Wednesday, March 11, 2009

Dec. 08-Jan. 09 U.N. Humanitarian Update – Iraq

In late February 2009 the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs released its latest humanitarian report on Iraq. The paper is a compilation of several others by UNICEF, Oxfam, and the International Organization for Migration, many of which have been reported here before, but also includes some new reporting as well. The humanitarian update focuses upon six main topics: refugees and the displaced, violence, women’s issues, children, Iraq’s food ration system, and health.

The Displaced

Returning refugees is a growing issue in Iraq. The number of Iraqis coming home has increased from 2007 to 2008. In 2007 an estimated 36,000 displaced people came back, compared to 195,240 in 2008. 25,000 refugees from other countries have also returned over those two years. In 2008 an average of 1,650 displaced families came back each month with the highest numbers during July, August and September, but then declining for the remaining three months of the year. Many have gone back to Baghdad, the sight of most of the displacement in the country. Other families wish to go back as well, but don’t have the financial means to.

The government has offered $432 to families that return from another province, and $216 to those that go back home within their own governorate. Baghdad began this program in October 2008, but it’s not clear whether it will continue in 2009. The Ministry of Displacement and Migration announced in February 2009 for example, that it had run out of funds for this program.

Many of those coming back face a number of problems finding basic necessities. Electricity is spotty, as well as access to public services and health care. Most importantly is finding housing. 41.8% of displaced families surveyed said they had no access to their property. 16.7% said they do have access, and 38.7% said they don’t know the status of their former homes. Of those that could go back 35% said their homes ere currently occupied. 22.1% said their homes were destroyed, 8.6% said they couldn’t go back to them because of security conditions, 2.5% said the military was using their property, while 0.5% said the government had taken it over.

In 2008 the Ministry of Displacement and Migration began plans to build housing projects for the displaced that could not go back home, but many of those plans have been put on hold because of budget cuts. Originally the Ministry was to be given $43.2 million for building housing projects in the 2009 budget, but that amount was slashed to $6.85 million because of the declining revenues from oil.

There are also restrictions and problems the displaced face when trying to receive aid from the government or retrieve their property. First, not all have registered with the Ministry of Displacement and Migration, which is a requirement to receive payments. Only Iraqis that left between January 1, 2006 and January 1, 2008 are covered. The amount of aid offered by the government is also not much, especially for those that had their homes destroyed. Iraqis that rented will probably not be able to get their places back, while those that sold, no matter what the situation, have no recourses. There are also some stories of returnees being threatened and attacked, and being forced to flee again. Finally, women have a much harder time coming up with the requirements to regain their property or get government assistance.

Both the United Nations and the International Organization for Migration (IOM) have programs for the internally displaced, but they are only reaching a fraction of the total. The U.N. has created Protection Assistance Centers for example that have only helped 26,677 people out of around 2 million internally displaced. The IOM has care packages for the displaced, but are only operating in Baghdad, Anbar, Irbil and Basra, and have only given them out to around 2,200 families, approximately 13,200 people.

Violence

Violence, especially against civilians, continues in Iraq, but at much lower levels than before. The number of civilian casualties from December 2008 to January 2009 for example decreased. In December 275 civilians were killed and 854 wounded compared to 192 killed and 591 wounded in January. Two to three dozen bodies are also found on the streets each month. On average thirteen Iraqis civilians were killed per day in 2008. Members of the Iraqi security forces are also targets with 83 killed and 200 wounded in December, and 99 killed and 231 wounded in January. In total 392 Iraqis were killed and 1,054 wounded in December, and 335 died in January, and 1,085 wounded.

Women’s Issues

The U.N. has growing concerns about the state of Iraq’s women. A 2008 report found that women headed 10.2% of Iraq’s households. There are also around 1 million widows in the country. These Iraqis are largely ignored in society, and have a much harder time providing for their families. A 2008 survey of the Iraqi and Middle Eastern press found that only 1% of stories were about women. More than half were about violence, and 20% more were on female suicide bombers. The Iraqi Minister of Women’s Affairs also recently resigned in February 2009 claiming that the government was providing her with few funds, but there are reports that she will go back to her job. Calling attention to their plight, a group of widows held a demonstration in Baghdad calling for government aid on International Women’s Day in March.

Female Headed Households By Province
Basra 5.6%
Najaf 6.8%
Babil 6.9%
Anbar 8.6%
Maysan 8.6%
Salahaddin 8.6%
Wasit 8.8%
Dohuk 10%
Tamim 10.1%
Ninewa 10.2%
Dhi Qar 10.6%
Qadisiyah 10.6%
Diyala 11.2%
Karbala 11.4%
Muthanna 11.8%
Sulaymaniya 11.8%
Baghdad 12.2%
Irbil 12.5%

Children

Children in northern Iraq are facing bad conditions. Schools visited by UNICEF in Diyala and Dohuk were overcrowded, lacked clean water, and sanitation. More than 900 children were also found in Kirkuk begging. Half of them were displaced.

Food

The Iraqi government began its food rations system in 1995 under the U.N.’s Oil for Food program. 95% of Iraqis support the system. In 2007 the Ministry of Trade, which controls it, was going to cut the handouts in half because a lack of funds, but the 2008 supplemental budget stopped that. In 2009 the Ministry of Trade still has plans to reduce the program, this time limiting it only to the poor. The packages cost the government $0.50 per person.

Health

The Ministry of Health is concerned about a measles outbreak. In 2008 6,000 cases were reported in nine provinces. They were also worried that it would spread to Najaf, Sulaymaniya, Irbil, Maysan, and Dohuk. That would place up to 800,000 children at risk. The government is telling families that they need to get their kids vaccinated, and is trying to create a new health program to deal with it.

SOURCES

Aswat al-Iraq, “Widows urge govt. to support them economically, socially,” 3/9/09

Salaheddin, Sinan, “Iraq’s women’s minister to withdraw resignation,” Associated Press, 3/9/09

Al-Shawfi, Mundher, “Iraqi government careless about its own refugees – minister,” Azzaman, 2/27/09

United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, “Humanitarian Update Iraq, December 2008-January 2009” United Nations, 1/31/09

Tuesday, March 10, 2009

Special Inspector General For Iraq Reconstruction’s “Hard Lessons” – Preface

In January 2009 the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR) released a heavy tome, over 500 pages long, reviewing America’s attempt to rebuild Iraq after the 2003 invasion. The report, entitled “Hard Lessons” begins with the pre-war planning for Iraq that started in mid-2002, and goes all the way up to the fall of 2008. The paper is far too long to read or digest in one fell swoop, so instead it will be tackled chapter by chapter. Overall, SIGIR found that America’s effort was uncoordinated, derailed by the security situation, and relied upon a bad contracting process. America’s greatest success in this endeavor was to build up the Iraqi security forces, but it failed to reconstruct the country’s basic services, infrastructure, and economy.

The Inspector General was first created during the time of the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA). It was originally called the Coalition Provisional Authority Office of Inspector General. In October 2004 it became the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction. At the same time Stuart Bowen was appointed its director, a position he holds to this day.

Since the 2003 invasion the U.S. has committed around $50 billion for the reconstruction of Iraq. It is the largest rebuilding project ever attempted by the United States. “Hard Lessons” believes that the Bush administration lacked unity of command and coordination when dealing with Iraq. To make things worse American policy and personnel were often changed. Security also became such an overriding concern that it derailed and diverted much of the reconstruction plan. Bad contracts and the lack of oversight and management also led to massive waste. The U.S. relied upon cost-plus contracts that paid companies a fixed price plus costs, allowed high overheads, paid excessive fees, and consented to long delays that all led to large cost overruns. At the same time, there were very few cases of fraud or corruption as seen by the few criminal cases that have been prosecuted.

As soon as the SIGIR went to Iraq it began to see problems. The first was the large amounts of cash that were used by the CPA to pay for everything. The U.S. for example, flew in $12 billion in $100 bills to Iraq from the Federal Reserve Bank in New York City in 2004. Second, the attacks in the country shot up security costs and delayed many projects. Last, SIGIR believed that the CPA set too many grand goals for what they could accomplish in Iraq.

All of these and more led to some tough criticisms in “Hard Lessons.” It does not believe that the U.S. met its goals for reconstructing Iraq. Electricity and oil production for example are still below goals set by the CPA. The number of successfully completed projects is also below expectations. SIGIR believes the lack of security in the country was the major cause for this failure. The U.S. was able to build up Iraq’s security forces largely from scratch after the CPA disbanded the armed forces. They have gone through a massive expansion, and while there are still problems, they have more capabilities then before. In the end, SIGIR believes that the U.S. did not have the resources or organization to carry out such a grandiose plan as rebuilding Iraq.

SOURCES

Glanz, James, “In Ramadi, Real Rebuilding, With Fresh Paint,” New York Times, 11/23/08

Pallister, David, “How the US sent $12bn in cash to Iraq. And watched it vanish,” Guardian, 2/8/07

Special Inspector General For Iraq Reconstruction, “Hard Lessons,” 1/22/09

Monday, March 9, 2009

Grassroots Reconciliation At The Samarra Shrine

In February 2006 the Shiite shrine at Samarra was bombed. In subsequent months Shiite militias responded with a wave of attacks that eventually led to Iraq descending into a sectarian civil war. Civilian deaths went from 2,165 in February according to the United Nations to eventually shooting up to 3,590 by July. Over 1.6 million were displaced as a result. On March 6, 2009 however a remarkable event happened. Over one million Shiite pilgrims returned to the Samarra shrine in an example of grassroots reconciliation.

Samarra, a Sunni city, is the burial place for two revered Shiite Imams. Those are the Imam Hasan Askari and his father Imam Ali Hadi. Both are descendents of the Prophet Mohammad. The death of the Imam Askari is usually celebrated with a pilgrimage to Samarra. On March 6 over one million Shiites from across the country made this trip, the first time since the 2006 bombing. Moqtada al-Sadr also called for his followers to join in the procession.

The city was heavily guarded by the Iraqi security forces, which erected blast walls along the path of the pilgrims. Even though some Shiites complained that they were not able to interact with the local Sunni population that much, there were still tents and food vendors set up to greet the visitors. 5,000 Sunnis and Shiites even went to a joint prayer service at a Sunni mosque, and then marched down the streets chanting anti-violence slogans.

While there are anecdotal reports of Iraqis being tired of the sectarian war, the events at Samarra are a specific example of that new status quo. The symbolism was strong as it took place at the starting place of the civil war. There are still many problems in Iraq, but it appears that at least for the people that made the pilgrimage to Samarra, and those that greeted them wanted to put part of Iraq’s bloody past behind them.

SOURCES

International Organization for Migration, “Three Years Of Post-Samarra Displacement In Iraq,” 2/22/09

O’Hanlon, Michael, Campbell, Jason, “Iraq Index,” Brookings Institution, 1/30/09

Rasheed, Hamid, “Sow of Sunni-Shiite unity in Iraq,” Los Angeles Times, 3/7/09

Schofield, Matthew, “Iraqi pilgrims visit Samarra’s bombed mosque once again,” McClatchy Newspapers, 3/6/09

Sunday, March 8, 2009

Al-Hadbaa Party Leader’s Vision For Ninewa

In the January 2009 elections the newly formed Al-Hadbaa List won an outright majority in Ninewa province. They received 38.4% of the vote, which netted them 19 of 37 seats on the provincial council. Shortly after the results were announced a politician from the Kurdish coalition, the Ninewa Brotherhood List, that ran in the election said they would be willing to work with Al-Hadbaa if Kurdish rights were guaranteed. Recently the leader of Al-Hadbaa, Atheel al-Nujafi, who is likely to become governor, has been interviewed several times. From his comments it seems highly unlikely that the Kurds and the newly elected Sunnis will have much in common.

Al-Nujafi had rather conventional views about developing Ninewa, and dealing with violence. He said he would create a long-term economic growth plan for the province that focuses upon the private sector. Al-Nujafi believes there are plenty of resources in Ninewa that can be exploited to enrich the area. Security was another major issue as Ninewa is one of the deadliest in the country. Al-Nujafi believes that there are three sources of violence. First there are political motivated attacks against the United States. Many of these insurgents also reject the political system. Al-Nujafi said that the government should talk with them to resolve their problems. Second were criminal gangs that have taken advantage of the power vacuum created by the competition for power between Arabs and Kurds. It was the duty of the security forces to deal with them. Last were foreign groups that wanted to undermine the country. The security forces and the provincial government would deal with them.

Nujafi’s most controversial comments however were about the Kurds who have ruled the province since 2005. Nujafi told the Iraqi paper Azzaman that the Kurds had done a poor job governing Ninewa. For that reason he wants all the standing Kurdish politicians to resign, and be replaced by fresh faces that would be acceptable to Arabs. The politicians also have to address Ninewa’s issues exclusively. He said that he would reject any that thought about the needs of Kurdistan. That included desires to annex disputed territories in the north, which he said should be under the control of Baghdad until their future was decided.

Finally, Nujafi blamed the Americans for the both violence and the recent past in Ninewa. He said that the American presence helped lead to the insurgency and their attacks in the province. He also accused the U.S. of being pro-Kurdish, supporting their rule over the province.

Nujafi’s statements have had a cool reception amongst the Kurds as could be expected. The out-going deputy governor Khasro Goran said that he believed Al-Hadbaa wanted to kick the Kurds out of Mosul. The Kurds have also formally asked the United States to keep troops in the north, fearing future disputes with the country’s Arabs.

Since al-Hadbaa won a majority in the January elections, they will have a largely free reign to rule Ninewa. While working on developing Ninewa’s economy and security would gain support from any Iraqi, the party’s stance on the Kurds looks to be fostering more divisions in a province that has seen noting but conflict for most of the period since the U.S. invasion. Adding to the situation, al-Hadbaa could also gain support from Baghdad as Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki has increasingly challenged Kurdistan himself. Either way it shows the precarious situation Iraq’s politics finds itself in. Having Sunnis gain greater representation in the country after they boycotted the first provincial elections in 2005 was obviously important, but that doesn’t mean it can’t foster further problems as well. In Ninewa's case it appears to have led to the election of a party that wants political payback against the Kurds.

SOURCES

Associated Press, “Iraqi provincial election results,” 2/19/09

Farrell, Stephen, “Election: Preliminary Results,” Baghdad Bureau Blog, New York Times, 2/5/09

Flintoff, Corey, “Shift In Power Heightens Tensions In Iraqi City,” All Things Considered, NPR, 2/27/09

Kamal, Adel, “new ninawa governor: no possibility of Kurdish alliance,” Niqash, 2/24/09

Mohsen, Amer, “Iraq Papers Thu: Corruption and Reconstruction,” IraqSlogger.com, 3/4/09

Salaheddin, Sinan, “Iraqi Kurdish politician want rights protected,” 2/21/09

World Tribune, “Kurdish government warns U.S. military pullout will spark war in N. Iraq,” 3/2/09

Saturday, March 7, 2009

Baghdad’s Latest Reconciliation Effort

On March 6 at a conference in Baghdad of tribal sheikhs Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki called for reconciliation with former Baathist military personnel. He said that as long as these former regime members were focused on the future and not the past they would have a place in society. This followed a months worth of activities where the government was attempting to get Saddam era Army officers to return from exile and be integrated back into Iraq.

At a meeting in the capital for Tribal Support Council members Prime Minister Maliki called for reconciliation with Baathists soldiers. He said that they made mistakes in the past, but now was the time to forgive and forget, and close that chapter in Iraq’s history. A Sunni parliamentarian from Iyad Allawi’s Iraqi National List said that the Prime Minister’s statements were needed, but more importantly, they needed to be backed up by action. That’s what the government was attempting to do the previous month.

In February 2009 Baghdad made several overtures to former soldiers from Saddam’s army that were living in foreign countries. This began with dialogue with former officers in both Jordan and Baghdad. The government was offering those below colonel jobs in the new Army, while those of a higher rank would receive pensions. According to Asharq al-Awsat this offer was open to any soldiers except members of Saddam’s Fedayeen. The Defense Ministry said they were preparing Iraq’s embassies and attaché offices across the region to accept whatever soldiers wanted to return, and set up a special committee to help integrate them. In the Baghdad meeting American and British officials were also involved, and according to the Saudi Al-Qatan paper, a delegation of Americans met with former officers in Amman, Jordan as well. The Iraqi armed forces have already taken in over 96,000 soldiers from Saddam’s army, so there was a precedent for this policy.

The motivations behind the move seemed to cause a bit of controversy in Iraq. In mid-January 2009 then Vice President elect Joe Biden visited Iraq. While there he told the Maliki government that they needed to do more on political reconciliation. A few weeks later Maliki, while meeting with French President Nicholas Sarkozy, responded by saying that the U.S. could no longer pressure Iraq, and that reconciliation was almost complete. Al-Hayat later reported that the outreach to soldiers was in fact done under pressure from the Americans.

While there were initial meetings with some officers, things seemed to quickly turn sour. In the beginning of February a former general met with Iraqi, American and British officials in Baghdad about soldiers returning. The former head of the Army also called on soldiers to go back to Iraq from abroad, and an ex-Republican Guard general said that the government was hoping 23,000 officers would come back. By mid-February however former officers were saying that they would not take up Maliki’s offer, and urged others to follow suit. They said they would only reconcile with the government if they got rid of the DeBaathification process, and paid them back pay for their years in exile. Discussions seemed to end at that point.

Iraq’s Army has already taken in thousands of former soldiers, but there are still some recalcitrant ones living in foreign countries. The latest outreach to those appeared to have been the result of Vice President Biden’s urging, showing that the U.S. still has pull within Iraq even though it is reducing troop levels. The future of the initiative is unknown however. What looked to be a promising start quickly turned into rejection by the old officers. Still, the military has been one of the few Iraqi institutions to take in members of the old regime in large numbers, although ironically it is prohibited under the Accountability and Justice Law (12) that replaced the DeBaathification order.

SOURCES

Agence France Presse, "Iraq parliament fails to elect new speaker," 2/8/09

Associated Press, “Biden Visits Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan,” 1/12/09

Aswat al-Iraq, “Ministerial plan to receive former army officers,” 2/15/09

Azzaman, “Former army generals snub government’s offer to return,” 2/19/09

International Center for Transitional Justice, “Briefing Paper: Iraq’s New ‘Accountability and Justice’ Law,” 1/22/08

Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, “Iraqi Government Invites Former Army Officers Back,” 2/18/09
- "Officers Who Served Under Saddam To Rejoin Iraqi Army," 2/7/09

Reid, Robert, “Iraqi PM reaches out to Saddam supporters,” Associated Press, 3/6/09

Roads To Iraq Blog, “American delegation met with former Iraqi army officers,” 2/20/09
- “Another failing reconciliation attempt,” 2/14/09

Santora, Marc and Cowell, Alan, “With Swipe at U.S., Iraq Builds ties to French,” New York Times, 2/11/09

Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, “Quarterly Report and Semiannual Report to the United States Congress,” 1/30/09

Friday, March 6, 2009

Ups And Downs Of Iraq’s Oil Industry And Its Implications For The Budget

A government official recently announced Iraq’s oil figures for February 2009. Exports were slightly down from the previous month. That accounted for a drop in revenue despite prices staying the same. The country’s production has always fluctuated for a number of reasons, both man made and natural. A bigger issue is what the price of Iraqi crude means for the budget.

In early March 2009 an Iraqi oil official announced that February’s exports and revenue were below February numbers. In January 2009 Iraq sold around 1.9 million barrels of oil a day for an average price of $37 a barrel. That brought in approximately $2.15 billion. By February exports had declined to about 1.8 million barrels a day. The price stayed the same, but revenues were down to $1.7 billion. Aging infrastructure and bad weather were blamed for the change between the two months.

Overall, Iraq’s production has been increasing over the last year. January’s numbers were an improvement over December 2008 when Iraq exported 1.82 million barrels a day. Total production was up in 2008 at 850.239 million barrels compared to 742.079 million in 2007. Exports were also up 13.3% from 2007 to 2008. However total production dropped for the last three months of 2008. The country has never reached pre-war levels either. Today the country averages between 2.3-2.4 million barrels a day in overall production, but before 2003 it produced 2.58 million.

The continual fluctuations in oil production and the low prices have big implications for Iraq’s immediate future. This year 85% of Iraq’s revenues are expected to come from petroleum. The 2009 budget, which was just passed by parliament, is based upon a $50 a barrel price for oil and 2 million barrels a day of exports. With prices low and production not going up any time soon, that means running a deficit, which could be up to $30 billion out of a $58.6 billion budget. The Finance Minister says that it will use its savings to cover the difference, but it only has around $35 billion. That would mean depleting almost its entire account for one budget, with no guarantees that in 2010 there would not be similar problems unless the world economy recovers. For this reason, the Finance Ministry is also considering floating $5 billion in government bonds to help fund projects. On the other hand, the Oil Ministry has been desperately trying to sign contracts with foreign countries to increase production. Some service deals have been signed, but the major international oil companies have not come to an agreement with Baghdad yet, and are arguing over the terms of the contracts.

Iraq has no flexibility in its oil production. The government wants to bring in foreign companies to boost output and add needed know how and investment, but the negotiations have been inconclusive so far. That’s not soon enough however for Iraq’s 2009 budget which is based upon a higher price and export numbers than Iraq is now capable of. If Baghdad goes ahead with its budget it will be running a huge deficit that will affect all sectors of the country from the economy, which is largely state-run, to employment as the government is the largest employer. It might also influence the parliamentary elections scheduled for the end of the year as many of the winning parties in the January 2009 provincial elections promised better services. That may not be possible under the current budget and oil output.

SOURCES

Abdul-Zahra, Qassim, “Iraq passes sharply reduced budget for 2009,” Associated Press, 3/5/09

Associated Press, “Iraq’s oil exports down in February,” 3/3/09
- “Iraq’s oil exports inch up in January,” 2/1/09

Aswat al-Iraq, “GDP higher by 10.9 % in 2008,” 2/11/09

Al-Hashemi, Mostafa, “$25 billion surplus staves off financial crisis – Iraqi minister,” Azzaman, 2/2/09

Mackey, Peg, “Iraq to rely on own technicians to reverse output decline,” Reuters, 2/24/09

Madhani, Aamer, “Iraq’s economy sputters as oil prices drop,” USA Today, 1/28/09

Reuters, “Iraq’s Legal and Security Risks Still Frighten Firms,” 2/13/09
- “UPDATE 1-Iraq to issue 1st post-Saddam bonds for $5 bln,” 1/28/09

Robertson, Campbell and Glanz, James, “Falling Revenues Threaten Rebuilding and Stability in Iraq,” New York Times, 2/26/09

Ryan, Missy, “Falling Oil Price Could Hamper Iraqi Military,” Reuters, 2/9/09
- “Iraq must focus on reconstruction upkeep, U.S. says,” Reuters, 2/4/09

Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, “Quarterly Report and Semiannual Report to the United States Congress,” 1/30/09

Al-Tameemi, Alaa, “Parliament divided on 2009 budget,” Azzaman, 3/4/09

Thursday, March 5, 2009

Monthly Media Coverage of Iraq From February 2 To March 1, 2009

Iraq re-emerged in the U.S. media in February 2009, sort of. During the four weeks of the month Iraq was in the top ten stories according to the Pew Research Center’s Project for Excellence in Journalism twice. That happened in the first week, February 2 to 8 and the last February 23 to March 1. Also of note is the fact that Iraq broke into the top five stories in the country for the firs time since October 2008.

Iraq was in and out of the news in February 2009. In the opening week Iraq was the number four story in the country, but only received 2% of overall coverage. That was when the results of the provincial elections were finally announced. For the next two weeks however, February 9 to 15 and 16 to 22, the war disappeared from the headlines. From February 23 to March 1 Iraq re-emerged as the number 3 and number 10 stories. At number 3 was President Obama’s announcement that he would pull most American troops out of the country by the end of 2011, which garnered 6% of American news coverage. At number 10 were events in Iraq, which included the charges against Iraqi parliamentarian Mohammad al-Daini for involvement in a number of insurgent attacks including a bombing of the legislature in 2007, and the re-opening of the Iraqi Museum. That received 2% of all stories in the U.S. media.

The last time Iraq broke the top five stories in America was the week of October 6 to 12, 2008. At that time Iraq was at number 4 even though it was only 1% of all stories. That was the week that Christians were attacked in Mosul, and the U.S. and Iraq were negotiating a Status of Forces Agreement.

Overall, average American coverage of Iraq was up for February compared to the previous month, but about average for the last six months of 2008. In February the war averaged 2.5% of all U.S. media coverage. That was double the amount of reporting in January when Iraq only received 1.25%. February matched the last six months of 2008 when it was between 2-3% of all stories. That is still below the average of 2007 when the war was 25% of the news and was consistently in the top five. If not for the President’s speech on his new Iraq policy, the topic might have dropped off the radar for the rest of the month. The coverage shows that only big events such as elections and announcements from Washington will get the American media’s attention, because it is spending most of its time on the current economic crisis and the new Obama administration.

SOURCES

Baker, Peter, “With Pledges to Troops and Iraqis, Obama Details Pullout,” New York Times, 2/27/09

Meyers, Steven Lee, “Iraq Museum Reopens Six Years After Looting,” New York Times, 2/23/09

Mohammed, Riyadh, “Election Results: Who’s Up, Who’s Down,” Baghdad Bureau Blog, New York Times, 2/6/09

Pew Research center’s Project for Excellence in Journalism, “PEJ News Coverage Index: Feb. 2-8, 2009, The News Narrative Turns Bearish On Obama,” 2/9/09
- “PEJ News Coverage Index: Feb. 9-15, 2009, Stimulus Success Shifts The Storyline,” 2/17/09
- “PEJ News Coverage Index: February 16-22, 2009, Fresh Challenges, New Debates Drive A Grim Economy Story,” 2/23/09
- “PEJ News Coverage Index: February 23-March 1, 2009, The New Obama Narrative: “Change” Was An Understatement,” 3/4/09

Santora, “Iraqi Lawmaker Is Charged With Masterminding an Attack on Parliament,” New York Times, 2/22/09

KRG Elects New Speaker of Parliament Increasing KDP-PUK Divide

   On November 4 the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) was able to elect a new speaker of parliament two years after election...