Review Timothy Andrews Sayle, Engel, Jeffrey, Brands, Hal and Inboden, William, Edited by, The Last Card, Inside George W. Bush’s Decision To Surge In Iraq, Cornell University Press, 2019

Sayle, Timothy Andrews, Engel, Jeffrey, Brands, Hal and Inboden, William, Edited by, The Last Card, Inside George W. Bush’s Decision To Surge In Iraq, Cornell University Press, 2019

 

The Last Card, Inside George W. Bush’s Decision To Surge In Iraq provides the most comprehensive view of how the Bush administration decided to order the Surge in 2007. It consists of two halves. The first is interviews with 28 members of the White House starting with President Bush himself along with Vice President Dick Cheney, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, and various members of the National Security Council, State Department, and Pentagon. The second part is a series of articles by academics trying to evaluate the decision making process and giving some views of whether the Surge worked or not. It’s those firsthand accounts of most of the major players within the government that makes this a must read for those interested in the Surge.

Review Expectation of Valor, Planning For The Iraqi War

Benson, Colonel Kevin, Expectation of Valor, Planning For The Iraqi War, Casemate, 2024

 

Colonel Kevin Benson who was the chief planner for the 3^rd Army wrote Expectation of Valor, Planning For The Iraqi War in response to the conventional wisdom that the U.S. military did not prepare for postwar Iraq in 2003. The author writes that the army did spend time coming up with ideas on how to secure and stabilize the country after the fall of Saddam. However he blames Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, General Tommy Franks and the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) for undermining the work that was done.

US Army In The Iraq War Volume 2 Ch 1 “Strategy In Crisis, October-December 2006

The second volume of the U.S. Army’s official history of the Iraqi War starts off with President Bush trying to come up with a new Iraq strategy. He’d been disengaged from the war and finally realized in 2006 that things were not going well. It took an extended period of time to formulate a new approach which highlighted the continued dysfunction within the White House over a conflict which was supposed to be a defining moment in the administration.

Review Blind Into Baghdad, America’s War In Iraq

Fallows, James, Blind Into Baghdad, America’s War In Iraq, New York: Vintage Books, 2006

 

Blind Into Baghdad, America’s War In Iraq by James Fallows is a collection of articles he wrote for the Atlantic Monthly before and after the 2003 invasion of Iraq. Most of them are focused upon how the Bush administration neglected planning for the aftermath of overthrowing Saddam Hussein, hence the title. Those chapters are the main reason to read Fallows’ work.

Review No End In Sight, Iraq’s Descent Into Chaos

Ferguson, Charles, No End In Sight, Iraq’s Descent Into Chaos, New York: Public Affairs, 2008

 

No End In Sight, Iraq’s Descent Into Chaos is an expansion of a documentary about the Iraq war that Charles Ferguson made. It consists of over a dozen interviews the author did with former U.S. officials, journalists, Iraqis and more. It is a condemnation of the U.S. invasion and occupation of Iraq. He blames President Bush, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, Coalition Provisional Authority head Paul Bremer for everything that went wrong. Most of the book is very informative and convincing but the last third gets a bit meandering as it loses focuses and goes into all kinds of topics such as withdrawing from Iraq, Iran’s role, what might have happened in Iraq and more.

Chilcot Report Section 3.5 Development of UK Strategy and Options September to November 2002 – Negotiation of Resolution 1441

From September to November 2002 the main issue before the Blair government was how to approach the United Nations and deal with the United States’ opposition to that move. Prime Minister Tony Blair’s only victory so far with the Bush administration was to convince the president to go to the U.N. to get a new resolution on Iraq. Now there were disputes over whether one or two resolutions were needed to go to war. The Blair government was told that two would be necessary, and the problems that would cause with the Americans, but Blair went ahead anyway taking the risk that things would work out.

Review A Time Of Our Choosing, America’s War In Iraq

Purdum, Todd, A Time Of Our Choosing, America’s War In Iraq, New York: Times Books, 2003

 

A Time Of Our Choosing, America’s War In Iraq was a disappointing read. Rather than being informative it showed all the faults of how the U.S. media covered the 2003 invasion. Written by New York Times Washington bureau chief Todd Purdum it largely presented the Bush administration’s argument for the war with no analysis and only a few criticisms and then gave the military’s view of the war. Most importantly it never really explained why the White House decided that Iraq was the number one threat to the country.

Chilcot Report Section 3.1 Development of UK Strategy and Options On Iraq, 9/11 to Early January 2002

Section 3.1 of the Chilcot Report documented the United Kingdom’s continued problems with its Iraq strategy at the start of the 2000s. London realized that international opinion had turned against its containment policy of sanctions and demanding weapons inspectors return to Iraq, yet it had no alternatives. Then 9/11 happened, opening the door to advocates of regime change within the new Bush administration. The Blair government initially believed that his Iraq policy didn’t have to change, but finally decided that getting rid of Saddam had to be on the table. That was the start of London following Washington for the rest of the decade.

Review The Gamble, General David Petraeus And The American Military Adventure In Iraq, 2006-2008

Ricks, Thomas, The Gamble, General David Petraeus And The American Military Adventure In Iraq, 2006-2008, New York: Penguin Press, 2009

 

The Gamble, General David Petraeus And The American Military Adventure In Iraq, 2006-2008 was journalist Tom Ricks second book about Iraq. His first, Fiasco was one of the best discussing how the U.S. military went wrong in Iraq after the 2003 invasion. The Gamble focused on how it tried to fix things with the 2007 Surge. Ricks looked at several individuals responsible for the new strategy namely Generals Jack Keane, David Petraeus and Raymond Odierno. It’s an interesting read because it argues that the U.S. succeeded tactically in bringing down the horrific violence in Iraq but did not provide the political change it hoped for that would ensure long term stability.

U.S. Army History Iraq War Vol 1 - Chapter 22 – The Failed Transition

 

This was the last chapter in the U.S. Army’s first volume on the Iraq War before the Conclusion. It deals with the end of 2006 when the American military believed it would be handing over responsibilities to the Iraqis and allowing a withdrawal. Instead Iraq was in the middle of a civil war with the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) and Maliki government actively involved on the side of Shiites. The failure of U.S. policy was due to Iraqi commander General George Casey’s continued misreading of the situation and refusing to change his strategy. The White House was also responsible for not providing any real leadership even when it finally realized things were going wrong. England was doing no better in southern Iraq.

U.S. Army History Of Iraq War Vol 1 – Chapter 8 – Muddling Through August-October 2003

The title of Chapter 8 of the U.S. Army history of the Iraq War is “Muddling Through” which is exactly what America was doing during the summer and fall of 2003. Washington D.C. was pushing for a strategy to stabilize Iraq which wasn’t forthcoming. That left the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) and the U.S. military to continue to go in different directions. The CPA was thinking of a 2-3 year transition to Iraqi sovereignty but was disappointed with the Iraqis it empowered. The army on the other hand wanted to withdraw as quickly as possible and turn over security to new Iraqi forces it was struggling to create. This added up to continued failures of the occupation of the country.

U.S. Army History Of Iraq War Vol 1 – Chapter 4 The Invasion of Iraq

In March 2003 the United States invaded Iraq. It only lasted three weeks, much quicker than was expected. While the U.S. was assured of a victory everything did not go as planned which is the topic of the third chapter of the U.S. Army history of the Iraq War.

U.S. Army History Of Iraq War Vol 1 – Chapter 3 Maneuvering Into Position

The third chapter of the U.S. Army history of the Iraq War was about the final American plans for the invasion, the continued neglect of the postwar situation, and how Saddam Hussein finally took the American threat seriously. The U.S. military was still focused upon overthrowing the Iraqi regime with the strategy for the aftermath an afterthought. By the end of 2002 Iraq finally began preparations for the coming war, but Saddam’s incompetence made them ineffective at best. That meant the war would be over quicker than the U.S. expected and they would have nothing for the next day.

U.S. Army History Of Iraq War Vol 1 – Chapter 2 Regime Change

Chapter 2 of the U.S. Army history of the Iraq War focused upon American planning for the invasion or the lack thereof. The Central Command (CENTCOM) which oversaw the war spent far more time coming up with an invasion strategy because of the micromanagement of Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld. It constantly had to revise its plan as a result. That was one of the main reasons why the U.S. had little to nothing on what would happen afterward. There were also several faulty assumptions by the Pentagon and military about postwar Iraq. Ironically Saddam didn’t even believe war was coming in 2002. This would affect the war in two important ways. First the U.S. was heading into a long occupation of a foreign country and was completely unprepared. Second Iraq wasn’t going to put up much of a fight because Saddam didn’t think one would happen.

Review Against All Enemies, Inside America’s War on Terror

Clarke, Richard, Against All Enemies, Inside America’s War on Terror, New York, London, Toronto, Sydney: Free Press, 2004

 

Richard Clarke’s Against All Enemies, Inside America’s War on Terror was an early criticism of the Bush White House and its invasion of Iraq. Clarke worked for four administrations dealing with terrorism under Clinton and the second Bush. Clarke’s argument was that after 9/11 rather than focusing upon Al Qaeda President Bush decided to go after Saddam Hussein making the situation worse. The problem is that half the book is about Clarke’s entire time in government covering many topics that have nothing to do with his point.

Review State of Denial, Bush At War, Part III

Woodward, Bob, State of Denial, Bush At War, Part III, New York, London, Toronto, Sydney: Simon & Schuster, 2006

State of Denial, Bush At War, Part III as the title suggests was Bod Woodward’s third book on President Bush’s wars. This one covered how the occupation of Iraq went wrong. It is a longwinded affair starting with George Bush’s deciding to run for president. It takes 152 pages just to get to the 2003 invasion of Iraq. Like his other releases it focuses upon top officials in the White House and their debates and decision making on the war based upon extensive interviews. Woodward’s main argument was that President Bush and Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld were never honest with themselves and the American public about Iraq and that trickled down throughout the administration where no one ever admitted they made any mistakes.

Review Plan of Attack: The Definitive Account Of The Decision To Invade Iraq

Review Woodward, Bob, Plan of Attack: The Definitive Account Of The Decision To Invade Iraq, New York, London, Toronto, Sydney: Simon & Schuster, 2004

Plan of Attack: The Definitive Account Of the Decision To Invade Iraq was the second of four books by Washington Post reporter Bob Woodward on the Bush administration’s wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. Like Woodward’s other work he provides an insider look at the White House and its decision making based upon interviews with top sources such as the president himself. Woodward provides few comments and no analysis. Plan of Attack is important for several reasons. First, it breaks down the characteristics of the major players in the government. Second, Woodward details the main decisions that led up to the 2003 invasion of Iraq. Finally, he highlights the fact that President Bush and his top advisers did not understand the war they were getting into. Almost their entire focus was upon deposing Saddam Hussein, when Bush said his ultimate goal was to transform Iraq into a democracy. The lack of a strategy to achieve that aim was why Iraq fell into chaos immediately after the 2003 invasion and has been plagued by problems ever since then.

Review Leap of Faith, Hubris, Negligence, and America’s Greatest Foreign Policy Tragedy

Review Mazarr, Michael, Leap of Faith, Hubris, Negligence, and America’s Greatest Foreign Policy Tragedy, New York: Public Affairs, 2019

RAND’s Michael Mazarr wanted to bring together all the research, reports and memoirs on the decision to invade Iraq in 2003 into one book and analyze what led to this momentous decision. As he wrote, it was a completely unjustified war. Iraq possessed no weapons of mass destruction, and had no connections to Al Qaeda. This is not hindsight, because if the government had gone closely through the intelligence it could have ascertained this. Not only that, but the United States failed to achieve its goal of spreading democracy across the Middle East and deterring future terrorism and jihadism. The overall lesson of Iraq was that the United States put itself into a quagmire and exhausted itself in the process. In the end, Mazarr believes this was an example of criminal negligence because the Bush administration never had a debate about the rational for war, never went through the information on Iraq or consider the risks and consequences. This was the strong point of Leap of Faith. Where Mazarr fell short was his overall thesis for why America chose war. If someone asked Mazarr why Iraq? He would ultimately say because the U.S. thought it could do good. He argued politicians believed the United States had a special mission in the world to fix its problems and the Bush White House made a value judgement about attacking Iraq rather than an analytical one. This explanation would make no one happy.

When The US Decided On A Long Term Occupation Of Iraq

The original U.S. plan for Iraq was to go in and out as quick as possible. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld was opposed to nation building, and he was given control of postwar Iraq. He wanted the American forces to withdraw as soon as the invasion was over. President Bush had campaigned against the U.S. attempting to rebuild countries as well, and signed off on the Pentagon’s plan for Iraq. When Jay Garner and the Office for Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA) the first group in charge of postwar Iraq looked like it was overwhelmed, the Bush administration turned to Paul Bremer and the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA). Bremer had a completely different philosophy wanting time to not only rebuild, but restructure Iraq’s institutions. When he was chosen to run Iraq was when the U.S. committed to a long-term occupation.

Did The Pentagon Adequately Prepare For Postwar Iraq? Interview With RAND’s James Dobbins

In January 2003 President Bush gave the Pentagon control of postwar Iraq. Douglas Feith the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy was put in charge of planning. Before the invasion, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld called in a group of outside experts to review what had been drawn up. One of those was James Dobbins from the RAND Corporation. This is an interview with Dobbins about what he thought about the Pentagon’s plans for Iraq.