Lessons Learned From 2009 That Apply To The 2010 Iraqi Elections

In 2009 Iraq held two separate elections. First was the January provincial elections where voters in fourteen of Iraq’s eighteen governorates elected new local officials, and then in July the three provinces of Kurdistan held balloting for its regional parliament. Both of those elections hold important lessons for Iraq’s parliamentary vote that started on March 4, 2010 and will be completed March 7.

The January provincial elections set several trends in Iraqi politics that will likely carry over into 2010. First, the voters punished the ruling parties in every province. Many interpreted this as a return to Iraqi nationalism, and a rejection of the sectarian parties that had taken power in 2005, but that’s not entirely true. Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s State of Law list for example, led by his Dawa Party, was considered the big winner in the vote as they won pluralities across southern Iraq and Baghdad, but even they were kicked out of office in Karbala, the only province that Dawa controlled after the January 2005 local elections. The major reason was that the provincial councils and governors had failed to develop the local economies, provide jobs, protect the public, and were known for corruption. For instance, in Basra, the brother of the governor from the Fadhila Party, was known as the largest oil smuggler in the province, while Fadhila carried out a running war with the Sadrists and Supreme Council for control of the city using their militias. In turn, voters blamed the ruling parties reliance upon religion and ethnosectarian politics for their failure to deliver on basic needs. This could have bad consequences for Maliki’s State of Law list this year. Maliki’s party controls the nine provinces of the south, along with Baghdad. Because of the world recession, the budgets for all of Iraq’s provinces have been drastically cut the last two years. As a result, the State of Law’s promises of better services and economic development have not materialized, and the public could punish them for that at the polls.

A second trend is the fragmentation of Iraq’s large coalitions. In 2005 the country’s main parties coalesced into three blocs, the Shiite United Iraqi Alliance, the Sunni Iraqi Accordance Front, and the Kurdish Alliance. They won control of the provinces and the parliament in the 2005 elections. Beginning in late-2008, these alliances broke apart. The first list to do so was the Accordance Front. In December 2008, the Iraqi National Dialogue Council withdrew from the alliance. In 2009 Vice President Tariq Hashemi, who had been the leader of the Iraqi Islamic Party, the largest component of the Accordance Front, left and formed his own party, the Renewal. Next Maliki decided to form his own State of Law list to run in the 2009 provincial vote breaking in two the United Alliance. Finally, in the July 2009 Kurdish parliamentary vote, the Change list emerged as the main opposition party to the Kurdish Alliance. Today there are seven large lists that are likely to take the majority of seats in the new parliament.

Major Players In The 2005 Elections 
United Iraqi Alliance – Made up of the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council, the Dawa Party, Sadrists, Fadhila Party. Won 128 of 275 seats in parliament.
Kurdish Alliance – Kurdistan Democratic Party, Patriotic Union of Kurdistan. Won 53 of 275 seats.
Iraqi Accordance Front – Iraqi Islamic Party, General Council for the People of Iraq, Iraqi National Dialogue Council. Won 44 of 275 seats.

Major Players In The 2010 Elections
State of Law – Dawa Party, Shiite Independents
Iraqi National Alliance – Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council, Sadrists, Fadhila Party, former Prime Minister Ibrahim al-Jaafari
Kurdish Alliance – Kurdistan Democratic Party, Patriotic Union of Kurdistan
Iraqi National Movement/Iraqiya – Former Prime Minister Iyad Allawi’s Iraqi National List, Iraqi National Dialogue Front, Vice President Hashemi’s Renewal, Al-Hadbaa Party, Ahrar Party
Unity of Iraq – Interior Minister Jawad Bolani’s Constitution Party, Anbar Sheikh Ahmad Abu Risha’s Awakening of Iraq and Independents
Iraqi Consensus – Iraqi Islamic Party, General Council for the People of Iraq
Change List – New Kurdish opposition party

Third, the 2010 election is likely to redistribute power within the existing Iraqi elites rather than bring about wholesale change in the ruling parties. The Western press for example, likes to note that there will be over 6,000 candidates and hundreds of parties competing in this year’s balloting, but very few of those will ever get the votes necessary to win a seat in parliament. In last year’s provincial election, not only did parties or individuals need to receive a large number of votes to win, but also the votes of those that didn’t reach this threshold were distributed amongst the winners. The results were that while 418 lists ran in the election, only 16 won, and more people voted for the 402 losers than the winners. That means that the seven large alliances will get the majority of votes and receive a place in the new ruling coalition. Most of the new parties are also secular and nationalist, and too small to win on their own. They will either end up losers in 2010 or have to join a larger list as junior partners to gain any power.

Last, voter turnout and who people support is still largely based upon ethnosectarian identity. In 2009 Shiites mostly voted for Shiites, Sunnis for Sunnis, and Kurds for Kurds. That is unlikely to change in 2010. Another pattern from last year was that Shiite participation went down, Sunni voting went up, and Kurds turned out in the same high levels. In 2005 Sunnis boycotted the provincial elections to protest the U.S. occupation. That meant in Anbar only 2% of the electorate showed up to the polls. In the governorate balloting in 2009 Sunnis voted in large numbers to make up for their lack of representation. Voter turnout in Salahaddin went from 29% in 2005 to 65% in 2009 as a result. At the same time, Shiite voting dropped, probably out of apathy due to the poor performance of their local officials. In Najaf for instance, voter participation went from 73% in 2005 to 55% in 2009. The Kurds on the other hand, continue to have the highest turnout in the country since they share many of the same interests, have not fragmented like the other large groups, and have a number of well-known politicians to choose from. In the July 2009 Kurdish parliamentary vote, 78.5% of the electorate participated. The lack of substantial issues being discussed in the run-up to the March vote may lead to another low turnout for Shiites, while Sunnis and Kurds could have higher numbers because they want to attain or maintain their current positions.

Voter Turnout: 2005 vs 2009 Provincial Elections
Shiite Provinces:
Babil: 71% vs 56%
Basra: ? vs 48%
Dhi Qar: 67% vs 50%
Karbala: 73% vs 60%
Maysan: 59% vs 46%
Muthanna: 61% vs 61%
Najaf: 73% vs 55%
Qadisiya: 69% vs 58%
Wasit: 66% vs 54%

Sunni Provinces:
Anbar: 2% vs 40%
Ninewa: 17% vs 60%
Salahaddin: 29% vs 65%

The patterns set in Iraq’s politics in 2009 will likely continue to play out into this year. Maliki is still the most popular politician in Iraq according to the latest polls, but being an incumbent will hurt him. His claim to have brought stability back to Iraq has been challenged by the 2009 bombings of Iraq’s ministries in Baghdad, and the nine provinces his State of Law controls have not been able to deliver the jobs and development that they promised due to budgetary constrains. He could still come out the winner, but only with a plurality slightly more than the runner-up. Second, the results of the election will reshuffle the lists in power, and the new ruling coalition will still be made up from the core of large parties that emerged after the fall of Saddam. Last, voter turnout will vary between Shiites, Sunnis, and Kurds. These will all mean that whatever new government comes to power will act and look a lot like the old one. Whatever real change that happens will be the result of who becomes prime minister. If Maliki gets re-elected, there will be more deadlock in the legislature as his opponents line up to block the passage of major laws as happened in 2009. If someone else becomes prime minister that could clear the way for some laws like the oil law to be passed, but that would still be difficult due to differences amongst the major parties again pointing to more continuation of the status quo.

SOURCES

Aswat al-Iraq, “459 centers receive 850,000 voters in special voting – IHEC,” 3/4/10
- “VP announces new list for upcoming parliamentary elections,” 9/12/09

BBC, “Guide to Iraqi political parties,” 1/20/06

Dagher, Sam, “Basra strike against Shiite militias also about oil,” Christian Science Monitor, 4/9/08

International Crisis Group, “Iraq’s Uncertain Future: Elections And Beyond,” 2/24/10

Knights, Michael and McCarthy, Eamon, “Provincial Politics in Iraq: Fragmentation or New Awakening?” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, April 2008

Pollack, Kenneth, “Iraq: An Elections Preview,” Brookings Institution, 3/2/10

Sly, Liz, “Kurdish opposition makes strong showing in Iraq regional elections,” Los Angeles Times, 7/27/09

Violence Not Markedly Up In Iraq Before March Elections

Despite various warnings of an increase in violence before Iraq's March 7, 2010 parliamentary elections, the latest casualty counts do not show a significant increase in deaths. Rather February 2010 followed the same pattern set in 2009. As has been the trend since April 2009, deaths have continued to go up and down each month. January 2010 had a low number of deaths, which meant February would have a higher count. According to Iraq Body Count for example, December 2009 saw 426 killed, followed by 258 in January, and 282 in February. Of the four major agencies that track Iraqi deaths (Iraq Body Count, icasualties, Iraqi ministries, and the Associated Press) Iraq's Interior, Defense, and Health ministries recorded the most deaths last month with 352. 

Mass casualty bombings have also begun to follow the same up and down pattern as casualties since July 2009. In February 2010 there were 11 such attacks, resulting in 160 deaths and 492 wounded. That compared to 10 mass casualty bombings in January with 100 dead and 407 wounded. Most of February's bombing fatalities came from a series of attacks on Shiites celebrating the Arbaeen festival in Baghdad and Karbala that killed over 100. Attacking sectarian targets like Shiite pilgrims has also been the focus of militants in the last two months rather than government institutions as happened in August, October, and December 2009. That was probably due to increased security and intelligence gathering by the Iraqi police and army, which allegedly foiled a large attack in Baghdad in January 2010, forcing Al Qaeda and other insurgents to take up other targets of opportunity.

Both the monthly death counts and bombing statistics show that violence in Iraq has hit a plateau. After dropping to their lowest levels since the U.S. invasion due to the January 2009 provincial elections, casualties and bombings have leveled off, and settled into a predictable pattern. It will be interesting to see whether March's balloting will have any effect, because greater political participation by disenfranchised groups could lead to another decrease in violence as happened last year, or a maintenance of the status quo in government could just keep things the same overall in Iraq.

Month	Iraq Body Count	Icasualties	Iraqi Ministries	Associated Press
July 09	394	240	275	309
August	585	439	456	425
September	298	158	203	238
October	404	320	410	364
November	205	106	122	93
December	426	287	367	383
January 10	258	135	196	177
February	282	236	352	255

Mass Casualty Bombings

Months	Bombings	Deaths	Wounded
July 09	35	180	655
August	44	359	2,252
September	13	70	263
October	22	241	887
November	10	43	136
December	25	246	851
January 10	10	100	407
February	11	160	492

SOURCES

Associated Press, "Iraq: Key figures since the war began," 3/1/10

Aswat al-Iraq, "2 killed, 9 wounded in Mosul blast," 2/16/10
- "2 killed, 10 wounded in blast in Mosul," 2/26/10
- "23 wounded in Mosul blast," 2/18/10
- "41 dead, 144 wounded in Karbala's arbaeen blasts - medica," 2/5/10
- "Baghdad blast leaves 1 dead, 11 injured," 2/5/10
- "Casualties from Baghdad bombing rise to 147," 2/1/10
- "East Karbala blast death toll up to 6," 2/4/10
- "Female suicide bomber attack leaves 14 casualties in Kufa," 2/12/10
- "Ramadi bombing attacks' casualties up to 27," 2/18/10
- "Strong blast kills 2, injures 23 in Karbala," 2/3/10

Faraj, Salam, "Iraqi death toll rises markedly in February," Agence France Presse, 3/1/10

icasualties.org

International Crisis Group, "Iraq's Uncertain Future: Elections and Beyond," 2/25/10

Iraq Body Count

Corruption Charges Thrown Around Before March Iraq Elections

With Iraqis due to head to the polls in just a week, others issues besides Baathists are finally being discussed. One is corruption in the government. That’s an easy target since Iraq has continually been ranked one of the most corrupt countries in the world since the 2003 invasion. Ahmad Chalabi who is running as part of the Iraqi National Alliance made one of the first comments about it when he charged the government with misspending its money. He said that there was a large deficit in the food ration system, which Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki was supposed to make up, but never did because Baghdad used the money inappropriately for other things. He also pointed to the bomb detector wands that were purchased by the Interior Ministry as another example of government waste, and said that the National Alliance had stood up against corruption when the 2010 budget was being put together in parliament. On February 25, one of the leading Shiite clerics in Iraq, Ayatollah Bashir al-Najafi attacked the Education, Water, Electricity, Agriculture, Oil, and Trade Ministries for graft. Although the Shiite clergy has not taken sides in this year’s election, five of the six ministers Najafi named are close to Maliki. Finally, on February 28 Vice President Tariq Hashemi on a trip to Jordan said that Iraq had received up to $300 billion in aid, cut its debt, and gotten international support, yet was still a poor and impoverished country. He blamed corruption, and said that Iraqis needed a change. Hashemi is part of former Prime Minister Iyad Allawi’s Iraqi National Movement. Since Maliki is the one in power he is obviously taking the brunt of these attacks. A member of the Prime Minister’s State of Law List responded to the criticism by saying that it cannot be blamed for the actions of the ministries. He claimed that the ministers listened to the orders of their respective political parties, not Maliki since it is a national unity government made up of various entities.

In the 2009 provincial elections Maliki ran alone as part of his new State of Law list. One of his main talking points was that the local governments run by the Supreme Council and others were corrupt, and had done nothing to develop the country since they took power in 2005. Now that same charge is being leveled at Maliki since his State of Law controls most of the southern provinces and Baghdad, and he has been in office since 2005. Corruption is definitely rampant throughout the country, and all the parties in power should shoulder the blame for it. Unfortunately, all of these attacks on Maliki are likely just campaign rhetoric that will end after the voting is over. When a new government is seated, it will operate just like the old one with graft, bribes, smuggling, etc.

SOURCES

Agence France Presse, “Iraq VP slams corruption, urges a vote for ‘change,’” 3/1/10
- “Shiite cleric accuses Iraq ministers of corruption,” 2/26/10

AK News, “Al Chalabi accuses the government of spending the public money,” 2/17/10
- “Iraqi MP: the Iraqi government can not judge corrupted Ministers,” 2/24/10

Maliki Flip Flops On Majority Rule

On February 17, 2010 Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki declared that the next government of Iraq would be based upon majority rule. The previous administrations were broad alliances made up of Shiites, Sunnis, and Kurds, something encouraged by the United States to foster reconciliation and power sharing, demanded by the main ethnosectarian parties that came to power in 2005, and made necessary by the parliamentary form of government adopted after the overthrow of Saddam. A quota system was also created that carved up the major offices by party. The Prime Minister criticized this system, saying that it was a failure because the different parties in power disagreed with each other, leading to deadlock. Maliki went on to claim that the next government would be a coalition as well, but one based upon lists that shared the same views.

By the end of the month however, the Prime Minister had flip flopped. The secretary general of Maliki’s State of Law said that the list would be open to forming a government with the Iraqi National Alliance, the Kurdish Alliance, and others after the March election. Those are the major players in the current regime, which Maliki said was dysfunctional. None of them agree on major issues either. Maliki and the Sadrists from the National Alliance for example, are opposed to the Kurds’ aspirations to annex Kirkuk and the disputed territories, while Maliki went after Sadr’s militia in 2008, and continues to arrest his followers. Interestingly, the main nationalist list the Iraqi National Alliance wasn’t mentioned, which might have more in common with Maliki’s policies before campaigning for the 2010 vote began, and State of Law jumped on the anti-Baathist bandwagon. Either way, the most recent comments by State of Law and the political reality of no party holding a majority of the public’s support will likely mean that whatever new government comes into power this year, will look and act much like the old government. 

SOURCES

AK News, “Maliki seeks coalition after March polls,” 3/1/10
- “MP: majority’s dictatorship to alter majority’s democracy in Iraq,” 2/17/10

Aswat al-Iraq, “Maliki reveals intention to form coalition after elections,” 2/28/10

Al-Mada, “Iraqi PM Al-Maliki: Next Government Will Be Coalition Government,” MEMRI Blog, 2/18/10

Al-Hadbaa-Change List Alliance In Ninewa For The March Elections?

In 2009 two new parties emerged in northern Iraq. One was the Arab led al-Hadbaa Party in Ninewa that was organized around Iraqi nationalism, economic development of the province, and opposition to Kurdish aspirations to annex disputed areas. It gained support from business elites, tribal sheikhs, Kurds opposed to the ruling Kurdish parties, Turkmen, former Baathists, and nationalist insurgent groups. That helped them win a majority in Ninewa in the January 2009 provincial elections, and take control of the local government. The other group was the Change List, formed by the co-founder of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) Nishurwan Mustafa. Change promised greater transparency in the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG), an end to corruption, and separating the ruling parties from the government administration and justice system. It won 23% of the vote in the July 2009 Kurdish parliamentary elections, including a majority in the PUK stronghold of Sulaymaniya, drawing upon former PUK members and people disaffected with the ruling Kurdish parties.

Both parties are now running in Ninewa in the March 2010 parliamentary vote, and have discussed an alliance. Al-Hadbaa is competing as part of former Prime Minister Iyad Allawi’s Iraqi National Movement, while the Change List is running alone. They are two of 37 parties involved in the balloting for 31 seats up for grabs in the governorate. At first, a coalition between the two would seem an odd couple since al-Hadbaa is mostly known for its anti-Kurdish stance, but they actually share the same opponents, the PUK and the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP). The Change List for example, has complained that the KDP is hindering their campaign in Ninewa, while the KDP-PUK led Ninewa Fraternal List are boycotting the al-Hadbaa led provincial council and have set up their own administration in districts they control in Ninewa. 

Talks have been held between the two lists, but nothing has been confirmed. Al-Hadbaa leaders believe that they can win up to 20 of Ninewa’s 31 seats, while Change expects to win around 3. It would still be a bit of an odd couple if the two did join together, but it could show that al-Hadbaa is opposed to Kurdish designs on Ninewa, rather than Kurds themselves, and that Change will not follow the lead of the PUK and KDP in parliament as many expect. The story is an interesting one, and shows the state of flux Iraqi politics are currently in as new parties are attempting to break the hold of the older, larger, and more powerful lists that have dominated Iraq since the 2003 invasion.

SOURCES

AK News, “Goran List faces obstacles caused by KDP in Mosul,” 2/27/10
- “Hadba expects to win 20 seats in eth March 7 polls,” 2/27/10

Hamad, Qassim Khidhir, “kurdish election lists,” Niqash, 6/30/09

International Crisis Group, “Iraq’s New Battlefront: The Struggle Over Ninewa,” 9/28/09

Niqash, “the hadbaa national list,” 1/28/09

Maliki Rejects DeBaathification Of Army And Police Officers

On February 24, 2010 the Accountability and Justice Commission announced that it wanted 376 members of the Iraqi army and police fired for ties with the Baathist regime. 99 were said to be high-ranking members of the Baath Party, while 83 were from Saddam’s military. Among those banned were the former head of the Baghdad Operations Command, the deputy chief of staff of the army, and the deputy commander of the infantry. On February 28, a government spokesman said that all of the officers were not only exempt, but were recruited by Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki from the old security forces, and were considered loyal to the new Iraqi government. Ali al-Lami, the head of the Accountability and Justice Commission, which took over from the old deBaathification Commission, claimed that any exemptions would require first going through the Commission, then parliament, and finally be approved by the cabinet. Lami is a candidate for the Iraqi National Alliance, which is the main rival to Maliki’s State of Law List in the March 2010 parliamentary elections.

The give and go between the Commission and the government shows that deBaathification can cut both ways. Both the National Alliance and State of Law have been pushing the Baathist issue hard in the run-up to the vote. It has quickly spread from targeting their nationalist and secular opponents by banning their candidates to firing members of the provincial bureaucracies. Now the fear of Baathists is being used against the security forces, which Maliki has tried to win over to his side. On February 25 for example, the Prime Minister’s office announced that it was rehiring 20,000 former officers fired when the U.S. disbanded the military in 2003. The National Alliance may be trying to target this potential constituency of Maliki’s with its latest banning. This just highlights the fact that once the Baathist card is out of the box it can be used against anyone, from the perpetuators of the hysteria to their enemies.

SOURCES

Agence France Presse, “Iraq says sacking of Saddam officers would be illegal,” 2/28/10

DPA, “Report: 376 Iraqi security officers to be fired for ‘Baathist’ ties,” 2/24/10

Santora, Marc, “Iraq to Rehire 20,000 Hussein-Era Army Officers,” New York Times, 2/25/10

Sullivan, Marisa Cochrane, “Sunni Politicians Barred From Candidacy,” Institute for the Study of War, 1/14/10

United Nations’ Human Rights Council Criticizes Iraq

On February 16, 2010 the United Nations Human Rights Council met in Geneva, Switzerland. The Council is currently reviewing the human rights situation of every member state. On that day they discussed Iraq, with several Western countries being very critical. The U.S. ambassador said that Iraq had to improve the poor conditions within its prisons and look into reports of abuse. He also said that the U.S. was concerned about attacks on minorities, gays, lesbians, and women within the country. The British ambassador called on Iraq to end the use of the death penalty. He said that too many people were on death row after quick trials. The delegate from Denmark talked about torture in Iraqi jails. The Canadian, French, and German representatives also talked about honor killings of women. That has been brought up in several United Nations human rights reports on Iraq. The German delegate mentioned attacks on journalists and religious pressures on the press that could limit freedom of the media.

The remarks by the delegates to the Human Rights Council show that while security has greatly improved in Iraq, there are still many issues that the country still faces. To prove the point there were several news reports of Iraq’s on going problems just after the meeting. On February 17 for example, the Iraqi Association to Defend Journalists’ Rights complained that a reporter for the satellite TV channel al-Ahd had been kidnapped in Kirkuk. Three days later, the head of the human rights committee on the Basra provincial council said that the Mina prison was being mismanaged. He mentioned that prisoners were on a hunger strike there, protesting mistreatment. February has also seen a spate of attacks and murders of Christians in the northern city of Mosul. The last occurred on February 23 when militants broke into a house and killed three members of a family, one of which was a priest. These all show that Iraq has a long way to go before it has a real democratic society. All the voting and debating within parliament, will be for naught if the average Iraqi is not free from these types of abuses or attacks.

SOURCES

AK News, “Human Rights Commission criticizes Mina’s prison administration, prisoners on hunger strike,” 2/20/10

Associated Press, “US tells Iraq to improve prisons, stamp out abuse,” 2/16/10

Aswat al-Iraq, “Association demands search for kidnapped journalist,” 2/17/10
- “Gunmen kill 3 Christians in Mosul,” 2/23/10

Nebehay, Stephanie, “West wants end to torture, honour killings in Iraq,” Reuters, 2/16/10

United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq, “Human Rights Report 1 January – 30 June 2009,” 12/15/09