Pre-2003 Invasion Iraq (2000-03)

This timeline covers the period before the U.S. invasion of Iraq from 2000-2003

 

Musings On Iraq review Against All Enemies, Inside America’s War on Terror

Musings On Iraq review The Master Plan, ISIS, Al-Qaeda, and the Jihadi Strategy For Final Victory

Musings On Iraq review To Start A War: How The Bush Administration Took America Into Iraq

Musings On Iraq review Losing Iraq, Inside The Post War Reconstruction Fiasco

Musings On Iraq review Leap of Faith, Hubris Negligence, and America’s Greatest Foreign

Policy Tragedy

Musings On Iraq review Hubris, The Inside Story of Spin, Scandal, And The Selling Of The Iraq War

Musings On Iraq review The Occupation of Iraq, Winning The War, Losing The Peace

Musings On Iraq review The Bush Administrations and Saddam Hussein, Deciding on Conflict

Musings On Iraq review Bush At War

Musings On Iraq review Plan of Attack: The Definitive Account Of The Decision To

Invade Iraq

Musings On Iraq review Hoodwinked, The Documents That Reveal How Bush Sold Us a War

Musings On Iraq review State of War, The Secret History of the CIA and the Bush Administration 

Musings On Iraq review The Report of the Iraq Inquiry, Executive Summary

Musings On Iraq review Salam Pax: The Baghdad Blog

Musings On Iraq review Iraq’s Future: The aftermath of regime change

Musings On Iraq review of Shaping the Plan for Operation Iraqi Freedom, The Role of Military Intelligence Assessment

Musings On Iraq review The Road to Iraq, The Making of a Neoconservative War

Musings On Iraq review from storm to Freedom, America’s Long War with Iraq

Musings On Iraq review America at the Crossroads, Democracy, Power, and the Neoconservative

Musings On Iraq review Wanting War: Why the Bush Administration Invaded Iraq

Musings On Iraq review The Fall of Baghdad

Musings On Iraq review The Next Attack, The Failure of the War on Terror and a Strategy for Getting it Right

Musings On Iraq review The Fall of Baghdad

Musings On Iraq review The Assassins’ Gate, America In Iraq

Musings On Iraq review State of Denial, Bush At War, Part III

Musings On Iraq review The Endgame, The Inside Story of the Struggle for Iraq, from George

W. Bush to Barack Obama

Musings On Iraq review What Happened, Inside the Bush White House and Washington’s Culture of Deception

Musings On Iraq review Hard Lessons, The Iraq Reconstruction Experience

Musings On Iraq review The One Percent Doctrine, Deep Inside America’s Pursuit Of Its Enemies Since 9/11

Musings On Iraq review Liberate And Leave, Fatal Flaws In The Early Strategy For Postwar Iraq

Musings On Iraq review The Man Who Pushed America To War, The Extraordinary Life, Adventures, and Obsessions of Ahmad Chalabi

Musings On Iraq review Arrows of the Night: Ahmad Chalabi and the Selling of the Iraq War

 

2000

Jan 5 Saddam said sanctions would erode by themselves and that already started

 

Feb 11 Iraq announced UN weapons inspectors would not be allowed back into country

(Musings On Iraq UN Inspectors Were Right Iraq Was Not A Threat)

(Musings On Iraq Iraq’s Rejection of UN Inspectors Led To Mistrust Over WMD and 2003 Invasion)

 

Mar 31 UN resolution 1293 doubled amount of spare parts Iraq could import to maintain

            its oil industry under Oil for Food program

 

Jun 8 UN Resolution 1302 renewed Oil For Food Program

 

Aug 17 Iraq reopened Saddam International Airport to get around UN sanctions

 

Aug 24 Iraq rejected new UN inspectors and Resolution 1284

(Musings On Iraq UN Inspectors Were Right Iraq Was Not A Threat)

(Musings On Iraq Iraq’s Rejection of UN Inspectors Led To Mistrust Over WMD and 2003 Invasion)

 

Aug 30 US and Soviets agreed not to send UN inspectors back to Iraq

(Musings On Iraq UN Inspectors Were Right Iraq Was Not A Threat)

(Musings On Iraq Iraq’s Rejection of UN Inspectors Led To Mistrust Over WMD and 2003 Invasion)

 

Oct 5 During VP debate Cheney said US might have to take military action to remove

            Saddam in future

 

Oct 11 Candidate Bush at presidential debate said he didn’t believe in nation building and military

should only be used for war and could overthrow dictators

 

Oct 13 Iran’s Foreign Minister Kharrazi visited Iraq for 3 days Highest ranking Iranian official to

visit Iraq since 1979 Revolution After trip Iran announced Iran and Iraq would re-open discussion on border and POW issue largely ended

 

Oct 15 Iran announced it was returning to 1975 Algiers Treaty Meant rapprochement with Iraq but

also Iraq gained nothing from Iran-Iraq War

 

Oct 20 UK Foreign Office said wanted to offer end of sanctions to return inspectors to Iraq but

didn’t think US would agree

(Musings On Iraq Review The Report of the Iraq Inquiry, Executive Summary)

(Musings On Iraq Chilcot Report Section 1.2 UK Iraq strategy September 2000 To September 2001)

 

Oct 21 Izzat al-Duri attended Arab summit saying Iraq believed only jihad could save Palestinians

in latest conflict with Israel

Oct 21 King Hussein of Jordan called for end of sanctions on Iraq at Arab summit

 

Oct 25 Congress authorized increase in support for Iraqi opposition groups to $25 mil in 2001 $18

mil would go to INC

 

Nov 1 UK intel report said Saddam had no reason to work with UN because felt US would never

end sanctions as long as he was in power

(Musings On Iraq Review The Report of the Iraq Inquiry, Executive Summary)

(Musings On Iraq Chilcot Report Section 1.2 UK Iraq strategy September 2000 To September 2001)

 

Nov 5 Syria announced it would re-open pipeline with Iraq once sanctions ended Sign of improved

relations between two

 

Nov 15 UK Foreign Office report Saddam felt like he was winning in breaking down sanctions

(Musings On Iraq Review The Report of the Iraq Inquiry, Executive Summary)

(Musings On Iraq Chilcot Report Section 1.2 UK Iraq strategy September 2000 To September 2001)

 

Nov 24 UK Foreign Office report Arab countries no longer supported sanctions on Iraq

(Musings On Iraq Review The Report of the Iraq Inquiry, Executive Summary)

(Musings On Iraq Chilcot Report Section 1.2 UK Iraq strategy September 2000 To September 2001)

 

Dec 1 UK Intel report Iraq contained but if sanctions ended Saddam would start rebuilding WMD

programs

(Musings On Iraq Chilcot Report Section 1.2 UK Iraq strategy September 2000 To September 2001)

 

Dec 5 UN Resolution 1330 renewed Oil for Food Program

 

2001

Jan 1 Break-in at Niger embassy in Rome to provide cover for how Italian intel

            broker Martino got fake Iraq-Niger uranium papers

(Musings On Iraq How US Intelligence Failed The Iraq-Niger Uranium Story)

(Musings On Iraq Review Hubris, The Inside Story of Spin, Scandal, And The Selling Of The Iraq War)

 

Jan 10 Outgoing Clinton Defense Secretary Cohen briefed President elect Bush on Iraq

Said Saddam contained and strong action vs Iraq would cause problems in region

 

Jan 30 1st NSC meeting of Bush admin talked about how Iraq destabilizing Middle East

CIA Dir Tenet provided intel Iraq working on WMD at factory Treasury Secretary O’Neil asked about WMD intel Tenet admitted no confirmation that Iraq producing WMD Secretary of State Powell argued for smart sanctions Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld wrote memo noting Iraq and others trying to buy advanced military technology

(Musings On Iraq Chilcot Report Section 1.2 UK Iraq strategy September 2000 To September 2001)

(Musings On Iraq review The Price of Loyalty)

 

Feb 1 2nd Bush NSC meeting again dealt with Iraq policy State Dept said US policy

should be to stop Iraq from threatening Middle East Secretary of State Powell talked again about smart sanctions Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld said removing Saddam and putting in pro-US govt could change Middle East and show world what US policy about Pentagon talked about rebuilding Gulf War coalition against Iraq CIA Director Tenet talked about coup vs Saddam End of meeting Rumsfeld said US objective was not getting rid of Saddam but his WMD

(Musings On Iraq Chilcot Report Section 1.2 UK Iraq strategy September 2000 To September 2001)

(Musings On Iraq review The Price of Loyalty)

 

Feb 5 National Security Adviser Rice chaired meeting to go over Iraq policy Agreed that

Saddam had won PR war over sanctions by convincing most of international community that they were hurting Iraqi public Also that sanctions were not forcing Saddam from power Secretary of State Powell argued for smart sanctions that would just focus upon military imports to Iraq Rice wanted review of No Fly Zone Led to less flights to try to avoid plane getting shot down Told US agencies to increase Intelligence gathering on WMD

(Musings On Iraq Chilcot Report Section 1.2 UK Iraq strategy September 2000 To September 2001)

(Musings On Iraq UN Inspectors Were Right Iraq Was Not A Threat)

(Musings On Iraq Iraq’s Rejection of UN Inspectors Led To Mistrust Over WMD and 2003 Invasion)

 

Feb 6 US and UK launched largest air strikes on Iraq in 2 yrs to destroy fiber optic

            communications system Iraq trying to install for its military

 

Feb 7 CIA report to Congress no evidence Iraq reconstituted WMD program since 1990s

(Musings On Iraq Origins Of Iraq’s WMD Programs)

 

Feb 12 Rumsfeld said Iraq was probably not a nuclear threat at this time

 

Feb 15 US and UK planes bombed Iraq’s air defense system as part of No Fly zone

 

Feb 16 Bush told speechwriter David Frum that he was going to get rid of Saddam  

Feb 16 UK Attorney General Lord Williams approved air attacks out of no fly zones

            in Iraq for self defense

Feb 16 US and UK planes bombed 20 radar and command and control centers in Iraq

outside of No Fly Zone US and UK claimed Iraq had upgraded its air defenses Then said bombed Iraq to stop it from upgrading its defenses

 

Feb 19 Richard Perle wrote letter to Def Sec Rumsfeld Said he’d been friends with Ahmed Chalabi

for years Attacked CIA for incompetence dealing with Iraq and was trying to discredit Chalabi Called out CIA Dir Tenet for being opponent of Chalabi Argued for US to back Chalabi’s revolt plan

(Musings On Iraq review The Man Who Pushed America To War, The Extraordinary Life, Adventures, and Obsessions of Ahmad Chalabi)

(Musings On Iraq review Arrows of the Night: Ahmad Chalabi and the Selling of the Iraq War)

 

Feb 24 Secretary of State Powell said Iraq had not developed any significant WMD capability and

            UN sanctions worked

(Musings On Iraq Origins Of Iraq’s WMD Programs)

 

Feb 25 Sunday Times report Said Iraq had nuclear weapons and tested them based upon Iraqi

defector and INC

 

Feb 27 Secretary of State Powell got Arab states to agree to new smart sanctions on Iraq

Feb 27 Deputy Defense Secretary Wolfowitz told Senate US reviewing Iraq policy and

            how to work with groups like INC

(Musings On Iraq review Losing Iraq, Inside The Post War Reconstruction Fiasco)

 

Mar 1 NSC meeting on Iraq policy Powell told to devise smart sanctions proposal for UN

Powell and Rumsfeld argued over dual use equipment that should be banned from Iraq

(Musings On Iraq review The Price of Loyalty)

Mar 1 Separate NSC meeting discussed working with Iraqi opposition and INC Talked

            about arming them but couldn’t agree on anything

(Musings On Iraq Chilcot Report Section 1.2 UK Iraq strategy September 2000 To September 2001)

 

Mar 4 US told UN Security Council Iraq had been reselling supplies from Oil for Food

            program setting up front companies giving kickbacks to get around sanctions

 

Apr 8 Date Czech Inter Min claimed 9/11 terrorist Atta met with Iraqi intelligence in Prague

            Later proven false

 

Apr 10 1st CIA report that Iraq tried to buy aluminum tubes for centrifuges and sign Iraq

renewed nuclear program Didn’t provide any analysis for claim Did say tubes were step backward from centrifuges Iraq used before Gulf War

(Musings On Iraq How A Contested Aluminum Tubes Story Became The Basis For War With Iraq)

 

Apr 11 1st US Energy Dept report on aluminum tubes Iraq tried to buy Said were wrong

size for centrifuges Did not meet specifications for centrifuges Iraq used before Said Iraq was openly buying large amount of tubes Would not be action for a secret nuclear program Thought tubes were for rocket launchers

(Musings On Iraq How A Contested Aluminum Tubes Story Became The Basis For War With Iraq)

 

Apr 17 Dept of Energy report said didn’t have enough info to tell whether Iraq had

            restarted its nuclear program

(Musings On Iraq How US Intelligence Created An Iraqi Nuclear Threat In 2002)

 

Apr 23 In response to State Dept asking CIA about coup in Iraq Dep Def Sec Wolfowitz wrote memo

arguing US should give military support to Iraqi rebels to overthrow Saddam

 

Apr 28 Report 9/11 terrorist Mohammed Atta met with Iraqi intel officer in Prague Story false

 

Apr 30 NSC meeting on Al Qaeda threat Deputy Defense Secretary Wolfowitz asked

why US should focus on bin Laden when Iraq terrorism real threat Brought up Mylroie’s conspiracy theories about Iraq being behind 93 World Trade Center bombing Deputy CIA Director McLaughlin told Wolfowitz no evidence of Iraq terrorist threat to US Deputy Secretary of State Armitage told Wolfowitz Al Qaeda was the main threat to US

(Musings On Iraq review Against All Enemies, Inside America’s War on Terror)

(Musings On Iraq Laurie Mylroie’s Convoluted Iraq-Terrorism Conspiracy Theory)

(Musings On Iraq Laurie Mylroie’s Iraq Conspiracy Theory Was Debunked By Captured Baath Documents)

 

May 5 Iraq told UN it worked on a nuclear bomb in the 1980s but it proved unfeasible In the 90s

IAEA found Iraq no longer working on nuclear program

 

May 9 US Energy Dept said aluminum tubes Iraq tried to buy fit specifications for rocket

            launchers IAEA found similar tubes during inspections in Baghdad

(Musings On Iraq How A Contested Aluminum Tubes Story Became The Basis For War With Iraq)

 

May 15 Secretary of State Powell told Congress UN sanctions had effectively contained

            Saddam

 

May 31 1st of four Deputies Committee of NSC meetings on revising Iraq policy

 

Jun 1 UN Resolution 1352 extended Oil for Food program

Jun 1 White House national security meeting on revising Iraq policy but no decisions

made Asked NSC for new ways to pressure Iraq

(Musings On Iraq Chilcot Report Section 1.2 UK Iraq strategy September 2000 To September 2001)

 

Jun 3 Saudi Amb to US Prince Bandar gave presentation to Bush saying Saddam taking

            advantage of instability in Middle East

 

Jun 5 During confirmation hearing future Deputy Undersecretary of Defense Feith said

            Saddam should be overthrown

 

Jun 14 CIA report aluminum tubes Iraq tried to buy were probably for centrifuges for

nuke program but could be rockets Still provided no justification for claim tubes for centrifuges

(Musings On Iraq How A Contested Aluminum Tubes Story Became The Basis For War With Iraq)

 

Jun 22 US decided to provide new aid to Iraqi opposition against Saddam

 

Jul 2 US intel report on confiscated aluminum tubes Iraq tried to buy Said did not fit rocket

            launchers Did match 1950s German centrifuge design

(Musings On Iraq How A Contested Aluminum Tubes Story Became The Basis For War With Iraq)

 

Jul 3 UN Resolution 1360 renewed Oil for Food program

 

Jul 12 Iraqi Military Alliance opposition group met in London made up of 60 former

            officers Called for democratic Iraq Foreign aid Iraqi soldiers to work with it

 

Jul 13 NSC meeting Dep Sec of State Armitage suggested that Bush make Iraq the top foreign

policy issue Dep Def Sec Wolfowitz argued for US to support Chalabi’s revolt plan and giving INC control of frozen Iraqi assets in US Def Sec Rumsfeld demanded full NSC meeting where Bush would hear plan

(Musings On Iraq review The Man Who Pushed America To War, The Extraordinary Life, Adventures, and Obsessions of Ahmad Chalabi)

(Musings On Iraq review Arrows of the Night: Ahmad Chalabi and the Selling of the Iraq War)

 

Jul 17 Saddam speech on anniversary of Baath coup said tyrants would not be able to

            overthrow him and he would not be defeated

 

Jul 26 Last of 4 NSC Deputies Committee meetings on revising Iraq policy

 

Jul 27 Pentagon memo said that sanctions were falling apart Meant US could face a nuclear armed

            Saddam Advocated for regime change without saying how to achieve it

 

Aug 1 NSC meeting Sec Def Rumsfeld presented plan for US to back Iraqi opposition and possible

military action Included backing INC’s revolt plan

 

Aug 7 US Energy Dept said aluminum tubes Iraq tried to buy could be for centrifuges

            but probably for rockets

(Musings On Iraq How A Contested Aluminum Tubes Story Became The Basis For War With Iraq)

 

Aug 15 UK Foreign Office legal adviser Sir Wood said that British forces could be sued

            if not given legal basis for going to war with Iraq

 

Aug 17 US Energy Dep report said aluminum tubes Iraq tried to buy were probably for

rockets not centrifuges for nuclear weapons program Said tubes didn’t match any designs for operating centrifuges Also refuted CIA analyst who claimed tubes could work for 1950s German centrifuge design Did say that Iraq trying to buy magnets and other moves showed that Iraq restarted its centrifuge program to enrich uranium Didn’t know if nuclear program restarted

(Musings On Iraq How A Contested Aluminum Tubes Story Became The Basis For War With Iraq)

(Musings On Iraq How US Intelligence Created An Iraqi Nuclear Threat In 2002)

 

Sep 1 Mullah Krekar founded Jund al-Islam that would become Ansar al-Islam in

            Sulaymaniya province

(Musings On Iraq Why Didn’t Bush Strike Zarqawi And Ansar al-Islam In 2002?)

 

Sep 4 1st major NSC meeting on Al Qaeda by Bush admin Def Sec Rumsfeld said Iraq was more

important

(Musings On Iraq review Against All Enemies, Inside America’s War on Terror)

 

Sep 8 German intel terminated CURVEBALL as a source Continued to be used by US intel as

source for Iraq having mobile WMD labs
(Musings On Iraq How Iraqi Defector CURVEBALL Became Basis For US Claims That Iraq Had WMD)

(Musings On Iraq Look Who The LA Times Dug Up – CURVEBALL)

(Musings On Iraq The Story Of CURVEBALL And Iraq’s Mobile Biological Weapons Labs)

 

Sep 10 US and UK planes hit three Iraqi air defense systems in largest strikes since Feb

            2001

Sep 10 Time reported Bush administration discussed overthrowing Saddam

 

Sep 11 Bush asked whether Iraq was involved in 9/11 because Saddam backed

            Palestinian terrorists

(Musings On Iraq Iraq, 9/11 And The Bush Administration)

(Musings On Iraq From 9/11 To The Invasion of Iraq: Analysis of Bush Administration Decision Making)

(Musings On Iraq Was Iraq An Imminent Threat To The West?)

(Musings On Iraq review Wanting War: Why the Bush Administration Invaded Iraq)

(Musings On Iraq review Leap of Faith, Hubris Negligence, and America’s Greatest Foreign

Policy Tragedy)

(Musings On Iraq review Plan of Attack: The Definitive Account Of The Decision To Invade

Iraq)

(Musings On Iraq review The Next Attack, The Failure of the War on Terror and a Strategy for Getting it Right)

(Musings On Iraq review The One Percent Doctrine, Deep Inside America’s Pursuit Of Its Enemies Since 9/11)

(Musings On Iraq review To Start A War: How The Bush Administration Took America Into Iraq)

Sep 11 Rice told UK Amb to US Meyer that White House was looking into whether Iraq

            involved in 9/11

(Musings On Iraq Chilcot Report Sec 3.1 Development of UK Strategy and Options on Iraq, 9/11 to Early January 2002)

Sep 11 5 hrs after 9/11 Defense Secretary Rumsfeld wrote memo asking for info on

            whether should attack Saddam and Iraq

Sep 11 Rumsfeld told Pentagon lawyer to talk to Deputy Secretary of Defense Wolfowitz

            about Iraq-Al Qaeda connections

Sep 11 NSC meeting Rumsfeld said he wasn’t sure Afghanistan should be first in war on terror

Asked if Iraq involved Powell argued Al Qaeda had to be first target

Sep 11 Counterterrorism chief Clarke said Rumsfeld and Deputy Defense Secretary

            Wolfowitz were taking advantage of 9/11 to push their Iraq agenda

(Musings On Iraq review Against All Enemies, Inside America’s War on Terror)

Sep 11 Bush said that US should get rid of Saddam and told some aides to look into

            Iraq-Al Qaeda connections

(Musings On Iraq Review Hubris, The Inside Story of Spin, Scandal, And The Selling Of The Iraq War)

(Musings On Iraq review The Bush Administrations and Saddam Hussein, Deciding on Conflict)

Sep 11 UndersecDef Feith said that war on terror had to start with Iraq

Sep 11 In 2003 Bush said that 9/11 changed his mind about the problems Saddam could

            pose Said he no longer believed in containment afterward

2001 Defense Policy Board member Perle said that Iraq responsible for 9/11 and had to pay

(Musings On Iraq Iraq, 9/11 And The Bush Administration)

(Musings On Iraq From 9/11 To The Invasion of Iraq: Analysis of Bush Administration Decision Making)

(Musings On Iraq review Wanting War: Why the Bush Administration Invaded Iraq)

(Musings On Iraq review Leap of Faith, Hubris Negligence, and America’s Greatest Foreign Policy Tragedy)

Sep 11 Italian intelligence told CIA that Iraq had tried to buy uranium from Niger

(Musings On Iraq How US Intelligence Failed The Iraq-Niger Uranium Story)

(Musings On Iraq Review Hubris, The Inside Story of Spin, Scandal, And The Selling Of The Iraq War)

Sep 11 Report that Saddam put his forces on alert and retreated to a bunker in Tikrit area

            showing he was involved in 9/11

 

Sep 12 Saddam said US reaped what it sowed with 9/11 attack

Sep 12 Bush asked Counterterrorism chief Clarke to look into whether Iraq involved in

            9/11

(Musings On Iraq Iraq, 9/11 And The Bush Administration)

(Musings On Iraq From 9/11 To The Invasion of Iraq: Analysis of Bush Administration Decision Making)

(Musings On Iraq Was Iraq An Imminent Threat To The West?)

(Musings On Iraq review Wanting War: Why the Bush Administration Invaded Iraq)

(Musings On Iraq review Leap of Faith, Hubris Negligence, and America’s Greatest Foreign

Policy Tragedy)

(Musings On Iraq review Plan of Attack: The Definitive Account Of The Decision To Invade

Iraq)

(Musings On Iraq review The Next Attack, The Failure of the War on Terror and a Strategy for Getting it Right)

(Musings On Iraq review The One Percent Doctrine, Deep Inside America’s Pursuit Of Its Enemies Since 9/11)

(Musings On Iraq review To Start A War: How The Bush Administration Took America Into Iraq)

Sep 12 Pentagon meeting on 9/11 CIA said was sure Al Qaeda behind attack Deputy

Defense Secretary Wolfowitz questioned that and said Iraq must have been involved

Sep 12 NSC met to discuss how to shape Bush doctrine and war on terror Rumsfeld

brought up attacking Iraq because not enough good targets to bomb in Afghanistan Rumsfeld asked if Iraq not Al Qaeda was behind 9/11 twice Also asked about Iran or Syria being involved Tenet said it was Al Qaeda Powell said US had to focus on Al Qaeda because that was what public wanted not Iraq Rumsfeld said Saddam should be overthrown Joint Chiefs head Gen Shelton said that was only possible via large invasion Bush said not time for Iraq

(Musings On Iraq review Bush At War)

Sep 12 White House told CIA to come up with covert plan against Iraq

Sep 12 Dep Sec Def Wolfowitz asked DIA for all info on Iraq’s involvement in terrorism since

            Gulf War

Sep 12 Defense Policy Board’s Perle told CIA Dir Tenet Iraq had to pay for 9/11 claiming

            it was behind attack

Sep 12 Czech intel source said he saw 9/11 hijacker Atta meet with Iraqi intel in Prague

            Apr 2001 Story false

Sep 12 Iraq conspiracy theorist Laurie Mylroie former CIA Dir James Woolsey columnist

            Charles Krauthammer all wrote pieces blaming Iraq for 9/11

(Musings On Iraq Laurie Mylroie’s Convoluted Iraq-Terrorism Conspiracy Theory)

(Musings On Iraq Laurie Mylroie’s Iraq Conspiracy Theory Was Debunked By Captured Baath Documents)

Sep 12 Ex-CIA Dir Woolsey told ABC and CNN US should look into Iraq being behind 9/11 Told

CBS Iraq behind 1993 World Trade Center bombing based upon Laurie Mylroie conspiracy theory and Iraq likely behind 9/11

 

Sep 13 Bush asked CIA Dir Tenet whether he was looking into Iraq-Al Qaeda

            connections

(Musings On Iraq Iraq, 9/11 And The Bush Administration)

(Musings On Iraq From 9/11 To The Invasion of Iraq: Analysis of Bush Administration Decision Making)

(Musings On Iraq Was Iraq An Imminent Threat To The West?)

(Musings On Iraq review Wanting War: Why the Bush Administration Invaded Iraq)

(Musings On Iraq review Leap of Faith, Hubris Negligence, and America’s Greatest Foreign

Policy Tragedy)

(Musings On Iraq review Plan of Attack: The Definitive Account Of The Decision To Invade

Iraq)

(Musings On Iraq review The Next Attack, The Failure of the War on Terror and a Strategy for Getting it Right)

(Musings On Iraq review The One Percent Doctrine, Deep Inside America’s Pursuit Of Its Enemies Since 9/11)

(Musings On Iraq review To Start A War: How The Bush Administration Took America Into Iraq)

Sep 13 Rumsfeld said attacking Iraq would be good deterrent to countries that support

            terrorism

Sep 13 Rumsfeld told army to come up with plans for seizing Iraq’s southern oil fields

Sep 13 Deputy Defense Secretary Wolfowitz told press US would eliminate states that

            sponsor terrorism

Sep 13 UnderSecDef Feith said that govt officials realized that war on terrorism would involve Iraq

Sep 13 US intelligence and counterterrorism agencies meeting agreed no connection

            between Iraq and al Qaeda Report sent to Bush

(Musings On Iraq review Against All Enemies, Inside America’s War on Terror)

Sep 13 Fmr CIA Dir Woolsey said US needed to look into whether Iraq rather than

            Al Qaeda was behind 9/11

Sep 13 Iraq conspiracy theorist L. Mylroie Wall St Journal OpEd said Al Qaeda not capable of

9/11 and was probably Iraq

(Musings On Iraq Laurie Mylroie’s Convoluted Iraq-Terrorism Conspiracy Theory)

(Musings On Iraq Laurie Mylroie’s Iraq Conspiracy Theory Was Debunked By Captured Baath Documents)

Sep 13 Time/CNN poll found 78% of Americans believed Iraq involved in 9/11

 

Sep 14 Bush told Blair that there might be an Iraq-Al Qaeda connection

(Musings On Iraq From 9/11 To The Invasion of Iraq: Analysis of Bush Administration Decision Making)

(Musings On Iraq Was Iraq An Imminent Threat To The West?)

(Musings On Iraq review Leap of Faith, Hubris Negligence, and America’s Greatest Foreign

Policy Tragedy)

(Musings On Iraq review Plan of Attack: The Definitive Account Of The Decision To Invade

Iraq)

(Musings On Iraq Review The Report of the Iraq Inquiry, Executive Summary)

(Musings On Iraq review The Next Attack, The Failure of the War on Terror and a Strategy for Getting it Right)

(Musings On Iraq review The One Percent Doctrine, Deep Inside America’s Pursuit Of Its Enemies Since 9/11)

(Musings On Iraq review To Start A War: How The Bush Administration Took America Into Iraq)

(Musings On Iraq Chilcot Report Sec 3.1 Development of UK Strategy and Options on Iraq, 9/11 to Early January 2002)

Sep 14 Fmr CIA Dir Woolsey said Saddam could be working with Al Qaeda

Sep 14 American Enterprise Institute press conference had Iraq conspiracy theorist

Mylroie claimed Iraq behind Al Qaeda and 9/11 David Wurmser said US had to focus on Iraq Michael Ledeen said US had to back INC

(Musings On Iraq review Losing Iraq, Inside The Post War Reconstruction Fiasco)

Sep 14 Iraq conspiracy theorist Mylroie on Fox’s O’Reilly Factor said Iraq behind 1993

World Trade Center Bombing Said getting rid of bin Laden good but Saddam was more important

(Musings On Iraq Laurie Mylroie’s Convoluted Iraq-Terrorism Conspiracy Theory)

(Musings On Iraq Laurie Mylroie’s Iraq Conspiracy Theory Was Debunked By Captured Baath Documents)

(Musings On Iraq review Wanting War: Why the Bush Administration Invaded Iraq)

 

Sep 15 Bush held meeting at Camp David to determine response to 9/11 Iraq brought

up several times Pentagon paper for Camp David said 3 priorities in war on terror: Al Qaeda, Taliban, Iraq Joint Chiefs head Gen Shelton went over Afghanistan war plans and Iraq ones if necessary National Security Adviser Rice said US military should think about military action in other places in case Afghanistan went bad Opened up opportunity to bring up Iraq Dep Def Sec Wolfowitz was afraid Afghanistan would be a quagmire Said Iraq would be easy in comparison and 10-50% chance Iraq behind 9/11 Said US should go after Iraq if serious about war on terror CIA Counterterror Chief Black said Iraq had nothing to do with 9/11 Wolfowitz said Iraq sent intel agents to Sudan and made alliance with bin Laden in 90s Black said he was Sudan station chief at time Said Iraq agents and bin Laden met but no alliance Bush said Iraq would be dealt with later Secretary of State Powell said Wolfowitz had no proof Iraq involved in 9/11 and was just using it for his Iraq agenda During break Wolfowitz brought up Iraq again with Bush After break Wolfowitz said that if US backed rebels in the south along with Kurds could seize all of Iraq’s oil Rumsfeld asked if it was time to attack Iraq Powell objected saying it would cost international support Powell said US had to do Afghanistan first and would make Iraq easier if wanted to deal with it later Bush didn’t want to do more than one war at a time Later Wolfowitz brought up Iraq again Before lunch Bush said he’d heard enough about Iraq After lunch Bush asked each adviser for their ideas Powell said if US wanted to go after other states they would still be there after Afghanistan Powell said he was against attacking Iraq because US would lose coalition and confuse war on terror Rumsfeld said if hitting Iraq would cost coalition US needed a new coalition Chief of Staff Card said US should build up troops in Persian Gulf that could be used vs Iraq but then said case against Iraq had not been made Cheney said if US attacked Iraq would lose its good guy image in war on terror Did say Iraq would be dealt with later on CIA Director Tenet said Afghanistan should be focus Voted on issue with 4-0 against going after Iraq with Rumsfeld abstaining

(Musings On Iraq review The One Percent Doctrine, Deep Inside America’s Pursuit Of Its Enemies Since 9/11)

(Musings On Iraq review Bush At War)

(Musings On Iraq review Losing Iraq, Inside The Post War Reconstruction Fiasco)

(Musings On Iraq review The Next Attack, The Failure of the War on Terror and a Strategy for Getting it Right)

Sep 15 Bush said he thought Iraq involved in 9/11 but told Rice it would be dealt with

            later

(Musings On Iraq Iraq, 9/11 And The Bush Administration)

(Musings On Iraq From 9/11 To The Invasion of Iraq: Analysis of Bush Administration Decision Making)

(Musings On Iraq Was Iraq An Imminent Threat To The West?)

(Musings On Iraq review Wanting War: Why the Bush Administration Invaded Iraq)

(Musings On Iraq review Leap of Faith, Hubris Negligence, and America’s Greatest Foreign Policy

Tragedy)

(Musings On Iraq review To Start A War: How The Bush Administration Took America Into Iraq)

Sep 15 UK Embassy in US warned that 9/11 would mean those in Bush admin that wanted regime

change would push their agenda more

(Musings On Iraq Chilcot Report Sec 3.1 Development of UK Strategy and Options on Iraq, 9/11 to Early January 2002)

 

Sep 16 Bush said unless Iraq connected to 9/11 it would be dealt with diplomatically not

            with force Told National Security Adviser Rice Iraq would be handled later

(Musings On Iraq review Bush At War)

Sep 16 Def Sec Rumsfeld told Dep Def Sec Wolfowitz and Undersec Def Feith to meet with Gen

Newbold and Gen Abizaid from Joint Chiefs about Iraq

Sep 16 VP Cheney on Meet The Press No evidence Iraq was linked to 9/11 Said focus was on Al

            Qaeda

Sep 16 Defense Policy Board’s Perle told CNN Iraq linked to Al Qaeda and said Saddam

            backed terrorism and states like Iraq had to be dealt with

(Musings On Iraq Iraq, 9/11 And The Bush Administration)

(Musings On Iraq From 9/11 To The Invasion of Iraq: Analysis of Bush Administration Decision Making)

(Musings On Iraq review Wanting War: Why the Bush Administration Invaded Iraq)

(Musings On Iraq review The Next Attack, The Failure of the War on Terror and a Strategy for Getting it Right)

Sep 16 Fmr CIA Dir Woolsey said stories of 9/11 hijacker Atta meeting with Iraqi

            intel showed Iraq needed to be investigated

 

Sep 17 Iraq’s Foreign Minister Sabri said that Muslims and Arabs considered U.S. a

            terrorist state

Sep 17 Bush said he believed Iraq was involved in 9/11 to his national security staff

(Musings On Iraq Was Iraq An Imminent Threat To The West?)

(Musings On Iraq review Bush At War)

(Musings On Iraq review Plan of Attack: The Definitive Account Of The Decision To Invade

Iraq)

(Musings On Iraq review The Next Attack, The Failure of the War on Terror and a Strategy for Getting it Right)

(Musings On Iraq review The One Percent Doctrine, Deep Inside America’s Pursuit Of Its Enemies Since 9/11)

(Musings On Iraq review The Endgame, The Inside Story of the Struggle for Iraq, from

George W. Bush to Barack Obama)

(Musings On Iraq review To Start A War: How The Bush Administration Took America Into Iraq)

Sep 17 Bush signed order for war in Afghanistan that also called for Pentagon to look into plans to

seize Iraq’s oil fields Bush told Def Sec Rumsfeld Iraq plans weren’t a priority like Afghanistan

(Musings On Iraq review Leap of Faith, Hubris Negligence, and America’s Greatest Foreign

Policy Tragedy)

(Musings On Iraq review The Endgame, The Inside Story of the Struggle for Iraq, from

George W. Bush to Barack Obama)

(Musings On Iraq Review Hubris, The Inside Story of Spin, Scandal, And The Selling Of The Iraq War)

(Musings On Iraq review The Bush Administrations and Saddam Hussein, Deciding on Conflict)

Sep 17 Bush told Pentagon it needed to be ready to deal with Iraq if it acted against US

            interests

Sep 17 Dep Sec of Def Wolfowitz sent memo to Rumsfeld advocating for attacking

Iraq Said better than 10% chance Iraq behind 9/11 Included Iraq conspiracy theorist Mylroie’s claim that Iraq behind 1993 World Trade Center bombing

(Musings On Iraq Laurie Mylroie’s Convoluted Iraq-Terrorism Conspiracy Theory)

(Musings On Iraq Laurie Mylroie’s Iraq Conspiracy Theory Was Debunked By Captured Baath Documents)

(Musings On Iraq review Wanting War: Why the Bush Administration Invaded Iraq)

(Musings On Iraq review Leap of Faith, Hubris Negligence, and America’s Greatest Foreign

Policy Tragedy)

Sep 17 David Wurmser and Iraq conspiracy theorist Mylroie talked to media about

            possible Iraq role in 9/11

Sep 17 Senator Allen told CNN US might think of regime change in Iraq

 

Sep 18 Richard Clarke’s counterterrorism office sent National Security Adviser Rice memo saying

            no Iraq-9/11 links found

Sep 18 Deputy Defense Secretary Wolfowitz wrote Rumsfeld that Iraq backed terrorists and

might have been behind 1993 World Trade Center bombing using conspiracy theorist Mylroie’s argument

(Musings On Iraq Laurie Mylroie’s Convoluted Iraq-Terrorism Conspiracy Theory)

(Musings On Iraq Laurie Mylroie’s Iraq Conspiracy Theory Was Debunked By Captured Baath Documents)

(Musings On Iraq Iraq, 9/11 And The Bush Administration)

(Musings On Iraq From 9/11 To The Invasion of Iraq: Analysis of Bush Administration Decision Making)

(Musings On Iraq review Wanting War: Why the Bush Administration Invaded Iraq)

(Musings On Iraq review The Next Attack, The Failure of the War on Terror and a Strategy for Getting it Right)

Sep 18 Reuters reported 9/11 hijacker Atta met with Iraqi intelligence in Europe Story was false

 

Sep 19 Iraq intelligence paper said Afghan source claimed bin Laden Taliban and Iraq

            worked together to target America Story was never confirmed

Sep 19 Bush asked CIA Dir Tenet to look into Iraq Al Qaeda ties and said VP Cheney

            had info on links

(Musings On Iraq review The Next Attack, The Failure of the War on Terror and a Strategy for Getting it Right)

(Musings On Iraq review Plan of Attack: The Definitive Account Of The Decision To Invade

Iraq)

(Musings On Iraq review The One Percent Doctrine, Deep Inside America’s Pursuit Of Its Enemies Since 9/11)

(Musings On Iraq review To Start A War: How The Bush Administration Took America Into Iraq)

(Musings On Iraq Was Iraq An Imminent Threat To The West?)

Sep 19 Deputy Secretary of Defense Wolfowitz sent ex-CIA Dir Woolsey to England to

            look into Iraq-9/11 connections

Sep 19 Rumsfeld told Bush routine air strikes on Iraq about to happen as part of No Fly

Zone Bush said had to make sure they were not perceived to be in response to 9/11

Sep 19 Pentagon’s Defense Policy Board held meeting on 9/11 Bernard Lewis and Ahmad

            Chalabi presented at meeting Chalabi said US should invade Iraq not Afghanistan

(Musings On Iraq Iraq, 9/11 And The Bush Administration)

(Musings On Iraq From 9/11 To The Invasion of Iraq: Analysis of Bush Administration Decision Making)

(Musings On Iraq review Wanting War: Why the Bush Administration Invaded Iraq)

(Musings On Iraq review Leap of Faith, Hubris Negligence, and America’s Greatest Foreign

Policy Tragedy)

(Musings On Iraq review Losing Iraq, Inside The Post War Reconstruction Fiasco)

(Musings On Iraq review The Man Who Pushed America To War, The Extraordinary Life, Adventures, and Obsessions of Ahmad Chalabi)

(Musings On Iraq review Arrows of the Night: Ahmad Chalabi and the Selling of the Iraq War)

 

Sep 20 Under Secretary of Defense Feith complained about lack of good targets in Afghanistan and

suggested bombing Iraq for 9/11 Said war on terror should be broad and include Iraq

Sep 20 NY Times report DepDefSec Wolfowitz and VP Cheney’s chief of staff Libby were

advocating regime change in Iraq

Sep 20 Project for a New American Century in letter to Bush said Iraq might have

            supported 9/11 and Saddam had to be targeted in war on terror

(Musings On Iraq review The Road to Iraq, The Making of a Neoconservative War)

Sep 20 US intel officials told press they were looking into Iraq’s connections to 9/11

Sep 20 Israeli intelligence said they thought Iraq connected to 9/11 Claimed Al Qaeda

            funded by Iraqi Intel Service

Sep 20 Bush brought up seizing Iraq’s oil fields with PM Blair Blair said US needed to keep public

opinion behind it with War on Terror Bush said Iraq wasn’t immediate problem Blair said needed to take time to build case vs Iraq

(Musings On Iraq From 9/11 To The Invasion of Iraq: Analysis of Bush Administration Decision Making)

(Musings On Iraq review Wanting War: Why the Bush Administration Invaded Iraq)

(Musings On Iraq Review The Report of the Iraq Inquiry, Executive Summary)

(Musings On Iraq review Leap of Faith, Hubris Negligence, and America’s Greatest Foreign

Policy Tragedy)

(Musings On Iraq Chilcot Report Sec 3.1 Development of UK Strategy and Options on Iraq, 9/11 to Early January 2002)

Sep 20 US and UK jets bombed missile batteries in southern Iraq as part of No Fly Zones

 

Sep 21 1st CIA report on Iraq and 9/11 found no connection but two had contacts in 1990s Bush

was briefed on findings Also didn’t think 9/11/ hijacker Atta met with Iraqi intelligence officer in Prague in 2001

Sep 21 DIA analyst at Pentagon’s Office of Special Plans said CIA report had good

            information but finding of no Iraq-Al Qaeda ties should be ignored

Sep 21 Undersecretary of Defense for Policy Feith sent DIA analysis of CIA report to

            Deputy Secretary of Defense Wolfowitz and Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld

Sep 21 CIA Dir Tenet told Bush CIA Czech office questioned 9/11 hijacker Atta meeting

            Iraqi intel officer in Prague

Sep 21 Admin officials told Wash Times Saddam talked with bin Laden just before 9/11

(Musings On Iraq Iraq, 9/11 And The Bush Administration)

(Musings On Iraq From 9/11 To The Invasion of Iraq: Analysis of Bush Administration Decision Making)

(Musings On Iraq review Wanting War: Why the Bush Administration Invaded Iraq)

(Musings On Iraq review Leap of Faith, Hubris Negligence, and America’s Greatest Foreign

Policy Tragedy)

Sep 21 INC provided Iraqi defector claimed Iraq was training terrorists to take over airplanes

at Salman Pak Baghdad Had been dismissed by US intel because he claimed he fled Iraq because he was tortured but he had no marks on his body Story proved false

 

Sep 22 Telegraph story claiming Iraq was funding Al Qaeda Quoted CIA and Israeli

            sources

 

Sep 23 National Security Adviser Rice told CNN Iraq would be stage two of war on terror

(Musings On Iraq Iraq, 9/11 And The Bush Administration)

(Musings On Iraq From 9/11 To The Invasion of Iraq: Analysis of Bush Administration Decision Making)

(Musings On Iraq Was Iraq An Imminent Threat To The West?)

(Musings On Iraq review Wanting War: Why the Bush Administration Invaded Iraq)

(Musings On Iraq review Leap of Faith, Hubris Negligence, and America’s Greatest Foreign

Policy Tragedy)

(Musings On Iraq review The Next Attack, The Failure of the War on Terror and a Strategy for Getting it Right)

Sep 23 Guardian article blamed Iraq for 9/11 Claimed Iraq knew about attack beforehand

Stories that Iraq provided money and training to Al Qaeda Claimed 4 months before 9/11 Iraqi intelligence met with Al Qaeda in Pakistan Was sending money to Al Qaeda via Lebanese banks Israeli intelligence officer said 9/11 probably funded by Iraqi intelligence INC defector ex-nuke scientist Hamza said Iraq probably behind 9/11 Talked with Iraqi exiles who said pilots trained in suicide attacks in Iraq in 1999

Sep 23 Telegraph quoted INC defector ex-nuke scientist Hamza that Iraq probably behind

            9/11 Claimed trained pilots for suicide attacks

 

Sep 24 William Safire OpEd said clear link between Iraq-Al Qaeda via Ansar al-Islam

(Musings On Iraq Why Didn’t Bush Strike Zarqawi And Ansar al-Islam In 2002?)

 

Sep 26 Bush told Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld to plan for Iraq invasion but do it informally

(Musings On Iraq From 9/11 To The Invasion of Iraq: Analysis of Bush Administration Decision Making)

(Musings On Iraq Was Iraq An Imminent Threat To The West?)

(Musings On Iraq review Wanting War: Why the Bush Administration Invaded Iraq)

(Musings On Iraq review Leap of Faith, Hubris Negligence, and America’s Greatest Foreign

Policy Tragedy)

(Musings On Iraq Review Hubris, The Inside Story of Spin, Scandal, And The Selling Of The Iraq War)

(Musings On Iraq review The Bush Administrations and Saddam Hussein, Deciding on Conflict)

(Musings On Iraq review The Next Attack, The Failure of the War on Terror and a Strategy for Getting it Right)

(Musings On Iraq review The Endgame, The Inside Story of the Struggle for Iraq, from

George W. Bush to Barack Obama)

 

Sep 27 Iraq’s Dep PM Tariq Aziz through back channels had letter sent to State Dept saying Iraq

didn’t want trouble with US after 9/11

Sep 27 Ahmed Chalabi said Iraq and Al Qaeda linked since 1990s and wanted to use

            bin Laden against US

(Musings On Iraq review The Man Who Pushed America To War, The Extraordinary Life, Adventures, and Obsessions of Ahmad Chalabi)

(Musings On Iraq review Arrows of the Night: Ahmad Chalabi and the Selling of the Iraq War)

Sep 27 Badr met Talabani and other PUK officials in Sulaymaniya Talked about enrolling Badr

members in Univ of Sulaymaniya and investment opportunities Talabani agreed to allow Badr to invest in PUK areas

(Musings On Iraq Early Report On Iran’s Activities In Iraq)

(Musings On Iraq Badr Organization A View Into Iraq’s Violent Past And Present)

 

Sep 28 After NSC meeting on start of Afghan war Bush said he believed Saddam was

            involved in 9/11 but Iraq would be dealt with later

Sep 28 Chalabi briefed DIA on INC defector Col Abu Zainab Qairy who said he saw Arab terrorists

training to hijack airplanes at camp in Salman Pak in Baghdad Meeting was set up by fmr CIA-Dir Woolsey False story

(Musings On Iraq review The Man Who Pushed America To War, The Extraordinary Life, Adventures, and Obsessions of Ahmad Chalabi)

(Musings On Iraq review Arrows of the Night: Ahmad Chalabi and the Selling of the Iraq War)

 

Sep 29 Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld ordered review of all existing Iraq war plans

(Musings On Iraq From 9/11 To The Invasion of Iraq: Analysis of Bush Administration Decision Making)

(Musings On Iraq Was Iraq An Imminent Threat To The West?)

(Musings On Iraq review Leap of Faith, Hubris Negligence, and America’s Greatest Foreign

Policy Tragedy)

(Musings On Iraq review The Endgame, The Inside Story of the Struggle for Iraq, from

George W. Bush to Barack Obama)

(Musings On Iraq review Hard Lessons, The Iraq Reconstruction Experience)

 

Sep 30 Report Al Qaeda defector said bin Laden did not like Saddam because of his attacks

            upon Muslim civilians

Sep 30 Iraqi defector told Sunday Telegraph Saddam started crash program to produce

            WMD in six months

Sep 30 CIA interviewed Iraqi defector Abu Zainab Qairy who claimed Iraq trained terrorists at

Salman Pak in Baghdad CIA did not believe his story Abu Zainab Qairy then went to INC who got his story into the press

 

Oct 1 Weekly Standard article argued Iraq connected to 9/11 and Saddam had to be removed

Oct 1 William Safire OpEd in New York Times claimed Al Qaeda operative was armed by Iraq

Oct 1 Badr met with Barzani and KDP officials in Irbil Badr asked Barzani about US intentions in

Iraq

(Musings On Iraq Early Report On Iran’s Activities In Iraq)

(Musings On Iraq Badr Organization A View Into Iraq’s Violent Past And Present)

 

Oct 2 Badr met with Barzani again Asked about US intentions in Iraq Barzani said that US was

thinking of invading Iraq after Afghanistan Barzani was worried about Turkish involvement in any invasion Barzani said that US would only support pro-US parties and they would take control after Saddam Badr asked to open office in Irbil

(Musings On Iraq Early Report On Iran’s Activities In Iraq)

(Musings On Iraq Badr Organization A View Into Iraq’s Violent Past And Present)

 

Oct 7 Saddam condemned US invasion of Afghanistan saying it would only lead to more

            instability in world

Oct 7 Bin Laden video said he was fighting for Iraqis who had suffered under sanctions

            White House would use this as evidence of Iraq-Al Qaeda connection

 

Oct 9 Iraq’s UN Amb Duri said Iraq had sent individual message of condolences after 9/11

            but not to US govt because of its bombings and sanctions on Iraq

 

Oct 10 FBI issued warning may be more possible anthrax attacks Pundits began blaming Iraq for

            attacks

 

Oct 11 Blair told Bush talk of war with Iraq was undermining war in Afghanistan and

Iraq could come later Said if US pivoted to Iraq would lose Arab world and prove bin Laden’s claim that War on terror was against Arabs

(Musings On Iraq Chilcot Report Sec 3.1 Development of UK Strategy and Options on Iraq, 9/11 to Early January 2002)

 

Oct 12 Jim Hoagland OpEd in Washington Post quoted INC defector Sabah Khodada that

Iraq was training terrorists to hijack planes at Salman Pak Said there was a 2nd INC defector who said he saw Islamists training at camp to hijack airplanes implying 9/11 connection

 

Oct 14 Frontline TV show interviewed INC provided Iraqi defector Khodada who claimed Iraq

trained terrorists to hijack planes at Salman Pak implying 9/11 connection

Oct 14 Guardian article quoted fmr CIA Dir Woolsey Iraq only country with capabilities to pull

            off anthrax letters in US

 

Oct 15 CIA report from Rome said that Italian intel said Iraq tried to buy uranium from Niger but

didn’t see much merit in it CIA DIA Energy Dept thought Iraq-Niger uranium deal was possible State Dept thought story suspect

(Musings On Iraq How US Intelligence Failed The Iraq-Niger Uranium Story)

(Musings On Iraq Review Hubris, The Inside Story of Spin, Scandal, And The Selling Of The Iraq War)

Oct 15 White House spokesman said no connection between Iraq and anthrax letters sent to Wash

DC

 

Oct 16 CIA Director Tenet met with UK officials and agreed no Iraq-9/11 connection

(Musings On Iraq Review The Report of the Iraq Inquiry, Executive Summary)

 

Oct 17 NY Times article reported Iraqi defector saw Iraq training terrorists at Salman Pak to take

airliners Was INC provided Khodada Reported INC said that Iraq diplomat met bin Laden in 1998 and offered him safe haven Reported Czech Inter Min said 9/11 hijacker Atta met with Iraqi intel officer in Prague

Oct 17 Bush called PM Blair Told him Iraq probably behind anthrax letters in US

 

Oct 18 2nd CIA report on story that Iraq tried to buy uranium from Niger Said Iraq

didn’t have facilities to process uranium

(Musings On Iraq How US Intelligence Failed The Iraq-Niger Uranium Story)

(Musings On Iraq Review Hubris, The Inside Story of Spin, Scandal, And The Selling Of The Iraq War)

Oct 18 Wall St Journal OpEd by ex-CIA Dir Woolsey said Iraq behind 9/11

 

Oct 21 Bush asked Def Sec Rumsfeld how Iraq war plans going

 

Oct 26 After anthrax letters sent to Wash DC ABC reported anthrax trademark of Iraq’s WMD

program

Oct 26 Czech Interior Ministry told press 9/11 hijacker Atta met Iraqi intel officer in Prague

 

Oct 31 ABC withdrew story that Iraq might be behind anthrax letters sent to Wash DC

 

Nov 4 Badr met with Shiite tribes loyal to ISCI Talked about taking over government in southern

Iraq after a US invasion

(Musings On Iraq Badr Organization A View Into Iraq’s Violent Past And Present)

 

Nov 5 Badr leadership of Abu Muhandis Amiri Safi Basra and commanders working in Iraq met

Talked about transition after US invasion Talked about replacing Iraqi leadership while maintaining Baathist state Talked about US backing a coup in Iraq Said US might invade Iraq after Afghanistan

(Musings On Iraq Badr Organization A View Into Iraq’s Violent Past And Present)

Nov 5 Time magazine OpEd said US should go to war with Iraq because connected to 9/11

Nov 5 State Dept intel agency said looked like Iraq renewed production of chemical weapons

 

Nov 8 NY Times article based upon 2 Iraqi defectors provided by INC One was Abu Zainab Qairy

Both said they worked at a terrorist training camp in Salman Pak Baghdad Said they saw Islamists and WMD produced to attack US Story released to coincide with INC defectors appearing on PBS Frontline Stories were false  

Nov 8 Frontline aired “Gunning for Saddam” Was full of conspiracies about Iraq being behind 9/11

and arguing that it should be attacked Talked with Defense Policy Board’s Perle who said Saddam most dangerous man in world because he could use WMD against US Included ex-CIA Director Woolsey who thought Iraq probably behind Al Qaeda and 1995 World Trade Center bombing Author Mylroie said Iraq behind Al Qaeda Interviewed INC connected ex-nuclear scientist Khidhir Hamza who said Iraq behind 9/11 and INC defector Khododa who claimed to have seen jihadists training with Iraqis in Salman Pak including taking airliners Said this was connected to 9/11 Khodada had been dismissed by US intel because he claimed he fled Iraq after he was tortured but he had no marks on his body

(Musings On Iraq Laurie Mylroie’s Convoluted Iraq-Terrorism Conspiracy Theory)

(Musings On Iraq Laurie Mylroie’s Iraq Conspiracy Theory Was Debunked By Captured Baath Documents)

 

Nov 11 London Observer quoted INC defectors Khodada and Abu Zainab Qairy that Iraq trained

terrorists at Salman Pak to hijack planes like 9/11 Khodada and Qairy had both been dismissed by US intel

 

Nov 12 INC presented Iraqi defector Lami who claimed Iraq training terrorists at Salman

            Pak and had anthrax

Nov 12 Safire column NY Times said 9/11 hijacker Atta met with Iraqi diplomat in 2001 was

undisputed fact Story false

 

Nov 14 Cheney said he knew 9/11 hijacker Atta met with Iraq intelligence in Prague in

            2001

Nov 14 Defense Policy Board’s Perle quoted INC defector ex-nuke scientist Hamza that

            Iraq could get nuclear bomb and attack US Called for preventive action vs Iraq

 

Nov 15 Secretary of State Powell told Blair that after Afghanistan Right in US would

            push for bombing Iraq

 

Nov 17 Deputy Defense Secretary Wolfowitz wrote Defense Secretary Rumsfeld that if

            any evidence found of Iraq involvement in 9/11 US should act

(Musings On Iraq Was Iraq An Imminent Threat To The West?)

(Musings On Iraq review Wanting War: Why the Bush Administration Invaded Iraq)

(Musings On Iraq review Leap of Faith, Hubris Negligence, and America’s Greatest Foreign

Policy Tragedy)

(Musings On Iraq review The Next Attack, The Failure of the War on Terror and a Strategy for Getting it Right)

 

Nov 20 US Embassy in Niger reported that Niger official said no way it could produce enough

uranium reports claimed Iraq bought from it

(Musings On Iraq How US Intelligence Failed The Iraq-Niger Uranium Story)

(Musings On Iraq Review Hubris, The Inside Story of Spin, Scandal, And The Selling Of The Iraq War)

Nov 20 Wall St Journal OpEd by Eliot Cohen said Iraq helped Al Qaeda and had WMD so should

be attacked

 

Nov 21 Bush told National Security Adviser Rice he wanted Secretary of Defense

            Rumsfeld to start planning for Iraq

(Musings On Iraq Was Iraq An Imminent Threat To The West?)

Nov 21 Bush told Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld to update war plans for Iraq Wanted it

            done secretly Was first official step in eventual invasion of Iraq

(Musings On Iraq review of Shaping the Plan for Operation Iraqi Freedom, The Role of Military Intelligence Assessment)

(Musings On Iraq review Wanting War: Why the Bush Administration Invaded Iraq)

(Musings On Iraq Review Hubris, The Inside Story of Spin, Scandal, And The Selling Of The Iraq War)

(Musings On Iraq review The Bush Administrations and Saddam Hussein, Deciding on Conflict)

(Musings On Iraq review Plan of Attack: The Definitive Account Of The Decision To

Invade Iraq)

(Musings On Iraq review The Endgame, The Inside Story of the Struggle for Iraq, from

George W. Bush to Barack Obama)

 

Nov 22 Saudi intel chief Prince Turksi said that bin Laden considered Saddam an apostate

 

Nov 26 Bush called Saddam a terrorist who would be held accountable and said Iraq

            needed to allow UN weapons inspectors back in

(Musings On Iraq UN Inspectors Were Right Iraq Was Not A Threat)

(Musings On Iraq Iraq’s Rejection of UN Inspectors Led To Mistrust Over WMD and 2003 Invasion)

(Musings On Iraq review Leap of Faith, Hubris Negligence, and America’s Greatest Foreign

Policy Tragedy)

Nov 26 White House spokesman Fleischer said US afraid Al Qaeda might try to get

            nuclear weapons from Iraq

 

Nov 27 Defense Secretary Rumsfeld told CENTCOM commander Gen Frank he wanted to

completely revise Iraq war plan

(Musings On Iraq review of Shaping the Plan for Operation Iraqi Freedom, The Role of Military Intelligence Assessment)

(Musings On Iraq review Leap of Faith, Hubris Negligence, and America’s Greatest Foreign

Policy Tragedy)

(Musings On Iraq review Plan of Attack: The Definitive Account Of The Decision To

Invade Iraq)

Nov 27 Saddam rejected Bush’s call for UN weapons inspectors to return to Iraq

(Musings On Iraq UN Inspectors Were Right Iraq Was Not A Threat)

(Musings On Iraq Iraq’s Rejection of UN Inspectors Led To Mistrust Over WMD and 2003 Invasion)

Nov 27 Wash Post survey found 78% of Americans supported military action against Iraq

 

Nov 28 UK intel report Iraq not connected to 9/11 not working with Al Qaeda not

            giving WMD to terrorists Said Iraq WMD threat “slight”

(Musings On Iraq Review The Report of the Iraq Inquiry, Executive Summary)

Nov 28 Pentagon officials told Time after Afghanistan US would target Iraq as next step

            in war on terror

(Musings On Iraq review Leap of Faith, Hubris Negligence, and America’s Greatest Foreign Policy Tragedy)

 

Nov 29 UN Resolution 1382 extended Oil for Food program

Nov 29 American Enterprise Institute panel said Saddam had to be removed before US could

confront radical Islam

(Musings On Iraq review Wanting War: Why the Bush Administration Invaded Iraq)

(Musings On Iraq review The Road to Iraq, The Making of a Neoconservative War)

(Musings On Iraq review America at the Crossroads, Democracy, Power, and the Neoconservative)

Nov 30 Defense Secretary Rumsfeld told press US knew Iraq had WMD because defectors said so

 

Dec 1 Defense Secretary Rumsfeld issued order to Joint Chiefs to begin revising war

planning for Iraq CENTCOM commander Gen Franks was only given 3 days to revise the plan and present it to Rumsfeld

(Musings On Iraq review of Shaping the Plan for Operation Iraqi Freedom, The Role of Military Intelligence Assessment)

(Musings On Iraq review Leap of Faith, Hubris Negligence, and America’s Greatest Foreign

Policy Tragedy)

(Musings On Iraq review Plan of Attack: The Definitive Account Of The Decision To

Invade Iraq)

Dec 1 NY Times article quoted Deputy Secretary of State Armitage saying that US was

going to force Iraq to allow UN inspectors back in Other administration officials said that White House was looking into how to support Iraqi opposition groups

 

Dec 2 Secretary of State Powell said no reason to believe Iraq didn’t have WMD

Dec 2 USA Today article said Iraq supported bin Laden when he was in Sudan in 1990s

Dec 2 Ex-CIA Dir Woolsey said he believed Iraq involved in 9/11

 

Dec 3 Blair told Bush he was not opposed to removing Saddam

(Musings On Iraq Chilcot Report Sec 3.1 Development of UK Strategy and Options on Iraq, 9/11 to Early January 2002)

 

Dec 4 CENTCOM Cmdr Gen Franks briefed Rumsfeld and Joint Chiefs Chairman Gen Meyers on

revised Iraq invasion plan Franks revised 1990s Op Plan 1003 Cut troops from 500,000 to 400,000 to be deployed in 6 instead of 7 months Franks said couldn't scrap Op Plan 1003 because never knew what would be needed Said would take a long time to revise Iraq war plan Rumsfeld said Afghanistan showed US didn’t need such a large and long invasion plan for Iraq Rumsfeld wanted a battle plan that could be executed in a very short time not months Franks agreed with Rumsfeld but said Op Plan 1003 only thing they had at moment Rumsfeld told Gen Franks goal of any military action against Iraq would be removing Saddam Franks given one week to revise plan Angry that Rumsfeld went from plan not important to it being urgent

(Musings On Iraq review of Shaping the Plan for Operation Iraqi Freedom, The Role of Military Intelligence Assessment)

(Musings On Iraq review Leap of Faith, Hubris Negligence, and America’s Greatest Foreign

Policy Tragedy)

(Musings On Iraq review Plan of Attack: The Definitive Account Of The Decision To Invade

Iraq)

(Musings On Iraq review Liberate And Leave, Fatal Flaws In The Early Strategy For Postwar Iraq)

Dec 4 PM Blair told Bush Iraq was a threat because it had WMD could export it and violated UN

            resolutions

Dec 4 PM Blair paper to Bush said that they had to consider regime change in Iraq Blair said had to

build steady case vs Iraq and gain international support

(Musings On Iraq Review The Report of the Iraq Inquiry, Executive Summary)

(Musings On Iraq Chilcot Report Sec 3.1 Development of UK Strategy and Options on Iraq, 9/11 to Early January 2002)

 

Dec 6 Letter to Wash Post by Senators McCain Lieberman and others said that Iraq had to be

eliminated

 

Dec 9 VP Cheney told NBC Iraq was hosting terrorists and developing WMD Claimed story 9/11

hijacker Atta met with Iraq intel officer in Prague was pretty much confirmed

(Musings On Iraq review Wanting War: Why the Bush Administration Invaded Iraq)

(Musings On Iraq review Leap of Faith, Hubris Negligence, and America’s Greatest Foreign Policy

Tragedy)

(Musings On Iraq review The One Percent Doctrine, Deep Inside America’s Pursuit Of Its Enemies Since 9/11)

 

Dec 10 Ansar al-Islam formed from 3 Kurdish Islamist groups

(Musings On Iraq Why Didn’t Bush Strike Zarqawi And Ansar al-Islam In 2002?)

Dec 10 Badr leadership Amiri Laquaa Basri met Talked about possible US invasion of Iraq and

how to prepare for it Iran told Badr to come up with action plan for post-Saddam Iraq Ordered to do recon within Iraq Carry out ops vs Iraqi military in south Iraq Prepare 2 battalions to send into Amarah and Nasiriya after a US invasion Battalions would be under Iranian intelligence control

(Musings On Iraq Badr Organization A View Into Iraq’s Violent Past And Present)

 

Dec 11 Cheney said that Saddam needed to be careful and see what happened to the Taliban in

            Afghanistan

(Musings On Iraq review Wanting War: Why the Bush Administration Invaded Iraq)

 

Dec 12 CENTCOM commander Gen Franks briefed Rumsfeld on invasion preparations

            and estimated costs with start time in spring 2002

(Musings On Iraq review Leap of Faith, Hubris Negligence, and America’s Greatest Foreign Policy Tragedy)

 

Dec 14 Sheikh on Iraqi state TV read poem to Saddam praising 9/11 attack

Dec 14 DIA report Iraq had 100 tons of WMD agents and munitions Could produce WMD Didn’t

know if happening but could be on small scale

(Musings On Iraq Iraq One Of The Worst Intelligence Failures In US History)

 

Dec 17 Iraqi defector Haideri provided by INC told CIA Iraq had secret WMD labs Labeled fabricator

by DIA May 2002 but his story continued to be used Haideri never saw WMD Later said he made up story because INC told him to

Dec 17 Secretary of State Powell said sanctions on Iraq should continue because it still had WMD

Dec 17 Czech Intel said story of 9/11 hijacker Atta meeting with Iraqi intel in Prague didn't

happen

Dec 17 Cheney told NBC story that 9/11 hijacker Atta met with Iraqi intel was unconfirmed

Dec 17 White House said anthrax attacks in U.S. came from domestic sources not Iraq

Dec 17 UN Resolution 1284 created UNMOVIC as new Iraq WMD inspection regime

(Musings On Iraq UN Inspectors Were Right Iraq Was Not A Threat)

(Musings On Iraq Iraq’s Rejection of UN Inspectors Led To Mistrust Over WMD and 2003 Invasion)

 

Dec 19 CENTCOM commander Gen Franks made 3rd presentation to Rumsfeld of revised Iraq war

            plan

(Musings On Iraq review Leap of Faith, Hubris Negligence, and America’s Greatest Foreign Policy Tragedy)

 

Dec 20 NYTimes article with INC defector Haideri Claimed he went to 20 WMD sites Haideri’s

claims used in CIA DIA and White House reports Labeled fabricator by DIA May 2002 but his story continued to be used Haideri never saw WMD Later said he made up story because INC told him to

 

Dec 21 UK Defense Minister Hoon asked ministry for plans for military action against Iraq

Dec 21 Vanity Fair article claimed Iraq involved in 9/11 based upon INC defector Abu Zainab Qairy

story that Iraq trained terrorists at Salman Pak Baghdad Abu Zainab had been dismissed by CIA

Dec 21 Vanity Fair author appeared on CNN and NBC repeating his story that INC defector Abu

Zainab Qairy claimed Iraq involved in 9/11 Story false

 

Dec 27 CENTCOM commander Gen Franks briefed Rumsfeld on war planning

(Musings On Iraq review Leap of Faith, Hubris Negligence, and America’s Greatest Foreign Policy Tragedy)

 

Dec 28 CENTCOM commander Gen Franks presented latest version of Iraq war plan to

Bush in Crawford, Texas Franks had 7 lines of operation that could be used independently or in conjunction Were bombings and missile attacks Special Forces penetrating into Iraq Ground operations by army and marines Information deception and psychological operations CIA support for Iraqi opposition diplomacy and humanitarian aid to Iraqi population Included 9 “slices” of Iraq that could be targeted Were Leadership internal security and intelligence agencies WMD missiles Republican Guard territory of Iraq Iraqi army infrastructure and civilian population Plan would need support of Kuwait Saudi Arabia Jordan Turkey Bahrain Qatar UAE Oman and England Could start with just 105,000 troops and then 230,000 more coming in next 60-90 days Franks wanted to start building up forces and supplies in region immediately get CIA to start building up support within Iraq and diplomacy to build up support amongst Gulf States Franks said US would be ready for Iraq invasion by April to June 2002

(Musings On Iraq review of Shaping the Plan for Operation Iraqi Freedom, The Role of Military Intelligence Assessment)

(Musings On Iraq review Leap of Faith, Hubris Negligence, and America’s Greatest Foreign

Policy Tragedy)

Dec 28 After Gen Franks briefing Bush asked CIA Dir Tenet about intel on Iraq Said was very thin

CIA only had 2 sources inside Iraq and contact with them erratic

Dec 28 CIA Director Tenet said US had worked with Iraqi opposition before and

abandoned them Said they would not cooperate with US without seeing real and large scale commitment from Washington

Dec 28 Bush told Secretary of State Powell and Defense Secretary Rumsfeld that they

needed to start building up support amongst countries around Iraq for US action

(Musings On Iraq Review Hubris, The Inside Story of Spin, Scandal, And The Selling Of The Iraq War)

(Musings On Iraq review The Bush Administrations and Saddam Hussein, Deciding on Conflict)

Dec 28 Bush asked Gen Franks if war plan good enough to win Franks said yes with

            work

Dec 28 Rumsfeld told Bush Iraq war would be over fast and quick US would quickly turn over

power to Iraqis and withdraw

(Musings On Iraq Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction’s “Hard Lessons” – Part I: Planning for Postwar Iraq September 2001 to May 2003)

(Musings On Iraq review Liberate And Leave, Fatal Flaws In The Early Strategy For Postwar Iraq)

Dec 28 Richard Perle of Pentagon’s Defense Policy Board OpEd in NY Times said US

            had to attack Iraq

(Musings On Iraq review Wanting War: Why the Bush Administration Invaded Iraq)

 

2002

Jan 3 CIA Director Tenet and staff briefed VP Cheney and his chief of staff Scooter

Libby on what they could do in Iraq Said covert action would not be able to overthrow Saddam only an invasion would Said containing and training to overthrow Saddam at same time wouldn’t work and needed a unified Iraq policy

(Musings On Iraq review Leap of Faith, Hubris Negligence, and America’s Greatest Foreign Policy Tragedy)

Jan 3 CIA Director Tenet gave same briefing to Bush President said dual Iraq policy

            would stand

Jan 3 CIA paper said Iraq could hit neighbors with WMD missiles

 

Jan 9 Gen Franks briefed Rumsfeld on latest war plan

(Musings On Iraq review of Shaping the Plan for Operation Iraqi Freedom, The Role of Military Intelligence Assessment)

Jan 9 Secretary of State Powell called Franks and voiced his concern that Rumsfeld was

trying to push a small an invasion force as possible and not give into that pressure

(Musings On Iraq review Leap of Faith, Hubris Negligence, and America’s Greatest Foreign

Policy Tragedy)

 

Jan 14 UK Defense Ministry analysis said weaknesses of INC outweighed its strengths

 

Jan 17 Gen Franks briefed his commanders at CENTCOM on initial Iraq war plans for 1st

            time

(Musings On Iraq review Leap of Faith, Hubris Negligence, and America’s Greatest Foreign

Policy Tragedy)

(Musings On Iraq review of Shaping the Plan for Operation Iraqi Freedom, The Role of Military Intelligence Assessment)

 

Jan 19 Def Sec Rumsfeld sent Col Mcgregor to brief Gen Franks on his plan to invade Iraq with just

35,000 troops by striking directly at Baghdad Briefing greatly angered members of CENTCOM staff who thought it unrealistic

 

Jan 21 Weekly Standard OpEd by Robert Kagan and William Kristol called for Iraq to be

            attacked as next step in war on terror

(Musings On Iraq review Wanting War: Why the Bush Administration Invaded Iraq)

(Musings On Iraq review The Road to Iraq, The Making of a Neoconservative War)

(Musings On Iraq review America at the Crossroads, Democracy, Power, and the Neoconservative Legacy)

 

Jan 22 Dep Def Sec Wolfowitz memo to Undersec Def Feith that Pentagon was not finding intel

on Iraq-Al Qaeda links and said Rumsfeld should get some analysis on issue

(Musings On Iraq review Leap of Faith, Hubris Negligence, and America’s Greatest Foreign

Policy Tragedy)

 

Jan 27 Gen Franks briefed Rumsfeld on latest war plan Franks said review found Iraqi

military seriously degraded by sanctions Claimed that more US got involved against Iraq the less the Iraqi people would support regime Cut war plan down from 7 months to just 150 days with 245,000 troops Franks wanted to lesson timeline even more Wanted to start information campaign against Saddam immediately to pressure him

(Musings On Iraq review Leap of Faith, Hubris Negligence, and America’s Greatest Foreign

Policy Tragedy)

(Musings On Iraq review of Shaping the Plan for Operation Iraqi Freedom, The Role of Military Intelligence Assessment)

 

Jan 29 Bush State of Union called Iraq part of Axis of Evil Said it still had WMD

programs Iran and North Korea were added to speech because White House didn’t want to be seen as focusing upon Saddam

(Musings On Iraq review Iraq’s Future The aftermath of regime change)

(Musings On Iraq review Wanting War: Why the Bush Administration Invaded Iraq)

(Musings On Iraq review Leap of Faith, Hubris Negligence, and America’s Greatest Foreign

Policy Tragedy)

(Musings On Iraq Review Hubris, The Inside Story of Spin, Scandal, And The Selling Of The Iraq War)

(Musings On Iraq review The Bush Administrations and Saddam Hussein, Deciding on Conflict)

(Musings On Iraq review What Happened, Inside the Bush White House and Washington’s Culture of Deception)

 

Jan 30 Natl Sec Adv Rice said Axis of Evil countries had to be dealt with diplomatically but at

same time said they couldn’t be negotiated with

(Musings On Iraq review Iraq’s Future The aftermath of regime change)

Jan 30 CIA unclassified report to Congress said Iraq trying to rebuild its nuclear program

(Musings On Iraq How US Intelligence Created An Iraqi Nuclear Threat In 2002)

 

Feb 1 Gen Franks briefed Rumsfeld on war plans with start time April 2002 with 300,000

            Troops

(Musings On Iraq review Leap of Faith, Hubris Negligence, and America’s Greatest Foreign Policy Tragedy)

(Musings On Iraq review of Shaping the Plan for Operation Iraqi Freedom, The Role of Military Intelligence Assessment)

 

Feb 2 Weekly Standard’s William Kristol told Senate invading Iraq would transform

            Middle East

(Musings On Iraq review The Road to Iraq, The Making of a Neoconservative War)

(Musings On Iraq review America at the Crossroads, Democracy, Power, and the Neoconservative Legacy)

(Musings On Iraq review Wanting War: Why the Bush Administration Invaded Iraq)

(Musings On Iraq review Losing Iraq, Inside The Post War Reconstruction Fiasco)

(Musings On Iraq review The Assassins’ Gate, America In Iraq)

 

Feb 4 Work on State Dept’s Future of Iraq Project began 17 working groups on Iraq’s postwar needs

Worked mostly with Iraqi exiles

(Musings On Iraq review Hard Lessons, The Iraq Reconstruction Experience)

 

Feb 5 CIA report on Iraq-Niger uranium deal Said it received text of deal from foreign

            intel service CIA and DIA thought text important State Dept skeptical

(Musings On Iraq How US Intelligence Failed The Iraq-Niger Uranium Story)

(Musings On Iraq Review Hubris, The Inside Story of Spin, Scandal, And The Selling Of The Iraq War)

Feb 5 CIA report said Iraq had 7 mobile WMD labs

(Musings On Iraq How Iraqi Defector CURVEBALL Became Basis For US Claims That Iraq Had WMD)

 

Feb 6 Sec State Powell told Congress White House considering all options on Iraq but that regime

            change had been US policy and would be good for region

(Musings On Iraq review Iraq’s Future The aftermath of regime change)

(Musings On Iraq review Leap of Faith, Hubris Negligence, and America’s Greatest Foreign Policy Tragedy)

Feb 6 CIA officials told NY Times Iraq not taken part in any anti-U.S. terrorism since

            1993 attempt on ex-Pres Bush

Feb 6 US intel officials told NY Times 9/11 hijacker Atta met with Iraqi intel in Prague

 

Feb 7 Gen Franks presented revised Iraq invasion plan to Bush at White House

(Musings On Iraq review Leap of Faith, Hubris Negligence, and America’s Greatest Foreign

Policy Tragedy)

(Musings On Iraq review of Shaping the Plan for Operation Iraqi Freedom, The Role of Military Intelligence Assessment)

 

Feb 10 VP Cheney speech said Iraq harbored terrorists and US wouldn’t allow terrorist states to

threaten US with WMD

Feb 10 CIA presented covert action plan against Iraq

(Musings On Iraq review Leap of Faith, Hubris Negligence, and America’s Greatest Foreign Policy Tragedy)

 

Feb 11 UK Ambassador to US Meyer said Bush’s Axis of Evil speech made more in US

            think about war vs Iraq

(Musings On Iraq Review The Report of the Iraq Inquiry, Executive Summary)

Feb 11 Former CIA Dir Woolsey told Pentagon about Iraqi defector with intel on Iraq’s

            WMD provided by INC

 

Feb 12 Powell told Senate that regime change in Iraq was US policy since Clinton

            Said no plans for invasion though

(Musings On Iraq review Leap of Faith, Hubris Negligence, and America’s Greatest Foreign

Policy Tragedy)

Feb 12 DIA report Iraq tried to buy 500 tons of yellowcake uranium from Niger

(Musings On Iraq How US Intelligence Failed The Iraq-Niger Uranium Story)

(Musings On Iraq Review Hubris, The Inside Story of Spin, Scandal, And The Selling Of The Iraq War)

 

Feb 13 Bush at press conference said he had a number of options for dealing with Iraq

Feb 13 Bush admin officials told several media outlets they had decided to move against

            Iraq

(Musings On Iraq review Wanting War: Why the Bush Administration Invaded Iraq)

(Musings On Iraq review Leap of Faith, Hubris Negligence, and America’s Greatest Foreign

Policy Tragedy)

(Musings On Iraq Review Hubris, The Inside Story of Spin, Scandal, And The Selling Of The Iraq War)

(Musings On Iraq review The Bush Administrations and Saddam Hussein, Deciding on Conflict)

(Musings On Iraq review Plan of Attack: The Definitive Account Of The Decision To Invade

Iraq)

 

Feb 14 National Security Adviser Rice called Blair Foreign Policy Adviser Manning

            saying US was only reviewing its Iraq policy

 

Feb 15 VP Cheney told Council on Foreign Relations action needed to be taken against

            Saddam for his aggressive actions support of terror WMD threat

(Musings On Iraq review Iraq’s Future The aftermath of regime change)

(Musings On Iraq review Wanting War: Why the Bush Administration Invaded Iraq)

(Musings On Iraq review Leap of Faith, Hubris Negligence, and America’s Greatest Foreign

Policy Tragedy)

(Musings On Iraq review Losing Iraq, Inside The Post War Reconstruction Fiasco)

 

Feb 16 Bush signed secret NSC directive calling for covert action against Iraq by CIA

Had budget of $189 mil for 2 years Included supporting Iraqi opposition carrying out sabotage inside Iraq working with third countries to support covert action an information campaign against Baghdad attacking Iraqi revenue sources and disrupting Baghdad’s smuggling operations

(Musings On Iraq review Wanting War: Why the Bush Administration Invaded Iraq)

(Musings On Iraq review Leap of Faith, Hubris Negligence, and America’s Greatest Foreign

Policy Tragedy)

(Musings On Iraq Review Hubris, The Inside Story of Spin, Scandal, And The Selling Of The Iraq War)

(Musings On Iraq review The Bush Administrations and Saddam Hussein, Deciding on Conflict)

 

Feb 18 US Embassy in Niger said new details on Iraq-Niger uranium deal

            meant a new look into story was needed

(Musings On Iraq How US Intelligence Failed The Iraq-Niger Uranium Story)

(Musings On Iraq Review Hubris, The Inside Story of Spin, Scandal, And The Selling Of The Iraq War)

 

Feb 19 CIA met with former Amb Joseph Wilson to ask if he would go to Niger to

            investigate alleged Iraq yellowcake deal 

(Musings On Iraq How US Intelligence Failed The Iraq-Niger Uranium Story)

(Musings On Iraq Review Hubris, The Inside Story of Spin, Scandal, And The Selling Of The Iraq War)

Feb 19 Sen Graham visited CENTCOM Gen Franks said if war on terror was to fight Al Qaeda US

should focus on Somalia and Yemen after Afghanistan not Iraq

 

Feb 20 Secret CIA team entered Kurdistan to prepare for ops inside Iraq Called Northern

            Iraq Liaison Elements

Feb 20 UK’s Joint Intel Comm chief Scarlett briefed Foreign Secretary Cook on Iraq’s

            WMD Cook thought Iraq didn’t have capability for large scale WMD attack

Feb 20 CIA gave former Amb Joseph Wilson talking points for his trip to Niger to

            investigate Iraq-Niger uranium deal

(Musings On Iraq How US Intelligence Failed The Iraq-Niger Uranium Story)

(Musings On Iraq Review Hubris, The Inside Story of Spin, Scandal, And The Selling Of The Iraq War)

 

Feb 21 Former Amb Joseph Wilson left for Niger to investigate Iraq buying uranium from it

(Musings On Iraq How US Intelligence Failed The Iraq-Niger Uranium Story)

(Musings On Iraq Review Hubris, The Inside Story of Spin, Scandal, And The Selling Of The Iraq War)

 

Feb 24 CENTCOM intelligence staff completed first draft of intelligence estimate for Iraq invasion

 

Feb 25 1st war game for Iraq invasion ran at Scott Air Force Base Illinois

 

Feb 26 Former Amb Wilson arrived in Niger to investigate Iraq trying to buy uranium

(Musings On Iraq How US Intelligence Failed The Iraq-Niger Uranium Story)

(Musings On Iraq Review Hubris, The Inside Story of Spin, Scandal, And The Selling Of The Iraq War)

Feb 26 MI6 Chief Dearlove said US would demand weapons inspectors under conditions

            Saddam wouldn’t accept to justify military action

(Musings On Iraq UN Inspectors Were Right Iraq Was Not A Threat)

(Musings On Iraq Iraq’s Rejection of UN Inspectors Led To Mistrust Over WMD and 2003 Invasion)

 

Feb 27 UK Defense Min said govt had to consider military action against Iraq

 

Feb 28 Blair told Australian TV Iraq was a threat because it had WMD

(Musings On Iraq Review The Report of the Iraq Inquiry, Executive Summary)

Feb 28 Gen Franks delivered target list for air strikes in Iraq to Rumsfeld

 

Mar 1 State Dept report on Iraq-Niger uranium deal Said it was unlikely

(Musings On Iraq How US Intelligence Failed The Iraq-Niger Uranium Story)

(Musings On Iraq Review Hubris, The Inside Story of Spin, Scandal, And The Selling Of The Iraq War)

 

Mar 4 State Dep intel memo sent to Powell and DIA Didn’t believe Niger would sell

            uranium to Iraq

(Musings On Iraq How US Intelligence Failed The Iraq-Niger Uranium Story)

(Musings On Iraq Review Hubris, The Inside Story of Spin, Scandal, And The Selling Of The Iraq War)

 

Mar 5 CIA debriefed former Ambassador Wilson on his trip to Niger to investigate Iraq

buying uranium Wilson said he found no proof of Iraq-Niger uranium deal but in 1999 Iraq asked Niger about better trade CIA believed 1999 overture about better Iraq-Niger trade might have been supporting proof of uranium deal Wilson left CIA debriefing believing he disproved Iraq-Niger uranium deal CIA felt they might have proof it happened

(Musings On Iraq How US Intelligence Failed The Iraq-Niger Uranium Story)

(Musings On Iraq Review Hubris, The Inside Story of Spin, Scandal, And The Selling Of The Iraq War)

Mar 5 UK Joint Intelligence Committee head Scarlett briefed Blair on Iraq’s WMD

Afterward Blair thought Iraq only had battlefield WMD capability

Mar 5 UK Home Secretary Blunkett at cabinet meeting asked whether legal basis for

            action vs Iraq

Mar 5 UK Foreign Secretary Straw wrote article saying if Saddam refused weapons

            inspectors there would be consequences

(Musings On Iraq UN Inspectors Were Right Iraq Was Not A Threat)

(Musings On Iraq Iraq’s Rejection of UN Inspectors Led To Mistrust Over WMD and 2003 Invasion)

Mar 5 UK intel report predicted successor to Saddam would be a Sunni military man

(Musings On Iraq Review The Report of the Iraq Inquiry, Executive Summary)

 

Mar 6 Blair wrote article for UK paper saying Iraq had WMD and would use them

(Musings On Iraq Review The Report of the Iraq Inquiry, Executive Summary)

Mar 6 Gen Franks briefed VP Cheney on which Middle East countries needed to be

            Lobbied to help with Iraq invasion before trip to region

(Musings On Iraq review Leap of Faith, Hubris Negligence, and America’s Greatest Foreign Policy Tragedy)

Mar 6 CIA held meeting on covert and unconventional warfare capabilities against Iraq

Mar 6 US war game held on political and military implications of Iraq invasion

 

Mar 8 Iraq options paper given to Blair Said UK could strengthen containment or

regime change using military Said invasion only way to ensure removal of Saddam

Mar 8 UK cabinet meeting said US no longer wanted to contain Iraq Said only

            way to remove Saddam was through invasion but no justification for it

(Musings On Iraq Review The Report of the Iraq Inquiry, Executive Summary)

Mar 8 CIA report on former Ambassador Wilson’s trip to Niger to investigate Iraq-Niger

uranium story Niger denied any deal Said June 1999 Iraqi delegation met with Niger PM about business which PM thought was buying uranium CIA analysts believed Wilson confirmed Iraq was interested in buying uranium from Niger State Dept believed Wilson’s trip confirmed that Iraq had not tried to buy uranium from Niger Wilson would later claim that he talked about fake Niger-Iraq documents but he didn’t know about them until later

(Musings On Iraq How US Intelligence Failed The Iraq-Niger Uranium Story)

(Musings On Iraq Review Hubris, The Inside Story of Spin, Scandal, And The Selling Of The Iraq War)

 

Mar 10 Report UK’s Joint Intelligence Committee investigation found no links between

            Iraq and 9/11

Mar 10 CIA briefing included story that Iraq tried to buy uranium from Niger

(Musings On Iraq How US Intelligence Failed The Iraq-Niger Uranium Story)

(Musings On Iraq Review Hubris, The Inside Story of Spin, Scandal, And The Selling Of The Iraq War)

 

Mar 11 Blair told Cheney UK would support US action to remove Saddam

(Musings On Iraq Review The Report of the Iraq Inquiry, Executive Summary)

 

Mar 12 VP Cheney made trip to Middle East to gain support for Iraq war

Mar 12 Blair Foreign Policy Adv Manning met with National Security Adviser Rice and

            said UK supported regime change in Iraq but needed good strategy

(Musings On Iraq Review The Report of the Iraq Inquiry, Executive Summary)

Mar 12 2 CIA reports said aluminum tubes Iraq tried to buy were for centrifuges and Iraq

            might be trying to build a nuclear weapon

(Musings On Iraq How A Contested Aluminum Tubes Story Became The Basis For War With Iraq)

(Musings On Iraq How US Intelligence Created An Iraqi Nuclear Threat In 2002)

 

Mar 13 Blair Foreign Policy Adviser Manning met with National Security Adviser Rice’s

            staff Manning said US not considered problems with going to war with Iraq

(Musings On Iraq Review The Report of the Iraq Inquiry, Executive Summary)

 

Mar 14 Blair Adviser Manning said National Security Adviser Rice committed to regime change in

Iraq Manning said US was working on strategic decisions on how to remove Saddam

(Musings On Iraq Review The Report of the Iraq Inquiry, Executive Summary)

 

Mar 17 Deputy Secretary of Defense Wolfowitz and Blair’s adviser Manning talked about

            building international support for military action vs Iraq

Mar 17 UK Amb to US Meyer told Wolowitz that if US wanted military action against Iraq it

needed to go through UN Wolfowitz said Iraq was linked with terrorism and harboring member of 1993 World Trade Center bombing Was based upon conspiracy theories of Laurie Mylroie

(Musings On Iraq Review The Report of the Iraq Inquiry, Executive Summary)

(Musings On Iraq Laurie Mylroie’s Convoluted Iraq-Terrorism Conspiracy Theory)

(Musings On Iraq Laurie Mylroie’s Iraq Conspiracy Theory Was Debunked By Captured Baath Documents)

Mar 17 Times of London article quoted Iraqi defector provided by INC that Iraq had WMD

programs

Mar 17 Bahrain Foreign Minister Salamn ibn Hamda al-Khalifa told press Arab world did

            not see Iraq as the threat but Israel for its actions against Palestinians

 

Mar 18 UK Amb Meyer met with Deputy Secretary of Defense Wolfowitz who said he was

            against going to UN against Iraq

(Musings On Iraq Review The Report of the Iraq Inquiry, Executive Summary)

 

Mar 19 CIA Director Tenet told Senate no Iraq Al Qaeda connection but Iraq couldn’t be

ruled out from involvement in 9/11 Said no doubt Iraq-Al Qaeda links and Iraq developing nuclear weapons

(Musings On Iraq How US Intelligence Created An Iraqi Nuclear Threat In 2002)

Mar 19 DIA Dir Adm Wilson briefed Senate Armed Services Comm on threats to US

            Didn’t include Iraq Said Iraq contained only residual WMD programs

 

Mar 20 US Amb to UN Negroponte letter to Security Council said Iraq failed to comply

            with weapons inspectors since end of Gulf War justifying use of force

(Musings On Iraq UN Inspectors Were Right Iraq Was Not A Threat)

(Musings On Iraq Iraq’s Rejection of UN Inspectors Led To Mistrust Over WMD and 2003 Invasion)

(Musings On Iraq review Leap of Faith, Hubris Negligence, and America’s Greatest Foreign Policy Tragedy)

Mar 20 State Dept legal adviser Taft said Iraq hadn’t complied with UN resolutions since

            1990s justifying use of force

Mar 20 ORHA staff went to CENTCOM in Qatar and found military had parallel

            post-war admin set up isolated from ORHA

(Musings On Iraq on Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction Hard Lessons Chapter 3 The Department of Defense Takes Charge)

(Musings On Iraq Special Inspector General For Iraq Reconstruction Hard Lessons Chapter 4 Staging in Kuwait)

(Musings On Iraq review Leap of Faith, Hubris Negligence, and America’s Greatest Foreign Policy

Tragedy)

(Musings On Iraq review Losing Iraq, Inside The Post War Reconstruction Fiasco)

(Musings On Iraq review Hard Lessons, The Iraq Reconstruction Experience)

 

Mar 21 VP Cheney told NSC Arab leaders not interested in Iraq because of Intifada in Palestine

Mar 21 Gen Franks met with US commanders in Germany to go over war plans Said war

            was going to happen and they needed to be ready

 

Mar 22 UK Foreign Office Political Director Ricketts memo to Foreign Secretary Straw

said US scrambling to find Iraq-Al Qaeda links and argument unconvincing Said no signs Iraq working on its WMD or nuke programs

Mar 22 MI6 Director Gieve letter to Home Office Secretary said no evidence Iraq

involved in 9/11 No evidence Iraq involved in any anti-west terrorism since 1993 attempt upon ex-Pres Bush

Mar 22 UK Defense Minister Hoon warned Blair if UK helped overthrow Saddam it

            would have to stay in Iraq for years

(Musings On Iraq Review The Report of the Iraq Inquiry, Executive Summary)

Mar 22 Bush said that Iraq had not allowed verification of its destruction of its WMD

 

Mar 23 Joint Chiefs did paper drill running through Iraq invasion plan

(Musings On Iraq review Leap of Faith, Hubris Negligence, and America’s Greatest Foreign

Policy Tragedy)

(Musings On Iraq review of Shaping the Plan for Operation Iraqi Freedom, The Role of Military Intelligence Assessment)

 

Mar 24 Cheney on CNN’s Late Edition called Saddam an evil man that U.S. would deal

            with

(Musings On Iraq review Wanting War: Why the Bush Administration Invaded Iraq)

 

Mar 25 UK Foreign Secretary Jack Straw told Blair no Iraq-Al Qaeda link and Iraq

not more of a threat now than before 9/11Straw argued for following legal path against Iraq via U.N. resolutions

(Musings On Iraq Review The Report of the Iraq Inquiry, Executive Summary)

Mar 25 CIA report said foreign govt told it Iraq tried to buy uranium from Niger

(Musings On Iraq How US Intelligence Failed The Iraq-Niger Uranium Story)

(Musings On Iraq Review Hubris, The Inside Story of Spin, Scandal, And The Selling Of The Iraq War)

Mar 25 New Yorker article said Iraq supported Al Qaeda via Kurdish Ansar al-Islam based

upon prisoner Shahab held by PUK in Sulaymaniya Kurds told New Yorker Al Qaeda’s Zawahiri met Saddam in 1992 Also that Iraq was sending WMD to Al Qaeda

(Musings On Iraq Why Didn’t Bush Strike Zarqawi And Ansar al-Islam In 2002?)

 

Mar 27 ORHA had meeting of all 4 postwar groups to come up with unified plan for Iraq

Didn’t happen The 4 groups had all been created separately within Bush administration with no coordination between them

(Musings On Iraq on Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction Hard Lessons Chapter 3 The Department of Defense Takes Charge)

(Musings On Iraq Special Inspector General For Iraq Reconstruction Hard Lessons Chapter 4 Staging in Kuwait)

(Musings On Iraq review Leap of Faith, Hubris Negligence, and America’s Greatest Foreign Policy

Tragedy)

(Musings On Iraq review Losing Iraq, Inside The Post War Reconstruction Fiasco)

(Musings On Iraq review Iraq’s Dysfunctional Democracy)

(Musings On Iraq review Hard Lessons, The Iraq Reconstruction Experience)

Mar 27 Deputy Secretary of Defense Wolfowitz told House of Representatives committee

Iraq oil would pay for reconstruction

(Musings On Iraq Iraq Oil Would Pay For Reconstruction)

 

Mar 28 Arab League called on Iraq to comply with all UN resolutions and end sanctions Rejected

            military action

Mar 28 Gen Franks briefed Joint Chiefs on Iraq war plans Said he would be ready by 10/1/02

(Musings On Iraq review of Shaping the Plan for Operation Iraqi Freedom, The Role of Military Intelligence Assessment)

(Musings On Iraq review Leap of Faith, Hubris Negligence, and America’s Greatest Foreign

Policy Tragedy)

 

Mar 29 Gen Franks briefed military service chiefs on Iraq war planning

(Musings On Iraq review Leap of Faith, Hubris Negligence, and America’s Greatest Foreign

Policy Tragedy)

(Musings On Iraq review of Shaping the Plan for Operation Iraqi Freedom, The Role of Military Intelligence Assessment)

 

Mar 30 Pentagon memo on creating an Iraqi authority after war Said had to be friendly to

the US Had to end Sunni rule Wanted rule of law individual liberty representative govt private enterprise Didn’t say how that was to be achieved

(Musings On Iraq review Leap of Faith, Hubris Negligence, and America’s Greatest Foreign Policy Tragedy)

(Musings On Iraq review State of Denial, Bush At War, Part III)

(Musings On Iraq review The Endgame, The Inside Story of the Struggle for Iraq, from

George W. Bush to Barack Obama)

(Musings On Iraq review Hard Lessons, The Iraq Reconstruction Experience)

 

Mar 31 Blair offered a division and UK bases to US for invasion

(Musings On Iraq Review The Report of the Iraq Inquiry, Executive Summary)

Mar 31 Def Sec Rumsfeld memo said important to create Iraqi interim authority as quickly

as possible so Iraqis were in power Had to pick pro-US Iraqis Said exiles could be core for new authority because they supported US goals in Iraq

(Musings On Iraq review Leap of Faith, Hubris Negligence, and America’s Greatest Foreign Policy

Tragedy)

(Musings On Iraq review State of Denial, Bush At War, Part III)

(Musings On Iraq review The Endgame, The Inside Story of the Struggle for Iraq, from

George W. Bush to Barack Obama)

(Musings On Iraq review Hard Lessons, The Iraq Reconstruction Experience)

Mar 31 Def Sec Rumsfeld memo to Bush said interim Iraqi authority was important to

convince Iraqis they not the US was going to run the country Said had to create one immediately

 

Apr 1 UK ambassador to US Meyer warned Bush thinking of war with Iraq by

            autumn but no postwar plans

(Musings On Iraq Chilcot Report Volume 2 Sec 3.3 Development of UK Iraq Strategy and Options April to July 2002)

(Musings On Iraq Review The Report of the Iraq Inquiry, Executive Summary)

 

Apr 2 UK Amb Meyer and PM Blair foreign policy advisor Manning met with Natl Sec Adv Rice

Reported Bush hadn’t worked out any details on Iraq yet and smarting from European rejecting pivot towards Iraq

(Musings On Iraq Chilcot Report Volume 2 Sec 3.3 Development of UK Iraq Strategy and Options April to July 2002)

(Musings On Iraq Review The Report of the Iraq Inquiry, Executive Summary)

 

Apr 4 UK intel officials claimed that Blair decided that WMD and Saddam were not

            good argument for going to war in Iraq

 

Apr 5 Blair gave TV interview saying Saddam needed to go

Apr 5 Blair and Bush met and talked about using inspections to pressure Saddam

(Musings On Iraq UN Inspectors Were Right Iraq Was Not A Threat)

(Musings On Iraq Iraq’s Rejection of UN Inspectors Led To Mistrust Over WMD and 2003 Invasion)

(Musings On Iraq Review The Report of the Iraq Inquiry, Executive Summary)

 

Apr 7 Blair and Bush meeting Blair pushed going to UN against Iraq Some claimed Blair

            okayed war with Iraq at meeting Blair denied that

Apr 7 Bush told TV network he’d decided Saddam must go

(Musings On Iraq review Iraq’s Future The aftermath of regime change)

(Musings On Iraq review Wanting War: Why the Bush Administration Invaded Iraq)

(Musings On Iraq Review The Report of the Iraq Inquiry, Executive Summary)

(Musings On Iraq Review Hubris, The Inside Story of Spin, Scandal, And The Selling Of The Iraq War)

(Musings On Iraq review The Bush Administrations and Saddam Hussein, Deciding on Conflict)

(Musings On Iraq review Plan of Attack: The Definitive Account Of The Decision To Invade

Iraq)

 

Apr 9 State Dept started Future of Iraq project bringing together 240 Iraqi exiles to chart out post-

            Saddam Iraq

(Musings On Iraq Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction’s “Hard Lessons” – Part I: Planning for Postwar Iraq September 2001 to May 2003)

(Musings On Iraq review Leap of Faith, Hubris Negligence, and America’s Greatest Foreign

Policy Tragedy)

(Musings On Iraq review Losing Iraq, Inside The Post War Reconstruction Fiasco)

(Musings On Iraq review Hard Lessons, The Iraq Reconstruction Experience)

 

Apr 10 Blair told parliament Saddam was threat to his people and region and was working

            on WMD

(Musings On Iraq Review The Report of the Iraq Inquiry, Executive Summary)

 

Apr 11 Gen Franks talked with Rumsfeld about war preparations that could start now

            without gaining much notice

(Musings On Iraq review Leap of Faith, Hubris Negligence, and America’s Greatest Foreign

Policy Tragedy)

(Musings On Iraq review of Shaping the Plan for Operation Iraqi Freedom, The Role of Military Intelligence Assessment)

 

Apr 14 Vanity Fair article talked with Iraqi defector Saadi who claimed Iraq building

WMD

 

Apr 15 Rumsfeld claimed that UN inspectors in 90s were ineffective 

(Musings On Iraq UN Inspectors Were Right Iraq Was Not A Threat)

(Musings On Iraq Iraq’s Rejection of UN Inspectors Led To Mistrust Over WMD and 2003 Invasion)

Apr 15 End of deadline set by Bush for invasion plan for Iraq to be completed

 

Apr 16 NSC meeting talked about training Iraqi exiles for help with invasion

 

Apr 18 CIA report said Iraq might have been able to make chemical weapons since

            1999

 

Apr 19 UK intel report Iraq not seen as a threat in Middle East except by Kuwait

 

Apr 20 Gen Franks briefed Bush on Iraq war plans Franks said he wanted to cut timeline

            by 1/3 and could start with 180,000 troops

(Musings On Iraq review Leap of Faith, Hubris Negligence, and America’s Greatest Foreign

Policy Tragedy)

(Musings On Iraq review of Shaping the Plan for Operation Iraqi Freedom, The Role of Military Intelligence Assessment)

 

Apr 21 Telegraph reported Iraq supported Ansar al-Islam Al Qaeda affiliate in Kurdistan

(Musings On Iraq Why Didn’t Bush Strike Zarqawi And Ansar al-Islam In 2002?)

 

Apr 23 Pentagon memo said UN would hold a postwar conference to pick Iraqi leaders like what

happened in Afghanistan Said Iraqi exiles would be put in charge of POW camps for former regime members and would take over Iraqi military Said provisional govt would be set up as quickly as possible so US could withdraw

(Musings On Iraq review Leap of Faith, Hubris Negligence, and America’s Greatest Foreign

Policy Tragedy)

 

Apr 24 Gen Franks me with commanders in Qatar Said they needed to start war

            preparations

(Musings On Iraq review Leap of Faith, Hubris Negligence, and America’s Greatest Foreign

Policy Tragedy)

(Musings On Iraq review of Shaping the Plan for Operation Iraqi Freedom, The Role of Military Intelligence Assessment)

 

Apr 25 Foreign Secretary Straw said UK had to stand up to “bullies” like Saddam

Apr 25 IAEA report that during inspections in 1990s Iraq’s nuclear program was

            dismantled and no ability to produce nuke material

(Musings On Iraq UN Inspectors Were Right Iraq Was Not A Threat)

(Musings On Iraq Iraq’s Rejection of UN Inspectors Led To Mistrust Over WMD and 2003 Invasion)

(Musings On Iraq How US Intelligence Created An Iraqi Nuclear Threat In 2002)

 

Apr 28 US military leaked story to NYTimes that Iraq invasion could use a force as small

            as 70,000 Was push back against Rumsfelds small invasion force

(Musings On Iraq How Arguments Over Iraq Invasion Plan Were Fought Through Press Leaks)

(Musings On Iraq review Plan of Attack: The Definitive Account Of The Decision To Invade

Iraq)

 

Apr 29 Pentagon official said 9/11 hijacker met with Iraqi intel officer in Prague

            Didn’t happen

 

May 1 Bush told Press Sec Fleischer he didn’t like “motherfuckers” like Saddam who gassed their

own people and “assholes” who lied to the world Said he was going to kick Saddam’s ass

(Musings On Iraq review Leap of Faith, Hubris Negligence, and America’s Greatest Foreign

Policy Tragedy)

(Musings On Iraq Review Hubris, The Inside Story of Spin, Scandal, And The Selling Of The Iraq War)

(Musings On Iraq review The Bush Administrations and Saddam Hussein, Deciding on Conflict)

May 1 FBI and CIA told media 9/11 hijacker Atta did not meet Iraqi intel in Prague April

            2001

 

May 8 UK Foreign Secretary Straw told Secretary of State Powell if Bush decided on

            military action against Iraq Blair would back him

(Musings On Iraq Review The Report of the Iraq Inquiry, Executive Summary)

(Musings On Iraq Chilcot Report Volume 2 Sec 3.3 Development of UK Iraq Strategy and Options April to July 2002)

 

May 9 Gen Franks ordered commanders to plan for including Turkey in Iraq invasion plans Franks

didn’t believe Ankara would agree to allow US troops to use country for invasion but needed to plan for it

May 9 Pentagon memo to Rumsfeld said that US had to pick who would fill vacuum after Saddam

Said Iraqi opposition would help

(Musings On Iraq review Leap of Faith, Hubris Negligence, and America’s Greatest Foreign

Policy Tragedy)

 

May 10 Gen Franks discussed war plans with Rumsfeld who was afraid Iraq might take initiative

            and launch a pre-emptive attack

(Musings On Iraq review Leap of Faith, Hubris Negligence, and America’s Greatest Foreign

Policy Tragedy)

(Musings On Iraq review of Shaping the Plan for Operation Iraqi Freedom, The Role of Military Intelligence Assessment)

May 10 Gen Franks briefed NSC on Middle Eastern countries and their role in invasion plans

May 10 CIA briefing book on Iraq’s WMD mentioned Iraq-Niger uranium deal

(Musings On Iraq How US Intelligence Failed The Iraq-Niger Uranium Story)

(Musings On Iraq Review Hubris, The Inside Story of Spin, Scandal, And The Selling Of The Iraq War)

 

May 11 Gen Franks briefed Bush on war plans at Camp David Said he would attack Iraq on 5

fronts: west for special operations south would be main invasion front from Kuwait north would be Turkey if it agreed to be involved center would be Baghdad attacked by air strikes and last would be information campaign

(Musings On Iraq review Leap of Faith, Hubris Negligence, and America’s Greatest Foreign

Policy Tragedy)

(Musings On Iraq review of Shaping the Plan for Operation Iraqi Freedom, The Role of Military Intelligence Assessment)

 

May 13 Defense Secretary Rumsfeld said US didn’t need to connect Iraq and 9/11 to go to

            war Said main reason was WMD

(Musings On Iraq review Iraq’s Future The aftermath of regime change)

(Musings On Iraq review Wanting War: Why the Bush Administration Invaded Iraq)

(Musings On Iraq review Leap of Faith, Hubris Negligence, and America’s Greatest Foreign

Policy Tragedy)

 

May 14 UN Resolution 1409 created smart sanctions on Iraq to try to limit military and

            WMD related imports but increased civilian imports

 

May 17 PM Blair’s foreign policy adv Manning told Natl Sec Adv Rice that they had to get weapons

inspections back into Iraq to garner public support for any war

(Musings On Iraq Chilcot Report Volume 2 Sec 3.3 Development of UK Iraq Strategy and Options April to July 2002)

(Musings On Iraq Review The Report of the Iraq Inquiry, Executive Summary)

 

May 18 British govt issued order to prepare for military action against Iraq

 

May 20 Rumsfeld asked Gen Franks to plan for a fortress Baghdad scenario where

            Saddam would withdraw all his forces into capital for an urban battle

 

May 21 Gen Franks lied to press saying he had no Iraq war plans and had not been asked to make

any Franks had been working on war plans since Nov 2001

(Musings On Iraq review Leap of Faith, Hubris Negligence, and America’s Greatest Foreign

Policy Tragedy)

(Musings On Iraq review of Shaping the Plan for Operation Iraqi Freedom, The Role of Military Intelligence Assessment)

 

May 23 During trip to Germany Bush said he had no Iraq war plans Part of strategy to work on war

plans while publicly denying it

(Musings On Iraq review Leap of Faith, Hubris Negligence, and America’s Greatest Foreign

Policy Tragedy)

(Musings On Iraq review of Shaping the Plan for Operation Iraqi Freedom, The Role of Military Intelligence Assessment)

(Musings On Iraq Review Hubris, The Inside Story of Spin, Scandal, And The Selling Of The Iraq War)

(Musings On Iraq review The Bush Administrations and Saddam Hussein, Deciding on Conflict)

(Musings On Iraq review Plan of Attack: The Definitive Account Of The Decision To Invade

Iraq)

 

May 24 Rumsfeld issued order to Joint Chiefs to begin Phase Four postwar planning for Iraq

(Musings On Iraq Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction’s “Hard Lessons” – Part I: Planning for Postwar Iraq September 2001 to May 2003)

(Musings On Iraq review of Shaping the Plan for Operation Iraqi Freedom, The Role of Military Intelligence Assessment)

(Musings On Iraq review Leap of Faith, Hubris Negligence, and America’s Greatest Foreign

Policy Tragedy)

(Musings On Iraq review Hard Lessons, The Iraq Reconstruction Experience)

 

May 26 During trip to France Bush said he had no Iraq war plans Part of strategy to work on war

plans while publicly denying it 

(Musings On Iraq review of Shaping the Plan for Operation Iraqi Freedom, The Role of Military Intelligence Assessment)

(Musings On Iraq review Leap of Faith, Hubris Negligence, and America’s Greatest Foreign

Policy Tragedy)

(Musings On Iraq Review Hubris, The Inside Story of Spin, Scandal, And The Selling Of The Iraq War)

(Musings On Iraq review The Bush Administrations and Saddam Hussein, Deciding on Conflict)

(Musings On Iraq review Plan of Attack: The Definitive Account Of The Decision To Invade

Iraq)

 

May 29 UK Def Min official Kelly said Blair govt had spun WMD dossier on Iraq

 

Jun 1 Bush gave speech at West Point arguing for pre-emptive war against rogue

            states because couldn’t be contained

(Musings On Iraq review America at the Crossroads, Democracy, Power, and the Neoconservative Legacy)

Jun 1 Bush told Natl Sec Adv Rice “Fuck Saddam. we’re taking him out”

(Musings On Iraq review Iraq’s Future The aftermath of regime change)

(Musings On Iraq review Wanting War: Why the Bush Administration Invaded Iraq)

(Musings On Iraq review Leap of Faith, Hubris Negligence, and America’s Greatest Foreign

Policy Tragedy)

(Musings On Iraq Review Hubris, The Inside Story of Spin, Scandal, And The Selling Of The Iraq War)

(Musings On Iraq review The Bush Administrations and Saddam Hussein, Deciding on Conflict)

 

Jun 2 Czech Interior Min claimed 9/11 hijacker Atta went to Prague and met with Iraqi

            intel officer

Jun 2 Iraq arrested Abdul Yasin involved in 1993 World Trade Center bombing

            Conspiracy theorists would later say this was proof Iraq involved in bombing

(Musings On Iraq Laurie Mylroie’s Convoluted Iraq-Terrorism Conspiracy Theory)

(Musings On Iraq Laurie Mylroie’s Iraq Conspiracy Theory Was Debunked By Captured Baath Documents)

Jun 2 60 Minutes aired show on Abdul Rahman Yasin who was involved in 1993 World Trade

Center bombing Fled to Baghdad Conspiracy theorist Laurie Mylroie claimed he was an Iraqi agent and showed Saddam behind attack 60 Minutes found no evidence he was Iraqi agent

 

Jun 3 General Franks briefed Rumsfeld on new Running Start war plan to begin conflict

before all US forces were in theater Rumsfeld liked plan and wanted more on it Franks also talked about dealing with Fortress Baghdad scenario by destroying Iraq’s command and control and attacking Iraqi units outside city to stop them from falling back into capital

(Musings On Iraq review Leap of Faith, Hubris Negligence, and America’s Greatest Foreign

Policy Tragedy)

(Musings On Iraq review of Shaping the Plan for Operation Iraqi Freedom, The Role of Military Intelligence Assessment)

 

Jun 5 Czech envoy to UN claimed 9/11 hijacker Atta met with Iraqi intel officer

            in Prague in 01

Jun 5 Blair told Rumsfeld UK would be with US in any military action against Iraq

(Musings On Iraq Chilcot Report Volume 2 Sec 3.3 Development of UK Iraq Strategy and Options April to July 2002)

(Musings On Iraq Review The Report of the Iraq Inquiry, Executive Summary)

 

Jun 11 Def Sec Rumsfeld said Iraq had chemical weapons and an active nuclear program

(Musings On Iraq How US Intelligence Created An Iraqi Nuclear Threat In 2002)

(Musings On Iraq review What Happened, Inside the Bush White House and Washington’s Culture of Deception)

 

Jun 13 UK Def Min paper said postwar planning needed to be made before taking

            military action against Iraq UK never made plans

(Musings On Iraq Chilcot Report Volume 2 Sec 3.3 Development of UK Iraq Strategy and Options April to July 2002)

(Musings On Iraq Review The Report of the Iraq Inquiry, Executive Summary)

 

Jun 18 CIA Dir Tenet told Congress couldn’t find evidence for story 9/11 hijacker

            Atta met with Iraqi intel officer in Prague in 01

 

Jun 19 US told UK that it was ready for its input on military planning against Iraq

(Musings On Iraq Review The Report of the Iraq Inquiry, Executive Summary)

Jun 19 Gen Franks briefed Bush on war plans

(Musings On Iraq review Leap of Faith, Hubris Negligence, and America’s Greatest Foreign

Policy Tragedy)

(Musings On Iraq review of Shaping the Plan for Operation Iraqi Freedom, The Role of Military Intelligence Assessment)

 

Jun 21 CIA paper on Iraq-Al Qaeda relationship Said two had contacts since mid-90s but

            no evidence of cooperation on terrorism Differences limited relationship

(Musings On Iraq review Leap of Faith, Hubris Negligence, and America’s Greatest Foreign

Policy Tragedy)

 

Jun 26 General Franks met with his commanders in Germany Told them to switch from

original Generated Plan for war with Iraq to new Running Start which would begin conflict before all forces in theater

(Musings On Iraq review of Shaping the Plan for Operation Iraqi Freedom, The Role of Military Intelligence Assessment)

Jun 26 INC memo to Senate Appropriations Committee said group had led to 108 English

articles from Oct 01-May 02 and White House officials had received those products

(Musings On Iraq review Leap of Faith, Hubris Negligence, and America’s Greatest Foreign

Policy Tragedy)

 

Jul 1 Pentagon memo said US should organize Iraqi opposition to help with regime change and fill

vacuum after Saddam Said exiles would help ensure no chaos after invasion Said if US tried to run Iraq without opposition leaders would backfire

(Musings On Iraq review Leap of Faith, Hubris Negligence, and America’s Greatest Foreign

Policy Tragedy)

 

Jul 2 UK Def Min secretary told Blair’s foreign policy adviser Manning US working on

military plans to remove Saddam with no post-war plan and no overall strategy behind it

(Musings On Iraq Chilcot Report Section 3.4 Development of UK Iraq Strategy and Options, Late July to 14 September 2002)

Jul 2 UK Def Min Hoon told Blair he had to push US to think about postwar Iraq

            planning

(Musings On Iraq Chilcot Report Volume 2 Sec 3.3 Development of UK Iraq Strategy and Options April to July 2002)

(Musings On Iraq Review The Report of the Iraq Inquiry, Executive Summary)

 

Jul 5 Supporters of Defense Secretary Rumsfeld leaked a CENTCOM document to the NY

Times stating that US would use air strikes from 8 countries and Special Forces and CIA operatives to carry out covert operations within Iraq to hunt SCUD missiles and WMD

(Musings On Iraq How Arguments Over Iraq Invasion Plan Were Fought Through Press Leaks)

Jul 5 Talks between Iraq and UN in Vienna brokedown over new weapons inspections

(Musings On Iraq UN Inspectors Were Right Iraq Was Not A Threat)

 

Jul 10 Pentagon Defense Policy Board met over Iraq invasion plans Angry military not thinking

            innovatively Wanted generals fired

 

Jul 15 Czech Intel head doubted that 9/11 hijacker Atta met with Iraqi intelligence in Prague in

            2001

Jul 15 Fmr Saddam Fedayeen told press Iraq trained Al Qaeda fighters in Salman Pak False story

 

Jul 16 Blair told parliament Iraq’s WMD threat to world and had to be dealt with but no decision

for military action made

(Musings On Iraq Review The Report of the Iraq Inquiry, Executive Summary)

 

Jul 17 34th anniversary of Baath coup Saddam gave speech saying he would defeat all

            the powerful and evil people arrayed against him

Jul 17 Rumsfeld told Gen Franks that costs for war preparations if completed by 12/1/02

would be around $700 mil US was working to expand airfields in Kuwait and built new fuel distribution system to pre-position fuel in northern Kuwait

Jul 17 Iraq issued arrest warrant for Zarqawi who had been traveling through the

            country from Iran

(Musings On Iraq review Insurgent Iraq, Al Zarqawi and the New Generation)

(Musings On Iraq review ISIS Inside The Army of Terror, Revised & Updated)

 

Jul 19 General Franks presented Running Start war plan to Bush Said four brigades

would be in Kuwait soon with Marine Expeditionary Force in region Two divisions would arrive in 2-3 weeks for a total of 100,000 troops to begin war within 30 days if needed

(Musings On Iraq review Leap of Faith, Hubris Negligence, and America’s Greatest Foreign Policy Tragedy)

(Musings On Iraq review of Shaping the Plan for Operation Iraqi Freedom, The Role of Military Intelligence Assessment)

Jul 19 MI6 head Dearlove said US already decided on military action to remove Saddam

            talk was now about how and when

(Musings On Iraq Chilcot Report Section 3.4 Development of UK Iraq Strategy and Options, Late July to 14 September 2002)

 

Jul 20 CIA Dir Tenet met MI6 Head Dearlove Tenet said WMD intel didn’t matter because war

was inevitable

(Musings On Iraq review Leap of Faith, Hubris Negligence, and America’s Greatest Foreign Policy Tragedy)

 

Jul 22 DIA officer told to start making secret intelligence briefings to Rumsfeld on Iraq-

            Al Qaeda ties based upon request by Deputy Defense Secretary Wolfowitz

(Musings On Iraq review Leap of Faith, Hubris Negligence, and America’s Greatest Foreign Policy Tragedy)

Jul 22 US Energy Dept assessed Iraq trying to buy magnets meeting with scientists Niger

            uranium story showed that Iraq restarted nuclear program

(Musings On Iraq How US Intelligence Failed The Iraq-Niger Uranium Story)

(Musings On Iraq Review Hubris, The Inside Story of Spin, Scandal, And The Selling Of The Iraq War)

(Musings On Iraq How US Intelligence Created An Iraqi Nuclear Threat In 2002)

 

Jul 23 Blair cabinet meeting John Scarlett head of Joint Intel Com said Saddam could only be

removed by invasion Sir Dearlove head of MI6 said Washington decided war was inevitable Bush wanted to justify invasion via terrorism and WMD Said that intelligence and facts were being used to justify invasion Blair’s foreign policy adviser said Iraq was fourth most dangerous country with WMD behind North Korea Iran and Libya Defense Staff head Sir Boyce gave 3 options for British in Iraq 1 Offer bases to US 2 Add air, navy special forces 3 40,000 troops for invasion

(Musings On Iraq Chilcot Report Volume 2 Sec 3.3 Development of UK Iraq Strategy and Options April to July 2002)

(Musings On Iraq Chilcot Report Section 3.4 Development of UK Iraq Strategy and Options, Late July to 14 September 2002)

(Musings On Iraq Review The Report of the Iraq Inquiry, Executive Summary)

 

Jul 24 Kurds claimed Iraq coordinating with Ansar al-Islam and Al Qaeda in pre-invasion

            propaganda campaign

(Musings On Iraq Why Didn’t Bush Strike Zarqawi And Ansar al-Islam In 2002?)

 

Jul 28 Blair told Bush UK would be with US on Iraq but had to consider difficulties

            and work on politics of war

(Musings On Iraq Chilcot Report Volume 2 Sec 3.3 Development of UK Iraq Strategy and Options April to July 2002)

(Musings On Iraq Chilcot Report Section 3.4 Development of UK Iraq Strategy and Options, Late July to 14 September 2002)

(Musings On Iraq Review The Report of the Iraq Inquiry, Executive Summary)

Jul 28 Washington Post article on Iraq war plans Claimed many in military wanted to

            contain Iraq

 

Jul 29 Blair’s foreign policy adv Manning told Rice UK with US against Iraq but had

            to go through UN

(Musings On Iraq Chilcot Report Volume 2 Sec 3.3 Development of UK Iraq Strategy and Options April to July 2002)

(Musings On Iraq Chilcot Report Section 3.4 Development of UK Iraq Strategy and Options, Late July to 14 September 2002)

(Musings On Iraq Review The Report of the Iraq Inquiry, Executive Summary)

Jul 29 NY Times article on Iraq war planning Mentioned General Franks plans for

            dealing with Baghdad

(Musings On Iraq How Arguments Over Iraq Invasion Plan Were Fought Through Press Leaks)

 

Jul 30 Blair’s foreign policy adviser Manning told Bush UK with US against Iraq but had

            to go through UN

Jul 30 UK attorney general Goldsmith told Blair without U.N. resolution war against

            Iraq illegal

(Musings On Iraq Chilcot Report Volume 2 Sec 3.3 Development of UK Iraq Strategy and Options April to July 2002)

(Musings On Iraq Chilcot Report Section 3.4 Development of UK Iraq Strategy and Options, Late July to 14 September 2002)

(Musings On Iraq Review The Report of the Iraq Inquiry, Executive Summary)

Jul 30 Pres Chirac said that Germany and France would only support an invasion of Iraq

            if backed by a UN resolution

Jul 30 Fmr head UN inspector Ekeus said US manipulated 90s inspections to spy on Iraqi

security services and find location of Saddam Said US wanted to create crises to justify attacks on Iraq

(Musings On Iraq UN Inspectors and CIA Spying On Iraq In The 90s)

 

Jul 31 Iraq Foreign Minister Sabri said Baghdad rejected return of UN inspectors Said they

            would just collect intel for U.S. strikes

(Musings On Iraq UN Inspectors Were Right Iraq Was Not A Threat)

(Musings On Iraq Iraq’s Rejection of UN Inspectors Led To Mistrust Over WMD and 2003 Invasion)

Jul 31 Bush said US goal was regime change but denied any war plans were on his desk Part of

strategy to work on war plans while publicly denying it

(Musings On Iraq review Wanting War: Why the Bush Administration Invaded Iraq)

(Musings On Iraq review Leap of Faith, Hubris Negligence, and America’s Greatest Foreign

Policy Tragedy)

(Musings On Iraq Review Hubris, The Inside Story of Spin, Scandal, And The Selling Of The Iraq War)

(Musings On Iraq review The Bush Administrations and Saddam Hussein, Deciding on Conflict)

(Musings On Iraq review Plan of Attack: The Definitive Account Of The Decision To Invade

Iraq)

Jul 31 Senate Foreign Relations Committee began hearing on Iraq invasion

Jul 31 Rumsfeld told Senate Committee time helped Saddam erode sanctions and spread

            terrorism

Jul 31 NSA had drill on Iraq Found it had little signals intel on country

Jul 31 Report Iraq working on nuclear program Quoted David Kay former UN inspector

and INC defectors Khidir Hamza and Adnan Haideri May 02 Haideri labeled fabricator by DIA

(Musings On Iraq How US Intelligence Created An Iraqi Nuclear Threat In 2002)

Jul 31 INC defector ex-nuke scientist Hamza testified to Senate Foreign Relations

            Committee claiming Iraq only lacked uranium to build nuke bomb in 1994

Jul 31 Iraq conspiracy theorist Mylroie interviewed on CNN Said Bush was going to

invade Iraq because of WMD and its ties to terrorism including 9/11 Accused CIA of covering up Iraq’s involvement in 9/11 Said INC should run Iraq after war

(Musings On Iraq Laurie Mylroie’s Convoluted Iraq-Terrorism Conspiracy Theory)

(Musings On Iraq Laurie Mylroie’s Iraq Conspiracy Theory Was Debunked By Captured Baath Documents)

(Musings On Iraq review Losing Iraq, Inside The Post War Reconstruction Fiasco)

 

Aug 1 Senate Foreign Relations Committee began hearings on possible postwar Iraq

Scenarios Senator Biden warned that unless US gained international support it could spend $70-$80 bil rebuilding Iraq

(Musings On Iraq review Leap of Faith, Hubris Negligence, and America’s Greatest Foreign Policy Tragedy)

Aug 1 Iraq invited Chief UN Inspector Blix to Baghdad for talks about new inspection

            regime

(Musings On Iraq UN Inspectors Were Right Iraq Was Not A Threat)

(Musings On Iraq Iraq’s Rejection of UN Inspectors Led To Mistrust Over WMD and 2003 Invasion)

Aug 1 CIA made 1st paper explaining assessment of aluminum tubes Said they were for

            nuclear program Said high specifications showed they were for centrifuges

(Musings On Iraq How A Contested Aluminum Tubes Story Became The Basis For War With Iraq)

Aug 1 Clinton’s National Security Adviser Sandy Berger OpEd in Washington Post said

just because U.S. could overthrow Iraq didn't mean it should do it Berger said power did not mean legitimacy

 

Aug 2 DIA report on debate over aluminum tubes Iraq tried to buy DIA sided with CIA

            that tubes were for centrifuges Said matched 1950s German centrifuge design

(Musings On Iraq How A Contested Aluminum Tubes Story Became The Basis For War With Iraq)

 

Aug 4 Under Secretary of Defense for Arms Control Bolton told BBC US didn’t care

            whether new UN inspections happened because goal was regime change in Iraq

(Musings On Iraq review Wanting War: Why the Bush Administration Invaded Iraq)

(Musings On Iraq UN Inspectors Were Right Iraq Was Not A Threat)

(Musings On Iraq Iraq’s Rejection of UN Inspectors Led To Mistrust Over WMD and 2003 Invasion)

Aug 4 Head of President’s Foreign Intel Board and Frm Natl Sec Adv Scowcroft gave TV interview

saying US should not invade Iraq Said would undermine war on terror and throw Middle East into turmoil Said UN inspectors should deal with Iraq’s WMD

 

Aug 5 Secretary of State Powell told Bush that Iraq invasion would dominate 1st term

and US would be responsible for Iraq afterward Said US had to go through UN to disarm Iraq and build international Coalition Bush said he wanted a coalition

(Musings On Iraq Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction’s “Hard Lessons” – Part I: Planning for Postwar Iraq September 2001 to May 2003)

(Musings On Iraq review Leap of Faith, Hubris Negligence, and America’s Greatest Foreign

Policy Tragedy)

(Musings On Iraq review Bush At War)

(Musings On Iraq review Plan of Attack: The Definitive Account Of The Decision To Invade

Iraq)

(Musings On Iraq review Losing Iraq, Inside The Post War Reconstruction Fiasco)

Aug 5 CENTCOM cmdr Gen Franks briefed Bush on latest version of Iraq war plan Had

original Generated Start plan Running Start which would have quicker build up and new Hybrid Plan which would be immediate start to war Franks said there was no postwar plan and he wanted to withdraw US forces as quickly as possible

Aug 5 Report Bush official said 9/11 hijacker Atta met with Iraqi intel in Prague in 2001

 

Aug 6 National Security Adviser Rice called Secretary of State Powell and told him he did a

great job with Bush Said there should be more discussions on what Iraq policy should be

(Musings On Iraq review Leap of Faith, Hubris Negligence, and America’s Greatest Foreign

Policy Tragedy)

Aug 6 General Franks told his commanders to switch to Hybrid War Plan

Aug 6 White House Chief of Staff Card called Powell asking for same briefing on Iraq

            he’d given Bush day before

Aug 6 Natl Sec Adv Rice paper Liberation Strategy for Iraq Said goal was to transform Iraq into a

democracy Had no strategy on how to achieve that Said when US overthrew Saddam can’t act like an invader Had to pose war as a liberation of the Iraqi people Same time US would have to stay in Iraq for many years

(Musings On Iraq review What Happened, Inside the Bush White House and Washington’s Culture of Deception)

(Musings On Iraq review Fiasco: The American Military Adventure In Iraq)

(Musings On Iraq review Plan of Attack: The Definitive Account Of The Decision To Invade

Iraq)

(Musings On Iraq review The Assassins’ Gate, America In Iraq)

(Musings On Iraq review State of Denial, Bush At War, Part III)

(Musings On Iraq review Hard Lessons, The Iraq Reconstruction Experience)

 

Aug 7 VP Cheney said he was skeptical UN inspectors would find anything in Iraq Said

            Iraq could get a nuclear bomb soon

(Musings On Iraq UN Inspectors Were Right Iraq Was Not A Threat)

(Musings On Iraq How US Intelligence Created An Iraqi Nuclear Threat In 2002)

 

Aug 8 House Majority Leader Armey said that if US didn’t have provocation it would

            not have international support for action vs Iraq

Aug 8 PUK KDP INC SCIRI met with Def Sec Rumsfeld and advocated for regime change and

talked about postwar governance INC wanted exiles to endorse Chalabi as leader

(Musings On Iraq review The Man Who Pushed America To War, The Extraordinary Life, Adventures, and Obsessions of Ahmad Chalabi)

(Musings On Iraq review Arrows of the Night: Ahmad Chalabi and the Selling of the Iraq War)

 

Aug 9 Defense Policy Board member Richard Perle said that removing Saddam would lead to more

            peaceful and stable Middle East

(Musings On Iraq review Wanting War: Why the Bush Administration Invaded Iraq)

(Musings On Iraq review Losing Iraq, Inside The Post War Reconstruction Fiasco)

Aug 9 Def Sec Rumsfeld at White House meeting said that US would not occupy Iraq for a long

time and shouldn’t promote democracy

(Musings On Iraq review Liberate And Leave, Fatal Flaws In The Early Strategy For Postwar Iraq)

Aug 9 After White House meeting UnderSecDef Feith told Def Sec Rumsfeld he should not be so

critical of creating a democracy in Iraq Rumsfeld said building democracy complex and not just holding an election

(Musings On Iraq review Leap of Faith, Hubris Negligence, and America’s Greatest Foreign

Policy Tragedy)

(Musings On Iraq review The Assassins’ Gate, America In Iraq)

Aug 9 Ahmed Chalabi convinced Ayatollah Hakim to join opposition meeting in Wash DC Would

help cement ISCI as one of parties US would work with after 03 invasion Also helped Chalabi’s standing in Iran

(Musings On Iraq review Arrows of the Night: Ahmad Chalabi and the Selling of the Iraq War)

 

Aug 10 Clinton’s National Security Adviser Sandy Berger OpEd in Washington Post said just

because U.S. could overthrow Iraq didn't mean it should do it Said power did not mean legitimacy

 

Aug 12 Iraq invasion plans leaked to Time Supported Rumsfeld’s ideas of a small force

or supporting an Iraqi revolt Rumsfeld allies told Time that Iraq would be simple and quick and that US military questioned using a large invasion force

(Musings On Iraq How Arguments Over Iraq Invasion Plan Were Fought Through Press Leaks)

(Musings On Iraq review Shaping the Plan for Operation Iraqi Freedom, The Role of Military Intelligence Assessment)

(Musings On Iraq review Liberate And Leave, Fatal Flaws In The Early Strategy For Postwar Iraq)

Aug 12 Kissinger OpEd in Washington Post Said he supported Bush for confronting

            Saddam but needed to build domestic and international support

Aug 12 UnderSecDef Feith sent Rumsfeld memo to create an exile armed force to help with

invasion 6,000 names submitted 600 passed vetting Only 76 graduated

Aug 12 UK Defense Min report to Blair Bush had authorized military for action against Iraq

(Musings On Iraq Chilcot Report Section 3.4 Development of UK Iraq Strategy and Options, Late July to 14 September 2002)

 

Aug 13 Gen Franks briefed Rumsfeld on progress with Hybrid war plan

(Musings On Iraq review Leap of Faith, Hubris Negligence, and America’s Greatest Foreign

Policy Tragedy)

(Musings On Iraq review of Shaping the Plan for Operation Iraqi Freedom, The Role of Military Intelligence Assessment)

 

Aug 14 National Security Presidential Directive included liberating people of Iraq and spreading

            democracy

(Musings On Iraq review What Happened, Inside the Bush White House and Washington’s Culture of Deception)

(Musings On Iraq review Iraq’s Future The aftermath of regime change)

(Musings On Iraq review Leap of Faith, Hubris Negligence, and America’s Greatest Foreign

Policy Tragedy)

(Musings On Iraq review Wanting War: Why the Bush Administration Invaded Iraq)

(Musings On Iraq review Fiasco: The American Military Adventure In Iraq)

(Musings On Iraq review The Assassins’ Gate, America In Iraq)

Aug 14 NSC meeting Powell said US had to build coalition against Iraq Said Bush should

address Iraq in his UN speech on 9/12/02 Cheney said Bush’s UN speech should attack organization for inaction on Iraq Rice agreed with both

 

Aug 15 National Security Adviser Rice said US needed to launch pre-emptive strike

            against Iraq before it got too strong

(Musings On Iraq review America at the Crossroads, Democracy, Power, and the Neoconservative Legacy)

(Musings On Iraq review Wanting War: Why the Bush Administration Invaded Iraq)

(Musings On Iraq review Leap of Faith, Hubris Negligence, and America’s Greatest Foreign Policy Tragedy)

Aug 15 Undersecretary of Defense for Policy Feith’s office briefed CIA officials on its

            findings that Iraq and Al Qaeda had cooperated for years

Aug 15 1st President Bush’s National Security Adviser Scowcroft wrote Wall St

            Journal OpEd saying Saddam not threat to US and not connected to 9/11

Aug 15 Powell called Scowcroft thanking him for OpEd saying it would help for

            arguments within administration over Iraq

Aug 15 Dep head of UK embassy to US wrote that White House talking about when war would start

not if it would happen

(Musings On Iraq Chilcot Report Section 3.4 Development of UK Iraq Strategy and Options, Late July to 14 September 2002)

 

Aug 16 NSC meeting Powell argued for going to UN for new resolution on Iraq Bush

            agreed

Aug 16 Member of Undersecretary of Defense for Policy Feith’s office claimed its

Aug 15 briefing convinced CIA Director Tenet to reconsider Iraq-Al Qaeda relationship Tenet denied that saying the briefing had provided nothing new CIA’s intelligence said Iraq and Al Qaeda had connections but no cooperation which Feith’s office claimed

 

Aug 17 Pentagon memo argued against State suggestion that US would have to run Iraq after

invasion State didn’t think Iraqi exiles could run Iraq Said agreed exiles had problems but US had to push them to prepare for the challenge Rejected a US occupation and said Iraq invasion should be like invasion of France in WWII when US fought with French forces to liberate their country Said were many bad elements in Iraq like radical Shiites communists Wahabis Al Qaeda that could fill vacuum after war so US had to put exiles into power

(Musings On Iraq review Leap of Faith, Hubris Negligence, and America’s Greatest Foreign

Policy Tragedy)

(Musings On Iraq review Fiasco: The American Military Adventure In Iraq)

(Musings On Iraq review Losing Iraq, Inside The Post War Reconstruction Fiasco)

 

Aug 17 Iraq intelligence issued order to keep an eye out for Abu Musab al-Zarqawi

(Musings On Iraq review Insurgent Iraq, Al Zarqawi and the New Generation)

(Musings On Iraq review ISIS Inside The Army of Terror, Revised & Updated)

Aug 17 CIA made 1st paper explaining assessment of aluminum tubes Said they were for

            nuclear program Said high specifications showed they were for centrifuges

(Musings On Iraq How A Contested Aluminum Tubes Story Became The Basis For War With Iraq)

 

Aug 20 Def Sec Rumsfeld said Al Qaeda operatives were in Iraq and that US needed to launch

            pre-emptive strike because couldn't wait for Iraq to get stronger

(Musings On Iraq review America at the Crossroads, Democracy, Power, and the Neoconservative Legacy)

(Musings On Iraq review Wanting War: Why the Bush Administration Invaded Iraq)

(Musings On Iraq review Leap of Faith, Hubris Negligence, and America’s Greatest Foreign Policy

Tragedy)

(Musings On Iraq review What Happened, Inside the Bush White House and Washington’s Culture of Deception)

Aug 20 Undersecretary of Defense for Policy Feith’s Policy Counterterrorism Evaluation

Group met with CIA to discuss Iraq-Al Qaeda ties Complained CIA didn’t believe Iraq involved in 9/11 Brought up story that 9/11 hijacker Atta met with Iraqi intelligence in Prague in 2001 

(Musings On Iraq review Leap of Faith, Hubris Negligence, and America’s Greatest Foreign

Policy Tragedy)

 

Aug 21 Bush told press he had patience on Iraq and was thinking of all the options Part of strategy

to privately work on war plans while publicly denying it

(Musings On Iraq review Leap of Faith, Hubris Negligence, and America’s Greatest Foreign

Policy Tragedy)

(Musings On Iraq Review Hubris, The Inside Story of Spin, Scandal, And The Selling Of The Iraq War)

(Musings On Iraq review The Bush Administrations and Saddam Hussein, Deciding on Conflict)

(Musings On Iraq review Plan of Attack: The Definitive Account Of The Decision To Invade

Iraq)

 

Aug 23 UK intel said it knew little about Iraq’s WMD since 1988

(Musings On Iraq Review The Report of the Iraq Inquiry, Executive Summary)

 

Aug 25 James Baker OpEd in New York Times said US needed UN resolution that Iraq

submit to inspections anytime Said US needed to be explicit that if Iraq avoided the inspections US would invade and change the govt

 

Aug 26 VP Cheney speech called Iraq a mortal threat to US Said no doubt that Iraq had WMD and

that it was good at deceiving weapons inspectors Claimed Iraqi defectors like Hussein Kamal proved Iraq had renewed its nuclear program Kamal actually said Iraq had ended its nuclear program in the 1990s and was killed in 1996 so had no way to know what Iraq was doing in 2002

(Musings On Iraq review What Happened, Inside the Bush White House and Washington’s Culture of Deception)

(Musings On Iraq review Iraq’s Future The aftermath of regime change)

(Musings On Iraq review Wanting War: Why the Bush Administration Invaded Iraq)

(Musings On Iraq review Leap of Faith, Hubris Negligence, and America’s Greatest Foreign

Policy Tragedy)

(Musings On Iraq UN Inspectors Were Right Iraq Was Not A Threat)

(Musings On Iraq Iraq’s Rejection of UN Inspectors Led To Mistrust Over WMD and 2003 Invasion)

Aug 26 Sec State Powell argued that US had to go through UN to deal with Iraq at National

Security Council

(Musings On Iraq review Losing Iraq, Inside The Post War Reconstruction Fiasco)

 

Aug 27 Cheney gave speech calling Saddam a threat that needed a pre-emptive strike to

            remove him

(Musings On Iraq review America at the Crossroads, Democracy, Power, and the Neoconservative Legacy)

(Musings On Iraq review Wanting War: Why the Bush Administration Invaded Iraq)

(Musings On Iraq review Leap of Faith, Hubris Negligence, and America’s Greatest Foreign Policy Tragedy)

Aug 27 Hosni Mubarak said that Arab League opposed invasion of Iraq

 

Aug 28 Def Policy Board’s Ken Adelman Wall St Journal OpEd Said Saddam worse

threat than Al Qaeda Argued UN not the answer and everyday delaying removing Saddam was a danger to US

(Musings On Iraq review Wanting War: Why the Bush Administration Invaded Iraq)

 

Aug 29 Bush signed Iraq: Goals, Objectives, Strategy that said US would use all means to remove

Saddam Said US would work with Iraqi exiles and not occupy Iraq Would build democracy in Iraq and help rebuild country Contradicted Pentagon’s vision of postwar Iraq that wouldn’t include rebuilding

(Musings On Iraq review of Shaping the Plan for Operation Iraqi Freedom, The Role of Military Intelligence Assessment)

(Musings On Iraq review Wanting War: Why the Bush Administration Invaded Iraq)

(Musings On Iraq review Leap of Faith, Hubris Negligence, and America’s Greatest Foreign

Policy Tragedy)

(Musings On Iraq Review Hubris, The Inside Story of Spin, Scandal, And The Selling Of The Iraq War)

(Musings On Iraq review The Bush Administrations and Saddam Hussein, Deciding on Conflict)

Aug 29 Bush’s Iraq: Goals, Objectives, Strategy led CENTCOM to start postwar planning Was never

a priority

(Musings On Iraq review Hard Lessons, The Iraq Reconstruction Experience)

Aug 29 Bush and Blair talked about tough UN resolution on Iraq disarmament and how

            Saddam wouldn't comply leading to conflict

(Musings On Iraq Chilcot Report Section 3.4 Development of UK Iraq Strategy and Options, Late July to 14 September 2002)

Aug 29 Cheney spoke at Veterans of Korea War about Iraq threat Said Iraqis would

            welcome US invasion with joy

Aug 29 UK Foreign Office paper said rebuilding Iraq would be a long and costly affair

(Musings On Iraq Review The Report of the Iraq Inquiry, Executive Summary)

Aug 29 IAEA spokesman in London Times No evidence Iraq rebuilding nuclear

            facilities Would be easy to find by spy satellites

(Musings On Iraq How US Intelligence Created An Iraqi Nuclear Threat In 2002)

Aug 29 Chirac said France opposed unilateral and pre-emptive action by U.S. against Iraq

 

Aug 30 Blair decided UK strategy would be to get UN to issue resolution that would

            give ultimatum to Iraq on inspectors or else

(Musings On Iraq Chilcot Report Section 3.4 Development of UK Iraq Strategy and Options, Late July to 14 September 2002)

(Musings On Iraq Review The Report of the Iraq Inquiry, Executive Summary)

(Musings On Iraq UN Inspectors Were Right Iraq Was Not A Threat)

(Musings On Iraq Iraq’s Rejection of UN Inspectors Led To Mistrust Over WMD and 2003 Invasion)

 

Sep 1 Fmr Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger said that he was scared that Richard

Perle and Paul Wolfowitz were arguing that Iraq invasion would be easy Said he was scared that U.S. would get bogged down in Iraq because hadn’t planned for it well

(Musings On Iraq review Fiasco: The American Military Adventure In Iraq)

 

Sep 2 Bush told Blair Iraq had WMD and unclear how quickly it could get nukes

Sep 2 NSC met to discuss how to approach UN on Iraq Powell wanted new inspections

            Cheney said that would be useless Bush decided to ask for new inspections

(Musings On Iraq review Losing Iraq, Inside The Post War Reconstruction Fiasco)

(Musings On Iraq UN Inspectors Were Right Iraq Was Not A Threat)

(Musings On Iraq Iraq’s Rejection of UN Inspectors Led To Mistrust Over WMD and 2003 Invasion)

Sep 2 Bush told NSC he wanted Congressional resolution for use of force vs Iraq

            Thought it would be easy with elections coming

(Musings On Iraq review Leap of Faith, Hubris Negligence, and America’s Greatest Foreign Policy Tragedy)

 

Sep 3 White House Iraq Group met for 1st time Decided on 1st propaganda campaign to promote

war with argument Iraq could get a nuclear bomb and the smoking gun could be a mushroom cloud Campaign started Sep 8

(Musings On Iraq review Leap of Faith, Hubris Negligence, and America’s Greatest Foreign

Policy Tragedy)

Sep 3 White House Iraq Group decided to ask for Congressional resolution of force vs Iraq before

midterm elections

Sep 3 Iraqi opposition met with US officials in London to draft part of Future of Iraq Project

Sep 3 Blair press conference said Saddam threat because of WMD that had to be

            dealt with

(Musings On Iraq Review The Report of the Iraq Inquiry, Executive Summary)

Sep 3 UK Amb to UN warned that body did not believe in using force against Iraq

(Musings On Iraq Chilcot Report Section 3.4 Development of UK Iraq Strategy and Options, Late July to 14 September 2002)

Sep 3 Abu Zubayda former Al Qaeda chief of operations told interrogators bin Laden against alliance

with Iraq but open to informal cooperation Zubaydah not bin Laden pushed ties with Iraq

 

Sep 4 Bush met with Congressional leaders to lobby for resolution on use of force

vs Iraq Many were receptive to idea House majority leader Dick Armey told Bush if he invaded Iraq US would be stuck in a quagmire 

(Musings On Iraq review Leap of Faith, Hubris Negligence, and America’s Greatest Foreign Policy Tragedy)

(Musings On Iraq Review Hubris, The Inside Story of Spin, Scandal, And The Selling Of The Iraq War)

(Musings On Iraq review The Bush Administrations and Saddam Hussein, Deciding on Conflict)

Sep 4 Rumsfeld briefed large number of Congressmen on Iraq He wasn’t prepared and

            wouldn’t divulge any info on threat

Sep 4 Bush sent letter to Speaker of House saying US had to deal with disarming Iraq

Sep 4 Rep Ike Skelton wrote letter to Pres Bush “To win victory is easy, to preserve its

            fruits, difficult”

Sep 4 UK Defense Ministry paper said that US had no clear postwar strategy for Iraq

            and that meant no winning plan

(Musings On Iraq Review The Report of the Iraq Inquiry, Executive Summary)

(Musings On Iraq review Fiasco: The American Military Adventure In Iraq)

Sep 4 Blair told Foreign Secretary Cook Iraq’s army depleted so he was trying to get

            nuclear weapons

Sep 4 UK Foreign Office memo Would be very hard to get UN to vote on any resolution setting

            ultimatum for Iraq to comply with weapons inspections or face consequences

(Musings On Iraq Chilcot Report Section 3.4 Development of UK Iraq Strategy and Options, Late July to 14 September 2002)

(Musings On Iraq Chilcot Report Section 3.5 Development of UK Strategy and Options September to November 2002 – Negotiation of Resolution 1441)

Sep 4 Report on whether Iraq working on nuclear program or not Quoted INC defector

ex-nuke scientist Hamza who claimed Iraq could have a bomb by 2005 Reporters taken to nuclear facility at al Qaim and was destroyed

(Musings On Iraq How US Intelligence Created An Iraqi Nuclear Threat In 2002)

(Musings On Iraq review Hoodwinked, The Documents That Reveal How Bush Sold Us a War)

Sep 4 Germany’s Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder ruled out German participation in any Iraq

            war even with UN and EU approval

 

Sep 5 Blair officials met over draft of WMD dossier Said Iraq had capability to produce

WMD Not sure it had made any Discussed WMD dossier Said Iraq had nuclear program but couldn't make weapon with sanctions

Sep 5 Powell called CENTCOM Cmdr Gen Franks saying he was worried not enough

troops planned for invasion Franks told Powell thanks for the advice but US military different from when he served

(Musings On Iraq review Leap of Faith, Hubris Negligence, and America’s Greatest Foreign Policy Tragedy)

Sep 5 Arab League rejected any attack upon Iraq

 

Sep 6 Rumsfeld and Gen Franks briefed Bush and NSC on latest war plans Gen Franks

told Bush and NSC US had been looking for Iraq SCUDs and WMD for 10 yrs and hadn’t found any Gen Franks believed Iraq had WMD but hadn’t found any to target

(Musings On Iraq review Leap of Faith, Hubris Negligence, and America’s Greatest Foreign

Policy Tragedy)

(Musings On Iraq review of Shaping the Plan for Operation Iraqi Freedom, The Role of Military Intelligence Assessment)

(Musings On Iraq Iraq One Of The Worst Intelligence Failures In US History)

Sep 6 NSC met without Bush Cheney argued going to UN was waste of time and said Bush just

needed to give speech at body saying Iraq was a threat Powell argued for new UN resolution on Iraq and warned of consequences of war Cheney said Saddam was a threat and nothing else mattered

(Musings On Iraq review Losing Iraq, Inside The Post War Reconstruction Fiasco)

Sep 6 Putin told Bush skeptical about use of force against Iraq but willing to work on

            new UN resolution demanding inspectors

(Musings On Iraq Chilcot Report Section 3.4 Development of UK Iraq Strategy and Options, Late July to 14 September 2002)

Sep 6 US officials told Knight Ridder no increase in threat from Iraq

Sep 6 UK Treasury Office paper said rebuilding Iraq could cost more than $10 bil

(Musings On Iraq Review The Report of the Iraq Inquiry, Executive Summary)

Sep 6 Report IAEA report found Iraq rebuilding buildings at nuclear site IAEA said no evidence

work had to do with nuclear program but not included in article 

 

Sep 7 NSC meeting debated whether US should go to UN and ask for return of weapons inspectors

Sec State Powell for Cheney against Powell brought up his concerns about size of Iraq invasion force at NSC Cheney argued for 30-60 day ultimatum for Saddam to step down Said Iraq developing WMD so fast US couldn’t wait Briefing book for meeting included argument for invading Iraq, how Iraq would be run after Saddam Lessons learned from occupation of Germany and Japan after WWII

(Musings On Iraq UN Inspectors Were Right Iraq Was Not A Threat)

(Musings On Iraq Iraq’s Rejection of UN Inspectors Led To Mistrust Over WMD and 2003 Invasion)

(Musings On Iraq review Leap of Faith, Hubris Negligence, and America’s Greatest Foreign

Policy Tragedy)

(Musings On Iraq review Losing Iraq, Inside The Post War Reconstruction Fiasco)

Sep 7 Blair and Bush met and decided on new UN resolution demanding new inspections

in Iraq Blair told Bush they should seek 2 UN resolutions 1 for inspectors 2nd for if Iraq didn’t comply Blair said that UK would take part in any military action against Iraq

(Musings On Iraq Review The Report of the Iraq Inquiry, Executive Summary)

(Musings On Iraq Chilcot Report Section 3.4 Development of UK Iraq Strategy and Options, Late July to 14 September 2002)

(Musings On Iraq Chilcot Report Section 3.5 Development of UK Strategy and Options September to November 2002 – Negotiation of Resolution 1441)

Sep 7 Bush and Blair press conference Both said IAEA found Iraq had nuclear program

and was 6 months away from getting a bomb Were referring to 1996 IAEA report during UN inspections not new one

(Musings On Iraq How US Intelligence Created An Iraqi Nuclear Threat In 2002)

 

Sep 8 Day 1 of White House PR campaign about Iraq WMD and nuclear threat

(Musings On Iraq How US Intelligence Created An Iraqi Nuclear Threat In 2002)

(Musings On Iraq Iraq One Of The Worst Intelligence Failures In US History)

(Musings On Iraq review Leap of Faith, Hubris Negligence, and America’s Greatest Foreign Policy

Tragedy)

(Musings On Iraq review What Happened, Inside the Bush White House and Washington’s Culture of Deception)

Sep 8 NY Times article quoted Iraqi defector saying Iraq renewed WMD program Had

large stockpiles 2nd Iraqi defector said Saddam wanted to restart his nuclear program Quoted White House official who said sign of Iraq’s nuclear program may be a mushroom cloud Bush administration leaked story to NY Times that Iraq was trying to buy aluminum tubes for centrifuges for its nuclear program

(Musings On Iraq How A Contested Aluminum Tubes Story Became The Basis For War With Iraq)

Sep 8 National Security Adviser Rice and Vice President Cheney went on TV repeating

claim Iraq rebuilding nuke program Used aluminum tubes as proof and quoted NY Times article on same topic

Sep 8 Defense Secretary Rumsfeld Secretary of State Powell Joint Chiefs head Gen

Myers all appeared on talk shows promoting Iraq as a threat due to WMD and nuke program

Sep 8 1st time admin officials said proof of Iraq’s nuke program “may be a mushroom

cloud” that would be repeated by others later on “Mushroom cloud” line came from White House speechwriter Gerson at a White House Iraq Group meeting

Sep 8 VP Cheney told Meet The Press 9/11 hijacker met with Iraqi intelligence in Prague in

            2001

(Musings On Iraq review What Happened, Inside the Bush White House and Washington’s Culture of Deception)

(Musings On Iraq review The One Percent Doctrine, Deep Inside America’s Pursuit Of Its Enemies Since 9/11)

Sep 8 Ex-Pres Clinton OpEd in Observer said Iraq was a threat but didn’t know if it required an

            invasion

Sep 8 Former UN inspector Scott Ritter addressed Iraq’s parliament Said US about to

launch historically mistaken war on Iraq without presenting hard evidence of its about Ira having WMD and being connected to 9/11

 

Sep 9 UK intel report Iraq probably wouldn’t use WMD without being attacked beforehand

Sep 9 State Dept spokesman mentioned that Iraq tried to buy aluminum tubes for centrifuges for

            nuke program to reporters

(Musings On Iraq How A Contested Aluminum Tubes Story Became The Basis For War With Iraq)

Sep 9 French Pres Chirac told NY Times needed to be 2 UN resolutions 1 on inspectors 2nd if Iraq

didn’t comply and that he didn’t support regime change

(Musings On Iraq Chilcot Report Section 3.4 Development of UK Iraq Strategy and Options, Late July to 14 September 2002)

Sep 9 Iran’s Supreme National Security Council met over impending US invasion of Iraq Decided

            on short and long term policy to protect Tehran’s interests 

(Musings On Iraq Iran’s Policy Towards Iraq)

Sep 9 Iraqi-American doctor from Cleveland went to Iraq for CIA to talk to her brother who

worked on Iraq’s nuke program Brother said program ended in 1991 Doctor one of dozens that talked with relatives in Iraq working on WMD-nuclear programs Info never used in any major reports CIA thought it was part of Iraqi disinformation campaign

(Musings On Iraq review State of War, The Secret History of the CIA and the Bush Administration)

 

Sep 10 Blair speech said Iraq not an imminent threat but had to be dealt with before it

            became one

Sep 10 Draft of UK dossier on Iraq’s WMD included claim Iraq could deploy battlefield

WMD in 45 minutes Came from Iyad Allawi’s Iraqi National Accord Said it had bought large amounts of uranium Had mobile WMD labs

(Musings On Iraq Review The Report of the Iraq Inquiry, Executive Summary)

(Musings On Iraq How Iraqi Defector CURVEBALL Became Basis For US Claims That Iraq Had WMD)

Sep 10 NSC meeting on Bush’s UN speech Rumsfeld and Cheney argued against going

            to UN Draft of speech didn't call for UN action on Iraq

Sep 10 US Intel officers told Wash Post not strong link between Iraq and Al Qaeda

Sep 10 European Commission President Romano Prodi warned that a U.S. unilateral war

            in Iraq would undermine U.S. foreign policy and its anti-terrorism coalition

Sep 10 Iraq took journalists to Tuwaitha site that US claimed was a nuclear facility Were

            shown three empty and broken down buildings

(Musings On Iraq How US Intelligence Created An Iraqi Nuclear Threat In 2002)

 

Sep 11 UK intel report that Iraq was producing WMD 7 days a week in facilities throughout the

country Warned that overthrowing Saddam would increase chances of WMD falling into hands of terrorists and terrorism in general

(Musings On Iraq Review The Report of the Iraq Inquiry, Executive Summary)

Sep 11 Blair said parliament had to discuss Iraq and WMD Said war with Iraq would

increase terrorist threat but Saddam giving WMD to terrorists was a larger concern

Sep 11 Bush told Rice and Powell he would ask for new UN resolution vs Iraq

Sep 11 Bush said he had gotten support from Australian Premier Howard and Spanish

            Pres Aznar for action against Iraq

Sep 11 Senator Graham asked CIA for new National Intelligence Estimate on Iraq

Sep 11 White House asked CIA to clear use of aluminum tubes story for Bush UN speech

(Musings On Iraq How A Contested Aluminum Tubes Story Became The Basis For War With Iraq)

Sep 11 Bush speechwriter Gerson called another speechwriter Gibson that Iraq tried to

buy uranium from Niger and wanted it included in Bush’s UN speech CIA was going to allow Niger claim be used in Bush’s UN speech initially, but then changed mind saying it was single source and unconfirmed

(Musings On Iraq How US Intelligence Failed The Iraq-Niger Uranium Story)

(Musings On Iraq Review Hubris, The Inside Story of Spin, Scandal, And The Selling Of The Iraq War)

 

Sep 12 Bush UN speech Said Iraq growing threat Could build a nuclear bomb within a

            year if got materials Said Iraq tried to buy aluminum tubes for nuke program

(Musings On Iraq How US Intelligence Created An Iraqi Nuclear Threat In 2002)

(Musings On Iraq Iraq One Of The Worst Intelligence Failures In US History)

(Musings On Iraq How A Contested Aluminum Tubes Story Became The Basis For War With Iraq)

(Musings On Iraq review Leap of Faith, Hubris Negligence, and America’s Greatest Foreign Policy

Tragedy)

(Musings On Iraq review What Happened, Inside the Bush White House and Washington’s Culture of Deception)

Sep 12 White House paper Decade of Deception and Defiance Went over Iraq’s human

rights abuses WMD programs Said Iraq had mobile WMD labs Said Iraq tried to buy aluminum tubes for centrifuges for nuclear program Included Dec 01 NY Times report on INC defector Adnan Haideri who claimed he went to secret WMD facilities Haider labeled a fabricator by the DIA in May 2002 but his claims continued to be used Included INC defector Abu Zainab Qairy report that Iraq training terrorists to hijack planes at Salman Pak Story dismissed by CIA

Sep 12 French Foreign Minister said France supported UN resolution on Iraq but UN

            should decide action if Iraq didn’t comply

(Musings On Iraq Chilcot Report Section 3.4 Development of UK Iraq Strategy and Options, Late July to 14 September 2002)

Sep 12 Joint Chiefs issued order to form Free Iraqi Force of Iraqi exiles Wasn’t

            implemented for 5 months

Sep 12 CIA ordered intel community to come up with National Intelligence Estimate on

            Iraq’s WMD and nuclear programs

Sep 12 ABC aired interview with Parisoula Lampsos mistress of Saddam Set up by INC Claimed bin

Laden went to Iraq and got money from Saddam DIA investigated story and found it false

 

Sep 13 Bush said US might only be certain Iraq had a nuclear device when it used one

(Musings On Iraq How US Intelligence Created An Iraqi Nuclear Threat In 2002)

(Musings On Iraq Iraq One Of The Worst Intelligence Failures In US History)

(Musings On Iraq review What Happened, Inside the Bush White House and Washington’s Culture of Deception)

Sep 13 VP Cheney said Iraqis would greet Americans as liberators

Sep 13 US official told Knight Ridder Iraq not close to building bomb to refute Bush’s

            claim day before to UN

Sep 13 NY Times article said majority view within US govt was aluminum tubes Iraq

tried to buy were for centrifuges Said State and Energy Depts dissented on tubes but they were in minority

Sep 13 Report if aluminum tubes Iraq tried to buy were for centrifuges would be first

            step in a long process to produce enriched uranium for a nuclear bomb

Sep 13 Energy Dept issued order forbidding employees to mention aluminum tubes Iraq

            tried to buy with reporters

(Musings On Iraq How A Contested Aluminum Tubes Story Became The Basis For War With Iraq)

 

Sep 14 Bush said Iraq had scientists infrastructure and buying equipment to enrich uranium to

build nuclear bomb in a year

(Musings On Iraq How US Intelligence Created An Iraqi Nuclear Threat In 2002)

(Musings On Iraq review What Happened, Inside the Bush White House and Washington’s Culture of Deception)

Sep 14 Deputies NSC meeting National Intelligence officer for Strategic Programs said US intel

on Iraq’s WMD didn’t justify a war Said NKorea a bigger threat and when that became public White House would have hard time explaining why it went to war Others at meeting said Iran bigger terrorist threat UnderSecDef Feith dismissed their criticisms

(Musings On Iraq Iraq One Of The Worst Intelligence Failures In US History)

(Musings On Iraq review Leap of Faith, Hubris Negligence, and America’s Greatest Foreign

Policy Tragedy)

 

Sep 16 Iraq told UN it would allow new weapons inspections with no conditions

(Musings On Iraq UN Inspectors Were Right Iraq Was Not A Threat)

(Musings On Iraq Iraq’s Rejection of UN Inspectors Led To Mistrust Over WMD and 2003 Invasion)

Sep 16 Undersecretary of Defense for Policy Feith’s office briefed VP Cheney’s chief of staff Libby

and Deputy National Security Adviser Hadley on Iraq-Al Qaeda connection Claimed over two dozen high-level meetings between two for more than a decade Claimed Iraq played role in 9/11 Said 1 hijacker given money by Iraq Said hijacker Atta met twice with Iraqi intelligence

(Musings On Iraq review Leap of Faith, Hubris Negligence, and America’s Greatest Foreign

Policy Tragedy)

Sep 16 New draft of UK dossier on Iraq said it had recently produced WMD but no evidence

(Musings On Iraq Review The Report of the Iraq Inquiry, Executive Summary)

 

Sep 17 National Security Strategy for Bush admin released Called for preemptive war to

            deal with rogue states

(Musings On Iraq review America at the Crossroads, Democracy, Power, and the Neoconservative Legacy)

(Musings On Iraq review Leap of Faith, Hubris Negligence, and America’s Greatest Foreign

Policy Tragedy)

Sep 17 Undersecretary of Defense Feith aide told Deputy Defense Secretary Wolfowitz

Cheney chief of staff Libby and Deputy National Security Adviser Hadley asked for chronology of 9/11 hijacker Atta’s travels after briefed by Feith’s staff that Atta met with Iraqi intel officer in Prague in 01

 

Sep 18 Def Sec Rumsfeld told House committee Iraq was close to acquiring materials to build a

nuclear bomb Said going to war important decision and why Bush had not decided on it yet Said war would not be costly and would not last more than 2 years Said US would not occupy Iraq

(Musings On Iraq How US Intelligence Created An Iraqi Nuclear Threat In 2002)

(Musings On Iraq Iraq One Of The Worst Intelligence Failures In US History)

(Musings On Iraq review Leap of Faith, Hubris Negligence, and America’s Greatest Foreign

Policy Tragedy)

(Musings On Iraq review What Happened, Inside the Bush White House and Washington’s Culture of Deception)

(Musings On Iraq review Bush At War)

Sep 18 CIA Paris Station Chief met with Lebanese reporter who said Iraq’s Foreign

Minister Sabri was willing to work with US Reporter passed along message from Sabri that Iraq’s WMD and nuclear programs were not active chemical weapons given to tribal and provincial leaders so wouldn’t be found Station Chief went to CIA HQ to tell about meeting Iraq Operations Group said Sabri was spreading disinformation

 

Sep 19 Pentagon’s Defense Policy Board met Argued for removing Saddam

Sep 19 Saddam sent letter to UN saying it had no WMD or nuclear weapons

(Musings On Iraq How US Intelligence Created An Iraqi Nuclear Threat In 2002)

Sep 19 Def Sec Rumsfeld told Senate that UN weapons inspections were weak and weren’t going to

find anything Described Iraq’s two nuclear devices programs in 90s Didn’t mention they were too heavy to ever be used Rumsfeld denied US helped Iraq develop WMD during Iran-Iraq War which was false

(Musings On Iraq UN Inspectors Were Right Iraq Was Not A Threat)

(Musings On Iraq Iraq’s Rejection of UN Inspectors Led To Mistrust Over WMD and 2003 Invasion)

Sep 19 CIA released report on Iraq’s ties to terrorism

Sep 19 New intel said Iraq might have offered training to Al Qaeda and safe haven to bin

            Laden in 1990s Later proved false

Sep 19 Bush met with 11 Congressmen to lobby them on Iraq policy Said war on terror

            going well but real threat was Iraq and WMD

(Musings On Iraq review What Happened, Inside the Bush White House and Washington’s Culture of Deception)

(Musings On Iraq review Leap of Faith, Hubris Negligence, and America’s Greatest Foreign

Policy Tragedy)

(Musings On Iraq Iraq One Of The Worst Intelligence Failures In US History)

Sep 19 White House released language it would use in Congressional resolution to use

            force vs Iraq

Sep 19 Institute for Science and Intl Sec said Bush admin was suppressing dissent on

aluminum tubes Iraq tried to buy Institute said tubes not proof of centrifuge program by Iraq

(Musings On Iraq How A Contested Aluminum Tubes Story Became The Basis For War With Iraq)

 

Sep 20 Pentagon set up planning group to deal with rebuilding Iraq’s oil industry after

            invasion

(Musings On Iraq review Leap of Faith, Hubris Negligence, and America’s Greatest Foreign Policy

Tragedy)

(Musings On Iraq review Hard Lessons, The Iraq Reconstruction Experience)

Sep 20 UK Defense Ministry said it could provide forces for military action against Iraq

(Musings On Iraq Review The Report of the Iraq Inquiry, Executive Summary)

Sep 20 Time article White House using unsubstantiated stories to make case of Iraq-Al

            Qaeda ties

Sep 20 Powell testified to House International Relations Committee to lobby for

Congressional use of force resolution vs Iraq Said there was debate about Iraq’s intent on buying aluminum tubes but Saddam trying to get nuke technology

(Musings On Iraq How A Contested Aluminum Tubes Story Became The Basis For War With Iraq)

(Musings On Iraq review What Happened, Inside the Bush White House and Washington’s Culture of Deception)

 

Sep 21 NY Times article said Bush received detailed Iraq war plan

 

Sep 22 National Security Adviser Rice said UN sanctions were failing and Iraq using illegal

            revenues to develop WMD

 

Sep 23 Blair told cabinet Iraq dossier would show Iraq expanding WMD capabilities and erosion of

sanctions one cause Education Secretary Morris asked Blair what had changed about Iraq to go to war other than Bush being elected

Sep 23 Former UN inspector Albright for Inst for Science and Intl Security issued report

            aluminum tubes Iraq tried to buy were not for centrifuges Probably rockets

(Musings On Iraq How A Contested Aluminum Tubes Story Became The Basis For War With Iraq)

 

Sep 24 UK dossier on Iraq WMD released Blair told parliament that Iraq had WMD and

it was producing them Said that Iraq could use WMD in 45 minutes Claimed Iraq could build a nuclear bomb in 2 years Included story Iraq tried to buy uranium from Africa Said no definitive intelligence that aluminum tubes Iraq tried to buy were for nuke program

(Musings On Iraq Review The Report of the Iraq Inquiry, Executive Summary)

(Musings On Iraq How US Intelligence Failed The Iraq-Niger Uranium Story)

(Musings On Iraq How A Contested Aluminum Tubes Story Became The Basis For War With Iraq)

Sep 24 UK Foreign Secretary Cook was surprised dossier on Iraq was mostly old WMD

            material

Sep 24 CIA Dir Tenet briefed Senate Foreign Relations Committee on intel on Iraq’s

WMD Told committee Iraq rebuilding its nuclear program Proof bought aluminum tubes Mentioned Niger uranium deal Sen Biden asked Tenet what technical evidence did CIA have of Iraqi WMD Tenet said none but had good human sources

(Musings On Iraq How US Intelligence Created An Iraqi Nuclear Threat In 2002)

(Musings On Iraq How US Intelligence Failed The Iraq-Niger Uranium Story)

(Musings On Iraq Review Hubris, The Inside Story of Spin, Scandal, And The Selling Of The Iraq War)

Sep 24 After Tenet testified State and Energy Dept intel analysts testified that they did

            not believe aluminum tubes were for centrifuges

 

Sep 25 Bush said couldn't distinguish between Al Qaeda and Saddam in war on terror

            because they were equally evil

(Musings On Iraq review Wanting War: Why the Bush Administration Invaded Iraq)

(Musings On Iraq review Leap of Faith, Hubris Negligence, and America’s Greatest Foreign Policy Tragedy)

Sep 25 National Security Adviser Rice said Iraq provided chemical weapons training to Al Qaeda

Came from Al Qaeda commander Libi who made up story under torture in Egypt

(Musings On Iraq review What Happened, Inside the Bush White House and Washington’s Culture of Deception)

Sep 25 Defense Secretary Rumsfeld and CIA Deputy Director McLaughlin briefed

            NATO defense ministers on Iraq-Al Qaeda ties

Sep 25 US and UK worked on draft UN resolution demanding inspectors return to Iraq

(Musings On Iraq Review The Report of the Iraq Inquiry, Executive Summary)

(Musings On Iraq UN Inspectors Were Right Iraq Was Not A Threat)

(Musings On Iraq Iraq’s Rejection of UN Inspectors Led To Mistrust Over WMD and 2003 Invasion)

(Musings On Iraq Chilcot Report Section 3.5 Development of UK Strategy and Options September to November 2002 – Negotiation of Resolution 1441)

Sep 25 National Intelligence Office for Strategic and Nuclear Programs had analyst meeting

to draft National Intelligence Estimate on Iraq CIA and DIA analysts said aluminum tubes Iraq  tried to buy were for centrifuges and that Iraq reconstitution nuclear program Energy and State Dept analysts said tubes were for rockets

(Musings On Iraq How A Contested Aluminum Tubes Story Became The Basis For War With Iraq)

(Musings On Iraq How US Intelligence Created An Iraqi Nuclear Threat In 2002)

 

Sep 26 Bush met with 18 Congressmen to lobby them on Iraq Said he’d talked to military

commanders and they had no problem with regime change Said Iraq had WMD Building facilities to make more If it got uranium could build a bomb in 6 months Repeated British claim that Iraq could use WMD in 45 min

(Musings On Iraq Iraq One Of The Worst Intelligence Failures In US History)

(Musings On Iraq How US Intelligence Created An Iraqi Nuclear Threat In 2002)

(Musings On Iraq review Leap of Faith, Hubris Negligence, and America’s Greatest Foreign

Policy Tragedy)

(Musings On Iraq review What Happened, Inside the Bush White House and Washington’s Culture of Deception)

Sep 26 Bush told press Al Qaeda could become an extension of Iraq and Iraq and Al Qaeda

were both part of war on terror Said each day Iraq could give WMD or a nuke to terrorists

(Musings On Iraq review Iraq’s Future The aftermath of regime change)

(Musings On Iraq review Wanting War: Why the Bush Administration Invaded Iraq)

(Musings On Iraq review What Happened, Inside the Bush White House and Washington’s Culture of Deception)

Sep 26 Secretary of State Powell told Senate Foreign Relations Committee that Iraq-

Niger uranium deal was proof had nuke program Also tried buying aluminum tubes for program

(Musings On Iraq How US Intelligence Failed The Iraq-Niger Uranium Story)

(Musings On Iraq Review Hubris, The Inside Story of Spin, Scandal, And The Selling Of The Iraq War)

(Musings On Iraq How A Contested Aluminum Tubes Story Became The Basis For War With Iraq)

Sep 26 Rumsfeld said Iraq had active WMD programs Said bulletproof confirmation of

            ties between Iraq and Al Qaeda

Sep 26 Pentagon and intel officials questioned White House claims of Iraq-Al Qaeda ties

            in the press

Sep 26 White House spokesman claimed Iraq trained Al Qaeda in chemical weapons

Sep 26 32 foreign policy experts ran full page ad in New York Times “War with Iraq is not

            in America’s national interest”

 

Sep 28 Bush radio address Said Iraq could launch a WMD attack upon US in 45 minutes

(Musings On Iraq Iraq One Of The Worst Intelligence Failures In US History)

(Musings On Iraq review What Happened, Inside the Bush White House and Washington’s Culture of Deception)

Sep 28 US gave draft UN resolution to France Russia China on new weapons inspectors Gave 7

days for Iraq to provide weapons declaration to UN 23 days to open all WMD sites Set up military bases for inspectors to work out of that would have no fly and no drive zones around them If Iraq failed to meet these demands UN member states were authorized to use all means to restore peace Were meant to make demands that Iraq would never comply with and justify war

(Musings On Iraq UN Inspectors Were Right Iraq Was Not A Threat)

(Musings On Iraq Iraq’s Rejection of UN Inspectors Led To Mistrust Over WMD and 2003 Invasion)

(Musings On Iraq review Leap of Faith, Hubris Negligence, and America’s Greatest Foreign

Policy Tragedy)

 

Sep 29 CIA report Story by INC defector Abu Zainab Qairy that Iraq trained terrorists at Salman Pak

camp in Baghdad was embellished and exaggerated No Ql Qaeda detainee said they were trained at Salman Pak

 

Sep 30 NYTimes OpEd by Clinton era counterterrorism official Benjamin said Saddam

            thought bin Laden a threat and 2 didn’t cooperate

Sep 30 Iraq and UN negotiated new weapons inspections in Vienna but blocked 8

            presidential sites US rejected deal

(Musings On Iraq UN Inspectors Were Right Iraq Was Not A Threat)

(Musings On Iraq Iraq’s Rejection of UN Inspectors Led To Mistrust Over WMD and 2003 Invasion)

 

Oct 1 Head UN inspector Blix met with Iraqi delegation Iraq agreed to UN Res 1284 and

            new unconditional inspections Iraq gave CDs on its nuclear facilities to IAEA

(Musings On Iraq UN Inspectors Were Right Iraq Was Not A Threat)

(Musings On Iraq Iraq’s Rejection of UN Inspectors Led To Mistrust Over WMD and 2003 Invasion)

Oct 1 Bush said military option wasn’t first choice with Iraq but disarming country was Part of

strategy to privately work on war plans while publicly denying it

(Musings On Iraq review Plan of Attack: The Definitive Account Of The Decision To Invade

Iraq)

Oct 1 Bush and Cheney met with Congressmen to lobby them over Iraq

Oct 1 White House spokesman Fleischer said that assassinating Saddam would be cheaper

            way out of Iraq crisis

Oct 1 National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) on Iraq released Said Iraq had WMD

Reported renewed production of mustard, sarin, cyclosporine, VX Reports Iraq bought chemicals and equipment for limited chemical weapons production Had little info on chemical stockpiles, but could be 100-500 metric tons Said all parts of biological weapons program active Had low confidence Iraq would use WMD and no intel that Iraq planning to attack US Speculated that in desperation Iraq might use Al Qaeda for WMD attack on US State Dept had 11 page annex with disagreements with NIE’s findings Said US intelligence community had no compelling case Iraq had active nuclear program Didn’t believe Iraq-Niger uranium story Said Iraq tried to buy aluminum tubes for centrifigues Sign of renewed nuclear program State and Energy Depts disagreed that aluminum tubes were for centrifuges Air Force intelligence didn’t think UAVs for WMD but rather for reconnaissance

(Musings On Iraq How US Intelligence Created An Iraqi Nuclear Threat In 2002)

(Musings On Iraq How US Intelligence Failed The Iraq-Niger Uranium Story)

(Musings On Iraq How A Contested Aluminum Tubes Story Became The Basis For War With Iraq)

(Musings On Iraq Iraq One Of The Worst Intelligence Failures In US History)

(Musings On Iraq Review Hubris, The Inside Story of Spin, Scandal, And The Selling Of The Iraq War)

 

Oct 2 Summary main points of National Intelligence Estimate released Said Iraq

            rebuilding nuke and WMD programs

Oct 2 Iraq called UK’s weapons dossier propaganda and lies

Oct 2 Bush appeared with Democrats and Republicans calling on Congress to pass

            use of force resolution on Iraq

(Musings On Iraq review Leap of Faith, Hubris Negligence, and America’s Greatest Foreign

Policy Tragedy)

(Musings On Iraq review What Happened, Inside the Bush White House and Washington’s Culture of Deception)

Oct 2 Bush said that Iraq had WMD stocks rebuilding programs working on nuclear

            programs

(Musings On Iraq How US Intelligence Created An Iraqi Nuclear Threat In 2002)

Oct 2 NY Times article quoted Defense Policy Board’s Richard Perle that CIA was anti-

            INC and it provided best intel on Iraq

Oct 2 CIA Director Tenet told Senate CIA had no sources inside Iraq since 1990s

Oct 2 CIA Dep Director McLaughlin told Senate British had stretched story that Iraq tried

to buy uranium from Africa Said low chance Iraq would use WMD Would only use the if attacked Said low chance Iraq would use terrorists against US unless America attacked Iraq

(Musings On Iraq How US Intelligence Failed The Iraq-Niger Uranium Story)

(Musings On Iraq Review Hubris, The Inside Story of Spin, Scandal, And The Selling Of The Iraq War)

Oct 2 Feith office memo Said exiles should organize a conference to create bill of rights for Iraq

before war US wanted a federal system of govt US military would run Iraq after war and work with exiles

 

Oct 3 Bush signed executive order to train 5,000 Iraqi exiles to help with invasion

Oct 3 US planes dropped flyers over Iraq telling them not to fight Americans

Oct 3 Report US using No Fly Zones to practice attacking Iraq

 

Oct 4 Unclassified version of CIA’s report on Iraq’s WMD released by White House

Dropped most of the reservations in original Said disputes within intelligence community over Iraq’s nuke program Said most believed aluminum tubes were for centrifuges Others for rockets

(Musings On Iraq How A Contested Aluminum Tubes Story Became The Basis For War With Iraq)

(Musings On Iraq Iraq One Of The Worst Intelligence Failures In US History)

(Musings On Iraq 2002 CIA White Paper On Iraq Vs the 2002-2003 U.N. Inspectors)

(Musings On Iraq review Hoodwinked, The Documents That Reveal How Bush Sold Us a War)

Oct 4 CIA told NSC to remove reference to Iraq trying to buy uranium from Niger

            from Bush speech

(Musings On Iraq How US Intelligence Failed The Iraq-Niger Uranium Story)

(Musings On Iraq Review Hubris, The Inside Story of Spin, Scandal, And The Selling Of The Iraq War)

Oct 4 General in charge intel for US invasion met with DIA to go over suspected WMD sites DIA

had no plans on how sites were to be dealt with during invasion General couldn’t confirm there was WMD at any of the 946 sites listed by DIA because intel so bad

Oct 4 CIA’s National Intel Officer told Senate Intel Comm he questioned Iraq-Africa

            uranium story in British dossier

Oct 4 UK Foreign Office legal advisor Sir Wood said that UN needed to act on Iraq to give legal

justification for war otherwise British forces could be sued

(Musings On Iraq Review The Report of the Iraq Inquiry, Executive Summary)

Oct 4 Intel officials complained to press that White House pressured them on reports

            on Iraq

Oct 4 Report Institute for Science and International Technology, Lawrence Livermore Lab

said didn’t believe aluminum tubes for centrifuges Claimed White House ignored contradictory views on Iraq Pushed US intel to come up with more on Iraq

Oct 4 State Dep Future of Iraq Project met in London INC presented plan written by Kanan

Makiya calling for exiles to set up transitional

(Musings On Iraq review Leap of Faith, Hubris Negligence, and America’s Greatest Foreign Policy

Tragedy)

(Musings On Iraq review Losing Iraq, Inside The Post War Reconstruction Fiasco)

(Musings On Iraq review The Assassins’ Gate, America In Iraq)

(Musings On Iraq review Hard Lessons, The Iraq Reconstruction Experience)

 

Oct 5 Bush in weekly radio address said U.S. had found Saddam ordered field commanders to use

chemical weapons something Iraq denied it had

(Musings On Iraq review What Happened, Inside the Bush White House and Washington’s Culture of Deception)

Oct 5 CIA Dir Tenet told White House to remove Iraq tried to buy uranium from Niger from Bush

            speech Said intel was weak

(Musings On Iraq How US Intelligence Failed The Iraq-Niger Uranium Story)

(Musings On Iraq Review Hubris, The Inside Story of Spin, Scandal, And The Selling Of The Iraq War)

Oct 5 Knight Ridder article quoted several intelligence officers that Bush admin ignoring

dissenting opinions on aluminum tubes

(Musings On Iraq How A Contested Aluminum Tubes Story Became The Basis For War With Iraq)

 

Oct 6 Bush said Iraq could have a nuclear weapon in a year if got enriched uranium

(Musings On Iraq How US Intelligence Created An Iraqi Nuclear Threat In 2002)

(Musings On Iraq review What Happened, Inside the Bush White House and Washington’s Culture of Deception)

Oct 6 Deputy National Security Advisor Hadley asked CIA Dir Tenet if story of Iraq

            trying to buy uranium from Niger could be put back in Bush speech Tenet said no

Oct 6 CIA told NSC to drop mentioning Iraq-Africa uranium story in draft of Bush

            speech for 2nd time

(Musings On Iraq How US Intelligence Failed The Iraq-Niger Uranium Story)

(Musings On Iraq Review Hubris, The Inside Story of Spin, Scandal, And The Selling Of The Iraq War)

 

Oct 7 Bush speech in Cincinnati outlined Iraq’s WMD and nuke threat to lobby for

Congressional use of force resolution Said US tried containment sanctions and inspections and Iraq still had WMD Warned that if Iraq didnt disarm US would do it Said Iraq great threat because of WMD and its history of aggression Said if Iraq got enriched uranium could have a nuclear bomb in less than a year Said Iraq tried to buy aluminum tubes for its nuclear program Said Al Qaeda and Iraq were united in their hatred for the US and had high level contracts for a decade Claimed Iraq trained Al Qaeda in bomb making and poisons and Saddam celebrated 9/11

(Musings On Iraq review Wanting War: Why the Bush Administration Invaded Iraq)

(Musings On Iraq review Iraq’s Future The aftermath of regime change)

(Musings On Iraq review Leap of Faith, Hubris Negligence, and America’s Greatest Foreign

Policy Tragedy)

(Musings On Iraq review What Happened, Inside the Bush White House and Washington’s Culture of Deception)

(Musings On Iraq How A Contested Aluminum Tubes Story Became The Basis For War With Iraq)

(Musings On Iraq How US Intelligence Created An Iraqi Nuclear Threat In 2002)

Oct 7 CIA blocked Bush from talking about Iraq trying to buy uranium from Africa in

            speech

(Musings On Iraq How US Intelligence Failed The Iraq-Niger Uranium Story)

(Musings On Iraq Review Hubris, The Inside Story of Spin, Scandal, And The Selling Of The Iraq War)

Oct 7 Italian contacted journalist about providing her with Iraq-Niger uranium deal

            papers They turned out to be fakes

Oct 7 CIA Director Tenet sent letter to Senate Intelligence Committee Said Iraq

wouldn’t conduct terrorist or WMD attacks upon US unless regime was threatened

Oct 7 CIA Director Tenet letter to Senate said Iraq wouldn’t conduct terrorist or WMD

attacks upon US unless regime threatened Wrote that there were high level Iraq-Al Qaeda ties going back a decade Iraq offered safe haven and non-aggression Iraq provided poison gas training to Al Qaeda Said Al Qaeda operatives in Iraq

Oct 7 Intelligence officials complained to press that White House claims of Iraq-Al

            Qaeda ties were exaggerated

Oct 7 Pentagon drafted 2 memos on postwar Iraq 1st said military would assume control of Iraqi

govt maintain security so rebuilding could begin and govt could restart 2nd memo said a military governor would run Iraq and appoint US specialists to run each ministry Didn’t say who would do this as invasion plan was to withdraw quickly Gen Franks said he would not run Iraq after invasion

(Musings On Iraq review State of Denial, Bush At War, Part III)

(Musings On Iraq review Hard Lessons, The Iraq Reconstruction Experience)

 

Oct 8 White House posted pictures claiming to be Iraq working on three facilities for

            nuclear weapons program

(Musings On Iraq How US Intelligence Created An Iraqi Nuclear Threat In 2002)

 

Oct 9 Bush told CENTCOM Commander Gen Franks he was not happy with Iraq war plan

Oct 9 CIA Dir Tenet told Senate Intel Comm Iraq would only use WMD if regime was

threatened

Oct 9 Italian reporter gave US Embassy in Rome copies of documents on alleged Iraq-

Niger uranium deal CIA Rome Station Chief misplaced documents and were never sent to CIA HQ Documents were later proved fakes 

(Musings On Iraq How US Intelligence Failed The Iraq-Niger Uranium Story)

(Musings On Iraq Review Hubris, The Inside Story of Spin, Scandal, And The Selling Of The Iraq War)

Oct 9 Ex-CIA agents complained to press that Bush admin used slanted intel to make case

against Iraq

Oct 9 Energy Dept official told Guardian he didn’t believe aluminum tubes Iraq tried to

buy were for nuclear program Former UN inspector Albright told Guardian CIA pushing aluminum tubes story while nuclear experts disagreed with it Albright said Lawrence Livermore Lab was told not to voice its doubts about aluminum tubes

(Musings On Iraq How A Contested Aluminum Tubes Story Became The Basis For War With Iraq)

 

Oct 10 UK intel report said that Iraq would only launch terrorism if attacked by US and

couldn't use WMD outside its territory Found no cooperation between Iraq and Al Qaeda and attack on Iraq would lead to more terrorism and radicalization Was leaked to press

(Musings On Iraq Review The Report of the Iraq Inquiry, Executive Summary)

(Musings On Iraq Chilcot Report Section 3.5 Development of UK Strategy and Options September to November 2002 – Negotiation of Resolution 1441)

Oct 10 US House of Representatives approved use of force resolution against Iraq 296-33

Oct 10 Pew poll 66% in US believed Iraq involved in 9/11 79% believed Iraq had or was close to

building a nuclear bomb

 

Oct 11 Putin said he supported new inspections in Iraq but doubted Saddam had WMD

Oct 11 Senate passed resolution allowing use of force against Iraq 77-23

Oct 11 CIA analysts complained to press they were being pressured by Pentagon about

            their Iraq assessments

 

Oct 12 Report questioned Bush’s claim Iraq still working on nuclear program based upon ex-

Iraqi nuclear scientist Hamza Ex UN inspector said Hamza exaggerating Hamza provided by INC Former UN Inspector Albright said he talked with nuclear experts at Oak Ridge and Lawrence Livermore who didn’t believe aluminum tubes were for Iraq’s nuclear program

(Musings On Iraq How A Contested Aluminum Tubes Story Became The Basis For War With Iraq)

(Musings On Iraq How US Intelligence Created An Iraqi Nuclear Threat In 2002)

 

Oct 15 Undersecretary of Defense Feith briefed NSC on plan for governing postwar Iraq

with 3-star general in charge of military and civilian administrator

(Musings On Iraq review State of Denial, Bush At War, Part III)

(Musings On Iraq review Hard Lessons, The Iraq Reconstruction Experience)

Oct 15 Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld wrote list of 29 things that could go wrong with Iraq

war Went over them with Bush Included not finding WMD another state taking advantage of US focus on Iraq, oil shocks Iraq could strike US or allies beforehand could be high collateral damage could lead to ethnosectarian conflict in Iraq Iraq would use WMD on Shiites Iraq could convince world US at war with Muslims Had no follow up on how to deal with any problems listed

(Musings On Iraq Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction’s “Hard Lessons” – Part I: Planning for Postwar Iraq September 2001 to May 2003)

(Musings On Iraq review Leap of Faith, Hubris Negligence, and America’s Greatest Foreign

Policy Tragedy)

Oct 15 Italy’s SISMI intel agency told CIA of Iraq-Niger uranium deal documents

(Musings On Iraq How US Intelligence Failed The Iraq-Niger Uranium Story)

(Musings On Iraq Review Hubris, The Inside Story of Spin, Scandal, And The Selling Of The Iraq War)

 

Oct 16 Iraq held elections where Saddam voted president for another 7 years

Oct 16 Iraq renewed offer for new UN inspections after US rejected deal

(Musings On Iraq UN Inspectors Were Right Iraq Was Not A Threat)

(Musings On Iraq Iraq’s Rejection of UN Inspectors Led To Mistrust Over WMD and 2003 Invasion)

Oct 16 French Pres Chirac said no Iraq Al Qaeda ties and attacking Iraq could lead to new

terrorist attacks

Oct 16 State Dept intel agency gave CIA DIA NSA Energy Dept copies of Iraq-Niger uranium

documents

(Musings On Iraq How US Intelligence Failed The Iraq-Niger Uranium Story)

(Musings On Iraq Review Hubris, The Inside Story of Spin, Scandal, And The Selling Of The Iraq War)

 

Oct 18 Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld told Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Feith to

create postwar planning office for Iraq Cancelled few days later by White House that worried postwar planning could derail invasion

(Musings On Iraq Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction’s “Hard Lessons” – Part I: Planning for Postwar Iraq September 2001 to May 2003)

(Musings On Iraq on Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction Hard Lessons Chapter 3 The Department of Defense Takes Charge)

(Musings On Iraq review Leap of Faith, Hubris Negligence, and America’s Greatest Foreign

Policy Tragedy)

(Musings On Iraq review Hard Lessons, The Iraq Reconstruction Experience)

 

Oct 20 Czech Intel told US no evidence 9/11 hijacker Atta met with Iraq intelligence in Prague

 

Oct 21 Report Czech Pres Havel told White House 9/11 terrorist Atta did not meet with Iraq

intelligence in Prague

 

Oct 23 US and UK submitted draft UN resolution for new weapons inspections in Iraq

(Musings On Iraq Review The Report of the Iraq Inquiry, Executive Summary)

(Musings On Iraq Chilcot Report Section 3.5 Development of UK Strategy and Options September to November 2002 – Negotiation of Resolution 1441)

 

Oct 24 Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Feith’s Policy Counterterrorism Group

briefed Rumsfeld claiming long term cooperation between Iraq and Al Qaeda

Oct 24 Def Sec Rumsfeld told press Policy Counterterrorism Group was not an intel unit It was set

up by UnderSecDef Feith to go through intel and find Iraq-Al Qaeda ties because US intel agencies said two were not linked

Oct 24 Intelligence officers complained to the press that Pentagon was politicizing

            Intelligence on Iraq probably referring to Feith’s office

(Musings On Iraq review Leap of Faith, Hubris Negligence, and America’s Greatest Foreign

Policy Tragedy)

 

Oct 25 VP Cheney met with Russian For Min Told him countries that sided with US in war

would get preferential treatment in contracts afterward

 

Oct 27 US intel complained to press Pentagon using own intel on Iraq and relying upon INC

too much

(Musings On Iraq review Leap of Faith, Hubris Negligence, and America’s Greatest Foreign

Policy Tragedy)

 

Oct 29 Gen Franks briefed Bush on war plans again

(Musings On Iraq review Leap of Faith, Hubris Negligence, and America’s Greatest Foreign

Policy Tragedy)

(Musings On Iraq review of Shaping the Plan for Operation Iraqi Freedom, The Role of Military Intelligence Assessment)

 

Oct 30 Vice President Cheney told head UN Inspector Blix that inspections couldn't last

            forever and US was ready to discredit them anyway to disarm Iraq

(Musings On Iraq UN Inspectors Were Right Iraq Was Not A Threat)

 

Oct 31 Blair agreed to offer a division to US for invasion of Iraq

(Musings On Iraq Review The Report of the Iraq Inquiry, Executive Summary)

Oct 31 UK energy companies met with govt official complaining business deals being made

for postwar Iraq and they were being left out

Oct 31 Iraqi opposition met in Salahddin Kurdistan Said they were united to remove

            Saddam Wanted to end sectarianism and create federal democratic state

 

Nov 1 UN head inspectors Blix and El Baradei visited Bush and Cheney at White House

            Bush said inspections had full US backing

(Musings On Iraq UN Inspectors Were Right Iraq Was Not A Threat)

(Musings On Iraq Iraq’s Rejection of UN Inspectors Led To Mistrust Over WMD and 2003 Invasion)

Nov 1 Under Secretary of State Bolton told conference if Iraq got fissile material it could

            have a nuclear bomb in a year

(Musings On Iraq How US Intelligence Created An Iraqi Nuclear Threat In 2002)

 

Nov 3 Observer reported INC’s Chalabi met with oil companies to discuss contracts in post-

Saddam Iraq

 

Nov 6 Secretary of State Powell got ok from National Security Adviser Rice to make deal

with France over language of new UN resolution to allow weapons inspections in Iraq

(Musings On Iraq UN Inspectors Were Right Iraq Was Not A Threat)

(Musings On Iraq Iraq’s Rejection of UN Inspectors Led To Mistrust Over WMD and 2003 Invasion)

Nov 6 UN told that Iraq cut back on oil smuggling but still continuing in violation of UN

sanctions

 

Nov 7 Bush said that Iraq would be disarmed

Nov 7 UK Embassy in US said hawks in Washington thought UN Res 1441 authorizing new

weapons inspections was a defeat

(Musings On Iraq UN Inspectors Were Right Iraq Was Not A Threat)

(Musings On Iraq Iraq’s Rejection of UN Inspectors Led To Mistrust Over WMD and 2003 Invasion)

(Musings On Iraq Review The Report of the Iraq Inquiry, Executive Summary)

 

Nov 8 UN Resolution 1441 said Iraq was in violation of previous resolutions and authorized

new weapons inspections anywhere in Iraq and would face serious consequences if didn’t

(Musings On Iraq Hangs Blix Replies To Tony Blair)

Nov 8 UN Res 1441 was immediately interpreted in different ways France said it meant a 2nd

resolution was necessary to go to war UK said it was last chance for Iraq or it would suffer the consequences

(Musings On Iraq UN Inspectors Were Right Iraq Was Not A Threat)

(Musings On Iraq Iraq’s Rejection of UN Inspectors Led To Mistrust Over WMD and 2003 Invasion)

 

Nov 12 CENTCOM Cmdr Gen Franks said if US didn't act on Iraq it could acquire and use a

nuclear weapon

(Musings On Iraq How US Intelligence Created An Iraqi Nuclear Threat In 2002)

Nov 12 Attny Gen Lord Goldsmith told Foreign Sec Straw that he wasn’t sure UN Resolution

1441 would give legal basis for war with Iraq Straw told Goldsmith he thought 1441 meant Iraq had to comply or else

Nov 12 NYTimes article claimed Iraq bought anti-WMD drugs as sign that it had WMD and

was going to use it

 

Nov 13 Iraq accepted UN Resolution 1441 to allow UN weapons inspectors

(Musings On Iraq UN Inspectors Were Right Iraq Was Not A Threat)

(Musings On Iraq Iraq’s Rejection of UN Inspectors Led To Mistrust Over WMD and 2003 Invasion)

(Musings On Iraq Chilcot Inquiry Section 3.6 Development of UK Strategy and Options, November 2002 to January 2003)

Nov 13 Def Sec Rumsfeld memo to Bush Said inspections were important because Saddam would

make a mistake and the military would be ready to react as soon as Bush gave the order

Nov 13 Blair said that goal of UN Res 1441 was disarming Iraq not regime change

Nov 13 Blair told UK cabinet that UN Res 1441 meant military action could be taken against Iraq in

case of violations without a 2nd resolution

(Musings On Iraq Review The Report of the Iraq Inquiry, Executive Summary)

 

Nov 14 UK For Sec Straw told cabinet UN Resolution 1441 authorized military action against

Iraq without a 2nd resolution

(Musings On Iraq Review The Report of the Iraq Inquiry, Executive Summary)

Nov 14 UK intel report said Iraq accepted new weapons inspectors to avoid US led attack and

would continue to hide its most important WMD programs

(Musings On Iraq UN Inspectors Were Right Iraq Was Not A Threat)

(Musings On Iraq Iraq’s Rejection of UN Inspectors Led To Mistrust Over WMD and 2003 Invasion)

(Musings On Iraq Chilcot Inquiry Section 3.6 Development of UK Strategy and Options, November 2002 to January 2003)

Nov 14 Def Policy Board’s Perle quoted INC defector ex-nuke scientist Hamza that Iraq could

get nuclear bomb and attack US Called for preventive action vs Iraq

(Musings On Iraq How US Intelligence Created An Iraqi Nuclear Threat In 2002)

 

Nov 15 US asked UK and other allies for military support against Iraq

Nov 15 Natl Sec Adv Rice said that US couldn’t allow Saddam to have a nuclear weapon

(Musings On Iraq How US Intelligence Created An Iraqi Nuclear Threat In 2002)

Nov 15 Saudi Amb to US Bandar visited Bush Said Saudis wanted to know US intentions

on Iraq Bush told Bandar he would let Saudis know if he decided on war with Iraq

 

Nov 17 Bush said that U.S. would form a coalition of the willing to disarm Iraq

 

Nov 18 New UN inspectors arrived in Baghdad

(Musings On Iraq UN Inspectors Were Right Iraq Was Not A Threat)

(Musings On Iraq Iraq’s Rejection of UN Inspectors Led To Mistrust Over WMD and 2003 Invasion)

 

Nov 19 UK Def Min official warned Blair’s office that without proper postwar planning Iraq

war could fail

(Musings On Iraq Review The Report of the Iraq Inquiry, Executive Summary)

 

Nov 21 NATO summit Bush was talking about war with Iraq and using new U.N. inspections

as catalyst for action

 

Nov 22 France told US that it did not believe Iraq tried to buy uranium from Niger

(Musings On Iraq How US Intelligence Failed The Iraq-Niger Uranium Story)

Nov 22 Russia’s Putin warned U.S. not to unilaterally act against Iraq

 

Nov 25 UN Resolution 1443 extended Oil for Food program

Nov 25 US Navy report claimed uranium from Niger was in a warehouse in Benin heading for

Iraq Report later found to be false

(Musings On Iraq How US Intelligence Failed The Iraq-Niger Uranium Story)

Nov 25 Head weapons inspector Blix told Security Council inspections would begin in Iraq on

11/27/02

(Musings On Iraq UN Inspectors Were Right Iraq Was Not A Threat)

(Musings On Iraq Iraq’s Rejection of UN Inspectors Led To Mistrust Over WMD and 2003 Invasion)

Nov 25 US intelligence took pictures of trucks moving materials from Amiriya Serum and

Vaccine Institute In February 2003 UN speech Secretary of State Powell claimed this was Iraqis hiding WMD before UN inspections restarted US analysts did not believe anything unusual was happening in photos

 

Nov 26 Gen Franks presented deployment plan for Iraq invasion to Rumsfeld Was for 300,000

troops to be sent from summer 02-spring 03 Rumsfeld said large deployment would undermine diplomatic moves US making on Iraq Rumsfeld decided to go through entire deployment process for Iraq invasion Ended up breaking it up and controlling entire process

(Musings On Iraq review of Shaping the Plan for Operation Iraqi Freedom, The Role of Military Intelligence Assessment)

(Musings On Iraq review Leap of Faith, Hubris Negligence, and America’s Greatest Foreign

Policy Tragedy)

(Musings On Iraq review Plan of Attack: The Definitive Account Of The Decision To Invade

Iraq)

 

Nov 27 UN weapons inspections carried out first inspections under new regime

(Musings On Iraq UN Inspectors Were Right Iraq Was Not A Threat)

(Musings On Iraq Iraq’s Rejection of UN Inspectors Led To Mistrust Over WMD and 2003 Invasion)

 

Nov 28 UN inspectors went to Dawrah Foot and Mouth Disease Facility Said facility couldn’t be

used in weapons programs Reporters said it was mostly destroyed

(Musings On Iraq UN Inspectors Were Right Iraq Was Not A Threat)

(Musings On Iraq Iraq’s Rejection of UN Inspectors Led To Mistrust Over WMD and 2003 Invasion)

 

Nov 29 UK Defense Min told Blair that US still had no political strategy for Iraq

(Musings On Iraq Review The Report of the Iraq Inquiry, Executive Summary)

Nov 29 American Enterprise Inst group of experts started work on paper on what U.S. facing

after 9/11 Would focus on Iraq

 

Dec 2 Bush Cheney Deputy Secretary of Defense Wolfowtiz gave speeches across US saying

that Iraq would not cooperate with weapons inspectors

(Musings On Iraq UN Inspectors Were Right Iraq Was Not A Threat)

(Musings On Iraq Iraq’s Rejection of UN Inspectors Led To Mistrust Over WMD and 2003 Invasion)

(Musings On Iraq Chilcot Inquiry Section 3.6 Development of UK Strategy and Options, November 2002 to January 2003)

Dec 2 White House spokesman said if Saddam said he had no WMD proved he was lying If he

said he had WMD he violated UN resolutions Claimed Iraq bought aluminum tubes for its nuke program

(Musings On Iraq How A Contested Aluminum Tubes Story Became The Basis For War With Iraq)

Dec 2 White House officials told US News & World Report they were making extensive

            plans for postwar Iraq

(Musings On Iraq Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction’s “Hard Lessons” – Part I: Planning for Postwar Iraq September 2001 to May 2003)

(Musings On Iraq review Leap of Faith, Hubris Negligence, and America’s Greatest Foreign Policy

Tragedy)

(Musings On Iraq review Hard Lessons, The Iraq Reconstruction Experience)

Dec 2 UK issued dossier on human rights abuses in Iraq Amnesty International attacked

            report as opportunistic and selective

 

Dec 3 Iraq officials cooperated with UN inspectors at surprise search of one of Saddam’s

Baghdad palaces

(Musings On Iraq UN Inspectors Were Right Iraq Was Not A Threat)

(Musings On Iraq Iraq’s Rejection of UN Inspectors Led To Mistrust Over WMD and 2003 Invasion)

 

Dec 4 UN Res 1447 extended Oil for Food program

 

Dec 5 White House spokesman said Bush and Rumsfeld wouldn't claim Iraq had WMD if it

wasn't true

Dec 5 Rumsfeld aid Herbits said he was taking over postwar Iraq planning because it was a

mess Under Secretary of Defense Feith’s office was supposed to do postwar Iraq planning Herbits said he was screwing up

(Musings On Iraq review Leap of Faith, Hubris Negligence, and America’s Greatest Foreign Policy

Tragedy)

(Musings On Iraq review State of Denial, Bush At War, Part III)

(Musings On Iraq review Hard Lessons, The Iraq Reconstruction Experience)

Dec 5 Report Tuwaitha nuclear facility showed no signs of involvement in weapons program

 

Dec 6 White House accused Iraq of hiding WMDs from UN inspectors

(Musings On Iraq UN Inspectors Were Right Iraq Was Not A Threat)

(Musings On Iraq Iraq’s Rejection of UN Inspectors Led To Mistrust Over WMD and 2003 Invasion)

(Musings On Iraq Chilcot Inquiry Section 3.6 Development of UK Strategy and Options, November 2002 to January 2003)

Dec 6 Official troop buildup for Iraq invasion began Wasn’t made public until Feb 03

 

Dec 7 TV speech Saddam apologized to people of Kuwait for 1990 invasion

Dec 7 Iraq gave its WMD and nuclear weapons declaration to UN as part of new

            inspections claiming it had no WMD

(Musings On Iraq Chilcot Inquiry Section 3.6 Development of UK Strategy and Options, November 2002 to January 2003)

Dec 7 Iraqi general claimed weapons declaration proved Iraq had no WMD

Dec 7 US and UK condemned Iraq’s weapons declaration as being incomplete and for denying

            it had WMD

(Musings On Iraq Review The Report of the Iraq Inquiry, Executive Summary)

(Musings On Iraq Iraq One Of The Worst Intelligence Failures In US History)

(Musings On Iraq Chilcot Inquiry Section 3.6 Development of UK Strategy and Options, November 2002 to January 2003)

Dec 7 Cheney told NSC Iraq’s weapons declaration was a material breach and Bush

should move towards war Said Powell and UN wanted to use inspections to avoid war Rumsfeld and Rice didn’t think Iraq’s weapons declaration was a material breach

(Musings On Iraq UN Inspectors Were Right Iraq Was Not A Threat)

(Musings On Iraq Iraq’s Rejection of UN Inspectors Led To Mistrust Over WMD and 2003 Invasion)

 

Dec 8 Iraq admitted that it was close to building a nuclear bomb but was abandoned a long

time ago

(Musings On Iraq How US Intelligence Created An Iraqi Nuclear Threat In 2002)

Dec 8 Gen Thurman and McKiernan went to Gen Franks and asked for more troops for Iraq

invasion

 

Dec 9 UK Foreign Office legal adv Sir Wood wrote paper saying UN Resolution 1441 did not

authorize war with Iraq

Dec 9 UK Foreign Office officially asked Attny Gen Lord Goldsmith for legal advice on

whether 2nd UN resolution needed to use force against Iraq

Dec 9 Blair ForPolAdv Manning MI6 head Dearlove met NatlSecAdv Rice Said start 03 US

would go to UN and argue for military action vs Iraq

(Musings On Iraq Review The Report of the Iraq Inquiry, Executive Summary)

(Musings On Iraq Chilcot Inquiry Section 3.6 Development of UK Strategy and Options, November 2002 to January 2003)

Dec 9 UN inspectors found Fallujah II chlorine plant out of service US listed it as WMD site

(Musings On Iraq UN Inspectors Were Right Iraq Was Not A Threat)

(Musings On Iraq Iraq’s Rejection of UN Inspectors Led To Mistrust Over WMD and 2003 Invasion)

(Musings On Iraq Chilcot Inquiry Section 3.6 Development of UK Strategy and Options, November 2002 to January 2003)

 

Dec 10 USAID said Iraq would be small intervention but security needed to be first

            priority

Dec 10 NSC committee presented humanitarian plan for postwar Iraq based upon secure

            environment and small US role

(Musings On Iraq Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction’s “Hard Lessons” – Part I: Planning for Postwar Iraq September 2001 to May 2003)

(Musings On Iraq on Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction Hard Lessons Chapter 2 The Agencies Engage)

(Musings On Iraq review Leap of Faith, Hubris Negligence, and America’s Greatest Foreign

Policy Tragedy)

(Musings On Iraq review Hard Lessons, The Iraq Reconstruction Experience)

Dec 10 IAEA went to Al Qaim facility US claimed was an active Iraqi nuclear plant Found it

destroyed Went to Al Furat and found no nuclear equipment there

(Musings On Iraq UN Inspectors Were Right Iraq Was Not A Threat)

(Musings On Iraq Iraq’s Rejection of UN Inspectors Led To Mistrust Over WMD and 2003 Invasion)

(Musings On Iraq Chilcot Inquiry Section 3.6 Development of UK Strategy and Options, November 2002 to January 2003)

(Musings On Iraq review Hoodwinked, The Documents That Reveal How Bush Sold Us a War)

 

Dec 11 Pentagon started another post-war planning group just 3 months before invasion

(Musings On Iraq review Leap of Faith, Hubris Negligence, and America’s Greatest Foreign

Policy Tragedy)

(Musings On Iraq Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction’s “Hard Lessons” – Part I: Planning for Postwar Iraq September 2001 to May 2003)

(Musings On Iraq review State of Denial, Bush At War, Part III)

(Musings On Iraq review Hard Lessons, The Iraq Reconstruction Experience)

Dec 11 IAEA went to Tarmiya facility where Iraq had worked on enriched uranium before Gulf War

Found it destroyed

(Musings On Iraq review Hoodwinked, The Documents That Reveal How Bush Sold Us a War)

(Musings On Iraq Chilcot Inquiry Section 3.6 Development of UK Strategy and Options, November 2002 to January 2003)

 

Dec 13 UK intel report said U.S. invasion and occupation of Iraq could help motivate

            Islamists for next 5 years

Dec 13 Bush said military would have small pox vaccinations Was actually protection

            against possible Iraq WMD attack during invasion

 

Dec 14 Iraqi opposition meeting in London Came up with 65 member committee but marked by

general disunity

Dec 14 CENTCOM briefed Joint Chiefs on postwar Iraq Warned that US could win the war and

lose the peace Warned there would be no Iraqi govt after the invasion so there could be chaos in the country Warned that US was only planning for the war and not the peace Said Iraq’s economy was a wreck and that US should maintain the military and not carry out an extensive deBaathification because could fracture Iraq

(Musings On Iraq Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction’s “Hard Lessons” – Part I: Planning for Postwar Iraq September 2001 to May 2003)

(Musings On Iraq review Leap of Faith, Hubris Negligence, and America’s Greatest Foreign

Policy Tragedy)

(Musings On Iraq review State of Denial, Bush At War, Part III)

(Musings On Iraq review Hard Lessons, The Iraq Reconstruction Experience)

Dec 14 CENTCOM briefing on postwar Iraq led Joint Chiefs to set up its own postwar planning

cell Was not coordinated with CENTCOM

 

Dec 17 Secretary of State Powell hinted that US would reject Iraq’s weapons declaration to UN

inspectors

(Musings On Iraq UN Inspectors Were Right Iraq Was Not A Threat)

(Musings On Iraq Iraq’s Rejection of UN Inspectors Led To Mistrust Over WMD and 2003 Invasion)

(Musings On Iraq Chilcot Inquiry Section 3.6 Development of UK Strategy and Options, November 2002 to January 2003)

Dec 17 CIA said that Iraq did not include trying to buy uranium from Niger and aluminum tubes

in its declaration to UN inspectors

(Musings On Iraq How A Contested Aluminum Tubes Story Became The Basis For War With Iraq)

(Musings On Iraq How US Intelligence Failed The Iraq-Niger Uranium Story)

Dec 17 US inspected warehouse in Benin where uranium headed for Iraq allegedly stored but

found nothing

 

Dec 18 NSC meeting on UN inspections Bush said Iraq not cooperating Bush told Powell that if

Iraq was in material breach that would mean war

(Musings On Iraq review Wanting War: Why the Bush Administration Invaded Iraq)

(Musings On Iraq UN Inspectors Were Right Iraq Was Not A Threat)

(Musings On Iraq Iraq’s Rejection of UN Inspectors Led To Mistrust Over WMD and 2003 Invasion)

(Musings On Iraq Chilcot Inquiry Section 3.6 Development of UK Strategy and Options, November 2002 to January 2003)

Dec 18 Bush met with Spanish Pres Anzar Said Iraq’s weapons declaration was a joke and

            US would eventually have to remove Saddam because he wouldn’t disarm

Dec 18 Sec Def Rumsfeld ordered start of civil administration to run postwar Iraq 3

            months before invasion

(Musings On Iraq Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction’s “Hard Lessons” – Part I: Planning for Postwar Iraq September 2001 to May 2003)

(Musings On Iraq on Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction Hard Lessons Chapter 3 The Department of Defense Takes Charge)

(Musings On Iraq review Leap of Faith, Hubris Negligence, and America’s Greatest Foreign Policy

Tragedy)

(Musings On Iraq review Hard Lessons, The Iraq Reconstruction Experience)

Dec 18 Saddam scrapped all of Iraq’s defense plans for U.S. invasion and replaced them

with one he made himself Consisted of concentric circles around Baghdad and defending main cities

Dec 18 CIA Dir Tenet asked Germans if CURVEBALL could be interviewed Germany

            said no

(Musings On Iraq How Iraqi Defector CURVEBALL Became Basis For US Claim That Iraq Had WMD)

(Musings On Iraq Look Who The LA Times Dug Up – CURVEBALL)

(Musings On Iraq Story of CURVEBALL And Iraq’s Mobile Biological Weapons Labs)

Dec 18 CIA briefed Bush at NSC on difficulties recruiting and maintaining sources in

Iraq Said US talking about war while trying diplomacy at UN made Iraqis unwilling to come forward because weren’t sure whether Washington was going to remove Saddam or not Bush said knew it was a difficult situation but that was the course US was going to follow

Dec 18 UK Foreign Secretary Straw said Iraq in material breach of UN resolutions with

            its weapons declaration that denied it had WMD

Dec 18 IAEA head El Baradei in Reuters said no evidence that Iraq has worked on any

            nuclear facilities since 1998

(Musings On Iraq How US Intelligence Created An Iraqi Nuclear Threat In 2002)

Dec 18 UK Defense Ministry admitted that ships were taking troops and tanks to Persian

            Gulf

Dec 18 State Dept posted listing of omissions in Iraq’s UN weapons declaration

 

Dec 19 Gen Franks briefed Bush again on war plans Went over what could go wrong and

            lessons from war game

(Musings On Iraq review Leap of Faith, Hubris Negligence, and America’s Greatest Foreign Policy Tragedy)

Dec 19 Head UN inspector Blix and IAEA chief El Baradei told Security Council about

initial weapons inspections Blix said Iraq had not provided much new info Said 1 main problem was declared amounts of WMD produced vs what Iraq could’ve produced and 2 secret destruction of stocks Iraq’s claims and potential WMD production didn't match and had no proof of its secret destruction of stocks

(Musings On Iraq UN Inspectors Were Right Iraq Was Not A Threat)

(Musings On Iraq Iraq’s Rejection of UN Inspectors Led To Mistrust Over WMD and 2003 Invasion)

(Musings On Iraq Chilcot Inquiry Section 3.6 Development of UK Strategy and Options, November 2002 to January 2003)

Dec 19 Sec of State Powell and US Amb to UN Negroponte said Iraq in “material breach” of

disarmament obligations with its weapons declaration to UN

Dec 19 Sec State Powell said Iraq bought aluminum tubes for centrifuges

(Musings On Iraq How A Contested Aluminum Tubes Story Became The Basis For War With Iraq)

Dec 19 France said it was up to inspectors not US to determine whether Iraq was

            hiding WMD

Dec 19 Russia criticized US for not providing evidence to Security Council and

            inspectors of Iraqi violations during inspections

Dec 19 State Dept paper accused Iraq of active WMD programs rebuilding nuke

program Not disclosing them to UN Did not say it tried to buy uranium from Niger

(Musings On Iraq How US Intelligence Failed The Iraq-Niger Uranium Story)

(Musings On Iraq Review Hubris, The Inside Story of Spin, Scandal, And The Selling Of The Iraq War)

Dec 19 UK cabinet told Blair govt would declare Iraq in material breach of UN Resolution 1441 in

January 2003 because of its arms declaration

Dec 19 CNN/Time poll 63% of US respondents believed US war with Iraq was

            inevitable

Dec 19 CIA had meeting on Curveball informant that claimed Iraq had mobile WMD labs

German office chief said Curveball seemed unreliable Analyst said Curveball claim of Iraq mobile WMD labs corroborated by another source Was an INC defector Deputy CIA Dir’s executive assistant said Curveball was credible 

(Musings On Iraq How Iraqi Defector CURVEBALL Became Basis For US Claim That Iraq Had WMD)

(Musings On Iraq Look Who The LA Times Dug Up – CURVEBALL)

(Musings On Iraq Story of CURVEBALL And Iraq’s Mobile Biological Weapons Labs)

 

Dec 20 IAEA inspectors said Tuwaitha facility involved in civilian nuclear research not involved in

weapons program

(Musings On Iraq UN Inspectors Were Right Iraq Was Not A Threat)

(Musings On Iraq Iraq’s Rejection of UN Inspectors Led To Mistrust Over WMD and 2003 Invasion)

(Musings On Iraq Chilcot Inquiry Section 3.6 Development of UK Strategy and Options, November 2002 to January 2003)

Dec 20 CIA blocked UN Amb to UN Negroponte mentioning Iraq-Niger uranium deal in speech to

Security Council

(Musings On Iraq How US Intelligence Failed The Iraq-Niger Uranium Story)

(Musings On Iraq Review Hubris, The Inside Story of Spin, Scandal, And The Selling Of The Iraq War)

 

Dec 21 Dep CIA Dir McLaughlin briefed Bush on intel on Iraq WMD Said Iraq had precursors and

biological components Had unaccounted WMD artillery shells from Iran-Iraq War Showed rocket engine test site that passed prescribed ranges Showed satellite photo of suspected clean up of chemical weapons spill Showed UAV flown 500km past UN limit of 150km Went over reports of Iraq having mobile WMD labs Played recording of 2 Republican Guard officers talking about removing nerve agents Said Saddam met with nuclear scientists talking about resuming their work Bush Natl Sec Adv Rice and Chief of Staff Card unimpressed by CIA presentation on WMD CIA Dir Tenet said case was a “slam dunk” Administration had been making assertions about threat of Iraq’s WMD and when presented with facts Bush didn’t believe the case

(Musings On Iraq How Iraqi Defector CURVEBALL Became Basis For US Claims That Iraq Had WMD)

(Musings On Iraq How US Intelligence Created An Iraqi Nuclear Threat In 2002)

(Musings On Iraq review Leap of Faith, Hubris Negligence, and America’s Greatest Foreign

Policy Tragedy)

 

Dec 22 Iraq invited CIA into country to find its WMD

 

Dec 24 Niger Premier said that his country did not try to sell uranium to Iraq

(Musings On Iraq How US Intelligence Failed The Iraq-Niger Uranium Story)

(Musings On Iraq Review Hubris, The Inside Story of Spin, Scandal, And The Selling Of The Iraq War)

Dec 24 UK Foreign Secretary Straw told Sec of State Powell a 2nd UN resolution was needed to

gain UK political support and legal justification for war

(Musings On Iraq Review The Report of the Iraq Inquiry, Executive Summary)

 

Dec 28 Report NSC Sr Dir Near East Abrams drafted plan for US to seize control of Iraq’s southern

oil fields

 

Dec 29 US Senate authorized war against Iraq

 

Dec 30 UK Foreign Sec Straw and Sec of State Powell thought UN inspections would not provide

smoking gun against Iraq so alternatives needed

(Musings On Iraq UN Inspectors Were Right Iraq Was Not A Threat)

(Musings On Iraq Iraq’s Rejection of UN Inspectors Led To Mistrust Over WMD and 2003 Invasion)

Dec 30 UN inspectors said they had gone to all major suspected WMD sites and found nothing

Dec 30 Report Reagan admin and its Middle East envoy Rumsfeld did nothing while Iraq used

WMD in Iran-Iraq War

Dec 30 NYTimes article said CIA looking into Iraq buying smallpox from a Russian scientist

 

Dec 31 UN inspector told press they were finding no evidence of Iraq’s WMD and Western intel

providing nothing substantive

(Musings On Iraq UN Inspectors Were Right Iraq Was Not A Threat)

(Musings On Iraq Iraq’s Rejection of UN Inspectors Led To Mistrust Over WMD and 2003 Invasion)

(Musings On Iraq Chilcot Inquiry Section 3.6 Development of UK Strategy and Options, November 2002 to January 2003)

Dec 31 Bush said couldn’t tell whether Iraq had a nuclear weapon or not

(Musings On Iraq How US Intelligence Created An Iraqi Nuclear Threat In 2002)

 

2003

Jan 2 UN inspector told Irish Times no active WMD or nuclear programs found in Iraq

(Musings On Iraq UN Inspectors Were Right Iraq Was Not A Threat)

(Musings On Iraq Iraq’s Rejection of UN Inspectors Led To Mistrust Over WMD and 2003 Invasion)

(Musings On Iraq How US Intelligence Created An Iraqi Nuclear Threat In 2002)

(Musings On Iraq Chilcot Inquiry Section 3.6 Development of UK Strategy and Options, November 2002 to January 2003)

 

Jan 4 UK Foreign Policy Adviser Manning told Blair US almost given up on inspections because

wanted immediate action against Iraq Manning warned that US was pushing for war as soon as possible

(Musings On Iraq Review The Report of the Iraq Inquiry, Executive Summary)

(Musings On Iraq UN Inspectors Were Right Iraq Was Not A Threat)

(Musings On Iraq Iraq’s Rejection of UN Inspectors Led To Mistrust Over WMD and 2003 Invasion)

(Musings On Iraq Chilcot Inquiry Section 3.6 Development of UK Strategy and Options, November 2002 to January 2003)

Jan 4 US Natl Intel Council report said building democracy in Iraq would be long and difficult

(Musings On Iraq review Iraq’s Future The aftermath of regime change)

(Musings On Iraq review Leap of Faith, Hubris Negligence, and America’s Greatest Foreign Policy Tragedy)

 

Jan 6 Saddam said he was ready for war Accused UN inspectors of being spies

(Musings On Iraq UN Inspectors Were Right Iraq Was Not A Threat)

(Musings On Iraq Iraq’s Rejection of UN Inspectors Led To Mistrust Over WMD and 2003 Invasion)

Jan 6 IAEA asked State Dept for info about Iraq-Niger uranium deal

(Musings On Iraq How US Intelligence Failed The Iraq-Niger Uranium Story)

(Musings On Iraq Review Hubris, The Inside Story of Spin, Scandal, And The Selling Of The Iraq War)

Jan 6 IAEA head El Baradei no evidence of any suspicious Iraq nuclear activities

(Musings On Iraq How US Intelligence Created An Iraqi Nuclear Threat In 2002)

(Musings On Iraq Chilcot Inquiry Section 3.6 Development of UK Strategy and Options, November 2002 to January 2003)

Jan 6 Bush met with cabinet and said needed strong case vs Iraq for war

(Musings On Iraq review Leap of Faith, Hubris Negligence, and America’s Greatest Foreign

Policy Tragedy)

(Musings On Iraq Review Hubris, The Inside Story of Spin, Scandal, And The Selling Of The Iraq War)

(Musings On Iraq review The Bush Administrations and Saddam Hussein, Deciding on Conflict)

Jan 6 Report 100 US Special Forces and 50 CIA officers had been sent into Iraq end of 2002 along

            with Australian Jordanians and British commandos to find targets for invasion

 

Jan 7 IAEA went to Al Qaim facility 3rd time US claimed was an active Iraqi nuclear

            plant IAEA found it destroyed

(Musings On Iraq UN Inspectors Were Right Iraq Was Not A Threat)

(Musings On Iraq Iraq’s Rejection of UN Inspectors Led To Mistrust Over WMD and 2003 Invasion)

(Musings On Iraq How US Intelligence Created An Iraqi Nuclear Threat In 2002)

(Musings On Iraq Chilcot Inquiry Section 3.6 Development of UK Strategy and Options, November 2002 to January 2003)

(Musings On Iraq review Hoodwinked, The Documents That Reveal How Bush Sold Us a War)

 

Jan 8 Bush met with Congressional leaders and said he would make case to Congress and

            US public for war

Jan 8 Bush met with Republican leaders saying Saddam wasn’t complying and he would

            have to address US about war

(Musings On Iraq review Leap of Faith, Hubris Negligence, and America’s Greatest Foreign Policy Tragedy)

(Musings On Iraq Review Hubris, The Inside Story of Spin, Scandal, And The Selling Of The Iraq War)

(Musings On Iraq review The Bush Administrations and Saddam Hussein, Deciding on Conflict)

 

Jan 9 Head UN weapons inspector Blix said no smoking gun found in Iraq but

didn’t mean there were no WMD Said Iraq’s Dec weapons declaration was incomplete

(Musings On Iraq Chilcot Inquiry Section 3.6 Development of UK Strategy and Options, November 2002 to January 2003)

Jan 9 IAEA head El Baradei said aluminum tubes Iraq tried to buy were probably for

            rockets not nuclear program

(Musings On Iraq How A Contested Aluminum Tubes Story Became The Basis For War With Iraq)

Jan 9 White House responded to IAEA saying Iraq spinning it over aluminum tubes

(Musings On Iraq UN Inspectors Were Right Iraq Was Not A Threat)

(Musings On Iraq Iraq’s Rejection of UN Inspectors Led To Mistrust Over WMD and 2003 Invasion)

Jan 9 White House spokesman said US knew for a fact Iraq had WMD

Jan 9 Pentagon asked Jay Garner to head ORHA to run postwar Iraq 2 months

            before invasion He initially said no

Jan 9 Gen Franks briefed Bush on war plan Talked about Turkey’s refusal to allow in US

troops Franks worried about Jordan and Saudi Arabia staying on board for war Said he’d be ready for invasion by Feb 03 but March would be better

(Musings On Iraq review Leap of Faith, Hubris Negligence, and America’s Greatest Foreign

Policy Tragedy)

(Musings On Iraq review of Shaping the Plan for Operation Iraqi Freedom, The Role of Military Intelligence Assessment)

(Musings On Iraq review Losing Iraq, Inside The Post War Reconstruction Fiasco)

 

Jan 10 US official said Iraq was deceiving the IAEA about its nuclear program

(Musings On Iraq How US Intelligence Created An Iraqi Nuclear Threat In 2002)

Jan 10 Bush met with 3 Iraq dissidents Rend Francke Hatim Mukhlis Kanan Makiya Bush

said he thought Iraqis could have a democracy Mukhlis told Bush all Iraqis wanted Saddam out Makiya said removing Saddam would change US’s image in region Makiya told Bush that U.S. forces would be greeted with sweets and flowers in Iraq Mukhlis told Bush if US troops didn’t win support of Iraqis Iraq would turn into Somalia in 2 months 

(Musings On Iraq “We Will Be Greeted As Liberators” Why The Bush Administration Saw Iraq As A War Of Liberation)

(Musings On Iraq review Iraq’s Future The aftermath of regime change)

(Musings On Iraq review The Assassins’ Gate, America In Iraq)

(Musings On Iraq review What Happened, Inside the Bush White House and Washington’s Culture of Deception)

Jan 10 NYTimes article IAEA challenged aluminum tubes story that they were for nuke

program and Energy and State Depts thought they might be for rockets CIA, DIA, NSA, White House said aluminum tubes Iraq tried to buy were for centrifuges State and Energy Depts disagreed UK didn’t think tubes for nuke program White House official told NYTimes Iraq was spinning IAEA after it said aluminum tubes were not for centrifuges

(Musings On Iraq How A Contested Aluminum Tubes Story Became The Basis For War With Iraq)

(Musings On Iraq UN Inspectors Were Right Iraq Was Not A Threat)

(Musings On Iraq Iraq’s Rejection of UN Inspectors Led To Mistrust Over WMD and 2003 Invasion)

 

Jan 11 UK naval task force left for Persian Gulf for Iraq invasion

Jan 11 Rumsfeld and Joint Chiefs head Gen Myers met Saudi Amb to US Bandar to get

Saudi support for invasion Bandar said he needed Bush’s word to get Saudi support

Jan 11 CIA report Iraqi missile brigade outside Baghdad given missiles to hide from UN

            inspectors some with WMD agents Report used in Powell’s Feb 03 UN speech

 

Jan 12 State Dept told White House docs claiming Iraq-Niger uranium deal were fakes

Jan 12 State Dept intel analyst sent email to intel community arguing that Niger docs were fakes

(Musings On Iraq How US Intelligence Failed The Iraq-Niger Uranium Story)

(Musings On Iraq Review Hubris, The Inside Story of Spin, Scandal, And The Selling Of The Iraq War)

Jan 12 IAEA said it would be hard to believe that Iraq was hiding a complete nuclear

weapons program IAEA head El Baredei said provisional conclusion aluminum tubes Iraq tried to buy were for rockets not centrifuges

(Musings On Iraq How A Contested Aluminum Tubes Story Became The Basis For War With Iraq)

(Musings On Iraq UN Inspectors Were Right Iraq Was Not A Threat)

(Musings On Iraq Iraq’s Rejection of UN Inspectors Led To Mistrust Over WMD and 2003 Invasion)

(Musings On Iraq How US Intelligence Created An Iraqi Nuclear Threat In 2002)

(Musings On Iraq Chilcot Inquiry Section 3.6 Development of UK Strategy and Options, November 2002 to January 2003)

 

Jan 13 Bush told Powell he’d decided on war and needed his support Powell said he

would back president Powell reminded Bush that if US invaded Iraq it would have to run the country

(Musings On Iraq review Wanting War: Why the Bush Administration Invaded Iraq)

(Musings On Iraq review Leap of Faith, Hubris Negligence, and America’s Greatest Foreign

Policy Tragedy)

(Musings On Iraq Review Hubris, The Inside Story of Spin, Scandal, And The Selling Of The Iraq War)

(Musings On Iraq review The Bush Administrations and Saddam Hussein, Deciding on Conflict)

Jan 13 Powell decided he had to play out diplomacy with Iraq at UN despite Bush’s

            decision to go to war

Jan 13 Bush met Saudi Amb Bandar Gave assurance that US would remove Saddam

Jan 13 Blair TV speech said Iraq could give WMD to terrorists and US and UK could

            act against Iraq without 2nd UN resolution

(Musings On Iraq Review The Report of the Iraq Inquiry, Executive Summary)

Jan 13 Lord Goldsmith told Blair and Foreign Sec Straw that there needed to be a 2nd

            UN resolution against Iraq to go to war

(Musings On Iraq Section 3.7 Development of UK Strategy and Options, 1 February to 7 March 2003)

Jan 13 State Dept intel analyst told other analysts Iraq-Niger uranium docs were probably

            fake 2 CIA analysts said they saw problems with docs but didn’t think they were fakes

(Musings On Iraq How US Intelligence Failed The Iraq-Niger Uranium Story)

(Musings On Iraq Review Hubris, The Inside Story of Spin, Scandal, And The Selling Of The Iraq War)

Jan 13 Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Feith called ex-Gen Jay Garner to run

            postwar Iraq and he accepted

(Musings On Iraq on Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction Hard Lessons Chapter 3 The Department of Defense Takes Charge)

(Musings On Iraq review Hard Lessons, The Iraq Reconstruction Experience)

Jan 13 IAEA head El Baradei said inspectors needed a few months to finish work in Iraq

(Musings On Iraq UN Inspectors Were Right Iraq Was Not A Threat)

(Musings On Iraq Iraq’s Rejection of UN Inspectors Led To Mistrust Over WMD and 2003 Invasion)

Jan 13 NSA Dir Adm Hayden ordered decentralization of intel so that it could be

            distributed to combat units during invasion

 

Jan 14 Bush told press time running out for Saddam

(Musings On Iraq Review Hubris, The Inside Story of Spin, Scandal, And The Selling Of The Iraq War)

(Musings On Iraq review The Bush Administrations and Saddam Hussein, Deciding on Conflict)

Jan 14 Bush met Polish Pres Kwasniewski Said he would support US in war but asked

            about consequences

Jan 14 UK Attorney General Goldsmith told Blair that 2nd UN resolution was needed to have

            legal justification for war with Iraq

(Musings On Iraq Review The Report of the Iraq Inquiry, Executive Summary)

(Musings On Iraq Section 3.7 Development of UK Strategy and Options, 1 February to 7 March 2003)

 

Jan 15 Bush received 1st brief on postwar Iraq plans from NSC’s Abrams Went over

humanitarian aid Emphasized feeding public Abrams said money had to be secretly sent to aid groups that would work in Iraq because they didn’t want to be seen supporting war Abrams said Oil for Food program would be maintained after invasion to feed public Abrams said that 2 mil Iraqis might be displaced during invasion NSC officials had gone to military to make sure things like health centers weren’t bombed during invasion Bush thought humanitarian aid after war very important Thought could change image of US in Middle East Plans made irrelevant when Pentagon given control of postwar Iraq

(Musings On Iraq Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction’s “Hard Lessons” – Part I: Planning for Postwar Iraq September 2001 to May 2003)

(Musings On Iraq on Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction Hard Lessons Chapter 2 The Agencies Engage)

(Musings On Iraq review Leap of Faith, Hubris Negligence, and America’s Greatest Foreign

Policy Tragedy)

(Musings On Iraq review Hard Lessons, The Iraq Reconstruction Experience)

Jan 15 Aid groups that had with USAID about postwar Iraq plans asked to meet with

            Pentagon leadership Nothing happened

Jan 15 CIA told White House that paper on Iraq should say Iraq tried to buy uranium

            from Africa not mention Niger

(Musings On Iraq How US Intelligence Failed The Iraq-Niger Uranium Story)

(Musings On Iraq Review Hubris, The Inside Story of Spin, Scandal, And The Selling Of The Iraq War)

Jan 15 Blair said 2nd UN resolution not necessary for use of force against Iraq

(Musings On Iraq Review The Report of the Iraq Inquiry, Executive Summary)

(Musings On Iraq Section 3.7 Development of UK Strategy and Options, 1 February to 7 March 2003)

Jan 15 Report Rumsfeld okayed more aggressive patrols over Iraq no fly zones and

            attacks on Iraq air defense in prep for invasion

 

Jan 16 UN inspectors found 12 missile warheads that could carry WMD not included

            in Iraq’s 2002 weapons declaration

(Musings On Iraq UN Inspectors Were Right Iraq Was Not A Threat)

(Musings On Iraq Iraq’s Rejection of UN Inspectors Led To Mistrust Over WMD and 2003 Invasion)

Jan 16 Blair told cabinet 2nd UN resolution was not necessary for military action against

            Iraq even though he was told it was

(Musings On Iraq Review The Report of the Iraq Inquiry, Executive Summary)

(Musings On Iraq Chilcot Inquiry Section 3.6 Development of UK Strategy and Options, November 2002 to January 2003)

Jan 16 Future Office for Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA) head Garner

met with Rumsfeld and Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Feith Rumsfeld said no coordination of postwar planning Told Garner he needed to consult with different agencies and coordinate postwar plans Garner said in WWII US spent years planning for postwar situation and he was only given a few weeks for Iraq

(Musings On Iraq on Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction Hard Lessons Chapter 3 The Department of Defense Takes Charge)

(Musings On Iraq review Hard Lessons, The Iraq Reconstruction Experience)

(Musings On Iraq review Iraq and Back, Inside The War To Win The Peace)

(Musings On Iraq review Leap of Faith, Hubris Negligence, and America’s Greatest Foreign

Policy Tragedy)

(Musings On Iraq review State of Denial, Bush At War, Part III)

(Musings On Iraq Only 3 of 13 Reconstruction Contracts Were Signed Before War)

Jan 16 CIA received documents claiming Iraq-Niger uranium deal Sent to State Dept to

            be translated Turned out to be fakes

(Musings On Iraq How US Intelligence Failed The Iraq-Niger Uranium Story)

(Musings On Iraq Review Hubris, The Inside Story of Spin, Scandal, And The Selling Of The Iraq War)

Jan 16 Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Feith sent Rumsfeld memo saying Iraq-

Syria pipeline should be kept open after the war to see whether Damascus was willing to cooperate with US in Iraq

 

Jan 17 Pentagon memo said no decision on postwar govt in Iraq Said would be a military

administration transitional authority elections leading to an Iraqi govt Didn’t match Pentagon plans to quickly withdraw US troops

(Musings On Iraq review Leap of Faith, Hubris Negligence, and America’s Greatest Foreign Policy

Tragedy)

(Musings On Iraq review State of Denial, Bush At War, Part III)

Jan 17 Blair agreed to 1 UK division and 3 combat brigades for Iraq War to be deployed

            in south

Jan 17 UN inspectors after 4 inspections Fallujah II chlorine plant inoperative US

            claimed it was producing WMD

(Musings On Iraq UN Inspectors Were Right Iraq Was Not A Threat)

(Musings On Iraq Iraq’s Rejection of UN Inspectors Led To Mistrust Over WMD and 2003 Invasion)

Jan 17 CIA report said Iraq had rebuilt its nuclear program Said were reports Iraq tried to

            buy uranium from Africa

(Musings On Iraq How US Intelligence Created An Iraqi Nuclear Threat In 2002)

(Musings On Iraq How US Intelligence Failed The Iraq-Niger Uranium Story)

Jan 17 CIA told Joint Chiefs of Staff that it had some reports that Iraq tried to buy

            uranium from Africa

(Musings On Iraq How US Intelligence Failed The Iraq-Niger Uranium Story)

(Musings On Iraq Review Hubris, The Inside Story of Spin, Scandal, And The Selling Of The Iraq War)

 

Jan 18 UN inspectors said sites named by US as WMD facilities had been looked at and

            nothing found

(Musings On Iraq UN Inspectors Were Right Iraq Was Not A Threat)

(Musings On Iraq Iraq’s Rejection of UN Inspectors Led To Mistrust Over WMD and 2003 Invasion)

Jan 18 Report Saudis attempted to get Saddam to go into exile to avert war

 

Jan 19 US offered Saddam immunity if he departed Iraq to avert war

Jan 19 Pentagon officials opposed to Rumsfeld’s invasion plan complained to Time that

the Defense Secretary was taking over deployment orders for invasion Included comment by Ret Gen Norman Schwarzkops that Rumsfeld was interfering too much

(Musings On Iraq How Arguments Over Iraq Invasion Plan Were Fought Through Press Leaks)

Jan 19 Former UN inspector David Kay OpEd in Wash Post said UN weapons inspectors

            would never find any hard evidence against Iraq

(Musings On Iraq UN Inspectors Were Right Iraq Was Not A Threat)

(Musings On Iraq Iraq’s Rejection of UN Inspectors Led To Mistrust Over WMD and 2003 Invasion)

 

Jan 20 Bush and Cheney met with Joint Chiefs and president asked if anyone had any

            concerns about the invasion No objections made

Jan 20 Iraq’s Military Industrialization Commission ordered its director generals to come

            forward with any info on WMD

Jan 20 White House gave report to Congress on Iraq’s noncompliance with UN inspectors

            Included Iraq not mentioning trying to buy uranium

(Musings On Iraq How US Intelligence Failed The Iraq-Niger Uranium Story)

(Musings On Iraq Review Hubris, The Inside Story of Spin, Scandal, And The Selling Of The Iraq War)

(Musings On Iraq UN Inspectors Were Right Iraq Was Not A Threat)

(Musings On Iraq Iraq’s Rejection of UN Inspectors Led To Mistrust Over WMD and 2003 Invasion)

Jan 20 National Security Presidential Directive 24 gave Pentagon control of postwar Iraq Pentagon

would dismiss previous NSC planning and kick out State Department officials

(Musings On Iraq review Losing Iraq, Inside The Post War Reconstruction Fiasco)

(Musings On Iraq review Hard Lessons, The Iraq Reconstruction Experience)

Jan 20 Office for Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA) created to

            run post-war Iraq 2 months before invasion

(Musings On Iraq review Iraq and Back, Inside The War To Win The Peace)

(Musings On Iraq on Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction Hard Lessons Chapter 3 The Department of Defense Takes Charge)

Jan 20 UK announced it deployed ground forces for Iraq War

Jan 20 France’s Foreign Minister deVillepin said there was no justification for war

against Iraq Powell was furious because took threat of war off table at UN and strengthened Saddam

(Musings On Iraq Section 3.7 Development of UK Strategy and Options, 1 February to 7 March 2003)

 

Jan 21 Bush said that Saddam was not interested in disarming and that time was running

            out on Iraq

(Musings On Iraq Review Hubris, The Inside Story of Spin, Scandal, And The Selling Of The Iraq War)

(Musings On Iraq review The Bush Administrations and Saddam Hussein, Deciding on Conflict)

Jan 21 Blair said 2nd UN resolution not necessary for use of force against Iraq

(Musings On Iraq Review The Report of the Iraq Inquiry, Executive Summary)

Jan 21 Deputy Secretary of State Armitage spoke at US Inst of Peace saying US trying to

            avoid war but Iraq not accounted for its WMD

 

Jan 22 CIA sent its report on Iraq WMD to White House to help make case for war

Jan 22 CIA analyst told IAEA aluminum tubes Iraq tried to buy were for centrifuges

            IAEA said they were for rockets IAEA proved right

(Musings On Iraq How A Contested Aluminum Tubes Story Became The Basis For War With Iraq)

Jan 22 2nd meeting of US UK Australia on postwar Iraq Little came of meeting

 

Jan 23 Defense Ministry ordered that if Baghdad were to fall all govt buildings were to

            be looted and burned

Jan 23 Mukhabarat document called for looting and destruction of property if Saddam

            were overthrown

Jan 23 National Security Adviser Rice wrote NY Times OpEd saying Iraq was hiding its

WMD programs from UN inspectors and tried to buy uranium for its nuclear program

(Musings On Iraq How US Intelligence Created An Iraqi Nuclear Threat In 2002)

(Musings On Iraq How US Intelligence Failed The Iraq-Niger Uranium Story)

(Musings On Iraq Review Hubris, The Inside Story of Spin, Scandal, And The Selling Of The Iraq War)

(Musings On Iraq review What Happened, Inside the Bush White House and Washington’s Culture of Deception)

Jan 23 Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld said that Iraq’s WMD and ties to terrorism were

            one threat

Jan 23 Under Secretary of Defense Wolfowitz said Iraq had tons of WMD and time

running out for it Said Iraq didn’t make truthful arms declaration to UN Talked about Iraqi defectors provided intelligence on mobile WMD labs Claimed Iraqi govt was threatening Iraqi scientists so they wouldn’t talke with UN

(Musings On Iraq How US Intelligence Failed The Iraq-Niger Uranium Story)

Jan 23 White House released document saying Iraq hiding its WMD and tried to buy

            uranium for it nuke program

(Musings On Iraq How US Intelligence Failed The Iraq-Niger Uranium Story)

(Musings On Iraq Review Hubris, The Inside Story of Spin, Scandal, And The Selling Of The Iraq War)

 

Jan 24 Gen Franks presented final war plan to Rumsfeld and Joint Chiefs head Gen Myers

(Musings On Iraq review of Shaping the Plan for Operation Iraqi Freedom, The Role of

Military

(Musings On Iraq review Leap of Faith, Hubris Negligence, and America’s Greatest Foreign

Policy Tragedy)

Jan 24 2nd NYTimes article on Iraqi defector Haideri provided by INC Said that he’d led

to dozens of DIA reports on Iraq’s WMD DIA labeled him a fabricator May 02 but story continued to be used

Jan 24 Defense Policy Board’s Richard Perle accused CIA of being biased against INC so

            it wouldn’t interview people like Haideri

(Musings On Iraq review Losing Iraq, Inside The Post War Reconstruction Fiasco)

Jan 24 PM Blair sent note to Bush suggesting delaying Iraq invasion for a month to allow

            more time for postwar planning

Jan 24 UK Foreign Office legal adv Sir Wood told Foreign Secretary Straw that Britain could not

go to war with Iraq without a 2nd U.N. resolution

(Musings On Iraq Review The Report of the Iraq Inquiry, Executive Summary)

(Musings On Iraq Section 3.7 Development of UK Strategy and Options, 1 February to 7 March 2003)

Jan 24 IAEA told Wash Post aluminum tubes Iraq tried to buy were wrong for nuke

            program

(Musings On Iraq How A Contested Aluminum Tubes Story Became The Basis For War With Iraq)

Jan 24 Archaeologists and scholars briefed Pentagon about historical sites in Iraq that

            should be spared from bombing

Jan 24 DIA report repeated CIA reporting on Iraq-Niger uranium deal and Navy

reported uranium was in a warehouse in Benin Said Iraq could have gotten uranium

(Musings On Iraq How US Intelligence Failed The Iraq-Niger Uranium Story)

(Musings On Iraq Review Hubris, The Inside Story of Spin, Scandal, And The Selling Of The Iraq War)

 

Jan 25 Military Industrialization Commission officials had Republican Guard

            commanders sign docs that they had no WMD in units

(Musings On Iraq UN Inspectors Were Right Iraq Was Not A Threat)

(Musings On Iraq Iraq’s Rejection of UN Inspectors Led To Mistrust Over WMD and 2003 Invasion)

Jan 25 Cheney chief of staff Libby briefed National Security Adviser Rice Chief of Staff

Hadley Deputy Secretary of State Hadley Deputy Defense Secretary Wolfowitz Bush aide Bartlett speech writer Gerson former communications chief Hughes on case vs Iraq’s WMD and ties to Al Qaeda Libby said Iraq hiding its WMD and cleaning sites before UN inspections Claimed Iraq-Al Qaeda ties strong Played recording of 2 Al Qaeda operatives talking about poisons that Libby said they got from Iraq Claimed 9/11 hijacker met with Iraq intelligence in Prague up to 4 times

 

Jan 26 Secretary of State Powell speech asked why Iraq tried to buy uranium

(Musings On Iraq How US Intelligence Failed The Iraq-Niger Uranium Story)

(Musings On Iraq Review Hubris, The Inside Story of Spin, Scandal, And The Selling Of The Iraq War)

Jan 26 Blair said Iraq non-cooperation with UN inspectors was material breach of UN Resolution

(Musings On Iraq UN Inspectors Were Right Iraq Was Not A Threat)

(Musings On Iraq Iraq’s Rejection of UN Inspectors Led To Mistrust Over WMD and 2003 Invasion)

 

Jan 27 Head UN inspector Blix told Security Council that Iraq cooperating with

inspections but had not accepted disarmament Asked what undeclared WMD items did Iraq have Asked did it illegally produce anything after 1998 Claimed Iraq’s WMD declaration had provided no new information and not answered questions about Iraq’s production of anthrax and VX gas and WMD bombs from Iran-Iraq War

Jan 27 IAEA head El Baradei told Security Council IAEA had found no evidence of an

active nuclear program in Iraq Said aluminum tubes Iraq tried to buy were probably for rockets not nuclear program

(Musings On Iraq How A Contested Aluminum Tubes Story Became The Basis For War With Iraq)

(Musings On Iraq UN Inspectors Were Right Iraq Was Not A Threat)

(Musings On Iraq Iraq’s Rejection of UN Inspectors Led To Mistrust Over WMD and 2003 Invasion)

(Musings On Iraq How US Intelligence Created An Iraqi Nuclear Threat In 2002)

Jan 27 Secretary of State Powell said Iraq was hiding its WMD

(Musings On Iraq Iraq One Of The Worst Intelligence Failures In US History)

(Musings On Iraq review What Happened, Inside the Bush White House and Washington’s Culture of Deception)

Jan 27 US intelligence said Blix would back off next declaration to UN on inspections

because didn’t want to cause war Some in White House believed Blix lying about inspections and he could not be trusted

Jan 27 Bush thought US stuck in inspection process and pushed him towards war

Jan 27 CIA report said Iraq tried to buy uranium from Niger in 1999 Said was uranium

            in warehouse in Benin but was going to France not Iraq

Jan 27 CIA Director Tenet given copy of Bush’s State of the Union address that included

claim that Iraq tried to buy uranium from Niger Tenet didn’t read speech CIA had struck claim from two previous speeches

Jan 27 CIA Berlin chief said that Iraqi defector CURVEBALL was considered a problem

            by Germans and they hadn’t confirmed any of his stories of mobile WMD labs

(Musings On Iraq How Iraqi Defector CURVEBALL Became Basis For US Claim That Iraq Had WMD)

(Musings On Iraq Look Who The LA Times Dug Up – CURVEBALL)

(Musings On Iraq Story of CURVEBALL And Iraq’s Mobile Biological Weapons Labs)

(Musings On Iraq How US Intelligence Failed The Iraq-Niger Uranium Story)

Jan 27 ORHA began contracting for supplies and personnel 2 months before invasion

(Musings On Iraq on Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction Hard Lessons Chapter 3 The Department of Defense Takes Charge)

(Musings On Iraq review Leap of Faith, Hubris Negligence, and America’s Greatest Foreign

Policy Tragedy)

Jan 27 William Safire NYTimes piece said Zarqawi went to Baghdad Then to Kurdistan

            to Ansar al-Islam proving Iraq-Al Qaeda link

(Musings On Iraq Why Didn’t Bush Strike Zarqawi And Ansar al-Islam In 2002?)

(Musings On Iraq review Insurgent Iraq, Al Zarqawi and the New Generation)

(Musings On Iraq review The Master Plan, ISIS, Al-Qaeda, and the Jihadi Strategy For Final Victory)

 

Jan 28 Bush’s State of Union said Iraq wasn’t disarming and hiding its programs from

weapons inspections Asked what 9/11 hijackers could’ve done if given WMD by Iraq Said Iraq had 25,000 liters of anthrax enough to make 38,000 liters of botulinum toxin Making sarin and VX gas Had mobile WMD labs Claimed Iraq tried to buy aluminum tubes for its nuclear program Said British learned Iraq tried to buy uranium from Africa Claimed said Saddam was harboring Al Qaeda members

(Musings On Iraq review What Happened, Inside the Bush White House and Washington’s Culture of Deception)

(Musings On Iraq review Wanting War: Why the Bush Administration Invaded Iraq)

(Musings On Iraq review Iraq’s Future The aftermath of regime change)

(Musings On Iraq review Leap of Faith, Hubris Negligence, and America’s Greatest Foreign

Policy Tragedy)

(Musings On Iraq How A Contested Aluminum Tubes Story Became The Basis For War With Iraq)

(Musings On Iraq How US Intelligence Failed The Iraq-Niger Uranium Story)

(Musings On Iraq How Iraqi Defector CURVEBALL Became Basis For US Claims That Iraq Had WMD)

(Musings On Iraq UN Inspectors Were Right Iraq Was Not A Threat)

(Musings On Iraq Iraq’s Rejection of UN Inspectors Led To Mistrust Over WMD and 2003 Invasion)

Jan 28 UK Foreign Secretary Straw told Foreign Office legal adviser Wood that he didn’t think 2nd

            UN resolution was necessary for action vs Iraq

(Musings On Iraq Review The Report of the Iraq Inquiry, Executive Summary)

Jan 28 ORHA head Garner met with NSC’s Zalimay who said goal of postwar Iraq

            should be getting Iraqis to govern as soon as possible

(Musings On Iraq on Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction Hard Lessons Chapter 3 The Department of Defense Takes Charge)

(Musings On Iraq review State of Denial, Bush At War, Part III)

Jan 28 Cheney Chief of Staff Libby gave copy of his briefing on Iraq WMD and ties to

            Al Qaeda to Powell to be used as basis for his UN speech

 

Jan 29 US Ambassador to the UN Negroponte said Iraq bought aluminum tubes for nuke

            program

(Musings On Iraq How A Contested Aluminum Tubes Story Became The Basis For War With Iraq)

Jan 29 Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld said Iraq had a nuke weapons program and tried

            to buy uranium from Africa

(Musings On Iraq How US Intelligence Failed The Iraq-Niger Uranium Story)

(Musings On Iraq Review Hubris, The Inside Story of Spin, Scandal, And The Selling Of The Iraq War)

(Musings On Iraq review What Happened, Inside the Bush White House and Washington’s Culture of Deception)

Jan 29 Secretary of State Powell’s Chief of Staff Wilkerson went to CIA to go over info

to be used in Secretary’s UN speech Wilkerson ended up rejecting Cheney Chief of Staff Libby’s briefing as basis for speech CIA Director Tenet said Powell should use National Intelligence Estimate on Iraq instead

Jan 29 Aid groups warned that if Pentagon ran postwar Iraq many international donors

            would be reluctant to give relief

(Musings On Iraq review Losing Iraq, Inside The Post War Reconstruction Fiasco)

 

Jan 30 Bush told Italian Premier Berlusconi that Iraq would be disarmed and Saddam

            removed

Jan 30 US Ambassador to the UN Negroponte told Senate aluminum tubes Iraq bought

            were not right for rockets in response to IAEA findings

(Musings On Iraq How A Contested Aluminum Tubes Story Became The Basis For War With Iraq)

Jan 30 Same hearing Deputy Secretary of State Armitage said there were differences in

            US about the tubes

Jan 30 White House spokesman said Bush stood by claim that aluminum tubes Iraq tried

            to buy were for nuclear program

Jan 30 CIA and Congressional inquiries found no evidence White House pressured US

            intel on Iraq’s WMD

Jan 30 Powell’s chief of staff Wilkerson began going through intel on Iraq with CIA for

            Powell’s Feb 03 UN speech

Jan 30 Aid group warned that breakdown of law and order likely right after Iraq invasion

            unless US immediately established control

Jan 30 UK Attorney General Goldsmith wrote Blair telling him UN Res 1441 didn’t

            authorize use of force against Iraq

(Musings On Iraq Review The Report of the Iraq Inquiry, Executive Summary)

 

Jan 31 Blair’s advisers told him had to prioritize pushing Bush on postwar planning for

Iraq but Blair failed to do so

Jan 31 Bush and Blair said that invasion would start Mar 10 2003 Blair told Bush he

needed a 2nd UN resolution for use of force against Iraq for domestic politics Bush agreed Decided a 2nd U.N. resolution would be good against Iraq but not necessary to go to war Talked about provoking Iraq to help justify war including getting US spy plane fired upon Bush said fighting between Iraqi factions would be unlikely after invasion

(Musings On Iraq review Leap of Faith, Hubris Negligence, and America’s Greatest Foreign

Policy Tragedy)

(Musings On Iraq Review Hubris, The Inside Story of Spin, Scandal, And The Selling Of The Iraq War)

(Musings On Iraq review The Bush Administrations and Saddam Hussein, Deciding on Conflict)

(Musings On Iraq Section 3.7 Development of UK Strategy and Options, 1 February to 7 March 2003)

Jan 31 Memo Blair and Bush met in DC Said Bush had decided to go to war with Iraq and

            Blair agreed

(Musings On Iraq Review The Report of the Iraq Inquiry, Executive Summary)

 

Feb 1 Chief UN inspector Blix refused US claims that Iraq was sending WMD and

            scientists outside country to hide them

(Musings On Iraq UN Inspectors Were Right Iraq Was Not A Threat)

(Musings On Iraq Iraq’s Rejection of UN Inspectors Led To Mistrust Over WMD and 2003 Invasion)

Feb 1 US Army War College study said ehtnosectarian differences could lead to civil war

or fractured state after fall of Saddam Said longer US presence in Iraq the more resistance it would face Said ethnosectarian parties would probably emerge in Iraq and increase divisions Warned that there would be terrorism providing services would be difficult oil could not pay for reconstruction Suggested 135 tasks US had to take care of to ensure stability of postwar Iraq Included securing border setting up local govts setting up police restoring electricity running hospitals reorganizing military disarming militias Said US would have to occupy Iraq for a long time and building democracy a huge challenge Warned US could win the Iraq war and lose the peace

(Musings On Iraq review Iraq’s Future The aftermath of regime change)

(Musings On Iraq Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction’s “Hard Lessons” – Part I: Planning for Postwar Iraq September 2001 to May 2003)

(Musings On Iraq review Leap of Faith, Hubris Negligence, and America’s Greatest Foreign

Policy Tragedy)

Feb 1 Powell went to CIA HQ to go over Iraq-Al Qaeda intel for UN speech Decided to

focus upon Zarqawi Cheney Chief of Staff Libby and Deputy National Security Adviser Hadley wanted Powell to use story that 9/11 hijacker Atta met with Iraqi intel in Prague in 2001 Powell said no because CIA questioned it

(Musings On Iraq review Insurgent Iraq, Al Zarqawi and the New Generation)

 

Feb 2 Powell and his deputy Armitage went to CIA to go through Iraq intel to use in his

UN speech Decided to use 3 intercepts of Iraqi officers perhaps talking about hiding WMD Decided to use CIA intel on Zarqawi operating in Kurdistan CIA Dir Tenet told Powell no intel Saddam directly involved with Zarqawi Powell decided to claim Iraq giving sanctuary to Zarqawi

(Musings On Iraq review Insurgent Iraq, Al Zarqawi and the New Generation)

 

Feb 3 UK issued paper on Iraqi deception campaign to hide its WMD Later turned out 60% was

plagiarized from a journal article

Feb 3 Secretary of State Powell OpEd in Wall St Journal said Iraq hiding its WMD

(Musings On Iraq Iraq One Of The Worst Intelligence Failures In US History)

Feb 3 CIA asked Italian intel for more info on Iraq-Niger deal but it had none

(Musings On Iraq How US Intelligence Failed The Iraq-Niger Uranium Story)

(Musings On Iraq Review Hubris, The Inside Story of Spin, Scandal, And The Selling Of The Iraq War)

 

Feb 4 US gave documents on alleged Iraq-Niger uranium deal to IAEA

(Musings On Iraq How US Intelligence Failed The Iraq-Niger Uranium Story)

(Musings On Iraq Review Hubris, The Inside Story of Spin, Scandal, And The Selling Of The Iraq War)

Feb 4 UN inspectors looked at two alleged mobile WMD labs and found nothing

(Musings On Iraq How Iraqi Defector CURVEBALL Became Basis For US Claims That Iraq Had WMD)

(Musings On Iraq Look Who The LA Times Dug Up – CURVEBALL)

(Musings On Iraq The Story Of CURVEBALL And Iraq’s Mobile Biological Weapons Labs)

Feb 4 CIA analyst emailed Deputy Chief of Iraq Task Force that Iraqi defector

CURVEBALL’s story of mobile WMD labs should not be used Deputy Chief said war coming so didn’t matter if there were questions about Curveball

Feb 4 CIA Director Tenet warned by European chief Drumheller that there were problems

with Curveball’s story that Iraq had mobile WMD labs Tenet said don’t worry

(Musings On Iraq How Iraqi Defector CURVEBALL Became Basis For US Claim That Iraq Had WMD)

(Musings On Iraq Look Who The LA Times Dug Up – CURVEBALL)

(Musings On Iraq Story of CURVEBALL And Iraq’s Mobile Biological Weapons Labs)

Feb 4 Blair said plan was to get UN to show Iraq not cooperating on WMD and then have

Arab countries make Saddam step down

Feb 4 Powell and Turkey’s Foreign Min Yakis met to talk about US aid in return for

            using Turkey in Iraq invasion

(Musings On Iraq review Losing Iraq, Inside The Post War Reconstruction Fiasco)

 

Feb 5 Before Powell’s UN speech Bush met with 20 Congressional leaders to lobby them

on Iraq National Security Adviser Rice told them US had tried everything and now war only option Rice said she was confident WMD would be found after war Briefly went over postwar plans

(Musings On Iraq review Leap of Faith, Hubris Negligence, and America’s Greatest Foreign Policy

Tragedy)

Feb 5 Powell and UK Foreign Secretary Straw met before UN speech Both skeptical

            about Iraq intel Powell thought most was circumstantial

Feb 5 Secretary of State Powell gave UN speech laying out US case against Iraq’s WMD

and Iraq-Al Qaeda ties using Zarqawi Claimed Iraq hiding its WMD from inspectors Said Qusay Hussein ordered removal of banned materials form sites Claimed WMD missiles had been distributed to western Iraq Said human sources reported Iraq had mobile WMD labs Claimed Iraq had UAVs that could be used to deliver WMD Said some disagreements within US intel community but most agreed Iraq tried to buy aluminum tubes for centrifuges Said Iraq gave safe haven to Zarqawi in Kurdistan Said Iraq-Al Qaeda had 8 meetings since 1990s Claimed Iraq gave Al Qaeda training in WMD

(Musings On Iraq review Insurgent Iraq, Al Zarqawi and the New Generation)

(Musings On Iraq review Iraq’s Future The aftermath of regime change)

(Musings On Iraq review What Happened, Inside the Bush White House and Washington’s Culture of Deception)

(Musings On Iraq How Iraqi Defector CURVEBALL Became Basis For US Claims That Iraq Had WMD)

(Musings On Iraq How A Contested Aluminum Tubes Story Became The Basis For War With Iraq)

Feb 5 Natl Sec Adv Rice on Larry King said there was an Iraq-Al Qaeda connection Said Saddam

could give WMD to terrorists

Feb 5 Chief UN inspector Blix told press never found any evidence of Iraq having mobile

            WMD labs

(Musings On Iraq UN Inspectors Were Right Iraq Was Not A Threat)

(Musings On Iraq Iraq’s Rejection of UN Inspectors Led To Mistrust Over WMD and 2003 Invasion)

Feb 5 3rd meeting of US UK Australia on postwar Iraq planning US rejected any role for

            UN

Feb 5 Washington Post editorial said Iraq violating UN resolutions and would support

            war

 

Feb 6 Bush said there was an Iraq-Al Qaeda relationship going to back to 1990s Said Iraq gave

bomb making forgery and WMD training to Al Qaeda Came from tortured Al Qaeda operative who later recanted story

(Musings On Iraq review What Happened, Inside the Bush White House and Washington’s Culture of Deception)

Feb 6 UK Foreign Secretary Straw wrote Attorney General Lord Goldsmith challenging need for

            2nd UN resolution to go to war with Iraq

(Musings On Iraq Review The Report of the Iraq Inquiry, Executive Summary)

Feb 6 Pentagon memo on postwar Iraq justice system said US needed to deploy 4,000 police or

3,000 international police to assure law and order Said military had no plans for that Asked if US was going to train a new Iraqi police force Estimated that would cost $700 mil the first year Asked if that money was available

(Musings On Iraq review Leap of Faith, Hubris Negligence, and America’s Greatest Foreign

Policy Tragedy)

Feb 6 Press revealed most of UK intel dossier on Iraq trying to hide WMD was

            plagiarized from a journal article

Feb 6 Khalizad met with Turkmen Front Kurds Turks to try to make deal between

            Ankara and Kurds to facilitate using Turkey for invasion

(Musings On Iraq review Losing Iraq, Inside The Post War Reconstruction Fiasco)

Feb 6 NY Times Washington Post USA Today editorials all said Powell’s UN speech

            convinced them of Iraq threat

 

Feb 7 US officials pushed back against Powell’s UN speech Told Wash Post Zarqawi

            connected to Al Qaeda but not part of group

(Musings On Iraq review Insurgent Iraq, Al Zarqawi and the New Generation)

Feb 7 Pres Chirac called Bush saying there were alternatives to war with Iraq Said if war

            happened France would help with reconstruction

Feb 7 State Dept memo warned of serious problems in postwar Iraq and possible security vacuum

after war Were told military couldn't spare troops to ensure security

(Musings On Iraq review Leap of Faith, Hubris Negligence, and America’s Greatest Foreign

Policy Tragedy)

Feb 7 Pres Mubarak’s son Gamal visited Bush saying Saddam might want to go into exile

            in Egypt

Feb 7 UK admitted paper on Iraq deception campaign over its WMD was plagiarized

            from US college student paper

Feb 7 State Dept gave translated copies of Iraq-Niger uranium deal to CIA Were not

            considered important to case Iraq restarted nuke program so docs not analyzed

(Musings On Iraq How US Intelligence Failed The Iraq-Niger Uranium Story)

(Musings On Iraq Review Hubris, The Inside Story of Spin, Scandal, And The Selling Of The Iraq War)

 

Feb 8 Bush said Iraq trying to buy equipment for WMD Saddam authorized his

            commanders to use chemical weapons

(Musings On Iraq Iraq One Of The Worst Intelligence Failures In US History)

(Musings On Iraq review What Happened, Inside the Bush White House and Washington’s Culture of Deception)

Feb 8 Iraq turned over new documents about its WMD programs to UN inspectors

            that was called substantial

Feb 8 UN inspectors went to site CURVEBALL claimed was secret WMD facility and

            found nothing

(Musings On Iraq How Iraqi Defector CURVEBALL Became Basis For US Claim That Iraq Had WMD)

(Musings On Iraq Look Who The LA Times Dug Up – CURVEBALL)

(Musings On Iraq Story of CURVEBALL And Iraq’s Mobile Biological Weapons Labs)

(Musings On Iraq UN Inspectors Were Right Iraq Was Not A Threat)

(Musings On Iraq Iraq’s Rejection of UN Inspectors Led To Mistrust Over WMD and 2003 Invasion)

 

Feb 9 France and Germany proposed tripling number of UN inspectors in Iraq US attacked plan

(Musings On Iraq Section 3.7 Development of UK Strategy and Options, 1 February to 7 March 2003)

Feb 9 Pentagon memo said that there would be security vacuum after invasion leading to disorder

Said civilians at Pentagon expected military to come up with troops to preserve order but military wanted troops for other tasks Memo was rejected by CENTCOM that said war plan was to get to Baghdad and couldn’t leave troops behind to maintain order

(Musings On Iraq review Leap of Faith, Hubris Negligence, and America’s Greatest Foreign Policy Tragedy)

Feb 9 Report UK intel didn’t think there was an Iraq-al Qaeda connection

(Musings On Iraq Review The Report of the Iraq Inquiry, Executive Summary)

(Musings On Iraq Section 3.7 Development of UK Strategy and Options, 1 February to 7 March 2003)

Feb 9 Observer article disputed Iraqi defector Mohammed Shahab used in March 02 New

            Yorker article who claimed Iraq connected to Al Qaeda via Ansar al-Islam

 

Feb 10 Australian Premier Howard met Bush Bush said Saddam would leave power or US

            would remove him

Feb 10 France Germany Russia statement called for more time for inspections Doused hopes that

            France would vote for or abstain on 2nd UN resolution on Iraq authorizing use of force

(Musings On Iraq Section 3.7 Development of UK Strategy and Options, 1 February to 7 March 2003)

Feb 10 UK intel report said attack on Iraq would increase threat of terrorist attacks by Al

            Qaeda

Feb 10 New Yorker article reported Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Feith’s office

            claim that Iraq connected to Al Qaeda and supporting Zarqawi

(Musings On Iraq review Insurgent Iraq, Al Zarqawi and the New Generation)

Feb 10 German officials investigating Zarqawi said found no evidence he was linked to

            Iraqi govt

Feb 10 US defense attache report that it looked at Benin warehouse and found no

            uranium headed for Iraq Inspection done in Dec 2002

(Musings On Iraq How US Intelligence Failed The Iraq-Niger Uranium Story)


 

Feb 11 Bin Laden released tape calling on Iraqis to resist coming US invasion and called

            Baath infidels

Feb 11 Secretary of State Powell claimed bin Laden complained about effect of

            sanctions on Iraqi people showed Baghdad aligned with Al Qaeda and terrorism

Feb 11 CIA Dir Tenet told Senate Iraq had WMD and was hiding them from UN Inspectors Said

Iraq tried to buy aluminum tubes from for its nuclear program Had mobile WMD labs Told Senate Iraq harboring Zarqawi and Al Qaeda associate Iraq trained Al Qaeda operatives

(Musings On Iraq UN Inspectors Were Right Iraq Was Not A Threat)

(Musings On Iraq Iraq’s Rejection of UN Inspectors Led To Mistrust Over WMD and 2003 Invasion)

(Musings On Iraq How A Contested Aluminum Tubes Story Became The Basis For War With Iraq)

(Musings On Iraq How Iraqi Defector CURVEBALL Became Basis For US Claims That Iraq Had WMD)

(Musings On Iraq review Insurgent Iraq, Al Zarqawi and the New Generation)

Feb 11 CIA senior Africa analyst said that Iraq-Niger uranium docs looked like fakes

(Musings On Iraq How US Intelligence Failed The Iraq-Niger Uranium Story)

(Musings On Iraq Review Hubris, The Inside Story of Spin, Scandal, And The Selling Of The Iraq War)

Feb 11 Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Feith and Under Secertary of State Grossman

testified to Senate Foreign Relations Committee on postwar Iraq plans Didn’t give any details Grossman said US would only stay in Iraq as long as necessary Would go through 4 phases to postwar Iraq 1st stability 2nd handing authority to Iraqis 3rd New constitution 4th electing new Iraqi govt Told Senate US would not create a govt in exile before invasion Committees would be formed to create new Iraq Iraqi institutions would still be running to help govern country Claimed White House authorized Future of Iraq Project as roadmap for Iraq Had been discarded by Pentagon Feith said Iraqi oil would pay for all reconstruction and running govt Said US would not impose any leaders or govt on Iraq

(Musings On Iraq on Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction Hard Lessons Chapter 3 The Department of Defense Takes Charge)

(Musings On Iraq Iraq Oil Would Pay For Reconstruction)

(Musings On Iraq review Leap of Faith, Hubris Negligence, and America’s Greatest Foreign

Policy Tragedy)

(Musings On Iraq review State of Denial, Bush At War, Part III)

(Musings On Iraq review Hard Lessons, The Iraq Reconstruction Experience)

Feb 11 Former CENTCOM commander Gen Zinni testified to Senate Said U.S. had to

maintain law and order peacekeeping civil unrest had to be stopped and prevent revenge develop local police

 

Feb 12 CIA Director Tenet testified to Senate Armed Services Committee Said Iraq had

larger WMD program then before Gulf War Warned Iraq would get a nuclear weapon sooner or later and would have missiles to deliver it Said US had briefed UN on all suspected WMD sites In reality didn’t provide information on 21 of 105 sites Said there were Iraq-Al Qaeda contacts but no command and control

(Musings On Iraq How US Intelligence Created An Iraqi Nuclear Threat In 2002)

Feb 12 UN inspectors announce Iraq’s Samoud 2 missiles violate range limits set by

            UN

Feb 12 IAEA interviewed Iraq’s ex-ambassador to Vatican Zahawie who was named in

            Iraq-Niger uranium deal docs Denied story

(Musings On Iraq How US Intelligence Failed The Iraq-Niger Uranium Story)

(Musings On Iraq Review Hubris, The Inside Story of Spin, Scandal, And The Selling Of The Iraq War)

 

Feb 13 UN announced it had humanitarian plan for Iraq working with 6 regional

            countries and had $30.6 mil and would ask for another $88.8 mil

Feb 13 CENTCOM Cmdr Gen Franks told Bush he had Iraqi mayors for each city to run

            things after invasion He didn’t

(Musings On Iraq review Leap of Faith, Hubris Negligence, and America’s Greatest Foreign

Policy Tragedy)

(Musings On Iraq on Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction Hard Lessons Chapter 3 The Department of Defense Takes Charge)

Feb 13 IAEA interviewed Iraq’s ex-ambassador to Vatican Zahawie second time over

            Iraq-Niger uranium deal Denied story

(Musings On Iraq How US Intelligence Failed The Iraq-Niger Uranium Story)

(Musings On Iraq Review Hubris, The Inside Story of Spin, Scandal, And The Selling Of The Iraq War)

 

Feb 14 Chief Inspector Blix briefed Security Council on Iraq inspections Said found no

evidence of WMD Said 400 inspections at 300 sites Were all without notice and gained entry every time Said Iraqis cooperating Soil samples showed no signs of WMD Iraq still had unaccounted for materials Found 2 banned missiles Refuted Powell’s claim that Iraqis were cleaning WMD sites before inspections

(Musings On Iraq Section 3.7 Development of UK Strategy and Options, 1 February to 7 March 2003)

Feb 14 IAEA head El Baradei said it had dismembered Iraq’s nuke program in 1998 and

found no evidence that it had been restarted yet Said Iraq had provided documents for why aluminum tubes it tried to buy had such specific specifications

(Musings On Iraq How A Contested Aluminum Tubes Story Became The Basis For War With Iraq)

(Musings On Iraq UN Inspectors Were Right Iraq Was Not A Threat)

(Musings On Iraq Iraq’s Rejection of UN Inspectors Led To Mistrust Over WMD and 2003 Invasion)

Feb 14 Powell told Security Council Iraq not cooperating with inspections and use of

            force still an option

Feb 14 Saddam issued presidential directive banning companies from importing

            equipment for WMD

Feb 14 Defense Secretary Rumsfeld gave speech that U.S. was opposed to nation building

            in Iraq

(Musings On Iraq review Liberate And Leave, Fatal Flaws In The Early Strategy For Postwar Iraq)

(Musings On Iraq review Leap of Faith, Hubris Negligence, and America’s Greatest Foreign Policy Tragedy)

(Musings On Iraq on Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction Hard Lessons Chapter 3 The Department of Defense Takes Charge)

Feb 14 Wash Post editorial supported war with Iraq

Feb 14 NSC met over how to respond to a coup in Iraq Didn’t think it was likely but had

            to plan for it

 

Feb 15 Protests in more than 600 cities around world against going to war with Iraq

Feb 15 Bush told Rumsfeld to slow troop deployments because getting ahead of diplomacy

 

Feb 16 National Security Adviser Rice claimed Iraq was deceiving UN weapons inspectors

(Musings On Iraq UN Inspectors Were Right Iraq Was Not A Threat)

(Musings On Iraq Iraq’s Rejection of UN Inspectors Led To Mistrust Over WMD and 2003 Invasion)

 

Feb 17 U2 spy planes began flying over Iraq for UN weapons inspectors

Feb 17 Turkish parliament delayed vote to allow deployment of US troops

            for Iraq invasion due to domestic opposition

Feb 17 IAEA found that Iraq-Niger uranium docs were fakes

(Musings On Iraq How US Intelligence Failed The Iraq-Niger Uranium Story)

(Musings On Iraq Review Hubris, The Inside Story of Spin, Scandal, And The Selling Of The Iraq War)

 

Feb 19 ORHA head Garner briefed Natl Sec Adv Rice to use Iraqi army and police to

            help rebuilding Iraq after war

(Musings On Iraq on Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction Hard Lessons Chapter 3 The Department of Defense Takes Charge)

(Musings On Iraq review Leap of Faith, Hubris Negligence, and America’s Greatest Foreign

Policy Tragedy)

Feb 19 Ahmed Chalabi OpEd in Wall St Journal Said Iraqis would welcome US liberation but

needed to include them in administration and decision making

(Musings On Iraq review The Man Who Pushed America To War, The Extraordinary Life, Adventures, and Obsessions of Ahmad Chalabi)

(Musings On Iraq review Arrows of the Night: Ahmad Chalabi and the Selling of the Iraq War)

 

Feb 20 Chief UN Inspector Blix told Blair intelligence he’d gotten wasn’t great and

            maybe Iraq didn’t have much WMD

(Musings On Iraq UN Inspectors Were Right Iraq Was Not A Threat)

(Musings On Iraq Iraq’s Rejection of UN Inspectors Led To Mistrust Over WMD and 2003 Invasion)

Feb 20 UN sources told press US intel on Iraq WMD was not turning up anything

Feb 20 Report interviews with Iraqi scientists by inspectors had not turned up any evidence

            of a nuclear program

(Musings On Iraq How US Intelligence Created An Iraqi Nuclear Threat In 2002)

Feb 20 Pew/Council on Foreign Relations poll found 57% of Americans believed Saddam involved

in 9/11

 

Feb 21 ORHA staff met in DC to have run through of their Iraq postwar plans

(Musings On Iraq on Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction Hard Lessons Chapter 3 The Department of Defense Takes Charge)

(Musings On Iraq review Leap of Faith, Hubris Negligence, and America’s Greatest Foreign

Policy Tragedy)

Feb 21 Blair met Bush at Camp David to reaffirm their alliance to remove Saddam

(Musings On Iraq Review The Report of the Iraq Inquiry, Executive Summary)

 

Feb 22 Bush administration officially announced it was deploying forces for invasion

            Actually started Dec 02

(Musings On Iraq review Wanting War: Why the Bush Administration Invaded Iraq)

(Musings On Iraq review Leap of Faith, Hubris Negligence, and America’s Greatest Foreign Policy Tragedy)

Feb 22 Spanish Pres Aznar visited Bush Had group call with Blair and Italian Premier Berlusconi

Bush said he had lost patience Wanted a 2nd Un resolution as quickly as possible to authorize use of force vs Iraq Bush threatened retaliation against members of UN security council that might vote against resolution Bush said Iraq was a historic moment to spread freedom

(Musings On Iraq Review The Report of the Iraq Inquiry, Executive Summary)

Feb 22 ORHA drill found US would not have enough troops for Iraq postwar security Was worried

not enough funding for postwar Iraq that could leave behind unstable country ORHA found US had no plans for what kind of govt they wanted in Iraq and how to achieve it ORHA Dep Head thought US had faulty assumptions overly optimistic lacked reality on what postwar Iraq would be like

(Musings On Iraq on Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction Hard Lessons Chapter 3 The Department of Defense Takes Charge)

(Musings On Iraq review State of Denial, Bush At War, Part III)

(Musings On Iraq review Hard Lessons, The Iraq Reconstruction Experience)

 

Feb 24 US UK Spain tabled 2nd draft resolution to UN saying Iraq had not taken

            opportunity to disarm 

(Musings On Iraq Review The Report of the Iraq Inquiry, Executive Summary)

Feb 24 Russia France Germany tabled counter draft resolution at UN calling for step by

            step disarmament process in Iraq

(Musings On Iraq Section 3.7 Development of UK Strategy and Options, 1 February to 7 March 2003)

Feb 24 Turkish cabinet agreed to allow US forces to be deployed for Iraq invasion in

            return for $1 bil in aid

Feb 24 Turkish Foreign Min asked US for $92 bil in aid and allowing Turkish troops into

            Kurdistan in return for US using Turkey for Iraq invasion

(Musings On Iraq review Losing Iraq, Inside The Post War Reconstruction Fiasco)

Feb 24 CIA denied Newsweek story that Hussein Kamal claimed Iraq destroyed its WMD

            in 90s He did say that

Feb 24 NSC meeting on Iraq oil sector Said US should not determine industry Went over

rebuilding and getting sector back on line after war Bush told NSC important to get Iraqis to be seen running oil sector after war Bush also worried about oil shocks due to invasion Saudis said they would handle prices

(Musings On Iraq on Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction Hard Lessons Chapter 2 The Agencies Engage)

Feb 24 US outlined general humanitarian relief plan for postwar Iraq including finances

            and implementation

(Musings On Iraq on Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction Hard Lessons Chapter 3 The Department of Defense Takes Charge)

(Musings On Iraq review Leap of Faith, Hubris Negligence, and America’s Greatest Foreign

Policy Tragedy)

 

Feb 25 Army chief Gen Shinseki told Senate US needed several hundred thousand troops to

            successfully occupy Iraq

(Musings On Iraq review Leap of Faith, Hubris Negligence, and America’s Greatest Foreign Policy Tragedy)

Feb 25 Blair told CENTCOM cmdr Gen Franks UN had to play a major role in postwar Iraq

Feb 25 Gen Franks told UK commander Adm Boyce US not thinking of WWII type Japanese

            or German rebuilding effort in Iraq

(Musings On Iraq on Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction Hard Lessons Chapter 3 The Department of Defense Takes Charge)

(Musings On Iraq Review The Report of the Iraq Inquiry, Executive Summary)

Feb 25 Iraqi opposition meeting in Salahaddin, Irbil Couldn't agree on a govt in exile

 

Feb 26 Bush speech at American Enterprise Institute Said that Iraq was direct threat to US due to

WMD and links to terrorists Said US had experience in stability operations and putting reformers in power Said other nations would help rebuild Iraq and US would stay in Iraq as long as necessary but “not a day more” Said spreading democracy to Iraq would be an inspiration to Middle East

(Musings On Iraq review Hard Lessons, The Iraq Reconstruction Experience)

(Musings On Iraq review What Happened, Inside the Bush White House and Washington’s Culture of Deception)

(Musings On Iraq review Leap of Faith, Hubris Negligence, and America’s Greatest Foreign

Policy Tragedy)

(Musings On Iraq review Iraq’s Future The aftermath of regime change)

(Musings On Iraq review Wanting War: Why the Bush Administration Invaded Iraq)

(Musings On Iraq review Fiasco: The American Military Adventure In Iraq)

(Musings On Iraq Iraq One Of The Worst Intelligence Failures In US History)

 

Feb 27 Deputy Defense Secretary Wolfowtiz told House Comm admin had no estimates of costs of

reconstructing Iraq and wouldn’t know until it got there Said calls for more troops to handle postwar Iraq were “outlandish” Said crazy to think postwar Iraq would take more troops than invasion Said Iraqis would greet US as liberators and that meant didn’t need more troops Said there would be large numbers of Free Iraqi Forces to restore order Said Iraq had no history of ethnic violence like in Bosnia that required long term peace keepers

(Musings On Iraq review Leap of Faith, Hubris Negligence, and America’s Greatest Foreign

Policy Tragedy)

(Musings On Iraq review Fiasco: The American Military Adventure In Iraq)

(Musings On Iraq review Hard Lessons, The Iraq Reconstruction Experience)

Feb 27 ORHA head Garner learned he only had $27 mil to run postwar Iraq

Feb 27 UK Attorney General Goldsmith changed his position that UN Resolution 1441

            alone could be legal basis for action against Iraq

(Musings On Iraq Review The Report of the Iraq Inquiry, Executive Summary)

Feb 27 UK oil firms met with govt officials saying they thought US firms were getting

            deals for postwar Iraq over them

Feb 27 State Dept paper said multiple sources claimed Iraq had mobile WMD labs Said

creating democracy in Iraq would be difficult and likely undermined by internal and external issues

(Musings On Iraq How Iraqi Defector CURVEBALL Became Basis For US Claims That Iraq Had WMD)

(Musings On Iraq review Iraq’s Future The aftermath of regime change)

Feb 27 CIA told Sen Levine that it didn’t believe Iraq-Niger uranium deal made but Iraq

            might have been interested in one in 1999

(Musings On Iraq How US Intelligence Failed The Iraq-Niger Uranium Story)

(Musings On Iraq Review Hubris, The Inside Story of Spin, Scandal, And The Selling Of The Iraq War)

Feb 27 Saddam agreed to destroy Saoud 2 missiles found to violate range limitations by Un

inspectors US and UK said Iraq playing games

(Musings On Iraq UN Inspectors Were Right Iraq Was Not A Threat)

(Musings On Iraq Iraq’s Rejection of UN Inspectors Led To Mistrust Over WMD and 2003 Invasion)

 

Feb 28 Iraq agreed to destroy Samud II ballistic missiles that violated UN restrictions

Feb 28 US attacked Iraq agreement to destroy Samud II missiles claiming it was just

            propaganda not real disarmament

Feb 28 Rumsfeld said Iraq never cooperated with UN inspectors

Feb 28 UN said found no evidence of active WMD programs in Iraq Inspectors went to site

CURVEBALL claimed was secret WMD facility for second time for samples Found nothing Said found small stock of mustard gas and some old WMD warheads and Iraq built 2 banned missiles Said Iraq had not provided any new information to answer questions from 1990s inspections

(Musings On Iraq How Iraqi Defector CURVEBALL Became Basis For US Claim That Iraq Had WMD)

(Musings On Iraq Look Who The LA Times Dug Up – CURVEBALL)

(Musings On Iraq Story of CURVEBALL And Iraq’s Mobile Biological Weapons Labs)

(Musings On Iraq UN Inspectors Were Right Iraq Was Not A Threat)

(Musings On Iraq Iraq’s Rejection of UN Inspectors Led To Mistrust Over WMD and 2003 Invasion)

Feb 28 State Dept said Iraq tried to buy aluminum tubes for its nuke program

(Musings On Iraq How A Contested Aluminum Tubes Story Became The Basis For War With Iraq)

Feb 28 State Dept said Iraq tried to buy aluminum tubes for its nuke program

Feb 28 ORHA head Garner made 1st brief of postwar Iraq plans to Bush 1 month before

            war

(Musings On Iraq on Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction Hard Lessons Chapter 3 The Department of Defense Takes Charge)

Feb 28 UK Defense Ministry report said Coalition had to prevent security vacuum after

            Invasion of Iraq and stop Al Qaeda from expanding into country

Feb 28 UK Def Min note to Blair office said UK failed to influence US postwar Iraq

            planning and UK would have to deal with US decisions made for it

(Musings On Iraq Review The Report of the Iraq Inquiry, Executive Summary)

Feb 28 Defense Policy Board warned by peacekeeping expert Perito could be

breakdown in law order right after invasion if Iraqi police didn’t go back to work Said that US troops could not take over police duties because not trained for that job

(Musings On Iraq review Leap of Faith, Hubris Negligence, and America’s Greatest Foreign

Policy Tragedy)

 

Mar 1 1st high level US meeting on creating Iraqi interim govt held just days before invasion

Undersecretary of Defense Feith said US would set up an Iraqi authority as soon as possible and would pick the members with majority being exiles because they would understand democracy better

(Musings On Iraq review Leap of Faith, Hubris Negligence, and America’s Greatest Foreign

Policy Tragedy)

(Musings On Iraq review State of Denial, Bush At War, Part III)

(Musings On Iraq review Hard Lessons, The Iraq Reconstruction Experience)

Mar 1 Turkish parliament rejected allowing US forces to use country for Iraq invasion

 

Mar 2 Senior admin official told NY Times UN weapons inspectors would not lead to

            anything

(Musings On Iraq UN Inspectors Were Right Iraq Was Not A Threat)

(Musings On Iraq Iraq’s Rejection of UN Inspectors Led To Mistrust Over WMD and 2003 Invasion)

Mar 2 Report US and UK increased air strikes in Iraq as part of no fly zone Were trying

            to weaken air defenses before invasion

 

Mar 3 Russia threatened to use veto power in UN to stop any resolution authorizing

            war vs Iraq

(Musings On Iraq Section 3.7 Development of UK Strategy and Options, 1 February to 7 March 2003)

Mar 3 US and UK planes hit five targets in Wasit and Basra as part of no fly zone Was attempt to

            weaken Iraq’s air defense system before invasion

Mar 3 IAEA told US that docs alleging Iraq-Niger uranium deal were forgeries

(Musings On Iraq How US Intelligence Failed The Iraq-Niger Uranium Story)

(Musings On Iraq Review Hubris, The Inside Story of Spin, Scandal, And The Selling Of The Iraq War)

Mar 3 US memo on setting up an Iraqi interim govt after invasion Said that Iraqi govt had to

promise equal rights to citizens, ban Baath party, deBaathify security forces

(Musings On Iraq review Leap of Faith, Hubris Negligence, and America’s Greatest Foreign Policy

Tragedy)

(Musings On Iraq review Hard Lessons, The Iraq Reconstruction Experience)

 

Mar 4 Undersecretary of Defense for Policy Feith briefed Bush and NSC on Pentagon’s

postwar plans Goals were to maintain integrity of Iraq improves living standards create a democracy destroy WMD fight war on terror get international support for rebuilding gain support of Iraqis get Iraqis to rule as quickly as possible to accomplish all tasks quickly Had no strategy on how to achieve goals

(Musings On Iraq Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction’s “Hard Lessons” – Part I: Planning for Postwar Iraq September 2001 to May 2003)

(Musings On Iraq on Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction Hard Lessons Chapter 3 The Department of Defense Takes Charge)

(Musings On Iraq review Hard Lessons, The Iraq Reconstruction Experience)

(Musings On Iraq review Iraq’s Future The aftermath of regime change)

(Musings On Iraq review Leap of Faith, Hubris Negligence, and America’s Greatest Foreign

Policy Tragedy)

(Musings On Iraq review Fiasco: The American Military Adventure In Iraq)

(Musings On Iraq review State of Denial, Bush At War, Part III)

Mar 4 US found that France made allegation that Iraq tried to buy uranium from Niger

            based upon fake documents

(Musings On Iraq How US Intelligence Failed The Iraq-Niger Uranium Story)

(Musings On Iraq Review Hubris, The Inside Story of Spin, Scandal, And The Selling Of The Iraq War)

Mar 4 Blair told that US was thinking about starting war on 3/12/03 despite UK desire

            for 2nd UN resolution against Iraq

Mar 4 UK Foreign Secretary Straw told parliament committee Iraq was in material

            breach of UN Resolution 1441 and that gave legal authority for action

(Musings On Iraq Review The Report of the Iraq Inquiry, Executive Summary)

 

Mar 5 CENTCOM commander Gen Franks briefed Bush on war preparations Were

            208,000 forces in Middle East with 50,000 more arriving in 2 weeks

Mar 5 ORHA head Garner got ok from Rice to use frozen Iraqi assets to pay for postwar

Plans He told Rice he didn’t think there would be enough troops to maintain security after invasion When asked if the White House had put together any plans for a post-Saddam govt he got no answer

(Musings On Iraq review Leap of Faith, Hubris Negligence, and America’s Greatest Foreign Policy Tragedy)

Mar 5 UK Embassy in Washington said Bush admin set on war with Iraq

Mar 5 France Russia Germany said they would not vote for a UN resolution authorizing

            force against Iraq

(Musings On Iraq Section 3.7 Development of UK Strategy and Options, 1 February to 7 March 2003)

Mar 5 Blair told Bush if they got 9 votes on UN Security Council for 2nd resolution and it

            was vetoed they would still have legal authority for action

Mar 5 UK Attorney Gen told Blair if 2nd resolution vetoed in UN would be no legal basis for Iraq

            war

(Musings On Iraq Review The Report of the Iraq Inquiry, Executive Summary)

Mar 5 Powell told Congress 2nd UN resolution against Iraq would pass while his staff told him

            wasn’t likely

Mar 5 Powell said that Iraq weapons declaration to UN farce because it said it had no WMD and

            claimed it was hiding them from inspectors

(Musings On Iraq UN Inspectors Were Right Iraq Was Not A Threat)

(Musings On Iraq Iraq’s Rejection of UN Inspectors Led To Mistrust Over WMD and 2003 Invasion)

Mar 5 National Intelligence Committee memo said that docs on Iraq-Niger uranium deal were

            forgeries

(Musings On Iraq How US Intelligence Failed The Iraq-Niger Uranium Story)

(Musings On Iraq Review Hubris, The Inside Story of Spin, Scandal, And The Selling Of The Iraq War)

Mar 5 Sir Tebbet Secretary of Defense Ministry asks cabinet for legal authorization for war with

Iraq

Mar 5 Russia Amb provided Iraq with numbers of US troops, equipment and their locations to Iraq

            before invasion

(Musings On Iraq Russia Provided Iraq With Details Of US Plans Right Before Invasion)

Mar 5 Bush met Vatican envoy who argued against war because of casualties and gulf between

            Christians and Muslims

 

Mar 6 Bush TV address Said time running out on UN weapons inspectors Accused Iraq

            of hiding its WMD Said that he’d not decided on war when he had

(Musings On Iraq Review Hubris, The Inside Story of Spin, Scandal, And The Selling Of The Iraq War)

(Musings On Iraq review The Bush Administrations and Saddam Hussein, Deciding on Conflict)

(Musings On Iraq review What Happened, Inside the Bush White House and Washington’s Culture of Deception)

Mar 6 National Security Advisor Rice sent letter to Senator Said US had briefed UN on

            all suspected WMD sites Actually didn’t give info on 21 of 105 sites

(Musings On Iraq UN Inspectors Were Right Iraq Was Not A Threat)

(Musings On Iraq Iraq’s Rejection of UN Inspectors Led To Mistrust Over WMD and 2003 Invasion)

Mar 6 Blair was told UK should not try to administer post-war Iraq

(Musings On Iraq Review The Report of the Iraq Inquiry, Executive Summary)

 

Mar 7 UK Attorney Gen Goldsmith said that 2nd UN resolution was needed for action against Iraq

(Musings On Iraq Review The Report of the Iraq Inquiry, Executive Summary)

Mar 7 Head weapons inspector Blix said that Iraq doing more but not fully cooperating and still

months more work ahead Found no evidence mobile WMD labs

(Musings On Iraq How Iraqi Defector CURVEBALL Became Basis For US Claims That Iraq Had WMD)

(Musings On Iraq Section 3.7 Development of UK Strategy and Options, 1 February to 7 March 2003)

Mar 7 IAEA chief El Baradei told UN no evidence Iraq restarted nuclear program

Concluded that aluminum tubes Iraq tried to buy were for rockets not nuke program Said documents claiming Iraq tried to buy uranium from Niger were fakes

(Musings On Iraq How A Contested Aluminum Tubes Story Became The Basis For War With Iraq)

(Musings On Iraq How US Intelligence Failed The Iraq-Niger Uranium Story)

(Musings On Iraq Review Hubris, The Inside Story of Spin, Scandal, And The Selling Of The Iraq War)

(Musings On Iraq UN Inspectors Were Right Iraq Was Not A Threat)

(Musings On Iraq Iraq’s Rejection of UN Inspectors Led To Mistrust Over WMD and 2003 Invasion)

(Musings On Iraq How US Intelligence Created An Iraqi Nuclear Threat In 2002)

Mar 7 Powell told UN Security Council in response to IAEA that US had new proof that

            Aluminum tubes were for centrifuges

Mar 7 UK Foreign Secretary Straw suggested UN set ultimatum for Iraq’s full

            cooperation with inspectors by March 17 or face war

Mar 7 2nd high level US meeting on creating an interim Iraqi authority after invasion held just

days before war

(Musings On Iraq review Leap of Faith, Hubris Negligence, and America’s Greatest Foreign

Policy Tragedy)

(Musings On Iraq review State of Denial, Bush At War, Part III)

(Musings On Iraq review Hard Lessons, The Iraq Reconstruction Experience)

Mar 7 Defense Policy Board’s Adelman wrote OpEd USA Today saying US had given

            Iraq too much time and needed action

 

Mar 8 Bush radio address said he was trying to avoid war but if Saddam didn’t disarm he would be

made to Bush had already decided on war

(Musings On Iraq review Leap of Faith, Hubris Negligence, and America’s Greatest Foreign Policy Tragedy)

(Musings On Iraq Review Hubris, The Inside Story of Spin, Scandal, And The Selling Of The Iraq War)

(Musings On Iraq review The Bush Administrations and Saddam Hussein, Deciding on Conflict)

Mar 8 Blair’s final attempt to get UN Security Council to pass 2nd resolution

            supporting force against Iraq failed

(Musings On Iraq Review The Report of the Iraq Inquiry, Executive Summary)

Mar 8 Blair’s foreign policy adviser Manning told Rice Blair willing to lose his govt

            in order to fight Iraq war

Mar 8 DIA report to Rumsfeld said that IAEA was dismissing Iraq-Niger uranium

story because based upon questionable docs said former ambassador Wilson’s trip found evidence that Iraq was interested in buying uranium from Niger Was navy report uranium was in Benin warehouse Was Somali businessmen who claimed shipment that was similar to Iraq-Niger deal although didn’t mention Iraq Niger or uranium

Mar 8 US official said administration had been duped by fake docs claiming Iraq tried

            to buy uranium from Niger

Mar 8 Former Ambassador Wilson told CNN US govt should and did know that Iraq-

            Niger uranium story was false

(Musings On Iraq How US Intelligence Failed The Iraq-Niger Uranium Story)

(Musings On Iraq Review Hubris, The Inside Story of Spin, Scandal, And The Selling Of The Iraq War)

Mar 8 Army Corps of Engineers gave KBR $7 bil contract to repair Iraq’s infrastructure

            after war

 

Mar 9 Karbala Div commander memo said main threat was not U.S. invasion but

            internal rebellions

Mar 9 Blair told Bush he needed a 2nd UN resolution authorizing force against Iraq to get

parliament’s support for war Bush said he couldn't wait Blair said he would back US

(Musings On Iraq Review The Report of the Iraq Inquiry, Executive Summary)

Mar 9 Powell told CNN that European country came up with new evidence that

            aluminum tubes Iraq tried to buy were for nukes not rockets

(Musings On Iraq How A Contested Aluminum Tubes Story Became The Basis For War With Iraq)

Mar 9 Powell on Meet The Press Iraq-Niger uranium story open to investigation and

            IAEA had been wrong about Iraq’s nuke program in 1990s

(Musings On Iraq How US Intelligence Failed The Iraq-Niger Uranium Story)

(Musings On Iraq Review Hubris, The Inside Story of Spin, Scandal, And The Selling Of The Iraq War)

 

Mar 10 UK gave Iraq 6 requirements to meet if wanted to avoid war including Saddam

            going on TV and admitting to WMD

Mar 10 Bush talked to his advisors about giving an ultimatum to Saddam to leave power

(Musings On Iraq review Leap of Faith, Hubris Negligence, and America’s Greatest Foreign Policy Tragedy)

Mar 10 French President Jacques Chirac said France would veto any new resolution because no

grounds for war

(Musings On Iraq Section 3.7 Development of UK Strategy and Options, 1 February to 7 March 2003)

Mar 10 Bush told Blair 2nd UN resolution against Iraq was waste of time Was major

            policy goal of Blair

(Musings On Iraq Review The Report of the Iraq Inquiry, Executive Summary)

Mar 10 US official said Iraq had cluster munitions to disperse WMD

Mar 10 ORHA head Garner briefed Bush on postwar Iraq plans including using Iraqi army for

reconstruction and interim govt Said would only remove top Baath leadership Bush approved plans

(Musings On Iraq review Hard Lessons, The Iraq Reconstruction Experience)

(Musings On Iraq review The Endgame, The Inside Story of the Struggle for Iraq, from

George W. Bush to Barack Obama)

Mar 10 NSC briefed on postwar Iraq plans Included excluding 25,000 top Baathists from

govt Prosecuting Iraqi war criminals Discussed truth and reconciliation commission Using Iraqi courts and police Establishing law and order Bush said US needed to get Iraqis running new govt and US would not pick new Iraqi leaders Powell said US had to get a new UN resolution for the US led interim administration in postwar Iraq US Treasury Sec Snow said that US dollars could be used as interim currency in Iraq until new dinar created Bush approved light deBaathification after war Using dollars as temporary currency in Iraq Retaining Iraqi police

(Musings On Iraq on Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction Hard Lessons Chapter 3 The Department of Defense Takes Charge)

Mar 10 Institute for Science and International Security report asked whether US misled

            public about Iraq rebuilding nuke program

Mar 10 Turkeys Erdogan met Bush Argued against deposing Saddam saying it would

            lead to Shiite govt tied to Iran

Mar 10 Gen Franks told White House mayors would be appointed to run Iraq after

            invasion Was not in any postwar plans

 

Mar 11 Bush and NSC met Agreed to keep Iraqi police

Mar 11 Rumsfeld said US could attack Iraq by itself without other nations Said British

might not participate UK Embassy in US furious at Rumsfeld remarks and complained to White House Rumsfeld forced to issue clarification saying British would take part in Iraq war

Mar 11 Blair said Britain would help in any US attack upon Iraq

Mar 11 UK acknowledged couldn't get 2nd UN resolution authorizing force against Iraq

            before US timetable for war

Mar 11 UK Chief of Defense Staff Adm Boyce said military needed legal directive for

            war with Iraq

(Musings On Iraq Review The Report of the Iraq Inquiry, Executive Summary)

Mar 11 CIA assessment said it didn’t dispute IAEA finding that Iraq-Niger uranium

            docs were fakes

Mar 11 CIA WMD division said it didn’t dispute IAEA finding that Iraq-Niger

            uranium docs were fakes and always considered intel on story fragmentary

(Musings On Iraq How US Intelligence Failed The Iraq-Niger Uranium Story)

(Musings On Iraq Review Hubris, The Inside Story of Spin, Scandal, And The Selling Of The Iraq War)

Mar 11 ORHA head Garner told press US would keep Iraqi army and would quickly

turn over control of country to Iraqis When asked Garner dismissed talk of US turning over power to Chalabi and INC

(Musings On Iraq review Leap of Faith, Hubris Negligence, and America’s Greatest Foreign Policy

Tragedy)

(Musings On Iraq review The Endgame, The Inside Story of the Struggle for Iraq, from

George W. Bush to Barack Obama)

(Musings On Iraq review Hard Lessons, The Iraq Reconstruction Experience)

Mar 11 After press conference Deputy Defense Secretary Wolfowitz and Under

Secretary of Defense for Policy Feith chastised Garner for his comments about Chalabi

Mar 11 Garner was later told by Pentagon he could no longer give press conferences

Mar 11 National Security Advisor Rice issued memo on postwar Iraq plans Said interim

Iraqi authority consisting of Iraqis Kurds and exiles would be formed followed by meeting in Baghdad to bring in more Iraqis like what happened in Afghanistan Included previous NSC decisions on oil and currency

(Musings On Iraq Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction’s “Hard Lessons” – Part I: Planning for Postwar Iraq September 2001 to May 2003)

(Musings On Iraq review State of Denial, Bush At War, Part III)

 

Mar 12 Bush endorsed Pentagon plan for quick transition to Iraqi authority made up of

            exiles and Kurds after war

(Musings On Iraq review Leap of Faith, Hubris Negligence, and America’s Greatest Foreign Policy

Tragedy)

(Musings On Iraq review State of Denial, Bush At War, Part III)

(Musings On Iraq review Hard Lessons, The Iraq Reconstruction Experience)

Mar 12 Undersecretary of Defense for Policy Feith briefed NSC on postwar plans for

Iraq’s Foreign Ministry military and intelligence services Said Foreign Ministry and embassies needed to be purged of top Baathists and intelligence officers Wanted to disband intelligence agencies Special Republican Guard Republican Guard State Security Office and militias Wanted to reduce military to just 3-5 army divisions

Mar 12 Bush called Blair about vote on 2nd UN resolution on Iraq Bush said if didn’t have

            votes shouldn’t have a vote

Mar 12 Bush called Mexican Pres Fox and Chilean Pres Lagos on 2nd UN resolution Fox

            non-committal Lagos said he would vote no

Mar 12 Bush called Blair and said that vote on 2nd UN resolution was dead

(Musings On Iraq Review The Report of the Iraq Inquiry, Executive Summary)

Mar 12 UN committee reported on Iraq violating sanctions

Mar 12 Iraqi scientists began private interviews with UN inspectors

(Musings On Iraq UN Inspectors Were Right Iraq Was Not A Threat)

(Musings On Iraq Iraq’s Rejection of UN Inspectors Led To Mistrust Over WMD and 2003 Invasion)

 

Mar 13 UK Foreign Office legal advisor Brummell wrote Attorney General Lord

            Goldsmith saying didn’t need 2nd UN resolution to go to war with Iraq

Mar 13 Lord Goldsmith changed his opinion saying 2nd resolution not needed for action

            against Iraq

Mar 13 Blair told Bush not to give ultimatum to Saddam until he had dealt with

            parliament Bush said OK

Mar 13 Blair told still hope that 2nd resolution could be passed in UN

(Musings On Iraq Review The Report of the Iraq Inquiry, Executive Summary)

Mar 13 USAID official told aid groups Iraq war would be quick Needs would be met

            Iraqis would regain control US would be out in a year

(Musings On Iraq on Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction Hard Lessons Chapter 2 The Agencies Engage)

(Musings On Iraq review Leap of Faith, Hubris Negligence, and America’s Greatest Foreign Policy Tragedy)

 

Mar 14 Rumsfeld told ORHA head Garner he was going to pick all the advisers that

            were going to run Iraqi ministries

(Musings On Iraq on Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction Hard Lessons Chapter 3 The Department of Defense Takes Charge)

(Musings On Iraq Special Inspector General For Iraq Reconstruction Hard Lessons Chapter 4 Staging in Kuwait)

(Musings On Iraq review State of Denial, Bush At War, Part III)

(Musings On Iraq review Leap of Faith, Hubris Negligence, and America’s Greatest Foreign Policy

Tragedy)

Mar 14 Iran’s national security adviser said US would not have a happy ending in Iraq

(Musings On Iraq Iran’s Policy Towards Iraq)

Mar 14 French Pres Chirac told Blair he would not accept a UN resolution that set

            an ultimatum for Iraq disarmament

(Musings On Iraq Review The Report of the Iraq Inquiry, Executive Summary)

Mar 14 NSC decided on language for ultimatum to Saddam Included 48 hour deadline to

            leave power pushed by Rumsfeld

 

Mar 15 Iraqi state TV said country was on a war footing Baghdad had been divided into four military

districts

Mar 15 Special Republican Guard withdrew $1 bil from Central Bank of Iraq under

            Uday Hussein to pay off sheikhs to put down rebellions

Mar 15 Iraqi security forces tried to stamp out signs of Kurdish opposition in Kirkuk City

Mar 15 VP Cheney told NBC that UN weapons inspectors had missed Iraq’s nuke program in 1990s

and they weren’t going to do better this time Said Iraq could have a nuclear bomb soon Said Iraqis defying inspections again

(Musings On Iraq Interview With VP Dick Cheney On Weapons Inspections March 2003)

(Musings On Iraq How US Intelligence Created An Iraqi Nuclear Threat In 2002)

(Musings On Iraq UN Inspectors Were Right Iraq Was Not A Threat)

(Musings On Iraq Iraq’s Rejection of UN Inspectors Led To Mistrust Over WMD and 2003 Invasion)

Mar 15 ORHA head Garner told Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld plan was only to

dismiss top two officials from each Iraqi ministry and not carry out any deBaathification policy Rumsfeld okayed plan

(Musings On Iraq review Leap of Faith, Hubris Negligence, and America’s Greatest Foreign Policy Tragedy)

Mar 15 Rumsfeld complained Garner picked non-Pentagon people to run some Iraqi

            ministries Wanted them all from Defense

(Musings On Iraq on Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction Hard Lessons Chapter 3 The Department of Defense Takes Charge)

(Musings On Iraq review State of Denial, Bush At War, Part III)

Mar 15 CIA gave explosive to Kurdish team which blew up Mosul-Baghdad railway

            starting covert action campaign before invasion

Mar 15 CNN/USA Today/Gallup poll found 51% of Americans believed Saddam involved in 9/11

 

Mar 16 Azores summit with Bush Blair Portuguese Premier Barroso Bush said that Iraq war would

start in days not weeks Blair got transcript of 60 Minutes interview with Pres Chirac who said he wanted 30 more days for UN inspections Blair Bush Barroso agreed to give 2nd UN resolution 24 more hours and pull it if didn’t have enough votes

(Musings On Iraq review Leap of Faith, Hubris Negligence, and America’s Greatest Foreign Policy

Tragedy)

(Musings On Iraq Review Hubris, The Inside Story of Spin, Scandal, And The Selling Of The Iraq War)

(Musings On Iraq review The Bush Administrations and Saddam Hussein, Deciding on Conflict)

Mar 16 Bush and Blair gave UN 24 hour ultimatum to enforce its own resolutions on Iraq

disarming or they would invade

Mar 16 Blair complained that US screwed up a 2nd UN resolution on Iraq

(Musings On Iraq Review The Report of the Iraq Inquiry, Executive Summary)

Mar 16 VP Cheney told Meet The Press that Americans would be greeted as liberators in Iraq Said

that Army Chief of Staff Gen Shinseki was wrong that US would need more troops to occupy Iraq than invade Told NBC that if world didn’t deal with Iraq it would go back to producing WMD Was already reconstituting its nuclear weapons program Claimed UN inspectors were wrong about Iraq’s weapons program in general citing Iraq buying aluminum tubes which US claimed were for centrifuges Said Iraq had long standing relationship with Al Qaeda

(Musings On Iraq How A Contested Aluminum Tubes Story Became The Basis For War With Iraq)

(Musings On Iraq How US Intelligence Created An Iraqi Nuclear Threat In 2002)

(Musings On Iraq UN Inspectors Were Right Iraq Was Not A Threat)

(Musings On Iraq Iraq’s Rejection of UN Inspectors Led To Mistrust Over WMD and 2003 Invasion)

(Musings On Iraq review Fiasco: The American Military Adventure In Iraq)

(Musings On Iraq review What Happened, Inside the Bush White House and Washington’s Culture of Deception)

(Musings On Iraq review Hard Lessons, The Iraq Reconstruction Experience)

Mar 16 Report US and France source for all of Iraq’s germ samples for its biological weapons

program in the 1980s

 

Mar 17 UN Draft resolution saying Iraq in non compliance and open to military action

            withdrawn by US because couldn’t be passed

Mar 17 Bush met with Congressional leaders telling them UN route with Iraq was dead

            Blamed France Sen Byrd only one who said he opposed war

Mar 17 Bush in TV speech said Iraq had WMD and was hiding them Gave Saddam

            and sons 48 hours to leave office or face invasion

(Musings On Iraq review Leap of Faith, Hubris Negligence, and America’s Greatest Foreign Policy

Tragedy)

(Musings On Iraq review What Happened, Inside the Bush White House and Washington’s Culture of Deception)

(Musings On Iraq Iraq One Of The Worst Intelligence Failures In US History)

Mar 17 Blair gave Saddam ultimatum to comply with UN resolutions

Mar 17 UN Sec Gen Annan announced he would order withdrawal of weapons

            inspectors due to impending war

Mar 17 UK Attorney Gen Lord Goldsmith gave legal advice that war with Iraq was legal

(Musings On Iraq Review The Report of the Iraq Inquiry, Executive Summary)

Mar 17 ORHA staff began leaving US for Kuwait

(Musings On Iraq review Iraq and Back, Inside The War To Win The Peace)

Mar 17 On flight to Kuwait ORHA head Garner met with his oil team Garner said he was

concerned Rumsfeld picked ex-Shell CEO Philip Carroll to join group Said was bad image wise to have an ex-US oil executive involved Oil teams said if Iraq’s oil sector was destroyed by war would need someone with standing of Carroll to deal with it

 

Mar 18 Saddam refuted Bush’s ultimatum to step down and leave Iraq

Mar 18 UN weapons inspectors ended work in Iraq Did 731 inspections at 411 sites and

            found no WMD or nuclear programs

(Musings On Iraq UN Inspectors Were Right Iraq Was Not A Threat)

(Musings On Iraq Iraq’s Rejection of UN Inspectors Led To Mistrust Over WMD and 2003 Invasion)

(Musings On Iraq How US Intelligence Created An Iraqi Nuclear Threat In 2002)

Mar 18 UN suspended Oil for Food program for Iraq due to impending war

Mar 18 US reconnaissance found 6-7 oil wells in Basra set afire by Iraqis Led Gen Franks to move

up invasion plan by a few days to try to stop further fields being set on fire

Mar 18 US military official told CNN Iraqi troops had VX and mustard gas munitions

Mar 18 UK military given official order to prepare for Iraq invasion

Mar 18 Joint Chief of Staff met to discuss withdrawal plans for post-invasion Iraq

(Musings On Iraq review Leap of Faith, Hubris Negligence, and America’s Greatest Foreign Policy Tragedy)

Mar 18 UK Gen Cross warned Blair that there wasn’t enough post-war planning for Iraq

(Musings On Iraq Review The Report of the Iraq Inquiry, Executive Summary)

Mar 18 2 British ministers and legal adv to Foreign Office resigned in protest against the

            war

Mar 18 British parliament voted 412 to 149 to endorse Iraq invasion

Mar 18 US named 30 countries willing to join Iraq war Became known as Coalition of

            the Willing

Mar 18 CIA source claimed he saw Saddam and his family at Dora farm south of

            Baghdad CIA Dir Tenet told Bush

Mar 18 US rep Khalizad went to Turkey Offered to allow 20,000 Turkish troops into Kurdistan

creation of buffer zone along Iraq-Turkey border blocking Peshmerga from entering Mosul and Kirkuk Disarming Kurds allow operations against PKK if Ankara would allow US troops to use country for invasion Erdogan said no

(Musings On Iraq review Losing Iraq, Inside The Post War Reconstruction Fiasco)

 

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This Day In Iraqi History - Jan 17

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