Review of 2008 Attack Statistics In Iraq

The last two quarterly reports to Congress by the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR) contained statistics on the total number of attacks from April to December 2008. For the beginning of that year, the reports contained a different metric using average daily attacks instead. As reported before, last year saw a steady decline in the number of deaths in Iraq. The casualties, depending upon the source dropped to 2003 or 2004 levels. According to the January 2009 SIGIR report, Iraqi civilian deaths are down 80% from June 2007 to December 2008. Iraqi security forces' casualties dropped 84%, and Coalition deaths are down 88% for that same time period. Attacks also declined 86% to around the same amount as 2003. From April 1 to September 30, 2008 the average number of attacks per month stayed almost the same at just over 1,700. From October 1 to December 31 however attacks dropped to approximately 1,100. The fact that was an almost 90% drop from the middle of 2007 shows just how massive the conflict in Iraq was. Attacks are now largely based upon the struggle for power rather than sect, and are nowhere near what they were in recent years. The country remains an extremely dangerous place, but has a new post-sectarian war status quo.

Southern Iraq and Kurdistan were the most peaceful parts of Iraq, while the Sunni and mixed sect-ethnic provinces accounted for the vast majority of violence. Most of the conflict in the south was between the feuding Shiite parties the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council and the Sadrists. Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki became involved when he sent forces to crackdown on the Mahdi Army in early 2008. That has largely ended leading to few acts of violence there now. In Kurdistan the tight control over the entry of non-Kurds has largely deterred attacks. Muthanna, Karbala, and Najaf all had single digit attacks from April to December 2008. The three Kurdistan provinces of Dohuk, Irbil, and Sulaymaniya only had 12 for that time period, followed by 33 in Qadisiyah, 45 in Dhi Qar, 51 in Wasit, and 94 in Maysan. That last province was the only one that had an increase in attacks from April to December because of the government's move against the Sadrists there. Basra had 145, but that was because of the end of the security operation against the Mahdi Army there as well that started in March 2008. From April to July there were 108 attacks there, but that quickly dropped to 26 from July to September, and eleven from October to the end of the year. Babil was the one southern province that had a large number of attacks consistently for the reporting period with 197 total. The remaining six provinces was the scene of most of the attacks in the country. Anbar had 646 where insurgents still carry out attacks against the Awakening tribes. Tamim with 677 contains the disputed city of Kirkuk, which has split Arabs, Kurds, Turkmen, and Christians there. Diyala had 1,321 attacks from April to December. It is ruled by Shiites, but has a Sunni majority. The Sons of Iraq there have also been a target of insurgents, and the Kurds desire to annex northern strips of the province. Salahaddin with 1,573 attacks is a largely Sunni governorate, but the provincial council is run by Kurds. Ninewa with 3,801 attacks is ethnically divided between Sunnis, Shiites, Kurds, Christians, and other smaller minority groups, and also has Kurdish leadership. Finally, the capital Baghdad has always had the most attacks with 3,801 as it is the seat of power.

Total Number of Attacks In Iraq From April 1-December 31, 2008

Province	Total Attacks 4/1/08-7/1/08	Total Attacks 7/1/08-9/30/08	Total Attacks 10/1/08-12/31/08
Muthanna	2	1	1
Karbala	1	4	0
Najaf	4	1	2
Kurdistan (Dohuk, Irbil, Sulaymaniya)	3	6	3
Qadisiyah	17	7	9
Dhi-Qar	17	21	7
Wasit	34	8	9
Maysan	12	43	39
Basra	108	26	11
Babil	81	54	62
Anbar	275	209	162
Tamim	248	245	184
Diyala	537	533	251
Salahaddin	717	482	374
Ninewa	1,041	924	511
Baghdad	2,221	867	713
TOTALS:	5,318	3,431	2,338
Avg. Per Month	1,772.6	1,715.5	1,169.0

SOURCES

Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, "Quarterly Report to the United States Congress," 10/30/08

- "Quarterly Report and Semiannual Report to the United States Congress," 1/30/09

Iraq’s Anti-Corruption Agencies

Iraq’s anti-corruption agencies continue to struggle with their job. The Minister of Planning Ali Baban told the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR) that he thought corruption was worse now than under Saddam. He said that corruption was rampant throughout the government, and that Baghdad had failed to stop it. The investigative group Transparency International supports Baban’s claims. They look into corruption in governments across the world. In 2003 they ranked Iraq 113 out of 133 governments on its annual corruption index with one being the best and 133 the worst. By 2008 Iraq was tied as the second most corrupt government in the world out of 180 nations. According to SIGIR’s evaluation, of Iraq’s three anti-corruption agencies only one was doing its job.

Iraq has three offices that are tasked with stopping corruption. Those are the inspector generals, the Board of Supreme Audit, and the Commission on Public Integrity. The Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) created the inspector generals in 2004. They were fashioned after the investigative bodies that work in the United States government. There is one inspector general for each Iraqi ministry and agency. The Board of Supreme Audit is run by Dr. Abdul Basit, and looks into the government’s finances. It is similar to the American Government Accountability Office. The third agency is the Commission on Public Integrity led by Judge Raheem al-Ogaili. It was created by the CPA as well, and is an independent group that is tasked with investigating corruption throughout the government.

Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki declared 2008 the year of fighting corruption, but SIGIR found little evidence of that. SIGIR said that the Board of Audit was the only reliable anti-corruption agency, and provided the best information. The inspector generals are caught in the middle of a controversy. Since 2008 six have been fired, but only a few of those have been replaced, leaving those agencies and ministries with no real oversight. The government claims they were not doing their job, but critics claim Prime Minister Maliki removed them for political reasons. Judge Ogaili of the Public Integrity Commission was definitely a political appointee. He took over from Judge Radhi Hamza al-Radhi who actively pursued corruption cases, but was constantly foiled by ministers, Maliki, and sometimes by the United States. In 2007 Judge Radhi fled Iraq due to threats. His successor was Judge Ogaili. He has been in office for over a year but has never been confirmed by parliament. The judge has said that corruption gives Iraq a bad image. His response has been to keep all the work of the Commission secret. He said his agency would only discuss cases after people have been found guilty. That rarely happens in Iraq. In 2008 only 300 officials were charged with corruption, and out of those 87 were found guilty. All were low-level officers. No high-level officials have ever had to go to court. That’s largely because of Article 136, a hold over from the Saddam period that allows ministers to stop any case from going to trial. This has consistently been used to stop corruption investigations. The Amnesty Law passed in 2008 that was supposed to foster reconciliation between Shiites and Sunnis has also been used to stop hundreds of corruption cases. The Commission on Public Integrity said it had to drop half of its investigations as a result of the law. By the end of 2008 the Prime Minister pardoned 1,023 government workers. Those included a group of Interior Ministry officers that were collecting salaries of 50,000 fake policemen, and Defense Ministry officials that skimmed money off of arms sales to Iraq. Maliki’s position is that corruption is all the result of Saddam Hussein, and would like to have the issue quietly disappear.

The International Monetary Fund (IMF) has also criticized Iraq’s fight with graft and fraud. The IMF has an agreement with Iraq to reduce its debt that includes better accounting of its oil profits. In 2008 the IMF said that Baghdad had not moved forward on this, and did not have a plan on how to create greater transparency. In December the organization said that Iraq had not done enough to fight corruption in the petroleum sector as a result.

The U.S. has often said it is committed to fighting corruption in Iraq, and has several programs to do so, but that appears to be more rhetoric than reality. The U.S. embassy in Baghdad has an anti-corruption coordinator, but there have been ten of those since the office was created. On average they have only served six months in Iraq, with the latest one just arriving in the country. That provides no continuity in effort. In May 2008, two State Department officials who worked in Iraq on this task said that the U.S. was never committed to the fight. The Americans have also stopped some investigations because of political concerns. A U.S. official told Reuters in December 2008 that if the U.S. or Baghdad really went after corruption, it could bring down the government because of the high officials that would be implicated.

Corruption has taken a great toll on Iraq. The former head of the Public Integrity Commission said that $13 billion had been lost in the reconstruction effort. The agency found oil workers in Basra stealing up to 500,000 barrels of oil a day in early 2008. No one of standing has been held accountable for these crimes. Instead, Prime Minister Maliki has attempted to silence the investigations fearing the bad image it creates for his country. That hinders development in a country that has mass unemployment and poverty despite its oil wealth, and undermines the public’s belief in the government. This was seen in the recent January 2009 provincial elections where corruption was a major issue. With no leadership from either the United States or Baghdad, this problem will continue to fester.

SOURCES

Adhoob, Salam, “An Inside View of the ‘Second Insurgency’: How Corruption and Waste Are Undermining the U.S. Mission in Iraq,” Senate Democratic Policy Committee Hearing, 9/22/08

Aswat al-Iraq, “Iraq among countries with highest levels of corruption – report,” 9/23/08

Brinkley, Joel, “Iraq quietly tackles rampant corruption,” San Francisco Chronicle, 1/24/09

Flahert, Anne, “Ex-officials: Bush admin. ignored Iraq corruption,” Associated Press, 5/13/08

Glanz, James and Mohammed, Riyadh, “Premier of Iraq Is Quietly Firing Fraud Monitors,” New York Times, 11/18/08

Human Rights Watch, “The Quality of Justice, Failings of Iraq’s Central Criminal Court,” December 2008

O’Hanlon, Michael and Campbell, Jason, “Iraq Index,” Brookings Institution, 11/20/08

Ryan, Missy, “U.S. Says Iraq Fails to Tackle Corrupt High Officials,” Reuters, 12/19/08

Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, “Quarterly Report to the United States Congress,” 10/30/08
- “Quarterly Report and Semiannual Report to the United States Congress,” 1/30/09

U.S. Embassy, “Review of Anticorruption Efforts in Iraq Working Draft,” 2007

Government Still Dominates Iraq’s Economy

In the recent quarterly report to Congress by the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR), there is an interview with Planning Minister Ali Baban. He noted that because Iraq lacks a strong business sector, and foreign investment has stayed away due to the violence, Baghdad plays the central role in the growth and development of the economy. This is despite the lofty goals of the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) that wanted to privatize Iraq and usher in free market reforms after the U.S. invasion. Saddam ran the country on a centralized, socialist model, so the effects of the CPA’s program was to shut down state run businesses and leave thousands of Iraqis out of work. Since then the government is still the largest employer in the country.

Lack of jobs remains a massive problem in Iraq today. Minister Baban said that unemployment stood at 35-40%. The SIGIR estimates that with underemployment that figure could rise to 60%. A 2008 United Nations’ survey of Iraqis from the end of 2007 found that the government still dominated the job market as a result because it is the only source of a steady paycheck. Unfortunately, many of these positions were obtained through bribes, party affiliation, and patronage. There are often reports of Iraqis having to pay to join the police for example. The Tribal Support Councils formed by Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki are a huge patronage system as each council is given the power to hire people for the organization as well as into the local security forces.

Below is a breakdown of jobs in fifteen of Iraq’s provinces plus Kurdistan based upon the U.N. survey. In all but three provinces, Babil, Ninewa, and Wasit, the government was the largest employer. In Najaf public sector jobs were a tie with self-employment in a non-farm industry. In Muthanna, Anbar, Dhi Qar, Basra, and Kurdistan the government provided 40% or more of the jobs with Kurdistan at the top with 50%. Self-employed but not on a farm was the second largest job source in eleven provinces and Kurdistan, followed by farming in three governorates. In Muthanna unskilled workers was the second source of work.

Two Largest Employers By Province

Kurdistan: 50% work for governmet, 20% self-employed non-farm
Basra: 46% work for government, 24% self-employed non-farm
Dhi Qar: 43% work for government, 29% self-employed non-farm
Anbar: 40% work for government, 22% self-employed non-farm
Muthanna: 40% work for government, 23% non-skilled labor
Salahaddin: 38% work for government, 32% self-employed farming
Baghdad: 38% work for government, 28% self-employed non-farm
Qadisiyah: 37% work for government, 15% self-employed non-farm
Karbala: 36% work for government, 34% self-employed non-farm
Tamim: 36% work for government, 30% self-employed non-farm
Maysan: 34% work for government, 25% self-employed non-farm
Diyala: 33% work for government, 20% self-employed non-farm
Najaf: 29% work for government, 29% self-employed non-farm
Babil: 33% self-employed farming, 26% work for government
Ninewa: 28% self-employed non-farm, 24% work for government
Wasit: 26% self-employed farming, 23% work for government

SOURCES

Cave, Damien, “Nonstop Theft and Bribery Stagger Iraq,” New York Times, 12/2/07

Fairweather, Jack, “Iraqi state enterprises warily reopen,” Financial Times, 6/16/08

Middle East Online, “Iraqi professionals forced to take small jobs,” Middle East Online, 2/21/08

Rubin, Alissa, “Maliki Pushes for Election Gains, Despite Fears,” New York Times, 1/26/09

Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, “Quarterly Report to the United States Congress,” 10/30/08
- “Quarterly Report and Semiannual Report to the United States Congress,” 1/30/09

Iraq’s Budget Stalled

Iraq’s 2009 proposed budget is still in limbo. It was recently revised a third time with a $2 billion increase after two successive cuts. It may also be based upon unrealistic predictions about the oil industry that provides the lion’s share of Baghdad’ revenue. The budget also cannot be passed because there is no speaker of parliament since Mahmoud Mashhadani resigned on December 23, 2008. This is a familiar process for Iraq where major legislation is often delayed because of political bickering.

The original 2009 budget was set at $79.8 billion, but now is at $62.8 billion, a $17 billion reduction. The budget has been changed three times. After the second time it was cut to $59.5 billion. $2 billion was recently added to cover government salaries and benefits however. Even with the reductions Iraq is still predicted to have a 31% budget deficit according to a member of parliament’s Finance Committee. The Ministry of Finance says that they have a $25 billion surplus that will cover the difference. The Ministry also announced at the end of January 2009 that it would issue government bonds for the first time. Finance Minister Bayan Jabar hopes that this will raise up to $5 billion. He gave no date on when this will happen.

80% of the 2009 budget is for operational costs, while the other 20% is for capital improvements. So far $12.2 billion has been set aside for the capital budget, $1 billion less than the previous year. The operational costs are also up from 2008 largely due to a salary increase. When the country was awash in oil profits Baghdad decided to raise pay, but not it is coming back to bite them. Wages are the biggest cost to the government. Of the $36.2 billion Baghdad has spent from January to October 2008, 38.1% was on salaries.

The reduction in the capital budget will have wide ranging effects throughout the government. The security forces are just now beginning to plan for this contingency. The National Police for example, want to add twelve new brigades to cover all of Iraq’s provinces, but now will only be able to add one more this year. The Defense Ministry has plans to buy new armored personnel carries that might go on hold as well. The food ration system is going to eliminate wealthy families from its rolls. A hiring freeze is also supposed to go into affect. The budgets for the provinces are due for a 50% decrease in spending. Other services are expected to be cut, but few Iraqi politicians are willing to sign off on them because parliamentary elections are expected at the end of the year.

An even bigger problem than the costs and cuts in the 2009 budget is the fact that it is based upon assumptions of the oil industry that may not come true. The revised budget estimates that world oil prices will be at $50 a barrel, and the country will export two million barrels a day, a long time goal of the Oil Ministry. In 2008 Iraq only produced 2.42 million barrels a day on average. For the last three months of 2008 it was down to 2.37 million barrels a day, almost the same amount as the last quarter of 2007. Exports averaged 1.79 million barrels a day at the end of 2008, a 3% increase from the previous quarter, but a 6% decrease from 2007. In January 2009 Iraq increased its exports to 1.89 million barrels a day, but the average price per barrel was only $37, a lower price than the world average of around $40. As the numbers show, oil production and exports have been largely stagnant since the U.S. invasion. They are also below the 2.58 million barrels a day mark set before the invasion. If the price and production goals are not met, Iraq will end up with a larger deficit than already expected.

A lot of things have changed since 2008. Last year Iraq was riding high off of record oil prices, and increased spending and salaries in response. Because of a paper-based bureaucracy, untrained staff and incompetence, Baghdad has never been able to spend all of its budget. This turned out to be a good thing for once as that left over money is now available to make up for the planned deficit. At the same time the budget cuts come at a time when U.S. reconstruction aid is coming to an end, and the country still needs billions to rebuild. As Planning Minister Ali Baban told the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, Iraq has little foreign investment and a small business community, which means government spending is the only real source of jobs and growth. When the budget will actually be passed is not known either, as it is taking a back seat to the disputes and competition over naming a new speaker of parliament.

SOURCES

Associated Press, “Iraq’s oil exports inch up in January,” 2/1/09

Aswat al-Iraq, "2009 budget faces 31% deficit - legislator," 2/8/09
- “No decrease in salaries because of oil prices – planning minister” 12/19/08

Al-Hashemi, Mostafa, “$25 billion surplus staves off financial crisis – Iraqi minister,” Azzaman, 2/2/09

Reuters, “UPDATE 1-Iraq to issue 1st post-Saddam bonds for $5 bln,” 1/28/09

Ryan, Missy, "Falling Oil Price Could Hamper Iraqi Military," Reuters, 2/9/09
- “Iraq must focus on reconstruction upkeep, U.S. says,” Reuters, 2/4/09

Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, “Quarterly Report and Semiannual Report to the United States Congress,” 1/30/09

Monthly Media Coverage of Iraq From December 29, 2008 to February 1, 2009

The American media’s coverage of the Iraq War in January 2009 may foreshadow the declining importance of the subject in the United States for the new year. As reported before, the American media allocated between 2-3% of its reporting to Iraq in 2008. This was a sharp decline from the beginning of 2007 when the war was a top five story and accounted for 25% of the news. By the end of the year it was down to 4%. In January 2009 Iraq accounted for only 1.25% of stories in the U.S.

According to the Pew Research Center’s Project for Excellent in Journalism that monitories all forms of American media, from December 29, 2008 to February 1, 2009 Iraq made the top ten stories in the country three out of four weeks. From December 29 to January 4 Iraq was the number seven story in America with 2% of all coverage. The handover of the Green Zone to Iraqis as part of the Status of Forces Agreement was in the news at that time. The next week Iraq did not make the top ten. From January 19 to 25 Iraq just made the top stories at number ten and only 1% of the stories. The new Obama administration was discussing its war policy then. For the week of January 26 to February 1 Iraq was number six with 2% of coverage. That was the week of the January 31 provincial elections. That was the biggest news of the month in Iraq, yet didn’t make the top five stories in America, and only raised press coverage to the average of the previous year.

Iraq has been consistently pushed farther and farther out of the news since 2007. When American politicians stopped discussing Iraq policy in 2007 there was a decided drop in media coverage. In 2008 the economic crisis and the campaign for president pushed most other news stories off the front pages and television screens. In 2009 the new Obama administration, the continued problems with the economy, and the new emphasis on Afghanistan will be the major stories, leaving Iraq more and more an afterthought in the minds of the American public.

SOURCES

Baker, Peter and Shanker, Thom, “Obama Meets With Officials on Iraq, Signaling New Commitment to Ending War,” New York Times, 1/21/09

Pew Research Center’s Project for Excellence In Journalism, “PEJ News Coverage Index: December 29, 2008-January 4, 2009; Symbols And Substance Of Obama’s First Week Drive The Narrative,” 1/5/09
- “PEJ News Coverage Index: January 5-11, 2009; Symbols And Substance Of Obama’s First Week Drive The Narrative,” 1/12/09
- “PEJ News Coverage Index: January 19-25, 2009; Symbols And Substance Of Obama’s First Week Drive The Narrative,” 1/26/09
- “PEJ News Coverage Index: January 26 – February 1, 2009; The Economic Crisis Returns With A Vengeance,” 2/2/09

Robertson, Campbell and Farrell, Stephen, “Green Zone, Heart of U.S. Occupation, Reverts To Iraqi Control,” New York Times, 12/31/08

The Islamic Party’s Victory In Diyala

There was a time when many observers believed that the Iraqi Islamic Party (IIP) would be one of the big losers in the January 2009 provincial election. The IIP had broken the Sunni boycott in 2005 and run anyway causing resentment amongst many. The formation of the Anbar Awakening, and then the Sons of Iraq across many of the Sunni areas directly challenged their rule as they had a popular base the IIP lacked. Instead the IIP and its Accordance Front coalition finished first in two provinces in the January balloting, and third in three others, plus a surprising fifth in Basra. One of those victories came in northern Diyala. The turn of events there showed how the IIP was able to turn the Sons of Iraq program to their electoral advantage.

Diyala province is in northern Iraq, and remains one of the most violent in Iraq. The population is roughly 55% Sunni Arabs, 30% Shiite Arabs, and 15% Kurds. In 2005 the Sunnis boycotted the election there allowing an alliance of the Dawa Party and the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council to take power with twenty of the 41 council seats. The Islamic Party did run there, coming in second with fourteen seats. That led to sectarian fighting and the growth of Al Qaeda in Iraq in Diyala. In April 2006 Abu Musab al-Zarqawi announced Diyala as the center of his Islamic Caliphate. That brought in Shiite militias from Baghdad to fight for their brethren, who began receiving arms and weapons from Iran. The Kurdish peshmerga had also moved into the Khanaqin district shortly after the U.S. invasion.

Things looked bleak in Diyala until 2007. That was the year members of the 1920s Revolution Brigades, and several other insurgent groups, along with the Karki and Shimouri tribes began turning on their former allies Al Qaeda in Iraq. These became the first Sons of Iraq (SOI) units in the province. What was at first seen as a threat by the Islamic Party to their claim to stand for the Sunni population, turned into an opportunity. In February 2007 Hussein al-Zubaydi the head of security in the Diyala provincial council and a member of the Islamic Party volunteered to work with the Americans to help organize the SOI. Zubaydi’s position allowed him to determine the make-up of the SOI. Later, when the U.S. began distributing aid through the SOI, the Islamic Party took advantage of that as well claiming responsibility. Through their maneuverings they were able to co-opt the SOI program, and build up a popular base that they never had before. This put them in a good position heading into the provincial elections that were originally scheduled for 2008.

It was just then that Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki became concerned about the growth of Sunni power there. In mid-2007 Baghdad created the Diyala Support Council that was supposed to ensure security in the province. It was not connected to the provincial council or security forces however, and worked explicitly to build up support for the Prime Minister. They were given control of recruiting locals into the security forces, which was a major form of patronage at Maliki’s disposal. The purpose of the council was to win over members of the SOI and weaken the Islamic Party’s new base. The U.S. quickly became concerned about the council's activities and complained to Baghdad about it saying that it might destabilize Diyala even more. In late October 2007 for example, the U.S. general in command of northern Iraq complained that Baghdad refused to take in 6,000 Sunnis into the Diyala provincial police. The general said that the Interior Ministry had turned down his request. Of course, the Diyala Support Council was able to deliver names directly to the Ministry and get them hired.

In 2008 Maliki upped the ante in Diyala. In January 2008 Baghdad formed the first Tribal Support Council in the province. Like the Diyala Support Council, the new Tribal Councils were meant to take fighters away from the SOI, create support for Maliki, divide the Sunnis, and weaken the Islamic Party. In July the Prime Minister launched the Omens of Prosperity security offensive there. The operation was aimed as much at the insurgents as the Islamic Party and their Sons of Iraq allies. By the end of August five top SOI leaders had been arrested along with hundreds of their followers, while others had fled the province. In the provincial capital Baquba for example, all of the SOI checkpoints were shut down by August, along with all but one of their offices. Members of the Islamic Party were also rounded and harassed. To underline the political nature of Omens of Prosperity the government arrested three SOI members as they were going to register as candidates for the provincial election. Their arrest made them ineligible to run. The SOI went to the U.S. for help, but they weren’t able to stop Maliki. This was a classic use of the carrot and the stick. At first, Maliki offered SOI jobs through the Diyala and Tribal Support Council programs in return for their support. He then went after those that had not joined him using the Iraqi Army and police.

The Islamic Party headed into the 2009 elections at a seeming disadvantage. There were over forty-five parties and lists running in Diyala, but the four major ones were expected to take most of the votes. Those were the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council’s Diyala Coalition, Maliki’s Rule of Law List, the Kurdistan Alliance, and the Accordance and Reform Front. The last was led by Ezze Addeen Ibrahim Yaseen Muhammed, and was made up of the Iraqi Islamic Party, the Iraqi Commission for Civil Society, the General Conference of Iraqi People, and the Iraqi Arab Assembly. It also included many members of the SOI. Concerned about their political future the SIIC controlled provincial council called for a delay in the election there for six months in December. That didn’t happen and the Islamic Party’s list began campaigning. That was tough in a province where there are still insurgent pockets. The List’s candidates rarely crossed sectarian lines, and one was kidnapped and killed. The Reform Front was also competing with Tribal Support Councils that were expected to deliver the tribes to Maliki’s list, along with Saleh al-Mutlak, a Sunni independent who was appealing mostly to Baathists.

When January 31, 2009 came along, the Islamic Party came out victorious. Despite the insurgency, and Maliki’s moves 57% of the province’s voters turned out, one of the highest in the country. They gave the Islamic Party’s list 21.1% of the vote, good enough for first place. The Kurdish Alliance came in second with 17.2%, Saleh al-Mutlak’s Iraqi National Project got 15%, while former Interim Prime Minister Iyad Allawi’s Iraqi National List was fourth at 9.5%. Maliki’s State of Law list came in fifth with 6%. That means the Islamic Party’s List will have to cut deals with at least two others to gain a majority to rule the province.

The Islamic Party’s moves allowed it to take advantage of Iraq’s two provincial elections. In 2005 they ran basically uncontested in Diyala because of the Sunni boycott and came in second place. In 2009 they were able to come in first. Their size, organization, access to money and the media, and the election law, which favored large parties all worked to the IIP’s advantage. More importantly they were able to co-opt the former insurgents that became the Sons of Iraq as they were first being organized in 2007, while surviving Maliki’s crackdown in 2008. The IIP can now claim that they speak for many of Iraq’s Sunnis having done well in two ballots. They have to exert their power in Diyala carefully however, as they will have coalition partners and be ever vigilant of Maliki’s willingness to use the security forces for his political gain.

Early Election Results In Diyala
Iraqi Accordance Front: 21.1%
Kurdish Alliance: 17.2%
Iraqi National Project: 15%
Iraqi National List: 9.5%
State of Law: 6%
Coalition of Diyala: 5.3%
National Reform Party: 4.3%
Independent Free Movement List: 3.1%
National Movement: 2.6%
Fadhila: 2.3%
TURNOUT: 57%

SOURCES

Abdullah, Muhammed, “calls to postpone diyala election,” Niqash, 12/10/08
- “Diyala Sees Early Campaigning,” Niqash, 12/8/08

Alsumaria, “Iraq Awakening Councils in Diyala end strike,” 3/4/08

Dagher, Sam, “Risky US alliances in Iraq,” Christian Science Monitor, 7/17/07

DPA, “Head of Iraqi provincial council calls for elections postponement,” 12/9/08

DVIDS News, “Paramount Sheiks Sign Peace Agreement,” 5/2/07

Farrell, Stephen, “Election: Preliminary Results,” Baghdad Bureau Blog, New York Times, 2/5/09

Garcia-Navarro, Lourdes, “Iraq Paramilitary Group Targeted, Despite Success,” Morning Edition, NPR, 9/4/08
- “Sunni Group Says It’s Being Harassed,” Morning Edition, 9/29/08

Goetze, Katharina and Salman, Daud and Naji, Zaineb, “Could Awakening Fighters Rejoin Insurgency?” Institute for War & Peace Reporting, 10/31/08

Gordon, Michael, “Iraq Hampers U.S. Bid to Widen Sunni Police Role,” New York Times, 10/28/07

Hendawi, Hamza, “Iraq moves against some US-backed Sunni fighters,” Associated Press, 8/18/08

Iraqi News, “Three Support Councils established in Diala,” 1/24/08

Kagan, Kimberly, “The Anbar Awakening: Displacing al Qaeda from Its Stronghold in Western Iraq,” Institute For The Study of War and WeeklyStandard.com, 8/21/06-3/30/07

Kimmons, Sean, “Hashing out their differences,” Stars and Stripes, 8/29/08

Knights, Michael and McCarthy, Eamon, “Provincial Politics in Iraq: Fragmentation or New Awakening?” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, April 2008

Levinson, Charles, “Awakening Councils in hiding as arrests on rise,” USA Today, 9/22/08

Multi-National Corps – Iraq, “Diyala leaders meet to establish tribal support councils (Diyala),” 3/21/08

Niqash, “accord and reform bloc,” 1/28/09

Oppel, Richard, “Iraq Takes Aim at Leaders of U.S.-Tied Sunni Groups,” New York Times, 8/22/08

Parker, Ned, “Baqubah a minefield of Iraqi sectarian tensions,” Los Angeles Times, 12/7/08
Parker, Ned, “Iraq seeks breakup of U.S.-funded Sunni fighters,” Los Angeles Times, 8/23/08

Roggio, Bill, “1920s Revolution Brigades turns on al Qaeda in Diyala,” Long War Journal.org, 6/12/07
- “Operation Omens of Prosperity begins in Diyala,” Long War Journal.org, 7/29/08

Russo, Claire, “Countdown To Diyala’s Provincial Election: Maliki & The IIP,” Institute for the Study of War, 1/30/09
- “The Maliki Government Confronts Diyala,” Institute for the Study of War,” 9/23/08

Shadid, Anthony, “Iraq’s Diyala Province Puts Power of Ballot to the Test,” Washington Post, 2/1/09

Al-Tuawijri, Ali, “Iraq’s anti-Qaeda fighters fear for their future,” Agence France Presse, 9/6/08

Tyson, Ann Scott, “Iraq Is Criticized for Slow Hire of Police,” Washington Post, 10/27/07
- “Sunni Fighters Find Strategic Benefits in Tentative Alliance With U.S.,” Washington Post, 8/9/07
- “Tribal Members Join in Effort To Assist U.S., Iraqi Forces,” Washington Post, 9/30/07

Zavis, Alexandra, “Residents wary as Iraq police blanket Baqubah,” Los Angeles Times, 7/31/08

Unfinished Business – Tamim Province

The Kurdistan Regional Government recently announced that they would be holding regional parliamentary elections in May 2009. The elections in fourteen of Iraq’s eighteen provinces have just concluded. That leaves Tamim as the only governorate that has not held or plans to hold balloting. The provincial election law, passed in September 2008 postponed voting there until a committee could come up with recommendations on how to conduct them there. Those findings are due at the end of March, but recent comments from a Kurdish politician questions whether they will have their work done on time, leaving the future of the province up in the air.

On February 2, a parliamentarian from the Kurdistan Islamic Union, an independent Kurdish bloc, claimed that the Tamim committee was not doing its job. He said that they will not have their work done by March 31, the deadline set by parliament in the provincial election law, which will threaten elections in that province. The Islamic Union member went on to say that the rest of the country had voted, and that any delay by the committee would be unfair for the citizens of Tamim.

Tamim is in northern Iraq and contains the disputed city of Kirkuk. In the January 2005 provincial elections, the List of Kurdistan Brotherhood led by the Kurdistan Democratic Party, took over half of the votes in the province, gaining control of 26 of the 41 seats on the provincial council. The rest of the votes went to the Iraqi Turkman Front with eight seats, the Iraqi Republican Group, five seats, and the Islamic Turkman Coalition and National Iraq Union that gained one seat each. The election allowed the Kurds to take over the administration of Tamim, the security forces, and appoint the governor, something greatly resented by the Arabs, Turkmen, and some Christians. The Arabs went on to boycott the council until December 2007. The Kurds have long wanted to annex Kirkuk and northern sections of Tamim, and the provincial election was their first step in that direction. They also attempted to force Arabs out of Kirkuk, and pressure Christians to support their moves.

Later in 2005 when the Constitution was drafted, the Kurds were able to insert Article 140. It called for normalization, a census in Tamim, and a vote by December 31, 2007 on whether Kirkuk wanted to be annexed. That followed the Kurds strategy of trying to peacefully, politically, and legally incorporate Kirkuk into Kurdistan, while creating facts on the ground through their control of the province to support their cause.

Article 140 has never been implemented however. By early 2007 the United Nations realized that the constitutional process would only lead to more conflicts, so they began looking for alternatives. On August 10, 2007 the U.N. Security Council passed Resolution 1770 that said the U.N. representative in Iraq was to work on settling Kirkuk, and all other disputed territories in the country. The first thing special envoy Stephan De Mistura did was get the Iraqi government to agree to delay Article 140. That was put off until June 30, 2008. When that passed no new date was set. This was supported by the United States that came to feel that a U.N. negotiated settlement was the best way to resolve Kirkuk. The Kurds however felt betrayed. They were also worried that any negotiations would cost them territory, perhaps even Kirkuk itself.

In the meantime, the Kurds were forced into a power sharing agreement that only angered them more. In December 2007 the Kurds gave up five of their seats on the provincial council so that the Turkmen could have eleven, the Arabs eight, and the Christians one. This ended the Arab boycott of the body that had been going on for over two years. The Kurds were also supposed to create a joint decision making process, release Arab prisoners, and have the Kurdish intelligence service withdraw from the province. The Kurds believed these moves violated the constitution, so they never followed through with the deal other than to give up some of their council seats.

To express their dissatisfaction, the Kurds began stonewalling important legislation and blocking U.S. policies. For example, they refused to allow the formation of Sons of Iraq in Tamim by the Americans for a very long time. They also began holding up a number of important laws such as the original version of the provincial election law.

The main sticking point in the passage of the provincial law was how to deal with Tamim. The first version of the legislation had an amendment inserted by a Turkmen parliamentarian that would postpone elections in Tamim, replace the Kurdish peshmerga with regular security forces, while the provincial council would be divided in thirds between the Kurds, Arabs, and Turkmen, along with one seat for Christians. The council would then determine how elections were to be held there. Arabs and Turkmen supported this proposal because they knew they would lose in any vote. It was also taken up by the opposition in parliament made up of the Sadrists, the Fadhila Party, the National Dialogue Council, the Iraqi National List, along with parts of the Iraqi Accordance Front, who were opposed to the expansion of Kurdistan. The Christians on the other hand, were against the power-sharing deal because it would only give them one seat. The Kurds at first walked out in protest over the article, and then the President of Iraq Jalal Talabani, a Kurd, vetoed it. Finally the parliament agreed to a version of the law that also held off on balloting, but created the committee discussed before. The Kurds came up with this plan because it maintained their control over the province.

If the Tamim commission does not have its work done by the end of March, the issue will then pass to Baghdad. The Prime Minister, along with the President of Iraq Jalal Talabani, and the speaker of parliament are supposed to work with the United Nations to come up with an election process for Tamim if that happens. That could be very complicated, as Maliki has actively opposed the Kurds’ aspirations to annex any disputed territory. That will probably mean the future of Kirkuk will again be put off. That would suit the Kurds as they already have de facto control. Maliki on the other hand, after his victories in the provincial elections, may be tempted to send in Iraqi security forces as he did in Khanaqin in Diyala to assert central government authority, and push out the Kurds. The Prime Minister has been doing something similar in Mosul since the summer of 2008. The U.S. can’t be expected to step in as President Obama is committed to withdrawing U.S. forces, and even during the end of the Bush term abdicated responsibility to the United Nations. Tamim shows that there are still many difficult issues remaining in the country, with the Arab-Kurd disputed right at the top. The feuding parties have not been willing to negotiate or compromise. Instead they have put off any tough decisions as in the provincial election law, and preferred maneuvering on the ground to assert their authority.

SOURCES

Ali, Ahmed and Knights, Michael, “Kirkuk: A Test for the International Community,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 1/14/09

Aswat al-Iraq, “Investigation committee in Kirkuk ‘late’ – MP,” 2/2/09

BBC News, “Guide to Iraqi political parties,” 1/20/06

Goode, Erica, “Iraq Passes Provincial Elections Law,” New York Times, 9/25/08

International Crisis Group, “Oil For Soil: Toward A Grand Bargain On Iraq And The Kurds,” 10/28/08

Iraq The Model Blog, “Talabani Rejects the Provincial Election Law,” 7/24/08

Al-Khalidi, Diaa, “divisions split kirkuk Christians,” Niqash, 11/11/08

Knights, Michael and McCarthy, Eamon, “Provincial Politics in Iraq: Fragmentation or New Awakening?” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, April 2008

Raghavan, Sudarsan and Londono, Ernesto, “Iraqis Take Flawed Step On Electoral Legislation,” Washington Post, 7/23/08

Reuters, “Iraq’s Kurds to elect parliament on May 19,” 2/2/09

Rubin, Alissa, “Kurds Object to Iraqi Provincial Election Law,” New York Times, 7/23/08

Tavernise, Sabrina, and Muhammed, Riyadh, “Iraqi Measure on Provincial Voting Is Vetoed,” New York Times, 7/24/08

Visser, Reidar, “After Compromise on Kirkuk, Finally an Elections Law for Iraq’s Governorates,” Historiae.org, 9/24/08
- “The Kirkuk Issue Exposes Weaknesses in Iraq’s Ruling Coalition,” Historiae.org, 8/7/08