Iraq, The Making of a Neoconservative War)
Sep 20 US intel officials told press they were looking into Iraq’s connections to 9/11
Sep 20 Israeli intelligence said they thought Iraq connected to 9/11 Claimed Al Qaeda
funded by Iraqi Intel Service
Sep 20 Bush brought up seizing Iraq’s oil fields with PM Blair Blair said US needed to keep public
opinion behind it with War on Terror Bush said Iraq wasn’t immediate problem Blair said needed to take time to build case vs Iraq
(Musings On Iraq From 9/11 To The Invasion of Iraq: Analysis of Bush Administration Decision Making)
(Musings On Iraq Iraq And 9/11, How The Bush Administration Immediately Focused Upon Saddam After The September Attacks)
(Musings On Iraq review Wanting War: Why the Bush Administration Invaded Iraq)
(Musings On Iraq Review The Report of the Iraq Inquiry, Executive Summary)
(Musings On Iraq review Leap of Faith, Hubris Negligence, and America’s Greatest Foreign
Policy Tragedy)
(Musings On Iraq Chilcot Report Sec 3.1 Development of UK Strategy and Options on Iraq, 9/11 to Early January 2002)
Sep 20 UK Amb to US Meyer said “Rumors were already flying that Bush would use 9/11 as a
pretext to attack Iraq”
Sep 20 US and UK jets bombed missile batteries in southern Iraq as part of No Fly Zones
Sep 20 Def Sec Rumsfeld talked about hitting Iraq as well as going to war in Afghanistan
Sep 21 1st CIA report on Iraq and 9/11 found no connection but two had contacts in 1990s Bush
was briefed on findings Also didn’t think 9/11/ hijacker Atta met with Iraqi intelligence officer in Prague in 2001
(Musings On Iraq Overview of America’s Policy Towards Iraq: From The Clinton Years To The
Sectarian War of 2006)
Sep 21 DIA analyst at Pentagon’s Office of Special Plans said CIA report had good
information but finding of no Iraq-Al Qaeda ties should be ignored
Sep 21 Undersecretary of Defense for Policy Feith sent DIA analysis of CIA report to
Deputy Secretary of Defense Wolfowitz and Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld
Sep 21 CIA Dir Tenet told Bush CIA Czech office questioned 9/11 hijacker Atta meeting
Iraqi intel officer in Prague
Sep 21 Admin officials told Wash Times Saddam talked with bin Laden just before 9/11
(Musings On Iraq Iraq, 9/11 And The Bush Administration)
(Musings On Iraq From 9/11 To The Invasion of Iraq: Analysis of Bush Administration Decision Making)
(Musings On Iraq review Wanting War: Why the Bush Administration Invaded Iraq)
(Musings On Iraq review Leap of Faith, Hubris Negligence, and America’s Greatest Foreign
Policy Tragedy)
Sep 21 INC provided Iraqi defector claimed Iraq was training terrorists to take over airplanes
at Salman Pak Baghdad Had been dismissed by US intel because he claimed he fled Iraq because he was tortured but he had no marks on his body Story proved false
Sep 22 Telegraph story claiming Iraq was funding Al Qaeda Quoted CIA and Israeli
sources
Sep 22 Columnist Charles Krauthammer told Fox attacking Iraq would cost US lots of allies but he
didn’t care
Sep 23 National Security Adviser Rice told CNN Iraq would be stage two of war on terror
(Musings On Iraq Iraq And 9/11, How The Bush Administration Immediately Focused Upon Saddam After The September Attacks)
(Musings On Iraq Iraq, 9/11 And The Bush Administration)
(Musings On Iraq From 9/11 To The Invasion of Iraq: Analysis of Bush Administration Decision Making)
(Musings On Iraq Was Iraq An Imminent Threat To The West?)
(Musings On Iraq review Wanting War: Why the Bush Administration Invaded Iraq)
(Musings On Iraq review Leap of Faith, Hubris Negligence, and America’s Greatest Foreign
Policy Tragedy)
(Musings On Iraq review The Next Attack, The Failure of the War on Terror and a Strategy for Getting it Right)
Sep 23 Guardian article blamed Iraq for 9/11 Claimed Iraq knew about attack beforehand
Stories that Iraq provided money and training to Al Qaeda Claimed 4 months before 9/11 Iraqi intelligence met with Al Qaeda in Pakistan Was sending money to Al Qaeda via Lebanese banks Israeli intelligence officer said 9/11 probably funded by Iraqi intelligence INC defector ex-nuke scientist Hamza said Iraq probably behind 9/11 Talked with Iraqi exiles who said pilots trained in suicide attacks in Iraq in 1999
Sep 23 Telegraph quoted INC defector ex-nuke scientist Hamza that Iraq probably behind
9/11 Claimed trained pilots for suicide attacks
Sep 23 Samir Vincent Iraqi born American met with Foreign Min Aziz in Baghdad Vincent said Iraq
should talk with US Aziz encouraged Vincent to talk with fmr Reagan official Frank Carlucci
Sep 24 William Safire OpEd said clear link between Iraq-Al Qaeda via Ansar al-Islam
(Musings On Iraq Why Didn’t Bush Strike Zarqawi And Ansar al-Islam In 2002?)
Sep 26 Bush told Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld to plan for Iraq invasion but do it informally
(Musings On Iraq From 9/11 To The Invasion of Iraq: Analysis of Bush Administration Decision Making)
(Musings On Iraq Was Iraq An Imminent Threat To The West?)
(Musings On Iraq review Wanting War: Why the Bush Administration Invaded Iraq)
(Musings On Iraq review Leap of Faith, Hubris Negligence, and America’s Greatest Foreign
Policy Tragedy)
(Musings On Iraq Review Hubris, The Inside Story of Spin, Scandal, And The Selling Of The Iraq War)
(Musings On Iraq review The Bush Administrations and Saddam Hussein, Deciding on Conflict)
(Musings On Iraq review The Next Attack, The Failure of the War on Terror and a Strategy for Getting it Right)
(Musings On Iraq review The Endgame, The Inside Story of the Struggle for Iraq, from
George W. Bush to Barack Obama)
Sep 27 Undersecretary of State Burns got note from Foreign Min Aziz Said Iraq hoped No Fly Zones
would end That might open opportunity for 2 countries to talk
Sep 27 Ahmed Chalabi said Iraq and Al Qaeda linked since 1990s and wanted to use
bin Laden against US
(Musings On Iraq review The Man Who Pushed America To War, The Extraordinary Life, Adventures, and Obsessions of Ahmad Chalabi)
(Musings On Iraq review Arrows of the Night: Ahmad Chalabi and the Selling of the Iraq War)
Sep 27 Badr met Talabani and other PUK officials in Sulaymaniya Talked about enrolling Badr
members in Univ of Sulaymaniya and investment opportunities Talabani agreed to allow Badr to invest in PUK areas
(Musings On Iraq Early Report On Iran’s Activities In Iraq)
(Musings On Iraq Badr Organization A View Into Iraq’s Violent Past And Present)
Sep 28 After NSC meeting on start of Afghan war Bush said he believed Saddam was
involved in 9/11 but Iraq would be dealt with later
Sep 28 Chalabi briefed DIA on INC defector Col Abu Zainab Qairy who said he saw Arab terrorists
training to hijack airplanes at camp in Salman Pak in Baghdad Meeting was set up by fmr CIA-Dir Woolsey False story
(Musings On Iraq review The Man Who Pushed America To War, The Extraordinary Life, Adventures, and Obsessions of Ahmad Chalabi)
(Musings On Iraq review Arrows of the Night: Ahmad Chalabi and the Selling of the Iraq War)
Sep 29 Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld ordered review of all existing Iraq war plans
(Musings On Iraq From 9/11 To The Invasion of Iraq: Analysis of Bush Administration Decision Making)
(Musings On Iraq Was Iraq An Imminent Threat To The West?)
(Musings On Iraq review Leap of Faith, Hubris Negligence, and America’s Greatest Foreign
Policy Tragedy)
(Musings On Iraq review The Endgame, The Inside Story of the Struggle for Iraq, from
George W. Bush to Barack Obama)
(Musings On Iraq review Hard Lessons, The Iraq Reconstruction Experience)
Sep 30 Report Al Qaeda defector said bin Laden did not like Saddam because of his attacks
upon Muslim civilians
Sep 30 Iraqi defector told Sunday Telegraph Saddam started crash program to produce
WMD in six months
Sep 30 CIA interviewed Iraqi defector Abu Zainab Qairy who claimed Iraq trained terrorists at
Salman Pak in Baghdad CIA did not believe his story Abu Zainab Qairy then went to INC who got his story into the press
Oct 1 Weekly Standard article argued Iraq connected to 9/11 and Saddam had to be removed
Oct 1 William Safire OpEd in New York Times claimed Al Qaeda operative was armed by Iraq
Oct 1 Badr met with Barzani and KDP officials in Irbil Badr asked Barzani about US intentions in
Iraq
(Musings On Iraq Early Report On Iran’s Activities In Iraq)
(Musings On Iraq Badr Organization A View Into Iraq’s Violent Past And Present)
Oct 2 Badr met with Barzani again Asked about US intentions in Iraq Barzani said that US was
thinking of invading Iraq after Afghanistan Barzani was worried about Turkish involvement in any invasion Barzani said that US would only support pro-US parties and they would take control after Saddam Badr asked to open office in Irbil
(Musings On Iraq Early Report On Iran’s Activities In Iraq)
(Musings On Iraq Badr Organization A View Into Iraq’s Violent Past And Present)
Oct 7 Saddam condemned US invasion of Afghanistan saying it would only lead to more
instability in world
Oct 7 Bin Laden video said he was fighting for Iraqis who had suffered under sanctions
White House would use this as evidence of Iraq-Al Qaeda connection
Oct 7 Weekly Standard’s William Kristol told Meet The Press biggest mistake of US was not
deposing Saddam during Gulf War
Oct 9 Iraq’s UN Amb Duri said Iraq had sent individual message of condolences after 9/11
but not to US govt because of its bombings and sanctions on Iraq
Oct 10 FBI issued warning may be more possible anthrax attacks Pundits began blaming Iraq for
attacks
Oct 11 Blair told Bush talk of war with Iraq was undermining war in Afghanistan and
Iraq could come later Said if US pivoted to Iraq would lose Arab world and prove bin Laden’s claim that War on terror was against Arabs
(Musings On Iraq Chilcot Report Sec 3.1 Development of UK Strategy and Options on Iraq, 9/11 to Early January 2002)
Oct 12 Jim Hoagland OpEd in Washington Post quoted INC defector Sabah Khodada that
Iraq was training terrorists to hijack planes at Salman Pak Said there was a 2nd INC defector who said he saw Islamists training at camp to hijack airplanes implying 9/11 connection
Oct 14 Frontline TV show interviewed INC provided Iraqi defector Khodada who claimed Iraq
trained terrorists to hijack planes at Salman Pak implying 9/11 connection
Oct 14 Guardian article quoted fmr CIA Dir Woolsey Iraq only country with capabilities to pull
off anthrax letters in US
Oct 15 CIA report from Rome said that Italian intel said Iraq tried to buy uranium from Niger but
didn’t see much merit in it CIA DIA Energy Dept thought Iraq-Niger uranium deal was possible State Dept thought story suspect
(Musings On Iraq How US Intelligence Failed The Iraq-Niger Uranium Story)
(Musings On Iraq Review Hubris, The Inside Story of Spin, Scandal, And The Selling Of The Iraq War)
(Musings On Iraq review The WMD Mirage, Iraq’s Decade of Deception and America’s False Premise for War)
Oct 15 White House spokesman said no connection between Iraq and anthrax letters sent to Wash
DC
Oct 16 CIA Director Tenet met with UK officials and agreed no Iraq-9/11 connection
(Musings On Iraq Review The Report of the Iraq Inquiry, Executive Summary)
Oct 17 NY Times article reported Iraqi defector saw Iraq training terrorists at Salman Pak to take
airliners Was INC provided Khodada Reported INC said that Iraq diplomat met bin Laden in 1998 and offered him safe haven Reported Czech Inter Min said 9/11 hijacker Atta met with Iraqi intel officer in Prague
(Musings On Iraq Overview of America’s Policy Towards Iraq: From The Clinton Years To The
Sectarian War of 2006)
Oct 17 Bush called PM Blair Told him Iraq probably behind anthrax letters in US
Oct 18 2nd CIA report on story that Iraq tried to buy uranium from Niger Said Iraq
didn’t have facilities to process uranium
(Musings On Iraq How US Intelligence Failed The Iraq-Niger Uranium Story)
(Musings On Iraq Review Hubris, The Inside Story of Spin, Scandal, And The Selling Of The Iraq War)
(Musings On Iraq review The WMD Mirage, Iraq’s Decade of Deception and America’s False Premise for War)
Oct 18 Wall St Journal OpEd by ex-CIA Dir Woolsey said Iraq behind 9/11
Oct 21 Bush asked Def Sec Rumsfeld how Iraq war plans going
Oct 23 Sec State Powell met with Jack Kemp who said planes in no fly zone should fire on Iraqi
targets This could be sign to Iraq Powell said if talks with Iraq opened could counter hawks in White House that wanted to attack Iraq after 9/11
Oct 26 After anthrax letters sent to Wash DC ABC reported anthrax trademark of Iraq’s WMD
program
Oct 26 Czech Interior Ministry told press 9/11 hijacker Atta met Iraqi intel officer in Prague
(Musings On Iraq Overview of America’s Policy Towards Iraq: From The Clinton Years To The
Sectarian War of 2006)
Oct 28 Columnist George Will told ABC that Saddam vowed revenge against US Had anthrax Loved
WMD Had terrorist training camps including practicing taking over airplanes Last claim came from INC defectors and false Said 9/11 hijacker Atta met with Iraqi diplomat Never happened
(Musings On Iraq Overview of America’s Policy Towards Iraq: From The Clinton Years To The
Sectarian War of 2006)
Oct 31 ABC withdrew story that Iraq might be behind anthrax letters sent to Wash DC
Nov 4 Badr met with Shiite tribes loyal to ISCI Talked about taking over government in southern
Iraq after a US invasion
(Musings On Iraq Badr Organization A View Into Iraq’s Violent Past And Present)
Nov 5 Badr leadership of Abu Muhandis Amiri Safi Basra and commanders working in Iraq met
Talked about transition after US invasion Talked about replacing Iraqi leadership while maintaining Baathist state Talked about US backing a coup in Iraq Said US might invade Iraq after Afghanistan
(Musings On Iraq Badr Organization A View Into Iraq’s Violent Past And Present)
Nov 5 Time magazine OpEd said US should go to war with Iraq because connected to 9/11
Nov 5 State Dept intel agency said looked like Iraq renewed production of chemical weapons
(Musings On Iraq review The WMD Mirage, Iraq’s Decade of Deception and America’s False Premise for War)
Nov 5 Iraqi intel chief Habbush gave letter to American Vincent Signed by 4 members of
Revolutionary Command Council Demanded US end sanctions End No Fly Zones Afterward Iraq would talk with US Habbush told Vincent Iraq very serious about talking with US
Nov 8 Pentagon memo on options for Iraq 1 was to back Iraqi opposition 2 was to help Kurdistan and
create no go zone for Iraqi military in south 3 was to encourage Iraqis to defect to Kurdistan 4 was giving more aid to INC through Iraq Liberation Act
Nov 8 NY Times article based upon 2 Iraqi defectors provided by INC One was Abu Zainab Qairy
Both said they worked at a terrorist training camp in Salman Pak Baghdad Said they saw Islamists and WMD produced to attack US Story released to coincide with INC defectors appearing on PBS Frontline Stories were false
Nov 8 Frontline aired “Gunning for Saddam” Was full of conspiracies about Iraq being behind 9/11
and arguing that it should be attacked Talked with Defense Policy Board’s Perle who said Saddam most dangerous man in world because he could use WMD against US Included ex-CIA Director Woolsey who thought Iraq probably behind Al Qaeda and 1995 World Trade Center bombing Author Mylroie said Iraq behind Al Qaeda Interviewed INC connected ex-nuclear scientist Khidhir Hamza who said Iraq behind 9/11 and INC defector Khododa who claimed to have seen jihadists training with Iraqis in Salman Pak including taking airliners Said this was connected to 9/11 Khodada had been dismissed by US intel because he claimed he fled Iraq after he was tortured but he had no marks on his body
(Musings On Iraq Laurie Mylroie’s Convoluted Iraq-Terrorism Conspiracy Theory)
(Musings On Iraq Laurie Mylroie’s Iraq Conspiracy Theory Was Debunked By Captured Baath Documents)
Nov 8 Natl Sec Adv Rice said US would not allow Iraq to threaten its own people its neighbors or US
interests by acquiring WMD
Nov 11 London Observer quoted INC defectors Khodada and Abu Zainab Qairy that Iraq trained
terrorists at Salman Pak to hijack planes like 9/11 Khodada and Qairy had both been dismissed by US intel
Nov 12 INC presented Iraqi defector Lami who claimed Iraq training terrorists at Salman
Pak and had anthrax
Nov 12 Safire column NY Times said 9/11 hijacker Atta met with Iraqi diplomat in 2001 was
undisputed fact Story false
(Musings On Iraq Overview of America’s Policy Towards Iraq: From The Clinton Years To The
Sectarian War of 2006)
Nov 14 Cheney said he knew 9/11 hijacker Atta met with Iraq intelligence in Prague in
2001
(Musings On Iraq Overview of America’s Policy Towards Iraq: From The Clinton Years To The
Sectarian War of 2006)
Nov 14 Defense Policy Board’s Perle quoted INC defector ex-nuke scientist Hamza that
Iraq could get nuclear bomb and attack US Called for preventive action vs Iraq
Nov 15 Secretary of State Powell told Blair that after Afghanistan Right in US would
push for bombing Iraq
Nov 17 Deputy Defense Secretary Wolfowitz wrote Defense Secretary Rumsfeld that if
any evidence found of Iraq involvement in 9/11 US should act
(Musings On Iraq Was Iraq An Imminent Threat To The West?)
(Musings On Iraq review Wanting War: Why the Bush Administration Invaded Iraq)
(Musings On Iraq review Leap of Faith, Hubris Negligence, and America’s Greatest Foreign
Policy Tragedy)
(Musings On Iraq review The Next Attack, The Failure of the War on Terror and a Strategy for Getting it Right)
Nov 18 Def Policy Board’s Richard Perle was one of the first to say Iraq was a threat because of
WMD and ties to Al Qaeda during interview on ABC
Nov 19 Def Policy Board head Richard Perle told CNN Saddam would be the next phase of the war
on terror Said Americans would be greeted as liberators in Iraq
Nov 20 US Embassy in Niger reported that Niger official said no way it could produce enough
uranium reports claimed Iraq bought from it
(Musings On Iraq How US Intelligence Failed The Iraq-Niger Uranium Story)
(Musings On Iraq Review Hubris, The Inside Story of Spin, Scandal, And The Selling Of The Iraq War)
(Musings On Iraq review The WMD Mirage, Iraq’s Decade of Deception and America’s False Premise for War)
Nov 20 Wall St Journal OpEd by Eliot Cohen said Iraq helped Al Qaeda and had WMD so should
be attacked
Nov 21 Bush told Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld to update war plans for Iraq Wanted it
done secretly Was first official step in eventual invasion of Iraq
(Musings On Iraq Was Iraq An Imminent Threat To The West?)
(Musings On Iraq review of Shaping the Plan for Operation Iraqi Freedom, The Role of Military Intelligence Assessment)
(Musings On Iraq review Wanting War: Why the Bush Administration Invaded Iraq)
(Musings On Iraq Review Hubris, The Inside Story of Spin, Scandal, And The Selling Of The Iraq War)
(Musings On Iraq review The Bush Administrations and Saddam Hussein, Deciding on Conflict)
(Musings On Iraq review Plan of Attack: The Definitive Account Of The Decision To
Invade Iraq)
(Musings On Iraq review The Endgame, The Inside Story of the Struggle for Iraq, from
George W. Bush to Barack Obama)
Nov 21 Joint Chiefs dep ops chief Gen Newbold told Gen Renaurt Gen Frank’s chief ops officer that
CENTCOM would be ordered to draw up plans for Iraq soon
Nov 22 Saudi intel chief Prince Turksi said that bin Laden considered Saddam an apostate
Nov 24 Weekly Standard’s William Kristol told Fox that debate within Bush White House was no
longer if the US would go after Saddam but how On Another Fox show Kristol said that if US didn’t remove Saddam would mean not removing most dangerous terrorist state in world
Nov 26 Bush called Saddam a terrorist who would be held accountable and said Iraq
needed to allow UN weapons inspectors back in
(Musings On Iraq UN Inspectors Were Right Iraq Was Not A Threat)
(Musings On Iraq Iraq’s Rejection of UN Inspectors Led To Mistrust Over WMD and 2003 Invasion)
(Musings On Iraq review Leap of Faith, Hubris Negligence, and America’s Greatest Foreign
Policy Tragedy)
Nov 26 White House spokesman Fleischer said US afraid Al Qaeda might try to get
nuclear weapons from Iraq
Nov 27 Defense Secretary Rumsfeld told CENTCOM commander Gen Frank Bush wanted revised
Iraq war plan Rumsfeld wanted quick start to war before all forces were in theater
(Musings On Iraq review of Shaping the Plan for Operation Iraqi Freedom, The Role of Military Intelligence Assessment)
(Musings On Iraq review Leap of Faith, Hubris Negligence, and America’s Greatest Foreign
Policy Tragedy)
(Musings On Iraq review Plan of Attack: The Definitive Account Of The Decision To
Invade Iraq)
(Musings On Iraq US Army History Of Iraq Vol 1 – Chapter 2 Regime Change)
Nov 27 Saddam rejected Bush’s call for UN weapons inspectors to return to Iraq
(Musings On Iraq UN Inspectors Were Right Iraq Was Not A Threat)
(Musings On Iraq Iraq’s Rejection of UN Inspectors Led To Mistrust Over WMD and 2003 Invasion)
Nov 27 Wash Post survey found 78% of Americans supported military action against Iraq
Nov 28 UK intel report Iraq not connected to 9/11 not working with Al Qaeda not
giving WMD to terrorists Said Iraq WMD threat “slight”
(Musings On Iraq Review The Report of the Iraq Inquiry, Executive Summary)
Nov 28 Pentagon officials told Time after Afghanistan US would target Iraq as next step
in war on terror
(Musings On Iraq review Leap of Faith, Hubris Negligence, and America’s Greatest Foreign Policy Tragedy)
Nov 28 Fmr CIA Dir James Woosely told Nightline that Saddam was a danger to world peace
Nov 29 UN Resolution 1382 extended Oil for Food program
Nov 29 American Enterprise Institute panel said Saddam had to be removed before US could
confront radical Islam
(Musings On Iraq review Wanting War: Why the Bush Administration Invaded Iraq)
(Musings On Iraq review The Road to Iraq, The Making of a Neoconservative War)
(Musings On Iraq review America at the Crossroads, Democracy, Power, and the Neoconservative)
Nov 30 Defense Secretary Rumsfeld told press US knew Iraq had WMD because defectors said so
Dec 1 Defense Secretary Rumsfeld issued order to Joint Chiefs to begin revising war
planning for Iraq CENTCOM commander Gen Franks was only given 3 days to revise the plan and present it to Rumsfeld
(Musings On Iraq review of Shaping the Plan for Operation Iraqi Freedom, The Role of Military Intelligence Assessment)
(Musings On Iraq review Leap of Faith, Hubris Negligence, and America’s Greatest Foreign
Policy Tragedy)
(Musings On Iraq review Plan of Attack: The Definitive Account Of The Decision To
Invade Iraq)
Dec 1 NY Times article quoted Deputy Secretary of State Armitage saying that US was
going to force Iraq to allow UN inspectors back in Other administration officials said that White House was looking into how to support Iraqi opposition groups
Dec 2 Secretary of State Powell said no reason to believe Iraq didn’t have WMD
Dec 2 USA Today article said Iraq supported bin Laden when he was in Sudan in 1990s
Dec 2 Ex-CIA Dir Woolsey said he believed Iraq involved in 9/11
Dec 3 Blair told Bush he was not opposed to removing Saddam
(Musings On Iraq Chilcot Report Sec 3.1 Development of UK Strategy and Options on Iraq, 9/11 to Early January 2002)
(Musings On Iraq review A War Of Choice, The British In Iraq 2003-9)
Dec 3 MI6 note to PM Blair’s foreign policy adv Manning Said no intel linking Iraq to jihadists Said
removing Saddam important to secure oil supplies Would lead to a secular state that would help against extremists Said Saddam could be removed in a coup
Dec 4 CENTCOM Cmdr Gen Franks briefed Rumsfeld and Joint Chiefs Chairman Gen Meyers on
revised Iraq invasion plan Franks revised 1990s Op Plan 1003 Cut troops from 500,000 to 400,000 to be deployed in 6 instead of 7 months Franks said couldn't scrap Op Plan 1003 because never knew what would be needed Said would take a long time to revise Iraq war plan Rumsfeld said Afghanistan showed US didn’t need such a large and long invasion plan for Iraq Rumsfeld wanted a battle plan that could be executed in a very short time not months Franks agreed with Rumsfeld but said Op Plan 1003 only thing they had at moment Rumsfeld told Gen Franks goal of any military action against Iraq would be removing Saddam Franks given one week to revise plan Angry that Rumsfeld went from plan not important to it being urgent
(Musings On Iraq review of Shaping the Plan for Operation Iraqi Freedom, The Role of Military Intelligence Assessment)
(Musings On Iraq review Leap of Faith, Hubris Negligence, and America’s Greatest Foreign
Policy Tragedy)
(Musings On Iraq review Plan of Attack: The Definitive Account Of The Decision To Invade
Iraq)
(Musings On Iraq review Liberate And Leave, Fatal Flaws In The Early Strategy For Postwar Iraq)
(Musings On Iraq US Army History Of Iraq Vol 1 – Chapter 2 Regime Change)
Dec 4 PM Blair told Bush Iraq was a threat because it had WMD could export it and violated UN
resolutions
(Musings On Iraq review A War Of Choice, The British In Iraq 2003-9)
Dec 4 PM Blair paper to Bush said that they had to consider regime change in Iraq Blair said had to
build steady case vs Iraq and gain international support
(Musings On Iraq Review The Report of the Iraq Inquiry, Executive Summary)
(Musings On Iraq Chilcot Report Sec 3.1 Development of UK Strategy and Options on Iraq, 9/11 to Early January 2002)
Dec 6 Letter to Wash Post by Senators McCain Liebermann and others said that Iraq had to be
included in war on terror
Dec 9 VP Cheney told NBC Iraq was hosting terrorists and developing WMD Claimed story 9/11
hijacker Atta met with Iraq intel officer in Prague was pretty much confirmed
(Musings On Iraq review Wanting War: Why the Bush Administration Invaded Iraq)
(Musings On Iraq review Leap of Faith, Hubris Negligence, and America’s Greatest Foreign Policy
Tragedy)
(Musings On Iraq review The One Percent Doctrine, Deep Inside America’s Pursuit Of Its Enemies Since 9/11)
(Musings On Iraq Overview of America’s Policy Towards Iraq: From The Clinton Years To The
Sectarian War of 2006)
Dec 10 Ansar al-Islam formed from 3 Kurdish Islamist groups
(Musings On Iraq Why Didn’t Bush Strike Zarqawi And Ansar al-Islam In 2002?)
Dec 10 Badr leadership Amiri Laquaa Basri met Talked about possible US invasion of Iraq and
how to prepare for it Iran told Badr to come up with action plan for post-Saddam Iraq Ordered to do recon within Iraq Carry out ops vs Iraqi military in south Iraq Prepare 2 battalions to send into Amarah and Nasiriya after a US invasion Battalions would be under Iranian intelligence control
(Musings On Iraq Badr Organization A View Into Iraq’s Violent Past And Present)
Dec 11 Cheney said that Saddam needed to be careful and see what happened to the Taliban in
Afghanistan
(Musings On Iraq review Wanting War: Why the Bush Administration Invaded Iraq)
Dec 12 CENTCOM commander Gen Franks briefed Rumsfeld on invasion preparations
and estimated costs with start time in spring 2002
(Musings On Iraq review Leap of Faith, Hubris Negligence, and America’s Greatest Foreign Policy Tragedy)
Dec 14 Sheikh on Iraqi state TV read poem to Saddam praising 9/11 attack
Dec 14 DIA report Iraq had 100 tons of WMD agents and munitions Could produce WMD Didn’t
know if happening but could be on small scale
(Musings On Iraq Iraq One Of The Worst Intelligence Failures In US History)
(Musings On Iraq review The WMD Mirage, Iraq’s Decade of Deception and America’s False Premise for War)
Dec 17 Iraqi defector Haideri provided by INC told CIA Iraq had secret WMD labs Labeled
fabricator by DIA May 2002 but his story continued to be used Haideri never saw WMD Later said he made up story because INC told him to
Dec 17 Secretary of State Powell said sanctions on Iraq should continue because it still had WMD
(Musings On Iraq Iraq One Of The Worst Intelligence Failures In US History)
(Musings On Iraq review Invisible War, The United States And The Iraq Sanctions)
Dec 17 Czech Intel said story of 9/11 hijacker Atta meeting with Iraqi intel in Prague didn't
happen
Dec 17 Cheney told NBC story that 9/11 hijacker Atta met with Iraqi intel was unconfirmed
(Musings On Iraq Overview of America’s Policy Towards Iraq: From The Clinton Years To The
Sectarian War of 2006)
Dec 17 White House said anthrax attacks in U.S. came from domestic sources not Iraq
Dec 19 CENTCOM commander Gen Franks made 3rd presentation to Rumsfeld of revised Iraq war
plan War would start with just 145,000 troops and final force would be 275,000 Rumsfeld wanted smaller force and faster deployment
(Musings On Iraq review Leap of Faith, Hubris Negligence, and America’s Greatest Foreign Policy
Tragedy)
(Musings On Iraq US Army History Of Iraq Vol 1 – Chapter 2 Regime Change)
Dec 20 NYTimes article with INC defector Haideri Claimed he went to 20 WMD sites Haideri’s
claims used in CIA DIA and White House reports Labeled fabricator by DIA May 2002 but his story continued to be used Haideri never saw WMD Later said he made up story because INC told him to
Dec 21 UK Defense Minister Hoon asked ministry for plans for military action against Iraq
Dec 21 Vanity Fair article claimed Iraq involved in 9/11 based upon INC defector Abu Zainab Qairy
story that Iraq trained terrorists at Salman Pak Baghdad Abu Zainab had been dismissed by CIA
Dec 21 Vanity Fair author appeared on CNN and NBC repeating his story that INC defector Abu
Zainab Qairy claimed Iraq involved in 9/11 Story false
Dec 27 CENTCOM commander Gen Franks briefed Rumsfeld on war planning
(Musings On Iraq review Leap of Faith, Hubris Negligence, and America’s Greatest Foreign Policy
Tragedy)
Dec 28 CENTCOM commander Gen Franks presented latest version of Iraq war plan to
Bush in Crawford, Texas Franks had 7 lines of operation that could be used independently or in conjunction Were bombings and missile attacks Special Forces penetrating into Iraq Ground operations by army and marines Information deception and psychological operations CIA support for Iraqi opposition diplomacy and humanitarian aid to Iraqi population Included 9 “slices” of Iraq that could be targeted Were Leadership internal security and intelligence agencies WMD missiles Republican Guard territory of Iraq Iraqi army infrastructure and civilian population Plan would need support of Kuwait Saudi Arabia Jordan Turkey Bahrain Qatar UAE Oman and England Could start with just 105,000 troops and then 230,000 more coming in next 60-90 days Franks wanted to start building up forces and supplies in region immediately get CIA to start building up support within Iraq and diplomacy to build up support amongst Gulf States Franks said US would be ready for Iraq invasion by April to June 2002 Bush said he wanted Saddam gone sooner rather than later Def Sec Rumsfeld said that number of troops was still under discussion Sec State Powell said might need more troops
(Musings On Iraq review of Shaping the Plan for Operation Iraqi Freedom, The Role of Military Intelligence Assessment)
(Musings On Iraq review Leap of Faith, Hubris Negligence, and America’s Greatest Foreign
Policy Tragedy)
(Musings On Iraq US Army History Of Iraq Vol 1 – Chapter 2 Regime Change)
Dec 28 After Gen Franks briefing Bush asked CIA Dir Tenet about intel on Iraq Said was very thin
CIA only had 2 sources inside Iraq and contact with them erratic
Dec 28 CIA Director Tenet said US had worked with Iraqi opposition before and
abandoned them Said they would not cooperate with US without seeing real and large scale commitment from Washington
Dec 28 Bush told Secretary of State Powell and Defense Secretary Rumsfeld that they
needed to start building up support amongst countries around Iraq for US action
(Musings On Iraq Review Hubris, The Inside Story of Spin, Scandal, And The Selling Of The Iraq War)
(Musings On Iraq review The Bush Administrations and Saddam Hussein, Deciding on Conflict)
Dec 28 Bush asked Gen Franks if war plan good enough to win Franks said yes with
work
Dec 28 Rumsfeld told Bush Iraq war would be over fast and quick US would quickly turn over
power to Iraqis and withdraw
(Musings On Iraq Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction’s “Hard Lessons” – Part I: Planning for Postwar Iraq September 2001 to May 2003)
(Musings On Iraq review Liberate And Leave, Fatal Flaws In The Early Strategy For Postwar Iraq)
Dec 28 Pentagon’s Def Policy Board’s Richard Perle OpEd in NY Times said US had to attack Iraq
Said Muslims were opposed to Saddam and would welcome his overthrow
(Musings On Iraq review Wanting War: Why the Bush Administration Invaded Iraq)
Dec 30 Columnist William Safire told Meet The Press that Saddam would be gone by end of 2002
Dec 31 Ret Adm McGregor gave paper to Newt Gingrich of Def Policy Board Called for 3
battlegroups of 16,500 troops total to make charge from south Iraq to Baghdad After Baghdad taken 15,000 more troops would be flown in McGregor said Afghanistan proved few could do more
2002
Jan 3 CIA Director Tenet and staff briefed VP Cheney and his chief of staff Scooter
Libby on what they could do in Iraq Said covert action would not be able to overthrow Saddam only an invasion would Said containing and training to overthrow Saddam at same time wouldn’t work and needed a unified Iraq policy
(Musings On Iraq review Leap of Faith, Hubris Negligence, and America’s Greatest Foreign Policy
Tragedy)
Jan 3 CIA Dir Tenet and staff briefed Bush said covert action couldn’t overthrow Saddam because no
one would work with US unless they were sure US going to overthrow regime
Jan 3 CIA Director Tenet gave same briefing to Bush President said dual Iraq policy
would stand
Jan 3 CIA paper said Iraq could hit neighbors with WMD missiles
Jan 9 Gen Franks briefed Rumsfeld on latest war plan
(Musings On Iraq review of Shaping the Plan for Operation Iraqi Freedom, The Role of Military Intelligence Assessment)
Jan 9 Secretary of State Powell called Franks and voiced his concern that Rumsfeld was
trying to push a small an invasion force as possible and not give into that pressure
(Musings On Iraq review Leap of Faith, Hubris Negligence, and America’s Greatest Foreign
Policy Tragedy)
Jan 12 Ret Gen McGregor presented plan for 16500 troops to invade Iraq and take Baghdad to
CENTCOM cmdr Gen Franks
Jan 14 UK Defense Ministry analysis said weaknesses of INC outweighed its strengths
Jan 17 Gen Franks briefed his commanders at CENTCOM on initial Iraq war plans for 1st
time
(Musings On Iraq review Leap of Faith, Hubris Negligence, and America’s Greatest Foreign
Policy Tragedy)
(Musings On Iraq review of Shaping the Plan for Operation Iraqi Freedom, The Role of Military Intelligence Assessment)
Jan 19 Def Sec Rumsfeld sent Col Mcgregor to brief Gen Franks on his plan to invade Iraq with just
35,000 troops by striking directly at Baghdad Briefing greatly angered members of CENTCOM staff who thought it unrealistic
(Musings On Iraq US Army History Of Iraq Vol 1 – Chapter 2 Regime Change)
Jan 21 Weekly Standard OpEd by Robert Kagan and William Kristol called for Iraq to be
attacked as next step in war on terror
(Musings On Iraq review Wanting War: Why the Bush Administration Invaded Iraq)
(Musings On Iraq review The Road to Iraq, The Making of a Neoconservative War)
(Musings On Iraq review America at the Crossroads, Democracy, Power, and the Neoconservative Legacy)
Jan 22 Dep Def Sec Wolfowitz memo to Undersec Def Feith that Pentagon was not finding intel
on Iraq-Al Qaeda links and said Rumsfeld should get some analysis on issue
(Musings On Iraq review Leap of Faith, Hubris Negligence, and America’s Greatest Foreign
Policy Tragedy)
Jan 27 Gen Franks briefed Rumsfeld on latest war plan Franks said review found Iraqi
military seriously degraded by sanctions Claimed that more US got involved against Iraq the less the Iraqi people would support regime Cut war plan down from 7 months to just 150 days with 245,000 troops Franks wanted to lesson timeline even more Wanted to start information campaign against Saddam immediately to pressure him
(Musings On Iraq review Leap of Faith, Hubris Negligence, and America’s Greatest Foreign
Policy Tragedy)
(Musings On Iraq review of Shaping the Plan for Operation Iraqi Freedom, The Role of Military Intelligence Assessment)
(Musings On Iraq US Army History Of Iraq Vol 1 – Chapter 2 Regime Change)
Jan 29 Bush State of Union called Iraq part of Axis of Evil Said it still had WMD
programs Iran and North Korea were added to speech because White House didn’t want to be seen as focusing upon Saddam
(Musings On Iraq review Iraq’s Future The aftermath of regime change)
(Musings On Iraq review Wanting War: Why the Bush Administration Invaded Iraq)
(Musings On Iraq review Leap of Faith, Hubris Negligence, and America’s Greatest Foreign
Policy Tragedy)
(Musings On Iraq Review Hubris, The Inside Story of Spin, Scandal, And The Selling Of The Iraq War)
(Musings On Iraq review The Bush Administrations and Saddam Hussein, Deciding on Conflict)
(Musings On Iraq review What Happened, Inside the Bush White House and Washington’s Culture of Deception)
(Musings On Iraq review The WMD Mirage, Iraq’s Decade of Deception and America’s False Premise for War)
(Musings On Iraq Overview of America’s Policy Towards Iraq: From The Clinton Years To The
Sectarian War of 2006)
Jan 30 Natl Sec Adv Rice said Axis of Evil countries had to be dealt with diplomatically but at
same time said they couldn’t be negotiated with
(Musings On Iraq review Iraq’s Future The aftermath of regime change)
Jan 30 CIA unclassified report to Congress said Iraq trying to rebuild its nuclear program
(Musings On Iraq How US Intelligence Created An Iraqi Nuclear Threat In 2002)
(Musings On Iraq review The WMD Mirage, Iraq’s Decade of Deception and America’s False Premise for War)
Feb 1 Gen Franks briefed Def Sec Rumsfeld on war plans with start time April 2002 with 300,000
troops with 60 day deployment Rumsfeld wanted 30 day deployment and less troops
(Musings On Iraq review Leap of Faith, Hubris Negligence, and America’s Greatest Foreign Policy
Tragedy)
(Musings On Iraq review of Shaping the Plan for Operation Iraqi Freedom, The Role of Military Intelligence Assessment)
Feb 1 Turkey wrote Saddam Asked him to allow UN weapons inspectors back into Iraq to stop US
invasion Saddam rejected idea
Feb 2 Weekly Standard’s William Kristol told Senate invading Iraq would transform
Middle East
(Musings On Iraq review The Road to Iraq, The Making of a Neoconservative War)
(Musings On Iraq review America at the Crossroads, Democracy, Power, and the Neoconservative Legacy)
(Musings On Iraq review Wanting War: Why the Bush Administration Invaded Iraq)
(Musings On Iraq review Losing Iraq, Inside The Post War Reconstruction Fiasco)
(Musings On Iraq review The Assassins’ Gate, America In Iraq)
Feb 4 Work on State Dept’s Future of Iraq Project began 17 working groups on Iraq’s postwar needs
Worked mostly with Iraqi exiles
(Musings On Iraq review Hard Lessons, The Iraq Reconstruction Experience)
(Musings On Iraq review Blood Money, Wasted Billions, Lost Lives, and Corporate Greed in Iraq)
Feb 5 CIA report on Iraq-Niger uranium deal Said it received text of deal from foreign
intel service CIA and DIA thought text important State Dept skeptical
(Musings On Iraq How US Intelligence Failed The Iraq-Niger Uranium Story)
(Musings On Iraq Review Hubris, The Inside Story of Spin, Scandal, And The Selling Of The Iraq War)
(Musings On Iraq review The WMD Mirage, Iraq’s Decade of Deception and America’s False Premise for War)
Feb 5 CIA report said Iraq had 7 mobile WMD labs
(Musings On Iraq How Iraqi Defector CURVEBALL Became Basis For US Claims That Iraq Had WMD)
(Musings On Iraq review Curveball, Spies, Lies, And The Con Man Who Caused A War)
Feb 6 Sec State Powell told Congress White House considering all options on Iraq but that regime
change had been US policy and would be good for region
(Musings On Iraq review Iraq’s Future The aftermath of regime change)
(Musings On Iraq review Leap of Faith, Hubris Negligence, and America’s Greatest Foreign Policy Tragedy)
Feb 6 CIA officials told NY Times Iraq not taken part in any anti-U.S. terrorism since
1993 attempt on ex-Pres Bush
Feb 6 US intel officials told NY Times 9/11 hijacker Atta met with Iraqi intel in Prague
(Musings On Iraq Overview of America’s Policy Towards Iraq: From The Clinton Years To The
Sectarian War of 2006)
Feb 7 Gen Franks presented revised Iraq invasion plan to Bush at White House
(Musings On Iraq review Leap of Faith, Hubris Negligence, and America’s Greatest Foreign
Policy Tragedy)
(Musings On Iraq review of Shaping the Plan for Operation Iraqi Freedom, The Role of Military Intelligence Assessment)
(Musings On Iraq US Army History Of Iraq Vol 1 – Chapter 2 Regime Change)
Feb 10 VP Cheney speech said Iraq harbored terrorists and US wouldn’t allow terrorist states to
threaten US with WMD
Feb 10 CIA presented covert action plan against Iraq
(Musings On Iraq review Leap of Faith, Hubris Negligence, and America’s Greatest Foreign Policy Tragedy)
Feb 10 VP Ramadan said Iraq ready to talk to UN about new inspections
Feb 11 UK Ambassador to US Meyer said Bush’s Axis of Evil speech made more in US
think about war vs Iraq
(Musings On Iraq Review The Report of the Iraq Inquiry, Executive Summary)
Feb 11 Former CIA Dir Woolsey told Pentagon about Iraqi defector with intel on Iraq’s
WMD provided by INC
Feb 12 Powell told Senate that regime change in Iraq was US policy since Clinton
Said no plans for invasion though
(Musings On Iraq review Leap of Faith, Hubris Negligence, and America’s Greatest Foreign
Policy Tragedy)
Feb 12 DIA report Iraq tried to buy 500 tons of yellowcake uranium from Niger
(Musings On Iraq How US Intelligence Failed The Iraq-Niger Uranium Story)
(Musings On Iraq Review Hubris, The Inside Story of Spin, Scandal, And The Selling Of The Iraq War)
(Musings On Iraq review The WMD Mirage, Iraq’s Decade of Deception and America’s False Premise for War)
Feb 13 Bush asked about regime change in Iraq at press conference Said worst case was terrorists
working with countries with WMD Said those countries had a choice to make about what they would do
Feb 13 Bush admin officials told several media outlets they had decided to move against
Iraq
(Musings On Iraq review Wanting War: Why the Bush Administration Invaded Iraq)
(Musings On Iraq review Leap of Faith, Hubris Negligence, and America’s Greatest Foreign
Policy Tragedy)
(Musings On Iraq Review Hubris, The Inside Story of Spin, Scandal, And The Selling Of The Iraq War)
(Musings On Iraq review The Bush Administrations and Saddam Hussein, Deciding on Conflict)
(Musings On Iraq review Plan of Attack: The Definitive Account Of The Decision To Invade
Iraq)
Feb 13 UK Amb to US Meyer wrote Bush admin was gearing up for removing Saddam but hadn’t
made decision on war yet Said UK policy was to get US to follow UN resolutions to build into support against Iraq
Feb 14 National Security Adviser Rice called Blair Foreign Policy Adviser Manning
saying US was only reviewing its Iraq policy
Feb 14 Foreign Min Sabri said Iraq would not allow return of UN inspectors
Feb 15 VP Cheney told Council on Foreign Relations action needed to be taken against
Saddam for his aggressive actions support of terror WMD threat
(Musings On Iraq review Iraq’s Future The aftermath of regime change)
(Musings On Iraq review Wanting War: Why the Bush Administration Invaded Iraq)
(Musings On Iraq review Leap of Faith, Hubris Negligence, and America’s Greatest Foreign
Policy Tragedy)
(Musings On Iraq review Losing Iraq, Inside The Post War Reconstruction Fiasco)
Feb 16 Bush signed secret NSC directive calling for covert action against Iraq by CIA
Had budget of $189 mil for 2 years Included supporting Iraqi opposition carrying out sabotage inside Iraq working with third countries to support covert action an information campaign against Baghdad attacking Iraqi revenue sources and disrupting Baghdad’s smuggling operations
(Musings On Iraq review Wanting War: Why the Bush Administration Invaded Iraq)
(Musings On Iraq review Leap of Faith, Hubris Negligence, and America’s Greatest Foreign
Policy Tragedy)
(Musings On Iraq Review Hubris, The Inside Story of Spin, Scandal, And The Selling Of The Iraq War)
(Musings On Iraq review The Bush Administrations and Saddam Hussein, Deciding on Conflict)
Feb 18 US Embassy in Niger said new details on Iraq-Niger uranium deal
meant a new look into story was needed
(Musings On Iraq How US Intelligence Failed The Iraq-Niger Uranium Story)
(Musings On Iraq Review Hubris, The Inside Story of Spin, Scandal, And The Selling Of The Iraq War)
(Musings On Iraq review The WMD Mirage, Iraq’s Decade of Deception and America’s False Premise for War)
Feb 19 CIA met with former Amb Joseph Wilson to ask if he would go to Niger to
investigate alleged Iraq yellowcake deal
(Musings On Iraq How US Intelligence Failed The Iraq-Niger Uranium Story)
(Musings On Iraq Review Hubris, The Inside Story of Spin, Scandal, And The Selling Of The Iraq War)
(Musings On Iraq review The WMD Mirage, Iraq’s Decade of Deception and America’s False Premise for War)
Feb 19 Sen Graham visited CENTCOM Gen Franks said if war on terror was to fight Al Qaeda US
should focus on Somalia and Yemen after Afghanistan not Iraq
Feb 19 Chalabi wrote Wall St Journal OpEd Said didn’t support US plans for postwar Iraq to maintain
govt structures under US management Said needed deBaathifiaction like deNazification in Germany after WWII
Feb 20 Secret CIA team entered Kurdistan to prepare for ops inside Iraq Called Northern
Iraq Liaison Elements
Feb 20 UK’s Joint Intel Comm chief Scarlett briefed Foreign Secretary Cook on Iraq’s
WMD Cook thought Iraq didn’t have capability for large scale WMD attack
Feb 20 CIA gave former Amb Joseph Wilson talking points for his trip to Niger to
investigate Iraq-Niger uranium deal
(Musings On Iraq How US Intelligence Failed The Iraq-Niger Uranium Story)
(Musings On Iraq Review Hubris, The Inside Story of Spin, Scandal, And The Selling Of The Iraq War)
Feb 21 Former Amb Joseph Wilson left for Niger to investigate Iraq buying uranium from it
(Musings On Iraq How US Intelligence Failed The Iraq-Niger Uranium Story)
(Musings On Iraq Review Hubris, The Inside Story of Spin, Scandal, And The Selling Of The Iraq War)
Feb 24 CENTCOM intelligence staff completed first draft of intelligence estimate for Iraq invasion
Feb 25 1st war game for Iraq invasion ran at Scott Air Force Base Illinois
Feb 26 Former Amb Wilson arrived in Niger to investigate Iraq trying to buy uranium
(Musings On Iraq How US Intelligence Failed The Iraq-Niger Uranium Story)
(Musings On Iraq Review Hubris, The Inside Story of Spin, Scandal, And The Selling Of The Iraq War)
Feb 26 MI6 Chief Dearlove said US would demand weapons inspectors under conditions
Saddam wouldn’t accept to justify military action
(Musings On Iraq UN Inspectors Were Right Iraq Was Not A Threat)
(Musings On Iraq Iraq’s Rejection of UN Inspectors Led To Mistrust Over WMD and 2003 Invasion)
Feb 27 UK Defense Min said govt had to consider military action against Iraq
Feb 28 Blair told Australian TV Iraq was a threat because it had WMD
(Musings On Iraq Review The Report of the Iraq Inquiry, Executive Summary)
(Musings On Iraq review A War Of Choice, The British In Iraq 2003-9)
Feb 28 Gen Franks delivered target list for air strikes in Iraq to Rumsfeld
Mar 1 State Dept report on Iraq-Niger uranium deal Said it was unlikely
(Musings On Iraq How US Intelligence Failed The Iraq-Niger Uranium Story)
(Musings On Iraq Review Hubris, The Inside Story of Spin, Scandal, And The Selling Of The Iraq War)
(Musings On Iraq review The WMD Mirage, Iraq’s Decade of Deception and America’s False Premise for War)
Mar 3 60 Minutes ran story based upon Iraqi defector who said he was from Mukhabarat Said Iraq
had mobile WMD labs to hide program from UN inspectors Labs didn’t exist
(Musings On Iraq review Curveball, Spies, Lies, And The Con Man Who Caused A War)
Mar 4 State Dep intel memo sent to Powell and DIA Didn’t believe Niger would sell
uranium to Iraq
(Musings On Iraq How US Intelligence Failed The Iraq-Niger Uranium Story)
(Musings On Iraq Review Hubris, The Inside Story of Spin, Scandal, And The Selling Of The Iraq War)
(Musings On Iraq review The WMD Mirage, Iraq’s Decade of Deception and America’s False Premise for War)
Mar 5 CIA debriefed former Ambassador Wilson on his trip to Niger to investigate Iraq
buying uranium Wilson said he found no proof of Iraq-Niger uranium deal but in 1999 Iraq asked Niger about better trade CIA believed 1999 overture about better Iraq-Niger trade might have been supporting proof of uranium deal Wilson left CIA debriefing believing he disproved Iraq-Niger uranium deal CIA felt they might have proof it happened
(Musings On Iraq How US Intelligence Failed The Iraq-Niger Uranium Story)
(Musings On Iraq Review Hubris, The Inside Story of Spin, Scandal, And The Selling Of The Iraq War)
(Musings On Iraq review The WMD Mirage, Iraq’s Decade of Deception and America’s False Premise for War)
Mar 5 UK Joint Intelligence Committee head Scarlett briefed Blair on Iraq’s WMD
Afterward Blair thought Iraq only had battlefield WMD capability
Mar 5 UK Home Secretary Blunkett at cabinet meeting asked whether legal basis for
action vs Iraq
Mar 5 UK Foreign Sec Straw had article in Times of London that there was increasing evidence
Iraq’s WMD program were growing Said if Iraq refused UN inspecotrs there would be consequences
Mar 5 UK intel report predicted successor to Saddam would be a Sunni military man
(Musings On Iraq Chilcot Inquiry Section 6.4 Planning and Preparation For A Post-Saddam Hussein Iraq, Mid-2001 to January 2003)
(Musings On Iraq Review The Report of the Iraq Inquiry, Executive Summary)
Mar 6 Blair wrote article for UK paper saying Iraq had WMD and would use them
(Musings On Iraq Review The Report of the Iraq Inquiry, Executive Summary)
(Musings On Iraq review A War Of Choice, The British In Iraq 2003-9)
Mar 6 Gen Franks briefed VP Cheney on which Middle East countries needed to be
Lobbied to help with Iraq invasion before trip to region
(Musings On Iraq review Leap of Faith, Hubris Negligence, and America’s Greatest Foreign Policy Tragedy)
Mar 6 CIA held meeting on covert and unconventional warfare capabilities against Iraq
Mar 6 US war game held on political and military implications of Iraq invasion
Mar 8 Iraq options paper given to Blair Said UK could strengthen containment or regime change
using military Said invasion only way to ensure removal of Saddam Said Iraq destabilizing force in Mideast but not threat it was before Said WMD programs continued but limited Found no evidence Iraq involved in any recent terrorism Meant no legal basis for war based on self-defense or fighting terrorism
(Musings On Iraq 2002 British Memo Said Iraq Not A Threat To The West)
Mar 8 UK cabinet meeting Foreign Sec Straw said smart sanctions were about to be implemented and
hoped that would undermine Saddam’s rhetoric about sanctions killing Iraqis Said Iraq had to comply with UN resolutions and destroy its WMD Said no decision made on military action but had to build intl support to show threat that Iraq posed Said US no longer wanted to contain Iraq Said only way to remove Saddam was through invasion but no justification for it Some officials said war on terror had to be separated from removing WMD in Iraq Some said military action had to have legal basis Blair said US shouldn’t act unilaterally and had to put effort into Arab-Israeli peace effort Blair said important that UK influence Bush’s decisions
(Musings On Iraq Review The Report of the Iraq Inquiry, Executive Summary)
(Musings On Iraq Chilcot Report Section 3.2 Development of UK Iraq Strategy and Options, January to April 2002 – “Axis of Evil” to Crawford)
Mar 8 CIA report on former Ambassador Wilson’s trip to Niger to investigate Iraq-Niger
uranium story Niger denied any deal Said June 1999 Iraqi delegation met with Niger PM about business which PM thought was buying uranium CIA analysts believed Wilson confirmed Iraq was interested in buying uranium from Niger State Dept believed Wilson’s trip confirmed that Iraq had not tried to buy uranium from Niger Wilson would later claim that he talked about fake Niger-Iraq documents but he didn’t know about them until later
(Musings On Iraq How US Intelligence Failed The Iraq-Niger Uranium Story)
(Musings On Iraq Review Hubris, The Inside Story of Spin, Scandal, And The Selling Of The Iraq War)
(Musings On Iraq review The WMD Mirage, Iraq’s Decade of Deception and America’s False Premise for War)
Mar 10 Report UK’s Joint Intelligence Committee investigation found no links between
Iraq and 9/11
Mar 10 CIA briefing included story that Iraq tried to buy uranium from Niger
(Musings On Iraq How US Intelligence Failed The Iraq-Niger Uranium Story)
(Musings On Iraq Review Hubris, The Inside Story of Spin, Scandal, And The Selling Of The Iraq War)
(Musings On Iraq review The WMD Mirage, Iraq’s Decade of Deception and America’s False Premise for War)
Mar 11 Blair told Cheney UK would support US action to remove Saddam
(Musings On Iraq review A War Of Choice, The British In Iraq 2003-9)
(Musings On Iraq Review The Report of the Iraq Inquiry, Executive Summary)
(Musings On Iraq Chilcot Report Section 3.2 Development of UK Iraq Strategy and Options, January to April 2002 – “Axis of Evil” to Crawford)
Mar 12 VP Cheney made trip to Middle East to gain support for Iraq war
Mar 12 Blair Foreign Policy Adv Manning met with National Security Adviser Rice and
said UK supported regime change in Iraq but needed good strategy
(Musings On Iraq review A War Of Choice, The British In Iraq 2003-9)
(Musings On Iraq Review The Report of the Iraq Inquiry, Executive Summary)
(Musings On Iraq Chilcot Report Section 3.2 Development of UK Iraq Strategy and Options, January to April 2002 – “Axis of Evil” to Crawford)
Mar 12 2 CIA reports said aluminum tubes Iraq tried to buy were for centrifuges and Iraq
might be trying to build a nuclear weapon
(Musings On Iraq How A Contested Aluminum Tubes Story Became The Basis For War With Iraq)
(Musings On Iraq How US Intelligence Created An Iraqi Nuclear Threat In 2002)
(Musings On Iraq review The WMD Mirage, Iraq’s Decade of Deception and America’s False Premise for War)
Mar 12 Labor Party meeting at parliament Foreign Sec Straw presented paper that Iraq’s WMD a
threat
Mar 12 SCIRI met State Dept official Said Bush ordered overthrow of Saddam and wanted to plan
for post-war Iraq State wanted to hold meeting of Iraqi opposition to get idea of what Iraq like
Mar 13 Blair Foreign Policy Adviser Manning met with National Security Adviser Rice’s
staff Manning said US not considered problems with going to war with Iraq
(Musings On Iraq Review The Report of the Iraq Inquiry, Executive Summary)
Mar 14 Blair Adviser Manning said National Security Adviser Rice committed to regime change in
Iraq Manning said US was working on strategic decisions on how to remove Saddam
(Musings On Iraq Review The Report of the Iraq Inquiry, Executive Summary)
(Musings On Iraq Chilcot Report Section 3.2 Development of UK Iraq Strategy and Options, January to April 2002 – “Axis of Evil” to Crawford)
Mar 17 Deputy Secretary of Defense Wolfowitz and Blair’s adviser Manning talked about
building international support for military action vs Iraq
(Musings On Iraq review A War Of Choice, The British In Iraq 2003-9)
(Musings On Iraq Chilcot Report Section 3.2 Development of UK Iraq Strategy and Options, January to April 2002 – “Axis of Evil” to Crawford)
Mar 17 UK Amb to US Meyer told Wolfowitz that if US wanted military action against Iraq it
needed to go through UN Wolfowitz said Iraq was linked with terrorism and harboring member of 1993 World Trade Center bombing Was based upon conspiracy theories of Laurie Mylroie
(Musings On Iraq Review The Report of the Iraq Inquiry, Executive Summary)
(Musings On Iraq Laurie Mylroie’s Convoluted Iraq-Terrorism Conspiracy Theory)
(Musings On Iraq Laurie Mylroie’s Iraq Conspiracy Theory Was Debunked By Captured Baath Documents)
Mar 17 Times of London article quoted Iraqi defector provided by INC that Iraq had WMD
programs
Mar 17 Bahrain Foreign Minister Salamn ibn Hamda al-Khalifa told press Arab world did
not see Iraq as the threat but Israel for its actions against Palestinians
Mar 18 UK Amb Meyer met with Deputy Secretary of Defense Wolfowitz who said he was
against going to UN against Iraq
(Musings On Iraq Review The Report of the Iraq Inquiry, Executive Summary)
Mar 19 CIA Director Tenet told Senate no Iraq Al Qaeda connection but Iraq couldn’t be
ruled out from involvement in 9/11 Said no doubt Iraq-Al Qaeda links and Iraq developing nuclear weapons
(Musings On Iraq How US Intelligence Created An Iraqi Nuclear Threat In 2002)
(Musings On Iraq review The WMD Mirage, Iraq’s Decade of Deception and America’s False Premise for War)
Mar 19 DIA Dir Adm Wilson briefed Senate Armed Services Comm on threats to US
Didn’t include Iraq Said Iraq contained only residual WMD programs
Mar 20 US Amb to UN Negroponte letter to Security Council said Iraq failed to comply
with weapons inspectors since end of Gulf War justifying use of force
(Musings On Iraq UN Inspectors Were Right Iraq Was Not A Threat)
(Musings On Iraq Iraq’s Rejection of UN Inspectors Led To Mistrust Over WMD and 2003 Invasion)
(Musings On Iraq review Leap of Faith, Hubris Negligence, and America’s Greatest Foreign Policy Tragedy)
Mar 20 State Dept legal adviser Taft said Iraq hadn’t complied with UN resolutions since
1990s justifying use of force
Mar 20 ORHA staff went to CENTCOM in Qatar and found military had parallel
post-war admin set up isolated from ORHA
(Musings On Iraq on Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction Hard Lessons Chapter 3 The Department of Defense Takes Charge)
(Musings On Iraq Special Inspector General For Iraq Reconstruction Hard Lessons Chapter 4 Staging in Kuwait)
(Musings On Iraq review Leap of Faith, Hubris Negligence, and America’s Greatest Foreign Policy
Tragedy)
(Musings On Iraq review Losing Iraq, Inside The Post War Reconstruction Fiasco)
(Musings On Iraq review Hard Lessons, The Iraq Reconstruction Experience)
Mar 20 DIA labeled Maj Harith INC defector who claimed he came up with idea for mobile WMD
labs in 1996 and built 7 of them as a fabricator Was never received by rest of U.S. intel that continued to use his story
(Musings On Iraq How Iraqi Defector CURVEBALL Became Basis For US Claim That Iraq Had WMD)
(Musings On Iraq Look Who The LA Times Dug Up – CURVEBALL)
(Musings On Iraq Story of CURVEBALL And Iraq’s Mobile Biological Weapons Labs)
(Musings On Iraq review The WMD Mirage, Iraq’s Decade of Deception and America’s False Premise for War)
Mar 21 VP Cheney told NSC Arab leaders not interested in Iraq because of Intifada in Palestine
Mar 21 Gen Franks met with US commanders in Germany to go over war plans Said war was going to
happen and they needed to be ready Air Force general said needed up to 2 wks to destroy Iraq’s air defense Marine general advocated for invasion force to quickly advance to catch Iraq by surprise Franks said main priority getting to Baghdad as quickly as possible
Mar 22 UK Foreign Office Political Director Ricketts memo to Foreign Secretary Straw
said US scrambling to find Iraq-Al Qaeda links and argument unconvincing Said no signs Iraq working on its WMD or nuke programs
Mar 22 Head of MI5 memo to Home Office Said Iraq not connected to any anti-West terrorism since
it tried to kill ex-Pres Bush in 1993 Found no evidence Iraq connected to 9/11 Were reports Al Qaeda and Iraq met no intel that two had cooperated
(Musings On Iraq 2002 British Memo Said Iraq Not A Threat To The West)
Mar 22 UK Defense Minister Hoon warned Blair if UK helped overthrow Saddam it
would have to stay in Iraq for years
(Musings On Iraq Review The Report of the Iraq Inquiry, Executive Summary)
(Musings On Iraq Chilcot Inquiry Section 6.1 Development of the Military Options for an Invasion of Iraq)
(Musings On Iraq Chilcot Inquiry Section 6.4 Planning and Preparation For A Post-Saddam Hussein Iraq, Mid-2001 to January 2003)
Mar 22 Bush said war with Iraq no imminent but Saddam was a bad leader who gassed his own
people and had WMD and could give them to terrorists Bush said he supported regime change
Mar 23 Joint Chiefs did paper drill running through Iraq invasion plan
(Musings On Iraq review Leap of Faith, Hubris Negligence, and America’s Greatest Foreign
Policy Tragedy)
(Musings On Iraq review of Shaping the Plan for Operation Iraqi Freedom, The Role of Military Intelligence Assessment)
Mar 24 Cheney on CNN’s Late Edition called Saddam an evil man that U.S. would deal
with
(Musings On Iraq review Wanting War: Why the Bush Administration Invaded Iraq)
Mar 24 UK Defense Min Strategic Planning Group said that UK might have to keep forces in Iraq for stability after invasion
(Musings On Iraq Chilcot Inquiry Section 6.4 Planning and Preparation For A Post-Saddam Hussein Iraq, Mid-2001 to January 2003)
Mar 25 UK Foreign Secretary Jack Straw told Blair no Iraq-Al Qaeda link and Iraq
not more of a threat now than before 9/11 Straw argued for following legal path against Iraq via U.N. resolutions
(Musings On Iraq 2002 British Memo Said Iraq Not A Threat To The West)
(Musings On Iraq Review The Report of the Iraq Inquiry, Executive Summary)
Mar 25 CIA report said foreign govt told it Iraq tried to buy uranium from Niger
(Musings On Iraq How US Intelligence Failed The Iraq-Niger Uranium Story)
(Musings On Iraq Review Hubris, The Inside Story of Spin, Scandal, And The Selling Of The Iraq War)
(Musings On Iraq review The WMD Mirage, Iraq’s Decade of Deception and America’s False Premise for War)
Mar 25 New Yorker article said Iraq supported Al Qaeda via Kurdish Ansar al-Islam based
upon prisoner Shahab held by PUK in Sulaymaniya Kurds told New Yorker Al Qaeda’s Zawahiri met Saddam in 1992 Also that Iraq was sending WMD to Al Qaeda
(Musings On Iraq Why Didn’t Bush Strike Zarqawi And Ansar al-Islam In 2002?)
Mar 27 ORHA had meeting of all 4 postwar groups to come up with unified plan for Iraq
Didn’t happen The 4 groups had all been created separately within Bush administration with no coordination between them
(Musings On Iraq on Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction Hard Lessons Chapter 3 The Department of Defense Takes Charge)
(Musings On Iraq Special Inspector General For Iraq Reconstruction Hard Lessons Chapter 4 Staging in Kuwait)
(Musings On Iraq review Leap of Faith, Hubris Negligence, and America’s Greatest Foreign Policy
Tragedy)
(Musings On Iraq review Losing Iraq, Inside The Post War Reconstruction Fiasco)
(Musings On Iraq review Iraq’s Dysfunctional Democracy)
(Musings On Iraq review Hard Lessons, The Iraq Reconstruction Experience)
Mar 27 Deputy Secretary of Defense Wolfowitz told House of Representatives committee
Iraq oil would pay for reconstruction
(Musings On Iraq Iraq Oil Would Pay For Reconstruction)
(Musings On Iraq Special Inspector General For Iraq Reconstruction’s Hard Lessons Chapter 13 Restarting Oil Production)
Mar 28 Arab League called on Iraq to comply with all UN resolutions and end sanctions Rejected
military action
Mar 28 Gen Franks briefed Joint Chiefs on Iraq war plans Said he would be ready by 10/1/02
(Musings On Iraq review of Shaping the Plan for Operation Iraqi Freedom, The Role of Military Intelligence Assessment)
(Musings On Iraq review Leap of Faith, Hubris Negligence, and America’s Greatest Foreign
Policy Tragedy)
Mar 29 Gen Franks briefed military service chiefs on Iraq war planning
(Musings On Iraq review Leap of Faith, Hubris Negligence, and America’s Greatest Foreign
Policy Tragedy)
(Musings On Iraq review of Shaping the Plan for Operation Iraqi Freedom, The Role of Military Intelligence Assessment)
Mar 30 Pentagon memo on creating an Iraqi authority after war Said had to be friendly to
the US Had to end Sunni rule Wanted rule of law individual liberty representative govt private enterprise Didn’t say how that was to be achieved
(Musings On Iraq review Leap of Faith, Hubris Negligence, and America’s Greatest Foreign Policy
Tragedy)
(Musings On Iraq review State of Denial, Bush At War, Part III)
(Musings On Iraq review The Endgame, The Inside Story of the Struggle for Iraq, from
George W. Bush to Barack Obama)
(Musings On Iraq review Hard Lessons, The Iraq Reconstruction Experience)
Mar 31 Blair offered a division and UK bases to US for invasion
(Musings On Iraq review A War Of Choice, The British In Iraq 2003-9)
(Musings On Iraq Review The Report of the Iraq Inquiry, Executive Summary)
(Musings On Iraq Chilcot Inquiry Section 6.1 Development of the Military Options for an Invasion of Iraq)
Mar 31 Def Sec Rumsfeld memo said important to create Iraqi interim authority as quickly
as possible so Iraqis were in power Had to pick pro-US Iraqis Said exiles could be core for new authority because they supported US goals in Iraq
(Musings On Iraq review Leap of Faith, Hubris Negligence, and America’s Greatest Foreign Policy
Tragedy)
(Musings On Iraq review State of Denial, Bush At War, Part III)
(Musings On Iraq review The Endgame, The Inside Story of the Struggle for Iraq, from
George W. Bush to Barack Obama)
(Musings On Iraq review Hard Lessons, The Iraq Reconstruction Experience)
Mar 31 Def Sec Rumsfeld memo to Bush said interim Iraqi authority was important to
convince Iraqis they not the US was going to run the country Said had to create one immediately
Apr 1 UK ambassador to US Meyer warned Bush thinking of war with Iraq by
autumn but no postwar plans
(Musings On Iraq Chilcot Report Section 3.2 Development of UK Iraq Strategy and Options, January to April 2002 – “Axis of Evil” to Crawford)
(Musings On Iraq Chilcot Report Sec 3.3 Development of UK Iraq Strategy and Options April to July 2002)
(Musings On Iraq Chilcot Inquiry Section 6.1 Development of the Military Options for an Invasion of Iraq)
(Musings On Iraq Chilcot Inquiry Section 6.4 Planning and Preparation For A Post-Saddam Hussein Iraq, Mid-2001 to January 2003)
(Musings On Iraq Review The Report of the Iraq Inquiry, Executive Summary)
Apr 2 PM Blair met with Chief of Defense Staff Adm Boyce before conference with Bush in US
Decided US needed to be deliberate and build coalition vs Iraq
(Musings On Iraq review A War Of Choice, The British In Iraq 2003-9)
Apr 2 UK Amb Meyer and PM Blair foreign policy advisor Manning met with Natl Sec Adv Rice
Reported Bush hadn’t worked out any details on Iraq yet and smarting from European rejecting pivot towards Iraq
(Musings On Iraq Chilcot Report Section 3.2 Development of UK Iraq Strategy and Options, January to April 2002 – “Axis of Evil” to Crawford)
(Musings On Iraq Review The Report of the Iraq Inquiry, Executive Summary)
Apr 2 Ansar al-Islam attempted to assassinate Barham Salah of PUK in Kurdistan
Apr 4 UK intel officials claimed that Blair decided that WMD and Saddam were not
good argument for going to war in Iraq
Apr 5 Blair gave TV interview saying Saddam needed to go
(Musings On Iraq review A War Of Choice, The British In Iraq 2003-9)
Apr 5 Blair and Bush met and talked about using inspections to pressure Saddam
(Musings On Iraq Chilcot Report Section 3.2 Development of UK Iraq Strategy and Options, January to April 2002 – “Axis of Evil” to Crawford)
(Musings On Iraq Review The Report of the Iraq Inquiry, Executive Summary)
Apr 7 Blair and Bush meeting Blair pushed going to UN against Iraq Some claimed Blair
okayed war with Iraq at meeting Blair denied that
(Musings On Iraq review A War Of Choice, The British In Iraq 2003-9)
(Musings On Iraq Chilcot Report Section 3.2 Development of UK Iraq Strategy and Options, January to April 2002 – “Axis of Evil” to Crawford)
Apr 7 Bush told TV network he’d decided Saddam must go
(Musings On Iraq review Iraq’s Future The aftermath of regime change)
(Musings On Iraq review Wanting War: Why the Bush Administration Invaded Iraq)
(Musings On Iraq Review The Report of the Iraq Inquiry, Executive Summary)
(Musings On Iraq Review Hubris, The Inside Story of Spin, Scandal, And The Selling Of The Iraq War)
(Musings On Iraq review The Bush Administrations and Saddam Hussein, Deciding on Conflict)
(Musings On Iraq review Plan of Attack: The Definitive Account Of The Decision To Invade
Iraq)
Apr 9 State Dept started Future of Iraq project bringing together 240 Iraqi exiles to chart out post-
Saddam Iraq
(Musings On Iraq Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction’s “Hard Lessons” – Part I: Planning for Postwar Iraq September 2001 to May 2003)
(Musings On Iraq review Leap of Faith, Hubris Negligence, and America’s Greatest Foreign
Policy Tragedy)
(Musings On Iraq review Losing Iraq, Inside The Post War Reconstruction Fiasco)
(Musings On Iraq review Hard Lessons, The Iraq Reconstruction Experience)
(Musings On Iraq review Blood Money, Wasted Billions, Lost Lives, and Corporate Greed in Iraq)
Apr 10 Blair told parliament Saddam was threat to his people and region and was working
on WMD
(Musings On Iraq Review The Report of the Iraq Inquiry, Executive Summary)
(Musings On Iraq review A War Of Choice, The British In Iraq 2003-9)
Apr 11 Gen Franks talked with Rumsfeld about war preparations that could start now
without gaining much notice
(Musings On Iraq review Leap of Faith, Hubris Negligence, and America’s Greatest Foreign
Policy Tragedy)
(Musings On Iraq review of Shaping the Plan for Operation Iraqi Freedom, The Role of Military Intelligence Assessment)
Apr 14 Vanity Fair article talked with Iraqi defector Saadi who claimed Iraq building
WMD
Apr 15 Rumsfeld claimed that UN inspectors in 90s were ineffective
(Musings On Iraq UN Inspectors Were Right Iraq Was Not A Threat)
(Musings On Iraq Iraq’s Rejection of UN Inspectors Led To Mistrust Over WMD and 2003 Invasion)
Apr 15 End of deadline set by Bush for invasion plan for Iraq to be completed
Apr 16 NSC meeting talked about training Iraqi exiles for help with invasion
Apr 18 CIA report said Iraq might have been able to make chemical weapons since 1999
(Musings On Iraq review The WMD Mirage, Iraq’s Decade of Deception and America’s False Premise for War)
Apr 19 UK intel report Iraq not seen as a threat in Middle East except by Kuwait
Apr 20 Gen Franks briefed Bush on Iraq war plans Franks said he wanted to cut timeline
by 1/3 and could start with 180,000 troops
(Musings On Iraq review Leap of Faith, Hubris Negligence, and America’s Greatest Foreign
Policy Tragedy)
(Musings On Iraq review of Shaping the Plan for Operation Iraqi Freedom, The Role of Military Intelligence Assessment)
Apr 21 Telegraph reported Iraq supported Ansar al-Islam Al Qaeda affiliate in Kurdistan
(Musings On Iraq Why Didn’t Bush Strike Zarqawi And Ansar al-Islam In 2002?)
Apr 23 Pentagon memo said UN would hold a postwar conference to pick Iraqi leaders like what
happened in Afghanistan Said Iraqi exiles would be put in charge of POW camps for former regime members and would take over Iraqi military Said provisional govt would be set up as quickly as possible so US could withdraw
(Musings On Iraq review Leap of Faith, Hubris Negligence, and America’s Greatest Foreign
Policy Tragedy)
Apr 24 Gen Franks met with commanders in Qatar Said they needed to start war
preparations
(Musings On Iraq review Leap of Faith, Hubris Negligence, and America’s Greatest Foreign
Policy Tragedy)
(Musings On Iraq review of Shaping the Plan for Operation Iraqi Freedom, The Role of Military Intelligence Assessment)
Apr 25 Foreign Secretary Straw said UK had to stand up to “bullies” like Saddam
Apr 25 IAEA report that during inspections in 1990s Iraq’s nuclear program was
dismantled and no ability to produce nuke material
(Musings On Iraq UN Inspectors Were Right Iraq Was Not A Threat)
(Musings On Iraq Iraq’s Rejection of UN Inspectors Led To Mistrust Over WMD and 2003 Invasion)
(Musings On Iraq How US Intelligence Created An Iraqi Nuclear Threat In 2002)
Apr 25 UK Defense Min started group to plan for military action vs Iraq Foreign Office added post-
war ideas
(Musings On Iraq Chilcot Inquiry Section 6.4 Planning and Preparation For A Post-Saddam Hussein Iraq, Mid-2001 to January 2003)
Apr 28 US military leaked story to NYTimes that Iraq invasion could use a force as small
as 70,000 Was push back against Rumsfeld’s small invasion force
(Musings On Iraq How Arguments Over Iraq Invasion Plan Were Fought Through Press Leaks)
(Musings On Iraq review Plan of Attack: The Definitive Account Of The Decision To Invade
Iraq)
Apr 29 Pentagon official said 9/11 hijacker met with Iraqi intel officer in Prague
Didn’t happen
May 1 Bush told Press Sec Fleischer he didn’t like “motherfuckers” like Saddam who gassed their
own people and “assholes” who lied to the world Said he was going to kick Saddam’s ass
(Musings On Iraq review Leap of Faith, Hubris Negligence, and America’s Greatest Foreign
Policy Tragedy)
(Musings On Iraq Review Hubris, The Inside Story of Spin, Scandal, And The Selling Of The Iraq War)
(Musings On Iraq review The Bush Administrations and Saddam Hussein, Deciding on Conflict)
May 1 FBI and CIA told media 9/11 hijacker Atta did not meet Iraqi intel in Prague April
2001
(Musings On Iraq Overview of America’s Policy Towards Iraq: From The Clinton Years To The
Sectarian War of 2006)
May 3 Iraqi nuclear scientist Jafar met with chief UN inspector Hans Blix and IAEA head El Baradei
at UN in NYC Said nothing new to declare about Iraq’s nuclear program Said UN would nothing new if inspections re-started Blix said new mandate was for inspectors to investigate for 60 days Then Blix would decide next step but Iraq needed to allow access El Baradei said only wanted to clean up a few issues on Iraq’s nuclear program Jafar grew mad Said Inspectors had talked about needing only a few things but never ended
May 8 UK Foreign Secretary Straw told Secretary of State Powell if Bush decided on
military action against Iraq Blair would back him
(Musings On Iraq review A War Of Choice, The British In Iraq 2003-9)
(Musings On Iraq Review The Report of the Iraq Inquiry, Executive Summary)
(Musings On Iraq Chilcot Report Sec 3.3 Development of UK Iraq Strategy and Options April to July 2002)
May 9 Gen Franks ordered commanders to plan for including Turkey in Iraq invasion plans Franks
didn’t believe Ankara would agree to allow US troops to use country for invasion but needed to plan for it
May 9 Pentagon memo to Rumsfeld said that US had to pick who would fill vacuum after Saddam
Said Iraqi opposition would help
(Musings On Iraq review Leap of Faith, Hubris Negligence, and America’s Greatest Foreign
Policy Tragedy)
May 9 Asst Sec od Def for Intl Sec Rodman wrote memo to Def Sec Rumsfeld Said US should
organize Iraqi opposition into a political-military force that could fill vacuum after invasion
May 10 Gen Franks discussed war plans with Rumsfeld who was afraid Iraq might take initiative
and launch a pre-emptive attack
(Musings On Iraq review Leap of Faith, Hubris Negligence, and America’s Greatest Foreign
Policy Tragedy)
(Musings On Iraq review of Shaping the Plan for Operation Iraqi Freedom, The Role of Military Intelligence Assessment)
May 10 Gen Franks briefed NSC on Middle Eastern countries and their role in invasion plans
May 10 CIA briefing book on Iraq’s WMD mentioned Iraq-Niger uranium deal
(Musings On Iraq How US Intelligence Failed The Iraq-Niger Uranium Story)
(Musings On Iraq Review Hubris, The Inside Story of Spin, Scandal, And The Selling Of The Iraq War)
May 11 Gen Franks briefed Bush on war plans at Camp David Said he would attack Iraq on 5
fronts: west for special operations south would be main invasion front from Kuwait north would be Turkey if it agreed to be involved center would be Baghdad attacked by air strikes and last would be information campaign Bush wanted info campaign to push invasion as liberation of Iraq
(Musings On Iraq review Leap of Faith, Hubris Negligence, and America’s Greatest Foreign
Policy Tragedy)
(Musings On Iraq review of Shaping the Plan for Operation Iraqi Freedom, The Role of Military Intelligence Assessment)
May 11 At Gen Franks briefing Sec Def Rumsfeld claimed 2 brigades and special forces company
could invade Iraq Was 2nd time he brought it up
(Musings On Iraq US Army History Of Iraq Vol 1 – Chapter 2 Regime Change)
May 13 Defense Secretary Rumsfeld said US didn’t need to connect Iraq and 9/11 to go to
war Said main reason was WMD
(Musings On Iraq review Iraq’s Future The aftermath of regime change)
(Musings On Iraq review Wanting War: Why the Bush Administration Invaded Iraq)
(Musings On Iraq review Leap of Faith, Hubris Negligence, and America’s Greatest Foreign
Policy Tragedy)
May 14 UN Resolution 1409 created smart sanctions on Iraq to try to limit military and
WMD related imports but increased civilian imports Didn’t change system
(Musings On Iraq review Invisible War, The United States And The Iraq Sanctions)
(Musings On Iraq Chilcot Report Section 3.2 Development of UK Iraq Strategy and Options, January to April 2002 – “Axis of Evil” to Crawford)
May 17 PM Blair’s foreign policy adv Manning told Natl Sec Adv Rice that they had to get weapons
inspections back into Iraq to garner public support for any war
(Musings On Iraq Chilcot Report Sec 3.3 Development of UK Iraq Strategy and Options April to July 2002)
(Musings On Iraq Review The Report of the Iraq Inquiry, Executive Summary)
May 18 British govt issued order to prepare for military action against Iraq
May 20 Rumsfeld asked Gen Franks to plan for a fortress Baghdad scenario where
Saddam would withdraw all his forces into capital for an urban battle
May 21 Gen Franks lied to press saying he had no Iraq war plans and had not been asked to make
any Franks had been working on war plans since Nov 2001
(Musings On Iraq review Leap of Faith, Hubris Negligence, and America’s Greatest Foreign
Policy Tragedy)
(Musings On Iraq review of Shaping the Plan for Operation Iraqi Freedom, The Role of Military Intelligence Assessment)
May 23 During trip to Germany Bush said he had no Iraq war plans Part of strategy to work on war
plans while publicly denying it
(Musings On Iraq review Leap of Faith, Hubris Negligence, and America’s Greatest Foreign
Policy Tragedy)
(Musings On Iraq review of Shaping the Plan for Operation Iraqi Freedom, The Role of Military Intelligence Assessment)
(Musings On Iraq Review Hubris, The Inside Story of Spin, Scandal, And The Selling Of The Iraq War)
(Musings On Iraq review The Bush Administrations and Saddam Hussein, Deciding on Conflict)
(Musings On Iraq review Plan of Attack: The Definitive Account Of The Decision To Invade
Iraq)
May 24 Rumsfeld issued order to Joint Chiefs to begin Phase Four postwar planning for Iraq
(Musings On Iraq Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction’s “Hard Lessons” – Part I: Planning for Postwar Iraq September 2001 to May 2003)
(Musings On Iraq review of Shaping the Plan for Operation Iraqi Freedom, The Role of Military Intelligence Assessment)
(Musings On Iraq review Leap of Faith, Hubris Negligence, and America’s Greatest Foreign
Policy Tragedy)
(Musings On Iraq review Hard Lessons, The Iraq Reconstruction Experience)
(Musings On Iraq review Blood Money, Wasted Billions, Lost Lives, and Corporate Greed in Iraq)
May 26 During trip to France Bush said he had no Iraq war plans Part of strategy to work on war
plans while publicly denying it
(Musings On Iraq review of Shaping the Plan for Operation Iraqi Freedom, The Role of Military Intelligence Assessment)
(Musings On Iraq review Leap of Faith, Hubris Negligence, and America’s Greatest Foreign
Policy Tragedy)
(Musings On Iraq Review Hubris, The Inside Story of Spin, Scandal, And The Selling Of The Iraq War)
(Musings On Iraq review The Bush Administrations and Saddam Hussein, Deciding on Conflict)
(Musings On Iraq review Plan of Attack: The Definitive Account Of The Decision To Invade
Iraq)
May 29 UK Def Min official Kelly said Blair govt had spun WMD dossier on Iraq
Jun 1 Bush gave speech at West Point arguing for pre-emptive war against rogue
states because couldn’t be contained Was argument for Iraq war
(Musings On Iraq review America at the Crossroads, Democracy, Power, and the Neoconservative Legacy)
Jun 1 Bush told Natl Sec Adv Rice “Fuck Saddam. we’re taking him out”
(Musings On Iraq review Iraq’s Future The aftermath of regime change)
(Musings On Iraq review Wanting War: Why the Bush Administration Invaded Iraq)
(Musings On Iraq review Leap of Faith, Hubris Negligence, and America’s Greatest Foreign
Policy Tragedy)
(Musings On Iraq Review Hubris, The Inside Story of Spin, Scandal, And The Selling Of The Iraq War)
(Musings On Iraq review The Bush Administrations and Saddam Hussein, Deciding on Conflict)
(Musings On Iraq review The Regime Change Consensus, Iraq In American Politics 1990-2003)
Jun 1 State Dept announced first meeting of Future of Iraq Project would be in July 02 Said it was up to Iraqis to change their country
Jun 2 Czech Interior Min claimed 9/11 hijacker Atta went to Prague and met with Iraqi
intel officer
(Musings On Iraq Overview of America’s Policy Towards Iraq: From The Clinton Years To The
Sectarian War of 2006)
Jun 2 Iraq arrested Abdul Yasin involved in 1993 World Trade Center bombing
Conspiracy theorists would later say this was proof Iraq involved in bombing
(Musings On Iraq Laurie Mylroie’s Convoluted Iraq-Terrorism Conspiracy Theory)
(Musings On Iraq Laurie Mylroie’s Iraq Conspiracy Theory Was Debunked By Captured Baath Documents)
Jun 2 60 Minutes aired show on Abdul Rahman Yasin who was involved in 1993 World Trade
Center bombing Fled to Baghdad Conspiracy theorist Laurie Mylroie claimed he was an Iraqi agent and showed Saddam behind attack 60 Minutes found no evidence he was Iraqi agent
Jun 3 General Franks briefed Rumsfeld on new Running Start war plan to begin conflict
before all US forces were in theater Rumsfeld liked plan and wanted more on it Franks also talked about dealing with Fortress Baghdad scenario by destroying Iraq’s command and control and attacking Iraqi units outside city to stop them from falling back into capital
(Musings On Iraq review Leap of Faith, Hubris Negligence, and America’s Greatest Foreign
Policy Tragedy)
(Musings On Iraq review of Shaping the Plan for Operation Iraqi Freedom, The Role of Military Intelligence Assessment)
Jun 5 Czech envoy to UN claimed 9/11 hijacker Atta met with Iraqi intel officer
in Prague in 01
(Musings On Iraq Overview of America’s Policy Towards Iraq: From The Clinton Years To The
Sectarian War of 2006)
Jun 5 Blair told Rumsfeld UK would be with US in any military action against Iraq
(Musings On Iraq Chilcot Report Sec 3.3 Development of UK Iraq Strategy and Options April to July 2002)
(Musings On Iraq Review The Report of the Iraq Inquiry, Executive Summary)
(Musings On Iraq review A War Of Choice, The British In Iraq 2003-9)
Jun 11 Def Sec Rumsfeld said Iraq had chemical weapons and an active nuclear program
(Musings On Iraq How US Intelligence Created An Iraqi Nuclear Threat In 2002)
(Musings On Iraq review What Happened, Inside the Bush White House and Washington’s Culture of Deception)
(Musings On Iraq review The WMD Mirage, Iraq’s Decade of Deception and America’s False Premise for War)
Jun 13 UK Def Min paper said postwar planning needed to be made before taking military action
against Iraq UK never made plans Said worse scenario would be long term and expensive occupation of Iraq
(Musings On Iraq Chilcot Report Sec 3.3 Development of UK Iraq Strategy and Options April to July 2002)
(Musings On Iraq Chilcot Inquiry Section 6.4 Planning and Preparation For A Post-Saddam Hussein Iraq, Mid-2001 to January 2003)
(Musings On Iraq Review The Report of the Iraq Inquiry, Executive Summary)
Jun 18 CIA Dir Tenet told Congress couldn’t find evidence for story 9/11 hijacker
Atta met with Iraqi intel officer in Prague in 01
(Musings On Iraq Overview of America’s Policy Towards Iraq: From The Clinton Years To The
Sectarian War of 2006)
Jun 19 US told UK that it was ready for its input on military planning against Iraq
(Musings On Iraq Review The Report of the Iraq Inquiry, Executive Summary)
(Musings On Iraq Chilcot Inquiry Section 6.1 Development of the Military Options for an Invasion of Iraq)
Jun 19 Gen Franks briefed Bush on war plans
(Musings On Iraq review Leap of Faith, Hubris Negligence, and America’s Greatest Foreign
Policy Tragedy)
(Musings On Iraq review of Shaping the Plan for Operation Iraqi Freedom, The Role of Military Intelligence Assessment)
Jun 21 CIA paper on Iraq-Al Qaeda relationship Said two had contacts since mid-90s but
no evidence of cooperation on terrorism Differences limited relationship
(Musings On Iraq review Leap of Faith, Hubris Negligence, and America’s Greatest Foreign
Policy Tragedy)
Jun 26 General Franks met with his commanders in Germany Told them to switch from
original Generated Plan for war with Iraq to new Running Start which would begin conflict before all forces in theater
(Musings On Iraq review of Shaping the Plan for Operation Iraqi Freedom, The Role of Military Intelligence Assessment)
Jun 26 INC memo to Senate Appropriations Committee said group had led to 108 English
articles from Oct 01-May 02 and White House officials had received those products
(Musings On Iraq review Leap of Faith, Hubris Negligence, and America’s Greatest Foreign
Policy Tragedy)
Jun 26 UK Defense Min told PM Blair’s Cabinet Office it needed a larger body to deal with postwar
Iraq Blair said no
(Musings On Iraq Chilcot Inquiry Section 6.4 Planning and Preparation For A Post-Saddam Hussein Iraq, Mid-2001 to January 2003)
Jul 1 Pentagon memo said US should organize Iraqi opposition to help with regime change and fill
vacuum after Saddam Said exiles would help ensure no chaos after invasion Said if US tried to run Iraq without opposition leaders would backfire
(Musings On Iraq review Leap of Faith, Hubris Negligence, and America’s Greatest Foreign
Policy Tragedy)
Jul 2 UK Def Min secretary told Blair’s foreign policy adviser Manning US working on
military plans to remove Saddam with no post-war plan and no overall strategy behind it
(Musings On Iraq Chilcot Report Section 3.4 Development of UK Iraq Strategy and Options, Late July to 14 September 2002)
(Musings On Iraq Chilcot Inquiry Section 6.4 Planning and Preparation For A Post-Saddam Hussein Iraq, Mid-2001 to January 2003)
(Musings On Iraq review A War Of Choice, The British In Iraq 2003-9)
Jul 2 UK Def Min Hoon told Blair he had to push US to think about postwar Iraq
planning
(Musings On Iraq Chilcot Report Sec 3.3 Development of UK Iraq Strategy and Options April to July 2002)
(Musings On Iraq Review The Report of the Iraq Inquiry, Executive Summary)
Jul 5 Supporters of Defense Secretary Rumsfeld leaked a CENTCOM document to the NY
Times stating that US would use air strikes from 8 countries and Special Forces and CIA operatives to carry out covert operations within Iraq to hunt SCUD missiles and WMD
(Musings On Iraq How Arguments Over Iraq Invasion Plan Were Fought Through Press Leaks)
Jul 5 Talks between Iraq and UN in Vienna brokedown over new weapons inspections
(Musings On Iraq UN Inspectors Were Right Iraq Was Not A Threat)
Jul 9 Joint Chiefs head Gen Myers said Gen Franks had to deal with civil affairs after invasion
Jul 10 Pentagon Defense Policy Board met over Iraq invasion plans Angry military not thinking
innovatively Wanted generals fired
Jul 10 Join Chiefs created Iraq Political-Military Cell to start postwar planning
Jul 14 Dep Sec Def Wolfowitz went to Turkey and discussed war plans vs Iraq
Jul 15 Czech Intel head doubted that 9/11 hijacker Atta met with Iraqi intelligence in Prague in
2001
(Musings On Iraq Overview of America’s Policy Towards Iraq: From The Clinton Years To The
Sectarian War of 2006)
Jul 15 Fmr Saddam Fedayeen told press Iraq trained Al Qaeda fighters in Salman Pak False story
Jul 16 Blair told parliament Iraq’s WMD threat to world and had to be dealt with but no decision
for military action made
(Musings On Iraq Review The Report of the Iraq Inquiry, Executive Summary)
(Musings On Iraq review A War Of Choice, The British In Iraq 2003-9)
Jul 17 34th anniversary of Baath coup Saddam gave speech saying he would defeat all
the powerful and evil people arrayed against him
Jul 17 Rumsfeld told Gen Franks that costs for war preparations if completed by 12/1/02
would be around $700 mil US was working to expand airfields in Kuwait and built new fuel distribution system to pre-position fuel in northern Kuwait
Jul 17 Iraq issued arrest warrant for Zarqawi who had been traveling through the
country from Iran
(Musings On Iraq review Insurgent Iraq, Al Zarqawi and the New Generation)
(Musings On Iraq review ISIS Inside The Army of Terror, Revised & Updated)
Jul 17 Sir Kevin Tebbit UK Undersectary of Defense met with Dep Def Sec Wolfowitz Dep Natl Sec
Adv Hadley Dep Sec of State Armitage Frank Miller Tebbit told them US had to plan for postwar Iraq Tebbit reported to Blair govt US doing more postwar planning
(Musings On Iraq Chilcot Inquiry Section 6.4 Planning and Preparation For A Post-Saddam Hussein Iraq, Mid-2001 to January 2003)
Jul 19 General Franks presented Running Start war plan to Bush Said four brigades
would be in Kuwait soon with Marine Expeditionary Force in region Two divisions would arrive in 2-3 weeks for a total of 100,000 troops to begin war within 30 days if needed
(Musings On Iraq review Leap of Faith, Hubris Negligence, and America’s Greatest Foreign Policy Tragedy)
(Musings On Iraq review of Shaping the Plan for Operation Iraqi Freedom, The Role of Military Intelligence Assessment)
Jul 19 MI6 head Dearlove said US already decided on military action to remove Saddam
talk was now about how and when
(Musings On Iraq Chilcot Report Section 3.4 Development of UK Iraq Strategy and Options, Late July to 14 September 2002)
Jul 19 UK Cabinet paper briefed PM Blair before meeting with Bush that he had to push US to think
about postwar Iraq
(Musings On Iraq Chilcot Inquiry Section 6.4 Planning and Preparation For A Post-Saddam Hussein Iraq, Mid-2001 to January 2003)
(Musings On Iraq review A War Of Choice, The British In Iraq 2003-9)
Jul 20 CIA Dir Tenet met MI6 Head Dearlove Tenet said WMD intel didn’t matter because war
was inevitable
(Musings On Iraq review Leap of Faith, Hubris Negligence, and America’s Greatest Foreign Policy Tragedy)
Jul 22 DIA officer told to start making secret intelligence briefings to Rumsfeld on Iraq-
Al Qaeda ties based upon request by Deputy Defense Secretary Wolfowitz
(Musings On Iraq review Leap of Faith, Hubris Negligence, and America’s Greatest Foreign Policy Tragedy)
Jul 22 US Energy Dept assessed Iraq trying to buy magnets meeting with scientists Niger
uranium story showed that Iraq restarted nuclear program
(Musings On Iraq How US Intelligence Failed The Iraq-Niger Uranium Story)
(Musings On Iraq Review Hubris, The Inside Story of Spin, Scandal, And The Selling Of The Iraq War)
(Musings On Iraq How US Intelligence Created An Iraqi Nuclear Threat In 2002)
(Musings On Iraq review The WMD Mirage, Iraq’s Decade of Deception and America’s False Premise for War)
Jul 23 Blair cabinet meeting John Scarlett head of Joint Intel Com said Saddam could only be
removed by invasion Sir Dearlove head of MI6 said Washington decided war was inevitable Bush wanted to justify invasion via terrorism and WMD Said that intelligence and facts were being used to justify invasion Blair’s foreign policy adviser said Iraq was fourth most dangerous country with WMD behind North Korea Iran and Libya Defense Staff head Sir Boyce gave 3 options for British in Iraq 1 Offer bases to US 2 Add air, navy special forces 3 40,000 troops for invasion Blair wanted UN inspectors to return to Iraq and build popular support vs Iraq Said if Iraq refused inspectors then regime change would gain more support from public
(Musings On Iraq Chilcot Report Sec 3.3 Development of UK Iraq Strategy and Options April to July 2002)
(Musings On Iraq Chilcot Report Section 3.4 Development of UK Iraq Strategy and Options, Late July to 14 September 2002)
(Musings On Iraq Chilcot Inquiry Sec 4.2 Iraq WMD Assessments, July to September 2002)
(Musings On Iraq Overview of America’s Policy Towards Iraq: From The Clinton Years To The
Sectarian War of 2006)
(Musings On Iraq Review The Report of the Iraq Inquiry, Executive Summary)
Jul 24 Kurds claimed Iraq coordinating with Ansar al-Islam and Al Qaeda in pre-invasion
propaganda campaign
(Musings On Iraq Why Didn’t Bush Strike Zarqawi And Ansar al-Islam In 2002?)
Jul 25 Dep Sec State Armitage presented 2 State plans to NSC on postwar Iraq 1 said an occupation
would probably be resisted by Iraqis but US needed to create a US authority to run country
Jul 28 Blair told Bush UK would be with US on Iraq but had to consider difficulties and work on
politics of war Blair wanted PR campaign against Iraq using WMD and ties to Al Qaeda to win over British public
(Musings On Iraq Chilcot Report Sec 3.3 Development of UK Iraq Strategy and Options April to July 2002)
(Musings On Iraq Chilcot Report Section 3.4 Development of UK Iraq Strategy and Options, Late July to 14 September 2002)
(Musings On Iraq Review The Report of the Iraq Inquiry, Executive Summary)
(Musings On Iraq review A War Of Choice, The British In Iraq 2003-9)
Jul 28 Washington Post article on Iraq war plans Claimed many in military wanted to
contain Iraq
Jul 29 Blair’s foreign policy adv Manning told Rice UK with US against Iraq but had
to go through UN
(Musings On Iraq Chilcot Report Sec 3.3 Development of UK Iraq Strategy and Options April to July 2002)
(Musings On Iraq Chilcot Report Section 3.4 Development of UK Iraq Strategy and Options, Late July to 14 September 2002)
(Musings On Iraq Review The Report of the Iraq Inquiry, Executive Summary)
Jul 29 NY Times article on Iraq war planning Mentioned General Franks plans for
dealing with Baghdad
(Musings On Iraq How Arguments Over Iraq Invasion Plan Were Fought Through Press Leaks)
Jul 30 Blair’s foreign policy adviser Manning told Bush UK with US against Iraq but had
to go through UN
Jul 30 UK attorney general Goldsmith told Blair without U.N. resolution war against
Iraq illegal
(Musings On Iraq Chilcot Report Sec 3.3 Development of UK Iraq Strategy and Options April to July 2002)
(Musings On Iraq Chilcot Report Section 3.4 Development of UK Iraq Strategy and Options, Late July to 14 September 2002)
(Musings On Iraq Review The Report of the Iraq Inquiry, Executive Summary)
Jul 30 Pres Chirac said that Germany and France would only support an invasion of Iraq
if backed by a UN resolution
Jul 30 Fmr head UN inspector Ekeus said US manipulated 90s inspections to spy on Iraqi
security services and find location of Saddam Said US wanted to create crises to justify attacks on Iraq
(Musings On Iraq UN Inspectors and CIA Spying On Iraq In The 90s)
Jul 31 Iraq Foreign Minister Sabri said Baghdad rejected return of UN inspectors Said they
would just collect intel for U.S. strikes
(Musings On Iraq UN Inspectors Were Right Iraq Was Not A Threat)
(Musings On Iraq Iraq’s Rejection of UN Inspectors Led To Mistrust Over WMD and 2003 Invasion)
Jul 31 Bush said US goal was regime change but denied any war plans were on his desk Part of
strategy to work on war plans while publicly denying it
(Musings On Iraq review Wanting War: Why the Bush Administration Invaded Iraq)
(Musings On Iraq review Leap of Faith, Hubris Negligence, and America’s Greatest Foreign
Policy Tragedy)
(Musings On Iraq Review Hubris, The Inside Story of Spin, Scandal, And The Selling Of The Iraq War)
(Musings On Iraq review The Bush Administrations and Saddam Hussein, Deciding on Conflict)
(Musings On Iraq review Plan of Attack: The Definitive Account Of The Decision To Invade
Iraq)
Jul 31 Senate Foreign Relations Committee began hearing on Iraq invasion
Jul 31 Rumsfeld told Senate Committee time helped Saddam erode sanctions and spread
terrorism
(Musings On Iraq review The Regime Change Consensus, Iraq In American Politics 1990-2003)
Jul 31 NSA had drill on Iraq Found it had little signals intel on country
Jul 31 Report Iraq working on nuclear program Quoted David Kay former UN inspector
and INC defectors Khidir Hamza and Adnan Haideri May 02 Haideri labeled fabricator by DIA
(Musings On Iraq How US Intelligence Created An Iraqi Nuclear Threat In 2002)
Jul 31 INC defector ex-nuke scientist Hamza testified to Senate Foreign Relations
Committee claiming Iraq only lacked uranium to build nuke bomb in 1994
Jul 31 Iraq conspiracy theorist Mylroie interviewed on CNN Said Bush was going to
invade Iraq because of WMD and its ties to terrorism including 9/11 Accused CIA of covering up Iraq’s involvement in 9/11 Said INC should run Iraq after war
(Musings On Iraq Laurie Mylroie’s Convoluted Iraq-Terrorism Conspiracy Theory)
(Musings On Iraq Laurie Mylroie’s Iraq Conspiracy Theory Was Debunked By Captured Baath Documents)
(Musings On Iraq review Losing Iraq, Inside The Post War Reconstruction Fiasco)
Jul 31 Blair and Bush talked Blair said had to get inspectors back into Iraq Give Saddam ultimatum to
comply Blair didn’t think Iraq would do so and could open door to war Bush agreed
Aug 1 Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing on possible postwar Iraq Sen Biden warned that
unless US gained international support it could spend $70-$80 bil rebuilding Iraq Historian Phebe Marr warned occupying Iraq would not be cheap Rend Rahim Francke said Iraqi police would disappear day after invasion Would be power vacuum US would have to restore services New police formed Economy revived
(Musings On Iraq review Leap of Faith, Hubris Negligence, and America’s Greatest Foreign Policy
Tragedy)
Aug 1 Iraq invited Chief UN Inspector Blix to Baghdad for talks about new inspection
regime
(Musings On Iraq UN Inspectors Were Right Iraq Was Not A Threat)
(Musings On Iraq Iraq’s Rejection of UN Inspectors Led To Mistrust Over WMD and 2003 Invasion)
Aug 1 CIA made 1st paper explaining assessment of aluminum tubes Said they were for
nuclear program Said high specifications showed they were for centrifuges
(Musings On Iraq How A Contested Aluminum Tubes Story Became The Basis For War With Iraq)
(Musings On Iraq review The WMD Mirage, Iraq’s Decade of Deception and America’s False Premise for War)
Aug 1 Clinton’s National Security Adviser Sandy Berger OpEd in Washington Post said
just because U.S. could overthrow Iraq didn't mean it should do it Berger said power did not mean legitimacy
Aug 2 DIA report on debate over aluminum tubes Iraq tried to buy DIA sided with CIA
that tubes were for centrifuges Said matched 1950s German centrifuge design
(Musings On Iraq How A Contested Aluminum Tubes Story Became The Basis For War With Iraq)
(Musings On Iraq review The WMD Mirage, Iraq’s Decade of Deception and America’s False Premise for War)
Aug 2 Sec State Powell Sec Def Rumsfeld VP Cheney Natl Sec Adv Rice met CIA said chemical
factory in Kurdistan with Al Qaeda terrorists located Alberto Gonzalez believed this was evidence Al Qaeda was in Iraq and making WMD
Aug 4 Under Secretary of Defense for Arms Control Bolton told BBC US didn’t care
whether new UN inspections happened because goal was regime change in Iraq
(Musings On Iraq review Wanting War: Why the Bush Administration Invaded Iraq)
(Musings On Iraq UN Inspectors Were Right Iraq Was Not A Threat)
(Musings On Iraq Iraq’s Rejection of UN Inspectors Led To Mistrust Over WMD and 2003 Invasion)
Aug 4 Head of President’s Foreign Intel Board and Frm Natl Sec Adv Scowcroft gave TV interview
saying US should not invade Iraq Said would undermine war on terror and throw Middle East into turmoil Said UN inspectors should deal with Iraq’s WMD
Aug 5 Secretary of State Powell told Bush that Iraq invasion would dominate 1st term
and US would be responsible for Iraq afterward Said US had to go through UN to disarm Iraq and build international Coalition Bush said he wanted a coalition
(Musings On Iraq Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction’s “Hard Lessons” – Part I: Planning for Postwar Iraq September 2001 to May 2003)
(Musings On Iraq review Leap of Faith, Hubris Negligence, and America’s Greatest Foreign
Policy Tragedy)
(Musings On Iraq review Bush At War)
(Musings On Iraq review Plan of Attack: The Definitive Account Of The Decision To Invade
Iraq)
(Musings On Iraq review Losing Iraq, Inside The Post War Reconstruction Fiasco)
(Musings On Iraq Overview of America’s Policy Towards Iraq: From The Clinton Years To The
Sectarian War of 2006)
Aug 5 CENTCOM cmdr Gen Franks briefed Bush on latest version of Iraq war plan Had
original Generated Start plan Running Start which would have quicker build up and new Hybrid Plan which would be immediate start to war Franks said there was no postwar plan and he wanted to withdraw US forces as quickly as possible
Aug 5 After CENTCOM cmdr Gen Franks presented latest war plan Postwar Iraq discussed Bush
asked CIA Dir Tenet how Iraqis would react to US invasion Tenet said most Iraqis would welcome it
Aug 5 Report Bush official said 9/11 hijacker Atta met with Iraqi intel in Prague in 2001
(Musings On Iraq Overview of America’s Policy Towards Iraq: From The Clinton Years To The
Sectarian War of 2006)
Aug 6 National Security Adviser Rice called Secretary of State Powell and told him he did a
great job with Bush Said there should be more discussions on what Iraq policy should be Were few actual discussions
(Musings On Iraq review Leap of Faith, Hubris Negligence, and America’s Greatest Foreign
Policy Tragedy)
Aug 6 General Franks told his commanders to switch to Hybrid War Plan
Aug 6 White House Chief of Staff Card called Powell asking for same briefing on Iraq
he’d given Bush day before
Aug 6 Natl Sec Adv Rice paper Liberation Strategy for Iraq Said goal was to transform Iraq into a
democracy Had no strategy on how to achieve that Said when US overthrew Saddam can’t act like an invader Had to pose war as a liberation of the Iraqi people Same time US would have to stay in Iraq for many years
(Musings On Iraq review Overreach, Delusions of Regime Change In Iraq)
(Musings On Iraq review What Happened, Inside the Bush White House and Washington’s Culture of Deception)
(Musings On Iraq review Fiasco: The American Military Adventure In Iraq)
(Musings On Iraq review Plan of Attack: The Definitive Account Of The Decision To Invade
Iraq)
(Musings On Iraq review The Assassins’ Gate, America In Iraq)
(Musings On Iraq review State of Denial, Bush At War, Part III)
(Musings On Iraq review Hard Lessons, The Iraq Reconstruction Experience)
(Musings On Iraq review Blood Money, Wasted Billions, Lost Lives, and Corporate Greed in Iraq)
(Musings On Iraq US Army History of Iraq War Vol 1 – Chapter 3 Maneuvering Into
Position)
(Musings On Iraq Overview of America’s Policy Towards Iraq: From The Clinton Years To The
Sectarian War of 2006)
Aug 6 Def Sec Rumsfeld upset with Natl Sec Adv Rice’s memo on creating democracy in Iraq
Rumsfeld didn’t care about that Wanted to stop terrorism Eliminate WMD and get rid of Saddam
Aug 7 VP Cheney said he was skeptical UN inspectors would find anything in Iraq Said
Iraq could get a nuclear bomb soon
(Musings On Iraq UN Inspectors Were Right Iraq Was Not A Threat)
(Musings On Iraq How US Intelligence Created An Iraqi Nuclear Threat In 2002)
Aug 8 Def Sec Rumsfeld briefed by Under Sec of Def Feith’s office on how CIA not giving accurate
intel on Iraq-Al Qaeda ties
Aug 8 House Majority Leader Armey said that if US didn’t have provocation it would
not have international support for action vs Iraq
Aug 8 PUK KDP INC SCIRI met with Def Sec Rumsfeld and advocated for regime change and
talked about postwar governance INC wanted exiles to endorse Chalabi as leader
(Musings On Iraq review The Man Who Pushed America To War, The Extraordinary Life, Adventures, and Obsessions of Ahmad Chalabi)
(Musings On Iraq review Arrows of the Night: Ahmad Chalabi and the Selling of the Iraq War)
Aug 8 UK Asst Head of Foreign Affairs said that Blair govt needed to plan for more than just
military action vs Iraq
(Musings On Iraq Chilcot Inquiry Section 6.4 Planning and Preparation For A Post-Saddam Hussein Iraq, Mid-2001 to January 2003)
Aug 9 Defense Policy Board member Richard Perle said that removing Saddam would lead to more
peaceful and stable Middle East
(Musings On Iraq review Wanting War: Why the Bush Administration Invaded Iraq)
(Musings On Iraq review Losing Iraq, Inside The Post War Reconstruction Fiasco)
Aug 9 Def Sec Rumsfeld at White House meeting said that US would not occupy Iraq for a long
time and shouldn’t promote democracy
(Musings On Iraq review Liberate And Leave, Fatal Flaws In The Early Strategy For Postwar Iraq)
Aug 9 After White House meeting UnderSecDef Feith told Def Sec Rumsfeld he should not be so
critical of creating a democracy in Iraq Rumsfeld said building democracy complex and not just holding an election
(Musings On Iraq review Overreach, Delusions of Regime Change In Iraq)
(Musings On Iraq review Leap of Faith, Hubris Negligence, and America’s Greatest Foreign
Policy Tragedy)
(Musings On Iraq review The Assassins’ Gate, America In Iraq)
Aug 9 Ahmed Chalabi convinced Ayatollah Hakim to join opposition meeting in Wash DC Would
help cement ISCI as one of parties US would work with after 03 invasion Also helped Chalabi’s standing in Iran
(Musings On Iraq review Arrows of the Night: Ahmad Chalabi and the Selling of the Iraq War)
Aug 10 Clinton’s National Security Adviser Sandy Berger OpEd in Washington Post said just
because U.S. could overthrow Iraq didn't mean it should do it Said power did not mean legitimacy
Aug 12 Iraq invasion plans leaked to Time Supported Rumsfeld’s ideas of a small force
or supporting an Iraqi revolt Rumsfeld allies told Time that Iraq would be simple and quick and that US military questioned using a large invasion force
(Musings On Iraq How Arguments Over Iraq Invasion Plan Were Fought Through Press Leaks)
(Musings On Iraq review Shaping the Plan for Operation Iraqi Freedom, The Role of Military Intelligence Assessment)
(Musings On Iraq review Liberate And Leave, Fatal Flaws In The Early Strategy For Postwar Iraq)
Aug 12 Kissinger OpEd in Washington Post Said he supported Bush for confronting
Saddam but needed to build domestic and international support
Aug 12 UnderSecDef Feith sent Rumsfeld memo to create an exile armed force to help with
invasion 6,000 names submitted 600 passed vetting Only 76 graduated
Aug 12 UK Defense Min report to Blair Bush had authorized military for action against Iraq
(Musings On Iraq Chilcot Report Section 3.4 Development of UK Iraq Strategy and Options, Late July to 14 September 2002)
Aug 12 Def Sec Rumsfeld sent memo to Joint Chiefs head Gen Myers to recruit train equip Iraqi
exiles
Aug 13 Gen Franks briefed Rumsfeld on progress with Hybrid war plan
(Musings On Iraq review Leap of Faith, Hubris Negligence, and America’s Greatest Foreign
Policy Tragedy)
(Musings On Iraq review of Shaping the Plan for Operation Iraqi Freedom, The Role of Military Intelligence Assessment)
Aug 14 NSC meeting Powell said US had to build coalition against Iraq Said Bush should
address Iraq in his UN speech on 9/12/02 Cheney said Bush’s UN speech should attack organization for inaction on Iraq Nat Sec Adv Rice agreed with both Rice presented paper Iraq Goals Objectives Strategy which was approved Said US needed to eliminate Iraq’s WMD End Iraqi threat Stop Iraq terrorizing its people Cut ties to terrorism Maintain unity of Iraq Liberate Iraqi people and create a democracy
(Musings On Iraq review Overreach, Delusions of Regime Change In Iraq)
(Musings On Iraq review What Happened, Inside the Bush White House and Washington’s Culture of Deception)
(Musings On Iraq review Iraq’s Future The aftermath of regime change)
(Musings On Iraq review Leap of Faith, Hubris Negligence, and America’s Greatest Foreign
Policy Tragedy)
(Musings On Iraq review Wanting War: Why the Bush Administration Invaded Iraq)
(Musings On Iraq review Fiasco: The American Military Adventure In Iraq)
(Musings On Iraq review The Assassins’ Gate, America In Iraq)
(Musings On Iraq Overview of America’s Policy Towards Iraq: From The Clinton Years To The
Sectarian War of 2006)
Aug 15 National Security Adviser Rice said US needed to launch pre-emptive strike
against Iraq before it got too strong
(Musings On Iraq review America at the Crossroads, Democracy, Power, and the Neoconservative Legacy)
(Musings On Iraq review Wanting War: Why the Bush Administration Invaded Iraq)
(Musings On Iraq review Leap of Faith, Hubris Negligence, and America’s Greatest Foreign Policy Tragedy)
Aug 15 Undersecretary of Defense for Policy Feith’s office briefed CIA officials on its
findings that Iraq and Al Qaeda had cooperated for years
(Musings On Iraq Overview of America’s Policy Towards Iraq: From The Clinton Years To The
Sectarian War of 2006)
Aug 15 1st President Bush’s National Security Adviser Scowcroft wrote Wall St
Journal OpEd saying Saddam not threat to US and not connected to 9/11
Aug 15 Powell called Scowcroft thanking him for OpEd saying it would help for
arguments within administration over Iraq
Aug 15 Dep head of UK embassy to US wrote that White House talking about when war would start
not if it would happen
(Musings On Iraq Chilcot Report Section 3.4 Development of UK Iraq Strategy and Options, Late July to 14 September 2002)
Aug 15 Jalal Talabani invited US and England to invade Iraq from PUK territory
Aug 16 NSC meeting Powell argued for going to UN for new resolution on Iraq Bush
agreed
(Musings On Iraq Overview of America’s Policy Towards Iraq: From The Clinton Years To The
Sectarian War of 2006)
(Musings On Iraq review Rise Of The Vulcans, The History of Bush’s War Cabinet)
Aug 16 Member of Undersecretary of Defense for Policy Feith’s office claimed its
Aug 15 briefing convinced CIA Director Tenet to reconsider Iraq-Al Qaeda relationship Tenet denied that saying the briefing had provided nothing new CIA’s intelligence said Iraq and Al Qaeda had connections but no cooperation which Feith’s office claimed
(Musings On Iraq Overview of America’s Policy Towards Iraq: From The Clinton Years To The
Sectarian War of 2006)
(Musings On Iraq review Leap of Faith, Hubris Negligence, and America’s Greatest Foreign Policy
Tragedy)
Aug 17 Pentagon memo argued against State suggestion that US would have to run Iraq after
invasion State didn’t think Iraqi exiles could run Iraq Said agreed exiles had problems but US had to push them to prepare for the challenge Rejected a US occupation and said Iraq invasion should be like invasion of France in WWII when US fought with French forces to liberate their country Said were many bad elements in Iraq like radical Shiites communists Wahabis Al Qaeda that could fill vacuum after war so US had to put exiles into power
(Musings On Iraq review Leap of Faith, Hubris Negligence, and America’s Greatest Foreign
Policy Tragedy)
(Musings On Iraq review Fiasco: The American Military Adventure In Iraq)
(Musings On Iraq review Losing Iraq, Inside The Post War Reconstruction Fiasco)
Aug 17 Iraq intelligence issued order to keep an eye out for Abu Musab al-Zarqawi
(Musings On Iraq review Insurgent Iraq, Al Zarqawi and the New Generation)
(Musings On Iraq review ISIS Inside The Army of Terror, Revised & Updated)
Aug 17 CIA made 1st paper explaining assessment of aluminum tubes Said they were for
nuclear program Said high specifications showed they were for centrifuges
(Musings On Iraq How A Contested Aluminum Tubes Story Became The Basis For War With Iraq)
(Musings On Iraq review The WMD Mirage, Iraq’s Decade of Deception and America’s False Premise for War)
Aug 18 VP Cheney met with Sen Lott who said US public wasn’t ready for Iraq war because case
hadn’t been made for why Cheney said case would be made soon
Aug 20 Def Sec Rumsfeld said Al Qaeda operatives were in Iraq and that US needed to launch
pre-emptive strike because couldn't wait for Iraq to get stronger
(Musings On Iraq review America at the Crossroads, Democracy, Power, and the Neoconservative Legacy)
(Musings On Iraq review Wanting War: Why the Bush Administration Invaded Iraq)
(Musings On Iraq review Leap of Faith, Hubris Negligence, and America’s Greatest Foreign Policy
Tragedy)
(Musings On Iraq review What Happened, Inside the Bush White House and Washington’s Culture of Deception)
Aug 20 Undersecretary of Defense for Policy Feith’s Policy Counterterrorism Evaluation
Group met with CIA to discuss Iraq-Al Qaeda ties Complained CIA didn’t believe Iraq involved in 9/11 Brought up story that 9/11 hijacker Atta met with Iraqi intelligence in Prague in 2001
(Musings On Iraq review Leap of Faith, Hubris Negligence, and America’s Greatest Foreign
Policy Tragedy)
(Musings On Iraq Overview of America’s Policy Towards Iraq: From The Clinton Years To The
Sectarian War of 2006)
Aug 21 Bush told press he had patience on Iraq and was thinking of all the options Part of strategy
to privately work on war plans while publicly denying it
(Musings On Iraq review Leap of Faith, Hubris Negligence, and America’s Greatest Foreign
Policy Tragedy)
(Musings On Iraq Review Hubris, The Inside Story of Spin, Scandal, And The Selling Of The Iraq War)
(Musings On Iraq review The Bush Administrations and Saddam Hussein, Deciding on Conflict)
(Musings On Iraq review Plan of Attack: The Definitive Account Of The Decision To Invade
Iraq)
Aug 23 UK intel said it knew little about Iraq’s WMD since 1988
(Musings On Iraq Review The Report of the Iraq Inquiry, Executive Summary)
Aug 25 James Baker OpEd in New York Times said US needed UN resolution that Iraq
submit to inspections anytime Said US needed to be explicit that if Iraq avoided the inspections US would invade and change the govt
Aug 26 VP Cheney speech called Iraq a mortal threat to US Said no doubt that Iraq had WMD and
that it was good at deceiving weapons inspectors Claimed Iraqi defectors like Hussein Kamil proved Iraq had renewed its nuclear program Hussein actually said Iraq had ended its nuclear program in the 1990s and was killed in 1996 so had no way to know what Iraq was doing in 2002
(Musings On Iraq review What Happened, Inside the Bush White House and Washington’s Culture of Deception)
(Musings On Iraq review Iraq’s Future The aftermath of regime change)
(Musings On Iraq review Wanting War: Why the Bush Administration Invaded Iraq)
(Musings On Iraq review Leap of Faith, Hubris Negligence, and America’s Greatest Foreign
Policy Tragedy)
(Musings On Iraq review The WMD Mirage, Iraq’s Decade of Deception and America’s False Premise for War)
(Musings On Iraq UN Inspectors Were Right Iraq Was Not A Threat)
(Musings On Iraq Iraq’s Rejection of UN Inspectors Led To Mistrust Over WMD and 2003 Invasion)
Aug 26 Sec State Powell argued that US had to go through UN to deal with Iraq at National Security
Council Said VP Cheney’s speech undermined policy Natl Sec Adv Rice agreed with Powell Said she would do something about Cheney Bush also angry with Cheney speech
(Musings On Iraq review Rise Of The Vulcans, The History of Bush’s War Cabinet)
(Musings On Iraq review Losing Iraq, Inside The Post War Reconstruction Fiasco)
(Musings On Iraq Overview of America’s Policy Towards Iraq: From The Clinton Years To The
Sectarian War of 2006)
Aug 26 Turkish Foreign Min official talked with Def Sec Rumsfeld who said Iraq war plans being
made but no final decision Invasion would include US using Turkey
Aug 27 Cheney gave speech calling Saddam a threat that needed a pre-emptive strike to
remove him
(Musings On Iraq review America at the Crossroads, Democracy, Power, and the Neoconservative Legacy)
(Musings On Iraq review Wanting War: Why the Bush Administration Invaded Iraq)
(Musings On Iraq review Leap of Faith, Hubris Negligence, and America’s Greatest Foreign Policy Tragedy)
Aug 27 Hosni Mubarak said that Arab League opposed invasion of Iraq
Aug 28 Def Policy Board’s Ken Adelman Wall St Journal OpEd Said Saddam worse
threat than Al Qaeda Argued UN not the answer and everyday delaying removing Saddam was a danger to US
(Musings On Iraq review Wanting War: Why the Bush Administration Invaded Iraq)
Aug 29 Bush signed Iraq: Goals, Objectives, Strategy that said US would use all means to remove
Saddam Said US would work with Iraqi exiles and not occupy Iraq Would build democracy in Iraq and help rebuild country Contradicted Pentagon’s vision of postwar Iraq that wouldn’t include rebuilding
(Musings On Iraq review Overreach, Delusions of Regime Change In Iraq)
(Musings On Iraq review of Shaping the Plan for Operation Iraqi Freedom, The Role of Military Intelligence Assessment)
(Musings On Iraq review Wanting War: Why the Bush Administration Invaded Iraq)
(Musings On Iraq review Leap of Faith, Hubris Negligence, and America’s Greatest Foreign
Policy Tragedy)
(Musings On Iraq Review Hubris, The Inside Story of Spin, Scandal, And The Selling Of The Iraq War)
(Musings On Iraq review The Bush Administrations and Saddam Hussein, Deciding on Conflict)
(Musings On Iraq Overview of America’s Policy Towards Iraq: From The Clinton Years To The
Sectarian War of 2006)
Aug 29 Bush’s Iraq: Goals, Objectives, Strategy led CENTCOM to start postwar planning Was never
a priority
(Musings On Iraq review Hard Lessons, The Iraq Reconstruction Experience)
(Musings On Iraq review Blood Money, Wasted Billions, Lost Lives, and Corporate Greed in Iraq)
(Musings On Iraq US Army History of Iraq War Vol 1 – Chapter 3 Maneuvering Into
Position)
Aug 29 Bush and Blair talked about tough UN resolution on Iraq disarmament and how
Saddam wouldn't comply leading to conflict
(Musings On Iraq Chilcot Report Section 3.4 Development of UK Iraq Strategy and Options, Late July to 14 September 2002)
Aug 29 Cheney spoke at Veterans of Korea War about Iraq threat Said Iraqis would
welcome US invasion with joy
(Musings On Iraq Overview of America’s Policy Towards Iraq: From The Clinton Years To The
Sectarian War of 2006)
Aug 29 UK Foreign Office paper said rebuilding Iraq would be a long and costly affair
(Musings On Iraq Review The Report of the Iraq Inquiry, Executive Summary)
(Musings On Iraq Chilcot Inquiry Section 6.4 Planning and Preparation For A Post-Saddam Hussein Iraq, Mid-2001 to January 2003)
Aug 29 IAEA spokesman in London Times No evidence Iraq rebuilding nuclear
facilities Would be easy to find by spy satellites
(Musings On Iraq How US Intelligence Created An Iraqi Nuclear Threat In 2002)
Aug 29 Chirac said France opposed unilateral and pre-emptive action by U.S. against Iraq
Aug 30 Blair decided UK strategy would be to get UN to issue resolution that would
give ultimatum to Iraq on inspectors or else
(Musings On Iraq Chilcot Report Section 3.4 Development of UK Iraq Strategy and Options, Late July to 14 September 2002)
(Musings On Iraq Review The Report of the Iraq Inquiry, Executive Summary)
(Musings On Iraq UN Inspectors Were Right Iraq Was Not A Threat)
(Musings On Iraq Iraq’s Rejection of UN Inspectors Led To Mistrust Over WMD and 2003 Invasion)
Aug 30 UK Asst Head of Foreign Affairs told UK Amb to US Sir David Manning that Blair govt
needed to start postwar planning for Iraq Manning said it was too soon to do that
(Musings On Iraq Chilcot Inquiry Section 6.4 Planning and Preparation For A Post-Saddam Hussein Iraq, Mid-2001 to January 2003)
Sep 1 Fmr Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger said that he was scared that Richard
Perle and Paul Wolfowitz were arguing that Iraq invasion would be easy Said he was scared that U.S. would get bogged down in Iraq because hadn’t planned for it well
(Musings On Iraq review Fiasco: The American Military Adventure In Iraq)
Sep 2 Bush told Blair Iraq had WMD and unclear how quickly it could get nukes
Sep 2 NSC met to discuss how to approach UN on Iraq Powell wanted new inspections
Cheney said that would be useless Bush decided to ask for new inspections
(Musings On Iraq review Rise Of The Vulcans, The History of Bush’s War Cabinet)
(Musings On Iraq review Losing Iraq, Inside The Post War Reconstruction Fiasco)
(Musings On Iraq UN Inspectors Were Right Iraq Was Not A Threat)
(Musings On Iraq Iraq’s Rejection of UN Inspectors Led To Mistrust Over WMD and 2003 Invasion)
Sep 2 Bush told NSC he wanted Congressional resolution for use of force vs Iraq
Thought it would be easy with elections coming
(Musings On Iraq review Leap of Faith, Hubris Negligence, and America’s Greatest Foreign Policy
Tragedy)
Sep 3 White House Iraq Group met for 1st time Decided on 1st propaganda campaign to promote
war with argument Iraq could get a nuclear bomb and the smoking gun could be a mushroom cloud Campaign started Sep 8
(Musings On Iraq How The Bush White House Used Leaked Intelligence To Launch A Media
Campaign Against Iraq In September 2002)
(Musings On Iraq review Leap of Faith, Hubris Negligence, and America’s Greatest Foreign
Policy Tragedy)
Sep 3 White House Iraq Group decided to ask for Congressional resolution of force vs Iraq before
midterm elections
Sep 3 Iraqi opposition met with US officials in London to draft part of Future of Iraq Project
Sep 3 Blair press conference said Saddam threat because of WMD that had to be
dealt with
(Musings On Iraq Chilcot Inquiry Sec 4.2 Iraq WMD Assessments, July to September 2002)
(Musings On Iraq Review The Report of the Iraq Inquiry, Executive Summary)
(Musings On Iraq review A War Of Choice, The British In Iraq 2003-9)
Sep 3 UK Amb to UN warned that body did not believe in using force against Iraq
(Musings On Iraq Chilcot Report Section 3.4 Development of UK Iraq Strategy and Options, Late July to 14 September 2002)
Sep 3 Abu Zubayda former Al Qaeda chief of operations told interrogators bin Laden against alliance
with Iraq but open to informal cooperation Zubaydah not bin Laden pushed ties with Iraq
Sep 4 Bush met with Congressional leaders to lobby for resolution on use of force
vs Iraq Many were receptive to idea House majority leader Dick Armey told Bush if he invaded Iraq US would be stuck in a quagmire
(Musings On Iraq review Leap of Faith, Hubris Negligence, and America’s Greatest Foreign Policy Tragedy)
(Musings On Iraq Review Hubris, The Inside Story of Spin, Scandal, And The Selling Of The Iraq War)
(Musings On Iraq review The Bush Administrations and Saddam Hussein, Deciding on Conflict)
Sep 4 Rumsfeld briefed large number of Congressmen on Iraq He wasn’t prepared and
wouldn’t divulge any info on threat
Sep 4 Bush sent letter to Speaker of House saying US had to deal with disarming Iraq
Sep 4 Rep Ike Skelton wrote letter to Pres Bush “To win victory is easy, to preserve its
fruits, difficult”
Sep 4 UK Defense Ministry paper said that US had no clear postwar strategy for Iraq
and that meant no winning plan Warned postwar Iraq would take a long time
(Musings On Iraq Review The Report of the Iraq Inquiry, Executive Summary)
(Musings On Iraq review Fiasco: The American Military Adventure In Iraq)
(Musings On Iraq Chilcot Inquiry Section 6.1 Development of the Military Options for an Invasion of Iraq)
(Musings On Iraq Chilcot Inquiry Section 6.4 Planning and Preparation For A Post-Saddam Hussein Iraq, Mid-2001 to January 2003)
Sep 4 Blair told Foreign Secretary Cook Iraq’s army depleted so he was trying to get
nuclear weapons
Sep 4 UK Foreign Office memo Would be very hard to get UN to vote on any resolution setting
ultimatum for Iraq to comply with weapons inspections or face consequences
(Musings On Iraq Chilcot Report Section 3.4 Development of UK Iraq Strategy and Options, Late July to 14 September 2002)
(Musings On Iraq Chilcot Report Section 3.5 Development of UK Strategy and Options September to November 2002 – Negotiation of Resolution 1441)
Sep 4 Report on whether Iraq working on nuclear program or not Quoted INC defector
ex-nuke scientist Hamza who claimed Iraq could have a bomb by 2005 Reporters taken to nuclear facility at al Qaim and was destroyed
(Musings On Iraq How US Intelligence Created An Iraqi Nuclear Threat In 2002)
(Musings On Iraq review Hoodwinked, The Documents That Reveal How Bush Sold Us a War)
Sep 4 Germany’s Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder ruled out German participation in any Iraq
war even with UN and EU approval
Sep 5 Blair officials met over draft of WMD dossier Said Iraq had capability to produce
WMD Not sure it had made any Discussed WMD dossier Said Iraq had nuclear program but couldn't make weapon with sanctions
Sep 5 Powell called CENTCOM Cmdr Gen Franks saying he was worried not enough
troops planned for invasion Franks told Powell thanks for the advice but US military different from when he served
(Musings On Iraq review Leap of Faith, Hubris Negligence, and America’s Greatest Foreign Policy Tragedy)
Sep 5 Arab League rejected any attack upon Iraq
Sep 6 Rumsfeld and Gen Franks briefed Bush and NSC on latest war plans Gen Franks
told Bush and NSC US had been looking for Iraq SCUDs and WMD for 10 yrs and hadn’t found any Gen Franks believed Iraq had WMD but hadn’t found any to target
(Musings On Iraq review Leap of Faith, Hubris Negligence, and America’s Greatest Foreign
Policy Tragedy)
(Musings On Iraq review of Shaping the Plan for Operation Iraqi Freedom, The Role of Military Intelligence Assessment)
(Musings On Iraq Iraq One Of The Worst Intelligence Failures In US History)
Sep 6 NSC met without Bush Cheney argued going to UN was waste of time and said Bush just
needed to give speech at body saying Iraq was a threat Powell argued for new UN resolution to win support Warned of consequences of war Cheney said Saddam was a threat and nothing else mattered
(Musings On Iraq review Rise Of The Vulcans, The History of Bush’s War Cabinet)
(Musings On Iraq review Losing Iraq, Inside The Post War Reconstruction Fiasco)
(Musings On Iraq Overview of America’s Policy Towards Iraq: From The Clinton Years To The
Sectarian War of 2006)
Sep 6 Putin told Bush skeptical about use of force against Iraq but willing to work on
new UN resolution demanding inspectors
(Musings On Iraq Chilcot Report Section 3.4 Development of UK Iraq Strategy and Options, Late July to 14 September 2002)
Sep 6 US officials told Knight Ridder no increase in threat from Iraq
Sep 6 UK Treasury Office paper said rebuilding Iraq could cost more than $10 bil
(Musings On Iraq Review The Report of the Iraq Inquiry, Executive Summary)
(Musings On Iraq Chilcot Inquiry Section 6.4 Planning and Preparation For A Post-Saddam Hussein Iraq, Mid-2001 to January 2003)
Sep 6 Report IAEA report found Iraq rebuilding buildings at nuclear site IAEA said no evidence
work had to do with nuclear program but not included in article
Sep 6 Bush and VP Cheney had dinner with PM Blair and spokesman Campbell Blair said had to go to UN over Iraq to win intl support
(Musings On Iraq review A War Of Choice, The British In Iraq 2003-9)
Sep 6 Joint Chief’s Strategy Plans and Police dir said CENTCOM didn’t understand importance of
the Iraqi opposition to stabilize Iraq after invasion
Sep 7 NSC meeting debated whether US should go to UN and ask for return of weapons inspectors
Sec State Powell for Cheney against Powell brought up his concerns about size of Iraq invasion force at NSC Cheney argued for 30-60 day ultimatum for Saddam to step down Said Iraq developing WMD so fast US couldn’t wait Briefing book for meeting included argument for invading Iraq, how Iraq would be run after Saddam Lessons learned from occupation of Germany and Japan after WWII
(Musings On Iraq UN Inspectors Were Right Iraq Was Not A Threat)
(Musings On Iraq Iraq’s Rejection of UN Inspectors Led To Mistrust Over WMD and 2003 Invasion)
(Musings On Iraq Overview of America’s Policy Towards Iraq: From The Clinton Years To The
Sectarian War of 2006)
(Musings On Iraq review Leap of Faith, Hubris Negligence, and America’s Greatest Foreign
Policy Tragedy)
(Musings On Iraq review Losing Iraq, Inside The Post War Reconstruction Fiasco)
(Musings On Iraq review Rise Of The Vulcans, The History of Bush’s War Cabinet)
Sep 7 Blair and Bush met and decided on new UN resolution demanding new inspections
in Iraq Blair told Bush they should seek 2 UN resolutions 1 for inspectors 2nd for if Iraq didn’t comply Blair said that UK would take part in any military action against Iraq Blair said rebuilding Iraq would be a major effort Might need troops to stay in Iraq for up to 18 months
(Musings On Iraq review A War Of Choice, The British In Iraq 2003-9)
(Musings On Iraq Review The Report of the Iraq Inquiry, Executive Summary)
(Musings On Iraq review Days Of Fire, Bush and Cheney in the White House)
(Musings On Iraq Chilcot Report Section 3.4 Development of UK Iraq Strategy and Options, Late July to 14 September 2002)
(Musings On Iraq Chilcot Report Section 3.5 Development of UK Strategy and Options September to November 2002 – Negotiation of Resolution 1441)
Sep 7 Bush and Blair press conference Both said IAEA found Iraq had nuclear program
and was 6 months away from getting a bomb Were referring to 1996 IAEA report during UN inspections not new one
(Musings On Iraq How US Intelligence Created An Iraqi Nuclear Threat In 2002)
Sep 8 Day 1 of White House PR campaign about Iraq WMD and nuclear threat
(Musings On Iraq How The Bush White House Used Leaked Intelligence To Launch A Media
Campaign Against Iraq In September 2002)
(Musings On Iraq How US Intelligence Created An Iraqi Nuclear Threat In 2002)
(Musings On Iraq Iraq One Of The Worst Intelligence Failures In US History)
(Musings On Iraq review Leap of Faith, Hubris Negligence, and America’s Greatest Foreign Policy
Tragedy)
(Musings On Iraq review What Happened, Inside the Bush White House and Washington’s Culture of Deception)
(Musings On Iraq review The WMD Mirage, Iraq’s Decade of Deception and America’s False Premise for War)
Sep 8 NY Times article quoted Iraqi defector saying Iraq renewed WMD program Had
large stockpiles 2nd Iraqi defector said Saddam wanted to restart his nuclear program Quoted White House official who said sign of Iraq’s nuclear program may be a mushroom cloud Bush administration leaked story to NY Times that Iraq was trying to buy aluminum tubes for centrifuges for its nuclear program
(Musings On Iraq How A Contested Aluminum Tubes Story Became The Basis For War With Iraq)
Sep 8 National Security Adviser Rice and Vice President Cheney went on TV repeating
claim Iraq rebuilding nuke program Used aluminum tubes as proof and quoted NY Times article on same topic
Sep 8 Defense Secretary Rumsfeld Secretary of State Powell Joint Chiefs head Gen
Myers all appeared on talk shows promoting Iraq as a threat due to WMD and nuke program
Sep 8 1st time admin officials said proof of Iraq’s nuke program “may be a mushroom
cloud” that would be repeated by others later on “Mushroom cloud” line came from White House speechwriter Gerson at a White House Iraq Group meeting
Sep 8 VP Cheney told Meet The Press 9/11 hijacker met with Iraqi intelligence in Prague in
2001
(Musings On Iraq review What Happened, Inside the Bush White House and Washington’s Culture of Deception)
(Musings On Iraq review The One Percent Doctrine, Deep Inside America’s Pursuit Of Its Enemies Since 9/11)
Sep 8 Ex-Pres Clinton OpEd in Observer said Iraq was a threat but didn’t know if it required an
invasion
Sep 8 Former UN inspector Scott Ritter addressed Iraq’s parliament Said US about to
launch historically mistaken war on Iraq without presenting hard evidence of its about Ira having WMD and being connected to 9/11
Sep 9 UK intel report Iraq had WMD and producing it Said Saddam would use WMD if threatened
Could fire missiles with WMD at Israel Claimed Iraq could deploy WMD in 45 mins Butler Report said report mostly based upon judgements of what Iraq was doing rather than actual evidence
(Musings On Iraq Chilcot Inquiry Sec 4.2 Iraq WMD Assessments, July to September 2002)
Sep 9 State Dept spokesman mentioned that Iraq tried to buy aluminum tubes for centrifuges for
nuke program to reporters
(Musings On Iraq How A Contested Aluminum Tubes Story Became The Basis For War With Iraq)
(Musings On Iraq review The WMD Mirage, Iraq’s Decade of Deception and America’s False Premise for War)
Sep 9 French Pres Chirac told NY Times needed to be 2 UN resolutions 1 on inspectors 2nd if Iraq
didn’t comply and that he didn’t support regime change
(Musings On Iraq Chilcot Report Section 3.4 Development of UK Iraq Strategy and Options, Late July to 14 September 2002)
Sep 9 Iran’s Supreme National Security Council met over impending US invasion of Iraq Decided
on short and long term policy to protect Tehran’s interests
(Musings On Iraq Iran’s Policy Towards Iraq)
Sep 9 Iraqi-American doctor from Cleveland went to Iraq for CIA to talk to her brother who
worked on Iraq’s nuke program Brother said program ended in 1991 Doctor one of dozens that talked with relatives in Iraq working on WMD-nuclear programs Info never used in any major reports CIA thought it was part of Iraqi disinformation campaign
(Musings On Iraq review State of War, The Secret History of the CIA and the Bush Administration)
(Musings On Iraq Overview of America’s Policy Towards Iraq: From The Clinton Years To The
Sectarian War of 2006)
Sep 10 Blair speech said Iraq not an imminent threat but had to be dealt with before it
became one
(Musings On Iraq review A War Of Choice, The British In Iraq 2003-9)
Sep 10 Draft of UK dossier on Iraq’s WMD included claim Iraq could deploy battlefield
WMD in 45 minutes Came from Iyad Allawi’s Iraqi National Accord Said it had bought large amounts of uranium Had mobile WMD labs
(Musings On Iraq Review The Report of the Iraq Inquiry, Executive Summary)
(Musings On Iraq How Iraqi Defector CURVEBALL Became Basis For US Claims That Iraq Had WMD)
Sep 10 NSC meeting on Bush’s UN speech Rumsfeld and Cheney argued against going
to UN Draft of speech didn't call for UN action on Iraq
Sep 10 US Intel officers told Wash Post not strong link between Iraq and Al Qaeda
Sep 10 European Commission President Romano Prodi warned that a U.S. unilateral war
in Iraq would undermine U.S. foreign policy and its anti-terrorism coalition
Sep 10 Iraq took journalists to Tuwaitha site that US claimed was a nuclear facility Were
shown three empty and broken down buildings
(Musings On Iraq How US Intelligence Created An Iraqi Nuclear Threat In 2002)
Sep 11 UK intel report that Iraq was producing WMD 7 days a week in facilities throughout the
country Warned that overthrowing Saddam would increase chances of WMD falling into hands of terrorists and terrorism in general
(Musings On Iraq Review The Report of the Iraq Inquiry, Executive Summary)
Sep 11 Blair said parliament had to discuss Iraq and WMD Said war with Iraq would
increase terrorist threat but Saddam giving WMD to terrorists was a larger concern
(Musings On Iraq review A War Of Choice, The British In Iraq 2003-9)
Sep 11 Bush told Rice and Powell he would ask for new UN resolution vs Iraq
(Musings On Iraq review Rise Of The Vulcans, The History of Bush’s War Cabinet)
Sep 11 Bush said he had gotten support from Australian Premier Howard and Spanish
Pres Aznar for action against Iraq
Sep 11 Senator Graham asked CIA for new National Intelligence Estimate on Iraq
Sep 11 White House asked CIA to clear use of aluminum tubes story for Bush UN speech
(Musings On Iraq How A Contested Aluminum Tubes Story Became The Basis For War With Iraq)
(Musings On Iraq review The WMD Mirage, Iraq’s Decade of Deception and America’s False Premise for War)
Sep 11 Bush speechwriter Gerson called another speechwriter Gibson that Iraq tried to
buy uranium from Niger and wanted it included in Bush’s UN speech CIA was going to allow Niger claim be used in Bush’s UN speech initially, but then changed mind saying it was single source and unconfirmed
(Musings On Iraq How US Intelligence Failed The Iraq-Niger Uranium Story)
(Musings On Iraq Review Hubris, The Inside Story of Spin, Scandal, And The Selling Of The Iraq War)
Sep 11 VP Cheney went to Pentagon to join Def Sec Rumsfeld and brief senators on Iraq threat
Sep 12 Bush UN speech Said Iraq growing threat Could build a nuclear bomb within a
year if got materials Said Iraq tried to buy aluminum tubes for nuke program
(Musings On Iraq How The Bush White House Used Leaked Intelligence To Launch A Media
Campaign Against Iraq In September 2002)
(Musings On Iraq How US Intelligence Created An Iraqi Nuclear Threat In 2002)
(Musings On Iraq Iraq One Of The Worst Intelligence Failures In US History)
(Musings On Iraq How A Contested Aluminum Tubes Story Became The Basis For War With Iraq)
(Musings On Iraq review Leap of Faith, Hubris Negligence, and America’s Greatest Foreign Policy
Tragedy)
(Musings On Iraq review What Happened, Inside the Bush White House and Washington’s Culture of Deception)
(Musings On Iraq review The WMD Mirage, Iraq’s Decade of Deception and America’s False Premise for War)
Sep 12 White House paper Decade of Deception and Defiance Went over Iraq’s human
rights abuses WMD programs Said Iraq had mobile WMD labs Said Iraq tried to buy aluminum tubes for centrifuges for nuclear program Included Dec 01 NY Times report on INC defector Adnan Haideri who claimed he went to secret WMD facilities Haider labeled a fabricator by the DIA in May 2002 but his claims continued to be used Included INC defector Abu Zainab Qairy report that Iraq training terrorists to hijack planes at Salman Pak Story dismissed by CIA
Sep 12 French Foreign Minister said France supported UN resolution on Iraq but UN
should decide action if Iraq didn’t comply
(Musings On Iraq Chilcot Report Section 3.4 Development of UK Iraq Strategy and Options, Late July to 14 September 2002)
Sep 12 Joint Chiefs issued order to form Free Iraqi Force of Iraqi exiles Wasn’t
implemented for 5 months
Sep 12 CIA ordered intel community to come up with National Intelligence Estimate on
Iraq’s WMD and nuclear programs
Sep 12 ABC aired interview with Parisoula Lampsos mistress of Saddam Set up by INC Claimed bin
Laden went to Iraq and got money from Saddam DIA investigated story and found it false
Sep 13 Bush said US might only be certain Iraq had a nuclear device when it used one
(Musings On Iraq How US Intelligence Created An Iraqi Nuclear Threat In 2002)
(Musings On Iraq Iraq One Of The Worst Intelligence Failures In US History)
(Musings On Iraq review What Happened, Inside the Bush White House and Washington’s Culture of Deception)
(Musings On Iraq review The WMD Mirage, Iraq’s Decade of Deception and America’s False Premise for War)
Sep 13 VP Cheney said Iraqis would greet Americans as liberators
Sep 13 US official told Knight Ridder Iraq not close to building bomb to refute Bush’s
claim day before to UN
Sep 13 NY Times article said majority view within US govt was aluminum tubes Iraq
tried to buy were for centrifuges Said State and Energy Depts dissented on tubes but they were in minority
(Musings On Iraq How The Bush White House Used Leaked Intelligence To Launch A Media
Campaign Against Iraq In September 2002)
Sep 13 Report if aluminum tubes Iraq tried to buy were for centrifuges would be first
step in a long process to produce enriched uranium for a nuclear bomb
Sep 13 Energy Dept issued order forbidding employees to mention aluminum tubes Iraq
tried to buy with reporters
(Musings On Iraq How A Contested Aluminum Tubes Story Became The Basis For War With Iraq)
Sep 14 Bush said Iraq had scientists infrastructure and buying equipment to enrich uranium to
build nuclear bomb in a year
(Musings On Iraq How US Intelligence Created An Iraqi Nuclear Threat In 2002)
(Musings On Iraq review What Happened, Inside the Bush White House and Washington’s Culture of Deception)
(Musings On Iraq review The WMD Mirage, Iraq’s Decade of Deception and America’s False Premise for War)
Sep 14 Deputies NSC meeting National Intelligence officer for Strategic Programs said US intel
on Iraq’s WMD didn’t justify a war Said NKorea a bigger threat and when that became public White House would have hard time explaining why it went to war Others at meeting said Iran bigger terrorist threat UnderSecDef Feith dismissed their criticisms
(Musings On Iraq Iraq One Of The Worst Intelligence Failures In US History)
(Musings On Iraq review Leap of Faith, Hubris Negligence, and America’s Greatest Foreign
Policy Tragedy)
Sep 16 Iraq told UN it would allow new weapons inspections with no conditions
(Musings On Iraq UN Inspectors Were Right Iraq Was Not A Threat)
(Musings On Iraq Iraq’s Rejection of UN Inspectors Led To Mistrust Over WMD and 2003 Invasion)
Sep 16 Undersecretary of Defense for Policy Feith’s office briefed VP Cheney’s chief of staff Libby
and Deputy National Security Adviser Hadley on Iraq-Al Qaeda connection Claimed over two dozen high-level meetings between two for more than a decade Claimed Iraq played role in 9/11 Said 1 hijacker given money by Iraq Said hijacker Atta met twice with Iraqi intelligence
(Musings On Iraq review Leap of Faith, Hubris Negligence, and America’s Greatest Foreign
Policy Tragedy)
(Musings On Iraq Overview of America’s Policy Towards Iraq: From The Clinton Years To The
Sectarian War of 2006)
Sep 16 New draft of UK dossier on Iraq said it had recently produced WMD but no evidence
(Musings On Iraq Review The Report of the Iraq Inquiry, Executive Summary)
Sep 17 National Security Strategy for Bush admin released Called for preemptive war to
deal with rogue states
(Musings On Iraq review America at the Crossroads, Democracy, Power, and the Neoconservative Legacy)
(Musings On Iraq review Leap of Faith, Hubris Negligence, and America’s Greatest Foreign
Policy Tragedy)
Sep 17 Undersecretary of Defense Feith aide told Deputy Defense Secretary Wolfowitz
Cheney chief of staff Libby and Deputy National Security Adviser Hadley asked for chronology of 9/11 hijacker Atta’s travels after briefed by Feith’s staff that Atta met with Iraqi intel officer in Prague in 01
(Musings On Iraq Overview of America’s Policy Towards Iraq: From The Clinton Years To The
Sectarian War of 2006)
Sep 18 Def Sec Rumsfeld on TV said Iraqis should remove Saddam
Sep 18 Def Sec Rumsfeld told House committee Iraq was close to acquiring materials to build a
nuclear bomb Said going to war important decision and why Bush had not decided on it yet Said war would not be costly and would not last more than 2 years Said US would not occupy Iraq
(Musings On Iraq How US Intelligence Created An Iraqi Nuclear Threat In 2002)
(Musings On Iraq Iraq One Of The Worst Intelligence Failures In US History)
(Musings On Iraq review Leap of Faith, Hubris Negligence, and America’s Greatest Foreign
Policy Tragedy)
(Musings On Iraq review What Happened, Inside the Bush White House and Washington’s Culture of Deception)
(Musings On Iraq review Bush At War)
(Musings On Iraq review The WMD Mirage, Iraq’s Decade of Deception and America’s False Premise for War)
Sep 18 CIA Paris Station Chief met with Lebanese reporter who said Iraq’s Foreign
Minister Sabri was willing to work with US Reporter passed along message from Sabri that Iraq’s WMD and nuclear programs were not active chemical weapons given to tribal and provincial leaders so wouldn’t be found Station Chief went to CIA HQ to tell about meeting Iraq Operations Group said Sabri was spreading disinformation
Sep 19 Pentagon’s Defense Policy Board met Argued for removing Saddam
Sep 19 Iraq Foreign Min Sabri read letter to UN from Saddam Said Bush’s UN speech was full of
distortions like trying to link Iraq to 9/11 Said Iraq had no WMD
(Musings On Iraq How US Intelligence Created An Iraqi Nuclear Threat In 2002)
(Musings On Iraq review Iraqi Perspectives Project, A View of Operation Iraqi Freedom from Saddam’s Senior Leadership)
Sep 19 Def Sec Rumsfeld told Senate that UN weapons inspections were weak and weren’t going to
find anything Described Iraq’s two nuclear devices programs in 90s Didn’t mention they were too heavy to ever be used Rumsfeld denied US helped Iraq develop WMD during Iran-Iraq War which was false
(Musings On Iraq UN Inspectors Were Right Iraq Was Not A Threat)
(Musings On Iraq Iraq’s Rejection of UN Inspectors Led To Mistrust Over WMD and 2003 Invasion)
Sep 19 CIA released report on Iraq’s ties to terrorism
Sep 19 New intel said Iraq might have offered training to Al Qaeda and safe haven to bin
Laden in 1990s Later proved false
Sep 19 Bush met with 11 Congressmen to lobby them on Iraq policy Said war on terror
going well but real threat was Iraq and WMD
(Musings On Iraq review What Happened, Inside the Bush White House and Washington’s Culture of Deception)
(Musings On Iraq review Leap of Faith, Hubris Negligence, and America’s Greatest Foreign
Policy Tragedy)
(Musings On Iraq Iraq One Of The Worst Intelligence Failures In US History)
Sep 19 White House released language it would use in Congressional resolution to use
force vs Iraq
Sep 19 Institute for Science and Intl Sec said Bush admin was suppressing dissent on
aluminum tubes Iraq tried to buy Institute said tubes not proof of centrifuge program by Iraq
(Musings On Iraq How A Contested Aluminum Tubes Story Became The Basis For War With Iraq)
Sep 20 Pentagon set up planning group to deal with rebuilding Iraq’s oil industry after
invasion
(Musings On Iraq review Leap of Faith, Hubris Negligence, and America’s Greatest Foreign Policy
Tragedy)
(Musings On Iraq review Hard Lessons, The Iraq Reconstruction Experience)
Sep 20 UK Defense Ministry said it could provide forces for military action against Iraq
(Musings On Iraq Review The Report of the Iraq Inquiry, Executive Summary)
(Musings On Iraq Chilcot Inquiry Section 6.1 Development of the Military Options for an Invasion of Iraq)
Sep 20 Time article White House using unsubstantiated stories to make case of Iraq-Al
Qaeda ties
Sep 20 Powell testified to House International Relations Committee to lobby for
Congressional use of force resolution vs Iraq Said there was debate about Iraq’s intent on buying aluminum tubes but Saddam trying to get nuke technology
(Musings On Iraq How A Contested Aluminum Tubes Story Became The Basis For War With Iraq)
(Musings On Iraq review What Happened, Inside the Bush White House and Washington’s Culture of Deception)
(Musings On Iraq review The WMD Mirage, Iraq’s Decade of Deception and America’s False Premise for War)
Sep 20 Blair govt formed Ad Hoc Group to coordinate post-war planning for Iraq across govt
Didn’t make any detailed plans or policy Drafted papers on reconstruction
(Musings On Iraq Chilcot Inquiry Section 6.4 Planning and Preparation For A Post-Saddam Hussein Iraq, Mid-2001 to January 2003)
Sep 21 NY Times article said Bush received detailed Iraq war plan
Sep 22 National Security Adviser Rice said UN sanctions were failing and Iraq using illegal
revenues to develop WMD
(Musings On Iraq review The Regime Change Consensus, Iraq In American Politics 1990-2003)
Sep 23 Blair told cabinet Iraq dossier would show Iraq expanding WMD capabilities and erosion of
sanctions one cause Education Secretary Morris asked Blair what had changed about Iraq to go to war other than Bush being elected Said intl community had to be involved in rebuilding Iraq
Sep 23 Former UN inspector Albright for Inst for Science and Intl Security issued report
aluminum tubes Iraq tried to buy were not for centrifuges Probably rockets
(Musings On Iraq How A Contested Aluminum Tubes Story Became The Basis For War With Iraq)
Sep 23 MI6 Report Iraqi source said Iraq had MWD in glass containers Analysts worried this story
sounded like the movie The Rock Source labeled liar in Feb 2003
(Musings On Iraq Chilcot Inquiry Section 4.3 Iraq WMD Assessments, October 2002 to March 2003)
Sep 24 UK dossier on Iraq WMD released Blair told parliament that Iraq had WMD and
it was producing them Said that Iraq could use WMD in 45 minutes Claimed Iraq could build a nuclear bomb in 2 years Included story Iraq tried to buy uranium from Africa Said no definitive intelligence that aluminum tubes Iraq tried to buy were for nuke program Butler Report said dossier made judgements into certainties that didn’t exist
(Musings On Iraq Chilcot Inquiry Sec 4.2 Iraq WMD Assessments, July to September 2002)
(Musings On Iraq Review The Report of the Iraq Inquiry, Executive Summary)
(Musings On Iraq How US Intelligence Failed The Iraq-Niger Uranium Story)
(Musings On Iraq How A Contested Aluminum Tubes Story Became The Basis For War With Iraq)
Sep 24 UK Foreign Secretary Cook was surprised dossier on Iraq was mostly old WMD
material
Sep 24 CIA Dir Tenet briefed Senate Foreign Relations Committee on intel on Iraq’s
WMD Told committee Iraq rebuilding its nuclear program Proof bought aluminum tubes Mentioned Niger uranium deal Sen Biden asked Tenet what technical evidence did CIA have of Iraqi WMD Tenet said none but had good human sources
(Musings On Iraq How US Intelligence Created An Iraqi Nuclear Threat In 2002)
(Musings On Iraq How US Intelligence Failed The Iraq-Niger Uranium Story)
(Musings On Iraq Review Hubris, The Inside Story of Spin, Scandal, And The Selling Of The Iraq War)
(Musings On Iraq review The WMD Mirage, Iraq’s Decade of Deception and America’s False Premise for War)
Sep 24 After Tenet testified State and Energy Dept intel analysts testified that they did
not believe aluminum tubes were for centrifuges
Sep 25 Bush said couldn't distinguish between Al Qaeda and Saddam in war on terror
because they were equally evil
(Musings On Iraq review Wanting War: Why the Bush Administration Invaded Iraq)
(Musings On Iraq review Leap of Faith, Hubris Negligence, and America’s Greatest Foreign Policy Tragedy)
Sep 25 National Security Adviser Rice said Iraq provided chemical weapons training to Al Qaeda
Came from Al Qaeda commander Libi who made up story under torture in Egypt
(Musings On Iraq review What Happened, Inside the Bush White House and Washington’s Culture of Deception)
Sep 25 Defense Secretary Rumsfeld and CIA Deputy Director McLaughlin briefed
NATO defense ministers on Iraq-Al Qaeda ties
Sep 25 US and UK worked on draft UN resolution demanding inspectors return to Iraq
(Musings On Iraq Review The Report of the Iraq Inquiry, Executive Summary)
(Musings On Iraq UN Inspectors Were Right Iraq Was Not A Threat)
(Musings On Iraq Iraq’s Rejection of UN Inspectors Led To Mistrust Over WMD and 2003 Invasion)
(Musings On Iraq Chilcot Report Section 3.5 Development of UK Strategy and Options September to November 2002 – Negotiation of Resolution 1441)
Sep 25 National Intelligence Office for Strategic and Nuclear Programs had analyst meeting
to draft National Intelligence Estimate on Iraq CIA and DIA analysts said aluminum tubes Iraq tried to buy were for centrifuges and that Iraq reconstitution nuclear program Energy and State Dept analysts said tubes were for rockets
(Musings On Iraq How A Contested Aluminum Tubes Story Became The Basis For War With Iraq)
(Musings On Iraq How US Intelligence Created An Iraqi Nuclear Threat In 2002)
(Musings On Iraq review The WMD Mirage, Iraq’s Decade of Deception and America’s False Premise for War)
Sep 26 Bush met with 18 Congressmen to lobby them on Iraq Said he’d talked to military
commanders and they had no problem with regime change Said Iraq had WMD Building facilities to make more If it got uranium could build a bomb in 6 months Repeated British claim that Iraq could use WMD in 45 min
(Musings On Iraq Iraq One Of The Worst Intelligence Failures In US History)
(Musings On Iraq How US Intelligence Created An Iraqi Nuclear Threat In 2002)
(Musings On Iraq review Leap of Faith, Hubris Negligence, and America’s Greatest Foreign
Policy Tragedy)
(Musings On Iraq review What Happened, Inside the Bush White House and Washington’s Culture of Deception)
(Musings On Iraq review The WMD Mirage, Iraq’s Decade of Deception and America’s False Premise for War)
Sep 26 Bush told press Al Qaeda could become an extension of Iraq and Iraq and Al Qaeda
were both part of war on terror Said each day Iraq could give WMD or a nuke to terrorists
(Musings On Iraq review Iraq’s Future The aftermath of regime change)
(Musings On Iraq review Wanting War: Why the Bush Administration Invaded Iraq)
(Musings On Iraq review What Happened, Inside the Bush White House and Washington’s Culture of Deception)
Sep 26 Secretary of State Powell told Senate Foreign Relations Committee that Iraq-
Niger uranium deal was proof had nuke program Also tried buying aluminum tubes for program
(Musings On Iraq How US Intelligence Failed The Iraq-Niger Uranium Story)
(Musings On Iraq Review Hubris, The Inside Story of Spin, Scandal, And The Selling Of The Iraq War)
(Musings On Iraq How A Contested Aluminum Tubes Story Became The Basis For War With Iraq)
Sep 26 Rumsfeld said Iraq had active WMD programs Said bulletproof confirmation of
ties between Iraq and Al Qaeda
Sep 26 Pentagon and intel officials questioned White House claims of Iraq-Al Qaeda ties
in the press
Sep 26 White House spokesman claimed Iraq trained Al Qaeda in chemical weapons
Sep 26 32 foreign policy experts ran full page ad in New York Times “War with Iraq is not
in America’s national interest”
Sep 28 Bush radio address Said Iraq could launch a WMD attack upon US in 45 minutes
(Musings On Iraq Iraq One Of The Worst Intelligence Failures In US History)
(Musings On Iraq review What Happened, Inside the Bush White House and Washington’s Culture of Deception)
Sep 28 US gave draft UN resolution to France Russia China on new weapons inspectors Gave 7
days for Iraq to provide weapons declaration to UN 23 days to open all WMD sites Set up military bases for inspectors to work out of that would have no fly and no drive zones around them If Iraq failed to meet these demands UN member states were authorized to use all means to restore peace Were meant to make demands that Iraq would never comply with and justify war
(Musings On Iraq UN Inspectors Were Right Iraq Was Not A Threat)
(Musings On Iraq Iraq’s Rejection of UN Inspectors Led To Mistrust Over WMD and 2003 Invasion)
(Musings On Iraq review Leap of Faith, Hubris Negligence, and America’s Greatest Foreign
Policy Tragedy)
Sep 29 CIA report Story by INC defector Abu Zainab Qairy that Iraq trained terrorists at Salman
Pak camp in Baghdad was embellished and exaggerated No Al Qaeda detainee said they were trained at Salman Pak
Sep 30 NYTimes OpEd by Clinton era counterterrorism official Benjamin said Saddam
thought bin Laden a threat and 2 didn’t cooperate
Sep 30 Iraq and UN negotiated new weapons inspections in Vienna but blocked 8
presidential sites US rejected deal
(Musings On Iraq UN Inspectors Were Right Iraq Was Not A Threat)
(Musings On Iraq Iraq’s Rejection of UN Inspectors Led To Mistrust Over WMD and 2003 Invasion)
Sep 30 UK Special Planning Group paper raised concerns that US not adequately planning for
postwar Iraq Worried deBaathification could undermine any new govt Warned about maintaining law and order Said more planning was needed
Oct 1 Head UN inspector Blix met with Iraqi delegation Iraq agreed to UN Res 1284 and
new unconditional inspections Iraq gave CDs on its nuclear facilities to IAEA
(Musings On Iraq UN Inspectors Were Right Iraq Was Not A Threat)
(Musings On Iraq Iraq’s Rejection of UN Inspectors Led To Mistrust Over WMD and 2003 Invasion)
Oct 1 Bush said military option wasn’t first choice with Iraq but disarming country was Part of
strategy to privately work on war plans while publicly denying it
(Musings On Iraq review Plan of Attack: The Definitive Account Of The Decision To Invade
Iraq)
(Musings On Iraq Overview of America’s Policy Towards Iraq: From The Clinton Years To The
Sectarian War of 2006)
Oct 1 Bush and Cheney met with Congressmen to lobby them over Iraq
Oct 1 White House spokesman Fleischer said that assassinating Saddam would be cheaper
way out of Iraq crisis
Oct 1 National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) on Iraq released Said Iraq had WMD
Reported renewed production of mustard, sarin, cyclosporine, VX Reports Iraq bought chemicals and equipment for limited chemical weapons production Had little info on chemical stockpiles, but could be 100-500 metric tons Said all parts of biological weapons program active Had low confidence Iraq would use WMD and no intel that Iraq planning to attack US Speculated that in desperation Iraq might use Al Qaeda for WMD attack on US State Dept had 11 page annex with disagreements with NIE’s findings Said US intelligence community had no compelling case Iraq had active nuclear program Didn’t believe Iraq-Niger uranium story Said Iraq tried to buy aluminum tubes for centrifigues Sign of renewed nuclear program State and Energy Depts disagreed that aluminum tubes were for centrifuges Air Force intelligence didn’t think UAVs for WMD but rather for reconnaissance
(Musings On Iraq How US Intelligence Created An Iraqi Nuclear Threat In 2002)
(Musings On Iraq How US Intelligence Failed The Iraq-Niger Uranium Story)
(Musings On Iraq How A Contested Aluminum Tubes Story Became The Basis For War With Iraq)
(Musings On Iraq Iraq One Of The Worst Intelligence Failures In US History)
(Musings On Iraq The CIA’s Shoddy Pre-War Intelligence Reporting: The Case Of Iraq’s Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs))
(Musings On Iraq Review Hubris, The Inside Story of Spin, Scandal, And The Selling Of The Iraq War)
(Musings On Iraq review The WMD Mirage, Iraq’s Decade of Deception and America’s False Premise for War)
Oct 2 Summary main points of National Intelligence Estimate released Said Iraq
rebuilding nuke and WMD programs
(Musings On Iraq review The WMD Mirage, Iraq’s Decade of Deception and America’s False Premise for War)
Oct 2 Iraq called UK’s weapons dossier propaganda and lies
Oct 2 Bush appeared with Democrats and Republicans calling on Congress to pass
use of force resolution on Iraq
(Musings On Iraq review Leap of Faith, Hubris Negligence, and America’s Greatest Foreign
Policy Tragedy)
(Musings On Iraq review What Happened, Inside the Bush White House and Washington’s Culture of Deception)
Oct 2 Bush said that Iraq had WMD stocks rebuilding programs working on nuclear
programs
(Musings On Iraq How US Intelligence Created An Iraqi Nuclear Threat In 2002)
Oct 2 NY Times article quoted Defense Policy Board’s Richard Perle that CIA was anti-
INC and it provided best intel on Iraq
Oct 2 CIA Director Tenet told Senate CIA had no sources inside Iraq since 1990s
Oct 2 CIA Dep Director McLaughlin told Senate British had stretched story that Iraq tried
to buy uranium from Africa Said low chance Iraq would use WMD Would only use the if attacked Said low chance Iraq would use terrorists against US unless America attacked Iraq
(Musings On Iraq How US Intelligence Failed The Iraq-Niger Uranium Story)
(Musings On Iraq Review Hubris, The Inside Story of Spin, Scandal, And The Selling Of The Iraq War)
Oct 2 Feith office memo Said exiles should organize a conference to create bill of rights for Iraq
before war US wanted a federal system of govt US military would run Iraq after war and work with exiles
Oct 2 UK oil industry representatives told Blair govt official British oil companies could lose out in
Iraq Afraid countries that supported war would get oil deals Official said Foreign Office would commit to UK companies getting fair share of contracts in postwar Iraq
Oct 3 Bush signed executive order to train 5,000 Iraqi exiles to help with invasion
Oct 3 US planes dropped flyers over Iraq telling them not to fight Americans
Oct 3 Report US using No Fly Zones to practice attacking Iraq
Oct 4 Unclassified version of CIA’s report on Iraq’s WMD released by White House
Dropped most of the reservations in original Said disputes within intelligence community over Iraq’s nuke program Said most believed aluminum tubes were for centrifuges Others for rockets
(Musings On Iraq How A Contested Aluminum Tubes Story Became The Basis For War With Iraq)
(Musings On Iraq Iraq One Of The Worst Intelligence Failures In US History)
(Musings On Iraq 2002 CIA White Paper On Iraq Vs the 2002-2003 U.N. Inspectors)
(Musings On Iraq review Hoodwinked, The Documents That Reveal How Bush Sold Us a War)
(Musings On Iraq review The WMD Mirage, Iraq’s Decade of Deception and America’s False Premise for War)
Oct 4 CIA told NSC to remove reference to Iraq trying to buy uranium from Niger
from Bush speech
(Musings On Iraq How US Intelligence Failed The Iraq-Niger Uranium Story)
(Musings On Iraq Review Hubris, The Inside Story of Spin, Scandal, And The Selling Of The Iraq War)
Oct 4 General in charge intel for US invasion met with DIA to go over suspected WMD sites DIA
had no plans on how sites were to be dealt with during invasion General couldn’t confirm there was WMD at any of the 946 sites listed by DIA because intel so bad
Oct 4 CIA’s National Intel Officer told Senate Intel Comm he questioned Iraq-Africa
uranium story in British dossier
Oct 4 UK Foreign Office legal advisor Sir Wood said that UN needed to act on Iraq to give legal
justification for war otherwise British forces could be sued
(Musings On Iraq Review The Report of the Iraq Inquiry, Executive Summary)
Oct 4 Intel officials complained to press that White House pressured them on reports
on Iraq
Oct 4 Report Institute for Science and International Technology, Lawrence Livermore Lab
said didn’t believe aluminum tubes for centrifuges Claimed White House ignored contradictory views on Iraq Pushed US intel to come up with more on Iraq
Oct 4 State Dep Future of Iraq Project met in London INC presented plan written by Kanan
Makiya calling for exiles to set up transitional
(Musings On Iraq review Leap of Faith, Hubris Negligence, and America’s Greatest Foreign Policy
Tragedy)
(Musings On Iraq review Losing Iraq, Inside The Post War Reconstruction Fiasco)
(Musings On Iraq review The Assassins’ Gate, America In Iraq)
(Musings On Iraq review Hard Lessons, The Iraq Reconstruction Experience)
Oct 4 Iraq ambassador to Russia sent note to Baghdad Pres Putin gave instructions to his Foreign Min
to oppose any UN resolutions authorizing force against Iraq
Oct 5 Bush in weekly radio address said U.S. had found Saddam ordered field commanders to use
chemical weapons something Iraq denied it had
(Musings On Iraq review What Happened, Inside the Bush White House and Washington’s Culture of Deception)
(Musings On Iraq review The WMD Mirage, Iraq’s Decade of Deception and America’s False Premise for War)
Oct 5 CIA Dir Tenet told White House to remove Iraq tried to buy uranium from Niger from Bush
speech Said intel was weak
(Musings On Iraq How US Intelligence Failed The Iraq-Niger Uranium Story)
(Musings On Iraq Review Hubris, The Inside Story of Spin, Scandal, And The Selling Of The Iraq War)
Oct 5 Knight Ridder article quoted several intelligence officers that Bush admin ignoring
dissenting opinions on aluminum tubes
(Musings On Iraq How A Contested Aluminum Tubes Story Became The Basis For War With Iraq)
Oct 5 NSC meeting CIA Dir Tenet said CIA didn’t know specific sites where Iraq had WMD that
would provide a smoking gun but certain Iraq had weapons
Oct 5 Def Sec Rumsfeld wrote memo Said US didn’t need new UN resolution to invade Iraq because
already ample justification Said new resolution would just be for politics
Oct 6 Bush said Iraq could have a nuclear weapon in a year if got enriched uranium
(Musings On Iraq How US Intelligence Created An Iraqi Nuclear Threat In 2002)
(Musings On Iraq review What Happened, Inside the Bush White House and Washington’s Culture of Deception)
(Musings On Iraq review The WMD Mirage, Iraq’s Decade of Deception and America’s False Premise for War)
Oct 6 Deputy National Security Advisor Hadley asked CIA Dir Tenet if story of Iraq
trying to buy uranium from Niger could be put back in Bush speech Tenet said no
Oct 6 CIA told NSC to drop mentioning Iraq-Africa uranium story in draft of Bush
speech for 2nd time
(Musings On Iraq How US Intelligence Failed The Iraq-Niger Uranium Story)
(Musings On Iraq Review Hubris, The Inside Story of Spin, Scandal, And The Selling Of The Iraq War)
Oct 7 Bush speech in Cincinnati outlined Iraq’s WMD and nuke threat to lobby for
Congressional use of force resolution Said US tried containment sanctions and inspections and Iraq still had WMD Warned that if Iraq didn’t disarm US would do it Said Iraq great threat because of WMD and its history of aggression Said if Iraq got enriched uranium could have a nuclear bomb in less than a year Said Iraq tried to buy aluminum tubes for its nuclear program Said Al Qaeda and Iraq were united in their hatred for the US and had high level contracts for a decade Claimed Iraq trained Al Qaeda in bomb making and poisons and Saddam celebrated 9/11
(Musings On Iraq review Wanting War: Why the Bush Administration Invaded Iraq)
(Musings On Iraq review Iraq’s Future The aftermath of regime change)
(Musings On Iraq review Leap of Faith, Hubris Negligence, and America’s Greatest Foreign
Policy Tragedy)
(Musings On Iraq review What Happened, Inside the Bush White House and Washington’s Culture of Deception)
(Musings On Iraq review The WMD Mirage, Iraq’s Decade of Deception and America’s False Premise for War)
(Musings On Iraq review The Regime Change Consensus, Iraq In American Politics 1990-2003)
(Musings On Iraq How A Contested Aluminum Tubes Story Became The Basis For War With Iraq)
(Musings On Iraq How US Intelligence Created An Iraqi Nuclear Threat In 2002)
Oct 7 CIA blocked Bush from talking about Iraq trying to buy uranium from Africa in
speech
(Musings On Iraq How US Intelligence Failed The Iraq-Niger Uranium Story)
(Musings On Iraq Review Hubris, The Inside Story of Spin, Scandal, And The Selling Of The Iraq War)
Oct 7 Italian contacted journalist about providing her with Iraq-Niger uranium deal
papers They turned out to be fakes
Oct 7 CIA Director Tenet sent letter to Senate Intelligence Committee Said Iraq
wouldn’t conduct terrorist or WMD attacks upon US unless regime was threatened
Oct 7 CIA Director Tenet letter to Senate said Iraq wouldn’t conduct terrorist or WMD
attacks upon US unless regime threatened Wrote that there were high level Iraq-Al Qaeda ties going back a decade Iraq offered safe haven and non-aggression Iraq provided poison gas training to Al Qaeda Said Al Qaeda operatives in Iraq
Oct 7 Intelligence officials complained to press that White House claims of Iraq-Al
Qaeda ties were exaggerated
Oct 7 Pentagon drafted 2 memos on postwar Iraq 1st said military would assume control of Iraqi
govt maintain security so rebuilding could begin and govt could restart 2nd memo said a military governor would run Iraq and appoint US specialists to run each ministry Didn’t say who would do this as invasion plan was to withdraw quickly Gen Franks said he would not run Iraq after invasion
(Musings On Iraq review State of Denial, Bush At War, Part III)
(Musings On Iraq review Hard Lessons, The Iraq Reconstruction Experience)
Oct 8 White House posted pictures claiming to be Iraq working on three facilities for
nuclear weapons program
(Musings On Iraq How US Intelligence Created An Iraqi Nuclear Threat In 2002)
(Musings On Iraq review The WMD Mirage, Iraq’s Decade of Deception and America’s False Premise for War)
Oct 9 Bush told CENTCOM Commander Gen Franks he was not happy with Iraq war plan
Oct 9 CIA Dir Tenet told Senate Intel Comm Iraq would only use WMD if regime was
threatened
Oct 9 Italian reporter gave US Embassy in Rome copies of documents on alleged Iraq-
Niger uranium deal CIA Rome Station Chief misplaced documents and were never sent to CIA HQ Documents were later proved fakes
(Musings On Iraq How US Intelligence Failed The Iraq-Niger Uranium Story)
(Musings On Iraq Review Hubris, The Inside Story of Spin, Scandal, And The Selling Of The Iraq War)
(Musings On Iraq review The WMD Mirage, Iraq’s Decade of Deception and America’s False Premise for War)
Oct 9 Ex-CIA agents complained to press that Bush admin used slanted intel to make case
against Iraq
Oct 9 Energy Dept official told Guardian he didn’t believe aluminum tubes Iraq tried to
buy were for nuclear program Former UN inspector Albright told Guardian CIA pushing aluminum tubes story while nuclear experts disagreed with it Albright said Lawrence Livermore Lab was told not to voice its doubts about aluminum tubes
(Musings On Iraq How A Contested Aluminum Tubes Story Became The Basis For War With Iraq)
Oct 9 NY Times reporter Judith Miller told Oprah US intel believed Iraq had anthrax and
botullinium toxin
Oct 9 Sen Kerry during Senate debate said after 9/11 no one could be certain that WMD wouldn’t be
used against US or allies in Mideast Sen Clinton said that if Iraq left unchecked its WMD and nuke programs would grow Sen Byrd said he wanted more evidence that Iraq was a threat Sen Kennedy said he saw no persuasive evidence that Iraq was going to get a nuke anytime soon Said attacking Iraq without Un inspectors and intl support would help Al Qaeda and increase terrorism
Oct 10 UK intel report said that Iraq would only launch terrorism if attacked by US and
couldn't use WMD outside its territory Found no cooperation between Iraq and Al Qaeda and attack on Iraq would lead to more terrorism and radicalization Was leaked to press
(Musings On Iraq Review The Report of the Iraq Inquiry, Executive Summary)
(Musings On Iraq Chilcot Report Section 3.5 Development of UK Strategy and Options September to November 2002 – Negotiation of Resolution 1441)
Oct 10 US House of Representatives approved use of force resolution against Iraq 296-33
(Musings On Iraq Overview of America’s Policy Towards Iraq: From The Clinton Years To The
Sectarian War of 2006)
Oct 10 Pew poll 66% in US believed Iraq involved in 9/11 79% believed Iraq had or was close to
building a nuclear bomb
Oct 11 Putin said he supported new inspections in Iraq but doubted Saddam had WMD
Oct 11 Senate passed resolution allowing use of force against Iraq 77-23
(Musings On Iraq Overview of America’s Policy Towards Iraq: From The Clinton Years To The
Sectarian War of 2006)
Oct 11 CIA analysts complained to press they were being pressured by Pentagon about
their Iraq assessments
Oct 11 UK intel report said Iraq would hide its WMD from UN inspectors Said Iraq had extensive
program to hide WMD in residential buildings schools private homes Also had mobile labs that could move around Iraq Worried UN didn’t have enough intel on Iraq to be effective
(Musings On Iraq Chilcot Inquiry Section 4.3 Iraq WMD Assessments, October 2002 to March 2003)
Oct 11 UK Foreign Office paper said UN should administer postwar Iraq Needed coalition to be in
charge of security
(Musings On Iraq Chilcot Inquiry Section 6.4 Planning and Preparation For A Post-Saddam Hussein Iraq, Mid-2001 to January 2003)
Oct 11 UK Amb to US said Bush was very suspicious of UN but thought it was worth trying to get
international support for action against Iraq
Oct 12 Report questioned Bush’s claim Iraq still working on nuclear program based upon ex-
Iraqi nuclear scientist Hamza Ex UN inspector said Hamza exaggerating Hamza provided by INC Former UN Inspector Albright said he talked with nuclear experts at Oak Ridge and Lawrence Livermore who didn’t believe aluminum tubes were for Iraq’s nuclear program
(Musings On Iraq How A Contested Aluminum Tubes Story Became The Basis For War With Iraq)
(Musings On Iraq How US Intelligence Created An Iraqi Nuclear Threat In 2002)
Oct 15 Undersecretary of Defense Feith briefed NSC on plan for governing postwar Iraq
with 3-star general in charge of military and civilian administrator
(Musings On Iraq review State of Denial, Bush At War, Part III)
(Musings On Iraq review Hard Lessons, The Iraq Reconstruction Experience)
Oct 15 Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld wrote list of 29 things that could go wrong with Iraq
war Went over them with Bush Included not finding WMD another state taking advantage of US focus on Iraq, oil shocks Iraq could strike US or allies beforehand could be high collateral damage could lead to ethnosectarian conflict in Iraq Iraq would use WMD on Shiites Iraq could convince world US at war with Muslims Had no follow up on how to deal with any problems listed
(Musings On Iraq Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction’s “Hard Lessons” – Part I: Planning for Postwar Iraq September 2001 to May 2003)
(Musings On Iraq review Leap of Faith, Hubris Negligence, and America’s Greatest Foreign
Policy Tragedy)
Oct 15 Italy’s SISMI intel agency told CIA of Iraq-Niger uranium deal documents
(Musings On Iraq How US Intelligence Failed The Iraq-Niger Uranium Story)
(Musings On Iraq Review Hubris, The Inside Story of Spin, Scandal, And The Selling Of The Iraq War)
(Musings On Iraq review The WMD Mirage, Iraq’s Decade of Deception and America’s False Premise for War)
Oct 16 Iraq held elections where Saddam voted president for another 7 years
Oct 16 Iraq renewed offer for new UN inspections after US rejected deal
(Musings On Iraq UN Inspectors Were Right Iraq Was Not A Threat)
(Musings On Iraq Iraq’s Rejection of UN Inspectors Led To Mistrust Over WMD and 2003 Invasion)
Oct 16 French Pres Chirac said no Iraq Al Qaeda ties and attacking Iraq could lead to new
terrorist attacks
Oct 16 State Dept intel agency gave CIA DIA NSA Energy Dept copies of Iraq-Niger uranium
documents
(Musings On Iraq How US Intelligence Failed The Iraq-Niger Uranium Story)
(Musings On Iraq Review Hubris, The Inside Story of Spin, Scandal, And The Selling Of The Iraq War)
(Musings On Iraq review The WMD Mirage, Iraq’s Decade of Deception and America’s False Premise for War)
Oct 18 Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld told Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Feith to
create postwar planning office for Iraq Cancelled few days later by White House that worried postwar planning could derail invasion
(Musings On Iraq Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction’s “Hard Lessons” – Part I: Planning for Postwar Iraq September 2001 to May 2003)
(Musings On Iraq on Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction Hard Lessons Chapter 3 The Department of Defense Takes Charge)
(Musings On Iraq review Leap of Faith, Hubris Negligence, and America’s Greatest Foreign
Policy Tragedy)
(Musings On Iraq review Hard Lessons, The Iraq Reconstruction Experience)
(Musings On Iraq review Blood Money, Wasted Billions, Lost Lives, and Corporate Greed in Iraq)
Oct 18 UK Foreign Office paper went over how UN could administer postwar Iraq Said best plan
would be UN administration and coalition for postwar security
(Musings On Iraq Chilcot Inquiry Section 6.4 Planning and Preparation For A Post-Saddam Hussein Iraq, Mid-2001 to January 2003)
Oct 19 Draft UK Foreign Office paper said economic reconstruction in Iraq planning needed to start
immediately Never adequately happened
(Musings On Iraq Chilcot Inquiry Section 6.4 Planning and Preparation For A Post-Saddam Hussein Iraq, Mid-2001 to January 2003)
Oct 20 Czech Intel told US no evidence 9/11 hijacker Atta met with Iraq intelligence in Prague
(Musings On Iraq Overview of America’s Policy Towards Iraq: From The Clinton Years To The
Sectarian War of 2006)
Oct 21 Report Czech Pres Havel told White House 9/11 terrorist Atta did not meet with Iraq
intelligence in Prague
(Musings On Iraq Overview of America’s Policy Towards Iraq: From The Clinton Years To The
Sectarian War of 2006)
Oct 23 US and UK submitted draft UN resolution for new weapons inspections in Iraq
(Musings On Iraq Review The Report of the Iraq Inquiry, Executive Summary)
(Musings On Iraq Chilcot Report Section 3.5 Development of UK Strategy and Options September to November 2002 – Negotiation of Resolution 1441)
Oct 23 UK Joint Intel Comm report said there could be uprising in Iraq after Saddam fell
Oct 24 Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Feith’s Policy Counterterrorism Group
briefed Rumsfeld claiming long term cooperation between Iraq and Al Qaeda
(Musings On Iraq Overview of America’s Policy Towards Iraq: From The Clinton Years To The
Sectarian War of 2006)
(Musings On Iraq review Leap of Faith, Hubris Negligence, and America’s Greatest Foreign Policy
Tragedy)
Oct 24 Def Sec Rumsfeld told press Policy Counterterrorism Group was not an intel unit It was set
up by UnderSecDef Feith to go through intel and find Iraq-Al Qaeda ties because US intel agencies said two were not linked
Oct 24 Intelligence officers complained to the press that Pentagon was politicizing
Intelligence on Iraq probably referring to Feith’s office
Oct 25 VP Cheney met with Russian For Min Told him countries that sided with US in war
would get preferential treatment in contracts afterward
Oct 27 US intel complained to press Pentagon using own intel on Iraq and relying upon INC
too much
(Musings On Iraq review Leap of Faith, Hubris Negligence, and America’s Greatest Foreign
Policy Tragedy)
Oct 28 Sec Def Rumsfeld met with Gen Franks Joint chiefs head Gen Pace Under Sec Def
Feith to discuss how to define victory in Iraq Rumsfeld wanted to make sure US said Iraqis would take lead in creating their own govt and institutions Talked about postwar Saddam state Said Gen Franks would be in charge of Iraq right after invasion which meant CENTCOM had to work with White House on postwar plans
Oct 29 Gen Franks briefed Bush on war plans again
(Musings On Iraq review Leap of Faith, Hubris Negligence, and America’s Greatest Foreign
Policy Tragedy)
(Musings On Iraq review of Shaping the Plan for Operation Iraqi Freedom, The Role of Military Intelligence Assessment)
Oct 30 Vice President Cheney told head UN Inspector Blix that inspections couldn't last
forever and US was ready to discredit them anyway to disarm Iraq
(Musings On Iraq UN Inspectors Were Right Iraq Was Not A Threat)
(Musings On Iraq Overview of America’s Policy Towards Iraq: From The Clinton Years To The
Sectarian War of 2006)
Oct 31 Blair agreed to offer a division to US for invasion of Iraq
(Musings On Iraq Review The Report of the Iraq Inquiry, Executive Summary)
(Musings On Iraq review A War Of Choice, The British In Iraq 2003-9)
Oct 31 UK energy companies met with govt official complaining business deals being made
for postwar Iraq and they were being left out
Oct 31 Iraqi opposition met in Salahaddin Kurdistan Said they were united to remove
Saddam Wanted to end sectarianism and create federal democratic state
Oct 31 Head of UK Defense Staff Adm Boyce told PM Blair that if UK provided large military force
it would have less responsibility for postwar Iraq reconstruction UK officials had been saying opposite
Nov 1 UN head inspectors Blix and El Baradei visited Bush and Cheney at White House
Bush said inspections had full US backing
(Musings On Iraq UN Inspectors Were Right Iraq Was Not A Threat)
(Musings On Iraq Iraq’s Rejection of UN Inspectors Led To Mistrust Over WMD and 2003 Invasion)
Nov 1 Under Secretary of State Bolton told conference if Iraq got fissile material it could
have a nuclear bomb in a year
(Musings On Iraq How US Intelligence Created An Iraqi Nuclear Threat In 2002)
(Musings On Iraq review The WMD Mirage, Iraq’s Decade of Deception and America’s False Premise for War)
Nov 1 UK Cabinet Office sent draft paper on postwar Iraq Said Coalition military govt should last 6
months UN should administer Iraq and then sovereignty returned to Iraq
(Musings On Iraq Chilcot Inquiry Section 6.4 Planning and Preparation For A Post-Saddam Hussein Iraq, Mid-2001 to January 2003)
Nov 3 Observer reported INC’s Chalabi met with oil companies to discuss contracts in post-
Saddam Iraq
Nov 6 Secretary of State Powell got ok from National Security Adviser Rice to make deal
with France over language of new UN resolution to allow weapons inspections in Iraq
(Musings On Iraq UN Inspectors Were Right Iraq Was Not A Threat)
(Musings On Iraq Iraq’s Rejection of UN Inspectors Led To Mistrust Over WMD and 2003 Invasion)
Nov 6 UN told that Iraq cut back on oil smuggling but still continuing in violation of UN
sanctions
(Musings On Iraq review Invisible War, The United States And The Iraq Sanctions)
Nov 6 UK Special Planning Group paper said postwar planning was the most important part of Iraq
war Never adequately happened
(Musings On Iraq Chilcot Inquiry Section 6.4 Planning and Preparation For A Post-Saddam Hussein Iraq, Mid-2001 to January 2003)
Nov 7 Bush said that Iraq would be disarmed
Nov 7 UK Embassy in US said hawks in Washington thought UN Res 1441 authorizing new
weapons inspections was a defeat Said hawks in admin thought any infraction of 1441 would justify war
(Musings On Iraq Chilcot Inquiry Section 5 Advice On The Legal Basis For Military Action, November 2002 To March 2003)
(Musings On Iraq Review The Report of the Iraq Inquiry, Executive Summary)
Nov 8 CENTCOM cmdr Gen Franks told planners only 1 army division and Marine Expeditionary
Force could overthrow Saddam Planners said wouldn’t be enough to secure Iraq if Saddam quickly fell
Nov 8 UN Resolution 1441 said Iraq was in violation of previous resolutions and authorized
new weapons inspections anywhere in Iraq and would face serious consequences if didn’t
(Musings On Iraq Hangs Blix Replies To Tony Blair)
Nov 8 UN Res 1441 was immediately interpreted in different ways France said it meant a 2nd
resolution was necessary to go to war UK said it was last chance for Iraq or it would suffer the consequences
(Musings On Iraq UN Inspectors Were Right Iraq Was Not A Threat)
(Musings On Iraq Iraq’s Rejection of UN Inspectors Led To Mistrust Over WMD and 2003 Invasion)
Nov 11 Pentagon gave Kellogg Brown & Root 1st reconstruction contract to plan for repairing
Iraq’s oil industry
(Musings On Iraq Special Inspector General For Iraq Reconstruction’s Hard Lessons Chapter 13 Restarting Oil Production)
Nov 12 CENTCOM Cmdr Gen Franks said if US didn't act on Iraq it could acquire and use a
nuclear weapon
(Musings On Iraq How US Intelligence Created An Iraqi Nuclear Threat In 2002)
(Musings On Iraq review The WMD Mirage, Iraq’s Decade of Deception and America’s False Premise for War)
Nov 12 Attny Gen Lord Goldsmith told Foreign Sec Straw that he wasn’t sure UN Resolution
1441 would give legal basis for war with Iraq Straw told Goldsmith he thought 1441 meant Iraq had to comply or else
(Musings On Iraq Chilcot Inquiry Section 5 Advice On The Legal Basis For Military Action, November 2002 To March 2003)
Nov 12 NYTimes article claimed Iraq bought anti-WMD drugs as sign that it had WMD and
was going to use it
Nov 13 Iraq accepted UN Resolution 1441 to allow UN weapons inspectors
(Musings On Iraq UN Inspectors Were Right Iraq Was Not A Threat)
(Musings On Iraq Iraq’s Rejection of UN Inspectors Led To Mistrust Over WMD and 2003 Invasion)
(Musings On Iraq Chilcot Inquiry Section 3.6 Development of UK Strategy and Options, November 2002 to January 2003)
Nov 13 Def Sec Rumsfeld memo to Bush Said inspections were important because Saddam would
make a mistake and the military would be ready to react as soon as Bush gave the order
Nov 13 Blair said that goal of UN Res 1441 was disarming Iraq not regime change
Nov 13 Blair told UK cabinet that UN Res 1441 meant military action could be taken against Iraq in
case of violations without a 2nd resolution
(Musings On Iraq Chilcot Inquiry Section 5 Advice On The Legal Basis For Military Action, November 2002 To March 2003)
(Musings On Iraq Review The Report of the Iraq Inquiry, Executive Summary)
Nov 14 UK For Sec Straw told cabinet UN Resolution 1441 authorized military action against
Iraq without a 2nd resolution
(Musings On Iraq Review The Report of the Iraq Inquiry, Executive Summary)
(Musings On Iraq Chilcot Inquiry Section 5 Advice On The Legal Basis For Military Action, November 2002 To March 2003)
Nov 14 UK intel report said Iraq accepted new weapons inspectors to avoid US led attack and
would continue to hide its most important WMD programs
(Musings On Iraq UN Inspectors Were Right Iraq Was Not A Threat)
(Musings On Iraq Iraq’s Rejection of UN Inspectors Led To Mistrust Over WMD and 2003 Invasion)
(Musings On Iraq Chilcot Inquiry Section 3.6 Development of UK Strategy and Options, November 2002 to January 2003)
Nov 14 Def Policy Board’s Perle quoted INC defector ex-nuke scientist Hamza that Iraq could
get nuclear bomb and attack US Called for preventive action vs Iraq
(Musings On Iraq How US Intelligence Created An Iraqi Nuclear Threat In 2002)
Nov 15 US asked UK and other allies for military support against Iraq
Nov 15 Natl Sec Adv Rice said that US couldn’t allow Saddam to have a nuclear weapon
(Musings On Iraq How US Intelligence Created An Iraqi Nuclear Threat In 2002)
Nov 15 Saudi Amb to US Bandar visited Bush Said Saudis wanted to know US intentions
on Iraq Bush told Bandar he would let Saudis know if he decided on war with Iraq
Nov 17 Bush said that U.S. would form a coalition of the willing to disarm Iraq
Nov 18 New UN inspectors arrived in Baghdad
(Musings On Iraq UN Inspectors Were Right Iraq Was Not A Threat)
(Musings On Iraq Iraq’s Rejection of UN Inspectors Led To Mistrust Over WMD and 2003 Invasion)
Nov 19 UK Def Min official warned Blair’s office that without proper postwar planning Iraq
war could fail
(Musings On Iraq Review The Report of the Iraq Inquiry, Executive Summary)
Nov 21 NATO summit Bush was talking about war with Iraq and using new U.N. inspections
as catalyst for action
Nov 22 France told US that it did not believe Iraq tried to buy uranium from Niger
(Musings On Iraq How US Intelligence Failed The Iraq-Niger Uranium Story)
Nov 22 Russia’s Putin warned U.S. not to unilaterally act against Iraq
Nov 25 UN Resolution 1443 extended Oil for Food program
Nov 25 US Navy report claimed uranium from Niger was in a warehouse in Benin heading for
Iraq Report later found to be false
(Musings On Iraq How US Intelligence Failed The Iraq-Niger Uranium Story)
Nov 25 Head weapons inspector Blix told Security Council inspections would begin in Iraq on
11/27/02
(Musings On Iraq UN Inspectors Were Right Iraq Was Not A Threat)
(Musings On Iraq Iraq’s Rejection of UN Inspectors Led To Mistrust Over WMD and 2003 Invasion)
Nov 25 US intelligence took pictures of trucks moving materials from Amiriya Serum and
Vaccine Institute In February 2003 UN speech Secretary of State Powell claimed this was Iraqis hiding WMD before UN inspections restarted US analysts did not believe anything unusual was happening in photos
(Musings On Iraq review The WMD Mirage, Iraq’s Decade of Deception and America’s False Premise for War)
Nov 26 Gen Franks presented deployment plan for Iraq invasion to Rumsfeld Was for 300,000
troops to be sent from summer 02-spring 03 Rumsfeld said large deployment would undermine diplomatic moves US making on Iraq Rumsfeld decided to go through entire deployment process for Iraq invasion Ended up breaking it up and controlling entire process
(Musings On Iraq review of Shaping the Plan for Operation Iraqi Freedom, The Role of Military Intelligence Assessment)
(Musings On Iraq review Leap of Faith, Hubris Negligence, and America’s Greatest Foreign
Policy Tragedy)
(Musings On Iraq review Plan of Attack: The Definitive Account Of The Decision To Invade
Iraq)
(Musings On Iraq US Army History of Iraq War Vol 1 – Chapter 3 Maneuvering Into Position)
Nov 27 UN weapons inspections carried out first inspections under new regime
(Musings On Iraq UN Inspectors Were Right Iraq Was Not A Threat)
(Musings On Iraq Iraq’s Rejection of UN Inspectors Led To Mistrust Over WMD and 2003 Invasion)
(Musings On Iraq review The WMD Mirage, Iraq’s Decade of Deception and America’s False Premise for War)
Nov 28 UN inspectors went to Dawrah Foot and Mouth Disease Facility Said facility couldn’t be
used for WMD Reporters said it was mostly destroyed Was abandoned in 1996 US listed it as major WMD site
(Musings On Iraq UN Inspectors Were Right Iraq Was Not A Threat)
(Musings On Iraq Iraq’s Rejection of UN Inspectors Led To Mistrust Over WMD and 2003 Invasion)
(Musings On Iraq review The WMD Mirage, Iraq’s Decade of Deception and America’s False Premise for War)
Nov 29 UK Defense Min told Blair that US still had no political strategy for Iraq
(Musings On Iraq Review The Report of the Iraq Inquiry, Executive Summary)
(Musings On Iraq review A War Of Choice, The British In Iraq 2003-9)
Nov 29 American Enterprise Inst group of experts started work on paper on what U.S. facing
after 9/11 Would focus on Iraq
Dec 2 Bush Cheney Deputy Secretary of Defense Wolfowtiz gave speeches across US saying
that Iraq would not cooperate with weapons inspectors
(Musings On Iraq review Days Of Fire, Bush and Cheney in the White House)
(Musings On Iraq UN Inspectors Were Right Iraq Was Not A Threat)
(Musings On Iraq Iraq’s Rejection of UN Inspectors Led To Mistrust Over WMD and 2003 Invasion)
(Musings On Iraq Chilcot Inquiry Section 3.6 Development of UK Strategy and Options, November 2002 to January 2003)
Dec 2 White House spokesman said if Saddam said he had no WMD proved he was lying If he
said he had WMD he violated UN resolutions Claimed Iraq bought aluminum tubes for its nuke program
(Musings On Iraq How A Contested Aluminum Tubes Story Became The Basis For War With Iraq)
(Musings On Iraq review The WMD Mirage, Iraq’s Decade of Deception and America’s False Premise for War)
Dec 2 White House officials told US News & World Report they were making extensive
plans for postwar Iraq
(Musings On Iraq Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction’s “Hard Lessons” – Part I: Planning for Postwar Iraq September 2001 to May 2003)
(Musings On Iraq review Leap of Faith, Hubris Negligence, and America’s Greatest Foreign Policy
Tragedy)
(Musings On Iraq review Hard Lessons, The Iraq Reconstruction Experience)
Dec 2 UK issued dossier on human rights abuses in Iraq Amnesty International attacked
report as opportunistic and selective
Dec 3 Iraq officials cooperated with UN inspectors at surprise search of one of Saddam’s
Baghdad palaces
(Musings On Iraq UN Inspectors Were Right Iraq Was Not A Threat)
(Musings On Iraq Iraq’s Rejection of UN Inspectors Led To Mistrust Over WMD and 2003 Invasion)
Dec 3 Dep Def Sec Wolfowitz went to Turkey to outline Iraq plans which included 60,000 US
troops deployed to Turkey
Dec 4 UN Res 1447 extended Oil for Food program
Dec 5 White House spokesman said Bush and Rumsfeld wouldn't claim Iraq had WMD if it
wasn't true
(Musings On Iraq review The WMD Mirage, Iraq’s Decade of Deception and America’s False Premise for War)
Dec 5 Rumsfeld aid Herbits said he was taking over postwar Iraq planning because it was a
mess Under Secretary of Defense Feith’s office was supposed to do postwar Iraq planning Herbits said he was screwing up
(Musings On Iraq review Leap of Faith, Hubris Negligence, and America’s Greatest Foreign Policy
Tragedy)
(Musings On Iraq review State of Denial, Bush At War, Part III)
(Musings On Iraq review Hard Lessons, The Iraq Reconstruction Experience)
Dec 5 Report Tuwaitha nuclear facility showed no signs of involvement in weapons program
Dec 5 Gen McKiernan ground forces cmdr for Invasion met with division cmdrs Said current invasion
plan would get off to quick start but didn’t have enough forces to continue momentum to Baghdad Said wanted all forces in theater before invasion started Rumsfeld and Franks were pushing for invasion starting before all troops in theater
Dec 6 White House accused Iraq of hiding WMDs from UN inspectors
(Musings On Iraq UN Inspectors Were Right Iraq Was Not A Threat)
(Musings On Iraq Iraq’s Rejection of UN Inspectors Led To Mistrust Over WMD and 2003 Invasion)
(Musings On Iraq Chilcot Inquiry Section 3.6 Development of UK Strategy and Options, November 2002 to January 2003)
(Musings On Iraq review The WMD Mirage, Iraq’s Decade of Deception and America’s False Premise for War)
Dec 6 Official troop buildup for Iraq invasion began Wasn’t made public until Feb 03
Dec 7 TV speech Saddam apologized to people of Kuwait for 1990 invasion
Dec 7 Iraq gave its WMD and nuclear weapons declaration to UN as part of new
inspections claiming it had no WMD Widely criticized for being incomplete
(Musings On Iraq Chilcot Inquiry Section 3.6 Development of UK Strategy and Options, November 2002 to January 2003)
Dec 7 Iraqi general claimed weapons declaration proved Iraq had no WMD
Dec 7 US and UK condemned Iraq’s weapons declaration as being incomplete and for denying
it had WMD
(Musings On Iraq Review The Report of the Iraq Inquiry, Executive Summary)
(Musings On Iraq Iraq One Of The Worst Intelligence Failures In US History)
Dec 7 Cheney told NSC Iraq’s weapons declaration was a material breach and Bush
should move towards war Said Powell and UN wanted to use inspections to avoid war Rumsfeld and Rice didn’t think Iraq’s weapons declaration was a material breach
(Musings On Iraq UN Inspectors Were Right Iraq Was Not A Threat)
(Musings On Iraq Iraq’s Rejection of UN Inspectors Led To Mistrust Over WMD and 2003 Invasion)
Dec 8 Iraq admitted that it was close to building a nuclear bomb but was abandoned a long
time ago
(Musings On Iraq How US Intelligence Created An Iraqi Nuclear Threat In 2002)
Dec 8 Gen Thurman and Gen McKiernan went to Gen Franks and asked for more troops for Iraq
invasion
Dec 8 During war gaming for invasion Gen Abizaid CENTCOM cmdr Gen Frank’s deputy brought up
lack of postwar plans Nothing done
Dec 9 UK Foreign Office legal adv Sir Wood wrote paper saying UN Resolution 1441 did not
authorize war with Iraq
Dec 9 UK Foreign Office officially asked Attny Gen Lord Goldsmith for legal advice on
whether 2nd UN resolution needed to use force against Iraq
(Musings On Iraq Chilcot Inquiry Section 5 Advice On The Legal Basis For Military Action, November 2002 To March 2003)
Dec 9 Blair ForPolAdv Manning MI6 head Dearlove met NatlSecAdv Rice Said start 03 US
would go to UN and argue for military action vs Iraq
(Musings On Iraq Review The Report of the Iraq Inquiry, Executive Summary)
(Musings On Iraq Chilcot Inquiry Section 3.6 Development of UK Strategy and Options, November 2002 to January 2003)
Dec 9 UN inspectors found Fallujah II chlorine plant out of service US listed it as WMD site
(Musings On Iraq UN Inspectors Were Right Iraq Was Not A Threat)
(Musings On Iraq Iraq’s Rejection of UN Inspectors Led To Mistrust Over WMD and 2003 Invasion)
(Musings On Iraq review The WMD Mirage, Iraq’s Decade of Deception and America’s False Premise for War)
Dec 10 USAID said Iraq would be small intervention but security needed to be first
priority
Dec 10 NSC committee presented humanitarian plan for postwar Iraq based upon secure
environment and small US role
(Musings On Iraq Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction’s “Hard Lessons” – Part I: Planning for Postwar Iraq September 2001 to May 2003)
(Musings On Iraq on Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction Hard Lessons Chapter 2 The Agencies Engage)
(Musings On Iraq review Leap of Faith, Hubris Negligence, and America’s Greatest Foreign
Policy Tragedy)
(Musings On Iraq review Hard Lessons, The Iraq Reconstruction Experience)
Dec 10 IAEA went to Al Qaim facility US claimed was an active Iraqi nuclear plant Found it
destroyed Went to Al Furat and found no nuclear equipment there
(Musings On Iraq UN Inspectors Were Right Iraq Was Not A Threat)
(Musings On Iraq Iraq’s Rejection of UN Inspectors Led To Mistrust Over WMD and 2003 Invasion)
(Musings On Iraq Chilcot Inquiry Section 3.6 Development of UK Strategy and Options, November 2002 to January 2003)
(Musings On Iraq review Hoodwinked, The Documents That Reveal How Bush Sold Us a War)
(Musings On Iraq review The WMD Mirage, Iraq’s Decade of Deception and America’s False Premise for War)
Dec 11 PM Blair told US impatient and thinking of invading Iraq by mid-Feb 03 Adviser said US
concerned inspectors would find nothing
(Musings On Iraq Chilcot Inquiry Section 4.3 Iraq WMD Assessments, October 2002 to March 2003)
Dec 11 Pentagon started another post-war planning group just 3 months before invasion
(Musings On Iraq review Leap of Faith, Hubris Negligence, and America’s Greatest Foreign
Policy Tragedy)
(Musings On Iraq Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction’s “Hard Lessons” – Part I: Planning for Postwar Iraq September 2001 to May 2003)
(Musings On Iraq review State of Denial, Bush At War, Part III)
(Musings On Iraq review Hard Lessons, The Iraq Reconstruction Experience)
(Musings On Iraq review Blood Money, Wasted Billions, Lost Lives, and Corporate Greed in Iraq)
Dec 11 IAEA went to Tarmiya facility where Iraq had worked on enriched uranium before Gulf War
Found it destroyed US listed it as major nuclear site
(Musings On Iraq review Hoodwinked, The Documents That Reveal How Bush Sold Us a War)
(Musings On Iraq Chilcot Inquiry Section 3.6 Development of UK Strategy and Options, November 2002 to January 2003)
(Musings On Iraq review The WMD Mirage, Iraq’s Decade of Deception and America’s False Premise for War)
Dec 13 UK intel report said U.S. invasion and occupation of Iraq could help motivate
Islamists for next 5 years
Dec 13 Bush said military would have small pox vaccinations Was actually protection
against possible Iraq WMD attack during invasion
Dec 13 UK Special Planning group paper said postwar Iraq would be crucial and had to be dealt
with to win Said if UK wasn’t willing to make a major commitment to rebuild Iraq it shouldn’t join war
(Musings On Iraq Chilcot Inquiry Section 6.4 Planning and Preparation For A Post-Saddam Hussein Iraq, Mid-2001 to January 2003)
Dec 14 Iraqi opposition meeting in London Came up with 65 member committee but marked by
general disunity
Dec 14 CENTCOM briefed Joint Chiefs on postwar Iraq Warned that US could win the war and
lose the peace Warned there would be no Iraqi govt after the invasion so there could be chaos in the country Warned that US was only planning for the war and not the peace Said Iraq’s economy was a wreck and that US should maintain the military and not carry out an extensive deBaathification because could fracture Iraq
(Musings On Iraq Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction’s “Hard Lessons” – Part I: Planning for Postwar Iraq September 2001 to May 2003)
(Musings On Iraq review Leap of Faith, Hubris Negligence, and America’s Greatest Foreign
Policy Tragedy)
(Musings On Iraq review State of Denial, Bush At War, Part III)
(Musings On Iraq review Hard Lessons, The Iraq Reconstruction Experience)
Dec 14 CENTCOM briefing on postwar Iraq led Joint Chiefs to set up its own postwar planning
cell Was not coordinated with CENTCOM
Dec 16 PM Blair called Bush Told him to be patient with UN inspectors Blair was told US was
worried inspectors would find nothing Bush also wanted war perhaps by Feb 03
(Musings On Iraq Chilcot Inquiry Section 4.3 Iraq WMD Assessments, October 2002 to March 2003)
Dec 17 Secretary of State Powell hinted that US would reject Iraq’s weapons declaration to UN
inspectors
(Musings On Iraq UN Inspectors Were Right Iraq Was Not A Threat)
(Musings On Iraq Iraq’s Rejection of UN Inspectors Led To Mistrust Over WMD and 2003 Invasion)
(Musings On Iraq Chilcot Inquiry Section 3.6 Development of UK Strategy and Options, November 2002 to January 2003)
Dec 17 CIA said that Iraq did not include trying to buy uranium from Niger and aluminum tubes
in its declaration to UN inspectors
(Musings On Iraq How A Contested Aluminum Tubes Story Became The Basis For War With Iraq)
(Musings On Iraq How US Intelligence Failed The Iraq-Niger Uranium Story)
(Musings On Iraq review The WMD Mirage, Iraq’s Decade of Deception and America’s False Premise for War)
Dec 17 US inspected warehouse in Benin where uranium headed for Iraq allegedly stored but
found nothing
Dec 18 NSC meeting on UN inspections Bush said Iraq not cooperating Bush told Powell that if
Iraq was in material breach that would mean war
(Musings On Iraq review The WMD Mirage, Iraq’s Decade of Deception and America’s False Premise for War)
(Musings On Iraq review Wanting War: Why the Bush Administration Invaded Iraq)
(Musings On Iraq UN Inspectors Were Right Iraq Was Not A Threat)
(Musings On Iraq Iraq’s Rejection of UN Inspectors Led To Mistrust Over WMD and 2003 Invasion)
(Musings On Iraq Chilcot Inquiry Section 3.6 Development of UK Strategy and Options, November 2002 to January 2003)
Dec 18 Bush met with Spanish Pres Anzar Said Iraq’s weapons declaration was a joke and
US would eventually have to remove Saddam because he wouldn’t disarm
Dec 18 Sec Def Rumsfeld ordered start of civil administration to run postwar Iraq 3
months before invasion
(Musings On Iraq Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction’s “Hard Lessons” – Part I: Planning for Postwar Iraq September 2001 to May 2003)
(Musings On Iraq on Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction Hard Lessons Chapter 3 The Department of Defense Takes Charge)
(Musings On Iraq review Leap of Faith, Hubris Negligence, and America’s Greatest Foreign Policy
Tragedy)
(Musings On Iraq review Hard Lessons, The Iraq Reconstruction Experience)
Dec 18 Gen Hawkins from Army Corps of Engineers told he would be part of new Iraq Joint Task
Force 4 that would run postwar Iraq Told to help set up command Had no staff Only got 58 people who’d never worked together 3 months before invasion
Dec 18 Saddam changed defensive plan for Iraq Were concentric circles around Baghdad Each one
would withdraw when came into contact with US until all forces were inside Baghdad city where they would fight to the death Qusay presented new plan to Republican Guard Were questions about underlying assumptions of plan Qusay said Saddam had already signed off on plan Their job was implementing it Were no details on how to withdraw Iraqi units were not allowed to communicate with each other so phased withdrawal impossible
(Musings On Iraq US Army History of Iraq War Vol 1 – Chapter 3 Maneuvering Into Position)
(Musings On Iraq review Iraqi Perspectives Project, A View of Operation Iraqi Freedom from Saddam’s Senior Leadership)
Dec 18 Dep CIA Dir McLaughlin told European chief Drumheller to ask Germans if they could see
Curveball because wanted to use his story about mobile WMD labs publicly
(Musings On Iraq How Iraqi Defector CURVEBALL Became Basis For US Claim That Iraq Had WMD)
(Musings On Iraq Look Who The LA Times Dug Up – CURVEBALL)
(Musings On Iraq Story of CURVEBALL And Iraq’s Mobile Biological Weapons Labs)
(Musings On Iraq review The WMD Mirage, Iraq’s Decade of Deception and America’s False Premise for War)
(Musings On Iraq review Curveball, Spies, Lies, And The Con Man Who Caused A War)
Dec 18 CIA briefed Bush at NSC on difficulties recruiting and maintaining sources in
Iraq Said US talking about war while trying diplomacy at UN made Iraqis unwilling to come forward because weren’t sure whether Washington was going to remove Saddam or not Bush said knew it was a difficult situation but that was the course US was going to follow
Dec 18 UK Foreign Secretary Straw said Iraq in material breach of UN resolutions with
its weapons declaration that denied it had WMD
Dec 18 IAEA head El Baradei told Reuters no evidence that Iraq has worked on any
nuclear facilities since 1998
(Musings On Iraq How US Intelligence Created An Iraqi Nuclear Threat In 2002)
Dec 18 UK Defense Ministry admitted that ships were taking troops and tanks to Persian
Gulf
Dec 18 State Dept posted listing of omissions in Iraq’s UN weapons declaration
Dec 19 Gen Franks briefed Bush again on war plans Went over what could go wrong and
lessons from war game
(Musings On Iraq review Leap of Faith, Hubris Negligence, and America’s Greatest Foreign Policy Tragedy)
Dec 19 Head UN inspector Blix and IAEA chief El Baradei told Security Council about
initial weapons inspections Blix said Iraq had not provided much new info Said 1 main problem was declared amounts of WMD produced vs what Iraq could’ve produced and 2 secret destruction of stocks Iraq’s claims and potential WMD production didn't match and had no proof of its secret destruction of stocks
(Musings On Iraq review The WMD Mirage, Iraq’s Decade of Deception and America’s False Premise for War)
(Musings On Iraq UN Inspectors Were Right Iraq Was Not A Threat)
(Musings On Iraq Iraq’s Rejection of UN Inspectors Led To Mistrust Over WMD and 2003 Invasion)
(Musings On Iraq Chilcot Inquiry Section 3.6 Development of UK Strategy and Options, November 2002 to January 2003)
Dec 19 Sec of State Powell and US Amb to UN Negroponte said Iraq in “material breach” of
disarmament obligations with its weapons declaration to UN
Dec 19 Sec State Powell said Iraq bought aluminum tubes for centrifuges
(Musings On Iraq How A Contested Aluminum Tubes Story Became The Basis For War With Iraq)
(Musings On Iraq review The WMD Mirage, Iraq’s Decade of Deception and America’s False Premise for War)
Dec 19 France said it was up to inspectors not US to determine whether Iraq was
hiding WMD
Dec 19 Russia criticized US for not providing evidence to Security Council and
inspectors of Iraqi violations during inspections
Dec 19 State Dept paper accused Iraq of active WMD programs rebuilding nuke
program Not disclosing them to UN Did not say it tried to buy uranium from Niger
(Musings On Iraq How US Intelligence Failed The Iraq-Niger Uranium Story)
(Musings On Iraq Review Hubris, The Inside Story of Spin, Scandal, And The Selling Of The Iraq War)
Dec 19 UK cabinet told Blair govt would declare Iraq in material breach of UN Resolution 1441 in
January 2003 because of its arms declaration
Dec 19 CNN/Time poll 63% of US respondents believed US war with Iraq was
inevitable
Dec 19 CIA European Chief Drumheller’s aide emailed him about concerns with Curveball and
mobile WMD labs story Said Curveball was more forthcoming when he wanted to be settled in Germany Afterward he said little Said German intel had doubts about him CIA hadn’t been able to vet him
(Musings On Iraq How Iraqi Defector CURVEBALL Became Basis For US Claim That Iraq Had WMD)
(Musings On Iraq Look Who The LA Times Dug Up – CURVEBALL)
(Musings On Iraq Story of CURVEBALL And Iraq’s Mobile Biological Weapons Labs)
(Musings On Iraq review The WMD Mirage, Iraq’s Decade of Deception and America’s False Premise for War)
(Musings On Iraq review Curveball, Spies, Lies, And The Con Man Who Caused A War)
Dec 19 CIA European Chief Drumheller met with WMD division WINPAC over Curveball and his
mobile WMD labs story German office chief said Curveball seemed unreliable WINPAC analyst said Curveball corroborated by another source Was an INC defector Deputy CIA Dir’s executive assistant said Curveball was credible Labs didn’t exist
Dec 19 Joint Chiefs head Gen Myers told Gen Franks to work on postwar Iraq plans more
Dec 19 Def Sec Rumsfeld and Joint Chiefs Gen Myers told Gen Franks he had to prepare to disarm
demobilize and reshape Iraqi military and set up new forces to secure Iraq after invasion
Dec 20 IAEA inspectors said Tuwaitha facility involved in civilian nuclear research not involved in
weapons program
(Musings On Iraq UN Inspectors Were Right Iraq Was Not A Threat)
(Musings On Iraq Iraq’s Rejection of UN Inspectors Led To Mistrust Over WMD and 2003 Invasion)
(Musings On Iraq Chilcot Inquiry Section 3.6 Development of UK Strategy and Options, November 2002 to January 2003)
Dec 20 CIA blocked UN Amb to UN Negroponte mentioning Iraq-Niger uranium deal in speech to
Security Council
(Musings On Iraq How US Intelligence Failed The Iraq-Niger Uranium Story)
(Musings On Iraq Review Hubris, The Inside Story of Spin, Scandal, And The Selling Of The Iraq War)
(Musings On Iraq review The WMD Mirage, Iraq’s Decade of Deception and America’s False Premise for War)
Dec 21 Dep CIA Dir McLaughlin briefed Bush on intel on Iraq WMD Said Iraq had precursors and
biological components Had unaccounted WMD artillery shells from Iran-Iraq War Showed rocket engine test site that passed prescribed ranges Showed satellite photo of suspected clean up of chemical weapons spill Showed UAV flown 500km past UN limit of 150km Went over reports of Iraq having mobile WMD labs Played recording of 2 Republican Guard officers talking about removing nerve agents Said Saddam met with nuclear scientists talking about resuming their work Bush Natl Sec Adv Rice and Chief of Staff Card unimpressed by CIA presentation on WMD CIA Dir Tenet said case was a “slam dunk” Administration had been making assertions about threat of Iraq’s WMD and when presented with facts Bush didn’t believe the case
(Musings On Iraq How Iraqi Defector CURVEBALL Became Basis For US Claims That Iraq Had WMD)
(Musings On Iraq How US Intelligence Created An Iraqi Nuclear Threat In 2002)
(Musings On Iraq The CIA’s Shoddy Pre-War Intelligence Reporting: The Case Of Iraq’s Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs))
(Musings On Iraq review Leap of Faith, Hubris Negligence, and America’s Greatest Foreign
Policy Tragedy)
(Musings On Iraq review The WMD Mirage, Iraq’s Decade of Deception and America’s False Premise for War)
Dec 22 Iraq invited CIA into country to find its WMD
Dec 24 Niger Premier said that his country did not try to sell uranium to Iraq
(Musings On Iraq How US Intelligence Failed The Iraq-Niger Uranium Story)
(Musings On Iraq Review Hubris, The Inside Story of Spin, Scandal, And The Selling Of The Iraq War)
Dec 24 UK Foreign Secretary Straw told Sec of State Powell a 2nd UN resolution was needed to
gain UK political support and legal justification for war
(Musings On Iraq Review The Report of the Iraq Inquiry, Executive Summary)
Dec 28 Report NSC Sr Dir Near East Abrams drafted plan for US to seize control of Iraq’s southern
oil fields
Dec 29 US Senate authorized war against Iraq
Dec 30 UK Foreign Sec Straw and Sec of State Powell thought UN inspections would not provide
smoking gun against Iraq so alternatives needed
(Musings On Iraq UN Inspectors Were Right Iraq Was Not A Threat)
(Musings On Iraq Iraq’s Rejection of UN Inspectors Led To Mistrust Over WMD and 2003 Invasion)
Dec 30 UN inspectors said they had gone to all major suspected WMD sites and found nothing
(Musings On Iraq review The WMD Mirage, Iraq’s Decade of Deception and America’s False Premise for War)
Dec 30 Report Reagan admin and its Middle East envoy Rumsfeld did nothing while Iraq used
WMD in Iran-Iraq War
Dec 30 NYTimes article said CIA looking into Iraq buying smallpox from a Russian scientist
Dec 31 UN inspector told press they were finding no evidence of Iraq’s WMD and Western intel
providing nothing substantive
(Musings On Iraq UN Inspectors Were Right Iraq Was Not A Threat)
(Musings On Iraq Iraq’s Rejection of UN Inspectors Led To Mistrust Over WMD and 2003 Invasion)
(Musings On Iraq Chilcot Inquiry Section 3.6 Development of UK Strategy and Options, November 2002 to January 2003)
(Musings On Iraq review The WMD Mirage, Iraq’s Decade of Deception and America’s False Premise for War)
Dec 31 Bush said couldn’t tell whether Iraq had a nuclear weapon or not
(Musings On Iraq How US Intelligence Created An Iraqi Nuclear Threat In 2002)
2003
Jan 2 UN inspector told Irish Times no active WMD or nuclear programs found in Iraq
(Musings On Iraq UN Inspectors Were Right Iraq Was Not A Threat)
(Musings On Iraq Iraq’s Rejection of UN Inspectors Led To Mistrust Over WMD and 2003 Invasion)
(Musings On Iraq How US Intelligence Created An Iraqi Nuclear Threat In 2002)
(Musings On Iraq Chilcot Inquiry Section 3.6 Development of UK Strategy and Options, November 2002 to January 2003)
Jan 4 PM Blair wrote Downing St Said people suspected US motives on Iraq They didn’t see Saddam
as threat Said removing Saddam was right thing to do Said Iraq had WMD
Jan 4 UK Foreign Policy Adviser Manning told Blair US almost given up on inspections because
wanted immediate action against Iraq Manning warned that US was pushing for war as soon as possible
(Musings On Iraq Review The Report of the Iraq Inquiry, Executive Summary)
(Musings On Iraq Iraq’s Rejection of UN Inspectors Led To Mistrust Over WMD and 2003 Invasion)
(Musings On Iraq Chilcot Inquiry Section 3.6 Development of UK Strategy and Options, November 2002 to January 2003)
Jan 4 US Natl Intel Council report said building democracy in Iraq would be long and difficult
(Musings On Iraq review Overreach, Delusions of Regime Change In Iraq)
(Musings On Iraq review Iraq’s Future The aftermath of regime change)
(Musings On Iraq review Leap of Faith, Hubris Negligence, and America’s Greatest Foreign Policy
Tragedy)
(Musings On Iraq Overview of America’s Policy Towards Iraq: From The Clinton Years To The
Sectarian War of 2006)
Jan 6 Saddam said he was ready for war Accused UN inspectors of being spies
(Musings On Iraq UN Inspectors Were Right Iraq Was Not A Threat)
(Musings On Iraq Iraq’s Rejection of UN Inspectors Led To Mistrust Over WMD and 2003 Invasion)
Jan 6 IAEA asked State Dept for info about Iraq-Niger uranium deal
(Musings On Iraq How US Intelligence Failed The Iraq-Niger Uranium Story)
(Musings On Iraq Review Hubris, The Inside Story of Spin, Scandal, And The Selling Of The Iraq War)
Jan 6 IAEA head El Baradei no evidence of any suspicious Iraq nuclear activities
(Musings On Iraq How US Intelligence Created An Iraqi Nuclear Threat In 2002)
(Musings On Iraq Chilcot Inquiry Section 3.6 Development of UK Strategy and Options, November 2002 to January 2003)
(Musings On Iraq review The WMD Mirage, Iraq’s Decade of Deception and America’s False Premise for War)
Jan 6 Bush met with cabinet and said needed strong case vs Iraq for war
(Musings On Iraq review Leap of Faith, Hubris Negligence, and America’s Greatest Foreign
Policy Tragedy)
(Musings On Iraq Review Hubris, The Inside Story of Spin, Scandal, And The Selling Of The Iraq War)
(Musings On Iraq review The Bush Administrations and Saddam Hussein, Deciding on Conflict)
Jan 6 Report 100 US Special Forces and 50 CIA officers had been sent into Iraq end of 2002 along
with Australian Jordanians and British commandos to find targets for invasion
Jan 7 IAEA went to Al Qaim facility 3rd time US claimed was an active Iraqi nuclear
plant IAEA found it destroyed
(Musings On Iraq UN Inspectors Were Right Iraq Was Not A Threat)
(Musings On Iraq Iraq’s Rejection of UN Inspectors Led To Mistrust Over WMD and 2003 Invasion)
(Musings On Iraq How US Intelligence Created An Iraqi Nuclear Threat In 2002)
(Musings On Iraq Chilcot Inquiry Section 3.6 Development of UK Strategy and Options, November 2002 to January 2003)
(Musings On Iraq review Hoodwinked, The Documents That Reveal How Bush Sold Us a War)
(Musings On Iraq review The WMD Mirage, Iraq’s Decade of Deception and America’s False Premise for War)
Jan 8 Bush met with Congressional leaders and said he would make case to Congress and
US public for war
Jan 8 Bush met with Republican leaders saying Saddam wasn’t complying and he would
have to address US about war
(Musings On Iraq review Leap of Faith, Hubris Negligence, and America’s Greatest Foreign Policy
Tragedy)
(Musings On Iraq Review Hubris, The Inside Story of Spin, Scandal, And The Selling Of The Iraq War)
(Musings On Iraq review The Bush Administrations and Saddam Hussein, Deciding on Conflict)
Jan 8 Saudi Foreign Min Faisal said that Iraq invasion could create a vacuum and eventually a civil
war
Jan 9 Head UN weapons inspector Blix said no smoking gun found in Iraq but
didn’t mean there were no WMD Said Iraq’s Dec weapons declaration was incomplete
(Musings On Iraq Chilcot Inquiry Section 3.6 Development of UK Strategy and Options, November 2002 to January 2003)
Jan 9 IAEA head El Baradei said aluminum tubes Iraq tried to buy were probably for
rockets not nuclear program
(Musings On Iraq How A Contested Aluminum Tubes Story Became The Basis For War With Iraq)
(Musings On Iraq review The WMD Mirage, Iraq’s Decade of Deception and America’s False Premise for War)
Jan 9 White House responded to IAEA saying Iraq spinning it over aluminum tubes
(Musings On Iraq UN Inspectors Were Right Iraq Was Not A Threat)
(Musings On Iraq Iraq’s Rejection of UN Inspectors Led To Mistrust Over WMD and 2003 Invasion)
Jan 9 White House spokesman said US knew for a fact Iraq had WMD
Jan 9 Pentagon asked Jay Garner to head ORHA to run postwar Iraq 2 months
before invasion He initially said no
(Musings On Iraq review Hard Lessons, The Iraq Reconstruction Experience)
(Musings On Iraq review No End In Sight, Iraq’s Descent Into Chaos)
Jan 9 Gen Franks briefed Bush on war plan Talked about Turkey’s refusal to allow in US
troops Franks worried about Jordan and Saudi Arabia staying on board for war Said he’d be ready for invasion by Feb 03 but March would be better
(Musings On Iraq review Leap of Faith, Hubris Negligence, and America’s Greatest Foreign
Policy Tragedy)
(Musings On Iraq review of Shaping the Plan for Operation Iraqi Freedom, The Role of Military Intelligence Assessment)
(Musings On Iraq review Losing Iraq, Inside The Post War Reconstruction Fiasco)
Jan 10 US official said Iraq was deceiving the IAEA about its nuclear program
(Musings On Iraq How US Intelligence Created An Iraqi Nuclear Threat In 2002)
(Musings On Iraq review The WMD Mirage, Iraq’s Decade of Deception and America’s False Premise for War)
Jan 10 Bush met with 3 Iraq dissidents Rend Francke Hatim Mukhlis Kanan Makiya Bush
said he thought Iraqis could have a democracy Mukhlis told Bush all Iraqis wanted Saddam out Makiya said removing Saddam would change US’s image in region Makiya told Bush that U.S. forces would be greeted with sweets and flowers in Iraq Mukhlis told Bush if US troops didn’t win support of Iraqis Iraq would turn into Somalia in 2 months
(Musings On Iraq “We Will Be Greeted As Liberators” Why The Bush Administration Saw Iraq As A War Of Liberation)
(Musings On Iraq Overview of America’s Policy Towards Iraq: From The Clinton Years To The
Sectarian War of 2006)
(Musings On Iraq review Overreach, Delusions of Regime Change In Iraq)
(Musings On Iraq review Iraq’s Future The aftermath of regime change)
(Musings On Iraq review The Assassins’ Gate, America In Iraq)
(Musings On Iraq review What Happened, Inside the Bush White House and Washington’s Culture of Deception)
Jan 10 NYTimes article IAEA challenged aluminum tubes story that they were for nuke
program and Energy and State Depts thought they might be for rockets CIA, DIA, NSA, White House said aluminum tubes Iraq tried to buy were for centrifuges State and Energy Depts disagreed UK didn’t think tubes for nuke program White House official told NYTimes Iraq was spinning IAEA after it said aluminum tubes were not for centrifuges
(Musings On Iraq How A Contested Aluminum Tubes Story Became The Basis For War With Iraq)
(Musings On Iraq UN Inspectors Were Right Iraq Was Not A Threat)
(Musings On Iraq Iraq’s Rejection of UN Inspectors Led To Mistrust Over WMD and 2003 Invasion)
Jan 10 Sec Def Rumsfeld told head of Joint Forces Command to create Joint Task Force to support
CENTCOM’s postwar planning
Jan 11 Bush met with Saudi Amb Prince Sultan Told him he had decided to take on Saddam
Jan 11 UK naval task force left for Persian Gulf for Iraq invasion
Jan 11 Rumsfeld and Joint Chiefs head Gen Myers met Saudi Amb to US Bandar to get
Saudi support for invasion Bandar said he needed Bush’s word to get Saudi support
Jan 11 CIA report Iraqi missile brigade outside Baghdad given missiles to hide from UN
inspectors some with WMD agents Report used in Powell’s Feb 03 UN speech
(Musings On Iraq review The WMD Mirage, Iraq’s Decade of Deception and America’s False Premise for War)
Jan 11 Turkey sent note to Saddam Said last opportunity to avoid war and he should comply with
UN resolutions Saddam said Turkey should persuade US to backdown
Jan 12 State Dept told White House docs claiming Iraq-Niger uranium deal were fakes
(Musings On Iraq review The WMD Mirage, Iraq’s Decade of Deception and America’s False Premise for War)
Jan 12 State Dept intel analyst sent email to intel community arguing that Niger docs were fakes
(Musings On Iraq How US Intelligence Failed The Iraq-Niger Uranium Story)
(Musings On Iraq Review Hubris, The Inside Story of Spin, Scandal, And The Selling Of The Iraq War)
Jan 12 IAEA said it would be hard to believe that Iraq was hiding a complete nuclear
weapons program IAEA head El Baredei said provisional conclusion aluminum tubes Iraq tried to buy were for rockets not centrifuges
(Musings On Iraq How A Contested Aluminum Tubes Story Became The Basis For War With Iraq)
(Musings On Iraq UN Inspectors Were Right Iraq Was Not A Threat)
(Musings On Iraq Iraq’s Rejection of UN Inspectors Led To Mistrust Over WMD and 2003 Invasion)
(Musings On Iraq How US Intelligence Created An Iraqi Nuclear Threat In 2002)
(Musings On Iraq Chilcot Inquiry Section 3.6 Development of UK Strategy and Options, November 2002 to January 2003)
Jan 13 Bush told Powell he’d decided on war and needed his support Powell said he
would back president Powell reminded Bush that if US invaded Iraq it would have to run the country
(Musings On Iraq review Wanting War: Why the Bush Administration Invaded Iraq)
(Musings On Iraq review Leap of Faith, Hubris Negligence, and America’s Greatest Foreign
Policy Tragedy)
(Musings On Iraq Review Hubris, The Inside Story of Spin, Scandal, And The Selling Of The Iraq War)
(Musings On Iraq review The Bush Administrations and Saddam Hussein, Deciding on Conflict)
Jan 13 Powell decided he had to play out diplomacy with Iraq at UN despite Bush’s
decision to go to war
Jan 13 Bush met Saudi Amb Bandar Gave assurance that US would remove Saddam
Jan 13 Blair TV speech said Iraq could give WMD to terrorists and US and UK could
act against Iraq without 2nd UN resolution
(Musings On Iraq Review The Report of the Iraq Inquiry, Executive Summary)
(Musings On Iraq review A War Of Choice, The British In Iraq 2003-9)
Jan 13 Lord Goldsmith told Blair and Foreign Sec Straw that there needed to be a 2nd
UN resolution against Iraq to go to war
(Musings On Iraq Chilcot Inquiry Section 3.7 Development of UK Strategy and Options, 1 February to 7 March 2003)
Jan 13 State Dept intel analyst told other analysts Iraq-Niger uranium docs were probably
fake 2 CIA analysts said they saw problems with docs but didn’t think they were fakes
(Musings On Iraq How US Intelligence Failed The Iraq-Niger Uranium Story)
(Musings On Iraq Review Hubris, The Inside Story of Spin, Scandal, And The Selling Of The Iraq War)
(Musings On Iraq review The WMD Mirage, Iraq’s Decade of Deception and America’s False Premise for War)
Jan 13 Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Feith called ex-Gen Jay Garner to run
postwar Iraq and he accepted
(Musings On Iraq on Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction Hard Lessons Chapter 3 The Department of Defense Takes Charge)
(Musings On Iraq review Hard Lessons, The Iraq Reconstruction Experience)
Jan 13 IAEA head El Baradei said inspectors needed a few months to finish work in Iraq
(Musings On Iraq UN Inspectors Were Right Iraq Was Not A Threat)
(Musings On Iraq Iraq’s Rejection of UN Inspectors Led To Mistrust Over WMD and 2003 Invasion)
Jan 13 NSA Dir Adm Hayden ordered decentralization of intel so that it could be
distributed to combat units during invasion
Jan 13 Natl Sec Adv Rice met with adv to French Pres Chirac and French Amb to US French warned
of instability that could happen after US invasion of Iraq Rice objected to everything French said Rice said there were already terrorists in Arab world and Arabs wouldn’t reject invasion Said Arab leaders would back US
Jan 14 Bush told press time running out for Saddam
(Musings On Iraq Review Hubris, The Inside Story of Spin, Scandal, And The Selling Of The Iraq War)
(Musings On Iraq review The Bush Administrations and Saddam Hussein, Deciding on Conflict)
Jan 14 Bush met Polish Pres Kwasniewski Said he would support US in war but asked
about consequences
Jan 14 UK Attorney General Goldsmith told Blair that 2nd UN resolution was needed to have
legal justification for war with Iraq
(Musings On Iraq Review The Report of the Iraq Inquiry, Executive Summary)
(Musings On Iraq Chilcot Inquiry Section 3.7 Development of UK Strategy and Options, 1 February to 7 March 2003)
(Musings On Iraq Chilcot Inquiry Section 5 Advice On The Legal Basis For Military Action, November 2002 To March 2003)
Jan 15 Bush received 1st brief on postwar Iraq plans from NSC’s Abrams Went over
humanitarian aid Emphasized feeding public Abrams said money had to be secretly sent to aid groups that would work in Iraq because they didn’t want to be seen supporting war Abrams said Oil for Food program would be maintained after invasion to feed public Abrams said that 2 mil Iraqis might be displaced during invasion NSC officials had gone to military to make sure things like health centers weren’t bombed during invasion Bush thought humanitarian aid after war very important Thought could change image of US in Middle East Plans made irrelevant when Pentagon given control of postwar Iraq
(Musings On Iraq Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction’s “Hard Lessons” – Part I: Planning for Postwar Iraq September 2001 to May 2003)
(Musings On Iraq on Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction Hard Lessons Chapter 2 The Agencies Engage)
(Musings On Iraq review Leap of Faith, Hubris Negligence, and America’s Greatest Foreign
Policy Tragedy)
(Musings On Iraq review Hard Lessons, The Iraq Reconstruction Experience)
Jan 15 Aid groups that met with USAID about postwar Iraq plans Asked to meet with
Pentagon USAID said everything would be fine because US would be seen as liberators Told aid groups to repeat that message publicly
(Musings On Iraq Overview of America’s Policy Towards Iraq: From The Clinton Years To The
Sectarian War of 2006)
Jan 15 CIA told White House that paper on Iraq should say Iraq tried to buy uranium
from Africa not mention Niger
(Musings On Iraq How US Intelligence Failed The Iraq-Niger Uranium Story)
(Musings On Iraq Review Hubris, The Inside Story of Spin, Scandal, And The Selling Of The Iraq War)
(Musings On Iraq review The WMD Mirage, Iraq’s Decade of Deception and America’s False Premise for War)
Jan 15 Blair said 2nd UN resolution not necessary for use of force against Iraq Attn Gen just told
him 2nd resolution needed
(Musings On Iraq Review The Report of the Iraq Inquiry, Executive Summary)
(Musings On Iraq Chilcot Inquiry Section 3.7 Development of UK Strategy and Options, 1 February to 7 March 2003)
(Musings On Iraq Chilcot Inquiry Section 5 Advice On The Legal Basis For Military Action, November 2002 To March 2003)
Jan 15 Report Rumsfeld okayed more aggressive patrols over Iraq no fly zones and
attacks on Iraq air defense in prep for invasion
Jan 15 NSC officials went to military to make sure things like health centers weren’t bombed during
invasion
Jan 15 Bush thought humanitarian aid after war very important Thought could change image of US
in Middle East
Jan 15 Aid groups met with USAID about postwar Iraq plans Asked to meet with Pentagon USAID
said everything would be fine because US would be seen as liberators Told aid groups to repeat that message publicly
(Musings On Iraq Overview of America’s Policy Towards Iraq: From The Clinton Years To The
Sectarian War of 2006)
Jan 16 UN inspectors found 12 missile warheads that could carry WMD not included
in Iraq’s 2002 weapons declaration
(Musings On Iraq UN Inspectors Were Right Iraq Was Not A Threat)
(Musings On Iraq Iraq’s Rejection of UN Inspectors Led To Mistrust Over WMD and 2003 Invasion)
Jan 16 Blair told cabinet 2nd UN resolution was not necessary for military action against
Iraq even though he was told it was
(Musings On Iraq Review The Report of the Iraq Inquiry, Executive Summary)
(Musings On Iraq Chilcot Inquiry Section 3.6 Development of UK Strategy and Options, November 2002 to January 2003)
(Musings On Iraq Chilcot Inquiry Section 5 Advice On The Legal Basis For Military Action, November 2002 To March 2003)
Jan 16 Future Office for Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA) head Garner
met with Rumsfeld and Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Feith Rumsfeld said no coordination of postwar planning Told Garner he needed to consult with different agencies and coordinate postwar plans Garner said in WWII US spent years planning for postwar situation and he was only given a few weeks for Iraq
(Musings On Iraq on Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction Hard Lessons Chapter 3 The Department of Defense Takes Charge)
(Musings On Iraq review Hard Lessons, The Iraq Reconstruction Experience)
(Musings On Iraq review Iraq and Back, Inside The War To Win The Peace)
(Musings On Iraq review Leap of Faith, Hubris Negligence, and America’s Greatest Foreign
Policy Tragedy)
(Musings On Iraq review State of Denial, Bush At War, Part III)
(Musings On Iraq Only 3 of 13 Reconstruction Contracts Were Signed Before War)
Jan 16 CIA received documents claiming Iraq-Niger uranium deal Sent to State Dept to
be translated Turned out to be fakes
(Musings On Iraq How US Intelligence Failed The Iraq-Niger Uranium Story)
(Musings On Iraq Review Hubris, The Inside Story of Spin, Scandal, And The Selling Of The Iraq War)
(Musings On Iraq review The WMD Mirage, Iraq’s Decade of Deception and America’s False Premise for War)
Jan 16 Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Feith sent Rumsfeld memo saying Iraq-
Syria pipeline should be kept open after the war to see whether Damascus was willing to cooperate with US in Iraq
Jan 16 UK general told CENTCOM cmdr Gen Franks he was unhappy with US postwar planning
(Musings On Iraq Chilcot Inquiry Section 6.5 Planning And Preparation For A Post-Saddam Hussein Iraq, January to March 2003)
Jan 17 Pentagon memo said no decision on postwar govt in Iraq Said would be a military
administration transitional authority elections leading to an Iraqi govt Didn’t match Pentagon plans to quickly withdraw US troops
(Musings On Iraq review Leap of Faith, Hubris Negligence, and America’s Greatest Foreign Policy
Tragedy)
(Musings On Iraq review State of Denial, Bush At War, Part III)
Jan 17 Blair agreed to 1 UK division and 3 combat brigades for Iraq War to be deployed
in south
(Musings On Iraq review A War Of Choice, The British In Iraq 2003-9)
Jan 17 UN inspectors after 4 inspections Fallujah II chlorine plant inoperative US
claimed it was producing WMD
(Musings On Iraq UN Inspectors Were Right Iraq Was Not A Threat)
(Musings On Iraq Iraq’s Rejection of UN Inspectors Led To Mistrust Over WMD and 2003 Invasion)
Jan 17 CIA report said Iraq had rebuilt its nuclear program Said were reports Iraq tried to
buy uranium from Africa
(Musings On Iraq How US Intelligence Created An Iraqi Nuclear Threat In 2002)
(Musings On Iraq How US Intelligence Failed The Iraq-Niger Uranium Story)
(Musings On Iraq review The WMD Mirage, Iraq’s Decade of Deception and America’s False Premise for War)
Jan 17 CIA told Joint Chiefs of Staff that it had some reports that Iraq tried to buy
uranium from Africa
(Musings On Iraq How US Intelligence Failed The Iraq-Niger Uranium Story)
(Musings On Iraq Review Hubris, The Inside Story of Spin, Scandal, And The Selling Of The Iraq War)
Jan 18 UN inspectors said sites named by US as WMD facilities had been looked at and
nothing found
(Musings On Iraq UN Inspectors Were Right Iraq Was Not A Threat)
(Musings On Iraq Iraq’s Rejection of UN Inspectors Led To Mistrust Over WMD and 2003 Invasion)
Jan 18 Report Saudis attempted to get Saddam to go into exile to avert war
Jan 18 Report 1987 Iran set up committee to organize Iraqi opposition Put ISCI in charge of Iraqi
POWs during Iran-Iraq War ISCI criticized Gulf War Called on Iraqis to oppose foreign forces and create Islamic rule in Iraq Dawa called on army to overthrow Saddam 1991 Islamic Action Org blamed US for not targeting Saddam during Gulf War 1992 opposition held meeting in Vienna Led to creation of INC as umbrella group 1992 another opposition meeting in Salahaddin Kurdistan 1998 US passed Iraq Liberation Act INC got money from US 2002 opposition meeting in London Opposition met with US in Aug 2002 ISCI decided to work with US to get rid of Saddam
(Musings On Iraq Origins Of Iraq’s Ethnosectarian Quota System)
Jan 19 US offered Saddam immunity if he departed Iraq to avert war
Jan 19 Pentagon officials opposed to Rumsfeld’s invasion plan complained to Time that
the Defense Secretary was taking over deployment orders for invasion Included comment by Ret Gen Norman Schwarzkops that Rumsfeld was interfering too much
(Musings On Iraq How Arguments Over Iraq Invasion Plan Were Fought Through Press Leaks)
(Musings On Iraq US Army History of Iraq War Vol 1 – Chapter 3 Maneuvering Into Position)
(Musings On Iraq review Plan of Attack: The Definitive Account Of The Decision To Invade Iraq)
Jan 19 Former UN inspector David Kay OpEd in Wash Post said UN weapons inspectors
would never find any hard evidence against Iraq
(Musings On Iraq UN Inspectors Were Right Iraq Was Not A Threat)
(Musings On Iraq Iraq’s Rejection of UN Inspectors Led To Mistrust Over WMD and 2003 Invasion)
Jan 19 UN inspectors got tip that mobile WMD lab was at Amiriya Serum and Vaccine Institute
Truck was full of measles vaccines
(Musings On Iraq How Iraqi Defector CURVEBALL Became Basis For US Claim That Iraq Had WMD)
(Musings On Iraq Look Who The LA Times Dug Up – CURVEBALL)
(Musings On Iraq Story of CURVEBALL And Iraq’s Mobile Biological Weapons Labs)
(Musings On Iraq review The WMD Mirage, Iraq’s Decade of Deception and America’s False Premise for War)
Jan 19 Fmr Natl War College Prof Gardiner presented assessment of Iraq’s likely postwar situation
Focused upon necessity to restore water sewage public health
Jan 20 Bush and Cheney met with Joint Chiefs and president asked if anyone had any
concerns about the invasion No objections made
Jan 20 Military Industrialization Commission ordered its director generals to come forward with
any info on WMD Gen Amin told military leaders to completely cooperate with inspectors
Jan 20 White House gave report to Congress on Iraq’s noncompliance with UN inspectors
Included Iraq not mentioning trying to buy uranium
(Musings On Iraq How US Intelligence Failed The Iraq-Niger Uranium Story)
(Musings On Iraq Review Hubris, The Inside Story of Spin, Scandal, And The Selling Of The Iraq War)
(Musings On Iraq review The WMD Mirage, Iraq’s Decade of Deception and America’s False Premise for War)
(Musings On Iraq UN Inspectors Were Right Iraq Was Not A Threat)
(Musings On Iraq Iraq’s Rejection of UN Inspectors Led To Mistrust Over WMD and 2003 Invasion)
Jan 20 National Security Presidential Directive 24 gave Pentagon control of postwar Iraq Pentagon
would dismiss previous NSC planning and kick out State Department officials
(Musings On Iraq review Losing Iraq, Inside The Post War Reconstruction Fiasco)
(Musings On Iraq review Hard Lessons, The Iraq Reconstruction Experience)
Jan 20 Office for Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA) created to
run post-war Iraq 2 months before invasion
(Musings On Iraq review Iraq and Back, Inside The War To Win The Peace)
(Musings On Iraq on Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction Hard Lessons Chapter 3 The Department of Defense Takes Charge)
Jan 20 UK announced it deployed ground forces for Iraq War
Jan 20 France’s Foreign Minister deVillepin said there was no justification for war
against Iraq Powell was furious because took threat of war off table at UN and strengthened Saddam
(Musings On Iraq Chilcot Inquiry Section 3.7 Development of UK Strategy and Options, 1 February to 7 March 2003)
Jan 21 Bush said that Saddam was not interested in disarming and that time was running
out on Iraq
(Musings On Iraq Review Hubris, The Inside Story of Spin, Scandal, And The Selling Of The Iraq War)
(Musings On Iraq review The Bush Administrations and Saddam Hussein, Deciding on Conflict)
Jan 21 Blair said 2nd UN resolution not necessary for use of force against Iraq
(Musings On Iraq Review The Report of the Iraq Inquiry, Executive Summary)
Jan 21 Deputy Secretary of State Armitage spoke at US Inst of Peace saying US trying to
avoid war but Iraq not accounted for its WMD
Jan 21 Fmr Natl War College Prof Gardiner presented his net assessment on need for US to restore
services in Iraq after invasion to Khalizad
Jan 22 CIA sent its report on Iraq WMD to White House to help make case for war
(Musings On Iraq review The WMD Mirage, Iraq’s Decade of Deception and America’s False Premise for War)
Jan 22 CIA analyst told IAEA aluminum tubes Iraq tried to buy were for centrifuges
IAEA said they were for rockets IAEA proved right
(Musings On Iraq How A Contested Aluminum Tubes Story Became The Basis For War With Iraq)
Jan 22 2nd meeting of US UK Australia on postwar Iraq Little came of meeting
Jan 23 Defense Ministry ordered that if Baghdad were to fall all govt buildings were to
be looted and burned
Jan 23 Mukhabarat document called for looting and destruction of property if Saddam
were overthrown
Jan 23 National Security Adviser Rice wrote NY Times OpEd saying Iraq was hiding its
WMD programs from UN inspectors and tried to buy uranium for its nuclear program
(Musings On Iraq How US Intelligence Created An Iraqi Nuclear Threat In 2002)
(Musings On Iraq How US Intelligence Failed The Iraq-Niger Uranium Story)
(Musings On Iraq Review Hubris, The Inside Story of Spin, Scandal, And The Selling Of The Iraq War)
(Musings On Iraq review What Happened, Inside the Bush White House and Washington’s Culture of Deception)
(Musings On Iraq review The WMD Mirage, Iraq’s Decade of Deception and America’s False Premise for War)
Jan 23 Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld said that Iraq’s WMD and ties to terrorism were
one threat
Jan 23 Under Secretary of Defense Wolfowitz said Iraq had tons of WMD and time
running out for it Said Iraq didn’t make truthful arms declaration to UN Talked about Iraqi defectors provided intelligence on mobile WMD labs Claimed Iraqi govt was threatening Iraqi scientists so they wouldn’t talke with UN
(Musings On Iraq How US Intelligence Failed The Iraq-Niger Uranium Story)
Jan 23 White House released document saying Iraq hiding its WMD and tried to buy
uranium for it nuke program
(Musings On Iraq How US Intelligence Failed The Iraq-Niger Uranium Story)
(Musings On Iraq Review Hubris, The Inside Story of Spin, Scandal, And The Selling Of The Iraq War)
Jan 24 Gen Franks presented final war plan to Rumsfeld and Joint Chiefs head Gen Myers
(Musings On Iraq review of Shaping the Plan for Operation Iraqi Freedom, The Role of
Military
(Musings On Iraq review Leap of Faith, Hubris Negligence, and America’s Greatest Foreign
Policy Tragedy)
Jan 24 2nd NYTimes article on Iraqi defector Haideri provided by INC Said that he’d led
to dozens of DIA reports on Iraq’s WMD DIA labeled him a fabricator May 02 but story continued to be used
Jan 24 Defense Policy Board’s Richard Perle accused CIA of being biased against INC so
it wouldn’t interview people like Haideri
(Musings On Iraq review Losing Iraq, Inside The Post War Reconstruction Fiasco)
Jan 24 PM Blair sent note to Bush suggesting delaying Iraq invasion for a month to allow
more time for postwar planning
(Musings On Iraq Chilcot Inquiry Section 6.5 Planning And Preparation For A Post-Saddam Hussein Iraq, January to March 2003)
(Musings On Iraq review A War Of Choice, The British In Iraq 2003-9)
Jan 24 UK Foreign Office legal adv Sir Wood told Foreign Secretary Straw that Britain could not
go to war with Iraq without a 2nd U.N. resolution
(Musings On Iraq Review The Report of the Iraq Inquiry, Executive Summary)
(Musings On Iraq Chilcot Inquiry Section 3.7 Development of UK Strategy and Options, 1 February to 7 March 2003)
Jan 24 IAEA told Wash Post aluminum tubes Iraq tried to buy were wrong for nuke
program
(Musings On Iraq How A Contested Aluminum Tubes Story Became The Basis For War With Iraq)
(Musings On Iraq review The WMD Mirage, Iraq’s Decade of Deception and America’s False Premise for War)
Jan 24 Archaeologists and scholars briefed Pentagon about historical sites in Iraq that
should be spared from bombing
Jan 24 DIA report repeated CIA reporting on Iraq-Niger uranium deal and Navy
reported uranium was in a warehouse in Benin Said Iraq could have gotten uranium
(Musings On Iraq How US Intelligence Failed The Iraq-Niger Uranium Story)
(Musings On Iraq Review Hubris, The Inside Story of Spin, Scandal, And The Selling Of The Iraq War)
Jan 25 Military Industrialization Commission officials had Republican Guard
commanders sign docs that they had no WMD in units
(Musings On Iraq UN Inspectors Were Right Iraq Was Not A Threat)
(Musings On Iraq Iraq’s Rejection of UN Inspectors Led To Mistrust Over WMD and 2003 Invasion)
Jan 25 Cheney chief of staff Libby briefed National Security Adviser Rice Chief of Staff
Hadley Deputy Secretary of State Hadley Deputy Defense Secretary Wolfowitz Bush aide Bartlett speech writer Gerson former communications chief Hughes on case vs Iraq’s WMD and ties to Al Qaeda Libby said Iraq hiding its WMD and cleaning sites before UN inspections Claimed Iraq-Al Qaeda ties strong Played recording of 2 Al Qaeda operatives talking about poisons that Libby said they got from Iraq Claimed 9/11 hijacker met with Iraq intelligence in Prague up to 4 times
(Musings On Iraq Iraq One Of The Worst Intelligence Failures In US History)
(Musings On Iraq review The WMD Mirage, Iraq’s Decade of Deception and America’s False Premise for War)
Jan 26 Secretary of State Powell speech asked why Iraq tried to buy uranium
(Musings On Iraq How US Intelligence Failed The Iraq-Niger Uranium Story)
(Musings On Iraq Review Hubris, The Inside Story of Spin, Scandal, And The Selling Of The Iraq War)
Jan 26 Blair said Iraq non-cooperation with UN inspectors was material breach of UN Resolution
(Musings On Iraq UN Inspectors Were Right Iraq Was Not A Threat)
(Musings On Iraq Iraq’s Rejection of UN Inspectors Led To Mistrust Over WMD and 2003 Invasion)
Jan 27 Bush asked Sec State Powell to make presentation at UN to make case against Iraq
Jan 27 Head UN inspector Blix told Security Council that Iraq cooperating with
inspections but had not accepted disarmament Asked what undeclared WMD items did Iraq have Asked did it illegally produce anything after 1998 Claimed Iraq’s WMD declaration had provided no new information and not answered questions about Iraq’s production of anthrax and VX gas and WMD bombs from Iran-Iraq War
Jan 27 IAEA head El Baradei told Security Council IAEA had found no evidence of an
active nuclear program in Iraq Said aluminum tubes Iraq tried to buy were probably for rockets not nuclear program
(Musings On Iraq How A Contested Aluminum Tubes Story Became The Basis For War With Iraq)
(Musings On Iraq UN Inspectors Were Right Iraq Was Not A Threat)
(Musings On Iraq Iraq’s Rejection of UN Inspectors Led To Mistrust Over WMD and 2003 Invasion)
(Musings On Iraq How US Intelligence Created An Iraqi Nuclear Threat In 2002)
(Musings On Iraq review The WMD Mirage, Iraq’s Decade of Deception and America’s False Premise for War)
Jan 27 Secretary of State Powell said Iraq was hiding its WMD
(Musings On Iraq Iraq One Of The Worst Intelligence Failures In US History)
(Musings On Iraq review What Happened, Inside the Bush White House and Washington’s Culture of Deception)
Jan 27 US intelligence said Blix would back off next declaration to UN on inspections
because didn’t want to cause war Some in White House believed Blix lying about inspections and he could not be trusted
Jan 27 Bush thought US stuck in inspection process and pushed him towards war
Jan 27 CIA report said Iraq tried to buy uranium from Niger in 1999 Said was uranium
in warehouse in Benin but was going to France not Iraq
Jan 27 CIA Director Tenet given copy of Bush’s State of the Union address that included
claim that Iraq tried to buy uranium from Niger Tenet didn’t read speech CIA had struck claim from two previous speeches
Jan 27 CIA Berlin chief said that Iraqi defector CURVEBALL was considered a problem by
Germans and they hadn’t confirmed any of his story of mobile WMD labs Said serious problem using Curveball’s story
(Musings On Iraq How Iraqi Defector CURVEBALL Became Basis For US Claim That Iraq Had WMD)
(Musings On Iraq Look Who The LA Times Dug Up – CURVEBALL)
(Musings On Iraq Story of CURVEBALL And Iraq’s Mobile Biological Weapons Labs)
(Musings On Iraq review The WMD Mirage, Iraq’s Decade of Deception and America’s False Premise for War)
(Musings On Iraq review Curveball, Spies, Lies, And The Con Man Who Caused A War)
Jan 27 ORHA began contracting for supplies and personnel 2 months before invasion
(Musings On Iraq on Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction Hard Lessons Chapter 3 The Department of Defense Takes Charge)
(Musings On Iraq review Leap of Faith, Hubris Negligence, and America’s Greatest Foreign
Policy Tragedy)
Jan 27 William Safire NYTimes piece said Zarqawi went to Baghdad Then to Kurdistan
to Ansar al-Islam proving Iraq-Al Qaeda link
(Musings On Iraq The Rise And Rebirth Of The Islamic State Interview With Author Michael Weiss)
(Musings On Iraq Why Didn’t Bush Strike Zarqawi And Ansar al-Islam In 2002?)
(Musings On Iraq review Insurgent Iraq, Al Zarqawi and the New Generation)
(Musings On Iraq review The Master Plan, ISIS, Al-Qaeda, and the Jihadi Strategy For Final Victory)
Jan 28 Bush’s State of Union said Iraq wasn’t disarming and hiding its programs from
weapons inspections Asked what 9/11 hijackers could’ve done if given WMD by Iraq Said Iraq had 25,000 liters of anthrax enough to make 38,000 liters of botulinum toxin Making sarin and VX gas Had mobile WMD labs Claimed Iraq tried to buy aluminum tubes for its nuclear program Said British learned Iraq tried to buy uranium from Africa Claimed said Saddam was harboring Al Qaeda members
(Musings On Iraq review What Happened, Inside the Bush White House and Washington’s Culture of Deception)
(Musings On Iraq review Wanting War: Why the Bush Administration Invaded Iraq)
(Musings On Iraq review Iraq’s Future The aftermath of regime change)
(Musings On Iraq review Leap of Faith, Hubris Negligence, and America’s Greatest Foreign
Policy Tragedy)
(Musings On Iraq review The WMD Mirage, Iraq’s Decade of Deception and America’s False Premise for War)
(Musings On Iraq How A Contested Aluminum Tubes Story Became The Basis For War With Iraq)
(Musings On Iraq How US Intelligence Failed The Iraq-Niger Uranium Story)
(Musings On Iraq How Iraqi Defector CURVEBALL Became Basis For US Claims That Iraq Had WMD)
(Musings On Iraq UN Inspectors Were Right Iraq Was Not A Threat)
(Musings On Iraq Iraq’s Rejection of UN Inspectors Led To Mistrust Over WMD and 2003 Invasion)
Jan 28 UK Foreign Secretary Straw told Foreign Office legal adviser Wood that he didn’t think 2nd
UN resolution was necessary for action vs Iraq
(Musings On Iraq Review The Report of the Iraq Inquiry, Executive Summary)
Jan 28 ORHA head Garner met with NSC’s Zalimay who said goal of postwar Iraq
should be getting Iraqis to govern as soon as possible
(Musings On Iraq on Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction Hard Lessons Chapter 3 The Department of Defense Takes Charge)
(Musings On Iraq review State of Denial, Bush At War, Part III)
Jan 28 Cheney Chief of Staff Libby gave copy of his briefing on Iraq WMD and ties to
Al Qaeda to Powell to be used as basis for his UN speech
Jan 29 US Ambassador to the UN Negroponte said Iraq bought aluminum tubes for nuke
program
(Musings On Iraq How A Contested Aluminum Tubes Story Became The Basis For War With Iraq)
(Musings On Iraq review The WMD Mirage, Iraq’s Decade of Deception and America’s False Premise for War)
Jan 29 Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld said Iraq had a nuke weapons program and tried
to buy uranium from Africa
(Musings On Iraq How US Intelligence Failed The Iraq-Niger Uranium Story)
(Musings On Iraq Review Hubris, The Inside Story of Spin, Scandal, And The Selling Of The Iraq War)
(Musings On Iraq review What Happened, Inside the Bush White House and Washington’s Culture of Deception)
Jan 29 Secretary of State Powell’s Chief of Staff Wilkerson went to CIA to go over info
to be used in Secretary’s UN speech Wilkerson ended up rejecting Cheney Chief of Staff Libby’s briefing as basis for speech CIA Director Tenet said Powell should use National Intelligence Estimate on Iraq instead
Jan 29 Iraq Working Group met with NGOs Told Pentagon picked Garner to run postwar Iraq Was
told this was a victory because a civilian would be in charge NGOs said Garner still worked for Pentagon Would deter some aid groups from working with Garner
Jan 29 Aid groups warned that if Pentagon ran postwar Iraq many international donors
would be reluctant to give relief
(Musings On Iraq review Losing Iraq, Inside The Post War Reconstruction Fiasco)
Jan 29 CIA report Said had been Iraq-Al Qaeda contacts Said Iraq offered safe haven to Al
Qaeda Found no evidence Iraq involved in 9/11 Came out after Dep Dir of Intel at CIA told CIA Dir Tenet he would resign unless VP Cheney chief of staff Libby stopped demanding changes in report Libby argued Iraq-Al Qaeda cooperated Libby Cheney Dep Def Sec Wolfowitz Under Sec Def for Policy Feith believed CIA politicized intel by not saying there was cooperation
Jan 30 Bush met with Joint Chiefs of Staff Asked if they had any doubts about war plan Army
chief Gen Shinseki brought up deployment of forces supply lines lack of Turkish front
Jan 30 Bush told Italian Premier Berlusconi that Iraq would be disarmed and Saddam
removed
Jan 30 US Ambassador to the UN Negroponte told Senate aluminum tubes Iraq bought
were not right for rockets in response to IAEA findings
(Musings On Iraq How A Contested Aluminum Tubes Story Became The Basis For War With Iraq)
(Musings On Iraq review The WMD Mirage, Iraq’s Decade of Deception and America’s False Premise for War)
Jan 30 Same hearing Deputy Secretary of State Armitage said there were differences in
US about the tubes
Jan 30 White House spokesman said Bush stood by claim that aluminum tubes Iraq tried
to buy were for nuclear program
Jan 30 CIA and Congressional inquiries found no evidence White House pressured US
intel on Iraq’s WMD
Jan 30 Powell’s chief of staff Wilkerson began going through intel on Iraq with CIA for
Powell’s Feb 03 UN speech
Jan 30 Aid group warned that breakdown of law and order likely right after Iraq invasion
unless US immediately established control
Jan 30 UK Attorney General Goldsmith wrote Blair telling him UN Res 1441 didn’t
authorize use of force against Iraq
(Musings On Iraq Review The Report of the Iraq Inquiry, Executive Summary)
Jan 30 Intl Rescue Comm warned US had to establish law and order immediately after invasion
Jan 31 Blair’s advisers told him had to prioritize pushing Bush on postwar planning for
Iraq but Blair failed to do so
(Musings On Iraq Chilcot Inquiry Section 6.5 Planning And Preparation For A Post-Saddam Hussein Iraq, January to March 2003)
(Musings On Iraq review A War Of Choice, The British In Iraq 2003-9)
Jan 31 Bush and Blair said that invasion would start Mar 10 2003 Blair told Bush he
needed a 2nd UN resolution for use of force against Iraq for domestic politics Bush agreed Decided a 2nd U.N. resolution would be good against Iraq but not necessary to go to war Talked about provoking Iraq to help justify war including getting US spy plane fired upon Bush said fighting between Iraqi factions would be unlikely after invasion
(Musings On Iraq review Leap of Faith, Hubris Negligence, and America’s Greatest Foreign
Policy Tragedy)
(Musings On Iraq Review Hubris, The Inside Story of Spin, Scandal, And The Selling Of The Iraq War)
(Musings On Iraq review The Bush Administrations and Saddam Hussein, Deciding on Conflict)
(Musings On Iraq Chilcot Inquiry Section 3.7 Development of UK Strategy and Options, 1 February to 7 March 2003)
Jan 31 Memo Blair and Bush met in DC Said Bush had decided to go to war with Iraq and
Blair agreed
(Musings On Iraq Review The Report of the Iraq Inquiry, Executive Summary)
Feb 1 Chief UN inspector Blix refused US claims that Iraq was sending WMD and
scientists outside country to hide them
(Musings On Iraq UN Inspectors Were Right Iraq Was Not A Threat)
(Musings On Iraq Iraq’s Rejection of UN Inspectors Led To Mistrust Over WMD and 2003 Invasion)
(Musings On Iraq review The WMD Mirage, Iraq’s Decade of Deception and America’s False Premise for War)
Feb 1 US Army War College study Said US might be seen as liberators at first but longer stayed they
would be seen as occupiers Said ehtnosectarian differences could lead to civil war or fractured state after fall of Saddam Said longer US presence in Iraq the more resistance it would face Said ethnosectarian parties would probably emerge in Iraq and increase divisions Warned that there would be terrorism providing services would be difficult oil could not pay for reconstruction Suggested 135 tasks US had to take care of to ensure stability of postwar Iraq Included securing border setting up local govts setting up police restoring electricity running hospitals reorganizing military disarming militias Said US would have to occupy Iraq for a long time and building democracy a huge challenge Warned US could win the Iraq war and lose the peace
(Musings On Iraq review Blind Into Baghdad, America’s War In Iraq)
(Musings On Iraq review Iraq’s Future The aftermath of regime change)
(Musings On Iraq review Leap of Faith, Hubris Negligence, and America’s Greatest Foreign
Policy Tragedy)
(Musings On Iraq review Overreach, Delusions of Regime Change In Iraq)
(Musings On Iraq Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction’s “Hard Lessons” – Part I: Planning for Postwar Iraq September 2001 to May 2003)
(Musings On Iraq Overview of America’s Policy Towards Iraq: From The Clinton Years To The
Sectarian War of 2006)
Feb 1 Powell went to CIA HQ to go over Iraq-Al Qaeda intel for UN speech Decided to
focus upon Zarqawi Cheney Chief of Staff Libby and Deputy National Security Adviser Hadley wanted Powell to use story that 9/11 hijacker Atta met with Iraqi intel in Prague in 2001 Powell said no because CIA questioned it
(Musings On Iraq review Insurgent Iraq, Al Zarqawi and the New Generation)
(Musings On Iraq Overview of America’s Policy Towards Iraq: From The Clinton Years To The
Sectarian War of 2006)
Feb 1 US-Turkey worked out rules of engagement for proposed Turkish security zone in Kurdistan
during invasion
Feb 2 Powell and his deputy Armitage went to CIA to go through Iraq intel to use in his
UN speech Decided to use 3 intercepts of Iraqi officers perhaps talking about hiding WMD Decided to use CIA intel on Zarqawi operating in Kurdistan CIA Dir Tenet told Powell no intel Saddam directly involved with Zarqawi Powell decided to claim Iraq giving sanctuary to Zarqawi
(Musings On Iraq review Insurgent Iraq, Al Zarqawi and the New Generation)
(Musings On Iraq review The WMD Mirage, Iraq’s Decade of Deception and America’s False Premise for War)
Feb 3 White House spokesman Fleischer said that Saddam should leave Iraq
Feb 3 UK issued paper on Iraqi deception campaign to hide its WMD Later turned out 60% was
plagiarized from a journal article
Feb 3 Secretary of State Powell OpEd in Wall St Journal said Iraq hiding its WMD
(Musings On Iraq Iraq One Of The Worst Intelligence Failures In US History)
(Musings On Iraq review The WMD Mirage, Iraq’s Decade of Deception and America’s False Premise for War)
Feb 3 CIA asked Italian intel for more info on Iraq-Niger deal but it had none
(Musings On Iraq How US Intelligence Failed The Iraq-Niger Uranium Story)
(Musings On Iraq Review Hubris, The Inside Story of Spin, Scandal, And The Selling Of The Iraq War)
(Musings On Iraq review The WMD Mirage, Iraq’s Decade of Deception and America’s False Premise for War)
Feb 3 Dep PM Ramadan and Foreign Min Sabri went to Turkey for last minute talks to halt war
Nothing came of it
Feb 4 US gave documents on alleged Iraq-Niger uranium deal to IAEA
(Musings On Iraq How US Intelligence Failed The Iraq-Niger Uranium Story)
(Musings On Iraq Review Hubris, The Inside Story of Spin, Scandal, And The Selling Of The Iraq War)
Feb 4 UN inspectors looked at two alleged mobile WMD labs and found nothing
(Musings On Iraq How Iraqi Defector CURVEBALL Became Basis For US Claim That Iraq Had WMD)
(Musings On Iraq Look Who The LA Times Dug Up – CURVEBALL)
(Musings On Iraq Story of CURVEBALL And Iraq’s Mobile Biological Weapons Labs)
(Musings On Iraq review The WMD Mirage, Iraq’s Decade of Deception and America’s False Premise for War)
Feb 4 CIA analyst emailed Dep Chief Iraq Task Force against using Curveball story that Iraq had
mobile WMD labs Also questioned 3 supporting sources Dept Chief told analyst war coming so didn’t matter if there were questions about Curveball and his mobile WMD labs story Didn’t exist
(Musings On Iraq review Curveball, Spies, Lies, And The Con Man Who Caused A War)
Feb 4 CIA Director Tenet warned by European chief Drumheller that there were problems
with Curveball’s story that Iraq had mobile WMD labs Tenet said don’t worry
Feb 4 Blair said plan was to get UN to show Iraq not cooperating on WMD and then have
Arab countries make Saddam step down
Feb 4 Powell and Turkey’s Foreign Min Yakis met to talk about US aid in return for
using Turkey in Iraq invasion
(Musings On Iraq review Losing Iraq, Inside The Post War Reconstruction Fiasco)
Feb 4 Saddam speech Said Iraqis had better morale and faith than US and UK and could defeat them
as a result
(Musings On Iraq review Iraqi Perspectives Project, A View of Operation Iraqi Freedom from Saddam’s Senior Leadership)
Feb 5 Before Powell’s UN speech Bush met with 20 Congressional leaders to lobby them
on Iraq National Security Adviser Rice told them US had tried everything and now war only option Rice said she was confident WMD would be found after war Briefly went over postwar plans
(Musings On Iraq review Leap of Faith, Hubris Negligence, and America’s Greatest Foreign Policy
Tragedy)
Feb 5 Powell and UK Foreign Secretary Straw met before UN speech Both skeptical
about Iraq intel Powell thought most was circumstantial
Feb 5 Secretary of State Powell gave UN speech laying out US case against Iraq’s WMD
and Iraq-Al Qaeda ties using Zarqawi Claimed Iraq hiding its WMD from inspectors Said Qusay Hussein ordered removal of banned materials form sites Claimed WMD missiles had been distributed to western Iraq Said human sources reported Iraq had mobile WMD labs Claimed Iraq had UAVs that could be used to deliver WMD Said some disagreements within US intel community but most agreed Iraq tried to buy aluminum tubes for centrifuges Said Iraq gave safe haven to Zarqawi in Kurdistan Said Iraq-Al Qaeda had 8 meetings since 1990s Claimed Iraq gave Al Qaeda training in WMD
(Musings On Iraq review Insurgent Iraq, Al Zarqawi and the New Generation)
(Musings On Iraq review Iraq’s Future The aftermath of regime change)
(Musings On Iraq review What Happened, Inside the Bush White House and Washington’s Culture of Deception)
(Musings On Iraq review The WMD Mirage, Iraq’s Decade of Deception and America’s False Premise for War)
(Musings On Iraq How Iraqi Defector CURVEBALL Became Basis For US Claims That Iraq Had WMD)
(Musings On Iraq How A Contested Aluminum Tubes Story Became The Basis For War With Iraq)
(Musings On Iraq The CIA’s Shoddy Pre-War Intelligence Reporting: The Case Of Iraq’s Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs))
Feb 5 Natl Sec Adv Rice on Larry King said there was an Iraq-Al Qaeda connection Said Saddam
could give WMD to terrorists
Feb 5 Chief UN inspector Blix told press never found any evidence of Iraq having mobile
WMD labs
(Musings On Iraq UN Inspectors Were Right Iraq Was Not A Threat)
(Musings On Iraq Iraq’s Rejection of UN Inspectors Led To Mistrust Over WMD and 2003 Invasion)
Feb 5 3rd meeting of US UK Australia on postwar Iraq planning US rejected any role for
UN
(Musings On Iraq Chilcot Inquiry Section 6.5 Planning And Preparation For A Post-Saddam Hussein Iraq, January to March 2003)
Feb 5 Washington Post editorial said Iraq violating UN resolutions and would support
war
Feb 6 PM Blair met with Blix and El Baradei Blix warned that unresolved issues from 1990s such as
Iraq claiming it destroyed its WMD without document it may not exist Blix told Foreign Min Straw that he believed Iraq had WMD programs
(Musings On Iraq Chilcot Inquiry Section 4.3 Iraq WMD Assessments, October 2002 to March 2003)
Feb 6 Bush said there was an Iraq-Al Qaeda relationship going to back to 1990s Said Iraq gave
bomb making forgery and WMD training to Al Qaeda Came from tortured Al Qaeda operative who later recanted story
(Musings On Iraq review What Happened, Inside the Bush White House and Washington’s Culture of Deception)
Feb 6 UK Foreign Secretary Straw wrote Attorney General Lord Goldsmith challenging need for
2nd UN resolution to go to war with Iraq
(Musings On Iraq Review The Report of the Iraq Inquiry, Executive Summary)
Feb 6 Pentagon memo on postwar Iraq justice system said US needed to deploy 4,000 police or
3,000 international police to assure law and order Said military had no plans for that Asked if US was going to train a new Iraqi police force Estimated that would cost $700 mil the first year Asked if that money was available
(Musings On Iraq review Leap of Faith, Hubris Negligence, and America’s Greatest Foreign
Policy Tragedy)
Feb 6 Press revealed most of UK intel dossier on Iraq trying to hide WMD was
plagiarized from a journal article
Feb 6 Khalilzad met with Turkmen Front Kurds Turks to try to make deal between
Ankara and Kurds to facilitate using Turkey for invasion
(Musings On Iraq review Losing Iraq, Inside The Post War Reconstruction Fiasco)
Feb 6 NY Times Washington Post USA Today editorials all said Powell’s UN speech
convinced them of Iraq threat
Feb 6 Turkish parliament voted to allow US military to upgrade ports and facilities for troop
deployment
Feb 7 US officials pushed back against Powell’s UN speech Told Wash Post Zarqawi
connected to Al Qaeda but not part of group
(Musings On Iraq review Insurgent Iraq, Al Zarqawi and the New Generation)
Feb 7 Pres Chirac called Bush saying there were alternatives to war with Iraq Said if war
happened France would help with reconstruction
Feb 7 State Dept memo warned of serious problems in postwar Iraq and possible security vacuum
after war Were told military couldn't spare troops to ensure security
(Musings On Iraq review Leap of Faith, Hubris Negligence, and America’s Greatest Foreign
Policy Tragedy)
Feb 7 Pres Mubarak’s son Gamal visited Bush saying Saddam might want to go into exile
in Egypt
Feb 7 UK admitted paper on Iraq deception campaign over its WMD was plagiarized
from US college student paper
Feb 7 State Dept gave translated copies of Iraq-Niger uranium deal to CIA Were not
considered important to case Iraq restarted nuke program so docs not analyzed
(Musings On Iraq How US Intelligence Failed The Iraq-Niger Uranium Story)
(Musings On Iraq Review Hubris, The Inside Story of Spin, Scandal, And The Selling Of The Iraq War)
(Musings On Iraq review The WMD Mirage, Iraq’s Decade of Deception and America’s False Premise for War)
Feb 8 Bush said Iraq trying to buy equipment for WMD Saddam authorized his
commanders to use chemical weapons
(Musings On Iraq Iraq One Of The Worst Intelligence Failures In US History)
(Musings On Iraq review What Happened, Inside the Bush White House and Washington’s Culture of Deception)
(Musings On Iraq review The WMD Mirage, Iraq’s Decade of Deception and America’s False Premise for War)
Feb 8 Iraq turned over new documents about its WMD programs to UN inspectors that was called
substantial Iraq said it unilaterally destroyed its VX after Gulf War
Feb 8 UN inspectors went to site CURVEBALL defector claimed was secret mobile WMD facility
and found nothing Didn’t match description CURVEBALL gave Samples found no WMD
(Musings On Iraq review Curveball, Spies, Lies, And The Con Man Who Caused A War)
(Musings On Iraq How Iraqi Defector CURVEBALL Became Basis For US Claim That Iraq Had WMD)
(Musings On Iraq Look Who The LA Times Dug Up – CURVEBALL)
(Musings On Iraq Story of CURVEBALL And Iraq’s Mobile Biological Weapons Labs)
(Musings On Iraq UN Inspectors Were Right Iraq Was Not A Threat)
(Musings On Iraq Iraq’s Rejection of UN Inspectors Led To Mistrust Over WMD and 2003 Invasion)
Feb 9 France and Germany proposed tripling number of UN inspectors in Iraq US attacked plan
(Musings On Iraq Chilcot Inquiry Section 3.7 Development of UK Strategy and Options, 1 February to 7 March 2003)
Feb 9 Pentagon memo said that there would be security vacuum after invasion leading to disorder
Said civilians at Pentagon expected military to come up with troops to preserve order but military wanted troops for other tasks Memo was rejected by CENTCOM that said war plan was to get to Baghdad and couldn’t leave troops behind to maintain order
(Musings On Iraq review Leap of Faith, Hubris Negligence, and America’s Greatest Foreign Policy Tragedy)
Feb 9 Report UK intel didn’t think there was an Iraq-al Qaeda connection
(Musings On Iraq Review The Report of the Iraq Inquiry, Executive Summary)
(Musings On Iraq Chilcot Inquiry Section 3.7 Development of UK Strategy and Options, 1 February to 7 March 2003)
Feb 9 Observer article disputed Iraqi defector Mohammed Shahab used in March 02 New
Yorker article who claimed Iraq connected to Al Qaeda via Ansar al-Islam
Feb 10 Australian Premier Howard met Bush Bush said Saddam would leave power or US
would remove him
Feb 10 France Germany Russia statement called for more time for inspections Doused hopes that
France would vote for or abstain on 2nd UN resolution on Iraq authorizing use of force
(Musings On Iraq Chilcot Inquiry Section 3.7 Development of UK Strategy and Options, 1 February to 7 March 2003)
Feb 10 UK created Iraq Planning Unit with less than 10 people after found out US had no real
postwar plans for Iraq UK didn’t do much planning either
(Musings On Iraq Chilcot Inquiry Section 6.5 Planning And Preparation For A Post-Saddam Hussein Iraq, January to March 2003)
Feb 10 UK intel report said attack on Iraq would increase threat of terrorist attacks by Al
Qaeda
Feb 10 New Yorker article reported Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Feith’s office
claim that Iraq connected to Al Qaeda and supporting Zarqawi
(Musings On Iraq review Insurgent Iraq, Al Zarqawi and the New Generation)
Feb 10 German officials investigating Zarqawi said found no evidence he was linked to
Iraqi govt
Feb 10 US defense attache report that it looked at Benin warehouse and found no
uranium headed for Iraq Inspection done in Dec 2002
(Musings On Iraq How US Intelligence Failed The Iraq-Niger Uranium Story)
Feb 11 Bin Laden released tape calling on Iraqis to resist coming US invasion and called
Baath infidels
Feb 11 Secretary of State Powell claimed bin Laden complained about effect of
sanctions on Iraqi people showed Baghdad aligned with Al Qaeda and terrorism
Feb 11 CIA Dir Tenet told Senate Iraq had WMD and was hiding them from UN Inspectors Said
Iraq tried to buy aluminum tubes from for its nuclear program Had mobile WMD labs Told Senate Iraq harboring Zarqawi and Al Qaeda associate Iraq trained Al Qaeda operatives
(Musings On Iraq UN Inspectors Were Right Iraq Was Not A Threat)
(Musings On Iraq Iraq’s Rejection of UN Inspectors Led To Mistrust Over WMD and 2003 Invasion)
(Musings On Iraq How A Contested Aluminum Tubes Story Became The Basis For War With Iraq)
(Musings On Iraq How Iraqi Defector CURVEBALL Became Basis For US Claims That Iraq Had WMD)
(Musings On Iraq review Insurgent Iraq, Al Zarqawi and the New Generation)
(Musings On Iraq review The WMD Mirage, Iraq’s Decade of Deception and America’s False Premise for War)
Feb 11 CIA senior Africa analyst said that Iraq-Niger uranium docs looked like fakes
(Musings On Iraq How US Intelligence Failed The Iraq-Niger Uranium Story)
(Musings On Iraq Review Hubris, The Inside Story of Spin, Scandal, And The Selling Of The Iraq War)
Feb 11 Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Feith and Under Secertary of State Grossman
testified to Senate Foreign Relations Committee on postwar Iraq plans Didn’t give any details Grossman said US would only stay in Iraq as long as necessary Would go through 4 phases to postwar Iraq 1st stability 2nd handing authority to Iraqis 3rd New constitution 4th electing new Iraqi govt Told Senate US would not create a govt in exile before invasion Committees would be formed to create new Iraq Iraqi institutions would still be running to help govern country Claimed White House authorized Future of Iraq Project as roadmap for Iraq Had been discarded by Pentagon Feith said Iraqi oil would pay for all reconstruction and running govt Said US would not impose any leaders or govt on Iraq
(Musings On Iraq on Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction Hard Lessons Chapter 3 The Department of Defense Takes Charge)
(Musings On Iraq Iraq Oil Would Pay For Reconstruction)
(Musings On Iraq review Leap of Faith, Hubris Negligence, and America’s Greatest Foreign
Policy Tragedy)
(Musings On Iraq review State of Denial, Bush At War, Part III)
(Musings On Iraq review Hard Lessons, The Iraq Reconstruction Experience)
Feb 11 Former CENTCOM commander Gen Zinni testified to Senate Said U.S. had to
maintain law and order peacekeeping civil unrest had to be stopped and prevent revenge develop local police
Feb 11 Aide to CIA European chief Drumheller emailed Defense HUMIT division chief about
Curveball not being vetted Division chief said CIA didn’t have a clue about how BND handled Curveball
(Musings On Iraq How Iraqi Defector CURVEBALL Became Basis For US Claim That Iraq Had WMD)
(Musings On Iraq Look Who The LA Times Dug Up – CURVEBALL)
(Musings On Iraq Story of CURVEBALL And Iraq’s Mobile Biological Weapons Labs)
(Musings On Iraq review The WMD Mirage, Iraq’s Decade of Deception and America’s False Premise for War)
(Musings On Iraq review Curveball, Spies, Lies, And The Con Man Who Caused A War)
Feb 11 UN inspectors wrote 9 page evaluation of Powell’s Feb 03 UN speech Pointed out 18 points
about WMD that were unsubstantiated Said most of the places Powell mentioned had been inspected and nothing found
Feb 12 CIA Director Tenet testified to Senate Armed Services Committee Said Iraq had
larger WMD program then before Gulf War Warned Iraq would get a nuclear weapon sooner or later and would have missiles to deliver it Said US had briefed UN on all suspected WMD sites In reality didn’t provide information on 21 of 105 sites Said there were Iraq-Al Qaeda contacts but no command and control
(Musings On Iraq How US Intelligence Created An Iraqi Nuclear Threat In 2002)
(Musings On Iraq review The WMD Mirage, Iraq’s Decade of Deception and America’s False Premise for War)
Feb 12 UN inspectors announce Iraq’s Samoud 2 missiles violated range limits set by UN Iraq
turned over list of 83 people involved in destruction of VX to confirm claim
Feb 12 IAEA interviewed Iraq’s ex-ambassador to Vatican Zahawie who was named in
Iraq-Niger uranium deal docs Denied story
(Musings On Iraq How US Intelligence Failed The Iraq-Niger Uranium Story)
(Musings On Iraq Review Hubris, The Inside Story of Spin, Scandal, And The Selling Of The Iraq War)
Feb 13 PM Blair at cabinet meeting on postwar Iraq International Development Office head Short
asked where money was for Iraq Blair hadn’t appropriated any
Feb 13 UN announced it had humanitarian plan for Iraq working with 6 regional
countries and had $30.6 mil and would ask for another $88.8 mil
Feb 13 CENTCOM Cmdr Gen Franks told Bush he had Iraqi mayors for each city to run
things after invasion He didn’t
(Musings On Iraq review Leap of Faith, Hubris Negligence, and America’s Greatest Foreign
Policy Tragedy)
(Musings On Iraq on Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction Hard Lessons Chapter 3 The Department of Defense Takes Charge)
Feb 13 IAEA interviewed Iraq’s ex-ambassador to Vatican Zahawie second time over
Iraq-Niger uranium deal Denied story
(Musings On Iraq How US Intelligence Failed The Iraq-Niger Uranium Story)
(Musings On Iraq Review Hubris, The Inside Story of Spin, Scandal, And The Selling Of The Iraq War)
Feb 13 Turkish delegation arrived in US for talks about financial compensation and aid for
involvement in Iraq war Wanted $92 bil
Feb 14 Chief Inspector Blix briefed Security Council on Iraq inspections Said found no
evidence of WMD Said 400 inspections at 300 sites Were all without notice and gained entry every time Said Iraqis cooperating Soil samples showed no signs of WMD Iraq still had unaccounted for materials Found 2 banned missiles Refuted Powell’s claim that Iraqis were cleaning WMD sites before inspections
(Musings On Iraq Chilcot Inquiry Section 3.7 Development of UK Strategy and Options, 1 February to 7 March 2003)
(Musings On Iraq review The WMD Mirage, Iraq’s Decade of Deception and America’s False Premise for War)
Feb 14 IAEA head El Baradei said it had dismembered Iraq’s nuke program in 1998 and
found no evidence that it had been restarted yet Said aluminum tubes for rockets
(Musings On Iraq How A Contested Aluminum Tubes Story Became The Basis For War With Iraq)
(Musings On Iraq UN Inspectors Were Right Iraq Was Not A Threat)
(Musings On Iraq Iraq’s Rejection of UN Inspectors Led To Mistrust Over WMD and 2003 Invasion)
Feb 14 Powell told Security Council Iraq not cooperating with inspections and use of
force still an option
Feb 14 Saddam issued presidential directive banning companies from importing
equipment for WMD
Feb 14 Def Sec Rumsfeld gave speech that U.S. was opposed to nation building in Iraq Said
Afghanistan provided new model where there was no US occupation and locals would take the lead Rumsfeld claimed US had enough time to properly plan for postwar Iraq
(Musings On Iraq review Liberate And Leave, Fatal Flaws In The Early Strategy For Postwar Iraq)
(Musings On Iraq review Leap of Faith, Hubris Negligence, and America’s Greatest Foreign Policy Tragedy)
(Musings On Iraq on Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction Hard Lessons Chapter 3 The Department of Defense Takes Charge)
Feb 14 Wash Post editorial supported war with Iraq
Feb 14 NSC met over how to respond to a coup in Iraq Didn’t think it was likely but had
to plan for it
Feb 15 Protests in more than 600 cities around world against going to war with Iraq
Feb 15 Bush told Rumsfeld to slow troop deployments because getting ahead of diplomacy
Feb 16 National Security Adviser Rice claimed Iraq was deceiving UN weapons inspectors
(Musings On Iraq UN Inspectors Were Right Iraq Was Not A Threat)
(Musings On Iraq Iraq’s Rejection of UN Inspectors Led To Mistrust Over WMD and 2003 Invasion)
Feb 17 U2 spy planes began flying over Iraq for UN weapons inspectors
Feb 17 Turkish parliament delayed vote to allow deployment of US troops
for Iraq invasion due to domestic opposition
Feb 17 IAEA found that Iraq-Niger uranium docs were fakes
(Musings On Iraq How US Intelligence Failed The Iraq-Niger Uranium Story)
(Musings On Iraq Review Hubris, The Inside Story of Spin, Scandal, And The Selling Of The Iraq War)
Feb 19 ORHA head Garner briefed Natl Sec Adv Rice to use Iraqi army and police to
help rebuilding Iraq after war
(Musings On Iraq on Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction Hard Lessons Chapter 3 The Department of Defense Takes Charge)
(Musings On Iraq review Leap of Faith, Hubris Negligence, and America’s Greatest Foreign
Policy Tragedy)
Feb 19 Ahmed Chalabi OpEd in Wall St Journal Said Iraqis would welcome US liberation but
needed to include them in administration and decision making
(Musings On Iraq review The Man Who Pushed America To War, The Extraordinary Life, Adventures, and Obsessions of Ahmad Chalabi)
(Musings On Iraq review Arrows of the Night: Ahmad Chalabi and the Selling of the Iraq War)
Feb 19 Report 1991 1st meeting of Iraqi opposition in Lebanon Jun 92 meeting in Vienna led to
creation of INC as umbrella group Oct 1992 opposition met in Irbil Came up with organization of INC Created 3 man presidential council for a Shiite a Kurd and a Sunni made up of Massoud Barzani Gen Naqib and Mohammed Uloom Feb 93 opposition meeting Created new committee to represent all the different parties Came up with ethnosectarian quotas
(Musings On Iraq Origins Of Iraq’s Ethnosectarian Quota System)
Feb 20 Def Sec Rumsfeld on TV said zero chace Saddam would step down so best situation
would be for Iraqis to remove Saddam themselves
Feb 20 Chief UN Inspector Blix told Blair intelligence he’d gotten wasn’t great and
maybe Iraq didn’t have much WMD
(Musings On Iraq UN Inspectors Were Right Iraq Was Not A Threat)
(Musings On Iraq Iraq’s Rejection of UN Inspectors Led To Mistrust Over WMD and 2003 Invasion)
(Musings On Iraq Chilcot Inquiry Section 4.3 Iraq WMD Assessments, October 2002 to March 2003)
Feb 20 UN sources told press US intel on Iraq WMD was not turning up anything
Feb 20 Report interviews with Iraqi scientists by inspectors had not turned up any evidence
of a nuclear program
(Musings On Iraq How US Intelligence Created An Iraqi Nuclear Threat In 2002)
Feb 20 Pew/Council on Foreign Relations poll found 57% of Americans believed Saddam
involved in 9/11
Feb 21 ORHA staff met in DC to have run through of their Iraq postwar plans
(Musings On Iraq on Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction Hard Lessons Chapter 3 The Department of Defense Takes Charge)
(Musings On Iraq review Leap of Faith, Hubris Negligence, and America’s Greatest Foreign
Policy Tragedy)
Feb 21 Blair met Bush at Camp David to reaffirm their alliance to remove Saddam
(Musings On Iraq Review The Report of the Iraq Inquiry, Executive Summary)
(Musings On Iraq review A War Of Choice, The British In Iraq 2003-9)
Feb 22 Bush administration officially announced it was deploying forces for invasion
Actually started Dec 02
(Musings On Iraq review Wanting War: Why the Bush Administration Invaded Iraq)
(Musings On Iraq review Leap of Faith, Hubris Negligence, and America’s Greatest Foreign Policy Tragedy)
Feb 22 Spanish Pres Aznar visited Bush Had group call with Blair and Italian Premier Berlusconi
Bush said he had lost patience Wanted a 2nd Un resolution as quickly as possible to authorize use of force vs Iraq Bush threatened retaliation against members of UN security council that might vote against resolution Bush said Iraq was a historic moment to spread freedom
(Musings On Iraq Review The Report of the Iraq Inquiry, Executive Summary)
Feb 22 ORHA drill found US would not have enough troops for Iraq postwar security Was
worried not enough funding for postwar Iraq that could leave behind unstable country ORHA found US had no plans for what kind of govt they wanted in Iraq and how to achieve it ORHA Dep Head thought US had faulty assumptions overly optimistic lacked reality on what postwar Iraq would be like
(Musings On Iraq on Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction Hard Lessons Chapter 3 The Department of Defense Takes Charge)
(Musings On Iraq review State of Denial, Bush At War, Part III)
(Musings On Iraq review Hard Lessons, The Iraq Reconstruction Experience)
Feb 23 Iraqi Army Chief of Staff sent orders to Basra units to conduct offensive ops to disrupt the
enemy but didn’t give any details on how or what to do
Feb 24 US UK Spain tabled 2nd draft resolution to UN saying Iraq had not taken
opportunity to disarm
(Musings On Iraq Review The Report of the Iraq Inquiry, Executive Summary)
Feb 24 Russia France Germany tabled counter draft resolution at UN calling for step by
step disarmament process in Iraq
(Musings On Iraq Chilcot Inquiry Section 3.7 Development of UK Strategy and Options, 1 February to 7 March 2003)
Feb 24 Turkish cabinet agreed to allow US forces to be deployed for Iraq invasion in
return for $1 bil in aid
Feb 24 Turkish Foreign Min asked US for $92 bil in aid and allowing Turkish troops into
Kurdistan in return for US using Turkey for Iraq invasion
(Musings On Iraq review Losing Iraq, Inside The Post War Reconstruction Fiasco)
Feb 24 CIA denied Newsweek story that Hussein Kamil claimed Iraq destroyed its WMD
in 90s He did say that
(Musings On Iraq Overview of America’s Policy Towards Iraq: From The Clinton Years To The
Sectarian War of 2006)
Feb 24 NSC meeting on Iraq oil sector Said US should not determine industry Went over
rebuilding and getting sector back on line after war Bush told NSC important to get Iraqis to be seen running oil sector after war Bush also worried about oil shocks due to invasion Saudis said they would handle prices
(Musings On Iraq on Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction Hard Lessons Chapter 2 The Agencies Engage)
Feb 24 US outlined general humanitarian relief plan for postwar Iraq including finances
and implementation
(Musings On Iraq on Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction Hard Lessons Chapter 3 The Department of Defense Takes Charge)
(Musings On Iraq review Leap of Faith, Hubris Negligence, and America’s Greatest Foreign
Policy Tragedy)
Feb 24 KDP warned that Turkish troops moving into Kurdistan during US invasion could lead to
clashes
Feb 25 Army chief Gen Shinseki told Senate US needed several hundred 1000 troops to
successfully occupy Iraq Made Def Sec Rumsfeld angry He told press Iraq would not need several hundred 1000 troops
(Musings On Iraq review Leap of Faith, Hubris Negligence, and America’s Greatest Foreign Policy
Tragedy)
(Musings On Iraq Overview of America’s Policy Towards Iraq: From The Clinton Years To The
Sectarian War of 2006)
Feb 25 Def Sec Rumsfeld told his dep Wolfowitz to complain to Army Sec White about
Shinseki’s comments to Senate that Iraq would need several hundred 1000 troops
Feb 25 Blair told CENTCOM cmdr Gen Franks UN had to play a major role in postwar Iraq
Feb 25 Gen Franks told UK commander Adm Boyce US not thinking of WWII type Japanese
or German rebuilding effort in Iraq
(Musings On Iraq on Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction Hard Lessons Chapter 3 The Department of Defense Takes Charge)
(Musings On Iraq Review The Report of the Iraq Inquiry, Executive Summary)
Feb 25 Iraqi opposition meeting in Salahaddin, Irbil Couldn't agree on a govt in exile
Feb 25 KRG parliament passed resolution rejecting foreign troops in Kurdistan Was warning to
Turkey
Feb 26 Bush speech at American Enterprise Institute Said that Iraq was direct threat to US due to
WMD and links to terrorists Said US had experience in stability operations and putting reformers in power Said other nations would help rebuild Iraq and US would stay in Iraq as long as necessary but “not a day more” Said spreading democracy to Iraq would be an inspiration to Middle East
(Musings On Iraq review Overreach, Delusions of Regime Change In Iraq)
(Musings On Iraq review Hard Lessons, The Iraq Reconstruction Experience)
(Musings On Iraq review What Happened, Inside the Bush White House and Washington’s Culture of Deception)
(Musings On Iraq review Leap of Faith, Hubris Negligence, and America’s Greatest Foreign
Policy Tragedy)
(Musings On Iraq review Iraq’s Future The aftermath of regime change)
(Musings On Iraq review Wanting War: Why the Bush Administration Invaded Iraq)
(Musings On Iraq review Fiasco: The American Military Adventure In Iraq)
(Musings On Iraq Iraq One Of The Worst Intelligence Failures In US History)
(Musings On Iraq Overview of America’s Policy Towards Iraq: From The Clinton Years To The
Sectarian War of 2006)
Feb 26 Opposition Follow Up and Coordination Committee met in Kurdistan Mohammed Bakir al-
Hakim wrote letter to meeting Said concerned US would exclude Iraqi people from running Iraq Meant the opposition Meeting elected leadership committee of Talabani Barzani Hakim Allawi Chalabi Adnan Pachachi added later He refused to join because of disagreements with Chalabi Later on Jaafari of Dawa and Chadiricy of Iraqi National Movement included
Feb 27 Deputy Defense Secretary Wolfowtiz told House Comm admin had no estimates of costs
of reconstructing Iraq and wouldn’t know until it got there Said calls for more troops to handle postwar Iraq were “outlandish” Said crazy to think postwar Iraq would take more troops than invasion Said Iraqis would greet US as liberators and that meant didn’t need more troops Said there would be large numbers of Free Iraqi Forces to restore order Said Iraq had no history of ethnic violence like in Bosnia that required long term peace keepers
(Musings On Iraq review Leap of Faith, Hubris Negligence, and America’s Greatest Foreign
Policy Tragedy)
(Musings On Iraq review Fiasco: The American Military Adventure In Iraq)
(Musings On Iraq review Hard Lessons, The Iraq Reconstruction Experience)
(Musings On Iraq Overview of America’s Policy Towards Iraq: From The Clinton Years To The
Sectarian War of 2006)
Feb 27 ORHA head Garner learned he only had $27 mil to run postwar Iraq
Feb 27 UK Attorney General Goldsmith changed his position that UN Resolution 1441
alone could be legal basis for action against Iraq Said UK could refer to UN Res 678 that authorized Gulf War as justification for new war
(Musings On Iraq Review The Report of the Iraq Inquiry, Executive Summary)
(Musings On Iraq Chilcot Inquiry Section 5 Advice On The Legal Basis For Military Action, November 2002 To March 2003)
Feb 27 UK oil firms met with govt officials saying they thought US firms were getting
deals for postwar Iraq over them
Feb 27 State Dept paper said multiple sources claimed Iraq had mobile WMD labs Said
creating democracy in Iraq would be difficult and likely undermined by internal and external issues
(Musings On Iraq How Iraqi Defector CURVEBALL Became Basis For US Claims That Iraq Had WMD)
(Musings On Iraq review Overreach, Delusions of Regime Change In Iraq)
(Musings On Iraq review Iraq’s Future The aftermath of regime change)
(Musings On Iraq review The WMD Mirage, Iraq’s Decade of Deception and America’s False Premise for War)
(Musings On Iraq Overview of America’s Policy Towards Iraq: From The Clinton Years To The
Sectarian War of 2006)
Feb 27 CIA told Sen Levine that it didn’t believe Iraq-Niger uranium deal made but Iraq
might have been interested in one in 1999
(Musings On Iraq How US Intelligence Failed The Iraq-Niger Uranium Story)
(Musings On Iraq Review Hubris, The Inside Story of Spin, Scandal, And The Selling Of The Iraq War)
Feb 27 Saddam agreed to destroy Samoud 2 missiles found to violate range limitations by UN
inspectors US and UK said Iraq playing games
(Musings On Iraq UN Inspectors Were Right Iraq Was Not A Threat)
(Musings On Iraq Iraq’s Rejection of UN Inspectors Led To Mistrust Over WMD and 2003 Invasion)
Feb 28 Iraq agreed to destroy Samud II ballistic missiles that violated UN restrictions
Feb 28 US attacked Iraq agreement to destroy Samud II missiles claiming it was just
propaganda not real disarmament
Feb 28 Rumsfeld said Iraq never cooperated with UN inspectors
Feb 28 Blix reported to Security Council Said Iraq needed more effort to show it destroyed WMD
in 1990s Also asked why it took so long for Iraq to comply with inspections Inspectors went to site CURVEBALL claimed was secret WMD facility for second time for samples Found nothing Said found small stock of mustard gas and some old WMD warheads and Iraq built 2 banned missiles Said Iraq had not provided any new information to answer questions from 1990s inspections Allowed U2 flights
(Musings On Iraq How Iraqi Defector CURVEBALL Became Basis For US Claim That Iraq Had WMD)
(Musings On Iraq Look Who The LA Times Dug Up – CURVEBALL)
(Musings On Iraq Story of CURVEBALL And Iraq’s Mobile Biological Weapons Labs)
(Musings On Iraq UN Inspectors Were Right Iraq Was Not A Threat)
(Musings On Iraq Iraq’s Rejection of UN Inspectors Led To Mistrust Over WMD and 2003 Invasion)
(Musings On Iraq review The WMD Mirage, Iraq’s Decade of Deception and America’s False Premise for War)
(Musings On Iraq review Curveball, Spies, Lies, And The Con Man Who Caused A War)
Feb 28 State Dept said Iraq tried to buy aluminum tubes for its nuke program
(Musings On Iraq How A Contested Aluminum Tubes Story Became The Basis For War With Iraq)
Feb 28 State Dept said Iraq tried to buy aluminum tubes for its nuke program
Feb 28 ORHA head Garner made 1st brief of postwar Iraq plans to Bush 1 month before
war
(Musings On Iraq on Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction Hard Lessons Chapter 3 The Department of Defense Takes Charge)
Feb 28 UK Defense Ministry report said Coalition had to prevent security vacuum after
Invasion of Iraq and stop Al Qaeda from expanding into country
Feb 28 UK Def Min note to Blair office said UK failed to influence US postwar Iraq
planning and UK would have to deal with US decisions made for it
(Musings On Iraq review A War Of Choice, The British In Iraq 2003-9)
(Musings On Iraq Review The Report of the Iraq Inquiry, Executive Summary)
(Musings On Iraq Chilcot Inquiry Section 6.5 Planning And Preparation For A Post-Saddam Hussein Iraq, January to March 2003)
Feb 28 Defense Policy Board warned by peacekeeping expert Perito could be breakdown in law
order right after invasion if Iraqi police didn’t go back to work Said couldn’t rely on Iraqi police Said that US troops could not take over police duties because not trained for that job Allies wouldn’t send forces either Said 2500 police force needed to be put together and trained before invasion so could go right into Iraq when invasion ended
(Musings On Iraq review Leap of Faith, Hubris Negligence, and America’s Greatest Foreign
Policy Tragedy)
Feb 28 UN inspectors went back to site CURVEBALL claimed was used for secret mobile WMD
labs Found nothing again
Mar 1 1st high level US meeting on creating Iraqi interim govt held just days before
invasion Undersecretary of Defense Feith said US would set up an Iraqi authority as soon as possible and would pick the members with majority being exiles because they would understand democracy better Nat Sec Adv Rice supported idea VP Chaney said quicker US handed over control to Iraqis the better Rice said important that Pentagon create the authority
(Musings On Iraq review Overreach, Delusions of Regime Change In Iraq)
(Musings On Iraq review Leap of Faith, Hubris Negligence, and America’s Greatest Foreign
Policy Tragedy)
(Musings On Iraq review State of Denial, Bush At War, Part III)
(Musings On Iraq review Hard Lessons, The Iraq Reconstruction Experience)
Mar 1 US and Turkey agreed on memoranda of understanding on Iraq invasion Turkey would
allow 62000 US troops to be deployed Turkey could deploy 60000 of its troops into 30-40km security zone in Kurdistan Would preserve integrity of Iraq Recognized Turkmen as foundation of Iraq US would stop peshmerga from occupying Kirkuk and Mosul Turkey would stay out of those 2 cities US would give Turkey $6bil in aid $24bil in loans
(Musings On Iraq review All Roads Lead To Baghdad: Army Special Operations Forces in Iraq)
Mar 1 Turkish parliament failed to pass resolution allowing Turkey to join Iraq invasion
Mar 1 UN inspectors went to Tikrit Industrial Facility where Iraqi defector CURVEBALL claimed
2 mobile WMD labs were supposed to be based Found nothing
(Musings On Iraq How Iraqi Defector CURVEBALL Became Basis For US Claim That Iraq Had WMD)
(Musings On Iraq Look Who The LA Times Dug Up – CURVEBALL)
(Musings On Iraq Story of CURVEBALL And Iraq’s Mobile Biological Weapons Labs)
(Musings On Iraq review The WMD Mirage, Iraq’s Decade of Deception and America’s False Premise for War)
(Musings On Iraq review Curveball, Spies, Lies, And The Con Man Who Caused A War)
Mar 2 Senior admin official told NY Times UN weapons inspectors would not lead to
anything Said inspections turned into a trap
(Musings On Iraq UN Inspectors Were Right Iraq Was Not A Threat)
(Musings On Iraq Iraq’s Rejection of UN Inspectors Led To Mistrust Over WMD and 2003 Invasion)
(Musings On Iraq Overview of America’s Policy Towards Iraq: From The Clinton Years To The
Sectarian War of 2006)
Mar 2 Report US and UK increased air strikes in Iraq as part of no fly zone Were trying
to weaken air defenses before invasion
Mar 2 SCIRI PUK KDP met in Kurdistan Abdul Aziz al-Hakim said parties needed to plan
immediately for postwar Iraq Barzani said PUK and KDP formed leadership group Didn’t want to make same mistakes of 1991 during uprising
Mar 3 Russia threatened to use veto power in UN to stop any resolution authorizing
war vs Iraq
(Musings On Iraq Chilcot Inquiry Section 3.7 Development of UK Strategy and Options, 1 February to 7 March 2003)
Mar 3 US and UK planes hit five targets in Wasit and Basra as part of no fly zone Was attempt to
weaken Iraq’s air defense system before invasion
Mar 3 IAEA told US that docs alleging Iraq-Niger uranium deal were forgeries
(Musings On Iraq How US Intelligence Failed The Iraq-Niger Uranium Story)
(Musings On Iraq Review Hubris, The Inside Story of Spin, Scandal, And The Selling Of The Iraq War)
Mar 3 US memo on setting up an Iraqi interim govt after invasion Said that Iraqi govt had to
promise equal rights to citizens, ban Baath party, deBaathify security forces
(Musings On Iraq review Leap of Faith, Hubris Negligence, and America’s Greatest Foreign Policy
Tragedy)
(Musings On Iraq review Hard Lessons, The Iraq Reconstruction Experience)
Mar 3 Joint Chiefs head Gen Pace called Gen Franks Franks said he had no problem setting up liaisons
with Kurds but didn’t want to work with Chalabi and INC
Mar 4 Undersecretary of Defense for Policy Feith briefed Bush and NSC on Pentagon’s
postwar plans Goals were to maintain integrity of Iraq improves living standards create a democracy destroy WMD fight war on terror get international support for rebuilding gain support of Iraqis get Iraqis to rule as quickly as possible to accomplish all tasks quickly Had no strategy on how to achieve goals
(Musings On Iraq Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction’s “Hard Lessons” – Part I: Planning for Postwar Iraq September 2001 to May 2003)
(Musings On Iraq on Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction Hard Lessons Chapter 3 The Department of Defense Takes Charge)
(Musings On Iraq Overview of America’s Policy Towards Iraq: From The Clinton Years To The
Sectarian War of 2006)
(Musings On Iraq review Overreach, Delusions of Regime Change In Iraq)
(Musings On Iraq review Hard Lessons, The Iraq Reconstruction Experience)
(Musings On Iraq review Iraq’s Future The aftermath of regime change)
(Musings On Iraq review Leap of Faith, Hubris Negligence, and America’s Greatest Foreign
Policy Tragedy)
(Musings On Iraq review Fiasco: The American Military Adventure In Iraq)
(Musings On Iraq review State of Denial, Bush At War, Part III)
Mar 4 US found that France made allegation that Iraq tried to buy uranium from Niger
based upon fake documents
(Musings On Iraq How US Intelligence Failed The Iraq-Niger Uranium Story)
(Musings On Iraq Review Hubris, The Inside Story of Spin, Scandal, And The Selling Of The Iraq War)
Mar 4 Blair told that US was thinking about starting war on 3/12/03 despite UK desire
for 2nd UN resolution against Iraq
(Musings On Iraq Chilcot Inquiry Section 3.8 Development of UK Strategy and Options, 8 to 20 March 2003)
Mar 4 UK Foreign Secretary Straw told parliament committee Iraq was in material
breach of UN Resolution 1441 and that gave legal authority for action
(Musings On Iraq Review The Report of the Iraq Inquiry, Executive Summary)
Mar 5 CENTCOM commander Gen Franks briefed Bush on war preparations Were 208,000
forces in Middle East with 50,000 more arriving in 2 weeks Bush asked about postwar plans Franks said mayors would be appointed to run liberated areas Franks made that up on the spot
Mar 5 ORHA head Garner got ok from Rice to use frozen Iraqi assets to pay for postwar
Plans He told Rice he didn’t think there would be enough troops to maintain security after invasion When asked if the White House had put together any plans for a post-Saddam govt he got no answer
(Musings On Iraq review Leap of Faith, Hubris Negligence, and America’s Greatest Foreign Policy Tragedy)
Mar 5 UK Embassy in Washington said Bush admin set on war with Iraq
(Musings On Iraq Chilcot Inquiry Section 3.8 Development of UK Strategy and Options, 8 to 20 March 2003)
Mar 5 France Russia Germany said they would not vote for a UN resolution authorizing
force against Iraq
(Musings On Iraq Chilcot Inquiry Section 3.7 Development of UK Strategy and Options, 1 February to 7 March 2003)
Mar 5 Blair told Bush if they got 9 votes on UN Security Council for 2nd resolution and it
was vetoed they would still have legal authority for action
Mar 5 UK Attorney Gen told Blair if 2nd resolution vetoed in UN would be no legal basis for Iraq
war
(Musings On Iraq Review The Report of the Iraq Inquiry, Executive Summary)
Mar 5 Powell told Congress 2nd UN resolution against Iraq would pass while his staff told him
wasn’t likely
Mar 5 Sec State Powell said that Iraq weapons declaration to UN farce because it said it had no
WMD and claimed it was hiding them from inspectors
(Musings On Iraq UN Inspectors Were Right Iraq Was Not A Threat)
(Musings On Iraq Iraq’s Rejection of UN Inspectors Led To Mistrust Over WMD and 2003 Invasion)
(Musings On Iraq review The WMD Mirage, Iraq’s Decade of Deception and America’s False Premise for War)
Mar 5 National Intelligence Committee memo said that docs on Iraq-Niger uranium deal were
forgeries
(Musings On Iraq How US Intelligence Failed The Iraq-Niger Uranium Story)
(Musings On Iraq Review Hubris, The Inside Story of Spin, Scandal, And The Selling Of The Iraq War)
Mar 5 Sir Tebbet Secretary of Defense Ministry asks cabinet for legal authorization for war with
Iraq
Mar 5 Russia Amb provided Iraq with numbers of US troops, equipment and their locations to
Iraq before invasion
(Musings On Iraq Russia Provided Iraq With Details Of US Plans Right Before Invasion)
Mar 5 Bush met Vatican envoy who argued against war because of casualties and gulf between
Christians and Muslims
Mar 5 UN inspectors interviewed Gen Saadi who was Saddam’s chief scientific adviser Said there
were no mobile WMD labs
(Musings On Iraq How Iraqi Defector CURVEBALL Became Basis For US Claim That Iraq Had WMD)
(Musings On Iraq Look Who The LA Times Dug Up – CURVEBALL)
(Musings On Iraq Story of CURVEBALL And Iraq’s Mobile Biological Weapons Labs)
(Musings On Iraq review The WMD Mirage, Iraq’s Decade of Deception and America’s False Premise for War)
Mar 6 Bush TV address Said time running out on UN weapons inspectors Accused Iraq of hiding its
WMD Said that he’d not decided on war when he had Said US would defend its security and didn’t need Un approval
(Musings On Iraq Review Hubris, The Inside Story of Spin, Scandal, And The Selling Of The Iraq War)
(Musings On Iraq review The Bush Administrations and Saddam Hussein, Deciding on Conflict)
(Musings On Iraq review What Happened, Inside the Bush White House and Washington’s Culture of Deception)
(Musings On Iraq review The WMD Mirage, Iraq’s Decade of Deception and America’s False Premise for War)
Mar 6 National Security Advisor Rice sent letter to Senator Said US had briefed UN on
all suspected WMD sites Actually didn’t give info on 21 of 105 sites
(Musings On Iraq UN Inspectors Were Right Iraq Was Not A Threat)
(Musings On Iraq Iraq’s Rejection of UN Inspectors Led To Mistrust Over WMD and 2003 Invasion)
Mar 6 Blair was told UK should not try to administer post-war Iraq
(Musings On Iraq Review The Report of the Iraq Inquiry, Executive Summary)
Mar 7 UK Amb to UN Greenstock paper said 2nd UN resolution not need to go to war with Iraq
Mar 7 UK Attn Gen Lord Goldsmith said that a material breach of inspections under UN Res 1441
could be violation of UN Res 678 that authorized Gulf War and OK new war but only Security Council could determine that
(Musings On Iraq Review The Report of the Iraq Inquiry, Executive Summary)
(Musings On Iraq Chilcot Inquiry Section 3.8 Development of UK Strategy and Options, 8 to 20 March 2003)
(Musings On Iraq Chilcot Inquiry Section 5 Advice On The Legal Basis For Military Action, November 2002 To March 2003)
Mar 7 Head weapons inspector Blix said that Iraq doing more but not fully cooperating and still
months more work ahead Said no evidence of mobile WMD labs Iraq destroying banned missiles showing more compliance Still months more work ahead Unaccounted for WMD still an issue
(Musings On Iraq How Iraqi Defector CURVEBALL Became Basis For US Claims That Iraq Had WMD)
(Musings On Iraq Chilcot Inquiry Section 3.7 Development of UK Strategy and Options, 1 February to 7 March 2003)
Mar 7 IAEA chief El Baradei told UN no evidence Iraq restarted nuclear program
Concluded that aluminum tubes Iraq tried to buy were for rockets not nuke program Said documents claiming Iraq tried to buy uranium from Niger were fakes
(Musings On Iraq review The WMD Mirage, Iraq’s Decade of Deception and America’s False Premise for War)
(Musings On Iraq How A Contested Aluminum Tubes Story Became The Basis For War With Iraq)
(Musings On Iraq How US Intelligence Failed The Iraq-Niger Uranium Story)
(Musings On Iraq Review Hubris, The Inside Story of Spin, Scandal, And The Selling Of The Iraq War)
(Musings On Iraq UN Inspectors Were Right Iraq Was Not A Threat)
(Musings On Iraq Iraq’s Rejection of UN Inspectors Led To Mistrust Over WMD and 2003 Invasion)
(Musings On Iraq How US Intelligence Created An Iraqi Nuclear Threat In 2002)
Mar 7 Powell told UN Security Council in response to IAEA that US had new proof that
aluminum tubes were for centrifuges
Mar 7 UK Foreign Secretary Straw suggested UN set ultimatum for Iraq’s full
cooperation with inspectors by March 17 or face war
Mar 7 2nd high level US meeting on creating an interim Iraqi authority after invasion held just
days before war Under Sec Def Feith said US should recognize an Iraqis authority as the Iraqi govt but under US consultation Said more seats on authority would be given to exiles because they understood US and democracy more than Iraqis State said US should pick members of authority Dep Sec State Armitage said forming authority should be held off CIA said no exiles should be included in authority
(Musings On Iraq review Leap of Faith, Hubris Negligence, and America’s Greatest Foreign
Policy Tragedy)
(Musings On Iraq review State of Denial, Bush At War, Part III)
(Musings On Iraq review Hard Lessons, The Iraq Reconstruction Experience)
Mar 7 Defense Policy Board’s Adelman wrote OpEd USA Today saying US had given
Iraq too much time and needed action
Mar 8 Bush radio address said he was trying to avoid war but if Saddam didn’t disarm he would
be made to Bush had already decided on war
(Musings On Iraq review Leap of Faith, Hubris Negligence, and America’s Greatest Foreign Policy Tragedy)
(Musings On Iraq Review Hubris, The Inside Story of Spin, Scandal, And The Selling Of The Iraq War)
(Musings On Iraq review The Bush Administrations and Saddam Hussein, Deciding on Conflict)
Mar 8 PM Blair’s final attempt to get UN Security Council to pass 2nd resolution
supporting force against Iraq failed
(Musings On Iraq Review The Report of the Iraq Inquiry, Executive Summary)
(Musings On Iraq Chilcot Inquiry Section 3.8 Development of UK Strategy and Options, 8 to 20 March 2003)
Mar 8 PM Blair’s foreign policy adviser Manning told Rice Blair willing to lose his govt
in order to fight Iraq war
(Musings On Iraq review A War Of Choice, The British In Iraq 2003-9)
Mar 8 DIA report to Rumsfeld said that IAEA was dismissing Iraq-Niger uranium
story because based upon questionable docs said former ambassador Wilson’s trip found evidence that Iraq was interested in buying uranium from Niger Was navy report uranium was in Benin warehouse Was Somali businessmen who claimed shipment that was similar to Iraq-Niger deal although didn’t mention Iraq Niger or uranium
(Musings On Iraq review The WMD Mirage, Iraq’s Decade of Deception and America’s False Premise for War)
Mar 8 US official said administration had been duped by fake docs claiming Iraq tried
to buy uranium from Niger
Mar 8 Former Ambassador Wilson told CNN US govt should and did know that Iraq-
Niger uranium story was false
(Musings On Iraq How US Intelligence Failed The Iraq-Niger Uranium Story)
(Musings On Iraq Review Hubris, The Inside Story of Spin, Scandal, And The Selling Of The Iraq War)
Mar 8 Army Corps of Engineers gave KBR $7 bil contract to repair Iraq’s infrastructure
after war
Mar 9 Saddam said US might be most powerful country but wasn’t strongest because that was given
by God When enemy was more advanced in technology Iraq should go back to basics and train soldiers to ride horses to deliver messages
(Musings On Iraq review Iraqi Perspectives Project, A View of Operation Iraqi Freedom from Saddam’s Senior Leadership)
Mar 9 Karbala Div commander memo said main threat was not U.S. invasion but
internal rebellions
Mar 9 PM Blair told Bush he needed a 2nd UN resolution authorizing force against Iraq to get
parliament’s support for war Bush said he couldn't wait Blair said he would back US
(Musings On Iraq Review The Report of the Iraq Inquiry, Executive Summary)
(Musings On Iraq Chilcot Inquiry Section 3.8 Development of UK Strategy and Options, 8 to 20 March 2003)
Mar 9 Powell told CNN that European country came up with new evidence that
aluminum tubes Iraq tried to buy were for nukes not rockets
(Musings On Iraq How A Contested Aluminum Tubes Story Became The Basis For War With Iraq)
(Musings On Iraq review The WMD Mirage, Iraq’s Decade of Deception and America’s False Premise for War)
Mar 9 Powell on Meet The Press Iraq-Niger uranium story open to investigation and
IAEA had been wrong about Iraq’s nuke program in 1990s
(Musings On Iraq How US Intelligence Failed The Iraq-Niger Uranium Story)
(Musings On Iraq Review Hubris, The Inside Story of Spin, Scandal, And The Selling Of The Iraq War)
Mar 10 UK gave Iraq 6 requirements to meet if wanted to avoid war including Saddam
going on TV and admitting to WMD
Mar 10 Bush talked to his advisors about giving an ultimatum to Saddam to leave power
(Musings On Iraq review Leap of Faith, Hubris Negligence, and America’s Greatest Foreign Policy Tragedy)
Mar 10 French President Jacques Chirac said France would veto any new resolution because no
grounds for war
(Musings On Iraq Chilcot Inquiry Section 3.7 Development of UK Strategy and Options, 1 February to 7 March 2003)
Mar 10 Bush told Blair 2nd UN resolution against Iraq was waste of time Was major
policy goal of Blair
(Musings On Iraq Review The Report of the Iraq Inquiry, Executive Summary)
Mar 10 US official said Iraq had cluster munitions to disperse WMD
Mar 10 ORHA head Garner briefed Bush on postwar Iraq plans including using Iraqi army for
reconstruction and interim govt Said would only remove top Baath leadership Bush approved plans
(Musings On Iraq review Hard Lessons, The Iraq Reconstruction Experience)
(Musings On Iraq review The Endgame, The Inside Story of the Struggle for Iraq, from
George W. Bush to Barack Obama)
(Musings On Iraq review Days Of Fire, Bush and Cheney in the White House)
Mar 10 NSC briefed on postwar Iraq plans Included excluding 25,000 top Baathists from
govt NSC’s Miller said most Baath members govt workers who joined party to get job Prosecuting Iraqi war criminals Discussed truth and reconciliation commission Using Iraqi courts and police Establishing law and order Bush said US needed to get Iraqis running new govt and US would not pick new Iraqi leaders Powell said US had to get a new UN resolution for the US led interim administration in postwar Iraq US Treasury Sec Snow said US dollars could be used as interim currency in Iraq until new dinar created Bush approved light deBaathification after war Using dollars as temporary currency in Iraq Retaining Iraqi police Also approved creating Iraqi Authority to run country
(Musings On Iraq on Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction Hard Lessons Chapter 3 The Department of Defense Takes Charge)
Mar 10 Institute for Science and International Security report asked whether US misled
public about Iraq rebuilding nuke program
Mar 10 Turkey’s Erdogan met Bush Argued against deposing Saddam saying it would
lead to Shiite govt tied to Iran
Mar 11 Bush and NSC met Agreed to keep Iraqi police
Mar 11 Rumsfeld said US could attack Iraq by itself without other nations Said British
might not participate UK Embassy in US furious at Rumsfeld remarks and complained to White House Rumsfeld forced to issue clarification saying British would take part in Iraq war
Mar 11 PM Blair said Britain would help in any US attack upon Iraq
(Musings On Iraq Chilcot Inquiry Section 3.8 Development of UK Strategy and Options, 8 to 20 March 2003)
(Musings On Iraq review A War Of Choice, The British In Iraq 2003-9)
Mar 11 UK acknowledged couldn't get 2nd UN resolution authorizing force against Iraq
before US timetable for war
Mar 11 UK Chief of Defense Staff Adm Boyce said military needed legal directive for
war with Iraq
(Musings On Iraq Review The Report of the Iraq Inquiry, Executive Summary)
Mar 11 CIA assessment said it didn’t dispute IAEA finding that Iraq-Niger uranium
docs were fakes
(Musings On Iraq review The WMD Mirage, Iraq’s Decade of Deception and America’s False Premise for War)
Mar 11 CIA WMD division said it didn’t dispute IAEA finding that Iraq-Niger
uranium docs were fakes and always considered intel on story fragmentary
(Musings On Iraq How US Intelligence Failed The Iraq-Niger Uranium Story)
(Musings On Iraq Review Hubris, The Inside Story of Spin, Scandal, And The Selling Of The Iraq War)
Mar 11 ORHA head Garner told press US would keep Iraqi army and would quickly
turn over control of country to Iraqis When asked Garner dismissed talk of US turning over power to Chalabi and INC
(Musings On Iraq review Leap of Faith, Hubris Negligence, and America’s Greatest Foreign Policy
Tragedy)
(Musings On Iraq review The Endgame, The Inside Story of the Struggle for Iraq, from
George W. Bush to Barack Obama)
(Musings On Iraq review Hard Lessons, The Iraq Reconstruction Experience)
(Musings On Iraq Overview of America’s Policy Towards Iraq: From The Clinton Years To The
Sectarian War of 2006)
Mar 11 After press conference Deputy Defense Secretary Wolfowitz and Under
Secretary of Defense for Policy Feith chastised Garner for his comments about Chalabi
Mar 11 Garner was later told by Pentagon he could no longer give press conferences
Mar 11 National Security Advisor Rice issued memo on postwar Iraq plans Said interim
Iraqi authority consisting of Iraqis Kurds and exiles would be formed followed by meeting in Baghdad to bring in more Iraqis like what happened in Afghanistan Included previous NSC decisions on oil and currency
(Musings On Iraq Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction’s “Hard Lessons” – Part I: Planning for Postwar Iraq September 2001 to May 2003)
(Musings On Iraq Overview of America’s Policy Towards Iraq: From The Clinton Years To The
Sectarian War of 2006)
(Musings On Iraq review State of Denial, Bush At War, Part III)
Mar 12 Bush endorsed Pentagon plan for quick transition to Iraqi authority made up of
exiles and Kurds after war
(Musings On Iraq review Leap of Faith, Hubris Negligence, and America’s Greatest Foreign Policy
Tragedy)
(Musings On Iraq review State of Denial, Bush At War, Part III)
(Musings On Iraq review Hard Lessons, The Iraq Reconstruction Experience)
Mar 12 UnderSecDef Feith briefed NSC on postwar plans Said Foreign Min and embassies
needed to be purged Wanted to disband intel services Republican Guard State Security Office militias Cut military to 3-5 divisions Said rebuilding military would be paid for by Iraq Would have own equipment Military would be used for rebuilding Iraq Warned would be dangerous to disband military Republican Guard security services would be disbanded Talked about creating interim govt with mix of exiles and Iraqis from within Iraq
Mar 12 Bush called PM Blair about vote on 2nd UN resolution on Iraq Bush said if didn’t have
votes shouldn’t have a vote
Mar 12 Bush called Mexican Pres Fox and Chilean Pres Lagos on 2nd UN resolution Fox
non-committal Lagos said he would vote no
Mar 12 Bush called PM Blair and said that vote on 2nd UN resolution was dead
(Musings On Iraq Review The Report of the Iraq Inquiry, Executive Summary)
Mar 12 UN committee reported on Iraq violating sanctions
(Musings On Iraq review Invisible War, The United States And The Iraq Sanctions)
Mar 12 Iraqi scientists began private interviews with UN inspectors
(Musings On Iraq UN Inspectors Were Right Iraq Was Not A Threat)
(Musings On Iraq Iraq’s Rejection of UN Inspectors Led To Mistrust Over WMD and 2003 Invasion)
Mar 13 UK Foreign Office legal advisor Brummell wrote Attorney General Lord
Goldsmith saying didn’t need 2nd UN resolution to go to war with Iraq
(Musings On Iraq Chilcot Inquiry Section 3.8 Development of UK Strategy and Options, 8 to 20 March 2003)
Mar 13 Lord Goldsmith changed his opinion saying 2nd resolution not needed for action
against Iraq
Mar 13 Blair told Bush not to give ultimatum to Saddam until he had dealt with
parliament Bush said OK
Mar 13 Blair told still hope that 2nd resolution could be passed in UN
(Musings On Iraq Review The Report of the Iraq Inquiry, Executive Summary)
Mar 13 Last meeting of Iraq Working Group USAID official Chamberlain said Iraq war would be
quick US would meet immediate needs of Iraqis Would withdraw within a year
(Musings On Iraq on Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction Hard Lessons Chapter 2 The Agencies Engage)
(Musings On Iraq review Leap of Faith, Hubris Negligence, and America’s Greatest Foreign Policy Tragedy)
Mar 14 CIA Dir Tenet told Bush VP Cheney was going to give a speech about Iraq-Al Qaeda
ties that Sec State Powell dropped from his UN speech Tenet said speech would go beyond what intel showed and argued against it Bush got Cheney to cancel speech
Mar 14 Rumsfeld told ORHA head Garner he was going to pick all the advisers that
were going to run Iraqi ministries
(Musings On Iraq on Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction Hard Lessons Chapter 3 The Department of Defense Takes Charge)
(Musings On Iraq Special Inspector General For Iraq Reconstruction Hard Lessons Chapter 4 Staging in Kuwait)
(Musings On Iraq review State of Denial, Bush At War, Part III)
(Musings On Iraq review Leap of Faith, Hubris Negligence, and America’s Greatest Foreign Policy
Tragedy)
Mar 14 Iran’s national security adviser said US would not have a happy ending in Iraq
(Musings On Iraq Iran’s Policy Towards Iraq)
Mar 14 French Pres Chirac told PM Blair he would not accept a UN resolution that set
an ultimatum for Iraq disarmament
(Musings On Iraq Review The Report of the Iraq Inquiry, Executive Summary)
(Musings On Iraq Chilcot Inquiry Section 3.8 Development of UK Strategy and Options, 8 to 20 March 2003)
Mar 14 NSC decided on language for ultimatum to Saddam Included 48 hour deadline to
leave power pushed by Rumsfeld
Mar 14 UK Attn Gen Lord Goldsmith changed his mind again Said 2nd UN resolution not needed to
authorize war vs Iraq
(Musings On Iraq Chilcot Inquiry Section 5 Advice On The Legal Basis For Military Action, November 2002 To March 2003)
Mar 15 Iraqi state TV said country was on a war footing Baghdad had been divided into four
military districts
Mar 15 Special Republican Guard withdrew $1 bil from Central Bank of Iraq under
Uday Hussein to pay off sheikhs to put down rebellions
Mar 15 Iraqi security forces tried to stamp out signs of Kurdish opposition in Kirkuk City
Mar 15 VP Cheney told NBC that UN weapons inspectors had missed Iraq’s nuke program in 1990s
and they weren’t going to do better this time Said Iraq could have a nuclear bomb soon Said Iraqis defying inspections again
(Musings On Iraq Interview With VP Dick Cheney On Weapons Inspections March 2003)
(Musings On Iraq How US Intelligence Created An Iraqi Nuclear Threat In 2002)
(Musings On Iraq UN Inspectors Were Right Iraq Was Not A Threat)
(Musings On Iraq Iraq’s Rejection of UN Inspectors Led To Mistrust Over WMD and 2003 Invasion)
(Musings On Iraq review The WMD Mirage, Iraq’s Decade of Deception and America’s False Premise for War)
(Musings On Iraq review Days Of Fire, Bush and Cheney in the White House)
Mar 15 ORHA head Garner told Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld plan was only to
dismiss top two officials from each Iraqi ministry and not carry out any deBaathification policy Rumsfeld okayed plan
(Musings On Iraq review Leap of Faith, Hubris Negligence, and America’s Greatest Foreign Policy Tragedy)
Mar 15 Rumsfeld complained Garner picked non-Pentagon people to run some Iraqi
ministries Wanted them all from Defense
(Musings On Iraq on Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction Hard Lessons Chapter 3 The Department of Defense Takes Charge)
(Musings On Iraq review State of Denial, Bush At War, Part III)
Mar 15 CIA gave explosive to Kurdish team which blew up Mosul-Baghdad railway
starting covert action campaign before invasion
Mar 15 CNN/USA Today/Gallup poll found 51% of Americans believed Saddam involved in 9/11
Mar 16 Azores summit with Bush Blair Portuguese Premier Barroso Bush said that Iraq war would
start in days not weeks Blair got transcript of 60 Minutes interview with Pres Chirac who said he wanted 30 more days for UN inspections Blair Bush Barroso agreed to give 2nd UN resolution 24 more hours and pull it if didn’t have enough votes
(Musings On Iraq review Leap of Faith, Hubris Negligence, and America’s Greatest Foreign Policy
Tragedy)
(Musings On Iraq Review Hubris, The Inside Story of Spin, Scandal, And The Selling Of The Iraq War)
(Musings On Iraq review The Bush Administrations and Saddam Hussein, Deciding on Conflict)
(Musings On Iraq Chilcot Inquiry Section 3.8 Development of UK Strategy and Options, 8 to 20 March 2003)
Mar 16 Bush and Blair gave UN 24 hour ultimatum to enforce its own resolutions on Iraq
disarming or they would invade
Mar 16 Blair complained that US screwed up a 2nd UN resolution on Iraq
(Musings On Iraq Review The Report of the Iraq Inquiry, Executive Summary)
Mar 16 VP Cheney was on Meet The Press Tim Russert asked if US ready for long and costly
war in Iraq Cheney said wouldn’t happen because US would be greeted as liberators Said Army Chief of Staff Gen Shinseki was wrong that US would need more troops to occupy Iraq than invade Told NBC that if world didn’t deal with Iraq it would go back to producing WMD Was already reconstituting its nuclear weapons program Claimed UN inspectors were wrong about Iraq’s weapons program in general citing Iraq buying aluminum tubes which US claimed were for centrifuges Said Iraq had long standing relationship with Al Qaeda
(Musings On Iraq How A Contested Aluminum Tubes Story Became The Basis For War With Iraq)
(Musings On Iraq How US Intelligence Created An Iraqi Nuclear Threat In 2002)
(Musings On Iraq UN Inspectors Were Right Iraq Was Not A Threat)
(Musings On Iraq Iraq’s Rejection of UN Inspectors Led To Mistrust Over WMD and 2003 Invasion)
(Musings On Iraq review Fiasco: The American Military Adventure In Iraq)
(Musings On Iraq review What Happened, Inside the Bush White House and Washington’s Culture of Deception)
(Musings On Iraq review Hard Lessons, The Iraq Reconstruction Experience)
(Musings On Iraq review The WMD Mirage, Iraq’s Decade of Deception and America’s False Premise for War)
(Musings On Iraq review Days Of Fire, Bush and Cheney in the White House)
Mar 16 Report US and France source for all of Iraq’s germ samples for its biological weapons
program in the 1980s
Mar 17 UN Draft resolution saying Iraq in non compliance and open to military action
withdrawn by US because couldn’t be passed
Mar 17 Bush met with Congressional leaders telling them UN route with Iraq was dead
Blamed France Sen Byrd only one who said he opposed war
Mar 17 Bush in TV speech said Iraq had WMD and was hiding them Gave Saddam
and sons 48 hours to leave office or face invasion
(Musings On Iraq review Leap of Faith, Hubris Negligence, and America’s Greatest Foreign Policy
Tragedy)
(Musings On Iraq review What Happened, Inside the Bush White House and Washington’s Culture of Deception)
(Musings On Iraq Iraq One Of The Worst Intelligence Failures In US History)
Mar 17 PM Blair gave Saddam ultimatum to comply with UN resolutions
(Musings On Iraq Chilcot Inquiry Section 3.8 Development of UK Strategy and Options, 8 to 20 March 2003)
(Musings On Iraq review A War Of Choice, The British In Iraq 2003-9)
Mar 17 UN Sec Gen Annan announced he would order withdrawal of weapons
inspectors due to impending war
Mar 17 UK Attorney Gen Lord Goldsmith gave legal advice that war with Iraq was legal
(Musings On Iraq Review The Report of the Iraq Inquiry, Executive Summary)
Mar 17 ORHA staff began leaving US for Kuwait
(Musings On Iraq review Iraq and Back, Inside The War To Win The Peace)
Mar 17 On flight to Kuwait ORHA head Garner met with his oil team Garner said he was
concerned Rumsfeld picked ex-Shell CEO Philip Carroll to join group Said was bad image wise to have an ex-US oil executive involved Oil teams said if Iraq’s oil sector was destroyed by war would need someone with standing of Carroll to deal with it
Mar 17 US ground forces cmdr Gen McKiernan met with staff Said war gaming showed postwar
plans needed to be revised to secure Iraq Said he couldn’t think about postwar Iraq until invasion finished because men could die Col Benson 3rd Army chief planner said men could die during postwar phase
Mar 18 Saddam refuted Bush’s ultimatum to step down and leave Iraq
Mar 18 UN weapons inspectors ended work in Iraq Did 731 inspections at 411 sites and
found no WMD or nuclear programs
(Musings On Iraq UN Inspectors Were Right Iraq Was Not A Threat)
(Musings On Iraq Iraq’s Rejection of UN Inspectors Led To Mistrust Over WMD and 2003 Invasion)
(Musings On Iraq How US Intelligence Created An Iraqi Nuclear Threat In 2002)
Mar 18 UN suspended Oil for Food program for Iraq due to impending war
Mar 18 US reconnaissance found 6-7 oil wells in Basra set afire by Iraqis Led Gen Franks to move
up invasion plan by a few days to try to stop further fields being set on fire
Mar 18 US military official told CNN Iraqi troops had VX and mustard gas munitions
Mar 18 UK military given official order to prepare for Iraq invasion
Mar 18 Joint Chief of Staff met to discuss withdrawal plans for post-invasion Iraq
(Musings On Iraq review Leap of Faith, Hubris Negligence, and America’s Greatest Foreign Policy
Tragedy)
Mar 18 Gen Cross UK representative to US returned to London Told Blair govt US not preparing for
postwar Iraq Govt not interested
(Musings On Iraq review A War Of Choice, The British In Iraq 2003-9)
(Musings On Iraq Review The Report of the Iraq Inquiry, Executive Summary)
(Musings On Iraq Chilcot Inquiry Section 6.5 Planning And Preparation For A Post-Saddam Hussein Iraq, January to March 2003)
Mar 18 2 British ministers and legal adv to Foreign Office resigned in protest against the
war
Mar 18 British parliament voted 412 to 149 to endorse Iraq invasion
(Musings On Iraq Chilcot Inquiry Section 3.8 Development of UK Strategy and Options, 8 to 20 March 2003)
Mar 18 US named 30 countries willing to join Iraq war Became known as Coalition of
the Willing
Mar 18 CIA source claimed he saw Saddam and his family at Dora farm south of
Baghdad CIA Dir Tenet told Bush
Mar 18 US rep Khalilzad went to Turkey Offered to allow 20,000 Turkish troops into Kurdistan
creation of buffer zone along Iraq-Turkey border blocking Peshmerga from entering Mosul and Kirkuk Disarming Kurds allow operations against PKK if Ankara would allow US troops to use country for invasion Erdogan said no
(Musings On Iraq review Losing Iraq, Inside The Post War Reconstruction Fiasco)
(Musings On Iraq review All Roads Lead To Baghdad: Army Special Operations Forces in Iraq)
Mar 18 Abdul Aziz al-Hakim met with US rep Khalilzad and State’s Ryan Crocker in Turkey
Khalilzad said Turkey worried that Turkmen not included in opposition leadership Turks worried about Kurdish refugees trying to flee to Turkey during war Turks wanted committee to deal with war issues Said all the opposition should issue statements that they didn’t want Iraqis to take law into their own hands during invasion
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