Iraq was once one of the major agriculture producers of the Middle East. Now the farming sector has fallen into disrepair, and Iraq is a major food importer. Both Baghdad and the U.S. military however are hoping that it will make a come back to provide a source of growth to make up for the plummeting price of oil, and jobs for an economy that is still facing high unemployment. The problem is that the farm sector faces such large structural problems that it will probably take a decade for it to recover.
In 2008 Iraq faced one of the worst drought in years. Rainfall in 2007 was down 40% according to the Iraqi government, and affected the northern provinces of Irbil, Dohuk, Tamim, Diyala, and Ninewa the worst. Barley and wheat that are dependent upon rain were hit the hardest. Production for both dropped 51%, and in November 2008, the government announced that it would have to import 50 thousand tons of wheat to make up for the shortfall. The Ministry of Agriculture started several assistance programs, but U.S. government observers didn’t think that many were effective.
2009 looks to be no better. The Iraqi paper Al Sabah reported that the Water Resource Ministry announced in January that snow and rain were down 1/3 from normal levels. In February the Agriculture Minister said that farm production is down 30%. This year the United Nations has also designated Iraq one of 32 countries that needs external food aid. Iraq already imports 50% of its food needs.
The lack of water was just the latest hit to a sector of Iraq’s economy that has fallen on hard times since the 1980s. 26% of Iraqis are involved in farming, and it accounts for 8% of the country’s production making it one of the largest after oil. It has largely been neglected since the Saddam times however, and then faced international sanctions, the chaos and sectarian war that followed the U.S. invasion, and government incompetence. For example, many farm workers have left the rural areas for the cities. The fighting also disrupted trade within the country. Corrupt government officials is another issue. The chief Iraqi inspector in Wasit told The National that corruption was everywhere in the province. Many officials take cuts of aid that is supposed to go to farmers, and families often offer bribes to get assistance from the government. The government is also not able to supply fertilizer and water from the irrigation system. Electrical shortages have limited power for pumps. There are few tariffs, which means Iraq has been flooded with cheap food imports from Syrian, Iran, and Turkey since the U.S. invasion. The lack of adequate drainage is also leading to high salinity in the south. 5% of the country’s arable land is disappearing a year as a result. Finally, there is little use of modern farming techniques, and a lack of credit. Many farmers can’t qualify for loans anyway, and need bribes if they want one. All of these make Iraqis less competitive than their foreign competitors.
Baghdad is now trying to promote the farm sector in a drive to diversify the economy. Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki announced a $200 million plan for agriculture. The government is going to subsidize seed sales and support for livestock and dates. Baghdad also has a plan to reclaim six million acres of land with high salinity. At the same time the government has cut subsidies for fuel and fertilizer.
Many U.S. officials in Iraq are skeptical of these plans. The head of the U.S. Provincial Reconstruction Team in Maysan and another member in the province told Reuters that the business was so dysfunctional and broken, and the government so incompetent and corrupt that it would be a Herculean task to revive farming. A U.S. Department of Agriculture report said the sector was “a disaster.” A U.S. farm expert thought it would take ten years to recover.
None of this is good news for Iraq’s struggling economy. The country is almost completely dependent upon oil to earn money. Now that prices have dropped for crude, the government is facing some tough decisions. Baghdad is talking about diversifying, and it’s important that the Agriculture Ministry is getting more money, but it’s unclear whether this is mere lip service or a real commitment.
SOURCES
Alsumaria, “Iraq waning farm sector urges recovery,” 3/3/09
Ashton, Adam, “Iraqi farmers are back in business, and Iraqis love local produce,” McClatchy Newspapers, 12/20/08
Aswat al-Iraq, “Agro-production down due to scarce rain – minister,” 2/23/09
Department of Defense, “Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq,” December 2008
Iraq Directory, “Iraq is Submitting a Tender to Buy 50 Thousand Tons of Wheat,” 11/25/08
Latif, Nizar, “Iraq in midst of ‘agricultural disaster,’” The National, 12/11/08
Ryan, Missy, “Iraq’s ailing farm sector more crucial than ever,” Reuters, 2/28/09
Al Sabah, “Iraq faces massive water shortage, Water Resources said,” 1/21/09
Sands, Phil and Latif, Nizar, “Corruption at the root of Iraq’s failing agriculture,” The National, 2/24/09
Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, “Quarterly Report and Semiannual Report to the United States Congress,” 1/30/09
Wednesday, March 4, 2009
Tuesday, March 3, 2009
Latest United Nations Numbers On Baghdad Province
Baghdad province is a paradox. It is one of the richest in the country, yet has pockets of deep poverty. Security is improving throughout the country and the capital, but it still has the most violence. Electricity production has increased yet half of Baghdad suffers from sever power outages. The United Nations’ Inter-Agency Information and Analysis Unit recently released a paper detailing the situation in the capital province.
Population
Baghdad has the largest, most urbanized population in Iraq. There are 7,145,470 people there, which is 24% of the total population. 87% live in urban areas, 13% in rural ones. The province is divided into nine major districts: Abu Ghraib, Adhamiyah, Kadhimiyah, Karkh, Madain, Mahmudiya, Resafa, Sadr City aka Thawra, and Tarmia.
Population
Baghdad: 7,145,470
Abu Ghraib: 326,626
Adhamiyah: 842,310
Kadhimiyah: 832,310
Karkh: 1,624,057
Madain: 332,883
Mahmudiya 496,053
Resafa: 1,312,052
Sadr City: 1,316,583
Tarmia: 62,147
Security
The security situation in Baghdad has improved with the rest of the country, but it is still the most dangerous area in the country. From June to December 2008 there was a steady decline in security incidents with one large increase from August to October that subsequently leveled off. At the beginning of June there were around 400 security incidents a month in the province. That declined to around 300 in August, but then increased to almost 550 by October. Since then they have decreased to around 250 by the end of 2008. The U.S. military has much more in depth reporting than the U.N. and found that attacks went from 2,221 a month in April 2008 to 713 in December.
Displaced
Baghdad faced the most displacement in the country during the sectarian war. After the Samarra Shiite shrine bombing in February 2006 1.6 million Iraqis became internal refugees. Over 60% of those came from the capital. Today there are 90,731 displaced families in the province, the largest amount in the country. Some Iraqis have begun to return, although it’s still a small percentage of the total. The International Organization for Migration recorded 31,521 families coming back to Baghdad so far as of February 2009. They face a variety of problems including finding jobs, permanent housing, and services.
Employment
Iraq’s unemployment rate matches that of the country’s. Iraq has 18% unemployment. 12% of males in the capital are unemployed, compared to 20% for women. 83% of the male population was involved in the labor force compared to 81% in the country. Unemployment for them was concentrated in Resafa and Sadr City that had double-digit joblessness. As a recent U.N. report found very few women are involved in Iraq’s economy. Only 11% of Baghdad province’s women were either employed or looking for work, compared to 18% in the country. There are wide differences between the districts however. In Mahmudiya and Tarmia 76% and 67% of women respectively were involved in the labor force. In Sadr City it was only 8%. Jobs for women are directly related to education. 43% of women over 10 years old in the province lack a primary education. The U.N. employment study found that women needed a college education to find steady work.
Employment in Baghdad
Male Unemployment (15-64 years old)
Iraq 12%
Tarmia 1%
Abu Ghraib 3%
Adhamiyah 3%
Mahmudiya 3%
Karkh 6%
Kadhimiyah 8%
Madain 8%
Baghdad 12%
Sadr City 15%
Resafa 16%
Males In Labor Force (15-64 years old)
Iraq 81%
Baghdad 83%
Karkh 75%
Mahmudiya 81%
Resafa 82%
Sadr City 83%
Adhamiyah 85%
Madain 85%
Kadhimiyah 83%
Abu Ghraib 87%
Tarmia 96%
Female Unemployment (15-64 years old)
Iraq 13%
Mahmudiya 0%
Tarmia 1%
Abu Ghraib 2%
Madain 5%
Karkh 7%
Sadr City 12%
Adhamiyah 13%
Kadhimiyah 17%
Baghdad 20%
Resafa 23%
Females In Labor Force (15-64 years old)
Iraq 18%
Sadr City 8%
Baghdad 11%
Resafa 16%
Kadhimiyah 17%
Karkh 19%
Madain 27%
Adhamiyah 28%
Abu Ghraib 49%
Tarmia 67%
Mahmudiya 76%
Poverty
Baghdad is one of the richest provinces in the country, but still has pockets of poverty. In Adhamiyah the U.N. found no families in the lowest income quintile. In Abu Ghraib (1%), Karkh (1%), Kadhimiyah (2%), and Resafa (4%) there was also little poverty. That compared to Sadr City (16%), Madain (20%), and Mahmudiya (20%) where poverty was the highest.
% of households in the lowest income quintile
Iraq 22%
Adhamiyah 0%
Abu Ghraib 1%
Karkh 1%
Kadhimiyah 2%
Resafa 4%
Tarmia 12%
Sadr City 16%
Madain 20%
Mahmudiya 20%
Electricity
The Electricity Minister recently announced that Iraq had surpassed pre-war levels of power production. The problem remains that output does not meet demand. The capital is a perfect example. In Karkh, Sadr City, Resafa, and Adhamiyah more than half the population has power cuts for more than 11 hours a day. Abu Ghraib on the other hand has the best electricity supply in the province with only 2% suffering from long power outages.
% of households with more than 11 hours of power cuts or no connection to electricity network
Iraq 52%
Abu Ghraib 2%
Tarmia 29%
Mahmudiya 33%
Madain 40%
Karkh 60%
Sadr City 67%
Kadhimiyah 67%
Resafa 70%
Adhamiyah 76%
Water
Baghdad’s water supply is quite good. 10% of the province compared to 26% in the country is connected to the water network. Only Mahmudiya has a real problem with almost 50% having no access.
% of households not connected to water network
Iraq 26%
Abu Ghraib 0%
Adhamiyah 0%
Kadhimiyah 0%
Karkh 0%
Sadr City 0%
Tarmia 0%
Resafa 5%
Madain 7%
Baghdad 10%
Mahmudiya 47%
Food
Most Iraqis depend upon the country’s food rations, which are the largest in the world. That hasn’t prevented problems with malnutrition however. 22% of Iraqis, and 21% of Baghdad have children five years and younger that suffer from chronic malnutrition. The districts worst affected are Sadr City, Kadhimiyah, and Adhamiyah, while Abu Ghraib, Mahmudiya, and Tarmia have the fewest incidents.
% of children 0-5 years old with chronic malnutrition
Iraq 22%
Baghdad 21%
Abu Ghraib 4%
Mahmudiya 6%
Tarmia 6%
Resafa 14%
Madain 16%
Karkh 18%
Sadr City 20%
Kadhimiyah 32%
Adhamiyah 42%
Health
Baghdad overall does better than the rest of the country in terms of chronic diseases. 8% of the province reported being affected by them compared to 9% in Iraq. Tarmia did the best with only 4% reporting chronic cases, but that compared to Karkh, Kadhimiyah, Abu Ghraib, Sadr City, Adhamiyah, and Resafa that were all in double digits.
% of individuals with chronic disease
Iraq 9%
Baghdad 8%
Tarmia 4%
Mahmudiya 8%
Madain 9%
Kadhimiyah 10%
Karkh 10%
Abu Ghraib 11%
Sadr City 12%
Adhamiyah 14%
Resafa 15%
SOURCES
Inter-Agency Information and Analysis Unit, “Baghdad Governorate Profile,” United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, February 2009
- “Iraq Labour Force Analysis 2003-2008,” United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, January 2009
International Organization for Migration, “Three Years Of Post-Samarra Displacement In Iraq,” 2/22/09
Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, “Iraq’s Electricity Production Surpasses Prewar Level,” 2/19/09
Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, "Quarterly Report and Semiannual Report to the United States Congress," 1/30/09
Population
Baghdad has the largest, most urbanized population in Iraq. There are 7,145,470 people there, which is 24% of the total population. 87% live in urban areas, 13% in rural ones. The province is divided into nine major districts: Abu Ghraib, Adhamiyah, Kadhimiyah, Karkh, Madain, Mahmudiya, Resafa, Sadr City aka Thawra, and Tarmia.
Population
Baghdad: 7,145,470
Abu Ghraib: 326,626
Adhamiyah: 842,310
Kadhimiyah: 832,310
Karkh: 1,624,057
Madain: 332,883
Mahmudiya 496,053
Resafa: 1,312,052
Sadr City: 1,316,583
Tarmia: 62,147
Security
The security situation in Baghdad has improved with the rest of the country, but it is still the most dangerous area in the country. From June to December 2008 there was a steady decline in security incidents with one large increase from August to October that subsequently leveled off. At the beginning of June there were around 400 security incidents a month in the province. That declined to around 300 in August, but then increased to almost 550 by October. Since then they have decreased to around 250 by the end of 2008. The U.S. military has much more in depth reporting than the U.N. and found that attacks went from 2,221 a month in April 2008 to 713 in December.
Displaced
Baghdad faced the most displacement in the country during the sectarian war. After the Samarra Shiite shrine bombing in February 2006 1.6 million Iraqis became internal refugees. Over 60% of those came from the capital. Today there are 90,731 displaced families in the province, the largest amount in the country. Some Iraqis have begun to return, although it’s still a small percentage of the total. The International Organization for Migration recorded 31,521 families coming back to Baghdad so far as of February 2009. They face a variety of problems including finding jobs, permanent housing, and services.
Employment
Iraq’s unemployment rate matches that of the country’s. Iraq has 18% unemployment. 12% of males in the capital are unemployed, compared to 20% for women. 83% of the male population was involved in the labor force compared to 81% in the country. Unemployment for them was concentrated in Resafa and Sadr City that had double-digit joblessness. As a recent U.N. report found very few women are involved in Iraq’s economy. Only 11% of Baghdad province’s women were either employed or looking for work, compared to 18% in the country. There are wide differences between the districts however. In Mahmudiya and Tarmia 76% and 67% of women respectively were involved in the labor force. In Sadr City it was only 8%. Jobs for women are directly related to education. 43% of women over 10 years old in the province lack a primary education. The U.N. employment study found that women needed a college education to find steady work.
Employment in Baghdad
Male Unemployment (15-64 years old)
Iraq 12%
Tarmia 1%
Abu Ghraib 3%
Adhamiyah 3%
Mahmudiya 3%
Karkh 6%
Kadhimiyah 8%
Madain 8%
Baghdad 12%
Sadr City 15%
Resafa 16%
Males In Labor Force (15-64 years old)
Iraq 81%
Baghdad 83%
Karkh 75%
Mahmudiya 81%
Resafa 82%
Sadr City 83%
Adhamiyah 85%
Madain 85%
Kadhimiyah 83%
Abu Ghraib 87%
Tarmia 96%
Female Unemployment (15-64 years old)
Iraq 13%
Mahmudiya 0%
Tarmia 1%
Abu Ghraib 2%
Madain 5%
Karkh 7%
Sadr City 12%
Adhamiyah 13%
Kadhimiyah 17%
Baghdad 20%
Resafa 23%
Females In Labor Force (15-64 years old)
Iraq 18%
Sadr City 8%
Baghdad 11%
Resafa 16%
Kadhimiyah 17%
Karkh 19%
Madain 27%
Adhamiyah 28%
Abu Ghraib 49%
Tarmia 67%
Mahmudiya 76%
Poverty
Baghdad is one of the richest provinces in the country, but still has pockets of poverty. In Adhamiyah the U.N. found no families in the lowest income quintile. In Abu Ghraib (1%), Karkh (1%), Kadhimiyah (2%), and Resafa (4%) there was also little poverty. That compared to Sadr City (16%), Madain (20%), and Mahmudiya (20%) where poverty was the highest.
% of households in the lowest income quintile
Iraq 22%
Adhamiyah 0%
Abu Ghraib 1%
Karkh 1%
Kadhimiyah 2%
Resafa 4%
Tarmia 12%
Sadr City 16%
Madain 20%
Mahmudiya 20%
Electricity
The Electricity Minister recently announced that Iraq had surpassed pre-war levels of power production. The problem remains that output does not meet demand. The capital is a perfect example. In Karkh, Sadr City, Resafa, and Adhamiyah more than half the population has power cuts for more than 11 hours a day. Abu Ghraib on the other hand has the best electricity supply in the province with only 2% suffering from long power outages.
% of households with more than 11 hours of power cuts or no connection to electricity network
Iraq 52%
Abu Ghraib 2%
Tarmia 29%
Mahmudiya 33%
Madain 40%
Karkh 60%
Sadr City 67%
Kadhimiyah 67%
Resafa 70%
Adhamiyah 76%
Water
Baghdad’s water supply is quite good. 10% of the province compared to 26% in the country is connected to the water network. Only Mahmudiya has a real problem with almost 50% having no access.
% of households not connected to water network
Iraq 26%
Abu Ghraib 0%
Adhamiyah 0%
Kadhimiyah 0%
Karkh 0%
Sadr City 0%
Tarmia 0%
Resafa 5%
Madain 7%
Baghdad 10%
Mahmudiya 47%
Food
Most Iraqis depend upon the country’s food rations, which are the largest in the world. That hasn’t prevented problems with malnutrition however. 22% of Iraqis, and 21% of Baghdad have children five years and younger that suffer from chronic malnutrition. The districts worst affected are Sadr City, Kadhimiyah, and Adhamiyah, while Abu Ghraib, Mahmudiya, and Tarmia have the fewest incidents.
% of children 0-5 years old with chronic malnutrition
Iraq 22%
Baghdad 21%
Abu Ghraib 4%
Mahmudiya 6%
Tarmia 6%
Resafa 14%
Madain 16%
Karkh 18%
Sadr City 20%
Kadhimiyah 32%
Adhamiyah 42%
Health
Baghdad overall does better than the rest of the country in terms of chronic diseases. 8% of the province reported being affected by them compared to 9% in Iraq. Tarmia did the best with only 4% reporting chronic cases, but that compared to Karkh, Kadhimiyah, Abu Ghraib, Sadr City, Adhamiyah, and Resafa that were all in double digits.
% of individuals with chronic disease
Iraq 9%
Baghdad 8%
Tarmia 4%
Mahmudiya 8%
Madain 9%
Kadhimiyah 10%
Karkh 10%
Abu Ghraib 11%
Sadr City 12%
Adhamiyah 14%
Resafa 15%
SOURCES
Inter-Agency Information and Analysis Unit, “Baghdad Governorate Profile,” United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, February 2009
- “Iraq Labour Force Analysis 2003-2008,” United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, January 2009
International Organization for Migration, “Three Years Of Post-Samarra Displacement In Iraq,” 2/22/09
Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, “Iraq’s Electricity Production Surpasses Prewar Level,” 2/19/09
Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, "Quarterly Report and Semiannual Report to the United States Congress," 1/30/09
Monday, March 2, 2009
Operation New Hope In Mosul
On February 20, 2009 the Iraqi government announced the beginning of its third security offensive in Ninewa province. Like the previous ones Operation New Hope is aimed at securing the troubled city of Mosul. Operation Lion’s Roar/Mother of Two Springs launched in May 2008, and Mother of Two Springs II in October 2008 had little affect on the number of casualties in the city in the long run. In January 2009 attacks were down before the provincial elections however. Afterwards casualties went back up, but still at a lower level then in 2008. Operation New Hope appears to be a more targeted campaign, and involves U.S. troops. It may be the last major joint Iraq-U.S. military operation before the June deadline for U.S. troops to be out Iraq’s cities, but like the previous ones does not address the major causes of violence in the city.
Operation New Hope has two stated goals. First it is a targeted campaign aimed at arresting suspects on a wanted list. On the opening day 74 people were arrested. Second it hopes to increase the government’s presence in certain areas outside of Mosul. Iraqi forces are in the lead, but the U.S. apparently has a large role. That’s shown by the fact that nine American soldiers were killed in the city in February 2009 before and during the offensive. Mosul is one of the few areas where U.S. forces have incorporated the Iraqis troops into their command center.
The offensive has been expected for quite some time. Back in November 2008 there were reports that Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki was considering a new operation there. The Prime Minister first talked of clearing Mosul back in December 2007. The moves against the Mahdi Army in early 2008 however delayed it until May. It was originally called Operation Lion’s Roar, but was then renamed Mother of Two Springs, a nickname for Mosul. Thirty-two thousand soldiers and police were committed to the operation, but by September Maliki admitted that it had not worked and blamed the citizens for not cooperating. As reported here before, Mother of Two Springs had little affect on the number of casualties beforehand and afterwards. When Christians were attacked in the city in October the government again committed more police to secure Mosul.
It wasn’t until the end of 2008 that attacks finally dropped, reaching a low in January 2009 as the country prepared for the provincial elections. According to press reports by January Mosul averaged just 1.8 deaths per day and 2.74 wounded compared to 3.61 deaths and 6.06 wounded per day in October 2008. One major difference between 2008 and 2009 has been the lack of mass casualty bombings. The city however was the deadliest in the country for politicians, and by February attacks and casualties started climbing back up.
Selected Casualty Numbers For Mosul Based Upon Press Reports
April 2008 – One Month Before Operation Lion’s Roar/Mother Of Two Springs
63 attacks/incidents – 2.1 attacks & incidents/day
71 killed – 2.37 killed/day
209 wounded – 7.0 wounded/day
42 kidnapped
June 2008
49 attacks/incidents –1.97 attacks & incidents/day
100 killed – 3.33 killed/day
279 wounded – 9.3 wounded/day
4 kidnapped
October 2008 – Month of Operation Mother Of Two Springs II
92 attacks/incidents – 2.96 attacks & incidents/day
112 deaths – 3.61 deaths/day
188 wounded – 6.06 wounded/day
November 2008
65 attacks/incidents – 2.16 attacks & incidents/day
53 deaths – 1.76 deaths/day
249 wounded – 8.3 wounded/day
December 2008
65 attacks/incidents – 2.09 attacks & incidents/day
68 deaths – 2.19 deaths/day
181 wounded – 5.83 wounded/day
January 2009 – Provincial Elections
52 attacks/incidents – 1.67 attacks & incidents/day
56 deaths – 1.80 killed/day
85 wounded – 2.74 wounded/day
February 2009
81 attacks/incidents – 2.89 attacks & incidents/day
58 deaths – 2.0 deaths/day
111 wounded – 3.96 wounded/day
The major cause of the violence in the city is the divide between Arabs and Kurds. In the January 2005 elections Sunnis boycotted, resulting in the Kurds taking over the provincial council. The Kurds also have aspirations to annex five areas around Mosul in northern Ninewa. Both have caused great anger amongst the province’s Arabs. To make matters worst, during the Surge many Al Qaeda operatives and other groups were forced north and settled in Mosul, which has been called the last urban stronghold for the insurgency. All together this has caused an explosive mix. Many of these armed groups have tried to portray themselves as the protectors of the Arabs against the Kurds, and continue to reject participating in the political system. As noted here before, Prime Minister Maliki attempted to exploit this division for his own political purposes by courting the Arabs in the city to oppose the Kurds. Maliki removed Kurdish units and officers, replacing them with Arab ones, and offered Arabs a role in reconstruction. Rather than offering reconciliation, the Prime Minister pushed for further ethnic differences.
The provincial elections may not help this process. The Al-Hadbaa party won an outright majority in the vote running on an explicitly anti-Kurdish campaign. The party’s leader Atheel al-Nujafi who will probably become the new governor has said that all the sitting Kurdish officials need to be replaced on the provincial council, and that he will not work with any Kurds that put Kurdish concerns before those of Ninewa. The current deputy governor who is a Kurd has accused Al-Hadbaa of wanting to rid Mosul of Kurds.
Al-Hadbaa’s Nujafi believes that Operation New Hope will do little to solve the province’s problems. He may be right. Until the divide between Arabs and Kurds is resolved there will be violence in Mosul. Prime Minister Maliki enflamed the situation by taking an anti-Kurdish turn in late 2008, and the Al-Hadbaa party has a similar position. Many were hoping that the provincial elections would help turn many of these conflicts into a political one, but in Ninewa’s case that may not be true. The real test will be whether violence goes back to 2008 levels now that the voting is over or remains at their current lower rate.
For more on Mosul see:
Mosul – Dangerous Place For Politicians
Mosul Remains One Of The Most Violent Cities In Iraq
Mosul: The New Battleground Between Maliki And The Kurds
New Security Offensive In Mosul?
Christians In Mosul Update
Bad Times For Iraq’s Christians
Back To Mosul
Mosul Update
The Security Situation In Mosul
SOURCES
A Pakistan News, “1 Policeman Killed, 10 injured in Separate Attacks In Iraq,” 12/1/08
- “Twin Blasts in Northern Iraq 2 Killed,” 12/31/08
Agence France Presse, “Iraq arrests dozens of ‘terrorists’ in Mosul,” 2/21/09
Ali, Fadhil, “Iraqi Government Launches Operation to Expel al-Qaeda from Mosul,” Terrorism Focus, Jamestown Foundation, 5/20/08
Areef, Slaem, “Mosul a ghost city as troops press ahead with offensive,” Azzaman, 5/15/08
Arraf, Jane, “As Iraq calms, Mosul remains a battle front,” Christian Science Monitor, 12/17/08
Associated Press, “Blast in Iraq kill 33, injure Iraqi general and four GIs,” 12/1/08
- “Bombs tear through Baghdad, Mosul,” 12/1/08
- “Two Iraqi policemen killed by U.S. troops,” 2/1/09
Associated Press and Agence France Presse, “Bombings in Baghdad kill 14,” The National, 11/4/08
Aswat al-Iraq, “2 army personnel wounded in IED blast in Mosul,” 2/26/09
- “2 civilians killed by U.S. warplane fire west of Mosul,” 11/1/08
- “2 civilians killed in Mosul,” 12/29/08
- “2 gunmen killed in Ninewa,” 11/13/08
- “2 IEDs wound 3 soldiers in Mosul,” 12/27/08
- “2 Iraqi soldiers killed in Mosul attack,” 11/1/08
- “2 killed, 25 wounded in 2nd suicide bombing in Mosul,” 11/27/08
- “2 mortars leave 4 soldiers wounded in Mosul,” 2/13/09
- “2 soldiers wounded by gunmen fire in Mosul,” 2/13/09
- “2 wanted men arrested, IEDs rip through Mosul,” 2/18/09
- “2 women injured in attack on PUK in Mosul,” 2/24/09
- “2 wounded by IED in Mosul,” 2/4/09
- “2 wounded in blast in Mosul,” 12/25/08
- “3 civilians injured by bomb blast in Mosul,” 1/26/09
- “3 cops killed in Mosul gunfire,” 1/11/09
- “3 gunmen killed in Mosul,” 1/23/09
- “3 missiles hit Mosul hospital, wound civilian,” 2/25/09
- “3 policemen killed by gunmen in Mosul,” 2/11/09
- “3 soldiers, policeman wounded in Mosul,” 12/4/08
- “3 women wounded by U.S. fire in Mosul,” 2/3/09
- “3 wounded in hand-grenade attack in Mosul,” 2/15/09
- “3 wounded in IED in Mosul,” 2/16/09
- “4 civilians injured in suicide explosion in Mosul,” 11/27/08
- “4 civilians wounded in Mosul blast,” 1/19/09
- “4 civilians wounded in Mosul blasts,” 11/10/08
- “4 killed, 6 wounded in Iraq violence in 24 hours,” 11/1/08
- “4 police personnel wounded in car bomb blast,” 1/11/09
- “4 sound bombs explode inside Mosul university,” 1/14/09
- “5 houses set on fire in Ninewa,” 2/16/09
- “5 IEDs rock Mosul; no casualties reported,” 12/11/08
- “6 suspects nabbed, IED defused in Mosul,” 2/18/09
- “6 women injured in Mosul blasts,” 12/1/08
- “12 killed, injured in Mosul attack,” 2/2/09
- “23 killed, injured in acts of violence until Friday afternoon,” 1/9/09
- “Army forces detonate bomb in Mosul without damage,” 2/6/09
- “Bike bomb explodes in Mosul, no casualties,” 1/7/09
- “Blast in Mosul kills policemen, wounds 6,” 11/17/08
- “Blast near KDP headquarters in Mosul,” 2/23/09
- “Bomb explodes near police motorcade in Mosul,” 1/6/09
- “Bomb explodes without casualties in Kirkuk,” 2/11/09
- “Bomb explodes without casualties in Mosul,” 2/10/09
- “Bomb wounds child, mother, army seizes TNT in Ninewa,” 11/14/08
- “Cab driver found dead in Mosul,” 1/7/09
- “Car bomb defused in eastern Mosul,” 2/19/09
- “Car bomb defused in eastern Mosul,” 2/23/09
- “Car bomb defused in Mosul,” 12/26/08
- “Car bomb kills cop, injures 5 in southern Mosul,” 2/19/09
- “Car bomb wounds 4 cops in Mosul,” 12/30/08
- “Child wounded in IED blast in Mosul,” 11/2/08
- “Civilian body found in Mosul,” 2/10/09
- “Civilian killed, 16 wounded in Mosul bombing,” 12/28/08
- “Civilian killed by U.S. fire in Mosul,” 12/15/08
- “Civilian wounded by gunmen fire in Mosul,” 2/6/09
- “Civilian wounded by U.S. fire in Mosul,” 2/4/09
- “Civilian wounded in attack in Mosul,” 2/25/09
- “Civilian wounded in car bomb attack in Mosul,” 12/7/08
- “Cop injured, two bombs explode in Mosul,” 1/12/09
- “Cop killed by bomb blast in Mosul,” 1/28/09
- “Cop killed in bomb blast in Mosul,” 2/18/09
- “Cop, soldier killed in Mosul attacks,” 12/13/08
- “Cop wounded in gun attack in Mosul,” 12/2/08
- “Explosion in front of KDP building in Ninewa,” 12/18/08
- “Female body found east of Mosul,” 2/13/09
- “Gang of kidnappers arrested, body found in Mosul,” 2/27/09
- “Gunmen kill cop in central Mosul,” 2/23/09
- “Gunmen kill former cop in Mosul,” 12/30/08
- “Gunmen kill officer in Ninewa,” 2/24/09
- “Gunmen set AsiaCell’s power generators on fire in Mosul,” 1/2/09
- “Gunmen set 2 AsiaCell’s towers ablaze in Mosul,” 1/6/09
- “Gunmen shoot down policeman in Mosul,” 11/24/08
- “Gunmen wound Mosul medicine college dean,” 12/14/08
- “Hand grenade wounds 3 cops in Mosul,” 2/24/09
- “IED blast targets police patrol in Mosul,” 2/8/09
- “IED injures U.S. soldier in Mosul,” 12/16/08
- “IED rocks IIP building in Ninewa,” 12/11/08
- “IED targets U.S. patrol in Mosul; no casualties,” 12/16/08
- “IED targets U.S. patrol, no casualties,” 1/12/09
- “IED wounds 2 in southern Mosul,” 1/18/09
- “IED wounds 4 in Mosul,” 2/3/09
- “IED wounds 5 in Mosul,” 1/26/09
- “IED wounds civilian in Mosul,” 2/28/09
- “IED wounds soldier in Mosul,” 2/14/09
- “IED wounds soldier in Mosul,” 2/21/09
- “IIP leader gunned down in Mosul,” 2/11/09
- “Iraq army Mosul HQ mortared,” 12/3/08
- “Iraqi soldier injured by bomb blast in Mosul,” 11/29/08
- “Journalist killed by policeman in Mosul,” 2/5/09
- “Local elections candidate gunned down,” 12/31/08
- “Military policeman shot in Mosul,” 12/24/08
- “More than 142 gunmen arrested during Mosul’s operations,” 5/13/08
- “Mosul blast leaves civilian killed, 2 wounded,” 1/24/09
- “Mosul car bomb kills 4, wounds 1,” 1/27/09
- “Neighborhood mayor gunned down in eastern Mosul,” 12/13/08
- “Ninewa blast wounds servicemen,” 1/21/09
- “Officer killed, 2 soldiers wounded in car bomb blast in Mosul,” 12/21/08
- “Oil protection element killed in Mosul,” 1/6/09
- “Operation Good Hope…fresh hope for Mosul residents?” 2/27/09
- “Policeman killed, 2 wounded in Mosul,” 2/5/09
- “Policeman killed, civilian wounded in Mosul blasts,” 11/6/08
- “Policeman killed, civilian wounded in separate incidents in Mosul,” 11/9/08
- “Policeman wounded in attack in Mosul,” 11/10/08
- “Policeman wounded in explosion in Mosul,” 2/2/09
- “Security forces detonate car bomb in Mosul,” 1/29/09
- “Senior police officer survives assassination attempt in Ninewa,” 2/11/09
- “Shabaki MP survives assassination attempt in Mosul,” 1/7/09
- “Soldier wounded by random fire in Mosul,” 11/24/08
- “Soldier wounded in IED blast in Mosul,” 2/19/09
- “Stocky IED injures 3 civilians in Mosul,” 1/28/09
- “Suicide attack kills soldier, wounds 3 in Mosul,” 2/11/09
- “Suicide bomber injures 2 cops in Mosul,” 11/19/08
- “Suicide car bomber wounds 3 in Mosul,” 2/9/09
- “Truck bomb kills 3 cops, injures civilian in Mosul,” 1/1/09
- “U.S. forces kill 3 brothers in Mosul,” 1/22/09
- “Unknown gunmen kill woman, wound 2 in Mosul,” 1/16/09
- “Woman shot down in western Mosul,” 12/13/08
Dagher, Sam, “Fractures in Iraq City as Kurds and Baghdad Vie,” New York Times, 10/28/08
Druzin, Heath, “Iraqis taking the lead? Yes and no,” Stars and Stripes, 2/22/09
Al-Dulaimy, Mohammed, “Found-up of Daily Violence in Iraq-Friday 2 January 2009,” 1/2/09
- “Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq-Monday 12 January 2008,” 1/12/09
- “Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq-Thursday 15 January 2008,” 1/15/09
- “Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq-Tuesday 6 January 2008,” 1/6/09
DPA, “Three policeman killed, four injured in attacks in Iraq,” 11/5/08
- “Two killed, four wounded in clashes with al-Qaeda suspects,” 11/25/08
Flintoff, Corey, “Shift In Power Heightens Tensions In Iraqi City,” All Things Considered, NPR, 2/27/09
Hammoudi, Laith, “Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq – Monday 1 December 2008,” 12/1/08
- “Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq – Saturday 29 November 2008,” 11/29/08
- “Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq – Thursday 4 December 2009,” 12/4/08
- “Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq – Thursday 29 January 2009,” 1/29/09
- “Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq – Tuesday 4 November 2008,” 11/4/08
- “Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq – Tuesday 16 December 2008,” 12/16/08
- “Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq – Tuesday 24 February 2009,” 2/24/09
- “Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq – Wednesday, Feb. 11, 2009,” 2/11/09
Hammoudi, Laith and Al-Dulaimy, Mohammed, “Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq – Monday 5 January 2009,” 1/5/09
Hammoudi, Laith and Kadhim, Hussein, “Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq – Wednesday 21 January 2009,” 1/29/09
Issa, Sahar, “Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq – Friday 16 January 2009,” 1/16/09
- “Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq – Friday 21 November 2008,” 11/21/08
- “Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq – Tuesday 13 January 2009,” 1/13/09
Al Jazeera, “Blast rocks Iraqi capital,” 11/12/08
- “Twin blasts target Baghdad police,” 12/17/08
Kadhim, Hussein, “Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq-Monday 3 November 2008,” 11/3/08
- “Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq-Monday 24 November 2008,” 11/24/08
- “Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq – Sunday 21 December 2008,” 12/21/08
- “Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq - Thursday 12 February 2009,” 2/12/09
- “Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq – Thursday 20 November 2008,” 11/20/08
- “Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq-Thursday 25 December 2008,” 12/25/08
- “Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq – Tuesday 3 February 2009,” 2/3/09
- “Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq-Tuesday 10 February 2009, 2/10/09
- “Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq – Tuesday 30 December 2008,” 12/30/08
- “Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq-Tuesday 10 February 2009,” 2/10/09
- “Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq-Wednesday 10 December 2008,” 12/10/08
- “Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq-Wednesday 12 November 2008,” 11/12/08
- “Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq-Wednesday 17 December 2008,” 12/17/08
- “Roundup of Daily Violence in Iraq – Monday 16 February 2009,” 2/16/09
- “Roundup of Daily Violence in Iraq – Monday 23 February 2009,” 2/23/09
- “Roundup of Daily Violence in Iraq – Thursday 26 February 2009,” 2/26/09
- “Roundup of Daily Violence in Iraq – Wednesday 7 January 2009,” 1/7/09
- “Roundup of Daily Violence in Iraq – Wednesday 25 February 2009,” 2/25/09
Kahl, Colin, Nagl, John, Brimley, Shawn, “Canceling Iraq’s Blank Check,” Foreign Policy, August 2008
Kamal, Adel, “new ninawa governor: no possibility of Kurdish alliance,” Niqash, 2/24/09
KUNA, “Iraqi PM admits failure of Umm Al-Rubai in military operation,” 9/18/08
Mohammed, Mujahid, “Iraq pours in police to protect Christians,” Agence France Presse, 10/12/08
Monsters & Critics, “Six people killed in Iraq clashes,” 2/7/09
Multi-National Forces-Iraq, “Attack at IP station in Mosul kills two, injures four Update to:20090224-05,” 2/24/09
- “Solider killed by indirect fire (Mosul),” 12/25/08
Robertson, Campbell, “Iraq Hands Death Penalty to 28 Cultists for Attacks,” New York Times, 2/27/09
Reuters, “Factbox – Security developments in Iraq, 09 Nov 2008,” 11/9/08
- “FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Dec 1,” 12/1/08
- “FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Dec 2,” 12/2/08
- “FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Dec 4,” 12/4/08
- “FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Dec 5,” 12/5/08
- “FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Dec 6,” 12/6/08
- “FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Dec 15,” 12/15/08
- “FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Dec 16,” 12/16/08
- “FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Dec 18,” 12/18/08
- “FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Dec 21,” 12/21/08
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- “FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Feb 4,” 2/4/09
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- “FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Feb 12,” 2/12/09
- “FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Feb 14,” 2/14/09
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- “FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Feb 19,” 2/19/09
- “FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Jan 1,” 1/1/09
- “FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Jan 2,” 1/2/09
- “FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Jan 3,” 1/3/09
- “FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Jan 5,” 1/5/09
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Samuels, Lennox, “Al Qaeda Nostra,” Newsweek, 5/21/08
Stairrett, Amanda Kim, “Battalion commander among 4 soldiers killed in Iraq,” Killeen Daily Herald, 2/14/09
Xinhua, “One killed, 15 wounded in car bombing in N Iraq,” 11/13/08
- “Suicide car bomb kills 16 in N Iraq,” 12/1/08
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Yacoub, Sameer, “US, Iraqi forces launch anti-al-Qaida offensive,” Associated Press, 2/22/09
Operation New Hope has two stated goals. First it is a targeted campaign aimed at arresting suspects on a wanted list. On the opening day 74 people were arrested. Second it hopes to increase the government’s presence in certain areas outside of Mosul. Iraqi forces are in the lead, but the U.S. apparently has a large role. That’s shown by the fact that nine American soldiers were killed in the city in February 2009 before and during the offensive. Mosul is one of the few areas where U.S. forces have incorporated the Iraqis troops into their command center.
The offensive has been expected for quite some time. Back in November 2008 there were reports that Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki was considering a new operation there. The Prime Minister first talked of clearing Mosul back in December 2007. The moves against the Mahdi Army in early 2008 however delayed it until May. It was originally called Operation Lion’s Roar, but was then renamed Mother of Two Springs, a nickname for Mosul. Thirty-two thousand soldiers and police were committed to the operation, but by September Maliki admitted that it had not worked and blamed the citizens for not cooperating. As reported here before, Mother of Two Springs had little affect on the number of casualties beforehand and afterwards. When Christians were attacked in the city in October the government again committed more police to secure Mosul.
It wasn’t until the end of 2008 that attacks finally dropped, reaching a low in January 2009 as the country prepared for the provincial elections. According to press reports by January Mosul averaged just 1.8 deaths per day and 2.74 wounded compared to 3.61 deaths and 6.06 wounded per day in October 2008. One major difference between 2008 and 2009 has been the lack of mass casualty bombings. The city however was the deadliest in the country for politicians, and by February attacks and casualties started climbing back up.
Selected Casualty Numbers For Mosul Based Upon Press Reports
April 2008 – One Month Before Operation Lion’s Roar/Mother Of Two Springs
63 attacks/incidents – 2.1 attacks & incidents/day
71 killed – 2.37 killed/day
209 wounded – 7.0 wounded/day
42 kidnapped
June 2008
49 attacks/incidents –1.97 attacks & incidents/day
100 killed – 3.33 killed/day
279 wounded – 9.3 wounded/day
4 kidnapped
October 2008 – Month of Operation Mother Of Two Springs II
92 attacks/incidents – 2.96 attacks & incidents/day
112 deaths – 3.61 deaths/day
188 wounded – 6.06 wounded/day
November 2008
65 attacks/incidents – 2.16 attacks & incidents/day
53 deaths – 1.76 deaths/day
249 wounded – 8.3 wounded/day
December 2008
65 attacks/incidents – 2.09 attacks & incidents/day
68 deaths – 2.19 deaths/day
181 wounded – 5.83 wounded/day
January 2009 – Provincial Elections
52 attacks/incidents – 1.67 attacks & incidents/day
56 deaths – 1.80 killed/day
85 wounded – 2.74 wounded/day
February 2009
81 attacks/incidents – 2.89 attacks & incidents/day
58 deaths – 2.0 deaths/day
111 wounded – 3.96 wounded/day
The major cause of the violence in the city is the divide between Arabs and Kurds. In the January 2005 elections Sunnis boycotted, resulting in the Kurds taking over the provincial council. The Kurds also have aspirations to annex five areas around Mosul in northern Ninewa. Both have caused great anger amongst the province’s Arabs. To make matters worst, during the Surge many Al Qaeda operatives and other groups were forced north and settled in Mosul, which has been called the last urban stronghold for the insurgency. All together this has caused an explosive mix. Many of these armed groups have tried to portray themselves as the protectors of the Arabs against the Kurds, and continue to reject participating in the political system. As noted here before, Prime Minister Maliki attempted to exploit this division for his own political purposes by courting the Arabs in the city to oppose the Kurds. Maliki removed Kurdish units and officers, replacing them with Arab ones, and offered Arabs a role in reconstruction. Rather than offering reconciliation, the Prime Minister pushed for further ethnic differences.
The provincial elections may not help this process. The Al-Hadbaa party won an outright majority in the vote running on an explicitly anti-Kurdish campaign. The party’s leader Atheel al-Nujafi who will probably become the new governor has said that all the sitting Kurdish officials need to be replaced on the provincial council, and that he will not work with any Kurds that put Kurdish concerns before those of Ninewa. The current deputy governor who is a Kurd has accused Al-Hadbaa of wanting to rid Mosul of Kurds.
Al-Hadbaa’s Nujafi believes that Operation New Hope will do little to solve the province’s problems. He may be right. Until the divide between Arabs and Kurds is resolved there will be violence in Mosul. Prime Minister Maliki enflamed the situation by taking an anti-Kurdish turn in late 2008, and the Al-Hadbaa party has a similar position. Many were hoping that the provincial elections would help turn many of these conflicts into a political one, but in Ninewa’s case that may not be true. The real test will be whether violence goes back to 2008 levels now that the voting is over or remains at their current lower rate.
For more on Mosul see:
Mosul – Dangerous Place For Politicians
Mosul Remains One Of The Most Violent Cities In Iraq
Mosul: The New Battleground Between Maliki And The Kurds
New Security Offensive In Mosul?
Christians In Mosul Update
Bad Times For Iraq’s Christians
Back To Mosul
Mosul Update
The Security Situation In Mosul
SOURCES
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- “5 IEDs rock Mosul; no casualties reported,” 12/11/08
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- “6 women injured in Mosul blasts,” 12/1/08
- “12 killed, injured in Mosul attack,” 2/2/09
- “23 killed, injured in acts of violence until Friday afternoon,” 1/9/09
- “Army forces detonate bomb in Mosul without damage,” 2/6/09
- “Bike bomb explodes in Mosul, no casualties,” 1/7/09
- “Blast in Mosul kills policemen, wounds 6,” 11/17/08
- “Blast near KDP headquarters in Mosul,” 2/23/09
- “Bomb explodes near police motorcade in Mosul,” 1/6/09
- “Bomb explodes without casualties in Kirkuk,” 2/11/09
- “Bomb explodes without casualties in Mosul,” 2/10/09
- “Bomb wounds child, mother, army seizes TNT in Ninewa,” 11/14/08
- “Cab driver found dead in Mosul,” 1/7/09
- “Car bomb defused in eastern Mosul,” 2/19/09
- “Car bomb defused in eastern Mosul,” 2/23/09
- “Car bomb defused in Mosul,” 12/26/08
- “Car bomb kills cop, injures 5 in southern Mosul,” 2/19/09
- “Car bomb wounds 4 cops in Mosul,” 12/30/08
- “Child wounded in IED blast in Mosul,” 11/2/08
- “Civilian body found in Mosul,” 2/10/09
- “Civilian killed, 16 wounded in Mosul bombing,” 12/28/08
- “Civilian killed by U.S. fire in Mosul,” 12/15/08
- “Civilian wounded by gunmen fire in Mosul,” 2/6/09
- “Civilian wounded by U.S. fire in Mosul,” 2/4/09
- “Civilian wounded in attack in Mosul,” 2/25/09
- “Civilian wounded in car bomb attack in Mosul,” 12/7/08
- “Cop injured, two bombs explode in Mosul,” 1/12/09
- “Cop killed by bomb blast in Mosul,” 1/28/09
- “Cop killed in bomb blast in Mosul,” 2/18/09
- “Cop, soldier killed in Mosul attacks,” 12/13/08
- “Cop wounded in gun attack in Mosul,” 12/2/08
- “Explosion in front of KDP building in Ninewa,” 12/18/08
- “Female body found east of Mosul,” 2/13/09
- “Gang of kidnappers arrested, body found in Mosul,” 2/27/09
- “Gunmen kill cop in central Mosul,” 2/23/09
- “Gunmen kill former cop in Mosul,” 12/30/08
- “Gunmen kill officer in Ninewa,” 2/24/09
- “Gunmen set AsiaCell’s power generators on fire in Mosul,” 1/2/09
- “Gunmen set 2 AsiaCell’s towers ablaze in Mosul,” 1/6/09
- “Gunmen shoot down policeman in Mosul,” 11/24/08
- “Gunmen wound Mosul medicine college dean,” 12/14/08
- “Hand grenade wounds 3 cops in Mosul,” 2/24/09
- “IED blast targets police patrol in Mosul,” 2/8/09
- “IED injures U.S. soldier in Mosul,” 12/16/08
- “IED rocks IIP building in Ninewa,” 12/11/08
- “IED targets U.S. patrol in Mosul; no casualties,” 12/16/08
- “IED targets U.S. patrol, no casualties,” 1/12/09
- “IED wounds 2 in southern Mosul,” 1/18/09
- “IED wounds 4 in Mosul,” 2/3/09
- “IED wounds 5 in Mosul,” 1/26/09
- “IED wounds civilian in Mosul,” 2/28/09
- “IED wounds soldier in Mosul,” 2/14/09
- “IED wounds soldier in Mosul,” 2/21/09
- “IIP leader gunned down in Mosul,” 2/11/09
- “Iraq army Mosul HQ mortared,” 12/3/08
- “Iraqi soldier injured by bomb blast in Mosul,” 11/29/08
- “Journalist killed by policeman in Mosul,” 2/5/09
- “Local elections candidate gunned down,” 12/31/08
- “Military policeman shot in Mosul,” 12/24/08
- “More than 142 gunmen arrested during Mosul’s operations,” 5/13/08
- “Mosul blast leaves civilian killed, 2 wounded,” 1/24/09
- “Mosul car bomb kills 4, wounds 1,” 1/27/09
- “Neighborhood mayor gunned down in eastern Mosul,” 12/13/08
- “Ninewa blast wounds servicemen,” 1/21/09
- “Officer killed, 2 soldiers wounded in car bomb blast in Mosul,” 12/21/08
- “Oil protection element killed in Mosul,” 1/6/09
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- “Policeman killed, 2 wounded in Mosul,” 2/5/09
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- “Policeman killed, civilian wounded in separate incidents in Mosul,” 11/9/08
- “Policeman wounded in attack in Mosul,” 11/10/08
- “Policeman wounded in explosion in Mosul,” 2/2/09
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- “Senior police officer survives assassination attempt in Ninewa,” 2/11/09
- “Shabaki MP survives assassination attempt in Mosul,” 1/7/09
- “Soldier wounded by random fire in Mosul,” 11/24/08
- “Soldier wounded in IED blast in Mosul,” 2/19/09
- “Stocky IED injures 3 civilians in Mosul,” 1/28/09
- “Suicide attack kills soldier, wounds 3 in Mosul,” 2/11/09
- “Suicide bomber injures 2 cops in Mosul,” 11/19/08
- “Suicide car bomber wounds 3 in Mosul,” 2/9/09
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- “U.S. forces kill 3 brothers in Mosul,” 1/22/09
- “Unknown gunmen kill woman, wound 2 in Mosul,” 1/16/09
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- “Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq – Wednesday, Feb. 11, 2009,” 2/11/09
Hammoudi, Laith and Al-Dulaimy, Mohammed, “Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq – Monday 5 January 2009,” 1/5/09
Hammoudi, Laith and Kadhim, Hussein, “Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq – Wednesday 21 January 2009,” 1/29/09
Issa, Sahar, “Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq – Friday 16 January 2009,” 1/16/09
- “Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq – Friday 21 November 2008,” 11/21/08
- “Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq – Tuesday 13 January 2009,” 1/13/09
Al Jazeera, “Blast rocks Iraqi capital,” 11/12/08
- “Twin blasts target Baghdad police,” 12/17/08
Kadhim, Hussein, “Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq-Monday 3 November 2008,” 11/3/08
- “Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq-Monday 24 November 2008,” 11/24/08
- “Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq – Sunday 21 December 2008,” 12/21/08
- “Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq - Thursday 12 February 2009,” 2/12/09
- “Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq – Thursday 20 November 2008,” 11/20/08
- “Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq-Thursday 25 December 2008,” 12/25/08
- “Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq – Tuesday 3 February 2009,” 2/3/09
- “Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq-Tuesday 10 February 2009, 2/10/09
- “Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq – Tuesday 30 December 2008,” 12/30/08
- “Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq-Tuesday 10 February 2009,” 2/10/09
- “Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq-Wednesday 10 December 2008,” 12/10/08
- “Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq-Wednesday 12 November 2008,” 11/12/08
- “Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq-Wednesday 17 December 2008,” 12/17/08
- “Roundup of Daily Violence in Iraq – Monday 16 February 2009,” 2/16/09
- “Roundup of Daily Violence in Iraq – Monday 23 February 2009,” 2/23/09
- “Roundup of Daily Violence in Iraq – Thursday 26 February 2009,” 2/26/09
- “Roundup of Daily Violence in Iraq – Wednesday 7 January 2009,” 1/7/09
- “Roundup of Daily Violence in Iraq – Wednesday 25 February 2009,” 2/25/09
Kahl, Colin, Nagl, John, Brimley, Shawn, “Canceling Iraq’s Blank Check,” Foreign Policy, August 2008
Kamal, Adel, “new ninawa governor: no possibility of Kurdish alliance,” Niqash, 2/24/09
KUNA, “Iraqi PM admits failure of Umm Al-Rubai in military operation,” 9/18/08
Mohammed, Mujahid, “Iraq pours in police to protect Christians,” Agence France Presse, 10/12/08
Monsters & Critics, “Six people killed in Iraq clashes,” 2/7/09
Multi-National Forces-Iraq, “Attack at IP station in Mosul kills two, injures four Update to:20090224-05,” 2/24/09
- “Solider killed by indirect fire (Mosul),” 12/25/08
Robertson, Campbell, “Iraq Hands Death Penalty to 28 Cultists for Attacks,” New York Times, 2/27/09
Reuters, “Factbox – Security developments in Iraq, 09 Nov 2008,” 11/9/08
- “FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Dec 1,” 12/1/08
- “FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Dec 2,” 12/2/08
- “FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Dec 4,” 12/4/08
- “FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Dec 5,” 12/5/08
- “FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Dec 6,” 12/6/08
- “FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Dec 15,” 12/15/08
- “FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Dec 16,” 12/16/08
- “FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Dec 18,” 12/18/08
- “FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Dec 21,” 12/21/08
- “FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Dec 30,” 12/30/08
- “FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Feb 4,” 2/4/09
- “FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Feb 7,” 2/7/09
- “FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Feb 9,” 2/9/09
- “FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Feb 10,” 2/10/09
- “FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Feb 11,” 2/11/09
- “FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Feb 12,” 2/12/09
- “FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Feb 14,” 2/14/09
- “FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Feb 15,” 2/15/09
- “FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Feb 19,” 2/19/09
- “FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Jan 1,” 1/1/09
- “FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Jan 2,” 1/2/09
- “FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Jan 3,” 1/3/09
- “FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Jan 5,” 1/5/09
- “FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Jan 9,” 1/9/09
- “FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Jan 11,” 1/11/09
- “FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Jan 13,” 1/13/09
- “FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Jan 14,” 1/14/09
- “FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Jan 15,” 1/15/09
- “FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Jan 16,” 1/16/09
- “FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Jan 18,” 1/18/09
- “FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Jan 20,” 1/20/09
- “FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Jan 25,” 1/25/09
- “FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Jan 26,” 1/26/09
- “FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Nov 2,” 11/2/08
- “FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Nov 3,” 11/3/08
- “FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Nov 4,” 11/4/08
- “FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Nov 6,” 11/6/08
- “FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Nov 8,” 11/8/08
- “FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Nov 12,” 11/12/08
- “FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Nov 15,” 11/15/08
- “FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Nov 17,” 11/17/08
- “FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Nov 23,” 11/23/08
- “Suicide bomber kills deputy head of Iraq Sunni party,” 1/18/09
- “US, Iraq Launch New Bid To Eradicate Al-Qaeda,” 2/22/09
Samuels, Lennox, “Al Qaeda Nostra,” Newsweek, 5/21/08
Stairrett, Amanda Kim, “Battalion commander among 4 soldiers killed in Iraq,” Killeen Daily Herald, 2/14/09
Xinhua, “One killed, 15 wounded in car bombing in N Iraq,” 11/13/08
- “Suicide car bomb kills 16 in N Iraq,” 12/1/08
- “Suicide car bomber wounds 10 in northern Iraq,” 1/6/09
- “Suicide car bombing kills Iraqi soldier in N Iraq,” 2/11/09
Yacoub, Sameer, “US, Iraqi forces launch anti-al-Qaida offensive,” Associated Press, 2/22/09
Sunday, March 1, 2009
Maliki’s Private Security Forces?
On February 17 members of the Baghdad Brigade arrested the secretary of parliamentarian Mohammad al-Daini. Nine days before members of the same unit detained Daini’s chief bodyguard. That began the latest drama in Iraq’s parliament as Daini was accused of involvement in a series of terrorist and criminal acts. The events also highlighted one of two security units that have come to be increasingly scrutinized by Iraqi lawmakers.
The Baghdad Brigade and the Counterterrorism Unit have been accused of being Prime Minister’s private security forces. The Baghdad Brigade has been in charge of the Green Zone since it was handed over by the U.S. on New Year’s day 2009. It is led by General Emaad Yahseen Al Zuhary, and is officially part of the Army. Its’ operations against Daini’s staff shows that it apparently has police powers in other parts of the capital. The Counterterrorism force is an elite unit of over 4,000 that focuses upon militias, the insurgency, kidnappings, and gangs. The unit was brought together in April 2007 under the Counterterrorism Bureau created by the Prime Minister. The Unit is actually independent from both the Defense and Interior ministries. Nouri al-Maliki has just put forward a bill in parliament that would institutionalize their independence by creating their own budget. Both the Baghdad Brigade and the Counterterrorism Unit also answer directly to the Prime Minister. This is what has led some Iraqi politicians to question these two forces, and Maliki’s intentions. Some of their uses have also added to the controversy.
The Counterterrorism Unit was the first one to gain notoriety when it raided the Diyala provincial council headquarters in August 2008. The unit arrested the provincial security chief and the president of Diyala University, but along the way killed the governor’s secretary and one of his bodyguards, beat the deputy governor, and got into a firefight with local police killing four officers. Baghdad claimed the two arrested officials were on a wanted list, but then later claimed that it was a rogue operation. Few believed that explanation since the unit is under the direct control of Maliki. Some thought it was the Prime Minister asserting his control over the provincial council. Several of the Sunni members of the council from the Iraqi Islamic Party, including the arrested provincial security chief, were trying to reach out and co-opt the province’s Sons of Iraq (SOI) in preparation for the provincial elections. At the same time Maliki was intent on breaking the SOI by creating a rival Diyala tribal support council to lure away their members, while arresting others. The bungled raid was part of this struggle between Baghdad and the province.
In December 20008 the Counterterrorism Unit also arrested several Interior Ministry officials. The supposed reasons for their detentions ranged everywhere from plotting a coup, to being former Baathists, to planning arson in the Interior Ministry building, to making fake IDs to gain access to the ministry. The fact that the Interior Minister Jawad al-Bolani had a different story for the arrests than Maliki would point to another use of the special force to send a political message. Al-Bolani is the leader of the Constitutional Party that ran in the provincial elections. He was said to have used the security forces and his position to expand the party. The arrests could have been a sign by the Prime Minister that Bolani needed to watch his steps before the January 2009 vote.
Maliki has increasingly used the security forces against his political rivals, and to impose his will and the authority of the central government over parts of the country. This began when he sent the security forces after the Mahdi Army in Basra in March 2008. Since then he has also employed them against the Sunni insurgents, the Sons of Iraq, the Kurds, the Sunnis of Diyala, and the Interior Ministry. If the charges against al-Daini prove to be true, it shows that the Baghdad Brigade and the Counterterrorism Unit are not just used at Maliki’s whim. At the same time, Iraq has few to any real checks and balances on the power of the prime minister, and the rule of law is weak. That has caused growing concern amongst parliamentarians over Maliki’s moves to create these two forces that are independent from the rest of the security forces and ministries, and only answer to him.
SOURCES
Aswat al-Iraq, “PM forms ministerial committee to investigate Diala incidents,” 8/19/08
- “PM’s special force arrested my chief guard, secretary – MP,” 2/18/09
August, Oliver, “Iraqi officials arrested in anti-Saddam party swoop,” Times of London, 12/18/08
Elliott, DJ, “Iraqi Security Forces Order of Battle update: February 2009,” Long War Journal.org, 2/5/09
Kadhim, Hussein, “Iraqi government plays down arrests of 23 police officers,” McClatchy Newspapers, 12/18/08
Michaels, Jim, “Chain of command concerns raised in Iraq,” USA Today, 2/23/09
Parker, Ned and Hameed, Saif, “Iraq releases detained security officers,” Los Angeles Times, 12/20/08
Parker, Sam, “Guest Post: Behind the Curtain in Diyala,” Abu Muqawama Blog, 8/20/08
Peyamner News Agency, “Articles – Baghdad residents welcome green zone handover,” 1/2/09
Raghavan, Sudarsan and Mizher, Qais, “Arrests in Iraq Seen as Politically Motivated,” Washington Post, 12/19/08
Robertson, Campbell and Al-Salhy, Suadad, “Charges Dismissed in Iraq Against Ministry Detainees,” New York Times, 12/23/08
Robertson, Campbell and Williams, Timothy, “Status of Detained Iraqis Is Murky Amid Talk of a Political Showdown,” New York Times, 12/21/08
Rubin, Alissa, “Ahead of Election, Iraq’s Leader Pushes for Gains,” New York Times, 1/26/09
Russo, Claire, “Countdown To Diyala’s Provincial Election: Maliki & The IIP,” Institute for the Study of War, 1/30/09
- “The Maliki Government Confronts Diyala,” Institute for the Study of War,” 9/23/08
Salaheddin, Sinan, “Police: Iraqi troops raid Diyala governor’s office,” Associated Press, 8/19/08
Spangler, Nicholas, “Diyala raid was rogue operation, Iraqi government says,” McClatchy Newspapers, 8/22/08
Susman, Tina and Salman, Raheem, “Manhunt targets Iraq lawmaker whose plane was turned back,” Los Angeles Times, 2/26/09
Tran, Mark, “Iraqi officials arrested over coup plot against prime minister,” Guardian, 12/18/08
The Baghdad Brigade and the Counterterrorism Unit have been accused of being Prime Minister’s private security forces. The Baghdad Brigade has been in charge of the Green Zone since it was handed over by the U.S. on New Year’s day 2009. It is led by General Emaad Yahseen Al Zuhary, and is officially part of the Army. Its’ operations against Daini’s staff shows that it apparently has police powers in other parts of the capital. The Counterterrorism force is an elite unit of over 4,000 that focuses upon militias, the insurgency, kidnappings, and gangs. The unit was brought together in April 2007 under the Counterterrorism Bureau created by the Prime Minister. The Unit is actually independent from both the Defense and Interior ministries. Nouri al-Maliki has just put forward a bill in parliament that would institutionalize their independence by creating their own budget. Both the Baghdad Brigade and the Counterterrorism Unit also answer directly to the Prime Minister. This is what has led some Iraqi politicians to question these two forces, and Maliki’s intentions. Some of their uses have also added to the controversy.
The Counterterrorism Unit was the first one to gain notoriety when it raided the Diyala provincial council headquarters in August 2008. The unit arrested the provincial security chief and the president of Diyala University, but along the way killed the governor’s secretary and one of his bodyguards, beat the deputy governor, and got into a firefight with local police killing four officers. Baghdad claimed the two arrested officials were on a wanted list, but then later claimed that it was a rogue operation. Few believed that explanation since the unit is under the direct control of Maliki. Some thought it was the Prime Minister asserting his control over the provincial council. Several of the Sunni members of the council from the Iraqi Islamic Party, including the arrested provincial security chief, were trying to reach out and co-opt the province’s Sons of Iraq (SOI) in preparation for the provincial elections. At the same time Maliki was intent on breaking the SOI by creating a rival Diyala tribal support council to lure away their members, while arresting others. The bungled raid was part of this struggle between Baghdad and the province.
In December 20008 the Counterterrorism Unit also arrested several Interior Ministry officials. The supposed reasons for their detentions ranged everywhere from plotting a coup, to being former Baathists, to planning arson in the Interior Ministry building, to making fake IDs to gain access to the ministry. The fact that the Interior Minister Jawad al-Bolani had a different story for the arrests than Maliki would point to another use of the special force to send a political message. Al-Bolani is the leader of the Constitutional Party that ran in the provincial elections. He was said to have used the security forces and his position to expand the party. The arrests could have been a sign by the Prime Minister that Bolani needed to watch his steps before the January 2009 vote.
Maliki has increasingly used the security forces against his political rivals, and to impose his will and the authority of the central government over parts of the country. This began when he sent the security forces after the Mahdi Army in Basra in March 2008. Since then he has also employed them against the Sunni insurgents, the Sons of Iraq, the Kurds, the Sunnis of Diyala, and the Interior Ministry. If the charges against al-Daini prove to be true, it shows that the Baghdad Brigade and the Counterterrorism Unit are not just used at Maliki’s whim. At the same time, Iraq has few to any real checks and balances on the power of the prime minister, and the rule of law is weak. That has caused growing concern amongst parliamentarians over Maliki’s moves to create these two forces that are independent from the rest of the security forces and ministries, and only answer to him.
SOURCES
Aswat al-Iraq, “PM forms ministerial committee to investigate Diala incidents,” 8/19/08
- “PM’s special force arrested my chief guard, secretary – MP,” 2/18/09
August, Oliver, “Iraqi officials arrested in anti-Saddam party swoop,” Times of London, 12/18/08
Elliott, DJ, “Iraqi Security Forces Order of Battle update: February 2009,” Long War Journal.org, 2/5/09
Kadhim, Hussein, “Iraqi government plays down arrests of 23 police officers,” McClatchy Newspapers, 12/18/08
Michaels, Jim, “Chain of command concerns raised in Iraq,” USA Today, 2/23/09
Parker, Ned and Hameed, Saif, “Iraq releases detained security officers,” Los Angeles Times, 12/20/08
Parker, Sam, “Guest Post: Behind the Curtain in Diyala,” Abu Muqawama Blog, 8/20/08
Peyamner News Agency, “Articles – Baghdad residents welcome green zone handover,” 1/2/09
Raghavan, Sudarsan and Mizher, Qais, “Arrests in Iraq Seen as Politically Motivated,” Washington Post, 12/19/08
Robertson, Campbell and Al-Salhy, Suadad, “Charges Dismissed in Iraq Against Ministry Detainees,” New York Times, 12/23/08
Robertson, Campbell and Williams, Timothy, “Status of Detained Iraqis Is Murky Amid Talk of a Political Showdown,” New York Times, 12/21/08
Rubin, Alissa, “Ahead of Election, Iraq’s Leader Pushes for Gains,” New York Times, 1/26/09
Russo, Claire, “Countdown To Diyala’s Provincial Election: Maliki & The IIP,” Institute for the Study of War, 1/30/09
- “The Maliki Government Confronts Diyala,” Institute for the Study of War,” 9/23/08
Salaheddin, Sinan, “Police: Iraqi troops raid Diyala governor’s office,” Associated Press, 8/19/08
Spangler, Nicholas, “Diyala raid was rogue operation, Iraqi government says,” McClatchy Newspapers, 8/22/08
Susman, Tina and Salman, Raheem, “Manhunt targets Iraq lawmaker whose plane was turned back,” Los Angeles Times, 2/26/09
Tran, Mark, “Iraqi officials arrested over coup plot against prime minister,” Guardian, 12/18/08
Saturday, February 28, 2009
February 2008 UNICEF Report on Iraq
UNICEF recently released a report on Iraq. It not only focused upon the country’s children, but health, education, poverty, and the displaced. The organization said that with the reduction in violence there was greater access to Iraq’s communities. That was revealing more examples of poverty and deprivation than anyone knew about previously.
The biggest issue UNICEF reported on was a developing measles threat. It said that nine provinces had reported measles affecting 6,000 people since early 2008. The Iraqi Ministry of Health is worried that it could spread. Najaf, Sulamaniya, Irbil, Maysan, and Dohuk were endangered by this disease, while a more recent report from the United Nations’ IRIN news agency said that Salahaddin, Tamim, Anbar, Diyala, Baghdad, Babil and Dhi Qar were hit the hardest. Most victims were small children under the age of six. Government officials said that the main cause of the spread of measles was the lack of security, which kept health workers out of many areas.
The United Nations agency also went to a few schools in the northern provinces of Diyala, Irbil, and Dohuk. All of them were lacking basic services, especially access to clean water. In Dohuk the schools lacked bathrooms, while children in two villages in Irbil were suffering from water born diseases.
The displaced was another issue the report dealt with. In Tamim, 900 children were found begging on the streets of Kirkuk. 100 of them were orphans. Around half were internal refugees. All of them were trying to support their impoverished families. Internal refugees that were returning to the province lacked shelter, and access to water and sanitation. In Basra 250 squatters in an old navy had no sanitation, health care, or clean water. On the positive side 1,325 displaced families returned to the city of Mosul in Ninewa.
In 2008 Iraq suffered a sever drought. The worst hit areas were in the north. UNICEF traveled to Irbil and Ninewa and saw the drought’s lingering effects. In two areas of Irbil there was high poverty exacerbated by the lack of water that destroyed their farms, which were also their main source of food.
Examples of impoverishment were also found in Anbar. The outskirts of the province had deep poverty. Two areas by Ramadi that suffered because of the violence are now improving because the government has started programs for children. They still lack adequate health, sanitation and other basic services however.
The last part of the report detailed the various projects UNICEF was working on in Iraq. So far, the organization has committed $8 million for humanitarian projects in 59 communities. Those have mainly focused upon water, schools, and health campaigns. The major problem is that United Nations can hardly meet its obligations. UNICEF is short 89% of the money it needs for its various programs.
UNICEF is hoping that the provincial elections will lead to more responsible local governments that will address the needs of the country’s children. They are afraid about the spread of measles. The lack of services is also a large problem across the country. Iraq’s infrastructure has not been kept up because of the violence. Even as that has declined, there is still large-scale neglect. Finally poverty is another major issue. It has led to children begging, and kept them from going to school. More and more of these cases are being discovered as attacks have declined. The lack of money for both the United Nations and the Iraqi government after the fall in oil prices will probably mean these issues will not be solved any time soon however.
SOURCES
IRIN, “IRAQ: Measles emerges in violence-hit regions,” 2/24/09
UNICEF, “UNICEF Humanitarian Action Update Iraq,” 2/17/09
The biggest issue UNICEF reported on was a developing measles threat. It said that nine provinces had reported measles affecting 6,000 people since early 2008. The Iraqi Ministry of Health is worried that it could spread. Najaf, Sulamaniya, Irbil, Maysan, and Dohuk were endangered by this disease, while a more recent report from the United Nations’ IRIN news agency said that Salahaddin, Tamim, Anbar, Diyala, Baghdad, Babil and Dhi Qar were hit the hardest. Most victims were small children under the age of six. Government officials said that the main cause of the spread of measles was the lack of security, which kept health workers out of many areas.
The United Nations agency also went to a few schools in the northern provinces of Diyala, Irbil, and Dohuk. All of them were lacking basic services, especially access to clean water. In Dohuk the schools lacked bathrooms, while children in two villages in Irbil were suffering from water born diseases.
The displaced was another issue the report dealt with. In Tamim, 900 children were found begging on the streets of Kirkuk. 100 of them were orphans. Around half were internal refugees. All of them were trying to support their impoverished families. Internal refugees that were returning to the province lacked shelter, and access to water and sanitation. In Basra 250 squatters in an old navy had no sanitation, health care, or clean water. On the positive side 1,325 displaced families returned to the city of Mosul in Ninewa.
In 2008 Iraq suffered a sever drought. The worst hit areas were in the north. UNICEF traveled to Irbil and Ninewa and saw the drought’s lingering effects. In two areas of Irbil there was high poverty exacerbated by the lack of water that destroyed their farms, which were also their main source of food.
Examples of impoverishment were also found in Anbar. The outskirts of the province had deep poverty. Two areas by Ramadi that suffered because of the violence are now improving because the government has started programs for children. They still lack adequate health, sanitation and other basic services however.
The last part of the report detailed the various projects UNICEF was working on in Iraq. So far, the organization has committed $8 million for humanitarian projects in 59 communities. Those have mainly focused upon water, schools, and health campaigns. The major problem is that United Nations can hardly meet its obligations. UNICEF is short 89% of the money it needs for its various programs.
UNICEF is hoping that the provincial elections will lead to more responsible local governments that will address the needs of the country’s children. They are afraid about the spread of measles. The lack of services is also a large problem across the country. Iraq’s infrastructure has not been kept up because of the violence. Even as that has declined, there is still large-scale neglect. Finally poverty is another major issue. It has led to children begging, and kept them from going to school. More and more of these cases are being discovered as attacks have declined. The lack of money for both the United Nations and the Iraqi government after the fall in oil prices will probably mean these issues will not be solved any time soon however.
SOURCES
IRIN, “IRAQ: Measles emerges in violence-hit regions,” 2/24/09
UNICEF, “UNICEF Humanitarian Action Update Iraq,” 2/17/09
Friday, February 27, 2009
Obama’s Withdrawal and American Public Opinion
Today Friday February 27 President Obama outlined his plans to withdraw U.S. forces from Iraq. In a speech at a Marine base he said that roughly two-thirds of U.S. troops would be out of Iraq by August 2010. The Pentagon presented the president with three withdrawal plans. These were a 16-month plan, what Pres. Obama promised in his election campaign, a 19-month one, and a 23 month one. As reported before, the U.S. commander in Iraq General Odierno had been advocating for keeping as many American troops in the country as possible, and withdrawing them very slowly. The president apparently picked a middle course between his election promise and Odierno’s wishes by going with the 19-month plan. Even after that’s complete, up to 50,000 U.S. troops could remain in Iraq for training, supply, intelligence, and the external defense of Iraq. CBS News and the New York Times recently released a public opinion poll on Iraq that found the American public agreeing with the President’s timeline.
On February 23, 2009 CBS News and the New York Times released the latest American public opinion poll on Iraq. The survey asked 1,112 people questions by phone from February 18 to 22. It included 315 Republicans, 397 Democrats, and 400 independents.
When asked what country should be the focus of the United States Iraq was still number one by just one percentage point. 36% said Iraq was the most important, followed by Afghanistan 35%, Iran 10%, North Korea 7%, and something else or a combination 4%.
When queried on how they thought things were going in Iraq almost two-thirds said things were well. 11% said very well, 52% said somewhat well, 20% said somewhat badly, 9% replied very badly, and 8% didn’t know or did not respond. Overall 63% felt things were good in Iraq compared to 29% who said the situation was bad. That was the highest amount of positive responses since a December 2003 poll. At that time 65% said things were well in Iraq, and 33% said they were bad. By June 2007 the mood had flipped with only 22% saying things were good in Iraq, compared to 77% who felt it was bad. In a December 2008 survey, the mood change could be seen with 56% saying things were well, and 39% saying it was bad. Now would appear to be the most opportune time to pull out U.S. forces as over 60% of those polled feel that things are good in Iraq. If more thought Iraq was going badly the administration would probably be attacked for withdrawing under duress.
Public feelings on such a move was another question in the poll. Based upon President Obama’s original plan to pull out troops within 16 months, the poll asked how important that was. 46% said it was very important, 32% said somewhat, 10% said not too important, 8% said not important at all, and 4% either didn’t know or had no answer.
Early on in his campaign President Obama committed to withdrawing troops from Iraq. The Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) signed between Iraq and the United States says that all U.S. troops have to be out of Iraq by the end of 2011. The majority of U.S. forces will now be about before that deadline. The public opinion poll shows that the American public largely supports this move. The remaining force of several thousand will be there to ensure stability. There’s a good chance that many of these will even stay beyond 2011 if General Odierno has his way. They can remain if the Iraqi government agrees to it. Before than however, the U.S. needs to show that it is committed to pulling out troops because in July of this year Iraq will have a referendum on the SOFA. If it is not passed American soldiers and marines would have to be out by the end of 2009.
CBS News/New York Times Poll February 23, 2009
Which country should be the focus of the U.S. government?
Iraq 36%
Afghanistan 35%
Iran 10%
North Korea 7%
Something else or combination 4%
Don’t know/no answer 8%
How are things going for the U.S. in Iraq?
Very well 11%
Somewhat well 52%
Somewhat badly 20%
Very badly 9%
Don’t know/no answer 8%
Comparing February 2009 Poll to December 2008, June 2007, and December 2003 Polls
Feb. 2009: 63% well, 29% bad
Dec. 08: 56% well, 39% bad
June 07: 22% well, 77% bad
Dec. 03: 65% well, 33% bad
How important is it for the U.S. to withdraw troops in 16 months?
Very important 46%
Somewhat important 32%
Not too important 10%
Not important at all 8%
Don’t know/no answer 4%
SOURCES
Barnes, Julian, “Compromise on Iraq withdrawal timeline appears near,” Los Angeles Times, 2/25/09
BBC, “Obama outlines Iraq pullout plan,” 2/27/09
CBS News/New York Times, “Iraq, Afghanistan, And Iran February 18-22, 2009,” 2/23/09
DeYoung, Karen and Kornblut, Anne, “Obama Sets Timetable for Iraq,” Washington Post, 2/28/09
Rubin, Alissa and Robertson, Campbell, “Iraq Backs Deal That Sets End of U.S. Role,” New York Times, 11/27/08
On February 23, 2009 CBS News and the New York Times released the latest American public opinion poll on Iraq. The survey asked 1,112 people questions by phone from February 18 to 22. It included 315 Republicans, 397 Democrats, and 400 independents.
When asked what country should be the focus of the United States Iraq was still number one by just one percentage point. 36% said Iraq was the most important, followed by Afghanistan 35%, Iran 10%, North Korea 7%, and something else or a combination 4%.
When queried on how they thought things were going in Iraq almost two-thirds said things were well. 11% said very well, 52% said somewhat well, 20% said somewhat badly, 9% replied very badly, and 8% didn’t know or did not respond. Overall 63% felt things were good in Iraq compared to 29% who said the situation was bad. That was the highest amount of positive responses since a December 2003 poll. At that time 65% said things were well in Iraq, and 33% said they were bad. By June 2007 the mood had flipped with only 22% saying things were good in Iraq, compared to 77% who felt it was bad. In a December 2008 survey, the mood change could be seen with 56% saying things were well, and 39% saying it was bad. Now would appear to be the most opportune time to pull out U.S. forces as over 60% of those polled feel that things are good in Iraq. If more thought Iraq was going badly the administration would probably be attacked for withdrawing under duress.
Public feelings on such a move was another question in the poll. Based upon President Obama’s original plan to pull out troops within 16 months, the poll asked how important that was. 46% said it was very important, 32% said somewhat, 10% said not too important, 8% said not important at all, and 4% either didn’t know or had no answer.
Early on in his campaign President Obama committed to withdrawing troops from Iraq. The Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) signed between Iraq and the United States says that all U.S. troops have to be out of Iraq by the end of 2011. The majority of U.S. forces will now be about before that deadline. The public opinion poll shows that the American public largely supports this move. The remaining force of several thousand will be there to ensure stability. There’s a good chance that many of these will even stay beyond 2011 if General Odierno has his way. They can remain if the Iraqi government agrees to it. Before than however, the U.S. needs to show that it is committed to pulling out troops because in July of this year Iraq will have a referendum on the SOFA. If it is not passed American soldiers and marines would have to be out by the end of 2009.
CBS News/New York Times Poll February 23, 2009
Which country should be the focus of the U.S. government?
Iraq 36%
Afghanistan 35%
Iran 10%
North Korea 7%
Something else or combination 4%
Don’t know/no answer 8%
How are things going for the U.S. in Iraq?
Very well 11%
Somewhat well 52%
Somewhat badly 20%
Very badly 9%
Don’t know/no answer 8%
Comparing February 2009 Poll to December 2008, June 2007, and December 2003 Polls
Feb. 2009: 63% well, 29% bad
Dec. 08: 56% well, 39% bad
June 07: 22% well, 77% bad
Dec. 03: 65% well, 33% bad
How important is it for the U.S. to withdraw troops in 16 months?
Very important 46%
Somewhat important 32%
Not too important 10%
Not important at all 8%
Don’t know/no answer 4%
SOURCES
Barnes, Julian, “Compromise on Iraq withdrawal timeline appears near,” Los Angeles Times, 2/25/09
BBC, “Obama outlines Iraq pullout plan,” 2/27/09
CBS News/New York Times, “Iraq, Afghanistan, And Iran February 18-22, 2009,” 2/23/09
DeYoung, Karen and Kornblut, Anne, “Obama Sets Timetable for Iraq,” Washington Post, 2/28/09
Rubin, Alissa and Robertson, Campbell, “Iraq Backs Deal That Sets End of U.S. Role,” New York Times, 11/27/08
Thursday, February 26, 2009
Iran Tried To Trade Security In Basra For Nuclear Program
At the end of February 2009 the BBC is going to air a program “Iran and the West: Nuclear confrontation.” In the show they interview Sir John Sawers, the British ambassador to the U.N. He claims that Iran sent messages to England that they would help improve security and political stability in Basra in return for allowing Tehran to work on its nuclear program. At the time the Iranians were deeply involved in supporting a variety of Shiite militias in the city that were attacking British troops.
Beginning in late 2003 Iran began negotiating with Britain, France, and Germany over its nuclear program. The talks did not go well with Iran refusing to back off. At one point, the Iranians did offer a deal. According to Ambassador Sawers, the Iranians left several messages for the three European countries that involved Basra. Tehran said they would stop attacks on British troops in the city as well as halt undermining the Iraqi political system in return for Britain, France, and Germany accepting Iran’s nuclear program. The Iranians were intent on continuing work on their project. Sawers said the British did not accept the offer.
The Iranians started exerting influence over Basra immediately after the U.S. invasion. In March 2003 Iran’s leaders President Mohammad Khatami and Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamanei decided that they would deploy the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council’s Badr Brigade to several Iraqi cities after the U.S. attack including Basra. At the time the militia was a formal part of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards’ Qods Force, and received up to $20 million a year in funding from them. The Qods Force also used front groups like the Iranian Red Crescent to infiltrate Basra.
Eventually Tehran began supporting a wide variety of Shiite militias in Basra to carry out attacks on the British. In 2005 they were supplying Iraqi militias with the Explosively Formed Projectile (EFPs) roadside bombs that were used against the English forces. Iran also offered $300 a month to anyone that would carry out attacks on the British. In October 2005 the British said that they captured a Mahdi Army commander who admitted to using EFPs, and blamed Iran and Lebanon’s Hezbollah for supplying them. Basra also became a major transit point for the Qods Force to ship weapons to militias they supported throughout southern Iraq. By mid-2007 the U.S. and British claimed that these supplies had increased with larger caliber rockets being provided to militias. Earlier in March 2007 breakaway militia commander Qais Khazali, his brother Laith, and Hezbollah commander Ali Mussa Daqduq were arrested in Basra. Qais Khazali had once been one of the leaders of the Sadrist movement, helping keep it alive during the Saddam era. In 2004 however he broke away to form his own group, and was eventually named the leader of what became known as the Special Groups by Iran. Daqduq was sent to Iraq to coordinate Hezbollah’s work with the Qods Force.
While the British were focused upon Iran’s military policy in Basra, Tehran also began increasing economic ties. In July 2005 the two countries signed an export deal to ship 150,000 barrels of Iraqi oil per day to Iran for refining. Basra also imported electricity from Iran. Iranian products flooded the Basra market. England’s Guardian reported that Iran was using friendly militias to intimidate local merchants to buy Iranian goods. A free trade zone between Basra and Iran also facilitated this trade. Iran became so influential that many stores in Barsa had signs in Persian, and Iranian money was accepted.
Iran was willing to give up their support for the Badr Brigade, the Mahdi Army, Special Groups, and the Thar Allah militias in return for England’s acquiescence in Tehran’s pursuit of its nuclear program. When Britain turned them down was not mentioned in the press reports, but Iran’s strong military influence was finally curtailed when Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki launched his offensive in Basra in March 2008. During the fighting General Petraeus claimed that Iranians were helping the Sadrists with tactical operations. Tehran’s goal has always been political influence within Iraq however, so they helped negotiate the cease-fire to end the conflict. In the aftermath several Mahdi Army commanders were captured that detailed the training Iran offered to militiamen. New Iranian weapons with 2008 production dates were also found in the city, and a Hezbollah operative was captured there. Iran was dealt a setback in Basra, but its economic power remains, and it showed its political importance when it helped end the fighting.
Ambassador Sawers’ revelation shows the role Iraq plays in Iran’s foreign policy. Before Saddam Hussein was Iran’s greatest rival and threat. After the U.S. invasion, Iraq became a great opportunity for Tehran. They could increase their political, economic and cultural influence in Iraq, while using it as a tool in its dealing with the West. Supporting Shiite militias was not only a way to exert power in Iraq, but also a means to hold down American troops as Iran feared that the Bush administration might attack them. The offer to England also showed that Iran’s military policy was always subject to its political needs. Whether Iran will continue to play such a role in the future is a big question as Iraqi nationalism is now re-emerging.
SOURCES
Abdul-Ahad, Ghaith, “’Welcolme to Tehran’ – how Iran took control of Basra,” Guardian, 5/19/07
Allam, Hannah, Landay, Jonathan, and Strobel, Warren, “Is an Iranian general the most powerful man in Iraq?” McClatchy Newspapers, 4/28/08
Alsumaria, “Militias and neighbors loot Iraqi South Oil,” 2/9/08
Baxter, Sarah and Colvin, Marie, “Iran joined militias in battle for Basra,” Sunday Times of London, 4/6/08
BBC, “Iran ‘behind attacks on British,’” 10/5/05
Beehner, Lionel, “IRAN: Nuclear Negotiations,” Council on Foreign Relations, 5/16/05
Beehner, Lionel, Bruno, Greg, “Iran’s Involvement in Iraq,” Council on Foreign Relations, 3/3/08
Borger, Julian, “Iran offered to end attacks on British troops in Iraq, claims diplomat,” Guardian, 2/20/09
Cochrane, Marisa, “The Fragmentation of the Sadrist Movement,” Institute for the Study of War, January 2009
Dreazen, Yochi, “U.S. Weighs Messages From Iran,” Wall Street Journal, 4/29/08
Felter, Joseph and Fishman, Brian, “Iranian Strategy in Iraq, Politics and ‘Other Means,’” Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, 10/13/08
Glanz, James and Rubin, Alissa, “U.S. and Iran Find Common Ground in Iraq’s Shiite Conflict,” New York Times, 4/21/08
Hendawi, Hamza and Abdul-Zahra, Qassim, “Hezbollah said to train Shiite militiamen in Iraq,” Associated Press, 7/1/08
Kagan, Kimberly, “Iran’s Proxy War against the United States and the Iraqi Government,” Institute for the Study of War, 8/20/07
Katzman, Kenneth, “Iran’s Activities and Influence in Iraq,” Congressional Research Service, 12/26/07
Mazzetti, Mark, Myers, Steven Lee and Shanker, Thom, “Questions Linger on Scope of Iran’s Threat in Iraq,” New York Times, 4/26/08
Norton-Taylor, Richard, “British troops to stay in Basra ‘for the long term,’” Guardian, 5/2/08
Oliver, Christian, “Iran and Iraq look to heal old wounds with oil deal,” Reuters, 7/19/05
Overhaus, Marco, “European diplomacy and Iran’s nuclear programme,” EuroActiv.com, 7/27/07
Partlow, Joshua, “Iraq and Iran: the ties that bind,” Seattle Times, 1/27/07
PBS Newhour, “Iran’s Role in Iraq, Nuclear Ambitions Cloud U.S. Policy,” 4/16/08
Pearson, Bryan, “Clear Iranian role in Baghdad violence: military,” Agence France Presse, 4/27/08
Phillips, James, “Deter Iranian and Syrian Meddling In Postwar Iraq,” Heritage Foundation, 4/4/03
Rayment, Sean, “Iran ‘paid Iraq insurgents to kill UK soldiers,” Telegraph, 5/25/08
Rubin, Alissa and Gordon, Michael, “Iraq Team to Discuss Militias With Iran,” New York Times, 5/1/08
Susman, Tina, “Iraq jumps into U.S.-Iran tussle,” Los Angeles Times, 4/29/08
Tanter, Raymond, “Iran’s Threat to Coalition Forces in Iraq,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 1/15/04
White, Jeffrey, “Fighting Iran in Iraq,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2/14/07
Wong, Edward, “Iran Is Playing a Growing Role in Iraq Economy,” New York Times, 3/17/07
Wright, Robin, “Iranian Flow Of Weapons Increasing, Officials Say,” Washington Post, 6/3/07
Beginning in late 2003 Iran began negotiating with Britain, France, and Germany over its nuclear program. The talks did not go well with Iran refusing to back off. At one point, the Iranians did offer a deal. According to Ambassador Sawers, the Iranians left several messages for the three European countries that involved Basra. Tehran said they would stop attacks on British troops in the city as well as halt undermining the Iraqi political system in return for Britain, France, and Germany accepting Iran’s nuclear program. The Iranians were intent on continuing work on their project. Sawers said the British did not accept the offer.
The Iranians started exerting influence over Basra immediately after the U.S. invasion. In March 2003 Iran’s leaders President Mohammad Khatami and Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamanei decided that they would deploy the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council’s Badr Brigade to several Iraqi cities after the U.S. attack including Basra. At the time the militia was a formal part of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards’ Qods Force, and received up to $20 million a year in funding from them. The Qods Force also used front groups like the Iranian Red Crescent to infiltrate Basra.
Eventually Tehran began supporting a wide variety of Shiite militias in Basra to carry out attacks on the British. In 2005 they were supplying Iraqi militias with the Explosively Formed Projectile (EFPs) roadside bombs that were used against the English forces. Iran also offered $300 a month to anyone that would carry out attacks on the British. In October 2005 the British said that they captured a Mahdi Army commander who admitted to using EFPs, and blamed Iran and Lebanon’s Hezbollah for supplying them. Basra also became a major transit point for the Qods Force to ship weapons to militias they supported throughout southern Iraq. By mid-2007 the U.S. and British claimed that these supplies had increased with larger caliber rockets being provided to militias. Earlier in March 2007 breakaway militia commander Qais Khazali, his brother Laith, and Hezbollah commander Ali Mussa Daqduq were arrested in Basra. Qais Khazali had once been one of the leaders of the Sadrist movement, helping keep it alive during the Saddam era. In 2004 however he broke away to form his own group, and was eventually named the leader of what became known as the Special Groups by Iran. Daqduq was sent to Iraq to coordinate Hezbollah’s work with the Qods Force.
While the British were focused upon Iran’s military policy in Basra, Tehran also began increasing economic ties. In July 2005 the two countries signed an export deal to ship 150,000 barrels of Iraqi oil per day to Iran for refining. Basra also imported electricity from Iran. Iranian products flooded the Basra market. England’s Guardian reported that Iran was using friendly militias to intimidate local merchants to buy Iranian goods. A free trade zone between Basra and Iran also facilitated this trade. Iran became so influential that many stores in Barsa had signs in Persian, and Iranian money was accepted.
Iran was willing to give up their support for the Badr Brigade, the Mahdi Army, Special Groups, and the Thar Allah militias in return for England’s acquiescence in Tehran’s pursuit of its nuclear program. When Britain turned them down was not mentioned in the press reports, but Iran’s strong military influence was finally curtailed when Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki launched his offensive in Basra in March 2008. During the fighting General Petraeus claimed that Iranians were helping the Sadrists with tactical operations. Tehran’s goal has always been political influence within Iraq however, so they helped negotiate the cease-fire to end the conflict. In the aftermath several Mahdi Army commanders were captured that detailed the training Iran offered to militiamen. New Iranian weapons with 2008 production dates were also found in the city, and a Hezbollah operative was captured there. Iran was dealt a setback in Basra, but its economic power remains, and it showed its political importance when it helped end the fighting.
Ambassador Sawers’ revelation shows the role Iraq plays in Iran’s foreign policy. Before Saddam Hussein was Iran’s greatest rival and threat. After the U.S. invasion, Iraq became a great opportunity for Tehran. They could increase their political, economic and cultural influence in Iraq, while using it as a tool in its dealing with the West. Supporting Shiite militias was not only a way to exert power in Iraq, but also a means to hold down American troops as Iran feared that the Bush administration might attack them. The offer to England also showed that Iran’s military policy was always subject to its political needs. Whether Iran will continue to play such a role in the future is a big question as Iraqi nationalism is now re-emerging.
SOURCES
Abdul-Ahad, Ghaith, “’Welcolme to Tehran’ – how Iran took control of Basra,” Guardian, 5/19/07
Allam, Hannah, Landay, Jonathan, and Strobel, Warren, “Is an Iranian general the most powerful man in Iraq?” McClatchy Newspapers, 4/28/08
Alsumaria, “Militias and neighbors loot Iraqi South Oil,” 2/9/08
Baxter, Sarah and Colvin, Marie, “Iran joined militias in battle for Basra,” Sunday Times of London, 4/6/08
BBC, “Iran ‘behind attacks on British,’” 10/5/05
Beehner, Lionel, “IRAN: Nuclear Negotiations,” Council on Foreign Relations, 5/16/05
Beehner, Lionel, Bruno, Greg, “Iran’s Involvement in Iraq,” Council on Foreign Relations, 3/3/08
Borger, Julian, “Iran offered to end attacks on British troops in Iraq, claims diplomat,” Guardian, 2/20/09
Cochrane, Marisa, “The Fragmentation of the Sadrist Movement,” Institute for the Study of War, January 2009
Dreazen, Yochi, “U.S. Weighs Messages From Iran,” Wall Street Journal, 4/29/08
Felter, Joseph and Fishman, Brian, “Iranian Strategy in Iraq, Politics and ‘Other Means,’” Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, 10/13/08
Glanz, James and Rubin, Alissa, “U.S. and Iran Find Common Ground in Iraq’s Shiite Conflict,” New York Times, 4/21/08
Hendawi, Hamza and Abdul-Zahra, Qassim, “Hezbollah said to train Shiite militiamen in Iraq,” Associated Press, 7/1/08
Kagan, Kimberly, “Iran’s Proxy War against the United States and the Iraqi Government,” Institute for the Study of War, 8/20/07
Katzman, Kenneth, “Iran’s Activities and Influence in Iraq,” Congressional Research Service, 12/26/07
Mazzetti, Mark, Myers, Steven Lee and Shanker, Thom, “Questions Linger on Scope of Iran’s Threat in Iraq,” New York Times, 4/26/08
Norton-Taylor, Richard, “British troops to stay in Basra ‘for the long term,’” Guardian, 5/2/08
Oliver, Christian, “Iran and Iraq look to heal old wounds with oil deal,” Reuters, 7/19/05
Overhaus, Marco, “European diplomacy and Iran’s nuclear programme,” EuroActiv.com, 7/27/07
Partlow, Joshua, “Iraq and Iran: the ties that bind,” Seattle Times, 1/27/07
PBS Newhour, “Iran’s Role in Iraq, Nuclear Ambitions Cloud U.S. Policy,” 4/16/08
Pearson, Bryan, “Clear Iranian role in Baghdad violence: military,” Agence France Presse, 4/27/08
Phillips, James, “Deter Iranian and Syrian Meddling In Postwar Iraq,” Heritage Foundation, 4/4/03
Rayment, Sean, “Iran ‘paid Iraq insurgents to kill UK soldiers,” Telegraph, 5/25/08
Rubin, Alissa and Gordon, Michael, “Iraq Team to Discuss Militias With Iran,” New York Times, 5/1/08
Susman, Tina, “Iraq jumps into U.S.-Iran tussle,” Los Angeles Times, 4/29/08
Tanter, Raymond, “Iran’s Threat to Coalition Forces in Iraq,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 1/15/04
White, Jeffrey, “Fighting Iran in Iraq,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2/14/07
Wong, Edward, “Iran Is Playing a Growing Role in Iraq Economy,” New York Times, 3/17/07
Wright, Robin, “Iranian Flow Of Weapons Increasing, Officials Say,” Washington Post, 6/3/07
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