Sam Wyer is an analyst at the Institute for the Study of War
specializing in Iraq. In December 2012, he authored a paper on Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq, the League of the Righteous. It provided one of the most detailed
breakdowns of the history and organization of the League, and how it has tried
to change itself from an Iranian-supported Special Group militia to a social
and political party. Below is an interview with Wyer about Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq.
Qais Khazali was a follower of the Sadiq al-Sadr, then Moqtada al-Sadr before forming his own group Asa'ib Ahl al-Haq, the League of the Righteous (Al-Arabiya)
1. Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq
(AAH), the League of the Righteous is led by Qais Khazali who was a student of
Moqtada al-Sadr’s father Mohammed Sadiq al-Sadr. Do you know what his role was in
the 1990s working for the elder Sadr?
Qais al-Khazali
formed a close relationship with Sadiq al-Sadr in Najaf during the 1990s. After
initially studying geology at Baghdad University, Khazali traveled to Najaf
where he was advised by Sadr to stay in the city and focus his studies on
religious affairs. Khazali studied Quran Explanation under Sadr, and quickly became
a trusted aide along with Riyad al-Nouri, Mohammad al-Tabatabai, now a
prominent AAH leader, Mustafa al-Yacoubi, and Jaber al-Khafaji.
2. After the 2003
invasion Khazali remained with Moqtada, in what capacity?
After Sadiq al-Sadr’s
assassination in 1999, Khazali, Tabatabai, and others helped maintain the
Sadrist Trend until the 2003 invasion. During this time, Moqtada al-Sadr
remained under house arrest, and was thus unable to assume a prominent role in
the organization. Following the invasion, Qom, Iran-based Ayatollah Kazim
al-Haeri declared Moqtada as his deputy and representative in Iraq, effectively
establishing Moqtada as the leader of the Sadrist Trend. Khazali and others
initially recognized the authority of Moqtada, and became his close deputies
and aides. Khazali worked as one of the Sadrist Trend’s spokesmen until his
split around 2004.
3. What led to the
split between those two?
In 2004, Moqtada
and his Jaish al-Mahdi (JAM) launched two largely unsuccessful uprisings, the
first between March and May 2004, and the second in August 2004 in Najaf.
Following the suppression of these uprisings, Moqtada ordered the end of all
JAM military operations against Coalition forces, and the Sadrist Trend was
forced underground, creating fractions within its leadership who disagreed with
Moqtada’s decisions. In particular, Qais al-Khazali and Akram al-Kaabi, who
controlled JAM forces in Baghdad and Najaf respectively, continued to direct
their forces without Moqtada’s consent. At the same time, Ayatollah Kazim
al-Haeri denounced Moqtada’s leadership, and removed him as his representative
in Iraq, a decision likely facilitated by Iranian leadership, further damaging
Moqtada’s hold on his organization.
4. Khazali went on to
form his own organization, which eventually became the League of the Righteous.
What is its ideology?
As a Sadrist
splinter group, the League of the Righteous adopted a similar ideology to the
Sadrist Trend. Ultimately, both groups claim to be the legitimate successor to Sadiq
al-Sadr’s organization, which emphasized Shiite religious activism and Iraqi
nationalism. Unlike the political quietist beliefs of Ayatollah Ali Sistani, Sadiq
al-Sadr believed that religious clerics should play an open role in political
and social issues. This idea was continued in full force by Moqtada and
therefore the post-2003 Sadrist Trend had a large focus on service provision,
education, and political activism.
The League of the
Righteous has largely followed this model. While formed as a militant group, it
has recently expanded as a religious, political, and social organization.
Unlike the Sadrist Movement, however, the League of the Righteous openly
displays its allegiance to Iran, and largely submits to Iranian clerical
authority, making it a more loyal proxy.
5. It didn’t seem
like it was a clean break however as many members of the League went back and
forth between the two organizations. Can you explain why that happened?
In 2005 Moqtada
al-Sadr decided to refocus the direction of the Sadrist Movement, and emphasize
political participation. During this time, he invited Qais al-Khazali and Akram
al-Kaabi to rejoin his movement, and take senior positions supervising Sadrist
political offices. Despite the initial splits in 2004, the League of the
Righteous was not solidified until 2006, when Iran drastically increased its
support in facilitating the formation of Shiite militant groups in Iraq. As
funding increased, Qais, Kaabi, and others split from Moqtada once again and
formed AAH.
6. What kind of
relationship did Khazali forge with Iran, and why was Tehran interested?
As mentioned, Iran
increased its support of Iraqi Shiite militant group networks around 2005-6. In
June 2006, Qais al-Khazali was appointed the head the network that ultimately became
Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq. As the general secretary of the League of the Righteous,
al-Khazali had a close relationship to Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps- Qods
Force (IRQC-QF) through his liaison Ali Mussa Daqduq, a Lebanese Hezbollah
operative tasked by IRGC-QF with assisting the formation of Shiite militant
group networks. Tehran saw al-Khazali as a much more dependable and stable
replacement to Moqtada al-Sadr, whose sporadic actions made him difficult to
control.
7. 2007 was when the
League really came into public view with two of the most famous raids upon the
Coalition. 1st was the attack upon the Karbala Provincial
Headquarters. Can you explain what happened in that event, and what kind of
support Iran supplied?
On January 20, 2007,
League gunmen infiltrated the Karbala Provincial Joint Coordination Center,
attacking the compound with grenades and small arms, killing one American
soldier, and capturing four others. The militants were able to enter to
compound by disguising themselves as American soldiers and driving SUVs similar
to those used by U.S. government officials. After fleeing the compound, the
militants executed their four hostages, and escaped.
While the attack
was carried out by League militants, it was planned and supported by IRGC-QF
and Lebanese Hezbollah. The operation’s sophistication far exceeded previous
League attacks, and revealed the depth of cooperation and training provided by
IRGC-QF and Hezbollah. After his arrest in March 2007, Ali Mussa Daqduq
provided additional details linking Iran to the raid. He reportedly stated that
the League could not have carried out such a sophisticated attack without the
help of the IRGC-QF. He revealed his role as trainer and facilitator for Shiite
militants. Furthermore, both Abdul Reza Shahlai, an IRGC-QF deputy commander,
and Ali Mussa Daqduq were designated by the U.S. Department of the Treasury for
their role in planning the attack.
8. As a result Qais
Khazali, his brother Laith, and Hezbollah operative Ali Mussa Daqduq were
captured in Basra in March. How did the League retaliate?
Despite the capture
of Qais and others on March 20, 2007, the League was still able to quickly
execute another sophisticated attack. On May 29, 2007, around 100 or so League
militants attacked the Iraqi Finance Ministry, and captured Peter Moore, a
British computer consultant, and four of his security guards. The scale and
sophistication of the operation again points to IRGC-QF assistance. Some
reports state that Moore was targeted because he was developing software to
track down missing aid money, much of which some thought was going to Iranian Shiite
groups such as the League. While unconfirmed, some also believe the League and
their Iranian operators took the hostages to IRGC camps in Iran. In any case,
the operation had a similar level of sophistication as was seen in the Karbala
attack earlier in the year, despite the capture of Qais al-Khazali, his
brother, and Daqduq. As a tit-for-tat operation, the Finance Ministry attack
gave the League leverage to secure the release of their members.
9. What role did
Daqduq play between Iran, Hezbollah and the League?
From around 2005 till
his capture in 2007, Daqduq, a member of Lebanese Hezbollah since 1983, played
a crucial role in Qods Force’s external operations network. During this time he
acted as the liaison between Qais al-Khazali and IRGC-QF officials, particularly
Abdul Reza Shahlai, the Qods Force commander accused of plotting the assassination
of the Saudi ambassador to the U.S. in 2011. In 2006 Daqduq traveled to Tehran
to meet Shahlai, where he received instructions to facilitate the formation of
Shiite militant groups in Iraq. Under Daqduq’s supervision, Iraqi Shiite
militants traveled to southern Lebanon and Iran to receive operations and
weapons training.
10. How did the group
use the 5 Brits it captured to its advantage?
The League
successfully used its five British hostages to secure the release of all of its
top leadership by early 2010. In June 2009, Laith al-Khazali, Qais’ brother,
and Abdul Hadi al-Daraji were released from U.S. custody. In July of that year
Hassan Salem, now the head of the League’s militia, and Saleh al-Jizani were
released. Finally, in January 2010, Qais al-Khazali was freed from custody. Hundreds
of lower level members were also released during this time.
11. From 2009 to the
U.S. withdrawal at the end of 2011, the League seemed to be playing a double
game. What was it telling the Americans and Iraqi government about their
intentions at that time?
As part of Maliki’s
reconciliation campaign, the League was encouraged to put down its arms and end
military operations against Coalition forces. Publicly, the League pledged to
do just that, which helped create favorable conditions for the release of its
leaders. The group began to engage in talks with the Iraqi government, and
announced its desire to participate in politics once American forces withdrew.
As mentioned, the League also negotiated the release of its leaders in exchange
for the bodies of its British captives. Numerous officials from both the Iraqi
and U.S. government publicly announced their perception that the League was
taking constructive steps towards reconciliation.
12. At the same time
what kind of military operations was it carrying out?
Despite its
pledges, the League continued to conduct operations against Coalition and Iraqi
forces using explosively formed penetrators (EFPs), improvised rocket assisted
munitions (IRAMs), targeted kidnappings, and assassinations. The League was
also engaged in a competition with the Sadrist Movement, which often ignited
firefights and political assassinations.
13. Since 2011 the
League has tried to refashion itself as a political and religious organization
instead of a militia. What steps has it taken to change its image?
The League has totally
revamped its public image. Instead of boasting about its military operations
against Coalition forces, the group now focuses on Iraqi nationalism and fixing
the flaws of the current Iraqi government. It has rebranded itself as an “Iraqi
nationalist political organization.” It now claims to promote national dialogue
between all religious and ethnic groups, helps provide services to minorities,
runs networks of religious schools, and has opened a number of political
representations throughout Iraq and in Beirut.
14. At first, it said
that it was going to run in the 2013 provincial elections, and then changed its
mind. It’s not clear whether it will participate in the 2014 parliamentary vote
either. How do you account for this uncertainty in its strategy?
The reasons behind
the decision not to run in the provincial elections are not entirely clear. On
one hand, it could be that the group does not feel organizationally ready to
participate directly. On the other, it could be a strategic decision by Maliki,
Iran, or the League itself in order to have the group to influence Iraq outside
the electoral system. The League may also not have wanted to open itself up to
any scrutiny involved in running, or it may be waiting for the more significant
parliamentary elections in 2014, at which point it will likely have a much more
support solid base throughout Iraq.
15. Today, the League
has a strong rivalry with the Sadr organization. What kinds of conflicts have
they gotten into?
In the past, the
Sadrists and League members have openly fought each other in disputed areas
around Najaf, Basra, and Baghdad. The League and the Sadrist Trend has been
engaged in a political assassination campaign that has gained speed in 2012 as
the League continues to expand at a rapid pace. In the past year, there have
been at least five tit-for-tat assassinations in these cities as part of the
larger competition over political support. While the assassinations have been
extremely discriminate, firefights between the two groups have also broken out
seemingly spontaneously.
16. In 2011 there were
a large number of assassinations of government officials and members of the
security forces. The Baghdad Operations Command blamed the League for some of
these murders. What has the group said about its militia and the use of force in
the last couple years?
In 2011, after the
League withdrew from government talks, it said it would not put down its arms
until the withdrawal of all U.S. forces from Iraq. During this time, as the
Baghdad Operations Command highlighted, there were a lot of attacks against
both Iraqi government and Coalition forces attributed to the League. As noted
earlier, the withdrawal of U.S. forces in December 2011 prompted the group to
reframe its objectives and public image. In regards to the use of force, however,
the group pledged to halt all military operations, but refused to surrender its
arms to the Iraqi government. In any case, it is apparent that the League has
maintained an operational militia.
17. There have been
reports that Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq has also sent fighters to Syria. What do you
think about the veracity of those stories, and why would the organization be
interested in the conflict there?
Obviously it is
tough to validate such reports in the open source. It is likely, however, that
Iraqi Shiite militants, and thus perhaps members of the League, are engaged to
some capacity in Syria. The common denominator of the reporting seems to be the
Sayyida Zeinab neighborhood in southeast Damascus, the location of the shrine
of Sayyida Zeinab, a very important religious location for Shiite Muslims.
Shiite militants may be located in that neighborhood to actually protect the
shrine from damage, or to use the predominately Shiite neighborhood as an
operating base for wider activities. The League also opened a political office
in Beirut, which given its history with the Lebanese Hezbollah, may be used as
a coordinating point between the two groups. Participation in the Syrian
conflict could provide the League with an opportunity to maintain the training
of its militia, and also grow its regional proxy network between Baghdad,
Damascus, and Beirut.
18. What is the
position of Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki with regards to the League?
Ultimately, Maliki
wants to use the League as political leverage over Moqtada al-Sadr and the
Sadrist Trend. Even though Maliki has historically been able to draw in the
Sadrists when needed, such as during the 2010 government formation, and push
them away when they grow too strong, as seen with the 2008 Knights’ Charge
operation, he would probably love to see the League challenge Sadr’s support
base in Iraq.
Nevertheless,
Maliki would likely push back against the League if they grew strong enough to
directly challenge his authority.
19. What do you think
is in the future for the League of the Righteous?
Essentially, the
League could play a few different roles in Iraq, which I think is what Iran
intends. First, it could continue its historic role of a large, well-funded,
well-organized Shiite militant group that Iran has at its disposal. Such a
group has historically been used to apply physical pressure to promote Iranian
objectives and threaten U.S. and Western interests in Iraq. While the group has
not been used to respond to Islamic State of Iraq operations against Shiites or
attack U.S. interests in Iraq, such actions remain possibilities. Recently, the
League threatened the use of force against Turkish interests for what the group
saw as “blatant interference” in Iraq.
As a political
force, it is likely that the League will continue to expand its activities
throughout Iraq. It has recently pledged to establish offices in every
province, with a particular focus in Ninewa. With that, outreach to tribal and
minority groups will continue, allowing the group to expand its service provision
network. The League will also continue to attempt to co-opt the legacy of Sadiq
al-Sadr in order to hijack the Sadrist’s current support base throughout
Iraq. It is unclear however what type of
autonomy from Iran the League entertains.
Finally, as a
religious organization the League will likely continue to develop its religious
school networks in Iraq and Lebanon. Such expansion will allow Iran to
penetrate regional Shiite networks. In this regard, the death of Sistani will
be a major inflection point for the League’s religious activities.
In any case, the
League will definitely be one to watch as Maliki continues to consolidate
power, Syria continues to threaten regional stability, and Iran re-shapes its
proxy strategy in light of it all.
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