New Opinion Poll of Iraqis

In mid-March 2009 the BBC, ABC, and NHK news departments released their latest public opinion poll of Iraqis. This was the seventh one they have conducted. A Turkish and an American company interviewed 2,228 Iraqis in person in February 2009. The questions were about security, services, the government, society, sectarianism, and the recent January 2009 provincial elections. A majority of Iraqis thought that security and life in general were improving, but still had questions about the country such as the economy, services, and the competence of the government.

Life In General

The poll began by asking people what they thought about their life and community. 65% said they thought their life was good compared to 35% that said it was bad. That was a slight increase from the last survey conducted in March 2008 when 54% said things were good and 45% said they were bad. During 2007 60% of respondents thought life was going badly in Iraq, while in 2004 and 2005 70% or more thought things were well. When broken down by group Shiites and Kurds had the most positive outlook on their lives, while Sunnis were split 50-50. That was an improvement however, because in the March 2008 poll only 34% of Sunnis said things were good.

When asked how Iraq in general was doing 58% had a positive view saying things were going well, compared to 40% that thought not. That was the best response since the question was asked over five polls beginning in 2005. Similarly when questioned about how things had changed in the country in the last six months 52% said things had gotten better, 39% said things were the same, with only 8% saying it had gotten worse. That was a dramatic turnaround from March 2008 and August 2007 when the same question was asked. In March only 36% said things were better. In August 2007 only 11% felt that way, while 61% thought things were worse.

When asked about the future, the majority of respondents had a favorable view as well. When questioned about how their area would be a year from now 65% said it would continue to be good, compared to 35% that said it would be bad. That was a huge increase from March 2008 when only 44% thought things would improve, but not up to the 2004 and 2005 levels when 70% and 71% respectively said things would be positive. When asked how their children's live would be, respondents weren't as optimistic with 44% saying it would be better, 26% saying it would be worse, and 29% claiming it would be about the same. Thoughts about the country overall were positive with 60% saying Iraq would be doing better within a year compared to 26% who said it would be the same, and only 12% who believed things would turn for the worse. Responses like that hadn't been seen since 2005 when 69% thought things would be better in a year, 11% though it would be the same, and 11% said the country would be worse off.

How are things in your life?

	Feb. 09	Mar. 08	Aug. 07	Feb. 07	2005	2004
Very Good	21%	13%	8%	8%	22%	13%
Quite Good	44%	41%	31%	31%	49%	57%
Quite Bad	19%	29%	34%	32%	18%	14%
Quite Bad	16%	16%	26%	28%	11%	15%
Refused/Don't know	-	-	-	-	1%	1%

By community comparing Feb. 09/March 08

	Kurds	Shiite	Sunni
Very Good	32%/24%	25%/14%	8%/7%
Quite Good	41%/49%	46%/48%	42%/27%
Quite Bad	23%/20%	16%/27%	23%/38%
Very Bad	4%/7%	13%/11%	28%/28%

How do you think Iraq is doing today?

	Feb. 09	Mar. 08	Aug. 07	Feb. 07	2005
Very Good	20%	7%	3%	4%	14%
Quite Good	38%	36%	19%	31%	30%
Quite Bad	25%	36%	40%	35%	23%
Quite Bad	15%	20%	38%	31%	30%
Refused/Don't know	-	1%	-	-	3%

In the last six months how has the situation in Iraq changed?

	Feb. 09	Mar. 08	Aug. 07
Became better	52%	36%	11%
Became worse	8%	26%	61%
Stayed the same	39%	37%	28%

What is your expectation for how things overall in your area will be a year from now?

	Feb. 09	Mar. 08	Aug. 07	Feb. 07	2005	2004
Very Good	21%	13%	8%	8%	22%	13%
Quite Good	44%	41%	31%	31%	49%	57%
Quite Bad	19%	29%	34%	32%	18%	14%
Quite Bad	16%	16%	26%	28%	11%	15%
Refused/Don't know	-	-	-	-	1%	1%

How will your children's life be?

	Feb. 09	March 08	Aug. 07	Feb. 07
Better	44%	39%	33%	42%
Worse	26%	28%	42%	37%
About the same	29%	31%	25%	21%
Refused/don't now	2%	1%	-	-

How do you think Iraq will be doing a year from now?

	Feb. 09	Mar. 08	Aug. 07	Feb. 07	2005
Much Better	30%	14%	4%	14%	41%
Somewhat Better	30%	32%	19%	26%	28%
About the Same	26%	33%	35%	26%	11%
Somewhat Worse	10%	13%	25%	21%	6%
Much Worse	2%	7%	17%	13%	5%
Refused/Don't know	2%	2%	-	-	-

Security

The positive view of life in Iraq and its future is largely due to the improved security situation. 85% of Iraqis said they thought security in their area was good. That was a huge increase from 62% in March 2008 and 43% in August 2007. Most thought that security had also improved or stayed the same in their area over the last six months. When asked about their personal safety in their neighborhoods 59% said they felt very safe, 35% said not very safe, and 6% said not safe at all. That was a reversal of the March 2008 numbers when 37% said they felt very safe, and 53% said not very safe. Positive numbers had not really been seen since 2005 when 63% said they felt very safe, and 30% said not very safe.

The improved security situation was also shown when Iraqis were asked whether they had personally encountered violence in their life. Overall, around 40% of respondents from 2007 on had some kind of situation happen in their area. By February 2009 the number were down in every category. 18% for example had seen a car bomb or suicide attack compared to 35% in March 2008 and 32% in September 2007. 18% had witnessed sectarian fighting, compared to 35% in March 2008, and 27% in September 2007. What was still high was kidnappings, which were usually done for profit with 32% saying they had seen it, down from 45% in March 2008 and 40% in September 2007, but up from 25% in February 2007. Seeing abuses by Iraqi and American forces were also down.

The two slight exceptions were when Iraqis were asked about the future of the security situation, and their freedom to move and live where they wanted. On those questions people seemed a little apprehensive, but still positive. 74% of those that said the security situation was better thought that it would stay that way in the future, compared to 21% that were not confident. That was down however from March 2008 when 82% said they were confident. When asked could they go where they wanted 74% said they felt safe, and 25% said not. That trend began in March 2008 when 44% said the situation was good, and 56% said it was bad. In February and August 2007 the answers were only 24% and 25% good respectively. When Iraqis were questioned about whether they thought they could live where they wanted without persecution however, things were more mixed. 43% said they felt good, compared to 56% who felt bad. That was only a slight change from March 2008 when 40% felt good about being able to live where they wanted, compared to 60% who felt the situation was bad. That was a big improvement from 2007 however when only 23% felt good.

Security in your neighborhood

	Feb. 09	Mar. 08	Aug. 07	Feb. 07	2005	2004
Very good	46%	20%	15%	17%	31%	20%
Quite good	39%	42%	28%	30%	30%	29%
Quite bad	14%	27%	24%	21%	17%	21%
Very bad	1%	12%	32%	32%	21%	29%
Refused/Don't know		-		-	1%	1%

Last six months has the security situation in your area changed?

	Feb. 09	Mar. 08	Aug. 07
Became better	50%	46%	24%
Became worse	3%	17%	31%
Stayed the same	47%	36%	45%
Refused/Don't know	-	1%	-

How safe do you feel in your neighborhood?

	Feb. 09	Mar. 08	Aug. 07	Feb. 07	2005	2004
Very safe	59%	37%	26%	26%	63%	40%
Not very safe	35%	53%	47%	41%	30%	40%
Not safe at all	6%	10%	28%	33%	6%	18%
Refused/Don't know	-	-	-	-	1%	3%

Which of the following have occurred near you?

Car bombs/suicide attacks	Have occurred near you	Have not occurred by you
Feb. 09	18%	82%
March 08	35%	64%
Sep. 07	32%	68%
Sniper, crossfire	Have occurred near you	Have not occurred by you
Feb. 09	21%	79%
March 08	34%	66%
Sep. 07	30%	70%
Feb. 07	30%	70%
Sectarian fighting	Have occurred near you	Have not occurred by you
Feb. 09	18%	82%
March 08	35%	64%
Sep. 07	27%	72%
Feb. 07	25%	75%
Kidnapping	Have occurred near you	Have not occurred by you
Feb. 09	32%	68%
March 08	45%	54%
Sep. 07	40%	59%
Feb. 07	25%	75%
Fighting between government and insurgents	Have occurred near you	Have not occurred by you
Feb. 09	20%	79%
March 08	37%	62%
Sep. 07	34%	66%
Feb. 07	34%	66%
Unnecessary violence against citizens by U.S. of Coalition	Have occurred near you	Have not occurred by you
Feb. 09	25%	74%
March 08	42%	57%
Sep. 07	41%	57%
Feb. 07	44%	55%
Unnecessary violence against citizens by Iraqi police	Have occurred near you	Have not occurred by you
Feb. 09	17%	83%
March 08	20%	79%
Sep. 07	21%	79%
Feb. 07	24%	76%
Unnecessary violence against citizens by Iraqi Army	Have occurred near you	Have not occurred by you
Feb. 09	18%	81%
March 08	20%	79%
Sep. 07	19%	81%
Feb. 07	24%	76%
Unnecessary violence against citizens by militias	Have occurred near you	Have not occurred by you
Feb. 09	18%	81%
March 08	36%	63%
Sep. 07	30%	70%
Feb. 07	31%	69%
Assassination or attempted assassination	Have occurred near you	Have not occurred by you
Feb. 09	22%	78%

If the security situation has improved do you think it will stay that way?

	Feb. 09	March 08
Very confident	30%	32%
Somewhat confident	44%	50%
Not so confident	19%	15%
Not all confident	2%	-

Freedom of movement in your neighborhood

	Feb. 09	Mar. 08	Aug. 07	Feb. 07
Very good	28%	21%	8%	8%
Quite good	46%	23%	17%	16%
Quite bad	19%	29%	32%	40%
Very bad	6%	27%	42%	35%
Refused/Don't know	1%	-	-	-

How do you feel about your freedom to live where you want without persecution in your neighborhood?

	Feb. 09	Mar. 08	Aug. 07	Feb. 07
Very good	12%	16%	8%	8%
Quite good	31%	24%	15%	15%
Quite bad	36%	32%	32%	39%
Very bad	20%	28%	45%	38%
Refused/Don't know	1%	-	-	-

Economy and Services

When asked what was the biggest problem facing them in their own lives, economic issues outweighed security ones, something that was noted in the March 2008 poll. The top five personal concerns in the recent survey were high prices 9%, no jobs 9%, crime 5%, terrorist attacks 5%, economic problems 5%, lack of services 5%, and poor electricity 5%. That compared to the March 2008 survey where the top concerns were electricity 11%, no jobs 10%, high prices 6%, lack of security 6%, social disintegration 5%, fuel shortages 5%, and the U.S. occupation 5%. Some of the top concerns were thus the same, but just changed in importance, and security and the U.S. were more important.

What is the biggest problem you face?

February 2009 – Top 5
1.	High prices	9%
2.	No jobs/unemployment	9%
3.	Common crime	5%
3.	Terrorist attacks	5%
3.	Economic problems	5%
3.	Lack of goods and services/problems with food rations	5%
3.	Poor electricity supply	5%
March 2008
1.	Poor electricity supply	11%
2.	No jobs/unemployment	10%
3.	High prices	6%
3.	Lack of security	6%
5.	Can't trust people/social disintegration	5%
5.	Fuel shortages	5%
5.	U.S. occupation	5%

When asked about individual issues in their neighborhood, the situation was mixed. Jobs, electricity, water, and health care were felt to be inadequate, while education, basic needs, crime prevention, general economic situation, and fuel supply were good. 34% said access to jobs in their area was good, compared to 66% who thought it was bad. That was up from the March 2008 and 2007 polls, but not as high as 38% recorded in 2005. Similar numbers were found for electricity supply with 37% saying it was good, and 62% saying it was bad. That was the best response since 2005 however. In August 2007 positive responses were in single digits. 38% said the water situation was good, compared to 61% who said it was bad, which was similar to March 2008 responses. Medical care was also seen as inadequate with 40% saying it was good, 60% saying it was bad. Schools were seen as doing much better with 64% saying they were good, and 35% saying they were bad. Basic needs were also being met with 62% saying the situation was positive, 39% saying it was negative. 78% said they felt protected from crime, 60% said their family's general economic situation was good, and 67% said they had good access to fuel. Those were all improvements from March 2008 with the last having the largest increase.

Iraqis were also divided on how things had gone over the last six months. 33% said things had gotten better for their family economically over that period, 23% said things were worse, and 44% said things had stayed the same. Only 14% said the job situation had changed for the better, compared to 35% who said it was worse, and 50% who said it had stayed the same. Those were almost the exact same responses found in March 2008.

Jobs in your neighborhood

	Feb. 09	Mar. 08	Aug. 07	Feb. 07	2005	2004
Very good	7%	7%	4%	3%	11%	7%
Quite good	27%	22%	17%	17%	27%	19%
Quite bad	32%	35%	37%	44%	23%	23%
Very bad	34%	35%	43%	35%	34%	46%
Refused/Don't know	-	1%	-	-	5%	6%

Electricity in your neighborhood

	Feb. 09	Mar. 08	Aug. 07	Feb. 07	2005	2004
Very good	7%	1%	2%	2%	11%	8%
Quite good	30%	11%	6%	11%	35%	27%
Quite bad	32%	43%	35%	37%	30%	28%
Very bad	30%	45%	58%	51%	25%	37%
Refused/Don't know	-	-	-	-	1%	1%

Clean water in your neighborhood

	Feb. 09	Mar. 08	Aug. 07	Feb. 07	2005	2004
Very good	13%	8%	9%	9%	19%	20%
Quite good	25%	23%	16%	22	39%	31%
Quite bad	29%	37%	35%	35%	27%	22%
Very bad	32%	31%	40%	34%	15%	26%
Refused/Don't know	-	1%	-	-	-	1%

Medical care in your neighborhood

	Feb. 09	Mar. 08	Aug. 07		Feb. 07	2005		2004
Very good	14%	10%	9%	8%			27%		17%
Quite good	26%	27%	23%	23%			35%		34%
Quite bad	28%	32%	37%	35%			23%		24%
Very bad	32%	30%	30%	34%			13%		22%
Refused/Don't know	-	-	-	-			2%		3%

Schools in your neighborhood

	Feb. 09	Mar. 08	Aug. 07	Feb. 07	2005	2004
Very good	18%	15%	15%	12%	43%	37%
Quite good	46%	48%	36%	31%	31%	35%
Quite bad	28%	29%	30%	35%	17%	15%
Very bad	7%	8%	19%	21%	7%	11%
Refused/Don't know	-	1%	-	-	1%	3%

Availability of basic needs in your neighborhood

	Feb. 09	Mar. 08	Aug. 07	Feb. 07	2005	2004
Very good	18%	19%	9%	8%	22%	18%
Quite good	44%	46%	30%	30%	38%	38%
Quite bad	25%	27%	34%	39%	23%	24%
Very bad	14%	8%	27%	23%	15%	17%
Refused/Don't know	-	-	-	-	2%	2%

Protection from crime in your neighborhood

	Feb. 09	Mar. 08	Aug. 07	Feb. 07	2005	2004
Very good	24%	19%	13%	14%	33%	21%
Quite good	54%	35%	22%	26%	33%	31%
Quite bad	17%	28%	28%	32%	19%	20%
Very bad	4%	18%	37%	28%	14%	23%
Refused/Don't know		-		-	1%	4%

Family's economic situation

	Feb. 09	Mar. 08	Aug. 07	Feb. 07	2005
Very good	19%	15%	7%	7%	22%
Quite good	41%	42%	30%	29%	48%
Quite bad	23%	27%	37%	41%	20%
Very bad	17%	16%	26%	23%	10%
Refused/Don't know	-	-	-	-	1%

Availability of fuel for cooking and driving

	Feb. 09	March 08	Aug. 07	Feb. 07
Very good	26%	2%	1%	1%
Quite good	41%	17%	8%	11%
Quite bad	24%	40%	33%	40%
Very bad	8%	41%	59%	48%
Refused/Don't know	-	-	-	-

In the past six months how has your family's economic situation changed?

	Feb. 09	March 08
Became better	33%	31%
Became worse	23%	24%
Stayed the same	44%	45%
Refused/Don't know	-	1%

In the last six months how has the job situation changed?

	Feb. 09	March 08
Became better	14%	18%
Became worse	35%	35%
Stayed the same	50%	46%
Refused/Don't know	-	1%

The government was seen as the main provider of services compared to others, but they were not believed to be competent. Only 16% said the national government was doing a good job providing services, compared to 67% who said they were doing something to little. 17% said they were doing nothing at all. The provincial governments did a little better with 15% saying they did a great deal, 73% saying they did something to a little, and 11% saying nothing at all. After that the Sons of Iraq, Awakenings, foreign aid groups, and the U.S. and Iraqi security forces were grouped together. For all those 9% said they were doing a great deal. Last were mosques and religious charities at 6% who thought they were doing a lot, and militias at 5%.

How is each group doing providing services to your neighborhood?

	National Government	Provincial Government	Sons of Iraq/ Awakening	Militia	Mosque/ Religious charity	Foreign aid	U.S.-Iraqi security forces
A great deal	16%	15%	9%	5%	6%	9%	9%
Some	37%	39%	18%	11%	24%	11%	24%
A little	30%	34%	24%	17%	30%	25%	27%
Nothing at all	17%	11%	45%	64%	38%	53%	38%
Refused/Don't know	-	1%	4%	4%	2%	2%	2%

When questioned about the biggest problems facing the entire country, security and the U.S. presence were still at the top of the list, the same as in March 2008. The top issues were lack of security 8%, terrorist attacks 7%, the U.S. occupation 7%, civil war 6%, ethnic/religious tensions 6%, economic problems 6%, high prices 6%, and a weak government/political instability 6%. Those closely followed the March responses, which were lack of security 13%, terrorist attacks 12%, sectarian violence 7%, civil war 6%, ethnic/religious tensions 6%, and the U.S. occupation 6%.

What is the biggest problem Iraq is facing?

Feb. 09
1.	Lack of security	8%
2.	Terrorist attacks	7%
2.	U.S. occupation	7%
4.	War/civil war	6%
4.	Ethnic/religious tensions	6%
4.	Economic problems	6%
4.	High prices	6%
4.	Political instability/weak government/bad leaders	6%
March 08
1.	Lack of security	13%
2.	Terrorist attacks	12%
3.	Sectarian violence	7%
4.	War/civil war	6%
4.	Ethnic/religious tensions	6%
4.	U.S. occupation	6%

Government, Groups, and Provincial Elections

As shown in the recent provincial elections, Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki is riding on a wave of popularity. 55% said they approved of his performance, his highest rating over four surveys. Views on him amassing power were mixed however with 41% saying he had too much, 25% saying he had too little, and 31% thinking he had the right amount. Opinions of the Iraqi parliament weren't as positive, and actually declined from the March 2008 poll. 47% said the parliament was willing to pass an oil law, down from 53% in March 2008, 46% said they were promoting reconciliation, down from 48%, and 38% said they were willing to fight corruption, down from 46%. Local governments were seen in a much better light with 59% saying they were doing a good job, compared to 40% saying they were bad. That was the highest rating since ABC, BBC, and the NHK started conducting the polls.

Thoughts on Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki?

	Feb. 09	Mar. 08	Aug. 07	Feb. 07
Approve	55%	40%	33%	43%
Disapprove	43%	58%	66%	57%
Refused/Don't know	2%	2%	1%	-

What do you think about Maliki's power?

Feb. 09
Too much power	41%
Too little power	25%
Right amount of power	31%
Refused/Don't know	3%

Opinions of Iraqi parliament

Sharing oil wealth with all parts of the country

	Feb. 09	March 08
Willing	47%	53%
Not willing	51%	46%
Refused/Don't know	2%	1%

Promoting reconciliation

	Feb. 09	March 08
Willing	46%	48%
Not willing	53%	51%
Refused/Don't know	1%	1%

Fighting corruption

	Feb. 09	March 08
Willing	38%	46%
Not willing	61%	53%
Refused/Don't know	1%	1%

Government in your neighborhood

	Feb. 09	Mar. 08	Aug. 07	Feb. 07	2005	2004
Very good	16%	11%	11%	12%	21%	18%
Quite good	43%	35%	28%	31%	30%	32%
Quite bad	25%	33%	32%	31%	24%	20%
Very bad	15%	21%	29%	26%	18%	18%
Refused/Don't know	-	1%	-	-	7%	12%

When asked their opinions on groups in Iraq, the security forces rated the best, with militias doing the worst. 73% said they had confidence in the Iraqi Army, and 74% said the same about the police. That was followed by the legal system 68%, the national government 61%, community leaders 44%, and Awakening councils 43%. The U.S. at 26%, and local militias with 18% were at the bottom. 67% also said that the security forces were loyal to the country. 30% said they followed individual factions. There was also suspicions about religious groups with 44% said they had too much power.

How do you feel about each group?

Iraqi Army

	Feb. 09	Mar. 08	Aug. 07	Feb. 07	2005	2004	2003
Great deal of confidence	37%	28%	23%	24%	36%	18%	13%
Quite a lot of confidence	36%	37%	43%	37%	31%	38%	25%
Not very much confidence	24%	24%	21%	25%	18%	25%	29%
None at all	3%	11%	12%	14%	12%	10%	16%
Refused/Don't know	-	-	-	-	3%	9%	17%

Iraqi police

	Feb. 09	March 08	Aug. 07	Feb. 07	2005	2004	2003
Great deal of confidence	36%	33%	33%	32%	38%	26%	18%
Quite a lot of confidence	38%	34%	36%	32%	31%	41%	28%
Not very much confidence	20%	20%	17%	16%	18%	20%	30%
None at all	5%	13%	15%	20%	12%	8%	15%
Refused/Don't know	-	1%	-	-	2%	4%	10%

U.S. military

	Feb. 09	Mar. 08	Aug. 07	Feb. 07	2005	2004	2003
Great deal of confidence	12%	4%	4%	6%	7%	8%	7%
Quite a lot of confidence	14%	16%	11%	12%	11%	17%	12%
Not very much confidence	28%	33%	27%	30%	23%	23%	20%
None at all	45%	46%	58%	52%	55%	43%	52%
Refused/Don't know	1%	1%	-	-	5%	8%	9%

Community leaders

	Feb. 09	Mar. 08	Aug. 07	Feb. 07	2005	2004	2003
Great deal of confidence	10%	12%	11%	11%	17%	17%	19%
Quite a lot of confidence	34%	35%	36%	34%	23%	34%	26%
Not very much confidence	33%	32%	34%	34%	29%	22%	21%
None at all	23%	20%	20%	21%	21%	16%	17%
Refused/Don't know	1%	1%	-	-	10%	12%	18%

National government

	Feb. 09	Mar. 08	Aug. 07	Feb. 07	2005
Great deal of confidence	26%	17%	11%	18%	23%
Quite a lot of confidence	35%	31%	28%	31%	30%
Not very much confidence	26%	26%	31%	27%	25%
None at all	13%	25%	30%	24%	16%
Refused/Don't know	1%	1%	-	-	6%

Local militia

	Feb. 09	Mar. 08	Aug. 07	Feb. 07
Great deal of confidence	4%	7%	11%	16%
Quite a lot of confidence	14%	15%	13%	20%
Not very much confidence	25%	24%	26%	26%
None at all	56%	47%	43%	38%
Refused/Don't know	1%	8%	8%	-

Awakening Council

	Feb. 09	Mar. 08
Great deal of confidence	15%	16%
Quite a lot of confidence	28%	40%
Not very much confidence	28%	27%
None at all	25%	9%
Refused/Don't know	4%	7%

Legal system

	Feb. 09
Great deal of confidence	28%
Quite a lot of confidence	40%
Not very much confidence	24%
None at all	8%
Refused/Don't know	1%

Who are the Iraqi security forces loyal to?

	Feb. 09
Loyal to individual factions	30%
Loyal to Iraq	67%
Refused/Don't know	2%

Opinion on role of religious groups in society

	Feb. 09
Too much	44%
Too little	29%
The right amount	26%
Refused/Don't know	2%

When asked about Iraq's governmental system, a strong central authority and democracy seem to have taken hold. 70% said Iraq power should be centered in the capital. 20% believed in regional governments, while 7% thought Iraq should break apart into separate states. Since 2004 Iraqis have said they support power being based in Baghdad. A democratic system also received the highest mark with 64% supporting it. That was a large jump from February 2007 when only 43% believed in it. Next was an Islamic state at 19%, then a strongman at 14%. Regardless of what type of government they wanted, a majority also believed in voting.

How should Iraq be governed in the future?

	Feb. 09	Mar. 08	Aug. 07	Feb. 07	2005	2004
Unified Iraq under a central government	70%	66%	62%	58%	70%	79%
Regional governments	20%	23%	28%	28%	18%	14%
Separate independent states	7%	9%	9%	14%	9%	4%
Refused/Don't know	3%	1%	1%	-	3%	3%

Which political system would be best for Iraq?

	Feb. 09	Feb. 07	2005	2004
Strong leader for life	14%	34%	26%	28%
Islamic state	19%	22%	14%	21%
Democracy	64%	43%	57%	49%
Refused/Don't know	3%	-	3%	4%

Regardless of type of government you prefer, are you confident that voting can work in Iraq?

	Feb. 09
Very confident	28%
Somewhat confident	38%
Not so confident	25%
Not confident at all	7%
Refused/Don't know	2%

The January 2009 provincial elections also seem to have had a positive affect on the public. 43% said the election increased their confidence in voting. 47% also said they felt that they were free and fair, as opposed to 37% who said they were not. When asked how the elections would affect a variety of issues, all the results were positive. 56% said it would make the political situation better, 40% said it would improve cooperation amongst sectarian groups, 48% said it would help with security, 44% believed it would improve services, 45% thought it would improve the economy. The only issue that most did not think the elections would change were rights for women with 44% saying it would have no effect. One big change in the 2009 voting was that more Sunnis participated compared to the last ones in January 2005. Over two-thirds thought this was a positive development.

How did the Jan. 09 provincial elections affect your view of voting working in Iraq?

	Feb. 09
Increased confidence	43%
Decreased confidence	18%
Made no difference	37%
Refused/Don't know	2%

Opinion of Jan. 09 provincial elections

	Feb. 09
Were free and fair	47%
Were not free or fair	37%
Depends on province	14%
Refused/Don't know	3%

Effect of provincial elections on the following

Political situation

	Feb. 09
Better	56%
Worse	12%
No real effect	29%
Refused/Don't know	3%

Cooperation amongst sectarian groups

	Feb. 09
Better	40%
Worse	27%
No real effect	31%
Refused/Don't know	1%

Security

	Feb. 09
Better	48%
Worse	22%
No real effect	28%
Refused/Don't know	1%

Public services

	Feb. 09
Better	44%
Worse	26%
No real effect	28%
Refused/Don't know	2%

Economic opportunity

	Feb. 09
Better	45%
Worse	22%
No real effect	31%
Refused/Don't know	1%

Rights for women

	Feb. 09
Better	27%
Worse	26%
No real effect	44%
Refused/Don't know	3%

Opinion on more Sunnis participating in Jan. 09 provincial elections than Jan. 05 vote

	Feb. 09
Positive	67%
Negative	10%
No real effect	20%
Refused/Don't know	3%

Many Iraqis believed that the sectarian and ethnic tensions were improving in the country. 60% said relations between Shiites and Sunnis were excellent to good. 79% believed that Sunnis and Shiites would reconcile, with only 17% believing that they would separate.

Thoughts on Arab-Kurdish relations were not as positive, but still good with 53% believing in reconciliation, compared to 43% who believed separation was in the future. 44% thought relations between the two groups were excellent to good. Iraqis tended to oppose the Kurds' aspirations however. 78% for example said Kirkuk should not become part of Kurdistan. 58% thought that the Kurds would eventually declare independence, an idea that only 23% would support.

How are relations between Shiites and Sunnis today in Iraq?

	Feb. 09	March 08
Excellent	27%	9%
Good	33%	38%
Not so good	21%	33%
Poor	18%	19%

How are relations between Arabs and Kurds in Iraq today?

	Feb. 09	March 08
Excellent	20%	11%
Good	24%	31%
Not so good	29%	33%
Poor	26%	24%

What is in Iraq's future between Sunnis and Shiites?

	Feb. 09
Reconciliation	79%
Separation	17%
Refused/Don't know	3%

What is in the future for Arabs and Kurds?

	Feb. 09
Reconciliation	53%
Separation	43%
Refused/Don't know	4%

Should Kirkuk become part of Kurdistan?

	Feb. 09	Mar. 08
Should	20%	27%
Should not	78%	72%
Refused/Don't know	1%	1%

How likely is it that Kurdistan will declare independence?

	Feb. 09
Very likely	31%
Somewhat likely	27%
Somewhat unlikely	23%
Very unlikely	17%

Would you support or oppose Kurdish independence?

	Feb. 09
Support strongly	11%
Support somewhat	12%
Oppose somewhat	27%
Oppose strongly	48%

Finally, opinions on whether Iraq's refugees should return reversed from the earlier March 2008 poll. Then 45% said it as not time to return, as opposed to 54% who thought it was. In the newest poll 57% believed it was time, compared to 40% who said it was not.

Should Iraqi refugees return

	Feb. 09	Mar. 08
Yes	57%	45%
No	40%	54%
Refused/Don't know	3%	1%

Opinions Of The U.S. And Coalition

Iraqis did not have a positive view of the U.S. or the Coalition. The low opinion of the American presence has been recorded in other polls. The Pentagon's quarterly report to Congress on Iraq for example, has consistently reported that few Iraqis are willing to give the U.S. military credit for security in their area.

In the ABC, BBC, NHK poll 53% said that the Americans controlled Iraq compared to 32% who said it was the government. When asked about the job the U.S. and other Coalition forces had done in Iraq only 30% said it had been good, with 69% saying they had done a bad job. That was the highest positive mark since 2005 however. Opinions of the U.S. invasion are also mostly negative with 56% saying it was wrong, compared to 42% who thought it was right. That was a decrease from the March 2008 poll. In February 2007 and 2004 however, there were higher positive marks. This might be the reason why 62% believed that journalist Muntadar al-Zaidi was a hero for throwing his shoes at President Bush. Iraqis didn't seem impressed by new President Obama either with only 35% saying he would have a positive effect on Iraq. 19% thought he would make things worse, while 38% said he would make no difference.

Who controls things in Iraq?

	Feb. 09	Feb. 07	2005
Iraqi government	32%	34%	44%
U.S.	53%	59%	24%
Somebody else	9%	4%	17%
No one	3%	3%	6%
Refused/Don't know	3%	-	9%

Opinion on how the U.S. and other Coalition forces have done in Iraq

	Feb. 09	Mar. 08	Aug. 07	Feb. 07	2005
A very good job	11%	6%	3%	6%	10%
Quite a good job	19%	23%	15%	18%	27%
Quite a bad job	30%	35%	32%	30%	19%
A very bad job	39%	35%	48%	46%	40%
Refused/Don't know	1%	1%	1%	-	5%

Opinion of U.S. invasion

	Feb. 09	Mar. 08	Aug. 07	Feb. 07	2005	2004
Absolutely Right	19%	21%	12%	22%	19%	20%
Somewhat Right	23%	28%	25%	25%	28%	29%
Somewhat Wrong	28%	23%	28%	19%	17%	13%
Absolutely Wrong	28%	27%	35%	34%	33%	26%
Refused/Don't know	2%	-	-	-	4%	13%

What is your opinion of journalist Muntadar al-Zaidi who threw his shoe at President Bush

	Feb. 09
A hero	62%
A criminal	24%
Both equally	10%
Refused/Don't know	4%

How will President Obama affect Iraq

	Feb. 09
Better	35%
Worse	19%
No difference	38%
Depends	5%
Refused/Don't know	3%

Iraqis are also waiting for the U.S. to leave. 46% said the U.S. should leave before the 2011 deadline set by the Status of Forces Agreement. 59% thought that Iraqi forces were ready now to take over from the U.S. as well. Even so, there were some Iraqis who were worried about security after the U.S. left. 42% said they were concerned, compared to 57% who said they were not.

Should the U.S. leave before the 2011 deadline?

	Feb. 09
Leaver sooner than 2011	46%
Stay longer than 2011	16%
The timetable for withdrawal is right	35%
Refused/Don't know	2%

Are the Iraqi forces ready now to take over from the U.S.?

	Feb. 09
Ready	59%
Not Ready	40%
Refused/Don't know	1%

How concerned are you that security will worsen after the U.S. leaves?

	Feb. 09
Very concerned	7%
Somewhat concerned	35%
Not so concerned	36%
Not concerned at all	21%
Refused/Don't know	1%

The British who controlled southern Iraq fared no better with a few exceptions. 42% said they had a negative affect, compared to 36% who thought they were a positive influence. 19% said they did both good and bad. 57% said the Iraqi forces were ready to take over from the English. 57% also thought that the security situation would not change much after the British left. When asked about the British impact upon the south overall, there were mixed reviews. 47% thought they helped with long-term security compared to 49% who thought they were a hindrance. 51% did say that the British helped rebuilding the government and police of the region, but only 42% said they helped with reconstruction.

Opinion of British forces in the south

	Feb. 09
Generally positive	36%
Generally negative	42%
Some of both	19%
Refused/Don't know	3%

Are Iraqi forces ready to take over security in Basra from the British?

	Feb. 09
Ready	57%
Not ready	38%
Refused/Don't know	5%

How concerned are you that security in Basra will worsen after British leave

	Feb. 09
Very concerned	12%
Somewhat concerned	28%
Not so concerned	37%
Not concerned at all	20%
Refused/Don't know	2%

Opinion of British impact on each of the following:

Long-term security

	Feb. 09
Help	47%
Hindrance	49%
Refused/Don't know	4%

Rebuilding government and police in the south

	Feb. 09
Help	51%
Hindrance	47%
Refused/Don't know	3%

Rebuilding infrastructure

	Feb. 09
Help	42%
Hindrance	55%
Refused/Don't know	4%

Foreign Relations

Iraqis didn't seem to have a positive few of very many countries overall. Only Turkey garnered a positive view with 35%. Even then 30% had a negative view of it. All of the other countries asked about were seen as negative. Those included Russia, Saudi Arabia, Syria, and England. The U.S. at 64% and Iran at 68% had the most negative responses.

Opinion of role of each country

Russia

	Feb. 09	Feb. 07
Positive	18%	15%
Neutral	57%	72%
Negative	22%	13%

Saudi Arabia

	Feb. 09	Feb. 07
Positive	21%	20%
Neutral	45%	28%
Negative	32%	52%

Iran

	Feb. 09	Feb. 07
Positive	12%	17%
Neutral	19%	16%
Negative	68%	67%

Syria

	Feb. 09	Feb. 07
Positive	23%	7%
Neutral	38%	30%
Negative	38%	63%

Turkey

	Feb. 09	Feb. 07
Positive	35%	10%
Neutral	34%	44%
Negative	30%	46%

U.S.

	Feb. 09	Feb. 07
Positive	18%	12%
Neutral	17%	11%
Negative	64%	77%

Britain

	Feb. 09	Feb. 07
Positive	22%	11%
Neutral	18%	14%
Negative	59%	75%

Conclusion

This poll represents the new status quo in Iraq. The sectarian war of 2006-2007 is over. Violence is down. Iraqis feel much safer in their own neighborhood, although they are more apprehensive about the situation across the entire country. Still, the survey shows that many Iraqis feel that the situation is sustainable, and that the future holds promise. Economic issues have now eclipsed security as the most important issues for individuals when asked about their own neighborhoods. The U.S. and England have also set a date for withdrawal, something that is widely popular. Belief in a strong central government, and voting also appeared to have taken hold in the country. The two major complaints now appear to be about the government's inability to provide services, the economic outlook, and the claims of the Kurds for Kirkuk and possible independence.

SOURCES

BBC, ABC, NHK, “Iraq Poll February 2009,” 3/16/09

Department of Defense, “Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq,” December 2008

Iraq’s Contradictory Oil Plan

It’s been reported here several times before that Iraq has been pursuing its oil plans in a haphazard way. Baghdad’s latest moves are more proof of that. The government is now pursuing a dual track strategy that looks to be contradictory. On the one hand, the Oil Ministry has put up oil and gas fields for bidding by international oil companies. On the other hand, the government is offering contracts to Iraqi and foreign companies to begin service work and exploration on those same fields. The goal is to boost immediate production to make up for the declining price of oil, while setting up long-term development deals with multi-nationals. The plan seems contradictory as it would have companies begin to work on fields now that are up for bid by others.

Iraq is almost completely dependent upon oil to garner revenues. As noted before, the drop in oil prices has forced Iraq to cut its budget several times, and is still expected to run a large deficit. To try to make up for this gap the Oil Minister Hussain Shahristani is signing a number of service contracts to try to boost short-term production. In March 2009 the Oil Ministry signed a $250 million deal with a state-run engineering company to repair gas units at the Rumaila fields in the south. That followed a series of contracts signed in February. One was a $90 million joint venture formed between the Oil Ministry and the Mesopotamia Petroleum Company to drill 60 new wells per year in the south. The first explorations are to begin in Bazargan, Fakka, and Halfaya in a few months. Ramco Energy also signed a $400 million joint venture for drilling. They will first work with the state-owned oil companies, and then help the international firms that sign long-term production deals. The Korea National Oil Corporation signed a non-binding $3.55 billion contract to work on Qush Tappa, Sangaw, and six other fields in the south. British owned Foster Wheeler Energy Limited won a contract from the South Oil Company to work on offshore oil facilities in Basra.

The hope is that these moves will boost production by 500,000 barrels a day within two years. Before, Shahristani said that the Ministry was aiming for a 300,000-350,000 increase in two years. The Oil Ministry is also calling for the creation of an Iraqi National Oil Company and a Supreme Petroleum Council to coordinate these efforts. The National Oil Company will oversee oil work, while the Supreme Petroleum Council will be tasked with working out development strategy.

The problem is that Iraq is also courting major international oil companies to work on these same fields at the same time. On December 31, 2008 the first round of bidding on oil and gas fields began, followed by a second round in January 2009. These are 20 year, service agreements. The Oil Ministry is telling the corporations that they are expected to start work within six months of completing their contracts, which they hope to complete by June.

Trying to negotiation these deals couldn’t have come at a worse time. In 2008 when oil prices were high Iraq had the upper hand when dealing with the international oil companies. Now that prices have dropped the corporations know that countries like Iraq are desperate for funds and can drive harder deals to their advantage.

The Oil Ministry has already begun making concessions. In early February Shahristani traveled to Istanbul, Turkey to meet with 32 companies to try to work out details on the contracts. Originally Iraq was offering joint ventures where a state-run oil company would own 51% and the foreign firms 49%. Now the Ministry has said the corporations can have 75% of the joint ventures. Iraq has also lowered the production targets the companies have to meet before they start getting paid. Since oil firms are still unsure of the risks involved in investing, Iraq is likely to make more compromises in the future.

There are a number of issues that stand in the way of Iraq signing these long-term contracts. The largest impediment is the fact that Iraq’s parliament has not passed a new hydrocarbon law that has been stalled for years. Companies are afraid that their terms might change after the legislation is passed. An energy analyst writing for UPI doubted that Iraq would be successful in this dual track policy because it lacks qualified personnel. Since the U.S. invasion Iraq has had a massive brain drain, costing it much of its human capital. An official from Ramco Energy said many companies still do not want to do business in Iraq because they have not paid some companies for their work. The government bureaucracy is another major problem. Every little step needs to be okayed by higher ups that greatly delays any work. The Oil Ministry has also made arbitrary changes to deals. In September 2008 for example, Shell signed a joint venture with the South Gas Company to exploit Basra’s natural gas. Then in February Mitsubishi was added. Both of these were no-bid contracts, and Iraq’s parliament complained about the original Shell one because there was no transparency in the negotiations. The Middle East Economic Survey has criticized the Oil Ministry over these deals saying that they have not done a good job on them. The exact terms are unclear, they are too complicated, and the Iraqis are slow. Finally, in December 2008 the International Monetary Fund also said the government wasn’t doing enough to fight corruption in the oil sector.

Can Iraq balance all of its plans? It’s not clear whether the long-term oil deals will be completed by June 2009. Some of the short-term contracts already signed seem complimentary to that larger effort, while others do not. Iraq has vast oil and gas resources that have been underdeveloped because of wars and international sanctions. The recent dramatic drop in petroleum prices are putting tremendous pressure upon the Oil Ministry to increase output to fund the government, which is almost completely dependent upon oil. Since 2003 the Ministry has largely failed to meet its goals, which has forced it to reverse course and make dramatic changes in its strategy before. This latest effort seems to fit that pattern. This time Oil Minister Shahristani may be jeopardizing major oil exploration and development for immediate production increases.

SOURCES

Ciszuk, Samuel, “Government hopes two-pronged oil strategy will not discourage IOC investment in Iraq,” UPI, 3/5/09

Cockerill, Rob, “New offshore oil export facilities in Iraq,” Gas World.com, 2/23/09

Hoyos, Carola, “Iraq eases terms for oil projects,” Financial Times, 2/26/09

IraqDirectory.com, “Iraq is urging the oil companies to start working in oil fields to cancel their agreements,” 2/16/09

Kamal, Fatima, “Ministry relies on state-run engineering firm to boost oil exports,” Azzaman, 3/12/09

Koo, Hejin and Kang, Shinhye, Kang, “South Korea Signs $3.55 Billion Iraq Oil Field Accord,” Bloomberg, 2/24/09

Lando, Ben, “Iraqi oil meetings to start crucial, difficult year as ministry faces variety of critics,” UPI, 2/10/09

Mackey, Peg, “Iraq to rely on own technicians to reverse output decline,” Reuters, 2/24/09

Pagnamenta, Robin, “Shell among contenders to develop big Iraqi oilfields,” Times of London, 1/3/09

Rasheed, Ahmed, “UPDATE 4-UK firm gets 1st of possibly many Iraq well deals,” Reuters, 2/26/09

Reuters, “Hungry For Money, Iraq Seeks To Boost Oil Sales,” 3/1/09
- “Iraq’s Legal and Security Risks Still Frighten Firms,” 2/13/09

Salaheddin, Sinan, “Iraq to offer 10 fields in 2nd oil licensing round,” Associated Pres, 12/30/08
- “Iraqi official: Mitsubishi to join Iraq gas deal,” Associated Press, 2/12/09

Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, “Quarterly Report and Semiannual Report to the United States Congress,” 1/30/09

Webb, Simon, “Iraq Proposes to Improve Terms for Big Oil Deals,” Rigzone, 2/13/09

Webb, Tim, “Scotland’s Ramco Energy agrees joint Iraqi oil venture,” Guardian, 2/26/09

Iran’s Policy Towards Iraq

In the winter 2008 addition of the Middle East Policy Council Journal, Iranian academic Kayhan Barzegar published an article entitled, “Iran’s Foreign Policy in Post-invasion Iraq.” It was a refutation of many common ideas about Tehran’s stance towards Iraq held by Americans and westerners. Barzegar is a professor of international relations at Azad University in Tehran, who is currently at the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard. Barzegar argues that rather than being offensive and ideological in nature, Iran’s Iraq policy is historically based upon long-standing ideas about Iranian-Arab relations, defensive in response to the new American military presence, and pragmatic, taking advantage of new opportunities that have evolved since the overthrow of Saddam.

Iran’s Worldview

Iran’s worldview has a major impact on its policy towards Iraq. Iran has a long history of conflict and rivalry with the Arab world. Iranian nationalism also says that Iranians are different from Arabs. Together this has led to a common belief that Arabs will always oppose Iran. The period of Saddam’s rule only re-enforced this belief. At the same time pan-Islamic ideas exist that say Iran needs to be involved in the Islamic world. For the decade after the Iranian Revolution this meant trying to spread the ideals of Ayatollah Khomeini, but since the 1990s, Tehran has been trying to reach out to Arab countries in a friendlier manner. Both of these factors have led the Iranian leadership to want to increase ties with the new Iraqi government so that they don’t develop into a rival again, and ensure Iran’s place in the region.

Iran’s Immediate Concerns In Iraq

Iran also has several immediate concerns in Iraq that shape policy. These include security, the history of the Iran-Iraq War, cultural ties, and economics. All of these together lead to a pragmatic approach to Iraq to make sure that there will not be conflict between the two again, that there can be a free flow of people across the border, and an increase in business opportunities.

The first is security. Iran wants to ensure the unity of Iraq, which is divided between Kurds, Sunnis, and Shiites. A break-up of Iraq could destabilize Iran. Iran and Iraq have also been historical rivals, and many Iranians believe that it could return to this role in the future. There is therefore an urge to improve ties between the two so that this won’t happen anytime soon. The Iranian opposition group Mujahadeen e-Khalq is also based in Iraq, which Tehran wants to keep in check.

Second are the lingering affects of the Iran-Iraq War. Many Iranians want to make sure that they did not fight the war for nothing. This has led to popular support for good relations so that another war might be prevented. According to the United Nations Iraq also owes Iran $149 billion in reparations. This has not been brought up by Iran lately, but it is a domestic issue. There are on-going disputes about the border between the two countries as well. Either or both issues could lead to conflicts in the future.

Third, is the desire amongst many Iranians to have good cultural relations with Iraq. This is tied up with access to the Shiite shrines in Karbala and Najaf in Iraq. Thousands of Iranians cross the border every month to go to these holy sites. Large numbers of Iraqis also go to Iran to visit Mashhad and Qom. Having open borders is important so that people can access to these areas.

Fourth Iran sees tremendous potential for economic gain in Iraq. Before the U.S. invasion most of Iran’s trade was through Jordan, Turkey and Russia. Now that Saddam is gone Iran has increased trade, tourism, and energy connections with Iraq. In February 2009 for example, the two countries signed a number of Memorandums of Understanding on industry, electricity, trade, and housing. They have also signed a deal to develop joint border oil fields. Every month similar announcements are made as the economic connections between the two are increasing.

Conflict With The U.S.

Just as important for Iran’s policy in Iraq is its conflict with the United States. For the last several decades, security in the Middle East has been largely defined by outside powers. From the 1970s on the U.S. tried to play Iran off of Iraq. The 2003 invasion disrupted this balance of power, and the U.S. has been attempting to rebuild it ever since. Iran has been adamantly opposed to re-creating this system, preferring a friendly Iraq rather than a new enemy. This conflict over ideas about security is at the heart of the dispute between Iran and the U.S.

This has led Iran to see the U.S. moves in Iraq as a threat. Initially, Tehran was afraid of the Bush administration’s talk of pre-emptive strikes and regime change. Having permanent American bases in Iraq was another major concern. The U.S. then began to blame Iran for instability in Iraq. The U.S. also portrayed itself as the arbitrator between the various factions in Iraq, which Iranians perceived as an invitation for a long-term presence. Finally, the U.S. has been emphasizing that if it leaves Iraq pre-maturely Iran will fill the vacuum and change the balance of the Middle East. This has led the U.S. to pressure neighboring Arab countries to improve ties with Iraq to counter Iran. Since Iraq is now Iran’s number one foreign concern, it can’t live with an American position that is attempting to turn Baghdad against Tehran. It has thus rejected cooperation with the U.S. because they have diametrically opposed visions. This has meant Iranian policy is as much defensive as pragmatic.

Ties With Iraq’s Shiite Factions

To ensure their interests, Iran has tried to establish friendly ties with all three major Shiite factions in Iraq, the Islamic Dawa party, the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council (SIIC), and the Sadrists. Tehran’s main emphasis is upon relations with the government and the ruling parties. The Dawa and SIIC have long standing connections with Iran as many members lived in exile in Iran for years during the Saddam era. A lot of Shiites in the government also feel that they need Iranian support for now because the neighboring Sunni governments were none too friendly to Shiites taking power. It also allows for a counterweight to American influence.

Tehran also has ties with the Sadrists, but Barzegar believes this has been mostly tactical and short term to oppose the U.S. presence. The Sadrists are nationalists that have never expressed any desire for strategic relations with Iran. As the recent report by the Combating Terrorism Center revealed, many Sadrists saw aid from Iran as a marriage of convenience as well to gain weapons and money. The reason why the two cooperated was their mutual animosity at the American troop presence. The chances for long-term ties are therefore limited. In Basra for example, Iran supported various militia groups, but when the government launched its offensive against them in March 2008, Tehran stepped in to moderate the cease-fire rather than perpetuate the fighting because ties with Baghdad were more important than the Shiite gunmen. Iran will probably continue to work with factions that work with them such as the Special Groups, but it is not as important as Iran’s other concerns in Iraq.

Stance Towards Iraq’s Other Factions

Iran also has a policy towards Iraq’s nationalist, Sunni, and Kurdish parties. Tehran is not friendly with former Prime Minister Iyad Allawi. He is a former Baathist that would probably attempt stronger ties with Sunni countries. Tehran also believes that many Sunnis are still deeply anti-Iranian and want to make sure they do not create another Iran-Iraq rivalry. The Kurds have had friendly relations with Iran, but it is worried about Kurdish independence. Any Kurdish state could be pro-Israel and pro-American, which would be a strategic threat to Iran. Tehran has thus tried to balance the Sunni and Kurdish parties in the government with the Shiites.

Refuting American Views of Iran’s Policy

One of Barzegar’s major arguments is that Americans and westerners have misinterpreted Tehran’s policy in Iraq. Many believe that Iran is driven by ideology and is following an offensive program in Iraq. Supporters of this view point to Iran’s ties with the Sadrists. There has also been much written about emerging Shiite power with Iran in its lead. While its true that Iran’s ideals do play a role in its foreign policy, and that for a decade after the overthrow of the Shah Iran tried to promote its revolution in the region, Barzegar believes that Iran has become much more strategic and opportunistic in the last few years. The ability to form an ideological alliance with Iraq’s Shiites for example is unlikely as the SIIC, Dawa, and the Sadrists all have different views of Iraq’s future and their relationship with Iran.

Conclusion

Overall, Iran wants to confront the American presence in Iraq, while taking advantage of the opportunities presented by the post-Saddam environment. Rather than being driven by ideology, Iraq’s worldview, and immediate cultural, political, and economic concerns according to Barzegar are driving Iran’s policy. They want friendly relations with Baghdad to prevent another rivalry, the free flow of people across the Iran-Iraq border, to increase business ties, see the U.S. leave, and stop their plans of creating an anti-Iranian Iraq. Tehran has largely been successful in all of these endeavors. For example, the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) signed between the U.S. and Iraq includes a withdrawal date for U.S. troops, and a promise not to use Iraq as a base to attack its neighbors, two clauses that were supported by Iran. In the January 2009 provincial elections many American analysts said that Tehran was a loser because their allies the SIIC lost, but Maliki still wants a unified Iraq and friendly relations with Iran. Those both fit Iran’s strategic goals. The point being that both Barzegar and the Combating Terrorism Center report argue that Iran is not attached to any individual, Sadr, or party, the SIIC, but rather wants influence within the government no matter who is at the helm. If Barzegar is right, then the question now is if the new Obama administration can accept an Iraqi government that is both friendly with the U.S. and Iran, and find some common ground with Tehran. If not, Iran will continue to oppose the Americans in Iraq, and reject cooperation.

SOURCES

Aswat al-Iraq, “Iraq, Iran sign MoUs in different spheres,” 2/28/09

Barzegar, Kayhan, “Iran’s Foreign Policy in Post-invasion Iraq,” Middle East Policy Council Journal, Winter 2008

Eggen, Dan and DeYoung, Karen, “Senior Iraqi Leader Says Pact With U.S. Is Unlikely to Pass,” Washington Post, 10/30/08

Felter, Joseph and Fishman, Brian, “Iranian Strategy in Iraq, Politics and ‘Other Means,’” Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, 10/13/08

Hiltermann, Joost, “Iraq’s elections: winners, losers, and what’s next,” Global Democracy, 2/10/09

Peterson, Scott, “At Iraqi border outpost, signs of improving ties with Iran,” Christian Science Monitor, 12/22/08

Reuters, “Iraq says still at odds with Iran over border,” 3/9/09

Tehran Times, “Iran, Iraq ink energy cooperation deal,” 2/21/09

Zelikow, Philip, “The new strategic situation in Iraq,” Foreign Policy Online, 2/9/09

Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction’s “Hard Lessons” – Part I: Planning for Postwar Iraq September 2001 to May 2003

The first chapter of the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction’s “Hard Lessons” review of the U.S. effort to rebuild Iraq focuses upon the pre-war planning. That began in the fall of 2001 and went up right through the U.S. invasion. This period was characterized by three main trends. First, the Defense and State Departments had diametrically opposed views of what Iraq would be like after the war. Second, there was little to no coordination between the different groups working on post-war planning, even within the same agency. Finally, a best-case scenario was adopted as the operative model by the White House, which shaped all the subsequent planning.

Planning for the Iraq war began towards the end of 2001. On November 21, 2001 President Bush ordered Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld to review the Pentagon’s strategy for invading Iraq. Even before that in September, Rumsfeld had already begun working on the Iraq war plan. This led to the Defense and State Departments as well as the National Security Council to eventually begin thinking about post-war Iraq.

At that time Iraq was in a state of disrepair due to Saddam’s rule, the Gulf War, and international sanctions. After the Gulf War Saddam had tried to rebuild Iraq’s infrastructure but it wasn’t successful. The non-oil sector was hit especially hard. By the mid-1990s unemployment and underemployment were over 50%. Gross Domestic Product, which peaked at $74.9 billion in 1990, dropped to below $20 billion for the rest of the decade. Iraq, which was a middle class Arab country before the Gulf War, became a poor underdeveloped one afterwards. 60% of the population depended upon the government food rations system, which wasn’t able to stop malnutrition from occurring. This led to the United Nations’ Oil For Food Program in 1995. That was manipulated both by the government, the U.N., and criminal gangs, and led to massive corruption. One thing the program did provide was an intimate look into the Iraqi economy and its needs. Unfortunately, none of that was looked at by the United States before the invasion.

On September 29, 2001 Secretary Rumsfeld ordered an internal review of the invasion plans for Iraq. Almost all of the planning focused solely upon the military side of the operation, because the Pentagon believed that the State Department would deal with the post-war situation. On December 28 Rumsfeld briefed President Bush. The Secretary stressed three themes that he would stay with until he left office. He said that the invasion would be over fast and quick. Afterwards the U.S. would turn power over to Iraqis, and the American troops would be out quickly. One of Rumsfeld’s deputies Undersecretary of Defense Douglas Feith continually stressed that the U.S. was going to act as liberators not occupiers. That meant Iraqi sovereignty as soon as possible after the war. Rumsfeld and Feith both thought this would make the Iraqis deal with their own problems, and not get the U.S. caught up in nation building. To support their argument the Pentagon pointed to the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan. Following this model also meant that the U.S. would not be responsible for rebuilding Iraq.

The State Department developed a completely different point of view. They considered the sectarian divisions within Iraq, and believed that it would take years for the country to be rebuilt and stabilized. They also didn’t think that Iraq would be like Afghanistan or that Iraqi leaders would emerge after the invasion that could take over the country. Secretary of State Colin Powell famously told President Bush that if the U.S. invaded they would be the ones that would be left to pick up the pieces. Powell warned that there would be no government and no law and order, meaning that the Iraqis would be looking to the U.S. for leadership. This conflict between Defense and State shaped the pre-war planning on Iraq with the dispute never being resolved.

In early 2002 the State Department’s Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs created the Future of Iraq Project. It included 200 Iraqi exiles and experts, and was the largest study done within the government on Iraq. Its major drawbacks were that it was not an operational plan, but rather background information for the administration of Iraq, and was never presented to Secretary Powell as a counter to the Pentagon’s vision. The project was broken up into various working groups, some of which provided high quality material, while others never finished. The basic premise was that the U.S. was going to have to run Iraq after the war, and that this should be a civilian job with the goal of building up democratic institutions before Iraqis could take over. The Coalition Provisional Authority later took up this position.

In the spring of 2003 the White House became involved in Iraq planning when the National Security Council started holding meetings on the topic. In early 2003 the National Security Council’s Deputies bean holding twice-weekly conferences on Iraq. They came up with three alternatives for post-invasion Iraq. One was Iraqis quickly taking over, the second was military rule through the Central Command, and the third was a civilian government, perhaps under the United Nations. They also addressed three major concerns: security, reconstruction, and creating a pro-U.S. stable Iraq.

Which approach the United States would follow was not decided until August 2002. On August 29 the White House issued “Iraq: Goals, Objectives, Strategy.” It said that the U.S. was committed to overthrowing Saddam, and that it would work with Iraqi exiles to liberate Iraq, not occupy it. Those were wins for the Pentagon. However it did say that the U.S. would be involved in the reconstruction of Iraq, something the State Department stressed.

After the paper was released the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), the National Security Council, and the Pentagon increased their efforts. The JCS ordered the Central Command (CENTCOM) to begin planning for post-war Iraq. Two Army majors that worked in Bosnia were given the task. That went against the preferences of Rumsfeld who wanted the U.S. out as quickly as possible. National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice also had a steering group on Iraq created. Over at the Defense Department Undersecretary Feith created the Office of Special Plans. The major problem was that while work on Iraq was accelerating in the fall of 2002 none of it was coordinated, and there was little sharing of ideas and information. The compartmentalization of these different groups led to a highly disjointed set of ideas.

One example was the National Security Council’s (NSC) humanitarian group. Elliot Abrams and Robin Cleveland of the Office of Management and Budget led it. It was created in September 2002 with members from the Central Intelligence Agency, the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), the Joint Chiefs, the Defense, State, Treasure, Justice, and Commerce departments. They considered the effects of Iraq using chemical weapons, a possible refugee crisis, the U.N.’s Oil for Food program, and what targets not to hit during the war. It also wanted to get Iraq up and running as quickly as possible after the war ended. A major problem was that it had very little information about what Iraq was like. They knew that sanctions had hurt the country, but decided that its oil wealth would pay for any reconstruction. Just as important it had no interaction with the other NSC groups working on military, political, and democratization affairs.

Over at the Pentagon, planning was often vague and based upon best-case scenarios. Different officials were often told that there were plans for post-war security, but there were no actual meetings about it. The Defense Department also followed Rumsfeld’s belief that the war would be short, there would be little damage to Iraq in the process, the country’s oil would pay for everything, an Iraqi leader would emerge, and that would allow the U.S. a quick exit.

On October 15, 2001 Undersecretary Feith briefed the National Security Council on CENTCOM’s planning. They came up with three phases for postwar Iraq. First there would be military control. Second a U.S. civilian authority would take over, and then finally, Iraqi leaders would emerge and the U.S. would turn power over to them and then leave. The military had no timeline for how long this process would take. Feith also said that Rumsfeld should be in charge during this time, allowing for unity of command after the war. This idea led to interagency arguments that lasted for two months.

At the same time, the administration wanted to keep all their work secret. On October 18 for example, Rumsfeld asked Feith to create an official postwar planning office, but then rescinded that order shortly afterwards. That was because the White House had decided that the government could not openly plan for postwar Iraq when it had not declared war yet, and publicly said it was trying to avoid it.

Work continued with some of the most informative coming from the worst-case scenario papers. In October Rumsfeld, Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz, Feith, and the Joint Chiefs came up with a memo on 29 things that could go wrong in Iraq. Some of them were not finding weapons of mass destruction, sectarian fighting, not being able to find Saddam, Iraq breaking apart, the U.S. being there for 10 years, occupation costs skyrocketing, and world opinion turning against the war. Rumsfeld briefed the NSC and the president on this paper at a NSC meeting. In December Powell received a similar paper partially written by Ryan Crocker, the future U.S. ambassador to Iraq. It warned of a possible sectarian war for power that could lead to the dissolution of the country.

Outside and inside the government there were also warnings about what could happen in post-war Iraq. A review of the U.S.’s efforts at nation-building showed that of the sixteen countries the U.S. intervened in only four West Germany, Japan, Panama, and Grenada stayed democratic ten years after the U.S. left. Three, Cuba, Haiti, and Nicaragua got worse. Academics also noted that Iraq was not like Germany and Japan after World War II. Both were rich, developed, homogenous countries with bureaucracies. That was largely lacking in Iraq. The planning for the occupation of those two countries also started shortly after Pearl Harbor and took years to develop. The U.S. was trying to plan for Iraq on the fly. The National Intelligence Council released a paper in January 2003 that said setting up a democracy in Iraq would be a long and arduous process. In February the Army War College put out a report that said Iraq could fall into civil war because of the ethnic and sectarian divisions in the country, that the armed forces would have to be completely rebuilt, and that rebuilding the country would be a huge effort after the economy had been devastated by sanctions. It also warned that the longer the U.S. stayed, the more resistance would grow to their presence. These reports had little affect on planning however.

Overall the administration’s effort to deal with post-war Iraq was uncoordinated and fragmented. The National Security Council and Condoleezza Rice were supposed to manage policy, but State and Defense largely worked on their own. The various NSC planning groups acted separately as well. The NSC also did not consult with many key agencies until very late in the game. That meant there was no coherent strategy in the White House on what to do about Iraq after the war was over. Many including Secretary Powell, Undersecretary Feith, and a biography have blamed Rice for her weak leadership at the time, and said the administration was dysfunctional during this period. “Hard Lessons” believes part of that was due to the workings of the bureaucracy, but it also reflected the divisive views of the main decision makers. Rumsfeld for example, thought that the U.S. should be in and out of Iraq as quickly as possible, so the U.S. didn’t need to address any of the country’s big problems, while Powell predicted a long occupation. In the fall of 2002 the White House picked a mix of both views, but did not have a single, unified plan of how it was to work.

SOURCES

Collins, Joseph, “Choosing War: The Decision to Invade Iraq and Its Aftermath,” Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, April 2008

PBS Frontline, “INTERVIEWS Elisabeth Bumiller,” Bush’s War, 3/24/08
- “INTERVIEWS Karen DeYoung,” Bush’s War, 3/24/08

Ricks, Thomas, Fiasco, The American Military Adventure In Iraq, 2006

Ricks, Thomas and DeYoung, Karen, “Ex-Defense Official Assails Colleagues Over Run-Up to War,” Washington Post, 3/9/08

Special Inspector General For Iraq Reconstruction, “Hard Lessons,” 1/22/09

Woodward, Bob, State of Denial, Bush At War, Part III, 2006

The State Of Ninewa Province

As reported here before, Ninewa is about to go through an important political transition as the provincial council will pass from the hands of the Kurds to the new Al-Hadbaa List. The leader of Al-Hadbaa has said that he wants to develop the economy of the province by encouraging the private sector. He believes that there are ample resources that could make Ninewa prosper. Whether that’s possible or not is yet to be seen. What is known is that Ninewa rates worse in education, health, and a number of other fields when compared to the Iraqi average, and it is the second most violent province in the country.

Population and Territory

Ninewa is the third largest province in Iraq in area, and the second most populated. It has 2,811,091 people, 9% of the country’s total. Only Baghdad has more. The province is divided into eight districts, Baaj, Hamdaniya, Hatra, Mosul, Shikhan, Sinjar, Tel Afar, and Tilkaif. Mosul, the provincial capital is the third largest city in Iraq behind Baghdad and Basra. The population is also a mix of Arabs, Kurds, Christians, and other smaller religious minorities. Sinjar, Tilkaif, and Shikhan are also disputed territories that have parts that the Kurds claim. This is the source of one of the major disputes between Arabs and Kurds in the province, and country.

Ninewa’s Population
Total: 2,811,091
Shikhan: 49,396
Hatra: 55,157
Baaj: 133,291
Hamdaniya: 143,462
Tilkaif: 190,403
Sinjar: 237,073
Tel Afar: 382,050
Mosul: 1,620,259

Security

Security was worse in Ninewa in the second half of 2007 before improving in 2008. By June 2008 there were approximately 300 security incidents. That jumped to 375 in September, but then declined afterwards, leveling off at around 225 incidents by November. Deaths have had a slow and steady decline during that same time period. In June there were around 130 deaths. That increased to 150 in July, and was at 100 by the end of 2008. In October Christians were also attacked in Mosul, which led almost 2,000 families to flee. 80% of those have now returned. In total, Ninewa still has around 19,100 families that were displaced during the violence there.

Education

Ninewa province rates worse in education, especially amongst women, compared to the rest of the country. In Iraq, 24% of women are illiterate. In Ninewa it ranges from 23% in Hamdaniya to a high of 60% in Hatra. That’s mainly because so few women attend school. Overall, 47% of women over ten years old have less than a primary education in Iraq. Only the Hamdaniya district at 44% beats that national average. Otherwise the rate goes from 52% of women with less than a primary education in Mosul up to 90% in Hatra. The men of Ninewa only do slightly better. In Iraq 11% of males are illiterate, compared to 12% in Ninewa. Sinjar and Hatra have the most illiteracy for men at 25% and 37% respectively. 31% of men over 10 years old have less than a primary education in the country, but in Ninewa it’s at 41%. Hamdaniya does the best at 27%, but the other eight districts range from 37%-68%.

Women Over 10 Years Old With Less Than Primary Education
Iraq: 47%
Hamdaniya: 44%
Mosul: 52%
Baaj: 53%
Ninewa: 58%
Tel Afar: 66%
Sinjar: 72%
Shikhan: 74%
Tilkaif: 76%
Hatra: 90%

Illiterate Women:
Iraq: 24%
Hamdaniya: 23%
Mosul: 24%
Ninewa: 30%
Baaj: 30%
Tilkaif: 31%
Tel Afar: 32%
Shikhan: 48%
Sinjar: 57%
Hatra: 60%

Men Over 10 Years Old With Less Than Primary Education
Iraq: 31%
Hamdaniya: 27%
Mosul: 37%
Tel Afar: 45%
Baaj: 45%
Sinjar: 46%
Shikhan: 49%
Tilkaif: 54%
Hatra: 68%

Illiterate Men
Iraq: 11%
Mosul: 8%
Hamdaniya: 9%
Tilkaif: 10%
Tel Afar: 15%
Baaj: 19%
Shikhan: 19%
Sinjar: 25%
Hatra: 37%

Employment

Similarly women do far worse than men in finding employment in Ninewa and in the country. In Iraq only 18% of women are employed or looking for a job. In only one district, Hatra at 30%, does Ninewa do better than that. Otherwise anywhere from 3% of women are in the labor force in Baaj and Tilkaif to up to 10% in Mosul and Hamdaniya. Female unemployment is also much higher in Ninewa, 35%, compared to the rest of the country, 13%. Tilkaif has the lowest unemployment rate for women at 9%, and Tel Afar matches the country’s rate at 13%. The remaining six districts however have unemployment for women ranging from 14% in Hamdaniya up to 62% in Hatra. Even for men, there is high unemployment in areas, even though more males are involved in the labor force than in Iraq overall. 81% of Iraqi men participate in the labor force, compared to 85% in Ninewa. Baaj 90% and Hatra 91% have the high numbers. Unemployment is still slightly higher in Ninewa, 13%, than the national average, 12%. Tel Afar, 21%, Shikhan, 23%, and Hatra, 33%, have the most jobless men.

Female Labor Force Participation 15-64 Years Old
Iraq: 18%
Ninewa: 8%
Baaj: 3%
Tilkaif: 3%
Tel Afar: 5%
Shikhan: 6%
Sinjar: 6%
Mosul: 10%
Hamdaniya: 10%
Hatra: 30%

Female Unemployment
Iraq: 13%
Ninewa: 35%
Tilkaif: 9%
Tel Afar: 13%
Hamdaniya: 14%
Sinjar: 14%
Shikhan: 30%
Baaj: 36%
Mosul: 40%
Hatra: 62%

Male Labor Force Participation 15-64
Iraq: 81%
Ninewa: 85%
Sinjar: 78%
Tel Afar: 81%
Hamdaniya: 82%
Mosul: 86%
Shikhan: 86%
Tilkaif: 87%
Baaj: 90%
Hatra: 91%

Male Unemployment
Iraq: 12%
Ninewa: 13%
Baaj: 3%
Hamdaniya: 8%
Sinjar: 9%
Mosul: 12%
Tilkaif: 13%
Tel Afar: 21%
Shikhan: 23%
Hatra: 33%

Poverty

The lack of jobs has resulted in high rates of poverty in the province. 22% of Iraqis are in the lowest per capita income quintile. In Ninewa that ranges from 57% in Tel Afar down to 25% in Mosul.

% In Lowest Per Capita Income Quintile
Iraq: 22%
Mosul: 25
Sinjar: 27%
Hamdaniya: 36%
Baaj: 37%
Tilkaif: 40%
Shikhan: 49%
Hatra: 54%
Tel Afar: 57%

Services

Services like electricity and water, are also limited in Ninewa. 52% of Iraq has more than eleven hours of power cuts or are not connected to the national network. In Sinjar and Baaj 100% of the residents have more than 11-hour electricity outages, followed by Hamdaniya 93%, Tilkaif 80%, and Shikhan 76%. Many Iraqis rely upon private generators or buy electricity for those that do to supplement the national power grid. 21% of Iraqis however have no alternative source of power, compared to 57% in Ninewa. Access to the water network is also limited in some parts of the province. Only in Tilkaif is the entire district connected to the water system. Otherwise anywhere from 7% in Mosul and Shikhan up to 83% in Sinjar, 86% in Hatra, and 100% in Baaj do not have access.

More Than 11 Hours Power Cut Or No Connection To Network
Iraq: 52%
Hatra: 15%
Tel Afar: 26%
Mosul: 50%
Shikhan: 76%
Tilkaif: 80%
Hamdaniya: 93%
Sinjar: 100%
Baaj: 100%

No Alternative Electricity Source
Iraq: 21%
Mosul: 7%
Shikhan: 17%
Tilkaif: 32%
Baaj: 37%
Sinjar: 49%
Hamdaniya: 59%
Hatra: 81%
Tel Afar: 90%

Not Connected to Water Network
Iraq: 26%
Tilkaif: 0%
Mosul: 7%
Shikhan: 7%
Hamdaniya: 20%
Tel Afar: 53%
Sinjar: 83%
Hatra: 86%
Baaj: 100%

Food

The majority of Iraqis depend upon the government’s food ration system, which is the largest in the world. There is still malnutrition in Iraq however. 22% of Iraqis face chronic malnutrition. Shikhan does the best in this department with only 11% affected, followed by Hatra 20%, and Hamdaniya 22%, while Baaj 42%, Sinjar and Tel Afar at 48% each do the worst.

Chronic Malnutrition
Iraq: 22%
Shikhan: 11%
Hatra: 20%
Hamdaniya: 22%
Tilkaif: 26%
Mosul: 27%
Baaj: 42%
Sinjar: 48%
Tel Afar: 48%

SOURCES

Inter-Agency Information and Analysis Unit, “Ninewa Governorate Profile,” United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, February 2009

Kamal, Adel, “new ninawa governor: no possibility of Kurdish alliance,” Niqash, 2/24/09

Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, “Iraqi Christians Returning To Mosul,” 3/5/09

Reuters, “UN Says 1 Million Iraqis Lack Food,” 11/12/08

Maliki Says More Transparency Needed But Takes No Responsibility For Corruption

Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki recently met with the heads of satellite TV stations working in Iraq and talked to them about fighting corruption. Maliki said that the government needs greater transparency for its finances, a call that has been echoed by the main anti-corruption body the Integrity Committee. In February 2009 Judge Rahim al-Ogaili, the head of the Committee said that parliament needed to pass new anti-corruption legislation. He called for a law that would make officials disclose their finances if they had unusual amounts of money. Until then, there is Integrity Committee Law No. 55 that requires high-ranking officers to turn their financial records over to the Committee. Maliki just turned over his, the first time a prime minister had done so, along with 17 other high officials. More importantly, Judge al-Ogaili said his Committee is pushing for the end of Article 136 that requires ministers to okay any prosecutions of their workers. This has given ministers near veto power over any corruption investigation.

At the same meeting with TV heads, Maliki said that the corruption found in Iraq was due to Saddam. It’s true that there was a lot of theft and graft under the former regime. For example the United Nations’ Oil For Food program led to vast criminality. From officials and reports however, Iraq may now be even more corrupt. 2008 was supposed to be the year of fighting corruption, yet nothing happened according to the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction. The Ministry of Trade that runs the food ration system created by the Oil For Food program is still suspected of smuggling. Parliament’s Committee for Integrity has called for the ministry to be investigated, but Maliki has done nothing about it. The Prime Minister has also been accused of undermining the Integrity Committee when it was headed by Judge Rati al-Rathi, Judge al-Ogaili’s predecessor.

It’s important that the Prime Minister and other officials disclose their financial statements, and it’s equally good that the Integrity Committee wants to end the control of the ministers over prosecutions. At the same time, both Maliki and Judge al-Rathi seem to be driven by protecting Iraq’s image, rather than actually fighting corruption. Judge Rathi for one has said that corruption gives Iraq a bad image that deters foreign investment. His solution was to not talk about the problem. Maliki has blamed Saddam’s era before for graft. In doing so, he is denying responsibility for corruption in his own government. The Prime Minister also has a record for interfering in and stopping investigations into officials. Getting rid of Article 136 would be a huge step towards giving Iraq’s anti-corruption agencies the power to look into cases. At the same time, until the attitudes of those at the top change, there will probably be no increase in prosecutions.

SOURCES

Alsumaria, “Maliki: Government seeks to fight corruption,” 3/11/09

Aswat al-Iraq, “Iraq among countries with highest levels of corruption – report,” 9/23/08

Brinkley, Joel, “Iraq quietly tackles rampant corruption,” San Francisco Chronicle, 1/24/09

al-Fadhily, Ali and Jamail, Dahr, “Corruption eats into Iraq food rations,” Middle East Online, 5/12/08

Flahert, Anne, “Ex-officials: Bush admin. ignored Iraq corruption,” Associated Press, 5/13/08

Human Rights Watch, “The Quality of Justice, Failings of Iraq’s Central Criminal Court,” December 2008

Lynch, Colum, “Oil-for-Food Panel Rebukes Annan, Cites Corruption,” Washington Post, 9/8/05

Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, “Iraq Seeks Financial Disclosure Law To Fight Corruption,” 2/21/09
- “Iraqi Officials Declare Financial Assets,” 3/5/09

Rosett, Claudia, “Iraq and the Importance of the U.N.’s Oil-food-Food Scandal,” Middle East Forum, 5/3/05

Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, “Quarterly Report and Semiannual Report to the United States Congress,” 1/30/09